During its inception, the European Community did not give precedence to the

development of fundamental liberties. Nevertheless, the ECJ acknowledged

that significant interests were held by both the Union and the Community
during that period, which rendered it difficult to ignore human rights and
mandated the Union-wide application of a policy. Establishing a reliable point
of reference and harmonizing legal precedents were the primary objectives
of the Charter of Essential Rights, which served to promote and clarify
fundamental rights. In accordance with the provisions outlined in Article 6 of
the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Charter came into force as of 2006.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued Opinion 2/13 in 2014 concerning
its incorporation into European Union (EU) legislation. To ensure the
protection of fundamental rights prior to the ratification of the Charter, the
ECJ established legal standards. As stated by the European Court of Justice in
the 11/70 International Handelsgesellschap case, a primary aim of the
European Union ought to be the protection of fundamental rights derived
from the constitutional heritage that is universally inherited by its member
states. This demonstrates the fundamental importance of these rights in
upholding the Union's fundamental principles and their foundation in
constitutional principles. The European Court of Justice affirmed this notion in
Case 36/02 Omega by stating that fundamental rights are intrinsically
significant, irrespective of their source in national constitutions or the
European Union legal system. EU law ensures the safeguarding of this
entitlement, irrespective of its source. Throughout the legislation of the
Union, robust protections for fundamental rights are unequivocally present.
In determining issues pertaining to fundamental rights, the Court consulted
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in three distinct
decisions: Rutili (36/75), Carpenter (60/00), and Schmidberger (112/00). The
Court petitioned the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for support in
its efforts to advance the cause of fundamental rights. This statement
demonstrates that the judiciary considers a multitude of elements when
determining the extent to which fundamental rights are protected. The aim
of Charter implementation was to establish and formalize fundamental rights
for the purpose of serving as a standard. The mandatory nature of the
Charter is established in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU). In accordance with Article 6.1 of the Treaty on European Union,
the Charter is regarded as an indispensable instrument of equivalent legal
weight to the Treaties. According to Article 6 of the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU), the interpretation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights shall
be regulated by Articles 51-54. It is unambiguously stated in Article 6.3 of
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) that fundamental rights are directly
influenced by general principles. Nevertheless, a number of Member States
voiced their dissent towards the Charter on the grounds that it might curtail
their sovereignty by expanding the jurisdiction of EU law beyond that of the
EU. Article 51 placed limitations on the scope of application that could be
attributed to the Charter. Two exceptionally broad conditions under which the
Charter is applicable are outlined in Article 51. EU law is applicable in two
situations. The first scenario occurs when individual Member States
implement the law, in accordance with Articles 51(1) and (2). The second
scenario occurs when EU authorities initiate action. A landmark case, Kerberg
Fransson (Case 617/10), established that the fundamental rights outlined in
the Charter are applicable universally in any context governed by EU law.
According to Fransson, the Charter is presently employed as a standard by
which the legitimacy of national and EU regulations can be evaluated,
provided that they adhere to the overarching principles of EU law. In Case
206/13 Siragusa, the Court established specific implementation criteria for
Article 51. The evaluation consisted of three parts: i) An analysis of the
national regulation's enforcement of laws established by the European Union
(EU); ii) A examination of the regulation to identify any objectives not
covered by EU law, notwithstanding its indirect influence on EU law; and iii)
An assessment of whether any specific provisions in EU law are relevant to or
could affect the matter under consideration. Regarding the subject matter of
the main proceedings, the Court argued that the Charter would lose all
significance if EU legislation did not impose any obligations on Member
States. The Hernandez-related judgment in case 198/13 upheld the legal
precedent established in the Siragusa case. This serves as an illustration of
the Courts' persistent failure to arrive at a clear understanding when
interpreting the Charter and Article 51, notwithstanding the application of
revised principles in the Siragusa case. The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
ruled in the Melloni case (Case 399/11) that when human rights and the
supremacy of EU law are in conflict, EU legislation takes precedence over the
matter for the sake of efficacy and priority. In evaluating the application, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) determined that the extradition did not
contravene the provisions of the Charter. Denial of the fundamental right to a
fair trial, as enshrined in Article 53 of the Charter, would result in a
deterioration of the effectiveness and caliber of EU legislation. The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) serves as the foundation upon which
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) assesses the legality of EU laws in order
to prevent EU legislation from infringing upon fundamental rights. To
illustrate this principle, Safe Harbour, Google Spain, and TestAchats are
utilized as specific cases. The Safe Harbour case resulted in the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) rendering the Safe Harbour agreement invalid on the
grounds that the United States failed to implement adequate safeguards
against data surveillance. The configuration infringed upon the privacy
guarantee safeguarded in the Charter. After conducting a thorough analysis
of the Charter, the court reached the determination in Google v. Spain that
safeguarding the fundamental right to privacy of individuals is more
important than maximizing financial gains for the company and, to a lesser
extent, meeting the public's information access requirements. The court
ruled in the Test-Achats case that gender cannot be a determining factor for
Member States when it comes to premiums or benefits. The presented
evidence provides support for the court's application of the Charter as a
criterion for making decisions, placing it above the more comprehensive
concept of human rights, ever since the Charter's inception. The proposed
agreement was rejected by the Court in Opinion 2/13, thereby influencing
the European Union's participation in the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Multiple grounds were cited by the Court in its denial of the
proposition. At the outset, the court determined that it had a thorough
understanding of the provisions delineated in the agreement. After
conducting an examination of the proposed agreement's compliance with
particular characteristics and its reliance on EU law as specified in Article 344
TFEU, the court reached the determination that it was in breach of Protocol
No. 8 and Article 6(2) TEU. As stipulated by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), external scrutiny is mandatory for the European Union (EU) upon its
entrance. The proposal was deemed incompatible by the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) due to its stringent assessment of the applicability of European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions. Without attaining legal
enforceability, the Charter remained outside the purview of European Union
legislation. The legal enforceability of the Charter was extended to all
Member States upon its integration into EU legislation via the 2009 Treaty of
Lisbon. Assuredly protected are fundamental human rights under the
Charter. According to Fransson and Siragusa, the courts are unsure of the
proper procedure for implementing the charter. The justices in the Safe
Harbour, Test-Achats, and Google Spain cases exhibited a steadfast stance in
protecting the rights of citizens of the European Union. These incidents serve
as evidence that the European Union's priorities are given precedence in
legal matters. Should fundamental rights present a challenge to the
legitimacy and effectiveness of EU legislation, the court will prioritize
safeguarding its supremacy over such rights. Despite the considerable
protections for fundamental rights provided by the Charter, it is evident that
the court's capacity to enforce these rights is constrained in light of the
potential erosion of the efficacy and preeminence of EU law.

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