Historia i Polityka

No. 46(53)/2023, pp. 49–70

www.hip. umk.pl
I S S N 1 8 9 9 - 51 6 0 , e - I S S N 2 3 9 1- 7 6 5 2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2023.030

Ryszard FICEK
The John Paul II Catholic University, Faculty of Social Science, Lublin, Poland

Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order

Reżimy hybrydowe i (nie)porządek polityczny

• Abstract • • Abstrakt •

This paper studies the concept of “hybrid Zasadniczym celem podjętych przez autora analiz
regimes”, not so much in defining and authen- jest przedstawienie koncepcji „reżimów hybry-
ticating their functionality but, above all, to dowych” nie tyle w kategoriach definiujących
exhibit them as so-called “partial” constitutional i uwiarygadniających ich funkcjonalność, ale
concepts. Articulating the tensions, divergences, przede wszystkim poprzez ukazanie ich jako tzw.
and antagonisms characteristic of these regimes, „niepełne” koncepcje ustrojowe. Wyartykułowanie
as well as highlighting the blurring boundaries charakterystycznych dla tych reżimów napięć,
between democratic systems and authoritarianism dywergencji i antagonizmów, jak również wy-
“with adjectives”, emphasizes the importance of eksponowanie zacierających się granic pomiędzy
the examined issues. The author introduces an systemami demokratycznymi a autorytaryzmem
alternative conceptualization and typology of „z przymiotnikami”, podkreśla istotność analizo-
hybrid regimes and a configurational approach. wanych zagadnień. Autor wprowadza alternatywną
Instead of placing political regimes on a linear propozycję konceptualizacji i typologii reżimów
continuum – from authoritarianism to democ- hybrydowych, wraz z zastosowaniem podejścia
racy – multidimensional solutions facilitating konfiguracyjnego. Zamiast bowiem umieszczać
an alternative typology of the analyzed concepts reżimy polityczne na liniowym kontinuum – od
have been exposed. The configuration approach, autorytaryzmu do demokracji – w artykule wyeks-
however, provides an analytically valuable way ponowane zostały wielowymiarowe rozwiązania
to evaluate and integrate hybrid regimes with ułatwiające przyjęcie alternatywnej typologii
other classification schemes. Such innovations, analizowanych koncepcji. Z kolei podejście
therefore, help alleviate conceptual confusion in konfiguracyjne zapewnia analitycznie użyteczny
the literature. Moreover, deepening the under- sposób ewaluacji i integracji reżimów hybrydo-
standing of the concept of hybrid regimes, along wych z innymi schematami klasyfikacyjnymi.
with emphasizing its conceptual ambiguities and Tego rodzaju innowacje pomagają złagodzić
complexity – especially concerning the “politically zamieszanie pojęciowe w literaturze przedmiotu.
correct” discourse on the current problems of frag- Co więcej, pogłębienie rozumienia koncepcji
ile and politically unstable states – is necessary reżimów hybrydowych wraz z podkreśleniem ich
50 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

to better understand the complex and confusing pojęciowych niejasności i złożoności – szczególnie
nature of modern regimes of power frequently w odniesieniu do „poprawnego politycznie” dys-
operating in the most politically unstable regions kursu dotyczącego zwłaszcza problemów państw
of the contemporary world. słabych i politycznie niestabilnych – jest konieczne
dla lepszego uświadomienia sobie złożonego i za-
gmatwanego charakteru współczesnych reżimów
władzy, działających często w bardzo niestabilnych
politycznie regionach współczesnego świata.

Keywords: hybrid regime; democracy; authori- Słowa kluczowe: reżim hybrydowy; demokracja;
tarianism; political transformation; civil society autorytaryzm; transformacja ustrojowa; społeczeń-
stwo obywatelskie

Introduction

The rather vague and methodologically “fluid” conceptual boundary defining the
differentiation between democratic and non-democratic regimes has been and yet
remains the subject of many scientific debates and digressions. However, the third
wave of democratization and the end of the Cold War dramatically increased the
global number of political regimes emphasizing the priority nature of a pluralist
political system, holding multiparty elections, with the declared full suffrage of
citizens, etc. Nevertheless, these democratic attributes often remain only a facade to
sustain authoritarian forms of government. In response to this problem, however,
scholars have developed many model concepts to capture the mixed or “hybrid”
nature of these regimes.
Attaching modifiers to predetermined types of political regimes has become
an approved method in this field. Yet, in the 1990s, the democratic system served
as a model from which new terms were derived, creating a convention commonly
referred to as “democracy with adjectives” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). The opposite
trend emerged in the early 2000s as a reaction to the democratic resentments of the
past. Thus, shifting attention to the non-democratic aspects of the institution of
power in hybrid regimes, scholars replaced the term “democracy” with the phrase
“authoritarianism”, which is considered the central point of the classification of
contemporary hybrid regimes. The conceptualization of hybrid regimes in this way,
unfortunately, only deepened the methodological confusion. The proliferation of
modified terms and conflicting definitions is straightforward and blunt evidence
(Diamond, 2002; Armony & Schamis, 2005).
The earlier terminology, used in models ranging from “democracy with adjec-
tives” to “authoritarianism with adjectives”, instead of facilitating understanding
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 51

and resolving conceptual difficulties in classifying “partial regimes”, has only added
additional problems. However, earlier complications in this area were due to the
vague terminology that made it impossible to clearly define the differences between
the various forms of democratic and non-democratic regimes of power. Neverthe-
less, contemporary conceptual confusion results from the illegible and blurred line
between authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes.
Therefore, this article aims to present a broader range of hybrid regimes that fit
into a vast agglomerate of political systems – from authoritarian satrapies to arrange-
ments similar to liberal democracies. The term “hybrid regime” seems more justified
concerning non-democratic or non-authoritarian political systems. Moreover, this
paper proposes an alternative perspective rather than rejecting the concept of hybrid
regimes, as some researchers have done (Brownlee, 2007; Armony & Schamis, 2005).
Following this approach, it is possible to redesign the conceptual field of con-
temporary political regimes. Most modern works analyzing hybrid regimes present
the so-called “continuum perspective” (Diamond, 1999; Diamond, Linz, & Lipset,
1999). Yet, this research analysis refers to the concepts describing complex and
multidimensional political regimes initiated by the research work of Juan Linz
(Linz, 1970, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1978, 1996). Nevertheless, the above perspective
displays the diversity of types of political regimes, emphasizing primarily their
generic differences and not the degree of advancement of “elements” typical of
democracy or autocracy. However, applying the above methodology requires facing
several diverse challenges directly related to the typology, systematic classification,
and specificity of the various concepts. Since classification systems are, in this case,
only theoretical constructions representing social interactions, they will always be
imperfect in practice. However, despite these limitations, further clarification of the
classification of political regimes is desirable and even necessary.
The political transformation of many countries, as well as the attributes, dom-
inants, and characteristics contained in it, are crucial for developing the causal
theory and formulating political practice. Therefore, an essential element of these
analyses is: (1) Firstly, to present a way out of the conceptual confusion present in
the contemporary literature on the subject. Therefore, the presented analyses show
the diversity and specificity of the concepts of the hybrid system, emphasizing
the discrepancy between them, despite the transition from adjectival variants of
democratic political systems to authoritarianism. Next, attention is directed to the
sources of conceptual confusion identified in the presented analysis. It is primarily
about the overarching concept of electoral and non-electoral regimes. To clarify
classification models, however, one advocates changing the definition of an electoral
regime from one that holds multiparty elections to one that conducts competitive
52 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

votes. This paper discusses how and why this new definition highlights and system-
atizes the conceptual space occupied by hybrid regimes. (2) Secondly, this paper
aims to develop innovative ways to conceptualize and organize regime types using
a configuration approach. Thus, rather than placing political regimes on a single
continuum – from authoritarianism to democracy – the configurational approach
provides researchers with an alternative view of political systems, emphasizing the
multiple forms and dimensions of the analyzed regimes. Based on a conceptual
literature review, this article proposes that competitiveness, state welfare intervention,
and civil liberties are the three principal axes along which contemporary regimes can
be most accurately and efficiently classified. While an ideal model that takes into
account all fundamental dimensions of conceptualization would allow for the proper
classification and description of all political regimes, the possible combinations of
these three dimensions provide a nuanced framework for defining the relationship
between multiparty regimes and for explaining and organizing the conceptual space
for hybrid regimes.
As a result, this article makes four significant contributions to the field of regime
theory. (1) First, it reduces the conceptual confusion present in the classification
of regimes by better theorizing the relationships between regime types at multiple
levels. (2) Second, it revives the multidimensional and configurational method of
conceptualizing regimes. As a result, more attention is paid to the various institu-
tional features that distinguish different systems. (3) Third, the multidimensional
method presented here sheds light on possible ways of comparing different regimes
based on their cross-sectional institutional characteristics, opening new avenues for
future empirical research. (4) Finally, this article sheds new light on the presentation
of innovative relations between hybrid regimes, allowing one to explain abstract
theoretical discussions in the dimension of political praxis.

The concept of the “hybrid regime”: the difficulty and inevitability

of term definition

the political regime means the totality of methods used by the state power in its
relations with society, as well as the rules, regulations, and procedures it follows in
these relations. In other words, political regime is an essential component of state
institutions. It also includes the methods of operation of political parties, their links
with the apparatus of state power, as well as the principles of operation of other
critical socio-political organizations. In political science, the concept of a political
regime is not evaluative. It only defines the principles, rules of the political game, and
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 53

the dependencies between the subjects of politics. Sometimes the political regime
is equated with the political system. In fact, it covers all mechanisms regulating
multidimensional relations in the state.
Hybrid political institutions combine traditional forms of governance with
institutional mechanisms that, to a large extent, are more often associated with the
political model typical of Western countries. Nevertheless, the above concept does
not perceive the structures of a destabilized and fragile state as a dysfunctional or-
ganization of socio-political life. In the understanding of the West, though, countries
that deviate from the Weberian model are considered weak, unstable, or rump. The
concept of a “hybrid” political order undoubtedly differs from this point of view. It
focuses its attention on such governance models, for which the order and stability
of social life are based on traditional political structures adapted to the geopolitical
specificity of a given country (Boege, Brown, & Clements, 2009).
In a hybrid political order, power in a state is significantly influenced by more
than one entity or political structure. In this context, these may be entities operating
locally, nationally, or internationally. They can also be customary institutions (e.g.,
local tribal authorities), non-governmental organizations (local or international),
religious institutions, and, of course, state entities. The term “hybrid structures” is
broad enough to cover various non-state forms of governance and governance of
a traditional nature (from the neo-patrimonial formula to the so-called “acephalic”).
They combine elements from different levels and spheres of socio-political life,
guided by a different logic of political action compared to Weber’s concept. In
addition, the above spheres do not exist in isolation but interpenetrate each other.
Consequently, a specific – albeit original – political order is formed, characterized
by a uniquely “tangled” and interdependent organizational structure with different
origins (Boege, Brown, & Clements, 2009).
The hybrid political order does not clearly distinguish between “state-owned”
and “informal” institutions, which merge and borrow system elements from each
other in this system. Therefore, a customary institution operating in a hybrid state
usually adopts the language of the state as well as some of the functions of the state.
In this context, speaking of a “weak” or “non-functional” state here is complex since
the above terms imply that another political actor is stronger than the state itself.
For that reason, it becomes more reasonable to consider the above factor as one of
the actors of the political scene, which affects the entirety of the political reality of
a given country.
Nevertheless, a more constructive approach to the hybrid political order would
understand the concept as an “emerging state”. In other words, instead of viewing
the hybridization of the political order as an indicator of dysfunction, the above
54 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

idea can be considered a potential basis for a stable, legitimate, and contextually
defined form of state political system. However, this requires a deeper analysis of
the relationship between the state and society based on a hybrid model: first of all,
defining their complementarity and dynamics that can model both development
and stabilization, as well as generate contradictions and incompatibilities of the
system. In this sense, hybrid models that genuinely form or combine traditional and
modern norms and practices of political functioning are likely to provide a more
effective form of legitimation of power precisely because they are based on a hybrid
model that ensures the plurality of existing political orders (Clements et al., 2007,
pp. 50–54).
Although the above concepts show many new aspects concerning – mainly
the traditional – structures of functioning of fragile states, they also offer a lot of
shortcomings. It is not only about analytical issues related to shaping the forms of
statehood but, above all, about conceptual confusion caused by mixing different
regularities. Critics of the hybrid political order emphasize that allegedly desta-
bilized states tend to blur the influence of the private and public spheres, as well
as the formal and informal spheres. In other words, in a hybrid political system,
actors representing public (legal, in the Weberian sense) and private (non-state)
institutions meaningfully influence the authorities. Moreover, the hybrid concept
lacks an analytical reference. Thus, although hybridization aims to overcome am-
biguous conceptual categories, it reinforces them. For example, one must accept
the empirical existence of a “formal” type based on Weber’s typical definition of
the state to describe how formal and informal institutions come together in hybrid
circumstances. Hence, a significant problem is an inability to distinguish the con-
structive pragmatic aspects of, among others, the theory of the “negotiated state” or
“twilight institutions” from those that seem destructive or even dangerous. Besides,
although the above concepts distance themselves from the neoliberal theories of
state building, they often remain under their significant influence (Clements et al.,
2007, p. 48).
In other words, the efforts of international aid organizations to “repair” failed
structures of fragile states are primarily rooted in the theory of “pragmatic neoliberal-
ism” (Bockman & Eyal, 2002, pp. 324–336). While diplomats of the Western world
influenced political opponents of a different point of view to conclude power-sharing
agreements and establish so-called “integrated political systems”, international de-
velopment experts proclaimed the ideas of liberal pluralism in order to replace the
fragility of the states with more stable structures (Levene, 2000, pp. 20–21). The
emphasis on pluralistic values is partly mirrored by a broad human rights agenda,
as well as an increasing focus on so-called informal institutions and “traditional
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 55

power structures” in shaping the statehood of fragile states (Ubink, 2008; Helmke &
Levitsky, 2004). The above procedures are pretty well correlated with the persistent
criticism of Weberian, Marxist, and functional conceptualizations of the so-called
“developing country”, regularly accused of failing to implement heterogeneous and
diverse forms of state institutionalization (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Migdal &
Schlichte, 2005).
Moreover, the neo-pluralist approach, which emphasizes the problems of allo-
cating state administrative structures rather than management and control, seeks
to overcome this limitation. Drawing from the theory of neo-patrimonialism and
diverse political reality (mixed polity) (Erdmann & Engel, 2007) and sharing simi-
larities with the concepts of “twilight institutions” and “negotiated state”, they shape
the notion of “hybrid political orders”. This concept, however, fits into the diverse
and rich literature presenting “hybridity” (Pieterse, 2001; Roberts, 2008; Egnell
& Haldén, 2013). It suggests that all complex forms of political praxis, as well as
socio-political norms and visions that emerge from the interaction of various social
groups, worldviews, and diverse political activities, are characterized by hybridity
(Richmond & Mitchell, 2012). In this sense, the notions of hybridity oppose the
contemporary conventional theories of state-building understood – especially by
the supporters of hybridity – as the culminating stage in the evolution of liberal
interventionism understood in the philosophical categories of Western thought. In
this way, the assumption that the local political reality of fragile states is an almost
void space that can be easily subordinated to the interests of the West has been
undermined. Thus, the concept of hybridity significantly enriches the contemporary
discourse on the issue of state-building (Roberts, 2008).
One of the positive aspects of this approach is the exposure of political actors
and institutions operating in the “hybrid” space of fragile states, thus emphasizing
the complexity and liquid reality of state-building. It also applies to questioning
the previously clearly defined boundaries between the categories characterizing the
processes of political change. It is also an invitation to pay attention to the vital
role that all levels and dimensions of society, as well as local government agencies,
perform in these processes (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012). This approach, how-
ever, provides the perspective of a more holistic and historically oriented vision of
state-building – and thus realizes that state fragility can be both a “system” and an
individual problem. It indicates the importance of the international context, which
determines the systemic transformation processes and state reconstruction of fragile
states (Haldén, 2013, p. 50).
Despite many positive aspects resulting from the previously cited theories, it
should be noted that their practical usefulness seems quite limited – especially
56 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

in the context of complex state-building processes, as well as the legitimacy and

delegitimacy of the structures of a local authority. Therefore, understanding the
political conditions of fragile states, their historical and institutional specificity, as
well as social and national identity, is a fundamental condition for constructively
solving conflict situations and shaping stable foundations of statehood. In other
words, institutional standardization – as the basis of state-building – is understood
as a process leading to the emergence of a dominant political structure that combines
within itself the leading relations of roles represented by numerous – minor – actors
of the country’s political scene. In this sense, the dominant structure would regulate
the diversity of roles and relationships in the political dimension. A similar situation
(institutional standardization) is related to the issue of building national identity.
The above concept is defined as a process of integrating the “common cultural
heritage”, which aims to shape a common identity of various socio-ethnic groups
(Migdal & Schlichte, 2005).
Institutional standardization underlies state-building and is understood as the
process by which a single conglomerate of political ‘rules and principles’ gains
dominance in a particular society. In other words, it is a state where the dominant
organizational structure governs all major political relations. Similarly, the standard-
ization of social identity lies at the heart of nation-building. It is defined as a process
in which one common cultural agglomerate of “worldview and mentality principles”
(world perception, religious traditions, morality, socio-cognitive elements, including
language, common socio-cultural values, mentality, etc.) gains dominance and is
standardized within a politically defined population. Assuming, therefore, that
the emerging states are characterized by a kind of hybridity, within which actors
and institutions combine various elements of different cultural origins, it can be
suggested that shaping the foundations of statehood is characterized – above all – by
a gradual standardization of the overarching “rules of the political game” within
a given society (North, 1990).
In this way, the conceptualization of the dynamics of political processes, rooted in
specific historical realities, may stimulate and enrich the development of the debate
on shaping the state structures of states, not only through the analysis of specific –
hidden or exposed – elements regarding the concept of hybridity, which are often
ambivalent (Tamanha, 2000). However, it is also related to the “added value”, which
fills the analytical gap between the usually unrelated concepts of state-building and
nation-building. Moreover, the conceptualization of the issue of state formation,
understood as the process of “rule normalization”, has important implications for
understanding the complex political situation of fragile states, paying attention to
the historical context determining the specificity of political processes and focusing
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 57

on appropriate forms of governance as an independent variable shaping the proper

structures of the state (Kaplan, 2008).
Nevertheless, the concepts of hybridization of state structures also show many
significant shortcomings. First, important issues remain unresolved in shaping
statehood: what conditions or types of the hybrid political order are constructive
and prioritized, and which are deconstructive? Moreover, hybridity is associated with
reducing and resolving socio-political conflicts (Williams, 2010) and strengthening,
creating, and deconstructing a politically unstable state. The fact that the concept of
the hybrid political order is unable to distinguish “positive” views from “negative”
aspects of hybridization makes it a widely held maxim rather than a functional and
effective analytical tool. In many unstable fragile states characterized by hybrid
institutional systems, the concept of the hybrid political order cannot explain the di-
vergent specificity of shaping their statehood structures, which is aimed at promoting
stable development and preventing conflict situations (Renders & Terlinden, 2010).
Moreover, by promoting institutional pluralism in destabilized but emerging
fragile states, the concepts of hybridity glorify and fetishize what is “unofficial”,
usurped, local, customary, and often anachronistic (Roberts, 2008). This results
in accepting past interpretations of non-state and often pathological orders as au-
tochthonous means of state-building by legitimizing neo-patrimonial asymmetry,
instability, inefficiency, and “decentralized despotism”. More importantly, the above
ideas support, perhaps unintentionally, the so-called pluralistic, i.e., multi-track,
concepts of the development of state structures, particularly the liberal notion of
a state based on broadly understood pluralism, which can be seen in various forms
of hybridity (Mehler, 2002).
However, there is a definite lack of clarity on this topic: does “hybridity” mean
a constellation of interconnected government institutions? Or is it contained in
parallel in different institutions? Secondly, is the “hybrid” nature of the political
structures of the state directly related to the “hybridity” of political imperatives
(influence of alternative centers of state power) in force within the borders of the
state, but taking into account the local diversity of customary political institutions
and traditional centers of power? (Dunn, 2009).

The hybrid regime as a democratic subtype

The great interest in research on hybrid regimes is indicated by factors such as the
growing number of research centers focusing their attention on hybrid regimes and
the rich terminology used when describing them. Especially in the second half of the
58 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

1990s, hybrid regimes were perceived to a large extent as “weakened democracies”

moving towards a consolidated democratic system. It means that they were perceived
as “transitional” political systems (“Transition Paradigm of the 1990s”) (Ekman,
2009). In this case, the term ‘hybrid regime’ refers to a democratic system understood
as a basic concept. In this context, it touches on the blurred and fuzzy boundary
between “full” democracy (liberal democracy) and “partial” democracy (incomplete
democracy or minimal democracy).
In general, democracy is defined as: “a system for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide using a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 269). However, the ideal concept of democracy
(polyarchy) includes seven systemic elements: (1) pluralistic electoral law; (2) free,
transparent, and fair elections; (3) general ballot; (4) inclusive right to run for
government office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative sources of information;
and (7) autonomy of associations and political parties (Bailey & Braybrooke, 2003).
Yet, standard indicators defining the specificity of democracy depend not only on
the conceptual dichotomy mentioned above but also on socio-political development
and innovation. In other words, democracy is always a matter of degree (Bollen &
Jackman, 1989).
However, there is no consensus in the contemporary literature on whether the
term ‘hybrid regime’ can be attributed more to democracy or autocracy. Another
“weakness” of the existing literature is a perceptible “democratic bias”. Many scholars
considered the analyzed hybrid regimes to be “partially” democratic systems. It is
based on the premise that countries affected by the problem of hybrid administrative
institutions will, after some time, “inherently” strive for democracy (Ekman, 2009).
Recent geopolitical changes and often surprising developments have shown that
while some hybrid states have indeed embarked on the path of democratization (e.g.,
Mexico, Vietnam, Taiwan), many others have gone in the opposite direction (e.g.,
Belarus) – and many stubbornly remain hybrid systems (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia)
(Bogaards, 2009).
However, due to the nature of diverse quasi-democratic systems (democracy with
adjectives), the difference between the system specificity of individual countries is
often blurred. A good example of this is El Salvador and Latvia (Levitsky & Way,
2002, p. 52). At the beginning of the 1990s, the states, as mentioned above, were
included in the category of partially democratic, although the situation of both coun-
tries was fundamentally different. Latvia was placed in this category because, right
after regaining independence from the former USSR, it began to create problems
for its Russian-speaking citizens by denying them privileged positions and making
it difficult to enforce their rights in various ways. In turn, El Salvador was almost
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 59

in a state of civil war, having lost civilian control over military. In addition, politi-
cal opposition was exterminated, and numerous human rights violations occurred
(Levitsky & Way, 2010). The above examples point to the elementary difficulties
underlying the definition and distinction of hybrid political systems.
Particularly in this case, the term ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier & Levitsky,
1997) highlighted some thought-provoking aspects. Such expressions (such as defec-
tive democracy, twilight institutions, damaged democracies, etc.) (Bogaards, 2009)
are created to describe the dynamic relationship between autocracy and democracy.
It makes sense because diverse terminology and innovative research methodology are
necessary to present the complex political transformation processes, their description,
and their assessment of the causes and consequences of the relationship between
democracy and autocracy (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Bogaards, 2018).
Contemporary discourse addresses the problem of defining democracy as
a procedural minimum that helps to identify relatively reduced content (Schedler,
2013). Thus, to describe pluralist democracy, Robert Dahl coined the famous
term ‘polyarchy’, which means ‘multicentric power’. In this case, social pluralism
guarantees that various actors on the political scene remain independent of each
other as well. This kind of pluralism limits absolute power in five different ways:
(1) through the freedom to form organizations; (2) through political rivalry within
the state’s administrative system; (3) through pluralistic competition allowing for
the election of leaders able to compromise; (4) it provides alternative sources of
information; (5) and thanks to this, socio-political pluralism can create a complex
system of separation of powers (Dahl, 1982).
Thus, if the currently functioning democracies fail to adapt to the procedural
minimum indicated here, then the above-mentioned political systems can be de-
scribed as “damaged democracies”. In practice, they lack the essential features of
a fully functioning democracy. The above process can be observed primarily in some
Latin American countries, where the legacy of authoritarian systems was institutional
collapse and the inability of the government to exercise complete control over the
military. Therefore, despite winning democratic elections, the government could
not extend its control over the military, or the state could not wholly separate itself
from patronage institutions. It can be seen in countries such as Chile, El Salvador,
Ecuador, and Paraguay (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
Some studies on South America show that semi-feudal and authoritarian
socio-political structures have caused such degeneration of the existing political
system (including violations of civil rights) that these countries cannot be considered
democratic. The inclusion of social issues as a definitional aspect may therefore be
an essential complementary idea for some discourses of the typology of political
60 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

regimes. The main reason for this is the particular situation of Latin American
countries, which are often characterized by such significant social inequalities that
deprive some citizens of their rights and even affect the categorization of the state’s
political system. However, the above terminological novelty has not yet reached the
consensus of researchers (O’Donnell, 1994; Levitsky & Way, 2010).
Unlike the previous notions, however, the term ‘defective democracy’ is more
widely accepted. Its concept of democracy consists of three elements: vertical legit-
imacy, horizontal accountability, and the existence of effective governance. Vertical
legitimacy concerns the relationship of citizens to power and is implemented through
elections and the enforcement of civil rights. Yet, horizontal accountability estab-
lishes liberal constitutionality. Effective governance assumes that only well-chosen
actors can make the right decisions (Merkel, 2004).
Democracies can therefore be considered defective if their essentially functioning
democratic electoral system is insufficient to select the right decision-makers or if
the dysfunction of the political regime results in the loss of vital lines of defense
of the national raison d’état. Therefore, the institutions of power are deprived of
social legitimacy and can no longer protect freedom, equality, and vital interests of
the state, both internally and externally. Wolfgang Merkel identifies four types of
defective democracy: (1) exclusive (democratic institutions are strong, but certain
social groups are limited in their civil rights); (2) illiberal (elections are free, but
civil rights are partially disregarded, constitutional norms have little or no binding
effect on elected state administration officials); (3) delegated (after free elections,
there is a transition to undemocratic forms of government, because the executive
power becomes independent of other forms of power); (4) and domain (the execu-
tive disregards or neglects the processes of democratic transformation). The above
typology of defective democracy systematizes and categorizes the most common
forms of “imperfect democracy” (Merkel, 2004).
It should be noted that most of the emerging democracies in the world are
flawed democracies that rarely evolve into pure autocratic regimes. Considering
the above typology, the most common forms are illiberal and delegated democracy.
The shortcomings of some quasi-democratic systems can develop over the years.
Yet, regional trends can significantly impact their “defective” functioning. A good
example is several Latin American countries that have followed the same path in
recent decades (including Brazil, Nicaragua, Colombia, etc.). In addition to helping
to define the systems that stretch out between democracy and authoritarianism, the
concept of flawed democracy also brings us closer to explaining the various causes
and consequences of “incomplete” democratic transitions (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 61

The hybrid regime as an authoritarian subtype

While democracy remains a critical term in the contemporary literature on the

subject, many scholars suggest using the concept of authoritarianism as an important
term for understanding the specificity of hybrid regimes. These include, among
others, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), or Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
(2002, 2010), who used the concept of “authoritarianism” as a primary term in their
research. In this context, Larry J. Diamond distinguishes four authoritarian systems:
(1) competitive authoritarianism; (2) hegemonic authoritarianism; (3) electoral
authoritarianism; and (4) politically closed authoritarianism (Diamond, 1999).
Each political system considers minimizing possible threats and uncertainties as
one of its key goals. For this purpose, political and administrative institutions are
used, providing both legitimacy and appropriate consolidation of a given power
system. In this case, Schedler’s typology of political regimes highlights four catego-
ries: (1) closed autocracy; (2) electoral authoritarianism; (3) electoral democracy;
and (4) liberal democracy. Closed autocracy and liberal democracy are at opposite
ends of a broader spectrum. However, this typology of political regimes rejects
the idea of “mixed systems” and upholds the “democracy–autocracy” dichotomy
(Schedler, 2013).
Graeme Gill identifies seven criteria of electoral authoritarianism: (1) control the
electoral process; (2) constantly mobilize the population; (3) control the legislature;
(4) maintain the elite’s unity; (5) manage the succession and recruitment of those in
power; (6) maintain extensive state control; finally, (7) conduct targeted distribution
of state budgetary funding (Gill, 2012). Nevertheless, authoritarian leaders may
allow for a multiparty election for two reasons: firstly, to yield to foreign pressure, i.e.,
to obtain the necessary domestic or international legitimacy. Secondly, an election
may ensure the long-term stabilization of the authoritarian regime.
Electoral authoritarian regimes now account for nearly two-thirds of post-Cold
War autocracies. This category includes, among others, countries such as Russia,
Zimbabwe, the Megreb states, and Venezuela. Although parliamentary elections
characterize these regimes, they are not truly competitive, where the objective
function of elections is to legitimize the system through voting (Gill, 2012). While
retaining the formal institutions of political representation, these regimes of power
also introduce manipulative strategies into the operation of these institutions. It
is to minimize the chances of multiparty competition leading to an unexpected
outcome, which would be a disaster for autocratic leaders. Authoritarian electoral
regimes assign an objective function to elections: they are significant for simulating
the process of legitimizing power. This kind of electoral authoritarianism is essentially
62 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

a “facade”, imitating the democratic principles and values of the electoral law, as
well as the freedom and transparency of the electoral process itself. In other words,
although elections are held by popular vote, state manipulation does so much dam-
age to electoral competition that it cannot be considered democratic (Wigell, 2008).
In this context, seven criteria for electoral authoritarianism can be identified:
(1) control of the electoral process; (2) social mobilization; (3) control of the legisla-
ture; (4) the unity of the political elite “holding power”; (5) managing the succession
and recruitment of the “right” representatives in power; (6) maintaining extensive
control of state institutions; finally, (7) targeted and “selective” distribution of funds
from the state budget (Gill, 2012). In this sense, the permission for multiparty elec-
tions is dictated mainly by two reasons: (1) the pressure of foreign public opinion, i.e.,
the need to obtain the necessary legitimacy for the actions of the power apparatus in
the national and international dimension; (2) elections can provide long-term political
stability, which is fundamental to the long-term actions of an authoritarian regime.
As a result of potential “outside” pressure, authoritarian regimes, if they require
international assistance, are interested in a military alliance, or are vulnerable due to
existing trade relations and thus dependent on democratic countries, and then more
likely to turn away from pure autocracies in an authoritarian electoral regime. The
regional position of a given country or the political systems of neighboring countries
can also be conducive to democratization, i.e., internal and external factors can
have a significant – instrumental – impact on forming electoral authoritarianism.
However, authoritarian electoral regimes can also arise from explicitly “democratic”
motivations or economic interests (Dimitrova, 2018).
Not surprisingly, electoral autocracies have become dominant among authori-
tarian regimes. Since the end of World War II, 113 authoritarian regimes have held
multiparty elections. At this point, mention should be made of four categories of
political regimes in the typology of Schedler’s system (closed autocracy – electoral
authoritarianism – electoral democracy – liberal democracy), for which closed
autocracies either have no electoral institutions at all, or there is no fundamental
multiparty electoral law (e.g., now Laos and Eswatini). However, despite various
disadvantages, multiparty elections can still help the opposition, even in the case of
authoritarian regimes. Even in such political conditions, the political elites of power
may be forced to leave their positions. It is what happened in Malawi in 1994 and
in Mexico also in 2000. To prevent this situation, autocracies use various means of
electoral manipulation: intrigue, manipulation, controlling media and campaign
finance, arresting opposition politicians, fraud, etc. (Schedler, 2013).
“Competitive authoritarianism” needs to be distinguished from purely au-
thoritarian regimes as well as from stable, functional democracies because modern
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 63

democracies have four characteristics that competitive authoritarian regimes do

not have in their determinants and correlations: (1) free elections confer legislative
and executive powers; (2) citizens are guaranteed universal suffrage; (3) political
and civil rights are protected; (4) elected officials exercise power (Levitsky & Way,
2010). Of course, the power elites of a democratic state can also – from time to
time – break the applicable legal rules, but such violations of norms are never of
a systemic nature. In other words, they do not fundamentally change the arena of
competition between the ruling powers and the opposition. On the other hand,
violations of norms committed by competitive authoritarian regimes are significant
and so frequent that the arena of political competition can be seriously deformed.
However, in authoritarianism based on political rivalry, power can be attacked in
four areas with the help of democratic institutions: elections, the legislature, the
judiciary, and the media (Wahman, Teorell, & Hadenius, 2013).
The biggest challenge for competitive autocracy is dealing with the inherent
contradictions of the system and the resulting uncertainty associated with the “in-
tegrated” coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods. Such sui generis
uncertainty poses a severe dilemma for the power elite: suppressing these elements
of the regime can be costly because existing norms are recognized as legal both
domestically and internationally. On the other hand, leaving them intact may result
in a potential loss of power. It can also lead to an acute regime crisis (e.g., Mexico in
1988, or Russia in 1993). In some cases, the system may successfully survive the crisis
(Russia in 1996), while in other cases, the current leader may lose its status (e.g.,
Mexico in 2000). Moreover, a political regime can collapse after a short transitional
period (e.g., Peru in 2000, or Serbia in 2000) (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2018).
In the 1990s, competitive autocracies typically emerged in three different ways:
(1) through the collapse of genuine autocracies. In this case, combined – external and
internal – pressures often forced autocratic regimes to create formal democratic insti-
tutions or to give fundamental functions to institutions shaping the democratic order
in the country. Nevertheless, due to the weak opposition, the political transformation
of the state did not usually lead to democracy. Instead, the political elites “holding
power” perfectly adapted to the rules of democracy. The above phenomenon can
be observed in sub-Saharan Africa. (2) Competitive authoritarianism can emerge
after the fall of a genuine autocratic regime. Because after the fall of autocracies,
weak electoral systems are usually formed. In turn, the lack of democratic norms
and the weak integration and political commitment of civil society allow elected
leaders to continue to rule the country in an authoritarian manner. Such a situation
appeared in Armenia, Ukraine, post-Soviet countries of Central Asia, and Romania
in the 1990s. (3) Competitive authoritarianism can also develop after the collapse of
64 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

a thoroughly democratic system. Deep and widespread socio-political and economic

crises can lead to situations in which elected government administration undermines
democratic institutions without intending to dismantle them completely. A good
example is Venezuela or Peru in the 1990s (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
At that time, competitive authoritarianism developed in countries where condi-
tions were not conducive to consolidation, neither democracy nor autocracy (e.g.,
former post-Soviet republics). Nonetheless, the emergence of the above requirements
does not necessarily lead to competitive authoritarianism. Sometimes the democratic
system is consolidated in unfavorable conditions (e.g., Mongolia, Mali). Often,
the fall of an authoritarian regime is followed by a rapid collapse of the state’s
administrative structures, civil war, and even anarchy (e.g., Libya, Somalia).
Thus, the differences between the typologies of political systems are pretty signif-
icant. The concept presented by Andreas Schedler offers a tetrachotomy expressed in
four subcategories: (1) closed autocracy; (2) electoral authoritarianism; (3) electoral
democracy; (4) liberal democracy (Schedler, 2013). In turn, the variant presented by
Steven Levitsky shows a trichotomy: authoritarianism – hybrid regime – democracy.
In the first case, party pluralism or electoral law referring to democratic standards
are not sufficient arguments for democratizing state institutions. On the other hand,
Levitsky emphasizes that hybrid regimes are inherently competitive because they take
into account multiparty electoral law. Moreover, informal administrative procedures,
political actors, as well as unofficial support groups (domestic and foreign lobbying)
determine the essence of a political regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010). On the other
hand, Schedler’s concept emphasizes the role of formal institutions in shaping the
political system of the state (Schedler, 2013).

The “hybrid paradox theory”: toward an institutional

and identity-standardized model

Although the idea of a “hybrid” political order has revived the contemporary dis-
course on shaping the stability of fragile states, it is difficult to accept the theoretical
diversity and pluralism of concepts. Nevertheless, a better capture of the specificity
of forming the statehood of fragile states seems to be possible thanks to the so-called
theory of “institutional and identity standardization”. Rooted in the existing con-
cepts of shaping statehood, the analytical idea of “standardization of rules” is original
because it combines the issues of building statehood with shaping the foundations
of national identity, as well as the problems of state-making and state-breaking,
corresponding to the constructive transformation of the political transformation
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 65

of fragile states and conditioning stabilization of their socio-political situation of

the country (Balthasar, 2015).
Because the hybrid political theory seems to be a historical norm rather than
a sensation or even an exotic anomaly, both past and present concepts of shaping
structures of fragile states and state projects are endogenous. What is more, they
are much more similar to each other than is commonly believed. So if hybridity is
not a factor distinguishing contemporary concepts of political transformation and
reconstruction of state structures, what does distinguish current theories from those
of the past, and what is the common feature that connects them with the present?
In the case of the hybrid political theory, a significant difference between the
past and present concepts of shaping state structures in the context of fragile states is
related to the appreciation of normative pluralism, which largely opposes the classical
approach to state formation. However, the classic approach emphasizes the need to
subordinate the population living in the territory of the state to the superior structure
of power and its homogeneous rules defining the legal order. Historically, even
multi-ethnic superpowers such as the US, China, and the Russian Federation, or
regional powers such as Germany and France, have traditionally been characterized
by ethnic domination, not by “pure” ethnic pluralism. In this sense, for example,
“Americanization” or “Germanization” was a long and officiated process of forced
adjustment and, as a consequence, a specific conformism inscribed in the strategies
of building an integrated and highly effective state structure (Schwartz, 1995).
The main contentious problem is, therefore, not the claim that state institutions
are negotiated – and therefore open to debate, negotiations, and compromises
consisting in mixing institutional elements with different cultural and political
patterns and origins – which makes today’s unstable fragile states little different
from historical processes of state-building in Europe or elsewhere in the world.
However, the proposal to adopt normative pluralism is controversial, as is accepting
the existence of parallel – albeit often not very compatible – political orders as
the essential elements conditioningthe creation of a statehood strategies, especially
within politically unstable fragile states.

Conclusions

The view popularized in the 1970s and 1980s that political transformation and
liberation from authoritarian regimes meant that the end of such authorities was
pure phantasmagoria and a myth. Later political events showed that it was not, as
Francis Fukuyama proclaimed, the “end of history”. Moreover, the dynamics of
66 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

geopolitical changes display that hybrid political systems in the global dimension are
constantly evolving. In addition, the prevailing belief today is that the authoritarian
regime and democracy are two opposite extremes of the political spectrum, defining
the specificity of contemporary political systems. However, concerning the above
analyses, the most significant and common innovation of the political transformation
of the 1990s was the hybrid regime model. In turn, the literature on the subject
contains a substantial source base on the theory of democracy, the methodology of
research on democratization, as well as non-democratic political regimes. However,
the scientific analysis of the above issues based on the indicated source base indicates
a lot of terminological confusion. As shown above, presenting, explaining, and
interpreting the origins of each political regime always requires considering both
the historical context and the specificity of the conditions of a particular country
and region.
This study aims to define the various forms of hybrid regimes to better under-
stand the principles of their functioning in heterogeneous geopolitical conditions.
It is particularly noteworthy because hybrid regimes – as a rule – do not seek to
achieve consolidated power in the state. The local political elites are instrumentally
using their “quasi-democratic” institutions to secure their state power. Since they can
demonstrate long-term stability, hybrid regimes should be considered well-assembled
political systems. Therefore, they are not temporary but are focused on long-term
activities. Thus, despite many democratic facade institutions, hybrid regimes can
be defined as particular political systems characterized by high dynamics of action,
which allows them to adapt to local socio-political conditions.
The classification of political regimes has always been a challenging and complex
undertaking. There are many undemocratic political regimes and a vast range of their
mutual correlations. Democracy also often appears – to some extent – imperfect
and unclear in its assumptions and political practice. Undoubtedly, however, the
complex realities of political life will always pose severe challenges to the concep-
tualization and classification of types of political regimes of power. Therefore, the
configuration approach is well suited to solving many complex issues, providing
a multidimensional view of hybrid regimes.
After presenting the source of many conceptual misunderstandings in the con-
temporary classification at the level of electoral regimes, this article advocates a redefi-
nition of the overarching concept of hybrid regimes: electoral and non-electoral. This
redefinition makes it possible to realize the significant contribution and importance
of generations of researchers involved in classifying contemporary non-democratic
regimes. At the same time, this approach shows a theoretical gap in older studies,
thus creating a conceptual space for non-democratic and non-authoritarian hybrid
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 67

regimes. Emphasizing the possible multidimensional configurations that may include

various regimes, one can postulate the need to organize mutual relations in demo-
cratic, hybrid, and authoritarian regimes. Therefore, while the modern classification
of political regimes is based mainly on a one-dimensional continuum, this article
emphasizes the importance of a multidimensional conceptualization of regimes
based on competition, “protective interference”, and civil liberties. As a result, such
a conceptual perspective can help unify the meaning of the hybrid regime and
alleviate the conceptual confusion in contemporary literature on the subject.
In addition, this article innovatively incorporates elements of political pragmatics
into the theoretical discourse on the types of hybrid regimes. The theoretical concepts
presented here can play an essential role in better understanding the specificity of
the analyzed ideas of political regimes but also allow to shape a common ground
on which scholars can constructively engage in a debate focused on new research
perspectives. In other words, this article opens up a potential perspective for further
analyses, disjunctions, and opportunities for future research. By emphasizing the
importance of the typological multidimensionality of political regimes, the previ-
ously largely unnoticed similarities and differences between the prospects of political
transformation of countries characterized by diverse geopolitical conditions were
highlighted. Based on competitiveness, civil liberties issues, and state interference
in important socio-political issues, the proposed tables illustrate ways of grouping
countries for comparative research. Therefore, the above distinctions make it possible
to undertake new and innovative cross-regional analyses. It also allows us to answer
several important questions regarding heterogeneous administrative structures, as
well as the heterogeneous apparatus of power characteristic of them, functioning
in the paradigm of a hybrid regime defining the most important dimensions of
state institutions.
To sum up, in-depth studies on the issue of undemocratic political regimes are
necessary for several fundamental reasons: (1) analyzing the functioning of hybrid
regimes is not only for a theoretical understanding of diverse ideologies but is
essential for political praxis; (2) a fuller insight into the shaping of non-democratic
regimes enables a fuller insight into the specificity of their functioning, which allows
answering fundamental questions concerning, among others: the effectiveness of
state administration, the effectiveness of the power apparatus, methods of resolving
socio-political conflicts, as well as their often very prolonged durability together with
the causes and issues of socio-political stability and economic development prospects;
(3) the scope of scientific research should be expanded to better understand the
political alternatives available for political transformation, especially for fragile and
destabilized countries of the modern world.
68 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

References:

Abts, K., & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus Democracy. Political Studies, 55(2),
405–424. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00657.x.
Armony, A.C., & Schamis, H.E. (2005). Babel in Democratization Studies. Journal of
Democracy, 16(4), 113–128. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0055.
Bailey, M., & Braybrooke, D. (2003). Robert A. Dahl’s Philosophy of Democracy, Exhibited
in His Essays. Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 99–118. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.
polisci.6.121901.085839.
Balthasar, D. (2015). From Hybridity to Standardization: Rethinking State-Making in
Contexts of Fragility. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 9(1), 26–47. DOI:
10.1080/17502977.2015.993502.
Bockman, J., & Eyal, G. (2002). Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowl-
edge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism. American Journal of Sociology, 108(2),
310–352. DOI: 10.7916/D8RN372B.
Boege, V., Brown, M.A., & Clements, K.P. (2009). Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile
States. Peace Review, 21(1), 13–21. DOI: 10.1080/10402650802689997.
Bogaards, M. (2009). How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Au-
thoritarianism. Democratization, 16(2), 399–423. DOI: 10.1080/13510340902777800.
Bogaards, M. (2018). De-democratization in Hungary: Diffusely Defective Democracy.
Democratization, 25(8), 1481–1499. DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2018.1485015.
Bollen, K.A., & Jackman, R.W. (1989). Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies. American
Sociological Review, 54(4), 612–621. DOI: 10.2307/2095882.
Brownlee, J. (2007). Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Clements, K., Boege, V., Brown, A., Foley, W., & Nolan, A. (2007). State Building Re-
considered: The Role of Hybridity in the formation of Political Order. Political Science,
59(1), 45–56. DOI: 10.1177/003231870705900106.
Collier, D., & Levitsky, S. (1997). Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in
Comparative Research. World Politics, 49(3), 430–451. DOI: 10.1353/wp.1997.0009.
Dahl, R.A. (1982). Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Diamond, L.J. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, L.J. (2002). Elections Without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.
Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 21–35. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0025.
Diamond, L., Linz, J.J., & Lipset, S.M. (Eds.). (1999). Democracy in Developing Countries
(2nd Ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Dimitrova, A.L. (2018). The Uncertain Road to Sustainable Democracy: Elite Coalitions,
Citizen Protests and the Prospects of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. East
European Politics, 34(3), 257–275. DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2018.1491840.
Dunn, K.C. (2009). ‘Sons of the Soil’ and Contemporary State Making: Autochthony,
Uncertainty and Political Violence in Africa. Third World Quarterly, 30(1), 113–127.
DOI: 10.1080/01436590802622417.
R y s z a r d F i c e k  • Hybrid Regimes and Political (Dis)Order 69

Egnell, R., & Haldén, P. (2013). Introduction: The Need for New Agendas in Statebuilding.
In: R. Egnell, & P. Haldén (Eds.). New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency
and History (pp. 1–10). London–New York: Routledge.
Ekman, J. (2009). Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Ana-
lyzing Hybrid Regimes. International Political Science Review, 30(1), 7–31. DOI:
10.1177/0192512108097054.
Erdmann, G., & Engel, U. (2007). Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review
and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 45(1),
95–119. DOI: 10.1080/14662040601135813.
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2018). How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization,
and Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ghani, A., & Lockhart, C. (2008). Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Frac-
tured World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gill, G. (2012). The Decline of a Dominant Party and the Destabilization of Electoral Au-
thoritarianism? Post-Soviet Affairs, 28(4), 449–471. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.28.4.449.
Haldén, P. (2013). Against Endogeneity: The Systemic Preconditions of State Formation.
In: R. Egnell, & P. Haldén (Eds.). New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency
and History (pp. 32–54). London–New York: Routledge.
Hallenberg, M. (2013). The Local Adaptation of Centralizing Politics: Hybrid Statebuilding in
Sixteenth-Century Sweden. In: R. Egnell, & P. Haldén (Eds.). New Agendas in Statebuild-
ing: Hybridity, Contingency and History (pp. 122–142). London–New York: Routledge.
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research
Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725–740. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592704040472.
Howard, M.M., & Roessler, Ph.G. (2006). Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive
Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science, 50(2), 365–381. DOI:
10.1111/J.1540-5907.2006.00189.X.
Kaplan, S.D. (2008). Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development. Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International.
Levene, M. (2000). The Limits of Tolerance: Nation-State Building and What It Means for Mi-
nority Groups. Patterns of Prejudice, 34(2), 19–40. DOI: 10.1080/00313220008559138.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L.A. (2002). Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0026.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L.A. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the
Cold War. New York–Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Linz, J.J. (1970). An Authoritarian Regime: Spain. In: E. Allardt, S. Rokkan, & S.M. Lipset
(Eds.). Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (pp. 251–283). New York: Free Press.
Linz, J.J. (2000). Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Linz, J.J., & Stepan, A. (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and
Reequilibration. An Introduction. Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Linz, J.J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: South-
ern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore & London: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Mac Ginty, R., & Sanghera, G. (2012). Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Develop-
ment: An Introduction. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 7(2), 3–8. DOI:
10.1080/15423166.2012.742800.
70 H i s t o r i a i Po l i t y k a • N o . 4 6 ( 5 3 ) / 2 0 2 3
Papers

Mehler, A. (2002). Decentralization, Division of Power and Crisis Prevention: A Theoretical

Exploration with Reference to Africa. In: T. Debiel, & A. Klein (Eds.). Fragile Peace: State
Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions (pp. 72–85). New York: Zed Books.
Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and Defective Democracies. Democratization, 11(5), 33–58.
DOI: 10.1080/13510340412331304598.
Migdal, J.S., & Schlichte, K. (2005). Rethinking the State. In: K. Schlichte (Ed.). The Dynam-
ics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination (pp. 1–40). Aldershot: Ashgate.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
O’Donnell, G.A. (1994). Delegative Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 55–69. DOI:
10.1353/jod.1994.0010.
Pieterse, J.N. (2001). Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions. London: Sage
Publications.
Renders, M., & Terlinden, U. (2010). Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order: The
Case of Somaliland. Development and Change, 41(4), 723–746. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
7660.2010.01652.x.
Richmond, O.P., & Mitchell, A. (2012). Introduction: Towards a Post-Liberal Peace:
Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, Agency and Autonomy. In:
O.P. Richmond, & A. Mitchell (Eds.). Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to
Post-Liberalism (pp. 1–38). Basingstoke–New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Roberts, D. (2008). Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: Advanced Lessons in
Statebuilding from Cambodia. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2(1), 63–86.
DOI: 10.1080/17502970701592298.
Roessler, R., & Howard, M.M. (2009). Post-Cold War Political Regimes: When Do Elections
Matter? In: S. Lindberg (Ed.). Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition
(pp. 101–127). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Schedler, A. (2013). The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Author-
itarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schumpeter, J. (1947). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (2nd Ed.). New York: Harper.
Schwartz, B. (1995). The Diversity Myth: America’s Leading Export. Atlantic Monthly,
275(5), 57–67.
Tamanha, B.Z. (2000). A Non- Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism. Journal of Law and
Society, 27(2), 296–321. DOI: 10.1111/1467-6478.00155.
Ubink, J. (2008). Traditional Authorities in Africa: Resurgence in an Era of Democratisation.
Leiden: Leiden University Press.
Wahman, M., Teorell, J., & Hadenius, A. (2013). Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited:
Updated Data in Comparative Perspective. Contemporary Politics, 19(1), 19–34. DOI:
10.1080/13569775.2013.773200.
Wigell, M. (2008). Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative
Politics. Democratization, 15(2), 230–250. DOI: 10.1080/13510340701846319.
Williams, J.M. (2010). Chieftaincy, the State and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apart-
heid South Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.