2025 INSC 627

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.12658 OF 2025

(Diary No.53097/2024)

SANTOSH DEVI Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

SUNDER Respondent(s)

O R D E R

J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

1. Delay condoned in filing and refiling the SLP.

2. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated

23.7.2024 in Regular Second Appeal No. 520/2020 by which the

High Court dismissed the second appeal preferred by the

petitioner herein and thereby affirmed the judgment and order

passed by the First Appellate Court affirming the judgment and

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
CHANDRESH
Date: 2025.05.05
[Link] IST
Reason:
1
decree passed by the trial court dismissing the suit.

3. The petitioner is before us against the concurrent findings of

three Courts.

4. It appears from the materials on record that the petitioner

herein instituted Civil Suit No.310-RBT of 2012 in the Court of

the Additional Civil Judge (SD), Ganaur for declaration with

consequential, mandatory as well as permanent injunction.

5. In the plaint, the petitioner prayed for the following reliefs:-

“It is, therefore, prayed that a decree for

declaration may kindly be granted declaring the
sale deed no.638 dated 26.05.2008 as well as
mutation no. 5340 dt.29.08.2008 be set aside to
the extent of 1/2 share executed in favour of the
defendant Sunder, who fraudulently, forcibly get
executed the sale dead and sanctioned mutation
to the extent of 1/2 share of the suit land in his
favour.

It is, therefore further prayed that a decree for

mandatory injunction may kindly be passed in
favour of the plaintiff against the defendant
directing the defendant to get executed and
registered the sale deed as well as rectified the
mutation no. 5340 dt. 29.08.2008 to the extent
of ½ share of the land detailed in para no.2 of
the plaint in favour of the plaintiff, which he got
fraudulently, wrongly, illegally got registered in
his own favour against the sale consideration

2
 already paid by the plaintiff to the vender, in
favour of the plaintiff without getting any sale
consideration and stamp and registration at his
own risk and costs.

It is further prayed that a decree for permanent

injunction may kindly be passed in favour of the
plaintiff against the defendant restraining him
from alienating any art of the suit land detailed
in para no.2 of the plaint, under the grab of
wrong illegal sale deed no. 638 dt. 26.05.08 and
mutation no. 5340 dt. 29.08.08 forcibly and
illegally to any person for all time to come.”

6. Insofar as the averments regarding the cause of action as

pleaded in the plaint is concerned, the same reads thus:-

“That the cause of action firstly secured to the

plaintiff only on 26.05.2008, the date of
execution and registration of the sale deed to the
extent of ½ share of land in favour of defendant
out of the suit land. Secondly in March, 2010
when the plaintiff came to know about the above
wrong, illegal sale deed to the extent of ½ share
in favour of the defendant, and then on
19.09.2012 the date of serving the legal notice
through registered post upon the defendant, and
lastly on 08.10.2012, the date of last refusal by
the defendant to accede the genuine request of
the plaintiff.”

7. The trial court framed the following issues for its

3
consideration:-

“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree

of declaration that the sale deed No.638 dated
26.5.2008 and its mutation No.5340 dated
29.8.2008 are illegal, null and void to the extent
of ½ share as prayed for ? OPP.

2. Whether the defendant is liable to be directed

to get executed and registered the sale deed as
well as rectified the mutation No.5340 dated
29.8.2006(sic) to the extent of ½ share of the
land detailed in para No.2 of the plaint in favour
of plaintiff, as prayed for ? OPP.

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of

permanent injunction as prayed for ? OPP.

4. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is not

maintainable in the present form ? OPD.

5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action

and locus-standi to file the present suit ? OPD.

6. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the

court with clean hands and has suppressed the
material facts from the Court ? OPD.

7. Whether the suit is barred by law of

limitation ? OPD.

8. Whether the plaintiff has not affixed the ad-

volerum court fee, thus suit is liable to fail?
OPD.”

8. It appears from the materials on record that the trial court

4
essentially dismissed the suit on the point of limitation. We may

quote the relevant findings recorded by the trial court in this

regard:-

“The relevant extract of his cross-examination is

reproduced here under :-

...Yaha Thik Hai Ki Registry Likhne Ke Bad Ram

Parshad Arjinawis Ne Hum Sabhi Ko Padkar
Suna Di Thi Aur Sabi Ne Thik Mankar Apne Apne
Anguthe Dastak Kiye The…”

Similarly, the vendor of the impugned sale deed

– [Link].8 has deposed that he put his signature
on the impugned sale deed at the instance of
plaintiff. The relevant extract of his cross-
examination is reproduced here under :-

“...Meine Bhimsain Ke Kehne Par Thik

Mankar Apne Sign Kiye The…”

Plaintiff himself has claimed in his cross-

examination that he put his signatures after
reading last one and half line which was
pertaining to payment of the sale consideration.
Meaning thereby, plaintiff himself has also
admitted that he was present at the time of
execution of the impugned sale deed; put his
signatures and appeared before Sub Registrar.
This deposition of plaintiff that he just read last
one and half line is not comprehendable as he is
an educated property dealer. Though, at this
juncture, the execution of impugned sale deed
without payment stood established yet, from the

5
 aforesaid discussion, it is abundantly clear on
file that factum of execution of impugned sale
deed to the extent of ½ share in favour of
defendant was in his notice/knowledge at the
time of execution of the impugned sale deed itself
i.e. on 26.5.2009.”

9. The trial court relied upon the decision of this Court

rendered in the case of Janardhanam Prasad vs. Ramdas , (2007)

2 LJR 783, for the proposition that the period of limitation for

the purpose of seeking cancellation of sale deed would be from

the date of registration of the sale deed.

10. The suit ultimately came to be dismissed.

11. The first appeal filed by the petitioner also came to be

dismissed. The First Appellate Court recorded the following

findings:-

“20. I have given thoughtful consideration to the

submissions made by both sides. It is pertinent to
note that a reading of the impugned sale deed
Ex.P18 reveals that the plaintiff is also a
signatory to the sale deed. It is also noteworthy
that the plaintiff admitted his signatures on the
sale deed during his cross-examination as
PW.10. It is further significant to note that PW.5
Ram Parshad, Deed Writer stated that the sale
deed was prepared by him as per instructions of

6
the parties and the contents of the same were
read over and explained to the parties who
accepted them to be correct and thereafter
affixed their thumb impressions and signatures
on the same. It is also relevant to note that PW.7
Rameshwar Dass- Numberdar who is attesting
witness to the sale deed admitted during his
cross-examination that the contents of the sale
deed were read over by the Deed Writer before all
the parties who accepted them to be correct and
thereafter affixed their thumb impressions and
signatures on the same. It is further worthwhile
to note that PW.8 Ajit Kumar-vendor has made a
similar statement in his cross-examination. It is
also important to note that the sale deed Ex.P18
is registered document which bears endorsement
of the Sub- Registrar that its contents were read
over and explained to the parties who accepted
them are to be correct and said endorsement
carries presumption of truth as per Sub Section
(2) of Section 60 of the Registration Act, 1908. In
these facts and circumstances of the case, I am
of the considered opinion that it is duly
established that plaintiff was duly aware about
the execution and registration of the sale deed
Ex.P18 in his name and in the name of
defendant to the extent of half share each since
its execution and registration and plea of fraud
taken by the plaintiff is not tenable. Accordingly,
the plaintiff could have challenged the sale deed
within three years from its registration i.e.
26.05.2008. However, the case in hand was filed
on 12.10.2012. At this juncture, I may also
observe that the provision for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 does not apply to suits. Therefore, the

7
argument of plaintiff that he was not well and
thereby prevented by a sufficient cause from
filing the suit within prescribed time cannot be
looked into. Consequently, the suit of the
plaintiff is hopelessly barred by limitation.

21. It is further imperative to note that even if it

is believed for the sake of arguments, that
plaintiff paid the entire sale consideration for
purchasing the land which is subject matter of
the sale deed under challenge, it is duly
established as already discussed above that
plaintiff was aware of the fact that defendant
was recorded owner in possession of the land to
the extent of half share since the very beginning.
Thus, when the plaintiff allowed the defendant
to get his name incorporated in the sale deed as
owner of half share of the land, the stand of
plaintiff that he is the absolute owner of the
land because he paid the entire sale
consideration, is hit by Section 4 of the Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. It is also
pertinent to mention that the law laid down in
Manoj Arora Vs. Mamta Arora (supra) which is
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff does not apply to the present lis as in
that case the plaintiff had purchased the
property in the name of his wife and in these
circumstances it was ruled that bar of Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Act will not apply to
the claim of husband over the suit property.
However, in the instant case the plaintiff and
defendant are not husband and wife or otherwise
closely related to each other.

22. In view of above discussion and peculiar

8
 facts and circumstances of the present lis, the
citations relied upon by the plaintiff are
distinguishable and not applicable to the case in
hand and no decree as prayed for can be passed
in favour of plaintiff. Consequently, the suit of
plaintiff has rightly been dismissed by the Trial
Court. Resultantly, no interference in this appeal
is warranted and the appeal is dismissed.
Parties are left to bear their own costs. Decree-
sheet be prepared accordingly. Trial Court record
along with copy of this Judgment be sent to Trial
Court for information. Appeal file be consigned
to record room.”

12. The petitioner preferred second appeal before the High

Court. The High Court dismissed the second appeal holding as

under:-

“6. A registered sale deed executed in favour of

two purchasers cannot be modified/rectified
merely on account of the fact that the payment
has been made from the plaintiff's account,
particularly, when they were working together as
the property brokers. Only they are aware of the
equation between them. In any case, the plaintiff
may have a right to recover the amount, if the
respondent has failed to pay his contribution.
However, that will be subject to the rendition of
accounts between the plaintiff and the
respondents. As regards the second argument, it
would be noted that Order VII Rule 6 of the Code
of Civil Procedure,1908, provides for exemption
arising out of the Limitation Law. It does not

9
 provide for extending the period of limitation or
condonation in filing the suit. It only suggests
that the ground of exemption from limitation
should be specifically pleaded in the plaint.
Order VII Rule 6 does not provide a remedy, it
merely lays down a procedure.”

13. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner is

here before this Court with the present petition.

14. We heard Ms. Srishti Singla, the learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner at length.

15. The learned counsel pressed into service two submissions.

The first submission is with regard to Order VII Rule 6 of the Civil

Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “the CPC”). The Order VII Rule 6

of CPC reads thus:-

“7. PLAINT

6. Grounds of exemption from limitation law.—

Where the suit is instituted after the expiration
of the period prescribed by the law of
limitation, the plaint shall show the ground
upon which exemption from such law is
claimed:

Provided that the Court may permit the

plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of
limitation on any ground not set out in the

10
 plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with
the grounds set out in the plaint.”

16. The second submission is with respect to Section 17 of the

Limitation Act. Section 17 reads thus:-

“17. Effect of fraud or mistake.—(1) Where, in the

case of any suit or application for which a
period of limitation is prescribed by this Act,—
(a) the suit or application is based upon the
fraud of the defendant or respondent or his
agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a
suit or application is founded is concealed by the
fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the suit or application is for relief from the
consequences of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish
the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been
fraudulently concealed from him;

the period of limitation shall not begin to run

until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered
the fraud or the mistake or could, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered it, or in
the case of a concealed document, until the
plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of
producing the concealed document or compelling
its production:

Provided that nothing in this section shall enable

any suit to be instituted or application to be
made to recover or enforce any charge against,
or set aside any transaction affecting, any

11
 property which—

(i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for

valuable consideration by a person who was not
a party to the fraud and did not at the time of
the purchase know, or have reason to believe,
that any fraud had been committed, or

(ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased

for valuable consideration subsequently to the
transaction in which the mistake was made, by a
person who did not know, or have reason to
believe, that the mistake had been made, or

(iii) in the case of a concealed document, has

been purchased for valuable consideration by a
person who was not a party to the concealment
and, did not at the time of purchase know, or
have reason to believe, that the document had
been concealed.

(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or

force, prevented the execution of a decree or
order within the period of limitation, the court
may, on the application of the judgment-creditor
made after the expiry of the said period extend
the period for execution of the decree or order:

Provided that such application is made within

one year from the date of the discovery of the
fraud or the cessation of force, as the case may
be.”

17. To appreciate the findings arrived at by the Courts below, we

must first see on whom the onus of proof lies. The record reveals

12
that the disputed document is a registered sale deed. It is not in

dispute that the petitioner has signed the sale deed. We are,

therefore, guided by the settled legal principle that a document is

presumed to be genuine if the same is registered, as held by this

Court in Prem Singh and Ors. v. Birbal and Ors. reported in

(2006) 5 SCC 353. The relevant portion of the said decision reads

as below:

“27. There is a presumption that a registered docu-

ment is validly executed. A registered document, there-
fore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of
proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence
to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respond-
ent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.”
(Emphasis supplied)

In view thereof, in the present case, the initial onus was on

the plaintiff, who had challenged the sale deed.

18. When fraud is alleged against the defendant, it is an acknow-

ledged rule of pleading that the plaintiff must set forth the par-

ticulars of the fraud which he alleges. In the present case, fraud

is alleged as a ground upon which the plaintiff justifies the insti-

tution of the suit long after the expiry of the period normally al-

13
lowed for the institution of the suit. Though no specific reference

to the provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for

short, ‘the Limitation Act’) is made in the plaint, it is manifest

that the pleading proceeds upon the hypothesis that the plaintiff

had also contributed along with the defendant in the purchase of

the subject property and at the time of the sale, the plaintiff was

entitled to 50% of the sale consideration. In other words, the

fraud was played upon the plaintiff to sign the sale deed and

thereby transfer the subject property. The requirement of Order

VII Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, are clear. It is necessary that

the plaint should show the ground upon which the exemption

from the normal period of limitation is claimed. The question is

whether the plaint in this case fulfils the requirements of law. As

observed by Lord Selborne in Walling Ford vs. Mutul Society re-

ported in (1880) 5 A.C. 685:

“With regard to fraud, if there be any principle

which is perfectly well settled, it is that general
allegations however strong be the words in which
they are stated, are insufficient even to amount
to an averment of fraud of which any Court
ought to take notice.”

14
19. It is not the mere use of general words such as ‘fraud’ that

can serve as the foundation for the plea. Such expressions are

quite ineffective to give the legal basis in the absence of particu-

lar statements of fact which alone can furnish the requisite basis

for the action.

20. Order VII Rule 6 uses the words “the plaint shall show the

ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed”. The ex-

emption provided under Sections 4 to 20 of the Limitation Act

are based on certain facts and events. Section 17, with which we

are concerned, provides for a fresh period of limitation, which is

founded on certain facts.

21. The matter can also be looked at from a different angle. As-

suming for the moment that the defendant was a party to the

fraud as alleged relating to the sale transaction, whether the same

by itself is sufficient to save limitation under Section 17 of the

Limitation Act. We are of the opinion that the fraud relating to

the sale transaction as alleged itself would not help the plaintiff

in getting over the plea of limitation in this case. As already dis-

15
cussed, under Section 17 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff

should have been kept out of knowledge of his right to sue by

means of fraud. We are of the opinion that the alleged fraud relat-

ing to the sale transaction itself has nothing to do with the ques-

tion viz., that the plaintiff had been kept out of knowledge of his

right to file a suit for cancellation of the sale deed because of

fraud.

22. In overall view of the matter, we are of the view that no

error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been

committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment

and order.

23. The Special Leave Petition stands, accordingly, dismissed.

24. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

…...............................J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)

..................................J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
New Delhi
May 2, 2025

16