DOCUMENT TITLE:
FITNESS FOR SERVICE ASSESSMENT
Level 1
As per API 579-1 & API 570/ASME FFS-1 2007
Assessment of Fire Damage & Metal Loss
Crude Distillation Unit
PREPARED FOR:
PETROJAM, JAMAICA
PREPARED BY:
TECHCORR USA MANAGEMENT, LLC
www.techcorr.com
03-29-2024 0 ISSUED FOR REVIEW / APPROVAL MG GD OD
REV. APPD. APPD.
DATE REASON FOR REVISION PREPARED CHECKED
N° TECHCORR COMPANY
DOCUMENT NUMBER: GS-FFS-PJ JOB NUMBER:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. DISCLAIMER ....................................................................................................3
2. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................4
3. SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................................5
4. INSPECTION PLAN ..........................................................................................5
5. METODOLOGY ................................................................................................5
6. UNIT PLOT PLANS WITH HEAT AFFECTED ZONES .............................7
7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ...............................................................................9
8. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................. 135
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1. DISCLAIMER
The data acquired by TechCorr USA professionals is collected by visual inspection and/or by other
means or apparatus indicated in the resulting report provided to the contact representative of the
client. The inspection and testing services performed by TechCorr USA is limited in scope, to the
acquisition and reporting of such data, and the extent, and performance of such inspection is limited
by the accessibility of the equipment as controlled by the Owner.
Interpretation of the data obtained during the inspection and/or testing process, as well as
determinations concerning safety and serviceability of such equipment, are an engineering function
and, as such, are beyond the scope of the inspection services which are performed by TechCorr USA.
Any interpretation of data contained in the documentation and/or in the field reports issued at the
time of the inspection are offered only as an accommodation to the Owner’s maintenance efforts and
are not intended as a substitute for the independent interpretation of such data by a qualified
engineering representative assigned by the Owner, unless specified by the Owner that such services
are a part of the subsequent reporting.
TechCorr USA suggests no representations, warranties, or guarantees with respect to the data
obtained, performance, safety, or serviceability of any equipment inspected, and no representations,
warranties, or guarantees are to be implied, without request for third party engineering involvement.
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2. INTRODUCTION
The Petrojam Refinery processes hydro-skimming to obtain Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG); Gasoline;
Kerosene/Jet Fuel; Automotive Diesel Oil (ADO); Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO); Very Low Sulphur Fuel
Oil (VLSFO); and Asphalt.
In March of this year, a fire occurred in said facilities, which impacted pressure vessels T-3, E-12,
D-1, E-85, D-82, and E-4; pumps P6, P6A, P4, P4A, P5, P5A, P9, P9A, P7, P7A, P2, P2A and
P82; together with the associated process piping.
The fire occurred on March 5, 2024, at 18:33 hours., stemming from the ½” nipple connection at
the discharge side of pump P-6A for approximately 45 minutes duration.
The second fire source occurred as a consequence of the first source, the same day at 18:35 hours,
at the air-cooled heat exchanger E-4 for approximately a 4-hour duration.
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3. SCOPE OF WORK
TechCorr was contracted to perform a Fitness for Service (FFS) Assessment for all the equipment
and related piping that were affected during the fire at the Crude Distillation Unit. The purpose of
this examination was to determine the current state of the impact for Heat Exposure Zones.
This is an executive summary report with all the findings, conclusion, and recommendations
produced by the API 579 fire assessment investigation. Additional information can be found in the
specific reports.
4. INSPECTION PLAN
The inspection team conducted the following tasks to assess the equipment and piping involved in
this incident.
• API 510 Report for 6 pressure vessels.
• API 570 Report on 14 piping systems.
• NDE Inspection Test Plan Reports (MT, PMI, Metallographic Analysis, UT, and Hardness
Testing).
• Fitness for Service Report.
• 3D Digital imagine, including locations and reports.
• Failure Analysis Report on pump P-6A Nipple.
• Stress Analysis, FEA Simulation, and Repair Procedure of Tower T-3 Skirt.
5. METHODOLOGY
The focus of this evaluation was to determine the mechanical integrity of pressure vessels and related
piping through the general metal loss and fire damage fitness for service evaluation. For this, the
evidence and data from the fire, and the data collected in the API 510/API 570 and NDE inspection,
were used.
Calculations were performed for each pressure vessel and related piping component and the
following criteria were used to determine the acceptance of each:
• Fire Damage Assessment Level 1: Acceptability criteria for continuous service based on heat
exposure zone and construction material. Below are the Heat Exposure Zones descriptions.
• General Metal Loss Assessment Level 1:
o Average Measured Thickness from Point Thickness Readings as per API 579-1 2021 Fitness
For Service.
o Minimum Measured Thickness as per API 579-1 2021 Fitness For Service
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Table 1: Description of Haet Exposure Zones to Evaluate Fire Damage.
Heat
Exposure Description Materials / Forms or Usage / Thermal Effects
Zone
Ambient temperature during fire event,
I No damaging effects
no fire exposure
Ambient to 65°C (150°F); smoke and
II No damaging effects
water exposure
Damage to coatings, electrical parts, hoses, gaskets, diaphragms,
65°C to 205°C (150°F to 400°F); light
III fiberglass, etc. Damage may be softening, melting, burning /
heat exposure
charring
Tempered aluminum alloys - Pipe and tanks: Reduced strength
Steel – machined or polished - Machinery or instrument parts:
> 205°C to 425°C (>400°F to Develops blue temper color.
IV
800°F); moderate heat exposure Zinc/aluminum die casting - Small valve handles and instrument
parts: Melts.
Zinc - Galvanized coating for steel structures: Melts.
Quenched and Tempered Steels - Springs, fasteners, 4140, etc.,
(particularly socket head cap screws): Tempering to lower strength.
18-8 Stainless Steel - Vessels, piping etc.: Sensitized (carbide PPT)
and reduced corrosion resistance.
> 425°C to 730°C (>800°F to
V Steel - Vessels and piping: Thermal distortion and creep, some heat
1350°F); heavy heat exposure
scale.
Steel - Vessels, piping, structures: Rapid oxidation -- thick black
scale.
Aluminum - Tanks, piping, accessories: Melts.
Steel - Vessels and piping: Iron carbide (cementite) spheroidizes.
Steel - All forms -- low alloy most susceptible: Austenitizes -- slow
cool equals anneal, fast quench turns hard and brittle.
Zinc - Galvanizing on steel: Oxidizes to white powder or vaporizes.
> 730°C (>1350°F); severe heat Copper - Tubing, pipe, etc.: Melts.
VI
exposure Alloy C-276 - Vessel, pipe: Melts.
316 SS – cast - Pumps, valves: Melts.
316 SS – wrought - Vessels, pipe: Melts.
Steel - Various: Melts.
Titanium - Vessels, pipe, etc.: Melts.
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6. UNIT PLOT PLANS WITH HEAT AFFECTED ZONES.
Figure 2: Top View of the Heat Affected Zones.
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Figure 3: Side View of the Heat Affected Zones.
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7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS.
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Legend:
VT: Visual Test,
Metall.: Metallography,
UT: Ultrasonic Test,
HT: Hardness Test,
MT: Magnetic Test,
PMI: Positive Material Identification,
F.D.A.: Fire Damage Assessment,
HEZ: Heat Exposure Zones.
8. CONCLUSIONS.
• Field inspection results and Fitness for Service analysis conclude that the material of the vessels
and piping system were not damaged by the heat of the fire.
• Therefore, it will be safe to operate at the designed conditions if routine inspections and the
recommended maintenance are performed.
• T-3 Skirt needs to be repaired to recover the structural integrity.
• At the location of the buckle, a combination of hydraulic jacks placed at the I.D. and a qualified
pre heating process from the O.D. is suggested to adequately reinstate the tower to its original
curvature or within allowed tolerances prior to the final mechanical repair.
• As simulated, a welded patch shall be placed and welded.
• The TFM inspection carried out to check the integrity of the Tower anchor bolts detected the
presence of cracks on bolts 3, 9, and 15 (Refer to TFM Report). These bolts are separated from
each other 120 Deg.
• As a result, an additional FEA determined that the minimum number of bolts required to support
the tower under these conditions is 12.
Written by:
Oswaldo Diaz
Metallurgical Engineer.
TechCorr Advanced NDE Manager
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