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End-term examination
Part A
Answer 1
(a) Claims under GATT that Canland and Mexland can raise against Unionland and Panel Body
Assessment
The discriminatory trade measures imposed by Unionland against Canland and Mexland raise
several legal concerns under the GATT 1994. These measures namely, the imposition of a 5%
ad valorem customs users fee on high-tech semiconductors from Canland and Mexland and the
requirement of a certificate of origin for imported semiconductor products are inconsistent with
several GATT obligations. As legal counsel for Canland and Mexland, multiple claims can be
31 advanced to establish violations of GATT Articles I:1, III:4, II:1(b), XI:1, and potentially
XXIII:1(a), supported by WTO jurisprudence and interpretive methodology.
26 First, the 5% fee violates the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle under Article I:1. As
2 clarified in Canada – Autos, MFN obligations require that any advantage, favor, privilege, or
7 immunity granted to a product from one WTO Member must be extended "immediately and
unconditionally" to like products from all Members. The key test, as laid down in Spain –
1 Unroasted Coffee, is whether there is a measure, whether it confers an advantage, whether the
products are “like,” and whether the advantage is extended without discrimination. In this case,
the fee applies exclusively to high-tech semiconductors from Canland and Mexland, while the
same products from Koland, Inland, and Germland are exempt. High-tech semiconductors are
physically and functionally identical regardless of origin, satisfying the likeness criterion.
Thus, Unionland’s policy constitutes de jure discrimination between like products based on
1 country of origin and is inconsistent with the MFN requirement.
15 Second, a clear violation arises under Article III:4, which guarantees national treatment in
respect of laws and regulations affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, or use of imported
products. The origin certificate requirement, imposed only on foreign products, directly affects
4 the conditions of competition in the internal market. As noted in US – Section 337, even
procedural asymmetries that disadvantage imports violate Article III:4. Since Unionland’s
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domestic semiconductor producers are not subjected to similar administrative burdens, the
12 measure accords less favorable treatment to like imported products.
Further, the 5% customs user fee may violate Article II:1(b), which prohibits WTO Members
from imposing tariffs above their bound rates. According to India – Additional Import Duties,
1 a Member cannot impose additional charges that are not ordinary customs duties unless they
are equivalent to internal taxes in compliance with Article II:2(a). If Unionland’s bound rate
on high-tech semiconductors is zero or lower than the applied 5%, and the fee cannot be
demonstrated as an internal charge equivalent to those imposed on like domestic goods, it
would amount to a breach of Unionland’s Schedule.
A potential indirect violation of Article XI:1 can also be alleged. Article XI:1 prohibits
quantitative restrictions, including measures that act as import restraints in form or in effect.
The certification requirement and the fee, though not quotas or bans, could function as trade
impediments by raising costs or delaying imports. As clarified in India – Quantitative
Restrictions, administrative or procedural hurdles that restrict trade access are considered
1 within the scope of Article XI:1.
4 Finally, Canland and Mexland may bring a violation complaint under Article XXIII:1(a) of
GATT 1994, asserting that the challenged measures nullify or impair benefits they expected
1 under the agreement. As stated in EC – Asbestos, the nullification or impairment of benefits
can exist even when the measures are facially lawful, so long as they upset legitimate
expectations tied to market access commitments.
1 In sum, the measures imposed by Unionland are inconsistent with the core principles of the
2 GATT: MFN treatment, national treatment, tariff bindings, and the prohibition of quantitative
restrictions. Each of these violations, backed by well-established WTO jurisprudence, would
33 support a strong case before the Dispute Settlement Body. The Panel is likely to find Unionland
2 in breach of its GATT obligations and recommend that the offending measures be brought into
conformity with WTO law.
17 (b) Can Unionland invoke any exceptions under GATT to justify its measures?
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1 Unionland may attempt to justify its measures under the general exceptions provided in Article
16 XX of the GATT, specifically paragraphs (b) and (d), or under the security exception in Article
XXI. However, each of these defenses is unlikely to succeed under WTO scrutiny.
14
1 Under Article XX(b), a Member may adopt measures "necessary to protect human, animal or
1 plant life or health." However, such measures must meet a stringent legal test, as articulated in
12 US – Gasoline and EC – Asbestos. The Member must demonstrate that the measure is designed
6 to protect health, is necessary to achieve that goal, and complies with the chapeau of Article
XX (i.e., it must not be applied in a manner constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or a disguised restriction on international trade). Unionland may argue that its restrictions are
intended to prevent circumvention of sanctions on Cheeland, which it claims poses security
and health risks. However, the measures apply only to Canland and Mexland, without any
evidence linking them to Cheeland's banned products. The selective application undermines
the argument that the measure is genuinely health-protective. As such, the necessity
requirement and the chapeau are not met.
42 Similarly, under Article XX(d), Unionland may argue that the measures are necessary to
enforce domestic laws banning Cheeland’s products. This requires demonstrating that the
1 certificate and fee are necessary to secure compliance and that no less trade-restrictive
1 alternatives are available. However, as established in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the
3 test includes a balancing of the measure’s trade-restrictiveness against its contribution to the
enforcement objective. In this case, Unionland has not provided credible evidence that Canland
16 or Mexland are involved in sanction evasion. Therefore, the measure is unlikely to satisfy the
"necessity" test or the chapeau requirement of Article XX.
22 Unionland might also invoke the security exception under Article XXI(b)(iii), claiming that
19 the measures protect its essential security interests during a time of emergency in international
36 relations. However, as clarified in Russia – Transit, while Article XXI is self-judging, the Panel
still examines whether the circumstances genuinely constitute an "emergency." In this dispute,
there is no war or armed conflict; the issue stems from a 2020 economic sanction and tech theft
dispute with Cheeland. WTO jurisprudence requires a present and objective threat—not merely
geopolitical tensions or economic concerns. The lack of immediacy or specific evidence makes
it unlikely that the Panel would uphold this defense.
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5 Thus, Unionland’s measures fail to satisfy the substantive and procedural requirements of the
GATT exceptions. The Panel is likely to conclude that the justifications under Articles XX and
XXI are unsubstantiated and that the measures remain inconsistent with Unionland’s WTO
obligations.
Answer 2
(a) Claims by Agrabah under the TBT Agreement
The Children Safety Act, 2024 (CSA), enacted by Endostan, bans the sale of dolls classified
under HSN 3.2.15 with lead content exceeding 100 PPM. This directly affects figurine dolls
imported from Agrabah, which typically contain 300–400 PPM lead. However, dolls from
Kamistan, known as Aris dolls, classified under HSN 3.1.10 and containing similar levels of
2 lead (200–300 PPM), remain unaffected. Agrabah, therefore, can raise viable claims under the
WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), particularly Articles 2.1, 2.2, and
2.5.
8 Under Article 2.1, WTO Members must ensure that technical regulations do not accord less
favorable treatment to imported products than that accorded to like domestic or other foreign
29 products. In US – Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body identified three criteria to evaluate
5 compliance: (a) the existence of a technical regulation, (b) the likeness of products, and (c)
whether imported products received less favorable treatment. The CSA qualifies as a “technical
regulation” as it imposes mandatory product characteristics (lead content limit), with legal
consequences for non-compliance, consistent with US – Tuna II (Mexico).
As for likeness, the figurine dolls and Aris dolls are physically similar (both painted and fabric-
covered), cater to the same consumer group (children aged 3–12), and serve similar end uses
40 (play and symbolic display). These likeness factors were affirmed in EC – Asbestos, where the
11 Appellate Body considered physical properties, end use, consumer perception, and tariff
classification. Even though Aris dolls are classified under a different HSN code, this does not
negate their likeness under WTO law.
The CSA bans only Agrabah’s dolls, thereby disadvantaging a specific product based on origin
and classification. This constitutes de facto discrimination, as held in Canada – Autos, where
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facially origin-neutral measures were found to confer an advantage selectively. Likewise, in
EC – Bananas, procedural rules benefitting specific exporters were held discriminatory.
Therefore, the CSA likely violates Article 2.1 by not treating like products equally.
10 Agrabah also has a strong claim under Article 2.2, which prohibits technical regulations that
are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective. Although protecting
41 children’s health is a recognized legitimate objective (Brazil – Tyres), the measure must not be
overly restrictive. The CSA applies selectively, excluding products like Aris dolls that pose
similar risks—despite the availability of less restrictive alternatives such as uniform labelling,
mandatory lead testing, or third-party certification. The absence of such options renders the
25 CSA more trade-restrictive than necessary and thus incompatible with Article 2.2.
Finally, Agrabah may invoke Article 2.5. This provision requires Members to justify deviations
from relevant international standards. The International Toy Council, comprising both
Endostan and Agrabah, published a report recommending a 100 PPM threshold. Although non-
binding, it represents an emerging international standard. As per US – COOL, Members must
explain any departure from such standards. Endostan applies the 100 PPM rule only to HSN
3.2.15 dolls, without scientific explanation for exempting Aris dolls from Kamistan. This
selective enforcement likely violates Article 2.5, given the absence of transparent justification.
4 In conclusion, Agrabah’s claims under Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.5 of the TBT Agreement are
strongly supported by WTO jurisprudence. The CSA’s selective and inconsistent application
1 amounts to de facto discrimination, is more trade-restrictive than necessary, and lacks adequate
2 justification under international standards. The Panel is likely to find the measure in violation
of Endostan’s TBT obligations.
(b) Endostan’s Defenses and Panel Assessment
5 Endostan will likely defend the CSA under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement by arguing that
the measure serves a legitimate objective: the protection of children’s health from exposure to
lead. The International Toy Council report endorsed by both parties demonstrates that lead
levels above 100 PPM in toys pose serious health risks to children. As in EC – Asbestos and
Brazil – Tyres, protecting human health is a valid objective under WTO law.
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3 However, a mere legitimate aim does not suffice. WTO panels assess whether the measure is
the least trade-restrictive option available. In Brazil – Tyres, the Appellate Body stressed the
32 need for a balancing exercise between the trade-restrictiveness of the measure and its
effectiveness. The CSA targets only dolls under HSN 3.2.15, excluding Aris dolls under HSN
3.1.10, even though they also contain lead above the prescribed threshold. Endostan may argue
4 that Aris dolls are religious items not meant for play and therefore not directly harmful. But in
EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body noted that a distinction in regulatory treatment must be
based on real and scientifically backed differences in risk—not assumed consumer behavior.
Unless Endostan can demonstrate with evidence that Aris dolls pose materially less risk, this
selective application weakens the legitimacy of the measure.
Endostan might also contend that tariff classification itself justifies differential treatment.
However, WTO law is clear that HSN codes are not determinative in assessing product likeness
or regulatory compliance. As emphasized in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, two products falling
under different HSN codes can still be like products if their use, physical features, and market
perception align, which is clearly the case here.
Lastly, the CSA’s preamble refers to psychological protection and shielding children from
24 “foreign propaganda.” This could raise concerns about the measure being a disguised
restriction on trade. In US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body rejected regulatory justifications that
appeared to mask protectionist intent.
20 Given the above, the Panel would likely find that the CSA violates Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement. The measure is discriminatory in practice, more trade-restrictive than
necessary, and not supported by objective or scientific reasoning. The Panel would likely
2 recommend that Endostan bring its measure into conformity with its WTO obligations by
ensuring uniform and non-discriminatory application of lead safety standards.
Part B
Answer 1
23
1 The WTO’s dispute settlement system has long been celebrated as the “jewel in the crown” of
2 the multilateral trading system, based on the integrated, binding two-tier framework under the
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2 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). However, as of 2025, that system remains fractured.
1 The continuing paralysis of the Appellate Body (AB) resulting from the United States'
persistent blockage of appointments since 2019 has fundamentally altered how appeals are
handled under DSU Article 17. Against this backdrop, WTO Members such as Nailand and
27 Lambodia have joined the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) under
DSU Article 25 to preserve a functioning appellate process. This essay examines the
37 implications of the Appellate Body crisis, the functioning of the MPIA as an alternative, and
how outcomes would differ if a disputing party were not an MPIA participant.
In a dispute between Nailand and Lambodia in 2025, the initial panel stage under the DSU
30 remains unaffected. Once consultations under Article 4 fail, a request for the establishment of
18 a panel under Article 6 leads to the constitution of an adjudicatory body to hear and decide the
case at first instance. This panel functions under the normal timelines and procedural
2 safeguards outlined in Articles 11–16. It prepares a report with findings on the consistency of
the contested measure with WTO obligations and recommends corrective steps if necessary.
9 The panel report is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) through the negative
consensus rule, unless appealed. In this first phase, there is no institutional dysfunction.
1 The complexity arises at the appellate stage. Under Article 17 of the DSU, Members have the
right to appeal issues of law covered in the panel report. However, the Appellate Body has been
3 defunct since 2019 due to the lack of quorum caused by the U.S. veto on judicial appointments.
As a result, if a party files a regular Article 17 appeal today, the report enters a procedural void,
often referred to as “appeal into the void”, where it remains unenforceable because the appeal
3 cannot be completed. This has led to a systemic risk that the WTO dispute settlement system
could be undermined by legal uncertainty and enforcement paralysis.
To mitigate this crisis, the MPIA was launched in 2020 by a coalition of WTO Members
committed to preserving a functional appellate mechanism. The MPIA is grounded in DSU
34 Article 25, which allows for arbitration as an alternative form of dispute resolution. It operates
through a standing pool of 10 arbitrators, appointed by consensus among participating
Members, from which three arbitrators are drawn per appeal. The procedures are designed to
35 mirror those of the original Appellate Body in terms of legal reasoning, scope of review,
timelines, and procedural fairness.
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In a dispute between Nailand and Lambodia, both being MPIA participants, the parties would
enter into a DSU Article 25 appeal arbitration agreement. They would notify the DSB jointly
28 and agree to suspend the panel proceedings up to 10 days before the circulation of the final
report. Once the suspension is in effect, the complaining party would file a notice of appeal,
accompanied by written submissions. The MPIA arbitration panel would then have 90 days to
issue a final, binding award. These awards are enforceable under the DSU’s post-adjudication
framework (Articles 21–22), ensuring continuity with the WTO’s rule-based system.
By using the MPIA, Nailand and Lambodia preserve the two-tier review model and avoid legal
limbo. The MPIA has already been used in cases such as EU – Palm Oil (Malaysia) and Turkey
– Pharmaceutical Products, and has demonstrated that binding adjudication with appellate
oversight remains feasible. The structure ensures impartiality and credibility, while upholding
the interpretive authority of WTO covered agreements, thereby maintaining the security and
predictability referenced in Article 3.2 of the DSU.
In contrast, if Lambodia were not an MPIA participant, the outcome would be starkly different.
Nailand could still file an appeal under Article 17, but with no Appellate Body in place, the
18 panel report would remain in legal limbo. This "appeal into the void" would effectively block
the adoption of the panel report indefinitely. As a result, Lambodia could delay compliance
and deny Nailand the fruits of a favorable ruling. This not only impedes enforcement but erodes
1 trust in the multilateral system, as highlighted in US – Section 301 Trade Act, where the
integrity of the WTO’s legal order was emphasized.
The strategic abuse of the appellate vacuum has become a pressing challenge. Without a
functional appeals process, the system's credibility weakens. Members are incentivized to
“appeal and escape” adverse rulings, undermining Articles 3.3 and 17.1 of the DSU, which
guarantee prompt resolution and the right to appellate review.
Though the MPIA serves as an effective interim mechanism, it is not a permanent fix. Its
applicability is confined to disputes between consenting Members. As a plurilateral
arrangement, it lacks the universality of the original AB and cannot bind non-participants. The
13 June 2022 WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) reaffirmed Members’ commitment to
restoring a “fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all Members by
2024.” Yet, as of 2025, consensus on institutional reform remains elusive.
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In conclusion, while WTO panels continue to function normally, the absence of a universal
appellate mechanism presents serious risks to the multilateral system. The MPIA offers a
legitimate and structured alternative for participating Members like Nailand and Lambodia,
preserving legal certainty and finality. However, for non-participants, the appellate void can be
exploited to stall justice. The MPIA is a critical stopgap, but a multilateral solution is essential
17 to fully restore the credibility and authority of the WTO’s dispute settlement framework.
Answer 3
2 The dispute DS777, Sokovia v. Latveria, centers around anti-dumping measures imposed by
Latveria on electric vehicles (EVs) imported from Sokovia. Latveria imposed a country-wide
dumping margin of 85%, calculated using prices from Wakanda, a high-income, luxury-EV-
producing third country, as a surrogate to determine normal value. Latveria justified this on the
basis that Sokovia is a non-market economy (NME), and claimed that Sokovian domestic
prices were too distorted to serve as a fair basis for comparison. The dispute raises important
legal questions under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), including compliance
with Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, and 6.10.
39 Sokovia argues that Latveria’s surrogate country methodology fails to satisfy the fair
comparison requirement under Article 2.4. Latveria’s use of Wakanda’s domestic prices to
determine normal value significantly inflates dumping margins, given that Wakandan EVs are
high-end products priced around USD 85,000, while Sokovian EVs are economy vehicles
priced closer to USD 28,000. The two product lines differ in terms of quality, technology,
market structure, and cost basis. This mismatch makes the surrogate data inappropriate and
renders the comparison fundamentally flawed. WTO jurisprudence supports Sokovia’s
1 position. In EC – Fasteners (China), the Appellate Body confirmed that the use of surrogate
data must not distort dumping margins and must account for differences in product
1 comparability and market structures. Similarly, in US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp
(Vietnam), the use of surrogate country prices was struck down when authorities ignored actual
available data from the exporting country.
Sokovia further challenges Latveria’s refusal to provide individual dumping margins to private
9 exporters. Article 6.10 of the ADA mandates that individual margins be determined for each
known exporter, unless it is impracticable. In this case, three firms—SokovAuto, Wanda
Motors, and Vision Electric—submitted detailed evidence showing independence from the
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Sokovian state in both ownership and pricing decisions. Despite this, Latveria applied a single
85% margin to all Sokovian firms, justifying the decision on grounds of administrative
impracticability and presumed state control. However, case law such as China – Broiler
Products and EC – Fasteners (China) confirms that even when an exporting country is
designated an NME, individual exporters that demonstrate sufficient independence must not
be denied the opportunity to obtain individual dumping margins. The ADA does not support
blanket presumptions of state control in lieu of examining firm-specific evidence.
21 In addition to Article 2.4 and 6.10 violations, Latveria also appears to have breached Article
2.2 of the ADA, which allows for the construction of normal value only when domestic prices
are unreliable. In such cases, the constructed value must reflect the actual costs of production
incurred by the exporters in question, plus reasonable profits. Latveria ignored cost data
submitted by the three independent firms and instead defaulted to Wakanda’s price and cost
38 structure. This is inconsistent with the reasoning in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), where the
Appellate Body emphasized that constructed values must be based on the exporter’s real costs
unless a reasoned justification is provided. The use of surrogate prices from a vastly different
market, without robust justification, undermines the objectivity required in a constructed value
analysis.
Latveria defends its methodology on the grounds that Sokovia is an NME, and thus its domestic
prices cannot be trusted due to state distortions. While WTO panels have acknowledged that
surrogate country methodologies may be permissible in cases of NMEs as in US – Anti-
Dumping Measures (China) this allowance is not absolute. The ADA does not contain a
separate NME clause; any surrogate use must still comply with Articles 2.2 and 2.4. Latveria’s
choice of Wakanda as a surrogate country despite the latter’s high production costs and
dissimilar product type undermines the legitimacy of this defense. Furthermore, even if
Sokovia is accepted as an NME, Latveria was still obligated to examine the independence
claims of Sokovian firms before assigning country-wide rates.
The claim that it was impracticable to assess individual margins also lacks credibility. Only
three firms requested individual treatment, and all submitted documentation sufficient to
demonstrate operational autonomy. In China – Broiler Products, the panel held that Article
6.10’s “impracticability” exception must be narrowly construed. Administrative burden alone
does not justify denial of individual assessment, especially where the number of exporters is
small and manageable.
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In light of the arguments and relevant jurisprudence, the Panel is likely to conclude that
Latveria violated its WTO obligations. Specifically, the use of Wakanda’s luxury EV pricing
as a surrogate violates the fair comparison obligation under Article 2.4. The blanket denial of
individual margins to autonomous exporters contravenes Article 6.10, and the failure to use
available cost data from Sokovia breaches Article 2.2 on constructed normal value. Latveria’s
reliance on NME status and impracticability lacks sufficient justification under WTO rules and
does not excuse compliance failures.
11 In conclusion, Latveria’s anti-dumping measures on Sokovian electric vehicles are inconsistent
with multiple provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The panel is likely to uphold
2 Sokovia’s claims and recommend that Latveria revise its methodology to ensure compliance
with WTO law. This case reaffirms that even in politically sensitive NME scenarios, the
WTO’s core principles of due process, transparency, and fair comparison must be upheld.
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