1. Sisti Marishay (suing as next friend of Emmanuel Didas) v.

The Board of Trustees –

a. Material Facts

On 26 October 2007, Emmanuel Didas was involved in a motorcycle accident in the Morocco
area of Dar es Salaam and was admitted to the Muhimbili Orthopaedic Institute (MOI). After an
X-ray, he was diagnosed with a torn patellar tendon and scheduled for surgery to remove a
blood clot from his knee. However, on 1 November 2007, due to a mix-up between the medical
records of two patients with similar names Emmanuel Didas and Emmanuel Mgaya Didas
underwent brain surgery instead of the intended knee surgery. This error led to severe physical
and mental impairments, including right-sided paralysis and aphasia. Despite efforts to resolve
the matter amicably, legal action was initiated, with Sisti Marishay acting as Didas's next friend.

b. Arguments of the Plaintiff

The plaintiff argued that the medical staff at MOI were negligent in mixing up the medical
records of two patients, leading to Didas undergoing an unnecessary brain surgery. As a result,
Didas suffered significant physical and mental impairments, including paralysis and loss of
speech. The plaintiff sought compensation for the damages suffered by Didas due to the
hospital's negligence.

c. Arguments of the Defendant (Defense Raised)

The defendants contended that the incident was a result of human error and not intentional
negligence. They argued that the hospital staff did not intend for the wrong surgery to occur
and that it was an unfortunate mistake. Additionally, the defendants claimed that Didas was
employed by MOI after his recovery, suggesting that he was physically fit and had returned to
work.

d. Arguments of the Court

The court examined the evidence presented, including medical reports and testimonies. It
acknowledged that the mix-up of medical records was a human error but emphasized that such
errors in a medical setting could have serious consequences. The court considered the extent of
Didas's impairments and the impact on his quality of life. It also noted that Didas's employment
at MOI after recovery did not negate the damages suffered due to the initial negligence.

e. Decision of the Court and Reason for the Decision (Ratio Decidendi)

1
CIVIL CASE NO. 129 OF 2012
The court found in favor of the plaintiff, holding the defendants liable for the medical
negligence that led to Didas's injuries. It awarded both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages
to compensate for the loss of earnings, the need for domestic help, and the pain and suffering
endured by Didas. The court emphasized that the compensation aimed to address the
permanent impairments and the diminished quality of life resulting from the negligent surgery.

f. Applicable Rule and Precedent Applied or Laid

The court applied principles of medical negligence and vicarious liability, holding the hospital
accountable for the actions of its staff. It also considered the need for compensation to address
both economic losses and non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering. While the
judgment did not explicitly reference specific precedents, it aligns with established legal
principles regarding medical negligence and the assessment of damages in personal injury
cases.

2. Francis Ngaire v. National Insurance Corporation of Tanzania Ltd 2

a. Material Facts

On 15 April 1968, Francis Ngaire was involved in a road accident in Dar es Salaam, resulting in
the loss of his right arm. The vehicle involved was owned by Mr. Mushi and driven by his
employee, Mr. Mohamedi. Subsequently, the driver was convicted of various traffic offenses
arising from the accident. On 6 March 1969, Ngaire's advocate, Mr. Chakera, contacted the
National Insurance Corporation (NIC) to inquire whether Mr. Mushi's vehicle was insured
against third-party risks. Mr. Mwaikambo, a clerk in the NIC's motor claims department,
confirmed that the vehicle was insured with the NIC and advised Mr. Chakera to send a copy of
the police report, which was promptly done. However, on 17 March 1969, the NIC's claims
manager sent a letter suggesting that Mr. Chakera contact the vehicle owner to confirm the
insurance status. Despite this suggestion, Mr. Chakera proceeded with civil proceedings against
Mr. Mushi and Mr. Mohamedi. On 13 September 1969, judgment was rendered in favor of
Ngaire, awarding damages of Shs. 50,000. Subsequently, the NIC denied liability, stating that
the vehicle was not insured with them at the time of the accident. In fact, the vehicle was
insured with the British India Insurance Company, but by then, Ngaire's claim against them was
time-barred. Ngaire then filed a tort action against the NIC for negligent misrepresentation.

b. Arguments of the Plaintiff

Ngaire contended that the NIC, through its employee Mr. Mwaikambo, negligently provided
false information regarding the insurance status of Mr. Mushi's vehicle. He argued that he
relied on this information to initiate legal proceedings and that the NIC's misrepresentation led
2
Civ. Case 130-DSM-70, 5/6/72
to his inability to recover damages from the actual insurer, British India Insurance Company,
due to the expiration of the limitation period. Ngaire sought compensation for the loss suffered
as a result of the NIC's negligence.

c. Arguments of the Defendant (Defense Raised)

NIC argued that they owed no duty of care to Ngaire regarding the information provided about
the vehicle's insurance status.They contended that any information given was not intended to
induce reliance and thus could not form the basis of a negligence claim.NIC claimed that even if
the information was incorrect, it did not cause Ngaire's inability to recover damages, as he
could have pursued other avenues.

d. Arguments of the Court

The court examined the facts and found that Mr. Mwaikambo, acting within the scope of his
duties, had provided false information regarding the insurance status of Mr. Mushi's vehicle.
The court noted that the NIC had a duty to exercise care in providing accurate information,
especially when such information was likely to be relied upon by third parties. The court also
considered the principle of estoppel, stating that when one person, by their declaration or act,
intentionally causes another to believe something to be true and to act upon that belief, they
are not allowed to deny the truth of that thing in subsequent proceedings.

e. Decision of the Court and Reason for the Decision (Ratio Decidendi)

The court ruled in favor of Ngaire, holding the NIC liable for negligent misrepresentation. It
awarded damages of Shs. 50,000, the same amount awarded in the earlier judgment against
Mr. Mushi and Mr. Mohamedi. The court emphasized that the NIC had a duty to provide
accurate information and that its failure to do so had caused Ngaire to suffer loss. The court
applied the principle of estoppel, preventing the NIC from denying the truth of its earlier
statements regarding the insurance status of the vehicle.

f. Applicable Rule and Precedent Applied or Laid

The court applied the principles of negligent misrepresentation and estoppel. It cited the case
of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd 3, where the House of Lords established that a
party who provides information or advice in the course of business owes a duty of care to those
who rely on it. The court also referred to Section 123 of the Evidence Act 4, which provides that
when one person, by their declaration or act, intentionally causes another to believe something

3
[1963] 2 All ER 575
4
1967
to be true and to act upon that belief, they are not allowed to deny the truth of that thing in
subsequent proceedings.

3. Belson Mbezibwa v. Coca-Cola Kwanza Ltd5

a. Material Facts

On an unspecified date, Belson Mbezibwa purchased a bottle of Stoney Tangawizi, a soft drink
produced by Coca-Cola Kwanza Ltd, from a 3-Ways kiosk in Dodoma. After consuming most of
the drink, he discovered particles of a dead snail and other impurities at the bottom of the
bottle. Mbezibwa reported the incident to the kiosk's staff, who retained the contaminated
bottle and identified Coca-Cola Kwanza Ltd as the supplier. Subsequently, Mbezibwa
experienced stomachache, vomiting, and diarrhea, leading him to seek medical attention. He
filed a lawsuit against Coca-Cola Kwanza Ltd, claiming damages for the harm suffered due to
consuming the contaminated drink.

b. Arguments of the Plaintiff

Mbezibwa argued that Coca-Cola Kwanza Ltd, as the manufacturer of the soft drink, owed a
duty of care to consumers to ensure their products were safe for consumption. He contended
that the presence of a dead snail and other impurities in the bottle was a clear indication of
negligence in the manufacturing process. Mbezibwa sought compensation for the physical
harm and distress caused by consuming the contaminated beverage.

c. Arguments of the Defendant (Defense Raised)

Coca-Cola Kwanza Ltd denied the allegations of negligence, asserting that they had no
knowledge of the contamination. The company challenged the authenticity and accuracy of the
Government Chemist's report, which identified the presence of a dead snail and other
impurities in the bottle. They argued that the sample tested by the Government Chemist might
not have originated from their production line and that the contamination could have occurred
after the product left their control.

d. Arguments of the Court

The court examined the evidence presented, including the Government Chemist's report, which
confirmed the presence of a dead snail and other impurities in the bottle. The court noted that
the bottle had not been tampered with since it left the manufacturer's control, as evidenced by
the "pop" sound when the bottle was opened at the kiosk. The court found that Coca-Cola
Kwanza Ltd had a duty to ensure their products were safe for consumption and that the
contamination was a result of negligence in the manufacturing process.
5
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 33 of 1999
e. Decision of the Court and Reason for the Decision (Ratio Decidendi)

The court ruled in favor of Mbezibwa, holding Coca-Cola Kwanza Ltd liable for negligence. The
company was ordered to pay 10 million Tanzanian Shillings in damages. The court emphasized
that manufacturers have a duty of care to consumers to ensure their products are safe for
consumption. The presence of a dead snail and other impurities in the bottle was deemed a
breach of that duty, leading to the harm suffered by Mbezibwa.

f. Applicable Rule and Precedent Applied or Laid

The court applied the principles of negligence, particularly the duty of care owed by
manufacturers to consumers. The case referenced the landmark decision in Donoghue v.
Stevenson6 where the House of Lords established that manufacturers owe a duty of care to the
ultimate consumers of their products. This case reinforced the application of the "neighbour
principle," which posits that one must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions that can
foreseeably harm others.

4. B.A. Minga v. Mwananchi Total Service Station, Shinyanga and Total (T) Ltd 7

a. Material Facts

In 1972, B.A. Minga purchased a gallon of kerosene from the Mwananchi Total Service Station
in Shinyanga. Due to a scarcity of pure kerosene, the station had mixed it with petrol. Later that
evening, the kerosene was used in a lamp, which exploded, causing significant damage to
Minga's property. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the kerosene was adulterated with
petrol.

b. Arguments of the Plaintiff

Minga argued that the defendants were negligent in selling adulterated kerosene, which led to
the explosion and subsequent damage to his property. He contended that the defendants had a
duty to ensure the purity of the kerosene they sold and that their failure to do so was a breach
of that duty.

c. Arguments of the Defendant (Defense Raised)

The defendants did not present a defense in the available records. However, it can be inferred
that they might have argued that the adulteration was due to the scarcity of pure kerosene and
that they did not intend to cause harm. Nonetheless, the court found them liable for
negligence.
6
[1932] AC 562

7
[1972] HCD 241
d. Arguments of the Court

The court held that the defendants owed a duty of care to their customers to ensure the purity
of the kerosene they sold. It emphasized that the adulteration of kerosene with petrol rendered
it highly flammable and dangerous. The court found that the defendants breached their duty by
selling adulterated kerosene, which led to the explosion and damage to Minga's property.

e. Decision of the Court and Reason for the Decision (Ratio Decidendi)

The court ruled in favor of Minga, holding the defendants liable for negligence. It awarded
damages to Minga for the loss suffered due to the explosion. The court's decision was based on
the principle that sellers owe a duty of care to their customers to ensure the safety of the
products they sell. The adulteration of kerosene with petrol was deemed a breach of that duty,
leading to the explosion and subsequent damage.

f. Applicable Rule and Precedent Applied or Laid

The court applied the principles of negligence, specifically focusing on the duty of care owed by
sellers to their customers. It established that sellers are liable for damages caused by the sale of
adulterated or unsafe products. This case is significant in Tanzanian law as it underscores the
responsibility of sellers to ensure the safety of their products and the potential liability for
negligence.

5. Mrs Mwamini Adam Ntengekaja & Another vs Urambo District Council & Another 8

a. Material Facts

On January 6, 2011, Mrs. Mwamini Adam underwent a caesarean section at Urambo District
Hospital in Tanzania. During the procedure, the attending surgeon, Dr. Jacob Kamanda,
negligently left a piece of surgical cloth inside her abdomen. This oversight led to severe
complications, including persistent infections and the eventual removal of her uterus. As a
result, Mrs. Adam became unable to conceive again. She and her husband filed a lawsuit
against the Urambo District Council, the hospital's owner, seeking compensation for the
physical, emotional, and psychological harm caused by the negligence.

b. Arguments of the Plaintiff

Mrs. Adam argued that the surgeon's failure to remove all surgical materials during the
caesarean section constituted gross negligence. She presented evidence of her deteriorating
health post-surgery, including chronic infections and the necessity of a subsequent operation
8
Civil Case No. 13 of 2011
that led to the removal of her uterus. This second surgery rendered her infertile, causing
significant emotional and psychological distress. She sought 500 million Tanzanian Shillings in
damages for the suffering endured.

c. Arguments of the Defendant (Defense Raised)

The Urambo District Council, representing the hospital, did not contest the occurrence of the
surgical error. However, they disputed the extent of the damages claimed by the plaintiff. The
defense argued that the compensation sought was excessive and did not accurately reflect the
actual harm suffered by Mrs. Adam.

d. Arguments of the Court

The High Court, presided over by Judge Amir Mruma, found that the evidence presented by
Mrs. Adam substantiated her claims of negligence. The court noted that the surgical error was a
clear breach of the standard of care expected in medical practice. Furthermore, the court
acknowledged the profound impact of the incident on Mrs. Adam's life, including her loss of
fertility and the psychological trauma endured. The court emphasized the importance of
holding medical professionals accountable for their actions to maintain public trust in
healthcare services.

e. Decision of the Court and Reason for the Decision (Ratio Decidendi)

The court ruled in favor of Mrs. Adam, ordering the Urambo District Council to pay 25 million
Tanzanian Shillings in compensation, along with accumulated interest and legal costs. The
decision was grounded in the principle that medical professionals owe a duty of care to their
patients and must adhere to established standards of practice. The court applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which allows negligence to be inferred from the nature of the accident itself
when the defendant had exclusive control over the situation. The court concluded that the
surgical error was a direct result of the hospital's failure to uphold this duty of care.

f. Applicable Law and Precedents

The court's decision was influenced by established principles of medical negligence under
Tanzanian tort law. The case referenced the precedent set in Theodoclina Alfaxad v. The
Medical Officer of Mkinga Hospital9, which dealt with issues of medical malpractice and the
standard of care expected from healthcare providers. Additionally, the court considered the
maxim res ipsa loquitur, which is applicable in cases where the nature of the accident itself
implies negligence. This case marked a significant development in Tanzanian legal jurisprudence
concerning medical negligence and the accountability of healthcare institutions.

9
[1992] TLR 235
6. Theodelina Alphaxad v. Medical Officer In Charge, Nkinga Hospital 10

a. Material Facts

In January 1991, six-year-old Theodelina Alphaxad sustained a forearm injury while playing. She
was initially treated at Sungwizi Dispensary and subsequently referred to Nkinga Hospital, a
private mission hospital in Igunga District, Tabora Region. Upon arrival at Nkinga Hospital on
January 22, 1991, X-rays revealed fractures of both the ulna and radius. Dr. Kirunga, the
attending surgeon, applied a plaster of Paris (P.O.P.) cast to the affected arm. Despite
experiencing pain, Theodelina was discharged with instructions to return after a week. On
January 25, 1991, she was brought back to the hospital due to persistent pain and discoloration
of the fingers. However, she was not attended to on that day. The following day, January 26,
1991, upon removal of the P.O.P., the fingers were found to be blackened, indicating
compromised blood circulation. Consequently, her left forearm was amputated on February 7,
1991. The plaintiff alleged that the amputation resulted from negligent treatment by the
hospital staff.

b. Arguments of the Plaintiff

The plaintiff, represented by Alphaxad Mirobo (Theodelina's father and next friend), contended
that the hospital's treatment was negligent, leading to the loss of Theodelina's left forearm. He
argued that the hospital failed to provide timely and appropriate care, particularly on January
25, 1991, when Theodelina reported back with complications. The plaintiff sought damages
amounting to 5,000,000 Tanzanian Shillings for the harm suffered.

c. Arguments of the Defendant (Defense Raised)

The defendant, represented by Dr. Lars-Gohan Lind Green, the Medical Officer In Charge of
Nkinga Hospital, acknowledged that Theodelina was treated at the hospital but denied
negligence. The defense argued that the plaintiff's father was responsible for not bringing
Theodelina back to the hospital promptly when complications arose. They asserted that the
hospital had provided appropriate instructions and that the delay in seeking further treatment
contributed to the adverse outcome.

d. Arguments of the Court

The court examined the facts and evidence presented, noting that the hospital staff had a duty
of care towards Theodelina. It observed that despite the complications reported on January 25,
1991, Theodelina was not attended to promptly. The court found that the hospital's failure to
act swiftly and appropriately contributed to the deterioration of her condition, leading to the

10
[1992] TLR 235
amputation. The court also considered the information provided to the plaintiff's father
regarding potential complications and the need for immediate return to the hospital.

e. Decision of the Court and Reason for the Decision (Ratio Decidendi)

The court held that the hospital was negligent in its treatment of Theodelina, leading to the loss
of her left forearm. It emphasized that hospitals are vicariously liable for the actions of their
staff and must ensure that patients receive timely and appropriate care. The court concluded
that the hospital's failure to attend to Theodelina promptly after complications arose
constituted a breach of the duty of care owed to her.

f. Applicable Law and Precedents

The court referred to established principles of medical negligence and vicarious liability. It cited
the case of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health 11, where it was held that hospitals are under a duty to
take reasonable care of their patients, irrespective of whether the patient pays directly or
indirectly for the treatment. The court also considered the doctrine of vicarious liability, holding
that hospitals are responsible for the actions of their staff in the course of their employment.

11
[1951] 2 K.B. 343