ALSO AVAILABLE FROM BLOOMSBURY ‘Bloomsbury Companion to Ana Philosophy, eited by Bary Danton and Howard Rebiason ‘Bleomsbury Comoanion 1 Metaphysics, edited by Nell A. Manson and oben. Barara +8 Bloomsbury Companin to Piesophy of Slenes,ecite by Steven Feneh ond J Saati ‘Cia reduction to he Epistemology of Memory, Thomas O. Senor ‘A Chica Inradvetien tothe Motaptysics of Time, Ban Cuts aphysies A CrialTarstation with Kants Bucidations, Selected Notes, 2 Retatod Mates, Alexander Baumgarten, warsated sd edited by Courtney [Link] and ton Myers Time: Philosophical ntreduction, James Hatington Debates in the Metaphysics of Time EDITED BY L. NATHAN OAKLANDER BLOOMSBURYlomsbury inspired ada mark of Bloomsbury Pubehing Pe Fen thea 2018 ‘fan Oates sere hi ih unde he Cpt, Casi na Patt Act 1968.0 be anced a Ear tte wos “Pts sare Ne tof hs pubcaton my be readied rare ty or byany mous, beane mechanical mtsrg paespyg, ees, © ‘maton stp aris sey, nas po preening ho ‘pathos “etpobity foros ase ny incl or iatizton acing on eng ‘etn a etm ha publeton carb acct oy Barr Bitchibrary Cataloguing n-Paleaion Dts ‘cxulogie eo or bons al ar Beh aN. Una of Congres Cataloging in Pubteation Dt ‘Ncxtlg eco Bis boat nar he ey of Congres ‘pest by Fearn Pepa Sokont, tena Nor NF Gh For tinda5 Becoming: Temporal, Absolute, and Atemporal M. Oreste Fiocco Introduction ner ae two conspicuous and inescapable features ofthis world n which me is rel. One experiences a word influx, a vansient wer in whch things constant come into existence, change and ease to be. One aso ‘@eprences a stable word, ona in which how things are at any gven moment ‘is parmanest, unchangeable Thus, one can contemplate in siencethen be sare by a fash and accompanying bo0m—then return to silence, and although the flash and boom are gona it seems inaubtabio that something ‘remains unchanged, at eatin so far as it must be tue tht flash and boom recede tis sient moment. Theres tansionce and permanonce. Yet these two features of the word ‘00m incompatbe, However focusing on one can yield only an objectionable ‘etapysies of te tothe extent thet the other, tae competing feture of the world, is neglected. The paar purpose of ths chapter i to sketch ‘2 mtphysis of tme thet embraces both features. Given 8 certain view of the nature of realty and ofthe structure it comin, fom 8 base of unconto- ‘éamism can both be genune and cojoctive features of reay Cis! to this undertaking is the notion of bacoming, tats, coming into ‘existonce. | distinguish three distinct phenomens of becoming: tengo absdute, end atemporal The last isthe last familar of these: 18 tho ‘Bheromenon of coming into existance outside of te. Although th dea that ‘here are things tat donot ent in uma not unfair serge taken for« DEBATES IN THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME ‘tented that if anything comes into existence, it must do so in time. Indeed, suspect many think thatthe idea of 2 ting coming ta be cutside of mes simply incoberont. It would be if becoming were 2 precose—but i net. a this chaps | articulate and dofend the notion of stempoa! becoming. Iie by ean ofthis notion that one can develop a uly satisfactory metaphysics of time, one that honors bath wensience and peeranence and ids foreach its proper domain within the wo [A discussion ofthe fundamentals ofthe metaphysics of time requies a9 ‘elit account of whst time ses. So | Begin with eich. Making der the nature of time per se enables me ta distinguish time fom temporal reaty and to present the two genetic positons regarding tamporl realty. | then ‘ropound an account of atemporalrekty, the werd outside of tne. Having laa tis foundation, ! consider the undeniable phemsmenon of temporal becoming, which underlies the fh ia the word, and decuss attempts 10 situate this phenomenon in diferent accounts of tema realty. | maintain ‘that the ony feasbi way of doing so is by recognizing absolute becoming. ‘Absolut becoming, however, seems to compromise fhe patent stably of the world, This leads to the key nation of atamporat becoming, Ar lum nating this phenomenon | defend its place na fly satefactry metaphysics of time, Time and temporal reality 'As 2 prologue, | ake a brit statement ofthe view of the word in tsett— ality asitis peor to ey conceptuaization by thinking beings orto Iingutic ‘oF soci interacions—that underies the present dacussion, Akhough | believe there ae strong reasons for socepting this ww, | eave fa defense to another occasion; itis feasible enaugh for present purposes | belive tat the word its contain 2 great varity of ndviualaubstances, Instances of genuine kinds of ting, and ways (both universal and parol hat these things ave. Each entity nasa ratwo determined by What is and stands in ‘lations to enies ofthe same and other categories. These reletors and the ‘constrains theaby placed onthe rela isthe structure in ealty Al features ‘of the ward hive an ontological bess inthis structure and nso fara they ‘dit of explration, are ultimately explicable in terms off This picture & ‘busty rel, then, about dint categories (cluding substances, kinds, ‘Properties, rd modes, the struct in the word and explanation. ‘A motophyais of tie isa theory ofthe peclly teal fates of ‘he word, those that arise given that ime is ea. | maintain tht a dstincton between the wold in time and the werld outside it crucial toa fuly BECOMING: TEMPORAL, ABSOLUTE, AND ATEMPORAL =a satisfactory metipysics of time. In crdor ta got puchaseon this istincion, fone needs an account of the nature of time Real. Wir uch an account, past the mere spat connotations of “in” and “outside"—to acquire a beter ‘sense of the weraly structure associted with temporality What time is Discussions of ime ara contentious nso far as ther is here @ subject, though, theres Some common ground far which discussion arses, cota phenomena that motivate inquiry and ste thought to go ogethe. The mst ‘conspicuous phenomenon associated with tme is change. Change is an incortestable fexture of the word. Moreover, what change i is uneonto- ‘veri an entity changes if and ony if itn Hal is one way at ane mamant ‘and an ncompstbie way ata distinct moment. Everyone who recogrizes ‘change can accept this account itis neva on any svete 1asve (Change is trought to require time. Although there has been debate ‘egeing wheter there coud be time without change-—and some accept there could'—no one mantains that there could be change without time ‘Thu, that change requ time seems a trzam. | suspect some accept it because, in ight of the foregeing account of change, ther accept tht there ‘could be no moments without ume or pethaps thoy just confit, with tines, that is, moments. The former is more insightful, Ragarcess, howeves of wh the truism s accepted, it eaves open what time its s. Despite inst in tee shroughout the history of Wester phlosopt. ‘there is vor ft ciscussion of time per so. This claim is prhans suring, but when one recognizes that investigations pertaining totime tad t focus (on issues attenfant on tine —tke change, becoming, tense, prsstnce, tempore! experence-rather than time tse, ane can ee «ts Wuth. Some ‘ecumenical accaunt of tine is neoded, than: some account that lumnates these issues and untes the iferent factions all of whor take themselves tobe nvesigavig the metaphysics of tm, In ight ofthese considerations, | provide an account of ume por se: | submit tat te is thing, namely the thing in vitwe of win any enuiy changes: An entty might have, by its very nature, the capacity to change—but without time itself coud nat change. Tm is, therfore, the thing tat makes change possible. It does £0 by viesing the roments requied for change, Time itself is soc from any ‘moment or collection of moments. “This bref acceut of time ise has atleast wo benef. i makes explct ‘the connection whereby change requires time and it also provides the ‘ontological bass of a phenemenon, to wit. change, the complexity of wich* DEBATES N THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME seems to be isuited to bo takon as primitive. Thee is inthe structure of ‘the world, some explanation of how change occurs and ths explanation is rooted in time, Time isais simple end essently extant: by its very eature it must exist? Some might object to this account of time itsolf because of the typostass it requses. One should recognize, however, that tis sort of ‘objection is besedon ontological sues, pertaining to parsimony or perhaps {an aversion to abstracts, rather than on any consideration ansing fom the ‘etaphysis of time tse Indoed, thre is nothing abjecionable about this account from the perspective of the metaphysis of time 8 wholly noua in regards to any controversial issue. Therefore, in an attemet to propo 1 fuly satisfactory metaphysics of time, | consider the proposed account of time per se to be not ont acceptable but also iluminatng. What temporal reality is: The world in time imi the thing that makes change possible, there coud be many ets that exit in vite of time, for ample, any moment that ons lor has any being whatsoever: any properties tat ora borne primal by moments le being present, boing past, being future) and any relations that are borne primary by moments (69, earior than, later than, simuttanaous wit “Moreover there are things thet do not exist in vtue of time yt ae intimately Felted tit in that dey require a moment at which to exis. for exsmp\0, any lontty whose vey nature includes the capacity to change. Such thing i 3 temporal entity ad exists at moment if exsts at, Tomperal ant all that exist invitue of time and every temporal entiy—tis the word in ame. Note that despite being included in temporal realty, a moment sol isnot 8 tmporal entity, for no moment exists ata moment sd 80 nat ating that coud change. Time isl is nether a temporal andy, fori exist a 90 ‘moment. no included in temporal reality, fr nothing, nding time, eosts in irue of so think the existence of time, a8 characterized above, is highly plausible 1 not beyond dispute) and that tis this nation of te that those who accopt that time is ves secept. Simi, | think the existence of tampera ‘eal is highly plausible (if not Beyond dispute. Anyene who others with 8 rite! examination of time, then, recognizes both me and tomperal ely. However, one needs to racognze the distinction between the two: te 2 parila entity; temporal ealty i @ collection of antes neuding concrete paricuars. moments, temporal properties, temporal relations) essentlly ‘elated to time. So with these ecumenical notions of time, temporal elty— land change—ther® is @ good deal of commen ground in the metaphysics ot BECOMING: TEMPORAL, ABSOLUTE, AND ATEMPORAL at Yer 28 noted above, discussions of time are contentious. One might accept te existence of botn time and temporal realty 88 characenaed and vet csayree about the extent or contents of temporal realty. Fa example, ‘the metphysics of tme that | utimataWy propose herein sone ia which ro ‘more thin single moment of time everest Gn any sense and only the ‘emporaproperty being presontan the temporal relion simultaneous with 4e insuntiated. Such 2 view is determined by @ number of canvoverea onsidertions. donot think itan exaggeration, Nowever, to maint that he source al he contention inthe metaphysics of ine 2 single ato sue: vnsthar tings come into argo out of beng smpiter Disagreement ‘on this su lads to two generic positon regarding tha nature et temoora realty. Those wo deny that a thing comes into or goes out of being simpler Dbebeve hat at no moment does anything thet exes inte absolutely fil to ‘be constituent of ely Tis isnot o say that in his vow each thing lays less, for there ean indeed be moments at which a thing doesnot exist However even at hese moments, that thing EXISTS Itenelassly atv to Some ott: moment. Each thing has a permanent, tenseless exstince at any ‘moment at which it ever exists. This leds to @ poston regarcing tempera ‘realty n wth all the many moments af ime—end everyting tet exists at ‘them—ate equal rea i 3 view in which temporal seaity is [Link] amogereous. Proponents a ths poston are called Shears, etemalss, back theorists end, somewhat misleadingly, tensalees theorists “Those who boliove that thing comes ino goes aut of bang smpitr {25c0pt tat something, which in ro way exists, can come into being at ‘moment or tht @ thing can cease o be in every way end, hence, Dear no Properties or stan in any aun to anyring inching any moment Tas ssc to « view of tomporal ealty in which thee ae ontological atferences ' the wotd n time. Given that his poston is based on dflerance edn ofa variety of more spectic wews, the univng feature of which ste sunpo- ‘ston the: temporal realty is ontologealy heterogeneous For example, the Vow that there is but ne moment and noting before or after it the View {hat there are many moments of time with diferent ontlopeal statuses, {he Wew hat this moment and whats prior tot have te same enslogis ‘sta theugh what is subsequent to thismoment Joss not ens ata a ost ontclogcal heterogeneity in tomporl rely, Presents, Adheorss, ving dock theorss and, perhaps, tensed theorists represent hs generic psition on temporal reality. In both positions, a thing exists atthe moments st which it est. The ‘ey stnction between the two isthe ontological status of thing at some ‘moment, m. at whic it does nct ext. in the former postion. athough it ‘088 not exst at mit does EXIST (onseleshy) at some other moment:in the lator poston, at mit does not exist at alin any way 1s not 2 constituent of reaiy. night ofthis pwotl france, tis porhapscear what ‘would motivate one to adopt the poston that temporal realty i otolgicaly hhomoganeaus: one’s experience of stble word n which Row thngs ar at any gen moment is permanent and unchangeable, Likewise, the mowaton forthe poston tht tompera eaity is ontlegially heterogeneous is one experiance of a world continuously i fx. in which how things are at any ‘von moments wansiont These two postions regarding the nature of tempore resty ae incom- patible, The positon ene adopts presumably turns en whether one regards permanence or ransience ae the dominant feature of wer a which time [Seal But since both are rretragable testes of one's expanencs, neglect ‘ther can leod only to an objectionable metaphysis of te, Fortunately, the ppearance of @ciemma here s¢ based on # fie assumption. This isthe ‘assumption that how the wei i, glen that mi ea, must be accounted for ently by en acount of tporal reality. Tis is false. There is moce to ‘the word than the word Yme-—shat mor thre is provides the moans of resenting fly satisfactory account of a werd in whch ume sre Atemporality 1 have discussed the notions of time end of temporal realty in some det in err to make clear the notion of atemporatty, of exstng ousiso of to, thai, watheut trparal realty. As mantoned above, tis notion i, Delve, ofthe utmost importa toa satistectory metaphysics of tine, The world outside time ‘A ewaghtforward account of atemporaty emerges from the foregoing. tha “hing intima, then ti lated to me ina suitably intimate way. One such ‘ya et be vlad es to partake of the very nature of time. Sie te fe us: the thing tat makes change possible, doing so by velding moments, i spausbe that what tis to partake ofthe very nature of time isto oust at ‘3 moment. Hence, exstence i time is existance at some moment. Every “temporal ety that, every entity whose very nature includ the eopacty to change, exist in tim. Since eveything is relted to everyting ese in some way in no the, t lesitin boing sil with respect to being real, a thing outside of ime does not fl tbe related to ime, Rather, sucha thing is outside of nein that fas to be related tote in a suitably intimate way: tf to parake of the SECOMING: TEMPORAL, ABSOLUTE, AND ATEMPORAL 92 ery cate of time, Sine, again, time is just the thing thet makes change Dossible—by yelling maments-e thing that fas 10 exist at 2 moment ‘oar fis to parake of time's cate. What is, then, to not exst 9 tne, to ext outside of time, is to at but at no mamant. AS such. an entity that exist outside of time—an atemporal entty—fas to meet a necessary Candton of change and so cant change. An stemporal ony ust ae 52 temporal one, but given thai respective rations to time, the formers ‘nmutable whereas the ator is mutable ‘An attempt to reject atemporality altogether ‘One mht reject this notion of tnelassness, or any othe: because one ‘ign maintain that a antes are capable of changing in some way anc, fence, enstat some moment fh scoect. there singly ae no ater fentoes and, fort. no atempocalty (and no atemporl becoming) "The clan that every entity is capabe of changing is plausible eniy if ne ‘counts as chango the ga land caresponcing loss) of any property conwary to one a thing has at some moment. tone were to do ths, one would hol thet when Xanippe goes fom boing wife to widow upon the death tf Sozrates that she hes undergone @ genuine change. This, however, does hot accord with the uncontrovecilacccunt of change nroduced above, for the properties being a wile and beng 2 widow do not characterize Xantpp= in herslt. The putative change that Xartope undergoes upon the death ‘of Socrates needs to be distngushed from the sort of ehenge Xantope Undergoes when, say, she stands up after sting. In te later case, the change aes fom the gain of e property tat is ncompatible wth one at anuppe has in vt of how she horse's. he forme case he change does not aise in vitue of Xentippe hers rather, in 8 clear sense, the change’ —so-caled “Cambridge change” ofa "Camnidge propery"*—has racially to do with something entialycstint In this context, one m whieh the bone of contention the mutabay of althigs—whether ts compatible ‘uth the nature ofeach thing to change—the later notion of change, the {nontroversial one presented shove is clearly the operative one” ‘Bearing tis soten a min, tare are some things—for exarle, numbers. ppopertes, [Link]—thut, 30 fers thar natures {re undertoed ata sam tobe capable of change It caany seers that ‘tings of hep Kinds are not ane way at ane merent then an ncompatie way stanoherin vitue of how they themsehes a. Indoed, am anata conse ‘ron tat even suggests that such rings can undergo genuine change! in ‘wat lows, then ake or fated that hee are atemporlentes. tings that test without tempt reaity ara as aryting es, but no st sy merent.4 DEBATES IN THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME ‘Two views of timelessness (neither of which is adequate) So there is no good reason to think that eventing must or can change* ‘Nevertheless, one might stil osist the proposed account of stemporalty, ‘There ae radtonly two notions of tmelassness Inne, anatempore thing 's ete it is supposed o os outside of time, that, at no moment Inthe ‘other timeless thing is sampiterat it ests unehanaina at each moment ‘Thus, one might acknowledge that tere are immiabie things, bt mata ‘hat such things stil exist in tme inthe eenge provided above: they exist unchanging a every moment The capcity to change, howeve s such a base fasture ofan enti tha it 's plows roared as partly dofintve of a tings nature ano. ti wey, ‘essentol to arything Wat has it, Mhus tis ofthe very nature ofa mutable hing to be capable of changing, i ha it ot posse fr tat very thi to ens os ‘he very thing its nd ye ack the capacity to change A mabe thing must be 2 spore thing in that it must ent ata moment ft exsts at al. Seley, for those things that are incepabo of changing, is of tow very neti t Be incapable of changing. Nothing mutable i possbiy mmuraie of vce vers, «2 foor, noting mutable becomes immutable lor vce versal Temporal 8d ‘stomporel entities ae necessariy mutiay excisi types of entity. This is important for it provides grounds for cyctng the cli hat atomporl etties are sempitema, “timeless” yet existing at moments. if ‘ne assumes that an entity that exes at moment i oso facto susceptle to change, then it folows immediately at no atemporl entity can ext ta ‘moment fone forgoes this assumption, alternative considerations support ‘the same conclusion. if an atemporal entity is essentlly immutable, fi not immutable Because it exits outside of tim. Rather. it fis to wut at 8 moment because, by its very nature, itis not ausceptible to change. If however. one assumes that an temporal entity exists unchenging at every ‘moment. one is left 1o account for why it ens at moment it cannot change. The assumption that it exist in time is ently gratutous, Te ‘simpler view, in that it does not require one to account for whet would be 4 potlexing featue of atemporal entitles, is the one in wach stomporal fentites just do not. by their very nature, exist at moments. Perhaps thse ho ccontsempiteal enitias maintain that such things exist smong the {erooral entves—ihat is, at moments—because they see no ether way ‘© understand timeless structure in the wot. But the procedng account Of time itself provides the moans todo so: timeless things est yet at no ‘aments), for they ae nt related to tne ina eultsly timate way. There is, then, litte motivation for maintaining that an immutable, stomporl entity exists at all moments. Ts does not mean, however, that | tek te tan notion otal xstnce routes an acute aczont {toteporty. is oon bongs wth te en east exon 0 ‘tan uenl ent specced te oe ta mst ni by tyr rare. waste rapport soy the re thng ta anys eed fe hs ‘sto curate an enor ny wt a tomo nt But aot © vresuch tng Pos no ogi spy ha 0. srNrant to coaly Setegueh eset extents bd, us. tonal cxconea| er es estan fr | osee tere ater at ae “elas tht nevealss have eg Sh gs ot ns essen, Serie ens so they oo, na tel Sse Become. Hower. hey eae ‘no oxstone auto me Each sa xp aempor baci. Becoming: Temporal and absolute uty adet that the nation of temporalbecoming likely sounds incoherent. ‘Te purpose of ths chapter though, i o show that act oly sit coherent but that atemporl becoming pays en imoorant role inthe metaphysics cof ume. Before expounding this phenomenon, itis helpful to discuss 2 ‘vexed, but more fem, one, namely temporal becoming. As observed a the outset, one of the conspicuous and inescapable features of a wor in ‘whlch time i eal ie cetsin dynamism: one experiences a world in fx in which things constantly core into existence, change. enc cease tobe. ‘Temporal becoming is standaraly supposed founders this dynamism. An ‘adequate account of this phenomenon makes cea the need fr atemooral becoming ‘Dynamism: Change, temporal becoming, and novelty Change is induonabie. Since there ean be no change without dyeamism, both postions regarding the nature of topo reslty—that tis ontlgh cally homogeneous end that ¢ontlogealyheterogensous—must provide ome account of temporal becoming, In ofa as temporal becoming is el phenomenon thas an ontological basis among the things that exist an the Feltions in which thy stand. Howover, no thing isin itself dynam, and no entity infection of every ater thing changes. Cerainly no property salt changes, nor any moment: even 2 paradigmatic mutable enti. 2 concete indivaul substance. which obviously as the caps to change. i natn itsel! dynamic. The dynamism in the word comes not rom ary thing. but fies from the relate n which enttesstana Racal ha inthe operaive focount of change, change oceus when a substance bears incompatible% DEBATES IN THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME pants nt mort Tha, dari dhe peraern Cronpor coin tat dost Stra auto ne Th sas on one eign tan! bering he coming io bag se ety «omer See ere aes {worl ery xsmng tr are pa) et vo mae et i tanpot ety&etaly atures ange mae ‘mgr! coring. cage he ako yarn fs Shwe a) ‘cnr boring ipo to ude the ama he ona Zire yh dasa sve song runs oot secon eon Be ved ae aie oe two cpa sels ‘cig te rate toate ore pon aay ort bot ing coment mat ESS annoy St rmin thea ble ag eso ostee ato monet Fe note a cant t ea posta re pos eae CF ronpr bear: mers paras ot at psn co ose very se nto thr. ser cosa te avon fe oon ascot eon mol tempura nse Is umeroly caoweedond oy prea nna thereto ciy—e es ah esac psec soy stor ton ogra wart nw ine en ‘hs meson yes tasty mn haan ren ot tower puss Th. aw “rane tnd poner vce nt an woth fps eat ore ramer eters and Sa mam a cote el ot me fone en an set eo anon tha te wot aon 0 ss Sarg td re pss Ses Stow roaster einen by aang at Ol ores Tail ew i.e om ne peal Tare eee et hing NOW Al owe chow wo gon rd ntl ar Late Pa earn thal cea nyse a eae Ct in col bese no atte ere de Inset pegs The ISson of ny ay ato wh 8 marin i tie tle he Samy aha hy sey Inout tte teed orcas aro ecouectenosaenen, ‘caret ao some sont Spc sate rors aes fertar ot posure poy te ute! oped at ane ter eran 0 eo lute ai seo ty, Wey dens ti nena ant asta an mea pes romtsin mena tne aon et trpon ee Cnty hogerous es herr osoan Apwoal casio ee ‘how one ho ks he waste onlay hares ‘secounts forthe erpresson of novaty,the phenomenon that. combined with ‘omporal becoming an change, yields the xceriance ofa word fsx . Novelty and ontological homogeneity of temporal reality Hf there are many oman of me and everything in temporal realty ‘he many moments and anything that exists at any one of them —hes the ‘same ontological status, noting in tune 18 garunsly nove. Every mutable ‘ing EXISTS (enselesi) ands alaaysa consent of realy, nthe sense ‘hat every moment ch temporal entity EXISTS at some moment, Since ‘nee is nating novel in eality sel one must account fr the impression of ‘novelty by ting some teraction between a thinking sing and a parmarent ‘eotre ofthe word Any novelty must be projected onto the word by ones ‘subjective experience oft, presumably as one encounters a permanent thing ‘er moment fr the fst. Therefore, one must account fo novety in terms ‘ofthe changes in thinking beings who EXIST fenseessy) st moments ‘As is clar trom their proposals to account forthe imaression of novelty ‘his point is recognized by proponents of the ontological homogeneity of ‘emporal realty J.C. Smart suggest tat tis one's confusion regarcing ‘now certain preciats in natural angusge ike “is pasts present” and “is ‘utue") work that isthe bass ofthis navety®D. H. Melor suggests that one's diferent belies at cifferent moments that isthe subjective “ruth {the metaphysical elehood that time flows" in the same vein, Laure ‘Paul suggest thatthe impression of nowy atses farm “the way bans of ‘conscious beings experince snd interpret cognitive inputs fom series of ‘stove events" But this aporoach dots not seem feasible. Geant that i is some mental ‘or neurophysclogea!) state of 8 thinking being that i the bass ofthe Impression of novelty. This impression is dstntve in that it marks a pericular moment as specal {as novel It can only do this. though, i 90 ‘ther moment is marked in tho same way. However, assuming temporal realty is ontological hemogeneaus, nothing tine i any more oF a ess ‘eal than anything ese “his includes ot only every thinking bang, but alco ‘every mental state of ery thinking beng I ths sso, and the meression ‘of novelty i inexorable, ten at every moment at wich one exit, one has the impression tht that moment is novel In which case, fr aay thinking boeing here ave many moments matked 38 novel: ndeed every moment at ‘whieh oneGusts presents sof 9¢ vel. Thus, the mental sate undarving ‘the mpression of nowy cannot be the source of one's senso that there ‘Something spec! sbout ths moment, now; for one has the same state (ora ‘leven sir ono} at very moment at which one EXISTS, and one EXISTSPs DEBATES IN THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME ‘at many moments. An explanation of ons senee ofthe novelty of pariculer ‘moment—this one, now —s stil needed ‘The problem here indicates 3 much deeper problem for he poston tat temporal reeity is ontelegcaly homogeneous. Th poston does nt present an accurate account of how one experiences a werd in which Sane sa Consider again Pou's account of th sense that te posses, At moment ‘i, one foots the freshness of a cool breeze, at m2. the breeze hes fed ‘downto the extent that one no longer felt If both moments of te are ‘equ rea. one both FEELS a cool eee at mi) and FEELS no brea lat ‘m2. One does not fee the breeze ad fel no broeze simutaneousy never theles, both experiences ae as rel and so should be oaualy arresting, 3 of course, one HAS no such edt and contctng experience of breeze and no bare, ‘Nota bene (and this point csanot be stressed enough It makes 00 iference that one experiences the coal breeze atm and fees No breers ‘at m2 fr both moments are equally ral and one is just as much at ane ‘moment, experiencing the cool braze, a8 one is atthe eter, experiencing no breeze." (Nor does it make any ference tt meray a temporal pert ‘of one at each moment, it a tempor part of 8 thinking boing i suicent for that thking being (0 be at and expesoncng a moment) Yet at most 8 ‘ingle moment i eor salient to one On the familar way). Even fone poste some sort of ment (or neurophysologicall mechanism that at aach morrent dompens one's experience of every ether moment, one must account fo he fct that ane experiences each equally real moment. order, 38 ew So the nee for an account ofthe bass of the imassion of novelty i wget but given that in tis positon, such an account can only bein terms of he ‘states of thinking beings in ime, one does not seem forthcoming ‘Therefore it seems hat fone acepts that tempol esity is ontological homogeneous, oe must posit somating extraneous to any thinking bing some objective feature of temporal reaty—as the basis of the undisputed impression of navy andthe means ofa plausible account ofthe pena: nology of being in time ‘Novelty and passage \What the prececing section reveals is that there can be temporal becoming 4nd much change inthe world—and even 8 sor of ceasing toe inte, vz. EXISTENCE at some moments, but not at others—and yet thera fi {o be any eal demism. The temporal becoming and change accepted 3y ‘those who think temporal realty is ontlogeally homogeneous is consistant with an utr lek of novelty, both inthe wocd ite and in one's experiense BECOMING: TEMPORAL, ABSOLUTE, AND ATEMPORAL 99 of. Many have conceded hs at and n eta Rove sopnsd hat ‘Soar estynies 9 teromaren wnte) feng me Peay ‘Sonn can ane se pen oy ay. ee ng ough soo sce cara, tool pred setae mew nposed sor be a oe meson ee nd of objective senporal proper ng the things ‘pe melaon of bet inti err ropes aang th th in nor rd hs ny bean tug fo bee dete festa of ‘agontonmopposton fo the one ch fe worn ne © only Soy nomenon. Aug the eine teres betas Gora) versons of te socaeaBenaoy on te ten of ie emote stim hats alrence th bc on n te means Srnec Paton etn est et node t be a7 oY wearers pst td ren in Tmcrnt en ryan ete tht omer as sme ras ‘Shon poner bows © enter afi ftw poston fet torovel ‘cin 'scmotuptyferopreoi ters) tan re one et poste ‘Spe tenes nt wrt tena ports note by ae Sorenson mem isis wen, tneahecive EA of rovety tempor eat the comnus gn ad sarin os, foment fe etre eo) rope, poses, posoness iy, cal to recog te For oure any ae fase poets pean. 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