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Chapter 2
ME T HOD OLOGY IN
INDIAN P H ILOSOPHY 1
Nirmalya N. Chakraborty, with
Prabal Kumar Sen

Abstract
Philosophy in classical India consists in attempts to argue for or against the philo-
sophical insights provided by the founding texts of various affiliations. With the rise of
systematic philosophical schools a need was felt to come up with rigorous rules where
philosophers talked about the kinds, structures and checks and balances of the debate.
Since much of the debate took place against the background of the Vedic discourse,
interpretation of the Vedic sentences occupies an important place in establishing one’s
own position. Various hermeneutic principles were formulated in order to arrive at the
correct understanding of the Vedic corpus.

Classical Indian philosophy has been marked by the presence of intuitive knowledge
since the time of the Upaniṣads. The Vedic people found language inadequate to
express some of their feelings. The grandeur and the vastness of natural powers (con-
ceived as deities by the Vedic thinkers) overwhelmed them. This ineffable nature of
reality became more evident in the Upaniṣads. Any positive description of the reality
was found inadequate. Reality falls under a description and also outside it, because
reality is omnipresent. This led the Upaniṣadic thinkers to describe reality in two ways.
First, reality is often described negatively (neti neti). Reality is described as inconceiv-
able, unchangeable, untouched, inaudible, invisible indestructible, etc. Second, real-
ity is also described as possessing contrary attributes like ‘greater than the greatest,’
‘subtler than the subtlest,’ etc. Intellect works within categories such as space, time
and causality, but reality is beyond all these. However, the Upaniṣads assert that man
has the faculty of intuition by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived
becomes perceived, the unknown becomes known. This knowledge is a direct insight
into the nature of reality. Though it is a kind of knowledge, it is different from all the
ordinary kinds of knowledge in that this knowledge is not verifiable or communicable.
It is not amenable to formal exposition. Later when systematic schools of philosophy

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developed in India, they incorporated this idea of intuitive knowledge in their own
metaphysical and epistemological systems. We have yogaja pratyakṣa in Nyāya, prajñā
in Buddhism, and aparokṣānubhūti in Advaita Vedānta.
It has become common to use the term ‘dars%ana’ as the equivalent of the English
term ‘philosophy.’ However, the term ‘dars%ana’ is narrower in its connotation than the
Western term ‘philosophy.’ Philosophy nowadays primarily refers to a discussion of cer-
tain fundamental problems of the subject concerned, like ‘philosophy of law,’ ‘philoso-
phy of science,’ etc. ‘Dars%ana’ in the Indian context primarily refers to a discipline that
helps in gaining knowledge of various kinds. The word ‘dars%ana’ is conveniently vague,
for it might mean simply perception (sensuous or non-sensuous), or it might also mean
conceptual seeing, logical inquiry. S. N. Dasgupta (1992, 68) tells us that the earliest
use of the word ‘dars%ana’ in the sense of philosophical knowledge is found in Vais%eṣika
Sūtras. Haribhadra, Ratnakīrti, and Mādhava use the word ‘dars%ana’ in the sense of
philosophical systems. The Vedic literature has provided the background by setting the
parameters of reasoning, the horizon against which questions were asked and solutions
were proposed, evaluated, and criticized. Even the etymological meaning of the term
‘philosophy’ (love of wisdom’) has very little to do with the modern sense of the term,
at least as it is used by professional philosophers. This has led some philosophers to
take the meaning of the term ‘ānvīkṣikī’ as coming close to what we nowadays mean by
philosophy (Matilal 2002, 358). ‘Ānvīkṣikī’ is normally defined as a rational investiga-
tion of what is obtained through perception and what is stated in scriptures, carried out
with the help of accepted means of knowledge (pramāṇas). What is perhaps unique in
the Indian philosophical context is that ānvīkṣikī (in the sense of philosophy) is con-
cerned with demonstrating the possibility of an ideal existence. Ānvīkṣikī, by itself, is
not causally efficacious to bring about the state of ideal existence. The task of ānvīkṣikī
is to convince oneself of the truth of what has been heard and to remove all doubts.
One of the earliest Upaniṣads (Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5) claims that
the Self is to be heard, argued about, and meditated upon (s%rotavyo mantavyo
nidhidhyāsitavyaḥ). This involves three processes: s%ravaṇa is the hearing of the truths
contained in the Upaniṣads, manana consists of rational defense of these truths
against actual or imagined opposition, and nididhyāsana stands for meditation on
these truths. Manana, the second step in acquiring the knowledge of the self, is
responsible for the appearance of different philosophical schools (dars%ana) in India.
Both the Vedic systems and their opponents emerge out of defending or opposing
the tenets of the Vedic thinking. The Vedas form the background for much of the
Indian philosophical system, either in the form of defending or opposing the Vedic
doctrines. Needless to say, significant differences exist even among the defenders
of the Vedic tenets with regard to their epistemological, metaphysical, and logical
doctrines. Radhakrishnan’s comment “Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual”
needs a careful and nuanced understanding (Radhakrishnan 1977, 24). This state-
ment is true in the sense that Indian philosophical literature is inclined to demon-
strate intellectually the feasibility of an idea of perfect existence viz., mokṣa. This
does not mean that Indian philosophy is itself spiritual in the sense that it does
not care for logical exploration, banking on only some experience that defies any

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reasoning. The vast amount of literature that has developed in each of the systems
of Indian philosophy bears testimony to the fact that manana has flourished unhin-
dered, resulting in lively philosophical debates among the adherents of different
theories. One must add a word of caution here. Falling back on the threefold dis-
tinction of s%ravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana, it would be proper to situate this intuitive
knowledge in the realm of nididhyāsana. There are ample evidences in many clas-
sical Indian texts on the basis of which it is safe to suggest that nididhyāsana must be
preceded by manana. Unless one is cognitively certain of the goal to be achieved,
one cannot sincerely adopt the path of meditating on that goal. But according to
those who admit the authority of the Veda-s, manana has a restriction and limit.
Manana must function within the ambit of the Vedic world-view. Manana that goes
against the Vedic insights is actually not manana proper. After manana, when one
possesses the cognitive certitude of the conclusion, then one can enter into the
realm of nididhyāsana. Śravaṇa by itself won’t lead anywhere. It must be followed by
manana. After a successful manana, nididhyāsana steps in. The systems like Cārvāka,
Buddhist, and Jaina, which are known as nāstika, do not admit the authoritativeness
of the Veda-s. The Cārvāka-s, to the best of our knowledge, did not have any scrip-
ture of their own. The Buddhist and Jaina schools, however, admit as authoritative
the words of Buddha and Mahāvīra respectively; and in their case, s%ravaṇa would
consist in acquaintance with such scriptures. Thus we see that all these stages are
important, and also that they have their limitations. Philosophy, as we understand
it today, falls under manana. Looked at in this way, manana only shows intellectually
the possibility of an ideal existence. If one wants to proceed further, than one can
take the help of nididhyāsana, but in that case, one goes beyond philosophy. Manana
does not causally bring intuitive truth into existence, it demonstrates the possibility
of the knowledge of such truth.
One of the most important aspects of Indian philosophical methodology is the pro-
cedure to be followed in an argument or debate between followers of different dars%anas
or between any particular group of philosophical opponents. Thus, one finds records of
sustained arguments and debates in early works like Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Kathā-
vatthu, and Milinda-pañha. Even though all the schools in the Indian philosophical
tradition have a long, chequered history of debate, the most systematic exposition of
the varieties of arguments and their function can be found in Nyāya philosophy. After
listening to the knowledge of self, manana requires arguing about that knowledge.
Exposition of this inferential knowledge of the self is known as anvīkṣā and the science
where this is discussed is called ānvīkṣikī. This is also known as nyāya. Reference to this
Nyāya philosophy can be found in ancient works like Chāndogyopaniṣad, Mahābhārata,
Manusmrti, Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Viṣṇupurāṇa, Arthas%āstra, etc. It must be noted here that
according to the adherents of the āstika schools (i.e. those who admit the Veda-s as
authoritative), the chief motive of ānvīkṣikī is to defend the Vedic world-view with the
help of inferences. So the Nyāya presentation of the nature and function of different
kinds of arguments is not independent of the Vedic conclusions, rather it is aimed at
supporting the Vedic stance. The idea is that once the Vedic doctrines are defended by
arguments, people will not be likely to doubt them. Since the five-membered argument

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is one of the sources of knowledge; Vedic views, once supported by some such infer-
ence, will also be accepted by all.
Naturally, the question arises: what does motivate one to enter into an argument?
We do not enter into an argument about something that is completely unknown to us.
Nor do we entertain any argument about something that is fully known to us. The idea
is that we enter into argument to acquire knowledge; and so, we won’t be motivated
to know something that is entirely unheard of, or which we know in every detail. We
can argue about something that we know in a very general way, but at the same time,
want to know in detail. When we want to know about something in a specific manner,
we think about two features of the said thing. For example, even after we know that
there is something called soul, we want to know further whether it is eternal or non-
eternal. The specific feature of the soul is what we would like to know. Even though
there are arguments in support of the eternal nature of the soul, there may be doubt in
our mind confirming the non-eternity of the soul. Even the arguments in support of
eternity of soul won’t be able to do anything because of this persistent doubt. This is
where we need tarka. Those who admit the bondage and freedom of soul argue that it
is only if soul is eternal, that we can talk about bondage and freedom of soul. Freedom
and bondage of soul won’t make any sense once soul is regarded as non-eternal. So, the
soul is eternal and cannot be non-eternal – this bit of knowledge is obtained through
tarka, which is a reductio type of argument, where the thesis of the opponent is refuted
by assuming it for the sake of argument, and then drawing undesirable consequences
from that thesis. This tarka removes the doubt about the nature of soul, and convinces
one of the validity of the arguments in support of the eternal nature of soul. Thus tarka
helps in establishing the validity of a particular argument, even though it is not itself of
the nature of valid argument. Notice also that this tarka is different from both doubtful
knowledge and certain knowledge. Where we have doubt, we have awareness like ‘Is
it this or that?’ Where we have certain knowledge, we have knowledge like ‘This is so
and so’. Tarka does not have either of these forms. The form of tarka is ‘This should
be like this, and not otherwise’. Tarka is the demonstration of an epistemic possibility
that strengthens the original argument. It is thus subsidiary to the original argument.
With the help of pramāṇa-s, we arrive at certain knowledge (nirṇaya). Nirṇaya
can be achieved through perception, inference, etc. But nirṇaya can also be achieved
by the mediator (madhyastha) after listening to the defender (vādī) and the counter-
defender (prativādī) participating in a debate. When the defender and the counter-
defender argue about two opposing views regarding the same object, a doubt arises in
the mind of the mediator (madhyastha) who acts as an arbitrator in the debate, since
two contrary properties cannot be present simultaneously in the same locus. When the
mediator listens to the defender establishing his own thesis and the counter-defender
refuting the former, he has to decide which of the arguments are admissible; and on
the basis of that, he has to declare the final result of the debate. When the mediator
finds the arguments in favor of one of the theses maintained by one of the parties to
be admissible, he supports that party, and the other party has to accept defeat. Where
this defending and countering of the respective theses are done in accordance with
the rules of debate, one party must win and the other must lose. The defender and

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the counter-defender, being certain about their own positions, advance arguments in
support of their respective theses. They do not have any doubt. It is only the mediator
who entertains doubt, and it is he who arrives at nirṇaya. Since neither of the parties
involved in the debate is willing to give up his own position, no nirṇaya can be arrived
at without the mediator, if the debate is such that one must identify the party that has
been defeated. (If, however, the debate takes place purely for the sake of arriving at
truth, then the question of someone being the winner and someone being defeated
does not arise; and in such cases, the presence of a mediator is not mandatory.) This
nirṇaya can be arrived at only through the knowledge of Nyāya, and process through
which one arrives at nirṇaya is initiated by the doubt that arises in the mind of the
mediator.
Not all forms of argumentation are equally valid. The type of debate (kathā)
between the two parties may be of three kinds, depending upon the different purposes
of the undertaking of the debate. These three types of debate are known as vāda, jalpa,
and vitaṇḍā. Where the argument and counter-argument are taken up to gain proper
knowledge of some entity, this debate is called vāda. When a student enters into an
argument with his teacher, the student aims at gaining knowledge. There is neither
the necessity of the presence of any mediator, nor any question of getting the better of
the adversary. Vāda involves honest search for truth. Of course the parties involved in
vāda could point out the fallacies that might be present in their respective arguments,
for this is absolutely necessary for the proper knowledge of the object under dispute.
When the parties enter into arguments and counterarguments for the sake of winning
in the debate, it is more like an intellectual sport that is known as jalpa, where defeat-
ing the other party is the aim. In jalpa, the arguments and counter-arguments proceed
like this. First, the defender puts forward his thesis, and defends this with the help of
some inference; and then shows how this inference is supposed to be free from all falla-
cies. Second, the counter-arguer explains the defender’s thesis and then shows fallacies
in it. Third, the defender again explains the counter-arguer’s thesis and then attempts
to show that his own thesis is free from the alleged fallacies. Thus the debate proceeds,
and when one of the contending parties fails to show that his thesis is free from the
fallacies alleged by the opponent, or fails to refute the thesis of the opponent, he is
declared by the mediator as the defeated party. In vitaṇḍā, one party refutes the thesis
of the other party, but never defends any thesis of its own. One could of course argue
that it is not true that the participant in a vitaṇḍā does not have any thesis of his own,
for if one does not have any thesis to defend, then there is no need for entering into
a debate. It may be the case, however, that the performer of vitaṇḍā does not defend
his thesis explicitly. Perhaps he tends to think that once he is able to refute the thesis
of the other party, it would automatically amount to his victory and the defeat of his
opponent. So, while the participant in a vitaṇḍā may very well have a thesis of his own,
he may not choose to defend his thesis in an explicit manner.
A dishonest contestant may also employ verbal tricks in such a debate to defeat his
opponent. These are known as chala in Nyāya terminology. If the counter-arguer uses
a term used by the defender in a sense different from the defender’s sense, and then
shows some fallacy in the defender’s argument, then such a verbal trick is obviously

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being employed for gaining victory, and such a practice is patently unfair. Such ver-
bal tricks may be of three different kinds. Suppose the defender says ‘This boy is rich
because he has nava blankets (navakambala)’ (‘nava’ in Sanskrit might mean either
new or nine), and the defender uses the word ‘nava’ to mean some new and costly
blanket (kambala). But the counter-arguer might, in order to malign his opponent,
take the word ‘nava’ to mean nine; and then argue that the probans (hetu) of the
proposed argument is inadmissible, since the boy does not have nine blankets. This
sort of quibbling is called vākchala. Of course, such quibbling does not vitiate the
defender’s argument. Again when the defender of a thesis uses a particular word,
the defender of the counter-thesis might deliberately take that word in a wider sense
that is not intended by his opponent, and then find fault with the thesis. This sort of
quibbling is called sāmānyachala. The application of sāmānyachala is dependent on
the presence of a universal or common property in the object under dispute. Suppose
a person says about a Brahmin: ‘This Brahmin possesses vidyācaraṇa’ (‘knowledge
of Veda-s and good conduct’), with the purpose of praising that Brahmin. Suppose
thereupon someone says ‘it is indeed possible for a Brahmin to possess these qual-
ities’. Now, a third person might point out that the second statement is unjustified,
since these features (viz. knowledge of Veda-s and good conduct) are not present in
all the Brahmins. A child Brahmin, or a fallen Brahmin who has deviated from his
duties, is bereft of these features. Such a person takes the universal Brahminhood to
be the means of establishing vidyācaraṇa, and then argues that if that be the case, then
even a fallen Brahmin would possess vidyācaraṇa. But surely this is not true. Here,
the property ‘vidyācaraṇa’ is taken by this third person to reside in all Brahmins by
virtue of the universal brahminhood residing in them, irrespective of whether they
have observed the requisite rituals or acquired the necessary learning. Another kind
of chala is known as upacārachala. Upacāra means the use of a word in its secondary
meaning. When, for example, one says ‘The whole podium is crying’, one means that
the people on the podium are crying, and not the podium itself. But if the counter-
arguer employs the rejoinder that it is not possible for the podium to cry, since the
podium is a material object, then he takes recourse to upcārachala. Jāti is another kind
of debate where the counter-arguer finds fault in the arguer’s argument not on the
basis of some universal concomitance (vyāpti) relation that should obtain between
the probans (hetu) and probandum (sādhya), but merely on the basis of some simi-
lar features (sādharmya) or dissimilar features (vaidharmya) of the things concerned.
Suppose someone employs the argument “Sound is non-eternal, since it is an effect,
e.g. a pot.” If his adversary employs the counter-argument “In that case, let sound also
be visible, since it is an effect, e.g. the pot,” then this would be a case of jāti. It must
be noted, however, that such counter-arguments are not admissible.
In a debate, the parties involved might have false awareness or ignorance regard-
ing the things that are the objects of debate or regarding the rules of argumentation.
Once detected by the opponent or the mediator, this would certainly ensure the defeat
(nigraha) of the party that possesses this false awareness. This is known as vipratipatti.
When the counter-arguer defends his own position, or finds faults in the arguer’s argu-
ment, the arguer must criticize that position or refute the alleged fallacies. If the arguer

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fails to do that, then he fails to do what should have been done. And this is due to his
ignorance. This is called apratipatti. This also ensures the defeat of the arguer.
Using examples (drṣtānta-s) in a debate is a well-known practice. In a debate only
that can be used as an example about which both the arguer and the counter-arguer are
in agreement. If the example itself is not unanimously admitted, then that cannot be
treated as an example in the debate. In other words, the example must be established
by some accepted means of knowledge (pramāṇa) that is acknowledged by both the
contending parties.
In a debate, when we arrive at the conclusion, the nature of the object concerned
under debate has been proved. The conclusion is the end of this proof (siddha anta).
The pramāṇa-s are the means of establishing the exact nature of the object under dis-
pute. In the conclusion, we arrive at the knowledge of the form ‘This is like this and
not like that’. This siddhānta could be of four kinds. (1) When there is a conclusion
that is not contrary to the doctrines admitted by any of the systems, and is accepted
by at least one of the systems, it is called sarvatantrasiddhānta. (2) There may be a
conclusion that is not accepted by all the systems, though it is accepted in only a
specific system; and this is called pratitantrasiddhānta. (3) When proving one conclu-
sion requires the proving some other, the original conclusion is the basis of the proof
of those other conclusions, and this original conclusion is called adhikaraṇasiddhānta.
(4) When in a debate one provisionally accepts the conclusion of the other party
and then argues about the features of that conclusion, then that conclusion is called
abhyupagamasiddhānta.
The subjective counterpart of siddhānta is known as nirṇaya. Nirṇaya is the debater’s
acquiring the knowledge of reality through tarka. Nirṇaya is the result of tarka that one
adopts on the basis of the prāmaṇa-s. So one cannot be said to have nirṇaya unless one
takes the help of pramāṇa and tarka. Tarka is the thus one of necessary prerequisites
of nirṇaya. Vāda thus starts with doubt (sams%aya), and ends with ascertainment (nirṇaya).
Nirṇaya is important for continuance of our everyday life, depending on which one
could accept what is to be accepted and reject what is to be rejected. Nyāya philoso-
phy also contains a detailed discussion of the ‘defects of probans’ (hetvābhāsa-s) that
might vitiate an inference. The parties involved in a debate must have a thorough
knowledge of these defects so that by avoiding such defects, they can employ valid
inferences. A detailed presentation of these defects would take us beyond the scope of
the present chapter.
Another aspect of Indian philosophical methodology is the hermeneutic task
concerning meaning and interpretation. The Pūrva Mīmāmsā school of Indian phil-
osophy, which was particularly concerned with the ascertainment of the meaning
of the Vedic statements, has provided us with a detailed discussion of the ways of
deciphering the meaning of different kinds of sentences. A sentence has been defined
as a collection of words having semantic competence (yogyatā), syntactic expect-
ancy (ākāṅkṣā), import (tātparya), and contiguity (āsatti); and which expresses a spe-
cific meaning. A sentence expresses a unified and unified meaning, but when it is
divided into parts, the parts expect each other in order to express the unified mean-
ing expressed by the sentence as a whole. When a sentence is such that there is no

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anomaly in grasping the relation between the meanings of the words constituting
the sentence, or between the sense initially expressed by a sentence and the con-
text in which it is uttered, we determine the meaning of the sentence following the
general rules of grammar. Such normal cases do not always draw the attention of
Pūrva Mīmāmsakas, who are more interested in deviant sentences that may be of five
kinds: (1) where we have some doubt regarding the meaning of the sentence (sandigdh
ārthapratipādaka); (2) where there is some obstacle in determining the meaning of the
sentence (vyāhatārthabodhaka); (3) where some meaning that is apparently contrary
to the meaning of another sentence is expressed (viruddhārthapratipādaka); (4) where
the meaning expressed by a sentence is already known through another source of
knowledge (anuvādaka); and (5) where something that is apparently nonsensical is
conveyed by a sentence (āpātata anarthaka).
Let us explain some of these cases with the help of examples. Since Mīmāmsakas are
interested in explaining the significance of problematic Vedic sentences, the sentences
that they discuss are usually taken from the Vedic corpus. But the Pūrva Mīmāmsaka
explanation of such sentences can very well be extended to ordinary sentences as well.
Take the Vedic sentence ‘agnirvai brāhmaṇaḥ’ (the Brahmin is indeed fire). Apparently,
the Brahmin (the person belonging to a particular caste) and fire are two completely
different things, and there cannot be any identity between the two. Here, in order to
understand the meaning of this sentence, we have to fall back on the secondary mean-
ings of these two words. What is being meant here is that the same thing is the origin of
Brāhmin and fire. In Vedic literature, it has been said that Brāhmin and fire originated
from the mouth of Prajāpati, the creator. This Vedic sentence is expressive of praise,
i.e. it conveys the thought that both Brahmin and fire are sacred, and occupy the cen-
tral place in the history of creation, because both had their origin in the mouth of the
creator. Of course, there are many other reasons why we take the secondary meaning
to explain the significance of a sentence. The most important of them is the fact that
we take resort to the secondary meaning of a word, when the primary meaning of the
same is incompatible with the import of that sentence.
Some sentences do not contain a verb, and therefore, their meaning cannot be
grasped. Hence, they fail to prescribe or prohibit any action. In these cases, we com-
plete the meaning of such sentences following methods called anuṣaṅga and adhyāhāra.
Anuṣaṅga is a method of inserting a word for completing the sentence; the word being
such that it has been used in some earlier sentence expressing a complete meaning.
Thus the word carries its meaning from one sentence to another sentence lacking
a verb, helping the latter sentence to express a complete meaning. Adhyāhāra is a
method of imagining a word in the sentential context where the relevant word is
absent. We come across Vedic sentences where there is more than one subordinate
clause, but only one ‘remainder of sentence’ (vākyas%eṣa) with a verb. Here, in order
to complete the meaning of the subordinate clauses, we have to insert in each of the
subordinate clauses the verb that occurs in the remainder of the sentence. If this verb
is not applicable due to any grammatical rule (e.g. the number and person of the verb
should agree with that of the subject), then we have to imagine the correct verb by
adhyāhāra.

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Some of the Vedic sentences are called arthavāda. This kind of sentence either
praises some action that has been enjoined, or denigrates some action that has been
prohibited. Though these sentences do not directly give any direction to perform an
action or refrain from it, they motivate the interested person either to perform or to
refrain from the said action. In many cases, the literal meaning of such sentences can-
not be admitted. In order to get the intended meaning of such an arthavāda sentence,
we need to connect them with positive injunctions (vidhi) or prohibitory sentences
(niṣedha). A niṣedha sentence like ‘varhiṣi rajatam na deyam’ (one should not offer silver
as a fee to the priests officiating in a sacrifice) is followed by the arthavāda sentence
‘so’rodīt yadarodīt tadrudrasya rudratvam, tasya yadas%ru s%īryantu’ (Rudra is so known
because he cried, and his tears became silver). Here, Rudra’s tears are called ‘silver.’
The literal meaning of this sentence does not seem to be something that can be true.
But if we take the niṣedha sentence and the arthavāda sentence together, then one can
grasp the significance of the arthavāda sentence, which is that if one offers silver as
fee to the priests officiating in the sacrifice, then one’s family will experience such a
turmoil within a year, that the members of that family will go on crying. This is why
offering silver as fee to the priests officiating in a sacrifice is not sanctioned.
The principles established by schools such as Nyāya and Pūrva Mīmāmsā were of
great significance to the development of Indian philosophical tradition, and they con-
tinue to play an important role in determining the nature of Indian philosophical
investigation and debate.

1
In Indian intellectual tradition, it is a common convention that at the beginning of
any technical treatise, it is customary for the author to state (or at least to indicate)
four factors known as anubhandha-s, the knowledge of which is supposed to motivate
an intelligent and interested person to study that text. Such factors do not directly
form the core of the subject(s) to be dealt with in that text, but they provide some idea
about the subject-matter of that text, and also the purpose that may be served by such
a study. These four factors are as follows:

1 adhikārī (i.e. the eligibility of the person who is entitled to read the text);
2 viṣaya (i.e. the subject-matter of the text);
3 sambandha (i.e. the relation between the text and its subject-matter);
4 prayojaṇa (i.e. the purpose to be served by the study of the text).

The knowledge of these factors is supposed to motivate the potential reader for the
following reasons:
A sensible person embarks on a course of action only when he is certain that the
action to be undertaken by him is such that (i) it can be accomplished by his own
endeavor, (ii) it leads to the attainment of something that is desirable, (iii) it does not
lead to the attainment of something that is extremely undesirable. In philosophical
jargon, the cognitions of these three facts are known as (i) krtisādhyatājñāna, (ii) iṣ

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tasādhanatājñāna, and (iii) balavadaniṣtāsādhanatājñāna respectively. When a person

comes to know that he is eligible for reading a particular text, he thereby knows that he
is capable of studying that text, and this serves here as the requisite krtisādhyatājñāna.
If that person is interested in achieving the purpose that is supposed to be served by the
study of that text, and if he also feels that the trouble of studying the text is more than
compensated by the benefits to be yielded by that study, then he would also have iṣta
sādhanatājñāna and balavadaniṣtāsadhanatājñāna as well. Thereupon, the person con-
cerned would proceed to study that text. The necessity of indicating these anubandha-s
has been pointed out by Kumārila Bhatta in his Ślokavārttika (Jijñāsāsūtra, verses 12–
17). Sometimes, these anubandha-s are also pointed out by the commentator(s), in case
they have not been mentioned in the book commented on.

2
A large number of texts pertaining to Indian philosophy are in the form of commentar-
ies. There are extensive commentaries on the Tripitaka-s of the Buddhists, the Āgama-s
of the Jainas, and the Upaniṣad-s. Most of the philosophical schools have some apho-
risms (sutra-s) as their starting point (e.g. Nyāyasūtra-s of Gautama, Vais%eṣikasūtra-s
of Kaṇāda, Yogasūtra-s of Patañjali, Mīmāmsāsūtra-s of Jaimini, and Brahmasūtra-s of
Bādārayaṇa), on which a large number of commentaries and sub-commentaries were
written. These commentaries not only explained the texts that were being commented
on – they also answered the objections that could be raised (or were actually raised)
against some doctrine expounded in the text concerned, and in some cases, either
supplemented the text or even proposed alterations to the views or doctrines that
seemed to be erroneous or defective to the commentators. Depending on their size and
the purpose served by them, such commentaries were classified into various types, e.g.
(i) bhāṣya, (ii) vārttika, (iii) tīkā, (iv) pañjikā, (v) vrtti, and so on. The bhāṣya on an
aphorism should explain the latter by words that closely follow the wordings of that
aphorism, and it may also make short statements and then expand them. A vārttika
type of commentary has three tasks to perform – (i) explaining what has been said in
the text commented upon, (ii) stating what should have been stated, but has not been
stated in that text, and (iii) pointing out improper statements in that text, and then
suggesting corrections to them. A tīkā type of commentary is supposed to give just
sufficient hints for understanding the text commented on. A vrtti  type of commen-
tary is usually brief, and its purpose is to make the text commented upon intelligible
to beginners. For example, we have Nyāyabhāṣya by Vātsyāyana on the Nyāyasūtra-s,
Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara on Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā by Vācaspati
Mis%ra on Nyāyavārttika, and also Vrtti by Vis%vanātha on the Nyāyasūtra-s. An ideal or
full-fledged commentary should perform the following tasks:

1 padaccheda (splitting up euphonic combination and identifying the individual words

of the text commented on);
2 padārthokti (stating the meanings of the isolated terms identified by the first step);

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3 vigraha (expounding the samāsa, i.e. nominal compound that may be involved in
a word);
4 vākyayojanā (determining the meaning of the entire sentence from word meanings);
5 ākṣepa (raising possible questions or objections);
6 samādhāna (providing answers to such anticipated questions or objections).

The best example of such a commentary is Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali on the Aṣtādhyāyi

of Pānini that contains the rules of word formation in Sanskrit.
A well-written book should contain chapters which have some intimate connection
with the book as a whole; and there should also be some connections that relate each
chapter to the chapters preceding it and succeeding it. In the absence of such intimate
connections, the different portions of the book will look like a disjointed collection,
without having any unity. Such interconnections, that are known as saṅgati-s, may
be of six kinds: (1) prasaṅga, (2) upodghāta, (3) hetutā, (4) avasara, (5) nirvāhakaikya,
and (6) kāryaikya. The commentators of Tattvacintāmaṇi, a text of the new school of
Nyāya, have discussed in detail the nature of such interconnections or relevance, and
they have also shown how the different sections of Tattvacintāmaṇi are related to each
other through such saṅgati-s.
Another classification of saṅgati-s can be found in the commentaries and sub-
commentaries of Mīmāmsā-sūtra-s and Brahma-sūtra-s, both of which aim at deter-
mining the meaning of Vedic sentences. Each of these books consists of some
chapters (adhyāya-s), that have sections (pāda-s), which again consist of sub-sections
(adhikaraṇa-s), which contain some aphorisms (sutra-s) that are supposed to deal with
some Vedic utterances (s%ruti-s). Now, the commentators have shown how each of
these aphorisms bears some relevance to the discipline (s%āstra) of Pūrva-Mīmāmsā or
Vedānta taken as a whole, then they determine how it is also connected with the rele-
vant section and sub-section in which it occurs, and how it is also connected with some
specific Vedic statement. These are known as s%āstrasaṅgati, adhyāyasaṅgati, pādasaṅgati,
adhikaraṇasaṅgati, and s%rutisaṅgati respectively. A detailed discussion of this topic with
proper examples is beyond the scope of this chapter.

3
The two systems of Pūrva-Mīmāmsa and Vedānta (which is also known as Uttara-
Mīmāmsā) are concerned with explaining Vedic sentences and determining their
meaning as well as their significance or import (tātparya). While Pūrva-Mīmāmsa
deals with sentences that mostly pertain to rituals, the rules devised by them for
explaining deviant or problematic sentences may be applied to other types of sen-
tence as well, and this has actually been done by the adherents of Vedānta for
explaining problematic or disputed sentences in the Upaniṣad-s, and also for deter-
mining the significance or import of such sentences. One way of determining the
import of a sentence is to consider the context in which the sentence is being
uttered, and this procedure often helps us in determining the import of a sentence
in which some ambiguous word has been used. The Sanskrit word ‘saindhava’ may

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mean either a horse born in the Sindhu province, or it may also mean rock salt.
Now, if a person utters the sentence “bring saindhava” when he is having his meals,
then he is obviously asking for salt; whereas if he utters this sentence on the eve
of a journey, then he is obviously asking someone to bring a horse. But sometimes,
the import of a sentence may have to be determined by a more complex process. In
order to do this, one has, first of all, to consider what has been said at the beginning
(upakrama) and also at the end (upasamhāra) of the passage in which the disputed
sentence occurs. Next, one has to consider the statement that is being repeatedly
stated. Such repetition is known as abhyāsa. Scripture usually reveals what is not
known through other sources. Thus, in determining the import of some scriptural
passage, one should see which of the sentences is expressing something that has not
been known previously from other sources. This element of novelty is known as
apūrvatā. Another means of finding import is to notice the sentences that declare
something as a desired result (phala). Thereafter, one has to note what is being
praised in some way or other. Such laudatory sentences are known as arthavāda.
Finally, one has to note what is being sought to be supported by some reasoning
(upapatti). In Vedāntasāra, a preliminary book of Advaita Vedānta, it has been
decided with the help of such criteria that the import of the sentence “tattvamasi”
that occurs in Chāndogya Upaniṣad is the identity between jīva (i.e. the individual
self) and Brahman (i.e. the ultimate reality).

Note
1 I am grateful to Professor Prabal Kumar Sen for his suggestions for improving an earlier version of the
chapter.

References
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