The Trouble with

Mission Command
Army Culture and
Leader Assumptions
Maj. David J. Devine, U.S. Army

I n 1911, Capt. Harry Cootes of the U.S. 13th

Cavalry authored a short leadership article
that appeared in the Journal of the United States
Cavalry Association. In his article, Cootes lament-
ed how micromanagement and a lack of trust had
Change in Wartime. Their book devotes significant
attention to the philosophy of mission command
and particularly the difficulties the modern U.S.
Army has encountered in ingraining this concept in
its leaders. Barno and Bensahel suggest that mission
reduced cavalry troop commanders in the early command represents a crucial element contributing
1900s to “mere figureheads, and in fact, a colonel’s to Army leaders’ adaptiveness and mental agility in
first sergeant.”1 Cootes, who had observed several dynamic operational environments. They also assert
European military maneuvers, contrasted the freedom that the Army does not effectively practice its mis-
enjoyed by French, German, and Russian command- sion command philosophy. The authors provide sev-
ers with the conformity and constraints imposed eral reasons for this failure, including excessive bu-
upon American officers. According to Cootes, exces- reaucracy, extensive micromanagement, widespread
sive authoritarianism, distrust, and interference by risk aversion, and endemic distrust. These negative
higher commanders severely degraded the initiative behaviors arise in response to peacetime bureaucratic
and adaptiveness of U.S. Army officers. These nega- requirements and persist in war.3
tive behaviors largely Although Cootes never saw the term “mission com-
Maj. David J. Devine, resulted in a “sit-fast mand,” he might agree with Barno and Bensahel’s obser-
U.S. Army, is the S-3 of do-nothing” leadership vations. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission
5th Battalion, 1st Cavalry culture among troop Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, defines
Regiment, 1st Stryker commanders.2 mission command as “the Army’s approach to command
Brigade Combat Team, Times have and control that empowers subordinate decision making
25th Infantry Division, at changed, but this and decentralized execution appropriate to the situa-
Fort Wainwright, Alaska. unfortunate condi- tion.”4 This approach provides the overarching philosophy
He holds a BA from Rhode tion persists. In 2020, commanders and subordinates use to execute decentral-
Island College. He has retired U.S. Army Lt. ized operations in fluid conditions. However, the Army
served with the 1st Cavalry Gen. David Barno and currently faces significant problems in practicing its
Division, 4th Infantry Dr. Nora Bensahel mission command philosophy. This difficulty stems from
Division, and 1st Security wrote Adaptation un- many of the factors outlined by Barno and Bensahel and
Force Assistance Brigade. der Fire: How Militaries persists because of deep-rooted cultural issues at play in

36 September-October 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

Soldiers conduct a mission briefing after jumping from an Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft 26 September 2017 during Exercise September Heat
at Rivolto Air Base in Udine, Italy. Commanders must integrate a mission command philosophy as often as possible in training events to develop
confident, adaptive, trustworthy subordinates. (Photo by Paolo Bovo, U.S. Army)

most Army organizations.5 To “fix” mission command, a prominent place in U.S. Army leadership doctrine.
the Army must first examine several pervasive leader Unless the Army changes that doctrine, it should at-
behaviors and challenge the underlying assumptions that tempt to practice it—or at least recognize the misalign-
leaders rely upon to solve problems and achieve success. ment between what it prints in field manuals and what
its leaders practice every day.
The Problem Furthermore, those leaders seemingly embrace the
The U.S. Army’s mission command approach first mission command approach and praise its virtues, at least
appeared in doctrine in 2003, but soldiers from var- in public. So why do many of these same leaders fail to
ious armies have arguably relied on similar philoso- practice this philosophy? Why does the U.S. Army have a
phies for centuries. The Germans certainly practiced problem instilling the mission command approach?
Auftragstaktik (mission tactics) in the nineteenth and Three interrelated leadership characteristics stand out
twentieth centuries, and the chaos and uncertainty as particular causes for this difficulty: a preference for au-
of war has forced many armies to adopt mission-type thoritarianism, a love of “bull,” and a lack of imagination.
tactics out of necessity.6 Mission command represents Norman Dixon illuminates these fundamental issues in
only one possible command style, and several authors On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, a 1976 study of
have argued in favor of different approaches and al- British military failures and the associated psychological
ternative conceptualizations of the mission command obstacles facing senior leaders. Historians and theorists
philosophy.7 Nevertheless, mission command occupies such as Williamson Murray and Meir Finkel echo many

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2021 37

of the same concerns. Though Dixon studied British mil- Bulls--t
itary culture and published his book decades ago, several Bulls--t (or “BS”) refers to all of the behaviors, proce-
of his findings still apply to the U.S. Army of the early dures, rules, and rituals that armies adopt and maintain
twenty-first century. to reduce anxiety and mitigate ambiguity.15 This defini-
tion differs from Paul Fussell’s concept of “chickens--t,”
Authoritarianism which refers to vindictive and petty behaviors meant
Military organizations have a long and complicated to engender misery and increase a military activity’s
history with authoritarian leadership styles.8 This authori- inherent unpleasantness.16 BS takes many forms—some

Many leaders seem to believe the military profession

requires autocracy—that armies need tough, aggres-
sive, and strong-willed leaders to handle the solemn
business of warfighting.

tarianism perhaps stems from and perpetuates classic mil- strange, others obnoxious, many unnecessary. Excessive
itary leadership stereotypes: the draconian drill instructor, cleanliness, compulsive orderliness, an obsession with
the inflexible martinet officer, and the imperious general. appearances, and an unhealthy devotion to uniformity
Many leaders seem to believe the military profession might all qualify as BS. Many, but not all, of the bureau-
requires autocracy—that armies need tough, aggressive, cratic practices associated with military service may also
and strong-willed leaders to handle the solemn business relate to BS as these processes and systems exist to reduce
of warfighting. These qualities can benefit militaries if or eliminate ambiguity. Much of this BS exists primarily
properly applied, and authoritarian leadership techniques in garrison. BS may vanish to some degree in deployed
have their place under certain risk conditions and in environments, but often as not, it persists.17
specific situations.9 In fact, ADP 6-0 clarifies that leaders Like authoritarianism, a moderate degree of BS
should exercise more control in situations where leaders may occasionally frustrate soldiers but does not pose a
lack training, little cohesion exists, and trust still needs to significant threat to mission command. Organizations
develop.10 As with leadership challenges in various organi- may even require activities typically classified as BS to
zations, situational and followership variables in military maintain good order and discipline in certain situa-
units can influence leader behavior. tions. But leaders who rely on excessive BS to mitigate
Yet excessive authoritarianism can also create condi- ambiguous situations can create an organizational cli-
tions that degrade mission command. Dixon notes that mate that stifles decentralization, initiative, and trust.
authoritarian leaders tend toward dishonesty, suspicion, In tranquilizing anxieties and imposing conformity, BS
obsessive behavior, pessimism, and scapegoating.11 He also destroys adaptiveness and innovation.18 Leaders
also asserts that authoritarian leaders often ignore candid cannot learn to effectively practice mission command
feedback and just as often fail to act upon information in environments that ruthlessly eliminate all forms of
that does not support their preconceived notions.12 Finally, risk, unpredictability, or disorder. Contemporary oper-
both Dixon and Finkel contend that highly authoritarian ating environments feature all of these characteristics,
leaders struggle to demonstrate adaptiveness or display the and no leader can ever hope to eradicate them.
disciplined initiative required by the mission command Despite its adverse effects, the Army must carefully
philosophy.13 All of these behaviors imperil the successful manage BS. Many disagreeable soldiers and hyper-
execution of mission command. Leaders may need to critical leaders tend to characterize everything as BS,
employ autocratic styles depending on their situation, but even those activities that demonstrably contribute
excessive authoritarianism—and military cultures that to organizational success. Bureaucracy begets some
overprioritize it—threatens decentralization.14 BS, and Murray notes that bureaucracies like those

38 September-October 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 TROUBLE WITH MISSION COMMAND

underpinning American military services also exist pri- Barno and Bensahel identify as a primary impediment
marily to alleviate anxieties, impose order, and efficient- to mission command’s successful implementation.23
ly safeguard the status quo.19 Thus, BS may represent an Unimaginative officers may not oppose mission
unavoidable part of the military experience that often command, and a lack of imagination does not imply a
simultaneously promotes efficiency and hinders creativ- lack of competence. In fact, such leaders may still benefit
ity. Since BS remains part of the military environment, organizations and demonstrate effective direct-level lead-
leaders can either manage it effectively or let the BS ership. Nor do mavericks and rule breakers necessarily
manage them and their formations. Commanders must demonstrate the type of creativity and imagination nec-
carefully balance the mundane activities that contribute essary for mission command’s success. But organizational
to organizational welfare and discipline with the under- leaders who demonstrate a chronic lack of imagination
standing that the U.S. Army cannot and creativity may more readily
substitute orderliness for initiative. discard the mission philosophy, with
its emphasis on risk acceptance and
Unimaginativeness disciplined initiative.
Authoritarianism and un-
checked BS serve to produce the Confronting
third characteristic that heavily the Underlying
impedes mission command within Assumptions
the Army: unimaginativeness, In his influential book
defined as a reluctance to consider Organizational Culture and
alternate solutions or apply creative Leadership, Edgar Schein argues
thinking. The U.S. Army often that culture consists of three layers:
recognizes tactical imaginativeness, artifacts, stated values, and under-
but it rarely rewards NCOs or lying assumptions.24 The Army’s
officers who get imaginative with culture—and the subcultures
career choices or who creatively of the Army’s various branches,
interpret orders. The Army often To view Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army components, and organizations—
Leadership and the Profession, visit https://
directly or indirectly punishes such armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ features these three layers. Salutes,
behavior. As a result, most lead- ARN20039-ADP_6-22-001-WEB-0.pdf. uniforms, and ceremonies consti-
ers content themselves with safe tute the Army’s artifacts, while the
solutions and prescribed career Army Values and Ethic comprise
paths. Many officers fail to internalize Army doctrinal its stated values. Meanwhile, underlying assumptions
publications that call for breaking paradigms and inno- represent ingrained principles, those stemming from be-
vating; accordingly, innovation remains an unfavorably haviors that have repeatedly and successfully solved or-
rated attribute in Army leadership surveys. 20
ganizational problems. These assumptions have become
Yet Barno, Bensahel, Dixon, and Murray all agree a part of the organization’s cultural fabric; members
that innovation and adaptation cannot successful- of the group rarely recognize them and often act upon
ly occur without openness to new ideas, and many them unconsciously. These deep-rooted assumptions
contemporary military leaders lack such imaginative drive various organizational behaviors and beliefs.25
faculties. Even ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the
21
Army culture has many underlying assumptions.
Profession, singles out imagination and creative think- Many of these entrenched beliefs result in the type of
ing as crucial components of adaptiveness and mental exceptional behavior recognized by valor awards, but
agility. Unimaginative leaders struggle to practice mis- others act as obstacles to decentralization, accountabil-
22

sion command because they cannot freely trust others ity, trust, initiative, and effective risk management. In
and they lack an interest in evaluating prudent risks short, these assumptions can stymie mission command.
or developing a sense of disciplined initiative. These Authoritarianism, a fondness for BS, and a lack of
behaviors contribute to the risk-averse culture that imagination have helped create many of these negative

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2021 39

Pfc. Gabriel Gomes, assigned to 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, calls a direction of fire while manning a mortar firing position
28 February 2017 in support of Operation Inherent Resolve near Mosul, Iraq. A mission command approach allows junior leaders to make de-
cisions and take action in accordance with a mission and intent in the absence of direct supervision. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Alex Manne, U.S. Army)

assumptions. To successfully implement its mission com- everything. In the event of failure, senior commanders
mand philosophy, the Army must confront and change may view the lack of personal command verification as
several of its most damaging leader assumptions, like the a sign of incompetence rather than an opportunity for
three outlined below. leaders to learn and further refine mutual trust.
Assumption 1: A leader must trust but verify, As painful as it sounds, the Army must abandon
even if verification results in micromanagement. “trust but verify.” It must slaughter this sacred cow.
Every U.S. Army officer who has misplaced trust in an Army commanders should instead adopt “certify and
unsuccessful subordinate has heard of the old Russian trust” as their maxim. Leaders do not automatically owe
proverb “trust but verify.” This Reagan-era maxim trust to their subordinates or vice versa. But leaders
can solve organizational problems, especially in rela- who intensively train and develop their subordinates
tively immature organizations or when dealing with can eventually certify their competence. Likewise,
untrained leaders. However, this thinly veiled author- subordinates can gain an understanding of their leaders’
itarian mantra destroys trust when used as a lodestar behaviors and motivations during such training. Both
to guide Army commanders in their interactions with parties can ultimately develop mutual trust—the bed-
subordinate officers. The “trust but verify” proverb—a rock of mission command. Through training and leader
sacred cow in many Army organizations—often development, commanders can serve as the wellspring
provides officers with a justification to micromanage. of that trust and ultimately build adaptive organizations.
As a result, many leaders trust very little and verify Conversely, commanders who elect solely to “trust but

40 September-October 2021 MILITARY REVIEW

 TROUBLE WITH MISSION COMMAND

verify” promote authoritarianism and its kindred spirit, or complexity into their training plans. Tellingly, ADP
micromanagement—the very leadership quality that 7-0, Training, calls for realistic, combat-focused training
Cootes railed against in 1911. but contains no mention of mission command.27 Not
Assumption 2: Mission command occurs natural- every training event merits such opportunities; after all,
ly without any training or commander involvement. basic rifle marksmanship ranges do not require much
Many commanders assume that their subordinates complexity. Yet, many unit collective training events
understand the mission command philosophy and would benefit from more ambiguity and opportunities to
that their organization can easily apply that approach demonstrate disciplined initiative instead of rote unifor-
without consistent commander involvement. ADP 6-0 mity. Commanders must incorporate mission command
confronts this assumption, stating that “commanders fundamentals—decentralization, initiative, trust, and
cannot expect subordinates to respond effectively to a risk acceptance—into training plans wherever possible.
mission command approach once operations commence Failure to train mission command before expecting sub-
if they have not developed subordinates comfortable ordinates to execute the approach during operations only
in its use beforehand.”26 Yet commanders often expect contributes to misguided assumptions.
just that from their subordinates, who often have not Assumption 3: Army leaders should avoid
experienced the level of institutional or operational risk because risk threatens promotion and career
development necessary to exercise mission command. advancement. This well-ingrained belief represents
Their expectations manifest in the notion that leaders the most insidious and damaging threat to mission
should “figure it out,” another much-loved Army man- command’s successful practice. Many officers do not
tra. “Figuring it out” may very well help officers develop trust, delegate, or take the initiative due to the fear of
critical or creative thinking skills in the appropriate type personal or organizational failure. They avoid taking
of training environments. However, expecting officers risks because these risks—if they result in failure or
to puzzle through the application of an intricate, trust- accidents—endanger careers. Army formations rarely
based leadership approach during the actual execution offer the psychological safety that Schein and other
of operations without sufficient prior training likely authors consider necessary to develop learning or-
represents, as ADP 6-0 notes, an unrealistic goal. ganizations.28 Despite claims to the contrary, officers
The assumption that mission command occurs know that failures, even in the pursuit of innovation
naturally and effortlessly influences many Army leader or adaptation, often negatively impact evaluation re-
development factors, including counseling, mentorship, ports. Many leaders, therefore, elect to hew to the safe
and evaluation reports. Commanders want subor- and unimaginative path. Alternatively, they and their
dinates who can “figure out” complex problems and organizations turn to BS in the form of bureaucratic
expect junior leaders to arrive at effective solutions and layers and laborious risk management processes that
exercise disciplined initiative with little or no training. seek to mitigate ambiguity but instead destroy trust
Unimaginative or authoritarian leaders looking to cir- and frustrate initiative.
cumvent the hard work of instilling the mission com- All of these behaviors severely hinder the execution
mand philosophy often act according to this assump- of mission command. The Army must dispose of the
tion. However, even earnest leaders seeking to apply assumption that drives these behaviors by rewarding
mission command may also eventually fall prey to this leaders who internalize the mission command philos-
assumption due to the pressures of leadership turnover, ophy by effectively trusting others, prudently accept-
fatigue, unfamiliar situations, and time. ing risk, and underwriting honest mistakes. ADP 6-0
As with trust but verify, the Army must change this specifies that commanders cannot tolerate all types
assumption through training. ADP 6-0 prompts com- of failure, such as ethical violations and dangerous re-
manders to train mission command by incorporating peated errors.29 Even tolerated failures must benefit the
this approach as often as possible into training events. affected leaders by producing learning opportunities
However, Army training management doctrine em- influenced and guided by commanders. This learning
phasizes standardization, uniformity, and efficiency. It process further contributes to the certification of com-
does not necessarily reward leaders who build ambiguity petent and trusted subordinate leaders.

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2021 41

 Some Army leaders currently recognize and empha- BS, and a distinct lack of imagination. These behaviors
size qualities such as trust, risk acceptance, and psycho- have produced underlying leader assumptions regarding
logical safety. Still, many commanders prize authoritarian the need for constant micromanagement, the expectation
officers who prioritize getting results above leader devel- of mission command without training, and the primacy
opment and organizational growth. The mission com- of risk aversion over prudent risk acceptance.
mand philosophy seeks to avoid catastrophic failure in The Army and its leaders must confront these
war by creating adaptive leaders who have learned from assumptions and challenge the paradigms that foster
repeated failure in peace. This approach cannot hope to them to successfully apply the mission command phi-
succeed if it remains governed by a status quo that prefers losophy. Army leaders must first identify and change
uninventive, risk averse, and professionally conservative their behaviors—excessive authoritarianism, the over-
leadership solutions. reliance on banality and order, and the lack of imagi-
nation—before they can realistically address underly-
Conclusion ing cultural assumptions. By changing behaviors and
The Army codified mission command nearly twenty confronting old beliefs, the Army can best ensure its
years ago and teaches this philosophy to all of its leaders leaders cultivate the type of adaptiveness and flexibility
in some form or fashion. Yet few Army organizations demanded by future battlefields. Those leaders who
effectively practice this approach today. Instead, Army see no value in such adaptive leadership would do well
formations often fail to trust, fail to train, fail to achieve to heed the wisdom of Capt. Harry Cootes, who more
shared understanding, and fail to reward those who than a century ago, desired greater trust and latitude
display real initiative. Army leaders contribute to these from his commander to engender “the enthusiasm,
failures through authoritarian behaviors, overprioritizing initiative and go” required of successful armies.30

Notes
1. Harry N. Cootes, “More Responsibility for the Troop Com- 12. Ibid., 417–20.
mander,” in Cavalry and Armor Heritage Series Volume I: Leadership, 13. Finkel, On Flexibility, 99–100.
ed. Royce R. Taylor Jr. and Burton S. Boudinot (Columbus, GA: 14. Ibid., 108–10.
Brentwood Publishers Group, 1986), 21. 15. Dixon, Military Incompetence, 283–90.
2. Ibid., 21–22. 16. Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Sec-
3. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation under Fire: How ond World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 80–81.
Militaries Change in Wartime (New York: Oxford University Press, 17. Dixon, Military Incompetence, 283–95.
2020), 265–68. 18. Ibid., 299–301.
4. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: 19. Williamson Murray, America and the Future of War: The Past
Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- as Prologue (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2017), 219–29.
ment Publishing Office [GPO], 2019), 1-3. 20. Ryan P. Riley et al., 2016 Center for Army Leadership Annual
5. Barno and Bensahel, Adaptation under Fire, 280. Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings (Fort
6. Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership, 2017), 11–13.
Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 21. Barno and Bensahel, Adaptation under Fire, 262–65; Dixon,
Press, 2011), 100–2. Military Incompetence, 588–90; Williamson Murray, Military Adapta-
7. Amos C. Fox, “Cutting Our Feet to Fit the Shoes: An Analysis tion in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University
of Mission Command in the U.S. Army,” Military Review 97, no. 1 Press, 2011), 758–59.
( January-February 2017): 49–56; Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi, 22. ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession (Washington,
“The Trouble With Mission Command: Flexive Command and the DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), 4-1.
Future of Command and Control,” Joint Force Quarterly 86 (3rd 23. Barno and Bensahel, Adaptation under Fire, 279–80.
Quarter, July 2017): 94–100. 24. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 5th
8. P. D. Harms et al., “Autocratic Leaders and Authoritarian ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017), 17–25.
Followers Revisited: A Review and Agenda for the Future,” The 25. Ibid., 21–25.
Leadership Quarterly 29 (2018): 115–16, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 26. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 2-21.
leaqua.2017.12.007. 27. ADP 7-0, Training (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019).
9. Ibid. 28. Schein, Organizational Culture, 328–29; John P. Kotter, Lead-
10. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 1-24. ing Change (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012), 108–12.
11. Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence 29. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 2-17.
(New York: Basic Books, 1976), 416–32. 30. Cootes, “More Responsibility,” 21.

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