EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to external aids. The
external aids are very useful tools for the interpretation or construction of statutory
provisions. As opposed to internal aids to construction there are certain aids which are
external to the statute. Such aids will include parliamentary history of the legislation,
historical facts and surrounding circumstances in which the statute came to be enacted,
reference to other statutes, use of dictionaries, use of foreign decisions, etc.

What are External Aids to the Interpretation of Statutes?

External aids to interpreting statutes are sources of information and guidance
utilised by courts and legal professionals to understand the meaning and intent
behind a particular statute. These aids are external to the statute’s text and
provide supplementary context for its interpretation.
External aids provide valuable assistance in the interpretation of statutes. They
help resolve uncertainties and fill gaps in the statutory text. The legislative
history, including committee reports, debates and statements made by
lawmakers during the drafting process, is a commonly used external aid. It
provides insights into the statute’s objectives, purpose and context, assisting in
determining the lawmakers’ intent.
Case law is another important external aid. Judicial decisions on related statutes
or similar legal issues can help understand the interpretation given by courts in
previous cases. These precedents serve as a guide for future interpretations and
contribute to the development of legal principles.
Other external aids include dictionaries, legal treatises and scholarly articles.
Dictionaries help ascertain the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute.
Legal treatises and scholarly articles provide academic analysis and expert
opinions on statutory interpretation, aiding in understanding complex legal
concepts.
Parliamentary History
Parliamentary history is another external aid to the interpretation of statutes and
comprises the original form of statutes presented before the legislature’s
enactment. The ministry responsible for introducing the bill would have justified
its enactment, known as the Statements of Objects and Reasons, which hold
significant importance. Additionally, Parliamentary History encompasses records
of debates held in Parliament, committee reports, resolutions passed by both
houses, and any amendments made to the bill.
Previously, Parliamentary History did not serve as a tool for interpreting statutes.
This perspective originated from the traditional English legal system and was
followed by the Supreme Court of India. However, subsequent court cases led to
a change in this view, including Parliamentary History as an external aid to
interpretation.
In the Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose case, Chief Justice Patanjali
Shastri expressed that the Statements of Objects and Reasons should not be
considered an external aid to interpretation. This was because these statements
are presented during the bill’s processing, and the bill may undergo several
changes during that period, making the statements subject to amendments.
However, in the case of State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, Justice S. R.
Das took the Statements of Objects and Reasons into account to assess the
socio-political and economic context of the introduced bill, while still
acknowledging the view expressed in the Ashwini Kumar case.
In the case of Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, the Supreme Court referred to a
speech by Dr B. R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly while interpreting
Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution. The Court held that although
Parliamentary debate is not binding on the courts, it can be considered to
understand the context, background, and legislative intent.
Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances
Historical facts play a crucial role in establishing the context in which a statute
was enacted, providing background information and aiding in interpretation. This
external aid to the interpretation is particularly significant when applying the
Mischief Rule of Interpretation, as outlined in the case of Heydon. The Mischief
Rule seeks to address four key points:
●​ The state of the law before the enactment of the statute in question.
●​ The earlier law failed to address the problem or issue (referred to as
“mischief”).
●​ The remedy provided by the statute in question.
●​ The rationale behind the remedy.
These points directly correspond to the historical facts surrounding the statute,
reflecting the circumstances in which it was enacted. An example of the
application of the mischief rule can be seen in the case of Bengal Immunity Co. v.
State of Bihar, which involved the interpretation of Article 286. The court ruled
that a state can impose sales tax only if all sale elements have a territorial
connection, preventing multiple states from imposing sales tax on the same
transaction.
Historical facts are the facts that led to the evolution of a statute. They can
assist judges in uncovering the true nature of the statute, enabling a more
efficient legal process. Any relevant historical facts that contributed to the
development of the statute can be helpful in its interpretation.
Scientific Inventions
In the interpretation of statutes, it is essential to consider any subsequent
developments related to the statute’s provisions. This is particularly relevant in
fields like science and technology, constantly evolving. Society is continuously
progressing and rapid advancements are occurring in various domains.
Therefore, while interpreting statutes designed to govern these developments, it
is important to consider these evolving circumstances.
A notable case illustrating this principle is State v. J. S. Chawdhry, which involved
Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This section specifically mentioned
handwriting experts but did not include typewriting experts since typewriters
were invented after the statute’s enactment. However, in the case at hand, the
party representing the state sought to rely on the opinion of typewriting experts.
The Supreme Court had previously held that the opinions of typewriting experts
were not admissible. Nevertheless, in this particular case, the Supreme Court
departed from its earlier view and deemed such opinions admissible.
This demonstrates the importance of considering subsequent developments and
adapting the interpretation of statutes accordingly, especially in light of
technological advancements and changing societal norms.
Other Statutes
When a statute lacks clarity regarding its intended meaning, other statutes in pari
materia that deal with the same or similar subjects can be considered for
interpretation. It is also an external aid to the interpretation of statutes. Although
these statutes may not be identical, they address related topics or different
aspects of the same subject matter. They have corresponding provisions despite
being enacted at different times and under different circumstances.
In the case of State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanath Iyer, the accused, an income-tax
officer, was charged with accepting a bribe. The trial court sentenced him to six
months of rigorous imprisonment. However, the High Court acquitted the
accused upon appeal, suggesting that he may have borrowed money instead of
accepting it as a bribe.
The Supreme Court, in its examination of Section 4 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, ruled that if there is evidence that the accused accepted
gratification in any form other than legal remuneration, it shall be presumed that
such gratification was accepted as a bribe, unless proven otherwise. This
provision was considered in pari materia with the Indian Evidence Act 1872,
where the words ‘shall presume’ corresponded to the words ‘it shall be presumed’
in the Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court overturned
the High Court’s decision and found the accused guilty.
This case illustrates the application of the principle of pari materia, wherein
related statutes can be used to interpret ambiguous provisions and establish a
consistent legal framework.
Foreign Decisions
Before independence, it was common for Indian courts to refer to English
judgments when deciding cases on specific matters. This was because the
Indian legal system had its roots in the English legal system, and many laws in
England and India were similar. However, after the enactment of the Constitution
of India, the Supreme Court of India started placing significant reliance on
American judgments.
It is important to note that the decisions of foreign courts do not bind Indian
courts and such decisions are merely persuasive. In the case of M. V. Elisabeth v.
Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court took a different
stance from the English courts when interpreting the phrase “damage caused by
a ship” under Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. The court
expanded the meaning of the phrase to include physical damage and damage
caused to the cargo within the ship.
This instance demonstrates that Indian courts have the discretion to depart from
foreign court decisions and interpret laws based on the specific context and
requirements of Indian law. While foreign judgments can provide persuasive
authority, Indian courts ultimately have the autonomy to arrive at their own
interpretations.
Dictionaries and Textbooks
When a statute is unclear about its intended meaning, the principle of pari
materia allows for considering other statutes that deal with the same or similar
subjects. While these statutes may not be identical, they address related topics
or different aspects of the same subject matter. Despite being enacted at
different times and under different circumstances, they contain corresponding
provisions.
For instance, in the case of State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanath Iyer, an income-tax
officer was accused of accepting a bribe. The trial court sentenced him to six
months of rigorous imprisonment, but on appeal, the High Court acquitted the
accused, suggesting that he may have borrowed money instead of accepting a
bribe. However, the Supreme Court examined Section 4 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947.
It ruled that if there is evidence that the accused accepted gratification in any
form other than legal remuneration, it shall be presumed that such gratification
was accepted as a bribe unless proven otherwise. The Supreme Court
considered this provision in pari materia with the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
where the words ‘shall presume’ corresponded to the words ‘it shall be presumed’
in the Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court overturned
the High Court’s decision and found the accused guilty.
This case exemplifies the principle of pari materia, allowing related statutes to be
used for interpretation when the intended meaning of a statute is unclear, thus
establishing a consistent legal framework.