Trends in Southeast Asia Series: 15(2003)

Malaysian Politics: The Emerging Scenario Under Abdullah Badawi

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2003 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author, and his/her interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

ISSN 0219-3213 December 2003

Editors Note: This publication is a transcript of the Seminar Presentation entitled Recent Developments in Malaysian Politics by Dr Chandra Muzaffar, held in ISEAS on 22 October 2003. The edited version has been re-titled Malaysian Politics: The Emerging Scenario Under Abdullah Badawi. It incorporates the additional comments made by the Speaker in the Discussion that followed. The Editorial Committee wishes to thank Dr K.S. Nathan for editing the transcript.

About the Speaker Chandra Muzaffar is a Malaysian who for many years taught at universities in his country, while remaining active in Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) work. He holds a B.Soc.Sc from the University of Singapore (1970), M.Soc.Sc from Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang (1974), and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Singapore (1977). A political scientist, his last academic position was Professor-cumDirector at the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue, University of Malaya. Apart from writings on civilisational dialogue, he has also published extensively on religion, human rights, Malaysian politics and international relations. He has authored or edited 18 books and written more than 500 articles in English and Malay in various local and international journals. Dialogue, Terror (2003). Chandra also founded a multi-ethnic social reform group in 1977 called Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN) (National Consciousness Movement) which sought to raise public awareness of issues pertaining to democracy and ethnic relations in Malaysia. Today, he is the President of an international NGO, the International Movement for a Just World (JUST) which is concerned about challenges to social justice and human dignity in global politics. JUST also attempts to develop guiding ideas on a just and compassionate civilisation based upon shared universal spiritual and moral values. Chandra sits on the Board of a number of other international NGOs concerned with social justice and civilisational dialogue. Among the academic awards Chandra has received is The Harry J. Benda Prize for distinguished scholarship on Southeast Asia from the Association of Asian Studies, North America. His latest book is entitled Muslims,

ISEAS DOCUMENT DELIVERY SERVICE. This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. <http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>

MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE EMERGING SCENARIO UNDER ABDULLAH BADAWI

I. 1.0

TEXT OF PRESENTATION Introduction: Leadership Transition

The topic of discussion today can be approached from different angles and I thought that perhaps the best way of approaching the topic, given what is going to happen in the next 9 days, or at the end of 9 days, is to talk about the transition. We will try to build our analysis around this transition from Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the 4th Prime Minister of Malaysia to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the would-be 5th Prime Minister, and focus on the emerging political scenario. Dr Mahathir will pass the baton to Abdullah Badawi on 31st of October. The many questions that people ask about this transfer of power are: Will Abdullah continue the policies pursued by Dr Mahathir? Will he rearrange national priorities? Will the emphasis change? Will he adopt a different style? I shall try to offer some thoughts on some of these questions. 2.0 General Election

I do not expect Abdullah to make any major changes in substance in the next few months until the General Election, and one does not know when the General Election will be held. There are a lot of guesses that have been made about the next General Election. There are a lot of people who say that Abdullah will go to the polls before the end of the first quarter of 2004 for two reasons: firstly, he would not want the effect of this honeymoon as Prime Minister to wear out, so he will have to go to the polls before that wears out. The second reason is Sabah one of the states in the Malaysian Federation which will have to hold its state elections by April 2004. Abdullah may want to synchronize the General Election with Sabahs State Elections.

2003 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

In all these years, Sabah has held its State Elections separately from the rest of the Federation. Perhaps the 11th General Election will be held in the first quarter of 2004. So I do not expect anything dramatic to happen before that. Why? Because Abdullah would want to consolidate his position. It may not be wise to make too many changes, especially since he has just taken over. But he would want to perhaps put across certain ideas to the general public and at the same time give the impression to the electorate that, while there is continuity, there is also some difference and it is a sort of difference which the people would be looking forward to. 3.0 Politics

Ill try to look at certain areas of concern as far as Malaysian politics is concerned from that perspective, based upon things that Abdullah himself has been saying for the last few months, and I have chosen seven areas to look at very quickly to get a feel of how Abdullah would approach policy and what sort of style he would bring into his administration. I will begin with politics and then move on to the economy and certain other areas. Abdullah is as committed as his predecessors to the power sharing arrangement that has evolved over the decades. He is not going to change that. In other words, if people are hoping that the ruling National Front Coalition will develop into a single, multi-ethnic party and thereby reduce some of the ethnic dichotomies in Malaysian politics, I dont think thats going to happen. In other words, this tried and tested arrangement where you have parties representing different ethnic communities operating at the level of their respective communities but at the same time, developing a consensus at the national level will continue, it seems to me, for the foreseeable future. Except, I wouldnt be surprised if there are some changes to leadership in the component parties of the ruling Barisan Nasional. I can see such changes taking place for two reasons. In other words, if you look at some of the other component parties of the Barisan Nasional, (other than UMNO) there are leaders who have been in there for umpteen years. Some of them may be asked to step aside in Abdullahs very courteous and polite style. This can happen for two reasons as I have said a while ago. First, there is, I think, quite a bit of pressure within some of these component parties for a change at the top: people who

have been there for over twenty years. The Chief Minister of Sarawak (Abdul Taib Mahmud), for instance, has been at the helm since 1981. The President of the Malaysian Indian Congress (S. Samy Vellu) has been there since 1983. The President of Gerakan (Lim Keng Yaik) has been there since 1990. However, in the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the leadership change took place in May this year, from Ling Liong Sik, who was party president since 1986, to Ong Ka Ting after a three-year bitter feud between two rival factions. One can go on and on. These are all stalwart marathon runners. They dont tire and Mahathir himself has said that it will be good if some of them gave way to younger leaders, so that is a cue. But it is pressure from within some of these parties which may impact upon the General Election that could persuade Abdullah to consider some changes after the General Election. He could promise the electorate that there would be some changes post Election. Now, I can see that happening in a couple of political parties. The other reason why I think there will be some changes is because, a new leader will have to get people who are closer to him to work with him even though Abdullah and Mahathir and others were altogether in the same team for such a long while. I dont think Abdullah is as comfortable as Mahathir was with some of these leaders, and once he takes over, he would want others, people who have been deputy presidents of their respective parties for a number of years, for instance, to come to the fore. So I can see that sort of change taking place. It is a question of feeling more confident about the leaders of the component parties who work with you. I can also see Abdullah reviewing some of the laws in the country that impinge upon human rights. There is no firm indication that this will happen but if one looks at the way he has responded to certain situations in the last 6 months or so, one gets the impression that he would want to see some changes at least. So I wouldnt be surprised if he institutes a review of some of these laws after a while, and if he takes a second look at laws like the Internal Security Act, especially after the National Human Rights Commission itself had proposed changes to the Internal Security Act. Fundamentally, the proposal was about removing detention without trial, and amending the law in such a way that the courts will be in charge of the

detentions of people who are suspected to be threats to national security. If the court is not satisfied that the person is a threat after investigations over 29 days, the person would have to be released. This is what the National Human Rights Commission has recommended. If on the other hand, if they have evidence, he is to be tried under any of the other laws in the country, not under a law that allows the government to detain people without a trial indefinitely. This would be a major change, given the global situation, given the concern with security and terrorism and all the rest of it. But it is, I think, important to remember that while Mahathirs tendency was to respond negatively to suggestions of this sort, Abdullah responded differently. He said, we will study this proposal. Abdullah clearly did not reject it when he said that we will study this proposal and we will see what we can do about it. I thought it was a response which human rights activists would be able to accept. Abdullah, I think, will also introduce a more consultative, consensus-oriented form of leadership which would provide greater space. He is not the sort of person who would be enamoured of one particular idea and decide that he would just go ahead and push it. Its not his style. He has got a civil service background. He has always been known to be a consensus-oriented leader and a person who is always happy to consult other people. Now that sort of approach I think would allow for some sort of democratic space to grow and expand, which is, what Malaysian society needs. It is something which civil society has been asking for, for a long while. Thats yet another change that one is hoping for. 4.0 Economy

Now when you look at the economy because the basic philosophy is not going to change one of the major contributions of the Mahathir era to Malaysias economic development has been this marriage between the public and private sectors: Malaysia Incorporated. I dont think Abdullah will jettison this idea, but there could be changes after a while. I wouldnt be surprised if Abdullah emphasizes the importance of some distance between business and administration, while holding on to this idea of public sector-private sector cooperation. It is the sort of distance which would, I suppose, make some of the top corporate players a little uneasy. Because one of the things that

has developed over the last two decades is a certain coziness, a certain incestuous relationship between certain individuals in big business and political elites. Abdullah is a person who is not close to particular business people. He has interacted with them but at the same time he is very conscious about the importance of maintaining some distance and I can see that happening and it would be good for the country, given the way in which the relationship between business and politicians has given rise to allegations of cronyism. I can also see Abdullah paying more attention to certain institutions of state linked to the economy which have been ignored to a great extent under Mahathirs stewardship. I am referring to institutions like the Securities Commission, regulatory institutions of that sort, the Central Bank whose advice is offered to the political elite as a matter of course, but there are occasions when their advice has been set aside. I can see some changes of that sort taking place where advice from the professionals is taken on board. institutions much more than Mahathir was inclined to. On the economy, Abdullah would want, it seems to me, to pay attention to a problem which has cropped up a number of times in the hustings, in the competition between UMNO and PAS in particular, but also UMNO and other opposition parities. This is the whole question of the redistribution of wealth in the country. With rapid economic progress, a lot of people have benefited but new gaps have developed in the national economy. I describe this as the gap between the have-a-lot and have-a-little I do not mean haves and have-nots anymore there have been allegations of opulence and extravagance on the part of an elite. He will have to find some way of addressing this issue, from the point of view of the marginalized, i.e. how one can improve their standard of living. The third area, corruption, is one which Abdullah has talked about quite a bit. As an individual, I think hes earnest about wanting to curb corruption especially elite corruption, corporate corruption. What he will do is still not very clear. But one of the things which he may want to consider is making the anti-corruption agency a truly independent body. At the moment, its not. He may also want to tighten up the law itself pertaining to corruption. These are things which Abdullah may want to work Again, because of his own background, civil service background, consensus leader, he is bound to listen to these

upon and he has, I think, sent a clear signal to a lot of people that corruption is one of his major concerns. 5.0 Education

Lets now look at the area of education which he has also talked about a number of times in recent months. Abdullah will remain committed, it seems to me, to the new emphasis on English in the school system because Malay has been there for a long while. It is the backbone of our national education system. Thats not going to change. But Mahathir had, for the past two years, given greater emphasis to English and one of his new programs is the teaching of Science and Mathematics in English from primary school right up to upper secondary level. I dont know whether that particular approach will remain. Im not sure because there has been a lot of criticism about this particular approach. It has been argued by educationists that one can teach English effectively without teaching a couple of subjects in that language. There are other ways of improving the standard of English. Abdullah may be inclined to listen to some of these comments because these are comments which have come from a whole lot of educationists who are unhappy with this attempt to teach two subjects in English which from a pedagogical point of view is not that sound an idea. So there are, I think, reactions to that. Without abandoning the larger commitment to English as an important language in the education system, one can expect to see some changes. The other issue in education which has cropped up, and people have asked Abdullah about it is whether he would remain committed to merit in the recruitment of students into universities. This again is a policy Mahathir introduced two years ago. In place of ethnic quotas which have been there for a long while, Dr Mahathir had introduced the merit system whereby students would be taken into the universities based on their results and other factors which had nothing to do with ethnicity. Abdullah has said this very openly that he is committed to this policy, and I think as a person, thats how he is inclined. He would see it as part of the process of strengthening inter-ethnic relations and I dont see him changing that. In fact, if anything, he would strengthen that particular approach to the recruitment of students.

6.0

Ethnic Relations

This is yet another aspect of public policy, and I would argue, is an area where Abdullah is particularly strong. It is not something the general public would be aware of that Abdullah more than perhaps his predecessors, has a very deep commitment to inter-ethnic harmony, and one of the episodes in his public career which has shaped his perspective on this, is the role that he played as a Special Officer to the National Operations Council immediately after the 1969 ethnic riots. As a special officer to the National Operations Council he was a witness to the effects of the riots in Kuala Lumpur. This has had a very deep impact upon his psyche, which is why Abdullah played such a direct role in trying to restore inter-ethnic harmony in that small part of southern Petaling Jaya, the Kampung Medan area, when some ethnic disturbances erupted in March, 2001. This is a reflection of how deeply he is concerned about this and I think he would try to do what he can to improve ethnic relations by addressing deep-seated ethnic prejudices, by increasing interaction in schools. It was Abdullah who introduced the vision school policy when he was Minister of Education in a different form. It has now been restored after some years when it was put on the back burner. Abdullah has given a lot of support to this idea of integrating students in secondary schools through this concept of Malay, Chinese and Tamil language streams students sharing facilities like the canteen, the school hall, the playing field and things like that. So I see him giving greater emphasis to ethnic relations and encouraging through the media attempts to make different communities understand one another. 7.0 Religion

That brings me to the sixth area, and that is religion. What would be Abdullahs approach to issues pertaining to religion? Religion will be a major challenge for Abdullah. As far as electoral politics is concerned, the whole question of religion, PAS position vis--vis an Islamic state and UMNOs response to it, will be a major issue. This is the issue which will engage his energies. Id like to suggest that Abdullah would be much more successful than Mahathir in dealing with the challenge

from the conservative right, the religious right. He will be more successful for two reasons: first, in dealing with the question of which Islam is the right Islam, which Islam should define the characteristics of the Malaysian state, the Malaysian polity, whether it is PAS Islam or UMNOs Islam because Mahathir has already designated Malaysia as an Islamic state. The credentials of the individuals involved in this debate would be very important, and Abdullahs credentials vis--vis Islam are much better than Mahathirs. His university degree is in Islamic studies. He comes from one of the most respected Muslim families in the country. His father was a religious leader. His grandfather was a mufti, and his great grandfather was a famous Tok Guru (religious teacher). Thats his lineage. So this pedigree would, I think, stand him in good stead in dealing with this question. Abdullah would be able to do things which Dr Mahathir was not able to do even though Dr Mahathir was I think, very clear and unequivocal about his position on a variety of issues pertaining to Islam. But Dr Mahathir was not able to lead prayers for instance, and these symbolic acts matter a lot when it comes to politics and to mass perceptions. Abdullah has led prayers in Parliament House, led prayers for the deceased PAS leader, Fadzil Noor, which had some impact upon the popular mind. So things of that sort would count. The second reason why I think Abdullah would be more successful: he is less confrontational on issues pertaining to Islam, and in dealing with issues that are so important to the Malay/Muslim community. An approach that is less adversarial, less controversial, less confrontational would carry much more weight, rather than the sort of frontal attacks upon PAS, frontal attacks upon the ulama, frontal attacks upon certain institutions that are seen as sacred by the Malay/Muslim community. So this more gentle, more subtle approach, it seems to me, would be more effective, and that is Abdullahs style when it comes to dealing with religious issues. 8.0 Foreign Policy

Finally, foreign policy issues. The general thrust of Malaysian foreign policy, it seems to me, will not change under Abdullah. He will remain committed to ASEAN, to Mahathirs idea of ASEAN Plus Three, creating an East Asia Economic Grouping

etc. These have become part of Malaysias foreign policy and he is going to remain committed to those ideas. Other policies include defending the interests of the third world and Mahathirs clarion call for UN reform. These concerns I think will remain. I dont think the substance of foreign policy will change in any way. However, Abdullahs style is going to impact upon foreign policy, which means that here again, he will be less confrontational. He is going to perhaps take a more oblique, more indirect approach in dealing with some of these issues. His pronouncements will be more nuanced. He is not going to go for the jugular unlike Mahathir, but in the end Mahathir ended up holding hands with Bush, we are told. So sometimes when you go for the jugular, then you hold hands, its okay. Abdullah, I think, will be a little more sophisticated, if one may use that word in dealing with some of these issues because thats his style. One hopes that Abdullah would not subscribe, and I see no evidence of this, to a sort of Manichean world view, pitting good and evil. Sometimes that sort of superficial, somewhat simplistic dichotomization of the world doesnt really help Malaysias own foreign policy interests. You can pursue a vigorous, non-aligned policy without getting into this trap. In fact one of the great strengths of non-alignment is its ability to see shades of grey as Jawaharlal Nehru, Indias first prime minister and father of non-alignment once said. One hopes that approach will emerge more clearly under Abdullah. 9.0 Abdullahs Personality

I have been generally quite positive about the man for two reasons: first, because I think you must give a person who is about to take over, a chance. So, you dont begin by attacking the guy or sort of expressing grave doubts about his ability. So, lets give him a chance, thats one of the reasons why I have been more positive. But the other reason is, I know Abdullah. I cant claim to know him intimately but I know him and I have worked with him. We were both members of the National Economic Consultative Council when he was a Member of Parliament, no more in the government hierarchy. This was when he was eased out but he was leader of the UMNO delegation to the National Economic Consultative Council, and there were a few of us from the NGO world who also sat in that Council. We sat in two

sub-committees, did a lot of drafting together, interacted a lot. One of the things I can say about Abdullah is he is a person with a very soft exterior, and he is gentle. He is nice to people. Its true. He would not like to hurt people and so on. But he is also a person who is capable of making tough decisions and tough decisions had to be made in that Council, especially on issues pertaining to restructuring because a lot of the Councils report was about ethnic structuring in the context of the new economic policy. There was an attempt to enunciate a new development policy and a lot of changes had to be made and he made some very, very tough decisions. The man is very concerned about being fair to everyone. Being just is something that dominates his thinking all the while. But at the end of the day, he makes his decision, stands by his decision and carries it through. Now, this is not the public perception of Abdullah unfortunately. They see him as a nice guy, therefore very soft. Nice guys are not necessarily soft. Let me tell you that one of the toughest political leaders we had was actually the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Someone who knew him very well once described the Tunku as a person who has got a velvet glove but an iron fist under that velvet glove. And some people have said that Mahathir is actually just the opposite. He appears to be tough but is actually quite soft when it comes to I suppose, forgiving people and bringing them back and so on. We dont know, but Abdullah I think, is capable of making tough decisions, and I dont see challenges emanating from within UMNO. There would be cliques, there would be perhaps, even factions. There will be people who will be jockeying for position and power. All these things will happen. That is part of politics, especially in a transition. However, I dont see this as his major challenge. For me, the major challenge that Abdullah will face, and this I think would become very obvious very quickly the major challenge would be from certain individuals in the corporate sector. That would be the major challenge, not from within UMNO or the Barisan Nasional. They will accept his leadership and they will go along with it. I mean Abdullah, being the sort of consensus leader, he will make decisions like who is going to be his number 2 and so on, based upon consensus, how people feel and all the rest of it, so it is not going to get him into deep trouble. But major corporate actors, that is a different ball

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game. If they are unhappy and they feel that they have been sidelined, that they are not getting what they think they should get, they may go and complain to the man who would be sitting in a big library a few meters from the Prime Ministers office because there is where he is going to locate himself. And if they go and complain to the man in the library, that could lead to problems. We can have a situation where like other leaders who have left the stage, he may feel inclined to offer advice to Abdullah, and it would be difficult for Abdullah. I hope that doesnt happen. I hope Dr Mahathir will allow Abdullah to develop his own style and do his own things. That I think is very important for the country and perhaps, that is what Dr Mahathir will do because Dr Mahathir would also be concerned about his legacy, and he would not want to do things which may tarnish his image in retirement. If he interferes, if he is seen as trying to determine policy, there would be a reaction, and that reaction would not be favourable to him. He would want to make sure that his own image is protected. Let me end by saying that my own concern, apart from this possible challenge that I talked about a minute ago, my own concern is this: having seen leaders emerge and leaders who hold some promise emerge, and having been disillusioned afterwards, I am quite realistic. Dont forget I was in politics for a short while! So I know what it is to be disenchanted. My concern is this, that Abdullah will be able to withstand pressures from within the family, from friends, from people who may have certain vested interests and who would want to pursue their own agenda. It happens all the while. I hope he will have the strength. I pray that he will have the strength to withstand such pressures. II. 10.0 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED Abdullah and the Bureaucracy

The institutions of governance would be able to accept him. If you are thinking of the bureaucracy, I dont think he will have any problems. He has always had very good relations with the bureaucracy. For instance, with some of the critical elements of the bureaucracy like the police, he has been very close to the police as the Minister of Home Affairs. He was Minister of Defence at one time, so he knows the armed forces

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quite well. The foreign policy bureaucracy, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs for 9 years. So I dont think this is going to be a problem for Abdullah. In fact, if you look at his style, its a sort of style that the civil service would be comfortable with. Well, I hope they dont get too comfortable with his style as that would be a problem, because I think Mahathir did shake up the bureaucracy quite a bit and it may be tempting now to go back into the comfort zone! 11.0 Abdullah and UMNO

Abdullah is a leader who is seen as UMNO by the UMNO rank and file. Because of his family background, because he hails from a very UMNO family, because of his own long association with UMNO and even when he was part of the Team B that mounted the challenge against Dr Mahathir in 1987, youll remember that Abdullah, unlike many others, did not leave the party, he remained behind because of all this, he is perceived as the quintessence of UMNO. Unlike Tengku Razaleigh who left the party, Musa Hitam (the former deputy premier) remained in UMNO, but while Musa ceased to be active, Abdullah remained active in UMNO. So, he has got a certain link if you like, with UMNO, a very deep relationship with UMNO, and I think that would be one of the factors. The other factor is this: in the 1987 UMNO Elections when the party was very divided, Abdullah was in Team B, together with Razaleigh, Musa and the others. Now he is one of the three vice-presidents who won, which means that he must have obtained support from both sides, partly because Abdullah is not seen as a person who is antagonistic to anyone. This is part of UMNOs culture, and this is something one has to keep in mind. If there is going to be a challenge, a real challenge, it will have to come from an individual who has a lot of support within the party. There are people who say that Najib Tun Razak has a lot of support within the party. It may be true because he did well in the UMNO Elections the last round, and the round before that he also performed quite well. But will Najib mount a challenge? Will he mount a challenge if he is made Number 2 in the party? Now Najib is 50, and he is about 13 years younger than Abdullah.

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I dont see Najib mounting a challenge and he wont get support if he mounts a challenge at this stage because in UMNO there is also a certain notion of seniority, age, and the rest of it. I dont see that happening. Besides, UMNO leaders and members know that Najib does not have Abdullahs religious credentials and that is what counts at this stage when UMNO is facing a huge challenge from PAS. Now will Muhyiddin Yassin (the other vice-president) mount a challenge if, lets say, he is left out? He is from Johor and Johor is a very powerful state as far as UMNO is concerned. I dont see that happening either. Why? Because Muhyiddin is only one of four or five players in Johor. In Johor, you have got a number of other major chieftains, and I think if you look at Johor UMNO, nearly everyone of them, including Muhyiddin, are Abdullah loyalists. Syed Hamid Albar (the current foreign minister) is very close to Abdullah. Musa still wields a lot of influence in Johor politics. He is very close to Abdullah Badawi. So I dont see Johor posing a problem. This is why, both in terms of individuals and regions that are important as far as UMNO is concerned, I dont see a challenge to Abdullahs position. And that is, in a sense, related to this question about advisers which I will address now. 12.0 Abdullahs Advisers

One does not really know who Abdullahs advisers are. But he is the sort of person who I think is close to different individuals. I would think that his own son-in-law, a very young man, Khairy Jamaluddin, 28 years old, is one of his closest advisers a very bright individual who is also very mature for his age. Of the senior politicians, I think it is Musa Hitam who is closest to him. Although Musa never made it to the top, in all the interviews that he has been giving to the media, he has come out very strongly on the side of Abdullah, and I suspect this will continue. There are some other people in the corporate world, young corporate professionals who give him advice on the economy and these are people who are very capable and these are individuals who I think will be able to provide some help to Abdullah.

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13.0

Abdullahs Attitude Towards Vested Interests

Now, about vested interests, one really doesnt know how one would be able to deal with this. I suppose one will have to humour some of these guys, some of these big corporate players. There is a story thats making its rounds in Kuala Lumpur that one of these guys, a very powerful corporate player who has a lot of businesses, who is close to the present Prime Minister, went to see Abdullah and asked him what his position would be after 31st October 2003. Abdullah is supposed to have told him: Havent you had enough of the good things? May be others should be given their share. So I suppose some of these people would want to continue to benefit from the system and Abdullah would have to find ways and means of dealing with them. 14.0 PAS Expectations of Abdullah

Now the question about PASs expectations of Abdullah. PAS fears Abdullah more than any other UMNO leader, which is why two years ago, they (PAS) conducted an opinion poll to find out who is the most suitable UMNO leader to be Prime Minister and the winner was Najib. That is the sort of Prime Minister that they would like because it will make it easier for them to expand their support, given PASs politics and the nature of UMNO politics at this stage. So, if you have someone who is seen as clean, who has got a religious persona, who comes across as someone who is Islamic, the way in which it is understood by society, it is going to be more difficult for PAS. So PAS is not pleased at all. This is why if you look at Harakah, the PAS newspaper, they have been attacking Abdullah all the while. They have said things about his son being involved in business, his brother being involved in business, and the good thing is that they have replied to those allegations which have no basis at all. His son is involved in the oil and gas business. He has been there for some time and it is true his companys shares went up with all the other oil and gas companies because of the market situation at that point. It had nothing to do with him being Abdullahs son. His son is another very bright individual. Abdullahs son is not in politics at all. Now, this son of his is a lawyer by training, studied in Cambridge, and is also a person who is regarded as very capable and hardworking (like his son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin who is a graduate of

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Oxford). Now, Abdullahs brother has been in the food business for the last 20 odd years. PAS has tried to make that into a big issue but he has been a businessman for much longer than Abdullah has been a senior UMNO politician. not tainted in any way. 15.0 Anwar Ibrahims Political Future Well, I hope Abdullah would be able to take care of all these allegations and make sure that he is

About Anwar and why I did not mention Anwar. I wouldnt write off Anwar, but on the other hand, given the structure I have adopted in my analysis, I dont see Anwar as a major player, meaning by which that the challenge to Abdullah from outside UMNO would come from PAS, not from Anwar. Anwar, if he is going to play a role at all, he will have to hitch a ride on the PAS wagon, which is what I think he is doing at the moment. He has become even closer to PAS because he has no where else to go. Four out of the 5 parliamentary seats that KeADILan, his party the party that I was a member of two years ago holds, are seats in Kelantan and Terengganu, and I describe them as PAS-dependent seats. These are KeADILan seats through sufferance because PAS has made it possible. There is only one genuine KeADILan seat and that is Anwars old seat in Penang, Permatang Pauh, which his wife Wan Azizah now occupies. So you can see that KeADILan is very, very dependent upon PAS. This is why I think Anwar has gone out of the way to support Hudud laws, to endorse PASs narrow interpretation of Syariah, and on almost every other policy issue, he just doesnt want to hurt PAS in any way. Thats the position that he has taken. However, at the same time, I think Anwar is also very much aware of the support that he has within segments of Western society, segments of the Western media, and some of the liberals. So, he also tries to appeal to them and a classic example of this was the article he wrote in the Asian Wall Street Journal entitled We Muslims Must Reform Our Own Politics (AWSJ, 14 October 2003, p. A13). If you read the article very carefully, you will find that he is trying to ensure that liberal fringe, if you like, continues to support him. But at the same time, he is playing up to

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the ulama and hudud laws and things of that sort. So Anwar will continue to dance on both sides of the street. That is typical of his politics. However, lets suppose a situation where UMNO is losing ground, for example in Kedah, would UMNO then be prepared to co-opt Anwar back into its fold? I dont see UMNO doing it because what you need in a situation like that is someone in UMNO who has got Islamic credentials, and Abdullah is there. So I dont think they will have to turn to Anwar and I cant see Abdullah accommodating Anwar, partly because he has to consolidate his own position. And the moment Anwar joins the fray, he is going to upset everything. You know, the way it is in politics. For that reason Abdullah would not want to allow it. Besides, there is a degree of personal animosity between the two men. 16.0 Abdullah and the New Economic Challenges

How would Abdullah cope with new economic challenges? I dont think any leader in Southeast Asia, or for that matter in other parts of the world, has ready-made answers for some of these new challenges. Abdullah will depend upon his economic advisors and I wouldnt be surprised if they come up with ideas which serve the public good. This is what one has to hope for. I dont know whether the Singapore situation and the Malaysian situation are similar as far as this is concerned. As you know, Malaysia has weathered the present crisis better than Singapore, and that is because of certain fundamentals in our economy. When you have oil, you have palm oil, the prices are still very good, and you have a very diversified manufacturing sector, I suppose you will be able to survive. The question is whether we can develop new strengths within the economy and again, there is an area where Malaysia has an advantage over Singapore, and perhaps other economies. As you know, we have begun to give quite a bit of emphasis to biotechnology and this is related to Malaysias rich flora and fauna and the need to develop research in this area. A number of important steps have been taken, and this is going to be a major money spinner in the future, according to various analysts. So I think this is something good that Mahathir has done in the last one year or so. And Abdullah has also committed himself to this, he will continue

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with this program. It is newer than the multi-media super corridor and I think the base is stronger in a sense because with respect to the multi-media super corridor, a very big mistake has been made as the emphasis has been on brick and mortar rather than on brain power. If you look at the Cyberjaya project for instance, the priorities are all wrong, but with biotechnology I think they are putting in quite a lot of money into university-based research. So lets see how these things shape up. 17.0 Abdullah and Singapore-Malaysia Relations

About Singapore-Malaysia relations, in terms of leaders in the two countries, well for the next year and a half, perhaps, I dont know, may be longer may be shorter, Abdullah will have to deal with the present Prime Minister. In terms of styles, I think there are more similarities between these two men than the person who may come after your present leader. These are not riddles. It is easy to understand what one is referring to. I think in terms of political styles, there are more similarities, it seems to me, as an observer, between Abdullah and Goh Chok Tong. countries. One hopes that differences in political style will not hinder or hamper relations between the two I have heard from reliable sources that Abdullah is quite keen on improving relations with Singapore. The question is, what he will do? Or how he will go about doing this? It is not his priority at the moment. He will have to think about his position in UMNO, the General Elections and a number of other major concerns. But I think at some point, he will address this issue. I was wondering whether we should think of an initiative outside the state, meaning by which, outside government think-tanks associated with the state and so on, that would address some of these challenges, problems that have cropped up in the relations between Singapore and Malaysia. So this group, lets call it the Singapore-Malaysia Friendship Forum, explores these issues, tries to understand them, circulates position papers, sends things to the media so that people will be able to discuss these things. I dont know whether it can be done, given what the media is in Malaysia and Singapore. But if this can be done, I think we would be opening up a new track for inter-state communication without going through the state.

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There is I think, some merit in this. I look at Indo-Pakistan relations and a number of private individuals on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan divide have been involved in efforts of this sort and after a couple of decades, it is beginning to bear fruit. There were also military men and a number of others who have been trying to build relations between the two countries outside the perimeters of the state. And they contributed to that thaw that was there for a short while because many of their activities, joint programs they organised and so on helped to sort of lower the temperature. I am just wondering if something like this can be done as far as Malaysia and Singapore are concerned. There are those who say that it doesnt matter what we talk about, our problems are associated with a certain era, it is a baggage from the past. Lets be more clinical about this. There will be problems. Well move forward. I am not so sure. The thing which worries me is there can be a lot of interaction at people to people level and yet suddenly something can erupt and you can have tensions and conflict that confound the rational prognosis of individuals from both sides of the divide. These things can happen. So I think there is a need to do something concrete. Now, there is this question about whether Abdullah can temper anti-Singapore feelings. I dont know whether there are these anti-Singapore feelings amongst the people. At the level of ordinary people in Singapore or in Malaysia, I dont think there is any hatred on either side of the causeway. I dont think there are those feelings at all. And even if you look at politicians, the politicians take the cue from the man at the top in Malaysia, and I suppose that is the way it is here in Singapore as well. They take the cue from people at the top. I am talking about politicians at the lower echelons, they take the cue. They find that this is what the leader wants, they respond. Like UMNO youth and MCA youth. So if the man at the top says, Look, this is how we are going to approach Singapore, there would be a change. The same would be true of the Singapore leadership.

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18.0

Abdullah and the Malaysian Chinese Parties

Now, the question about Chinese parties and how they feel about Abdullah. If you look at Mahathirs ascendancy, Mahathir in 1981 had a problem of sorts with the Chinese community. He was seen as an ultra, which was not a fair label at all but that was the perception. Now, Abdullah is one of those leaders who has never been associated with any communal position as such. Look at his background. Look at his record. He has been in the Cabinet for many, many years but he has not been associated with lets say, the sort of position that Muhammad Taib, the former Chief Minister of Selangor has been associated with. Even Najib, when Najib was the UMNO Youth Leader, we had the 1987 tensions and the arrests. But Abdullah has not been associated with any of these things. So I dont think the Chinese community has any problems with him. In fact, they have been very, very positive towards him. Look at all the articles that have been appearing in the local Chinese newspapers. 19.0 Abdullahs Ability to Win back Malay Support for UMNO

Can Abdullah regain lost ground, and will he be able to win back Malay support in certain areas in the forthcoming General Election? Perhaps, especially those seats which PAS candidates had won with very narrow margins and there are a number of such seats in Terengganu in particular, more than in Kelantan. Abdullah is also Chairman of UMNO Terengganu. He has taken direct responsibility for UMNOs performance in Terengganu, so he will have to deliver. There are a couple of other seats that PAS had won in other places like Perak and Selangor where the victories were very narrow. So I dont think it would be too difficult for UMNO, given a different scenario, to regain lost ground. I would be very, very surprised if UMNO doesnt do better than it did in 1999. In short, in the coming Elections, UMNO is expected to do better, especially in certain Malay areas. What they lost were basically the two states where PAS had done well even in the past and some seats here and there, most notably in Kedah. But in Kedah, if PAS wants to come to power, it has to remember that it has to contend with a 36% non-Malay electorate. Kedah is not Kelantan, is not Terengganu. The influence of the madrasahs, the independent madrasahs which had helped PAS in

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Kelantan and Terengganu, that influence is confined to a certain segment of the northern part of Kedah. It doesnt affect the part of Kedah I come from, the central part of Kedah, or southern Kedah. Even in the last elections, they did not perform well in those two areas. It is in the northern part that they did very well. 20.0 Abdullah and Money Politics

It is quite well known that money politics plays a large part in Malaysian politics. Now that Abdullah is taking over, does he have access to the war chest that Mahathir had? Access he may have, but whether he would want to use it, I think that would be the critical point and I hope he doesnt. You know money politics is not just at the level of inter-party competition. Within UMNO itself, this has been a very big problem and one of the things that had happened in UMNO since the Tengku Razaleigh-Musa fight in 1981 is the way money politics had developed in the party. Someone was saying the other day, a cynic, that it was Razaleigh who invented money politics in UMNO in 1981. Daim Zainuddin was Minister of Finance for many years. He developed money politics. And in 1993, Anwar Ibrahim perfected it into an art he allegedly institutionalized money politics. This is UMNO. So it is going to be quite tough to deal with money politics, you are right, within the party first, before we talk about inter-party competition. But, there is one thing that Abdullah did recently. There was a contest for a position in one of the Federal Territory (you know, where Kuala Lumpur is) divisions between two UMNO leaders and both of them wanted the blessing of the Prime Minister-designate and of course, the President designate. Abdullah knew that one of them, the more popular was using money. So he told him bluntly that he will not give him any support because he has been using money to buy support from the branches. You know, the branches, they feed into the divisions and so on. And that candidate who was using money politics lost in the contest. So if Abdullah can be consistent about this, then I think it will be good. But it is going to be tough.

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21.0

Bumiputera Rights

The whole question of Bumiputeraism and the dichotomy between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera of the 70s, 80s and perhaps part of the 90s is no longer that important an issue today, even for non-Bumiputeras for two reasons. First, you look at the way in which non-Bumiputeras have managed to get into universities and colleges in the country. In the past, in the 70s, when the NEP was implemented in a certain manner, a lot of them had to go abroad and that was a very heavy burden upon non-Bumiputera parents. But, starting from Hussein Onn the decision he made about the 55% quota for Malays, and 45% quota for non-Malays in public universities in 1978 an attempt was made to ease the situation. And then Mahathir continued with this by opening up tertiary education to the private sector. So he got a lot of colleges and others to come in, training programs, universities, any number of private universities now, and this was a way of helping the non-Bumiputera population. Now, that has continued. And then of course, now you have recruitment based on merit in the public universities. So you have these three decisions at different points and they have helped to lower the ethnic temperature as it were. So its not that big an issue. The big issue in the past, as far as business was concerned, was the Industrial Coordination Act that mandated equity participation by Bumiputeras. Under that Act, when non-Bumiputeras set up small and medium sized enterprises they had to employ a certain number of Bumiputeras, and there had to be a certain amount of Bumiputera capital and so on. Now that Act has been abolished, and such restrictions are no longer in force. Now of course, as far as foreign corporations are concerned, you still have some sort of balance. But this has not really affected non-Bumiputeras in that sense. So I think there has been a change as far as this is concerned. 22.0 Mahathirs Role After Retirement

After retirement, I think, Dr Mahathirs role is still unclear. Some of us thought that Mahathir would become the Secretary-General of the OIC. But that may not happen. They havent appointed the new Secretary-General though because the term of the present office holder has not ended, which means that Mahathir will still be in his

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library. Whether he will be tempted to make comments on everything that happens, will media people go to him, whether corporate people, disaffected UMNO politicians will go to him, we dont know. But Mahathir I think is serious about writing his memoirs. Mahathir will go around giving talks and lectures, and he is bound to be invited to any number of international conferences. I think he is going to speak at the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) meeting quite soon, in November or December this year. He is going to do things of that sort. If he makes rational comments, not nasty comments (he has threatened to be nasty after retirement), makes rational comments and intelligent arguments about global issues like Nelson Mandela, offers good advice privately on domestic issues, things will be okay. On domestic issues, if he is unhappy about something, may be he should communicate his views privately to Abdullah. And if he does that, then I think the new prime minister would find that approach helpful, and Mahathir may want to do things that way. Because as I said a while ago, he is also very concerned about his legacy. But, you will never know. Mahathir is a not a person whose behaviour you can predict very easily. So I really dont know what will happen. 23.0 Abdullah and the New MCA Leadership

Ong Ka Ting and Chan Kong Choy reflect the new leadership in MCA. Does Abdullah prefer one to the other? I dont think there is any evidence to support this. Both Mahathir and Abdullah had accepted these two new leaders because that was the only compromise that was workable. Both Ling Liong Sik and Lim Ah Lek had to step down. Now its true that Abdullah was, at a personal level, closer to Lim Ah Lek than to Ling Liong Sik. Ling Liong Sik was very close to Mahathir. This is what I meant when I said that leaders who have been there for a long while, had a certain relationship with Mahathir they will have to make way. Ling Liong Sik would have been one of them except that he has got out of the picture. Now, Abdullah was closer to Lim Ah Lek. Chan Kong Choy, you are right, was Lim Ah Leks protg. But it doesnt follow that he is close to Chan Kong Choy. Mahathir himself, I thought, made a very good move when he accepted Ong Ka Ting

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(Lings protg) as the President, Chan Kong Choy, (Lim Ah Leks protg) as deputy president, but appointed Chan Kong Choy to the more powerful ministry, the Ministry of Transport, which Ling had occupied before. That was a very clever move, because that way, he would be able to give Kong Choy some exposure. And I suppose after a while, depending on how they perform, it would be clearer who is the more capable leader. I dont see Abdullah preferring one to the other. 24.0 Abdullah and the Finance Portfolio

Is there any prospect of Dr Zeti Aziz, the Governor of Bank Negara, being brought into the Cabinet? Im doubtful. We already have a powerful woman dealing with economic affairs. I dont know whether Malaysian society can take two of them. I suppose it will be a bit difficult because I cant see Zeti and Rafidah getting along in this sort of setting. This is not a sexist comment. I am just talking about the personalities involved. Zeti is more gentle, compared to Rafidah, but if she is Minister of Finance and has to deal with Rafidah Aziz who is the current Minister of International Trade and Industry, I dont know whether things will work out. Im just joking. I dont know whether Abdullah has any particular individual in mind. The present Second Finance Minister is a Mahathir appointee. I am not sure if he will be able to keep his position after changes are made. This is Jamaluddin Jarjis who is an engineer by training. But Abdullah may have to have someone who carries some weight because it is a very important portfolio. What I have heard, and this is from the grapevine, is that Abdullah himself will become the Minister of Finance for a while at least, because it may be the safest thing to do in this transition. 25.0 Conclusion: Mahathir and the Transformation of the Malays

There is no doubt that you need a strong leader to effect major change. Well, Mahathirs approach to things like Malay attitudes, the transformation of the Malay community and so on, these are important issues. I am not sure if he has adopted the best possible style or approach in dealing with these issues. If you go on scolding a community, all the while you criticize them, I think after a while there will be a bit of reaction. Which is why I think segments of Malay society, and I am quite certain

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about this, had never really warmed up to Mahathir. May be there was another way of dealing with issues of this sort. If you look at the late Tun Razak (Malaysias 2nd Prime Minster from 1970-76) who was also very concerned about the transformation of the Malay community you know, he was the moving force, the driving force behind the rural development program, education of the Malays and so on. He addressed some of these issues but in a much more gentle manner, and may be thats what will work with the Malay community as with the other communities. I dont think Mahathir has been very successful as far as this type of approach vis--vis the Malays is concerned, but it is also partly because of the way in which Mahathir sees the problem itself. By his reckoning, and he has said this many times, he had not succeeded in transforming the Malay community. What exactly does this mean? If you look at the growth of the Malay professional class over the last 20 or 30 years, it is just phenomenal. If you ask anyone in the country, any objective analyst, name me the best constitutional lawyer in the country, name me the top gynaecologist, orthopaedic surgeon, architect, surveyor you will be very surprised that in all these areas there will be Malay names cropping up. Even a lot of nonMalay professionals would say so, so what is the transformation that Mahathir was hoping to achieve? I think the transformation that he wanted was the creation of a successful Malay capitalist class. This was what he wanted. In other words, a number of Malays who would be powerful capitalists of their own volition not linked to the state, not dependent upon the state, wealthy, well-endowed capitalists. This is what I think he wanted. Look at his Malay Dilemma, look at his other book in Malay Menghadapi Cabaran: this is what he believes in. May be from that point of view, he may not have succeeded, but I am not sure whether that should be the criterion one should use. I would rather that there was a transformation of the community and that transformation has taken place to a great extent. Of course, there is a lot more to be done. Look at the middle class, look at the working class: Malay representation is quite significant today, compared to 20 or 30 years ago. But when he talks about failures, he is talking about the Tajuddin Ramlis, the Halim Saads, he is talking about may be Daim Zainuddin who in the end turned out to be a disappointment. He is

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talking about people of this sort. But I think this raises a very fundamental question. Why should they be seen as the ultimate measure of whether the community has succeeded or failed? One should look at other indices in society and I dont think Mahathir has paid enough attention to those other indices.

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TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1(99): Marzuki Darusman, SH, Indonesia in Transition, April 1999. 2(99): Leo Suryadinata, The Ethnic Chinese Issue and National Integration in Indonesia, June 1999. 3(99): James Cotton, Peacekeeping in East Timor: an Australian perspective, July 1999. 4(99): John Funston, Malaysia/Thailand, A Mid-Year Review: Contrasting Political Trajectories, September 1999. 5(99): David K. Linnan, Indonesian Bankruptcy Policy & Reform: Efficiency and Economic Nationalism, September 1999. Reconciling

6(99): Mahani Zainal Abidin and Zakaria Haji Ahmad, The Financial Crisis in Malaysia: The Economic and Political Consequences, October 1999. 7(99): Sheng Lijun, How China is Going to Respond to Lee Teng-Huis Two States Theory, December 1999. 1(2000): Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Khoo Kay Kim, K S Nathan, Hari Singh, Meredith Weiss and John Funston, Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment, January 2000. 2(2000): Michael Leifer, The Political and Security Outlook for Southeast Asia, January 2000. 3(2000): Agus Widjojo and Bambang Harymurti, Understanding Political Change and the role of the military in Post Suharto Indonesia, February 2000. 4(2000): Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Thailand: February 2000. Toward a Sustainable Recovery,

5(2000): John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention Practice and Prospects, March 2000. 6(2000): C. P. F. Luhulima, Scope of ASEANs Security Framework for the 21st Century, April 2000. 7(2000): Ahn Choong Yong, Koreas Economic Outlook in 2000: Recovery and Further Restructuring, April 2000.

8(2000): Mohamed Ariff and Azidin W. A. Kadir, The Near-Term Outlook for the Malaysian Economy, May 2000. 9(2000): John Funston, Election Fervour: Political Contest in Thailand and Malaysia, September 2000. 10(2000): Tin Maung Maung Than, Myanmar: The Dilemma of Stalled Reforms, September 2000. 11(2000): Sheng Lijun, Taiwans New President and Cross-Strait Relations, September 2000. 12(2000): Mohammad Sadli, Restoring Investor Confidence in Indonesia, October 2000. 13(2000): Mochtar Buchori and Cornelis Lay, Assessing Current Political Developments in Indonesia, October 2000. 1(2001): Jos Ramos-Horta, East Timor and the Region, January 2001. 2(2001): Ali Alatas, ASEAN Plus Three Equals Peace Plus Prosperity, January 2001. 3(2001): Abdul Aziz and Michael Leifer, Political and Governance Challenges in Southeast Asia: Outlook 2001, January 2001. 4(2001): Hadi Soesastro, Mahani Zainal Abidin and Chalongphob Sussangkarn, The Regional Economic Outlook in 2001: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, January 2001. 5(2001): M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Kitti Limskul, Thailand After The Election: Politics and Economics, May 2001. 6(2001): Ade Komarudin, Ali Masykur Musa, Alvin Lie, Irwan Prayitno and Pramono Anung, Trends in Indonesia: Visions for Indonesias Future, May 2001. 7(2001): Djoko Hartono and David Ehrmann, The Indonesian Economic Crisis and its Impact on Educational Enrolment and Quality, May 2001. 8(2001): Sheng Lijun, A New U.S. Asia Policy?: Air Collision, Arms Sales and ChinaU.S. Relations, June 2001. 9(2001): Tan Sri Musa Hitam, Islam and State in Malaysia, September 2001. 10(2001): Surin Pitsuwan, Future Directions for ASEAN, September 2001. 11(2001): Thaksin Shinawatra, Rethinking Recovery, September 2001.

12(2001): K. S. Nathan, Economic Slowdown and Domestic Politics: Malaysia Boleh?, October 2001. 13(2001): Derek da Cunha, Tan See Seng, K S Nathan and Farish A Noor, Regional Political and Security Implications of the Terror Attacks in the United States, October 2001. 14(2001): Anthony L. Smith, What the Recent Terror Attacks Mean for Indonesia, November 2001. 1(2002): Harold Crouch, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Carmen A. Abubakar and Yang Razali Kassim, Islam in Southeast Asia: Analysing Recent Developments, January 2002. 2(2002): Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Hadi Soesastro, Outlook for Indonesia, January 2002. 3(2002): Supachai Panitchpakdi, Wang Gungwu, Paul M. Evans, Ernesto M. Pernia, Outlook for China and the Region, February 2002. 4(2002): Zainal Aznam Yusof and Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Regional Economic Outlook 2002: Malaysia and Thailand, March 2002. 5(2002): Hadar N. Gumay, Shamsul A.B., Temario C. Rivera, Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, Assessing Democratic Evolution in Southeast Asia, April 2002. 6(2002): Anthony L. Smith, Recent Political Developments in Southeast Asia, April 2002. 7(2002): Harold Crouch, The Key Determinants of Indonesias Political Future, August 2002. 8(2002): Farish A. Noor, PAS post-Fadzil Noor: Future Directions and Prospects, August 2002. 9(2002): Daljit Singh, The Post-September 11 Geostrategic Landscape and Southeast Asian Response to the Threat of Terrorism, September 2002. 1(2003): Richard H. Solomon and Yang Jiemian, Political and Security Outlook: Asian Geostrategic Trends, Feburary 2003. 2(2003): Hadi Soesastro, Mahani Zainal Abidin, Somchai Jitsuchon, Regional Economic Outlook 2003: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, March 2003. 3(2003): Rohan K. Gunaratna, Political and Security Outlook 2003: Terrorism in Southeast Asia: What to Expect, April 2003.

4(2003): Zainah Anwar and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Political and Security Outlook 2003: Islam: The Challenge from Extremist Interpretations, April 2003. 5(2003): Tommy Koh, Kristin Paulson, Jose Tongzon and Vikram Khanna, USSingapore FTA: Implications and Prospects, June 2003. 6(2003): Kyaw Yin Hlaing and David Koh, Political Developments in Myanmar and Vietnam, August 2003. 7(2003): Mohd Shafie Apdal and Carlyle A. Thayer, Security, Political Terrorism and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, August 2003. 8(2003): Rehman Rashid and James Wong Wing-On, Malaysia in Transition: The Battle for the Malay Mind, August 2003. 9(2003): Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Harold Crouch, Indonesia: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics, August 2003. 10(2003): Michael Vatikiotis and Chin Kin Wah, The Geopolitical Situation in East and Southeast Asia, August 2003. 11(2003): Yaacob Ibrahim, Peter Riddell, Shad Saleem Faruqi and Sharon Siddique, Perspectives on Doctrinal and Strategic Implications of Global Islam, Part I, Global Islam: Doctrinal and Strategic Implications, August 2003. 12(2003): Surin Pitsuwan, Zainah Anwar, Hussin Mutalib, Bernard T. AdeneyRisakotta, Perspectives on Doctrinal and Strategic Implications of Global Islam, Part II, Southeast Asia Post-September 11: The Challenge of Political Islam, August 2003. 13(2003): T. J. Pempel, The Changing Character of Japans Economic Linkages with Southeast Asia, October 2003. 14(2003): Cassey Lee, Implementing Competition Policy in Malaysia, October 2003. 15(2003): Chandra Muzaffar, Malaysian Politics: The Emerging Scenario Under Abdullah Badawi, December 2003. WTO Issues 1(2003): Barry Desker and Margaret Liang, Trade Facilitation: The Road Ahead, August 2003.

Series Editors Chin Kin Wah Tin Maung Maung Than Editorial Committee Lee Hock Guan Sakulrat Montreevat Guest Editor K.S. Nathan

Papers in this series are preliminary in nature and are intended to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The Editorial Committee accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed, which rests exclusively with the individual author. No part of this publication may be produced in any form without permission. Comments are welcomed and may be sent to the author at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. http://www.iseas.edu.sg

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institutes research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS) and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS).