Arms Control and Nuclear Non-

Proliferation
Achieving Peace by Removing Weapons
Central Superior Services Examination 2023

Ameer Abdullah Khan

Lecturer
Department of International Relations
National Defence University, Islamabad
Basic Terms
• Arms Control
• Disarmament
• Non-Proliferation

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Arms Control
• The term "arms race" generally refers to peacetime competitions between states for military superiority.
• Efforts to control or limit such competitions by mutual agreement are variously referred to as "arms control,"
"arms limitation," "arms reduction," or "disarmament.“
• Though many of these expressions date to the nineteenth century, it was not until the twentieth century that
they entered common usage.
• Examples of "arms races" are found throughout much of American history, but the largest and most important
remains the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, especially as it involved
nuclear weapons.
• The most common explanation for the origins of arms races has to do with what political scientists call the
"security dilemma."
• According to this theory, security for one means insecurity for other.
• Scholars and practitioners such as John Steinbruner, Jonathan Dean, or Stuart Croft worked extensively on the
theoretical backing of arms control.
• Arms control is meant to break the security dilemma. It aims at mutual security between partners and overall
stability (be it in a crisis, a grand-strategy, or stability to put an end to an arms race).
• Other than stability, arms control comes with cost reduction and damage limitation.

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Disarmament
• It differs from disarmament since the maintenance of stability might allow for mutually controlled armament
and does not take a peace-without-weapons-stance.
• Nevertheless, arms control is a defensive strategy in principle, since transparency, equality, and stability do not
fit into an offensive strategy.
• “Arms control” and “Disarmament” are not synonyms.
• Arms Control seeks to limit weapons in certain agreed ways (e.g., quantity, range, lethality, transparency, while
• Disarmament aims at the physical elimination of agreed types of weapons, or mutual commitments not to
produce them
• According to another definition, “Arms control,” or “arms limitation,” generally refers to efforts to re-figure
arsenals or to limit their growth.
• Disarmament” refers to more ambitious efforts to reduce or eliminate certain weapons.

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Disarmament
• In the Post WW-II scenario, the world seeks to eliminate all “weapons of mass destruction” or WMD (i.e.,
nuclear, biological, and chemical arms); leading to complete disarmament
• In the conventional weapons context, the world is seeking to control the weapons through treaties made
between potential adversaries that reduce the likelihood and scope of war, usually imposing limitations on
military capability including sale, production and limits on the use of many types of conventional weapons.
• Although disarmament always involves the reduction of military forces or weapons, arms control does not.
• In fact, arms control agreements sometimes allow for the increase of weapons by one or more parties to a
treaty.
• Arms Control is more realistic approach

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Non-Proliferation
• More specific to nuclear Weapons
• Quality & Quantity
• Emergence of the need

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Theoretical Approaches to Proliferation
a. Nuclear Optimists
• Kenneth Waltz’s school of thought conclude that general proliferation would create more stable environment
among nations
• Waltz and other proliferation optimists argue that more may be better
• Another school of thought views that “controlled proliferation” is more important to stabilize the security
environments globally [John Mearsheimer]
• This camp argues that the world is better off with more and better nuclear weapons. These arguments are
based on the concept of “deterrence stability”
• The views expressed by Bernard Brodie at the beginning of the nuclear era seems still valid even in 21st
century security challenges that rules out war fighting and winning and suggests that the chief purpose of a
military establishment from now must be to avert the war that means nuclear deterrence must work
• The above referred analogy encourages the states to develop and maintain nuclear weapons
• The theorists who encourage promoting nuclear weapons generally ignore the destabilizing aspects attached
to these weapons
• Nonetheless, it is generally perceived that the world regimes led by P-5 countries are working in line with the
school of thought that inclined promoting “controlled proliferation”

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Theoretical Approaches to Proliferation
b. Nuclear Pessimists

• On the basis of morality and humanitarian law, there is yet another group that makes argument in favor of the
total abolition of nuclear weapons [Scott Sagan]
• The proliferation pessimists argue that ‘more will be worse’
• This school of thought counters that more and better nuclear weapons increase the chances of preventive
wars crisis, instability and accidental or crisis-driven nuclear detonation
• Sagan views that proliferation begets proliferation, domino effect. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it
creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to
balance or eliminate the security threat.

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Theoretical Approaches to Proliferation
c. Causal Approach

• David Krieger raises another question in debate between the optimists and pessimists, arguing that the
promoters of these two schools of thoughts only retain focus on how proliferation affect the world.
• But they have not identified the different effects on states that proliferate.
• Krieger views that a state that may like to project its military power-proliferation is not good because
proliferation constraints its military freedom and action.
• Contrary, proliferation is good for non-power projecting countries to counter their rivals- it does not constraint
their military might
• Krieger brings out four important factors:
- Fear
- Enhancing Security
- Enhancing the country’s bully potential or
- Countering another country’s bully potential
- Prestige

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Theoretical Approaches to Proliferation
c. Causal Approach

• William Epstein views that for countries without acute security problems, the political and economic
motivations are the predominant ones and these include such incentives as strengthening their independence
and increasing their status and prestige in the world.
• William Epstein opines that the incentives and disincentives for countries to go nuclear comprise a
combination of military, political, and economic concerns and motivations.
• William Epstein further explains that for countries without acute security problems, the political and economic
motivations are the predominant ones and these include such incentives as strengthening their independence
and increasing their status and prestige in the world.

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Why Nations Don’t Go Nuclear?
• Technological capability- Confidence
• Security alliances
• Treaty Obligations
• Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
• Perception of negative consequences
• National self image- defined goals
• Normative restraint

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Why Nations Go Nuclear?
• Fear - Insecurity (US-German Fear), (Soviet-US fear)-China-Soviet & US fear), (India-Chinese fear), (Pakistan-
India’s fear), (Israel-Middle East fear) etc.
• Enhancing Security
• Enhancing the country’s bully potential
• Countering another country’s bully potential
• Prestige, Status and Influence
• The regional and geo-political conditions
• International Isolation causes insecurity.
• Aid to Victory
• Internal Civil and Military pressure
• Elements of Uncertainty and Nuclear Use

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Strategies of Proliferation

Hedging

Sheltered Proliferation
Sprinting
Pursuit Strategies

Hiding

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Strategies of Proliferation
Hedging

• Deferring a decision on actual weaponization. It refrains from actively developing nuclear weapons but has not
explicitly forsworn the option, putting the pieces in place for a future nuclear weapons program.
• Hedgers develop capabilities that are consistent with both the pursuit of nuclear weapons and a peaceful
nuclear energy program, preserving a “breakout option” if their desire for nuclear weapons shifts from
“maybe” to “yes.”
• Hedgers include states with civilian energy programs that have—or are in a position to achieve—control of
the fuel cycle and those that seek to develop indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities that could provide
weapons-grade uranium or reprocessing capabilities for plutonium weapons.
• Importantly, however, hedging is not simply a technological condition or a state of so-called nuclear latency,
which is largely related to enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
• Rather, this strategy focuses on how, where, and why states might consciously choose to hedge on a nuclear
weapons program as opposed to acquiring such weapons

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Strategies of Proliferation
Hedging

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Strategies of Proliferation
Sprinting

• The active weapons acquisition strategy is sprinting.

• States selecting this strategy seek to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as possible.
• The state must be relatively unconcerned with external powers knowing its intent and capabilities.
• There are almost always efforts at tactical obfuscation to protect the integrity of research and production
facilities and activity, but there is little attempt to mask either the intent or capability to develop nuclear
weapons.
• The state is free to openly develop uranium enrichment or reprocess plutonium for expressly military
purposes, as well as build delivery vehicles and create organizational routines to manage a nuclear weapons
arsenal.

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Strategies of Proliferation
Hiding

• A hider seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, but does so in a fashion that privileges secrecy over speed. Hiders
fear prevention or coercion if their activities and capabilities are discovered by other states.
• They may also fear reactive proliferation by their rivals if their efforts become known.
• The ideal outcome for a hider is to present the fait accompli of a nuclear weapons capability before it is
discovered or to achieve at least sufficient progress to deter prevention. Hiders tend to prefer pathways to
nuclear weapons that are easier to conceal, and they are willing to sacrifice efficiency to maximize secrecy.
• Although uranium enrichment technologies are often presumed to be easier to conceal than plutonium
reprocessing technologies, there have been hiders, such as Taiwan, that attempted to conceal their plutonium
reprocessing capabilities.
• Hiding is a high-risk, high-reward strategy.

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Strategies of Proliferation
Sheltered Pursuit

• Sheltered pursuit involves actively cultivating or opportunistically taking advantage of major power protection
against external threats to pursue nuclear weapons.
• The state offering shelter is often a superpower, but may also include other major powers such as China.
• The major power is not usually a formal ally, given that major powers often prefer their formal allies not to
possess nuclear weapons so that they can alone control nuclear use and escalation within their alliance blocs.
• Instead, the state may and itself in a transactional client-patron relationship with a major power that is
complicit in, or at least tolerant of, its nuclear weapons pursuit and offers immunity against external coercion.
• The immunity given to the sheltered pursuer often has nothing to do with its nuclear program.

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Non-Proliferation Treaties
• START & SALT
• OST
• NPT
• CTBT
• FMCT
• ABM Treaty
• INF Treaty

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)

Space Weaponisation
• The Concept
- Weaponisation
- Militarisation

• Current Status
• OST
• Future Implications

Ameer Abdullah Khan – International Relations (CSS 2023)