“TheIsraelLobby” in Perspective

Mitchell Plitnick and Chris Toensing

AUTHOR ID: Mitchell Plitnick is director of education and policy at Jewish Voice for Peace.
Chris Toensing is editor of Middle East Report.
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s 82-page paper “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign
Policy” has entered the canon of contemporary political culture in the United States. So
much, positive and negative, has been written about the March 2006 essay that the phrase
“the Mearsheimer-Walt argument” is now shorthand for the idea that pro-Israel advocates
exert a heavy—and malign—influence upon the formulation of US Middle East policy. To
veteran students of Middle Eastaffairs, this idea is hardly new, of course. But the fact that
two top international relations scholars affiliated with the Universityof Chicagoand
HarvardUniversity’s Kennedy School of Government, respectively, have espoused this
analysis has lent it unprecedented currency. Farrar, Straus and Giroux will publish a book-
length version of the professors’ argument in late 2007. Along with President Jimmy Carter’s
volume Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, “The Israel Lobby” (as the paper is commonly
known) has opened up a debate that many members of the lobby have long sought to
suppress.
Like Carter, Mearsheimer and Walt have faced ugly and unsubstantiated allegations of
racism for drawing attention to the imbalance in US Middle East policy and the lobby’s clout.
Walt’s Harvard colleague Alan Dershowitz labeled them “bigots” and “liars,” and the Anti-
Defamation League accused them of promulgating “a classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic
analysis invoking the canards of Jewish power and Jewish control.” Reams of angry
newsprint later, these kneejerk cries of anti-Semitism have not registered, and for good
reason. Plainly, a lobby that is universally recognized by Washingtoninsiders—and even
promotes itself—as one of the few most powerful in the country is influential. [1] Saying so
cannot be inherently anti-Semitic.
The related allegation of sloppy research is also silly. In December 2006, Mearsheimer and
Walt released a point-by-point rebuttal, perhaps not coincidentally also 82 pages long, of the
charges of poor scholarship leveled by Benny Morris, Martin Kramer and others. Almost
every charge was a misreading of the original paper. Nor is “The Israel Lobby” “piss-poor,
monocausal social science,” as political scientist and blogger Daniel Drezner would have it.
On the contrary, the text is full of caveats and qualifiers.

The essential flaw in the Mearsheimer-Walt argument is not, as many critics have said, the
authors’ exaggeration of the pro-Israel lobby’s power, for although the authors do this in
some instances, the thrust of their argument remains sound in many others. It is not even
their inattention to the other factors that have historically defined theUSinterest in theMiddle
Eastfor the bipartisan foreign policy establishment. Rather, the most serious fault lies in the
professors’ conclusion—soothing in this day and age—that US Middle East policy would
become “more temperate” on any number of fronts were the influence of the Israel lobby to
be curtailed. This conclusion is undercut by the remarkable continuities in US Middle East
policy since the Truman administration, including in times when the pro-Israel lobby was
weak. Other factors—chiefly the drive for hegemony in the Persian Gulf—have embroiled
theUSin plenty of trouble.

The Cold War Prism

Mearsheimer and Walt issue a broad indictment of their subject. “No lobby,” they write, “has
managed to divert US foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would
otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that US and Israeli interests
are essentially identical.” Has the lobby’s influence always explained USsupport for Israel?
This question is crucial because it helps to define the extent to which that influence explains
USpolicy toward Israeltoday.
From the day in 1948 that President Harry Truman announced his support for the creation of
a Jewish state in Palestine, Israelhas held a special place in the hearts and minds of many
Americans, Jewish and otherwise. The fledgling state was more European than Middle
Eastern in orientation, providing common cultural ground. The mythos surrounding the
creation of Israeland the sympathy generated by the horrifying tragedy of the Holocaust
played major roles in shaping popular American sympathy in the 1960s and 1970s, when the
“special relationship” between Israeland the USwas cemented. [2] Christians, including many
African-Americans, responded warmly to the narrative wherein a plucky people, fleeing
horrific persecution and age-old prejudice, made the desert bloom in the Holy Land and
stoutly defended their new polity against all comers. [3]
On the official level, Israelfound its early sources of support elsewhere, while working
tirelessly to build support in the United States.[4] After Israel’s decisive victory over
neighboring Arab states in 1967, the US committed itself more and more to what might be
called “the Israel track.” The reason, however, was neither a domestic lobby nor a
sentimental soft spot among policymakers for the Jewish state. The reason was that
policymakers saw the Middle East through the prism of the Cold War. [5]
Concern about Soviet backing for Egypthad led Lyndon Johnson, while a Congressman, to
oppose President Dwight Eisenhower’s determination to force Israelto pull out of the Sinai
and away from the Suez Canalin 1956, without some move toward changing the status quo.
[6] The outcome of the 1967 war, entailing the humiliation of Soviet-allied Egypt and Syria,
strengthened President Johnson’s conviction that Israel was a useful Cold War asset. After
the war, an anonymous State Department official told the press: “Israel has probably done
more for the United States in the Middle East in relation to money and effort than any of our
so-called allies elsewhere around the globe since the end of the Second World War. In the
Far East we can get almost no one to help us in Vietnam. Here the Israelis won the war
single-handedly, have taken us off the hook and have served our interests as well as
theirs.”[7] Aspiring chief executive Richard Nixon—also not known for philo-Semitism—
supported Israel vigorously on the 1967 campaign trail, pursuant to a visit to Israel that June
21, when he met wounded Egyptian soldiers in an Israeli hospital. There he wrote down an
Egyptian tank commander’s complaint: “Russia is to blame. They furnished the arms. We did
the dying.”[8]
Under the quintessential Cold Warriors Nixon and his foreign policy doyen Henry Kissinger,
USmaterial aid to Israelbegan to rise precipitously, and diplomatic support was vastly
strengthened. By the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, developed in reaction to the Vietnamquagmire,
the USwould project its power abroad through regional proxies rather than American troops.
Israel, Saudi Arabiaand the Shah’s Iranwere chosen in the Middle East. Israelpromptly
proved its worth by helping King Hussein of Jordanin brutally stamping out a Palestinian
rebellion in 1970, stabilizing a key Western ally in the region at the expense of the PLO,
seen in Washingtonas a Soviet proxy. In 1973, Nixon and Kissinger agreed to a major airlift
of munitions to Israeltoward the tail end of that year’s Arab-Israeli war. Though the USpaid
dearly for that decision with the Arab oil embargo, the next year, aid to Israeltopped $2
billion. As in subsequent years, much of this aid was pumped back into the USeconomy in
the form of arms purchases, giving the American arms industry a strong interest in the US-
Israeli strategic alliance. Nixon’s was a path born of Cold War strategy and opposition to
Arab nationalism—perceived as a threat to oil-rich Saudi Arabia—not the efforts of a lobby.
[9]
Mearsheimer and Walt acknowledge thatIsrael“may have been a strategic asset during the
Cold War,” but they insist on counting the costs, like the expense of the aid and the
economic damage wrought by the 1973 embargo. These costs are viewed as penalties of
supportingIsraelrather than the expected price to pay in the Cold War calculus of Nixon and
[Link] its place in US Cold War strategy by its 1967 victory and by its
ability to fully stand against theUSSR’s Arab proxies in a way other Arab countries could not
have done. However questionable the overall strategy might have been, the support
ofIsraeldid not come about due to the actions of a lobby, but through strategic planning
which viewed the most significant Arab states as Soviet proxies andIsraelas theUS’
strongest and most reliable ally.

The Rise of the Israel Lobby

During the Reagan years, the major institutions of the Israellobby arose to defend the US-
Israeli strategic alliance forged in the wake of the 1967 war. The most prominent is the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). According to its website, AIPAC boasts a
$47 million annual budget and “100,000 members in all 50 states.” In 2001, Fortune ranked
AIPAC fourth most powerful among all lobbying groups. It is routinely in the top five, and is
usually the only foreign policy lobby on the entire list. Although AIPAC itself does not directly
engage in campaign contributions, it sets the agenda for the many pro-Israel PACs that do,
and it has further mounted well-documented campaigns against members of Congress it
judges insufficiently supportive of Israel. Not coincidentally, the Reagan administration was
also intimately connected to the Christian Coalition and many figures from that
administration, both Christian and Jewish, have resurfaced in the administration of George
W. Bush. From the 1980s on, there can be no doubt that these two major players in lobbying
on behalf of hardline Israeli policies have been highly influential, especially in Congress. [10]
Arguably, as Mearsheimer and Walt contend, the likes of AIPAC and the Christian right have
been necessary for keeping the special relationship intact, for the end of the Cold War threw
Israel’s usefulness into a different light. There was no Soviet Unionto compete with, and
pan-Arab nationalism was largely a lost cause. But concern remained that nationalist or
Islamist forces might win control of oil-producing Arab states. The role Israelplayed in
smashing Arab nationalists was and is still valued in Washington. Israeli military and
intelligence assistance has been well-documented in Latin Americaand other parts of the
world.[11] In the Middle East, where US intelligence weaknesses are glaring, Israel plays a
virtually irreplaceable role, with its population of native speakers of Arabic. Additionally,
support for Israel, while somewhat diminished by the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the 1987-
1993 Palestinian intifada and the 2006 Lebanon war, remains quite strong among Americans
to this day. Americans generally do not support blind backing of whatever Israel does, but
the positive disposition towards Israel is a factor in the minds of decision-makers. [12] While
it is perhaps impossible to completely separate that positive disposition from the activities of
the Israel lobby, the fact that even Walt and Mearsheimer themselves speak of their own
concern for Israel demonstrates that there is much more to it than mere promotion and
advocacy.
Finally, it should also be noted that while, as we will see below, resolving the issue of the
Israeli occupation and Palestinian statelessness has at times been on Washington’s agenda,
it is never an end unto itself, but a means toward other policy goals. The Palestinians are not
viewed as a potential boon to US policy goals in the region. This leaves peace initiatives
much more vulnerable to opposition from domestic forces.

One should also note that US responses to Israeli demands are not always absolutely
positive. From Reagan’s sale of AWACS fighters toSaudi Arabiato the first Bush
administration’s threat to withhold loan guarantees fromIsrael, there are scattered examples
ofIsraeland the pro-Israel lobby proving unable to veto executive branch decisions. Ongoing
disputes over Israeli arms sales to China (and previously to India), the current Bush
administration’s quiet non-response to Israeli requests for financial compensation for its
Gaza “withdrawal” and its message to the Olmert government that it should not ask for
funding for its “convergence plan” are additional examples. Pro-Israel lobbyists bitterly
opposed many of theseUSmoves, as they do any hint of US “pressure” onIsraelto resolve its
conflict with the Palestinians.

Palestinein Global Strategy

To what extent does theIsraellobby shape US Middle East policy today? Mearsheimer and
Walt’s argument is strongest when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the
Cold War, when Nixon and Reagan were implacably hostile to the PLO as overly friendly to
the Soviets, support for Israel against the Palestinians fit into a broader US strategy. Since
the Soviet Union’s demise, however, there has been scant benefit toWashingtonto balance
the undoubted cost, especially in anger at theUSamong Arabs and Muslims, of its pro-Israel
leanings. For this reason, the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill
Clinton exerted considerable diplomatic energy to broker an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
To the extent that the failure of this diplomacy was caused by systemic favoritism shown to
Israeli negotiating positions, the Israel lobby and US officials linked to the pro-Israel
Washington Institute for Near East Policy must bear a great deal of the blame. The lobby
was also an important factor weakening—or eviscerating—USopposition to Israeli “facts on
the ground” that prejudiced the outcome of a future final status settlement inIsrael’s favor.

George W. Bush’s foreign policy team assumed office with a different mindset than its
predecessors’. The passions aroused by occupation and Palestinian suffering in the Arab
and Muslim world were not a strategic factor in the Bush team’s worldview, for they had
exacted no pound of flesh from the US since the 1973 embargo, an experiment they rightly
calculated the oil-producing Arab states were loath to repeat. The Bush White House’s
default position was to ignore the simmering intifada, leavingIsrael a free hand in its harsh
military measures, just as pro-Israel Republicans on the Christian right demanded.
Mearsheimer and Walt actually give the Bush administration too much credit, when they
write: “It is now largely forgotten, but in the fall of 2001, and especially in the spring of 2002,
the Bush administration tried to reduce anti-American sentiment in the Arab world and
undermine support for al-Qaeda, by halting Israel’s expansionist policies in the Occupied
Territories and advocating the creation of a Palestinian state.” What they are describing was
a short-lived revival of Clinton-era thinking, as personified by Secretary of State Colin
Powell, after the September 11 attacks required theUSto seek greater Arab cooperation in
the “war on terror.” Prior to September 11, 2001, the Bush administration had scarcely
budged from Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s position that any resumption of substantive
Israeli-Palestinian talks would have to wait until there was utter “calm”—as defined by Israel
—in Israel-Palestine. Afterward, to rally Arab support, Powell began stating
forgottenUScommitments to achieve a “settlement freeze,” and even mentioned the term
“peace plan.” TheUSnever followed through, however. Mearsheimer and Walt argue that this
is because theIsraellobby had “swung into action” to re-equate Arafat with Osama bin Laden.
Another, more plausible explanation, given the Bush administration’s predilections, is that
Arab states freely cooperated in rounding up radical Islamists even without the semblance of
a “peace process” in Israel-Palestine. There was no cost to untyingSharon’s hands once
more that would outweigh the benefit of pleasing Bush’s pro-Israel supporters.

In terms of Bush administration policy, there is universal agreement that the policy debate
initially held between Colin Powell and Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld ended in victory
for the Cheney/Rumsfeld camp. And all the evidence suggests that Cheney and Rumsfeld
are motivated by their own ideology (rooted in both Christian Zionism and neo-conservative
philosophy) not by the lobby’s pressure.
At any rate, by 2002 the White House’s commitment to renewing Israeli-Palestinian talks was
long gone. Bush waited several days after the beginning of Operation Defensive Shield, the
massive Israeli tank invasion of the West Bankin March-April 2002, which targeted numerous
Palestinian Authority installations, to dispatch Powell to the region. Mearsheimer and Walt
cite the Powell mission as evidence of a commitment to evenhandedness, but they do not
mention that Powell took “the slow boat to Tel Aviv,” stopping first in Rabatand Cairo. With
encouragement from other USofficials, Israelinterpreted the delay in Powell’s arrival as carte
blanche to escalate its offensive.[13] These events, as well as subsequent Bush
administration neglect of the Israeli-Palestinian portfolio, bespeak a White House that does
not need lobbying to let Israel drive events, so long as this does not complicate other, more
pressing US interests.
The Attack-Iraq Caucus
The Bush administration’s real interest in 2001 was the Persian Gulf, specifically Saddam
Hussein’sIraq. In their most explosive argument, Mearsheimer and Walt state that “the war
[inIraq] was due in large part to the Lobby’s influence, especially the neo-conservatives
within it.” They then follow the trail of statements from neo-conservatives advocating the
forcible removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and tie this advocacy to devotion toIsrael.

Here they run into problems of direct evidence. It is easy to show the neo-conservatives’
affinity for Israel—actually, the Israeli right—but they have not made the case that this
affinity was a “necessary, if not sufficient cause” of the 2003 invasion. Nor is it even clear
that love for Israelmotivated the pro-war impulses of the neo-conservatives themselves. For
instance, the professors adduce the so-called “Clean Break Paper” of 1996, which was put
together by a “study group” featuring key Bush administration hawks David Wurmser and
Douglas Feith, and saw removing Saddam Hussein as a key Israeli goal, to bolster their
theory. The central theme of this paper, however, is promoting Israelas a regional hegemon
independent of the US. Far from encouraging USaction in the service of Israeli interests, this
paper was entirely rooted in the idea that Israelmust quickly wean itself off USsupport and
exert its proven ability to dominate the region militarily on its own. [14]
Mearsheimer and Walt are not the first to point to the activities of the Project for a New
American Century (PNAC) as especially revelatory. The genealogy of PNAC’s ideas,
however, suggests a much broader set of motivations than loyalty to Israel. PNAC made its
debut in 1997 by issuing a statement of principles decrying drift in US foreign and defense
policy and calling instead for “a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.” The
statement was signed by six hawkish politicians, most notably Dick Cheney and Donald
Rumsfeld. Among the signatories who were soon to be household names were I. Lewis
“Scooter” Libby and Paul Wolfowitz.[15]
Next came two letters, one addressed to Bill Clinton and the second posted to the House
and Senate majority leaders. The occasion for the PNAC letters was the pending failure of
containment in ensuring that Iraqwas not reconstituting its WMDs. In a speech in 1997,
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had made clear that regime change was containment’s
real agenda, saying that the US would back sanctions “as long as it takes” to usher in “a
successor regime” that would comply with UN resolutions. [16]
PNAC’s concern was the fate of US Middle East policy goals, not the integrity of UN
resolutions. “It hardly needs to be added,” they wrote to Clinton, “that if Saddam does
acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction…the safety of American troops
in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a
significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard.” Unless Saddam’s
regime was taken out, “We will have suffered an incalculable blow to American leadership
and credibility; we will have sustained a significant defeat in our worldwide efforts to limit the
spread of weapons of mass destruction…. This could well make Saddam the driving force
ofMiddle Eastpolitics.” The hawks gathered by PNAC did not fearIraq’s putative weapons;
they feared the potential of an “uncontained”Iraqto disruptUShegemony in the region.
At one level, the PNAC letters did not diverge from previous articulations of US interests in
the Middle East. A September 1978 Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum listed three strategic
goals for the US in the region: “to assure continuous access to petroleum resources, to
prevent an inimical power or combination of powers from establishing hegemony and to
assure the survival of Israel as an independent state in a stable relationship with contiguous
Arab states.” Kenneth Pollack, who ran Iraq policy at Clinton’s NSC and then authored a
book-length case for invading Iraq in 2002, writes that these goals “have guided US policy
ever since.”[17]
But the PNAC letters about Iraqsprung from a deeper ideological well. The introduction to
PNAC’s full-length report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, published in 2000, summarized
the group’s agenda: “At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand
strategy should aim to preserve and expand this advantageous position as far into the future
as possible.” PNAC recommended adding $15-20 billion in defense spending annually,
“restoring” the size of the active-duty military to 1.6 million personnel and “selectively”
modernizing military hardware.”[18]
Most of the PNAC members are staunchly and vocally pro-Israel. What unites the neo-
conservatives with their traditional Cold Warrior confréres Cheney and Rumsfeld is not
Israel, however, but a common set of ideas about USpower. The convergence of interests
first appeared in the aborted Defense Policy Guidance of 1992. This document is the
Pentagon’s classified internal assessment, made every two years, of comprehensive military
strategy. In 1992, the task fell to Paul Wolfowitz, who set about conceiving a justification for
maintaining the military at Cold War strength. He delegated the actual writing of the Defense
Policy Guidance to his top aide Libby, who in turn passed it off to his colleague Zalmay
Khalilzad. What Khalilzad came up with stunned Washingtonwhen the draft was leaked to
the press: The US was uniquely qualified to be the sole superpower, and to maintain that
status, the USshould actively block the rise of any possible rival. [19]
Khalilzad was specific: “In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to
remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to
the region’s oil.” The White House swiftly disowned the document, but it found an
appreciative reader in Dick Cheney. “You’ve discovered a new rationale for our role in the
world,” Khalilzad recalls being told by his boss.[20] Rebuilding America’s Defenses cites the
1992 Defense Policy Guidance as its primary intellectual inspiration. [21] When the Cheney
Defense Department was reunited in the administration of George W. Bush, much of this
“inspiration” made its way into the 2002 National Security Strategy. Together with
Washington’s long-standing interest in Persian Gulf oil, the genealogy of PNAC suggests
that the decision to invade Iraq was determined by grand ambitions for US power—not a
“desire to make Israel more secure,” as Mearsheimer and Walt assert.
Wanted: A Counterweight
In the 15 months since the publication of “The Israel Lobby,” history has thrown up a series
of Rorschach blots in which it is possible to see confirmation or refutation of the
Mearsheimer-Walt thesis. WhileIsrael bombarded and invadedGaza in the summer of 2006,
following the capture of a single Israeli soldier, the Bush administration sat on its hands. The
White House continues to hew toIsrael’s position that “there is no partner” on the Palestinian
side as long as Hamas has ministers in the Palestinian Authority. Is this because the lobby
will not permit otherwise, or because the Bush administration is bent on preventing any
Islamist movement from exercising effective governance, lest movements elsewhere take
heart? For 34 days in the summer of 2006,Israel bombed and shelledLebanon
whileWashington actively blocked a ceasefire in the name ofIsrael’s “right to defend itself.”
Certainly AIPAC and the Christian right were pushing the same line, but President Bush’s
immediate casting of blame upon Iran and Syria for provoking the war suggested a deeper-
seated agenda than solidarity with Israel. There is reason to believe that Bush green-
lightedIsrael’s assault to neutralize an Iranian proxy in advance of eventualUS strikes
uponIran’s nuclear facilities. Certainly, it appears that theUS only dropped its resistance to a
ceasefire whenIsrael proved incapable of defeating Hizballah quickly. In 2007, despite the
belligerent clamor from AIPAC and other elements of theIsrael lobby, the prospect of an
attack onIran seems to have faded. But the key factor here is the deepening disaster inIraq
and the constraints it imposes.
Mearsheimer and Walt have taken a major step professionally, one which their positions
certainly did not require of them and one that opened them up to a lot of criticism. That
criticism has been unfair and hysterical. It was a courageous and noble step to take, one
which the professors said they took in order to open up a debate that has not occurred
broadly enough in the past. It is in this spirit that we offer these areas where we find the
professors to be mistaken as well as those where they are correct.

The influence of theIsraellobby should neither be underestimated nor overstated. It is not

some omnipotent force that can turn the world’s sole superpower against its own perceived
interests. The lobby derives its strength, in some measure, from being largely unopposed
[Link] remain a strongUSally, for many reasons, for the foreseeable future.
But that need not mean that theUScannot pressureIsraelinto the compromises required for a
just peace with the Palestinians. This can happen if a counterweight to theIsraellobby is
built. But such a counterweight is only effective if it understands what its opponent can and
cannot accomplish. In this, Mearsheimer’s and Walt’s paper must be seen as a beginning,
one which rational discussion can build on.

[1] For a detailed history of various pro-Israel lobbying groups, see J. J. Goldberg, Jewish
Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1996) and
Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987).
[2] See, for example, Peter Novick, The Holocaust In American Life (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 1999).
[3] See the work of Melani McAlister, especially “A Cultural History of the War Without
End,” Journal of American History (September 2002), and her book, Epic Encounters:
Culture, Media and US Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000 (Berkeley,CA:University
ofCalifornia Press, 2001).
[4] For detailed histories of the early development of the “special relationship” between the
US and Israel see the works of Abraham Ben-Zvi, particularly Decade of Transition:
Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1998) and John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to
Israel (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002). For a more concise review, see Avi
Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, pp. 200-217 and other parts.
[5] See, among others, William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the
Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (third edition) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
2005), Shalim and Be-Zvi cited above and William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions:
American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley andLos
Angeles,CA:University ofCalifornia Press, 1977
[6] Quandt, Peace Process), p. 52.
[7] US News and World Report, June 19, 1967, quoted in Joel Beinin, “The United States-
Israeli Alliance,” in Tony Kushner and Alisa Solomon, eds. Wrestling with Zion: Progressive
Jewish-American Responses to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (New York: Grove Press,
2003), p. 42.
[8] Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements,
1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 57.
[9] Interestingly, in this period, Kissinger helped to propagate in Arab capitals the notion that
Jewish campaign donors were behindUS assistance toIsrael. During a December 17, 1975
meeting with Saadoun Hammadi, then foreign minister ofIraq, he said: “[Our backing
forIsrael] originated in American domestic politics…. So it was not an American design to get
a bastion of imperialism in the area. It was much less complicated. And I would say that until
1973 the Jewish community had enormous influence.” Memorandum of conversation
between Kissinger and Hammadi, Paris, December 17, 1975. Accessible through the
National Security Archive.
[10] For insights into how the lobby wields power in Congress, see Michael Massing, “The
Storm over the Israel Lobby,” New York Review of Books, June 8, 2006.
[11] Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The US, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston: South
End Press, 1999), pp. 15, 21, 24-26.
[12] For an excellent overview of post-September 11 American attitudes towardIsrael,
see [Link]
f.
[13] Charles D. Smith, “The ‘Do More’ Chorus in Washington,” Middle East Report Online,
April 15, 2002.
[14] The full text of the paper can be found online at [Link] .
[15] The full list of signatories includes six politicians: Jeb Bush, governor ofFlorida and
presidential brother,
Cheney, 2000 Republican presidential candidate Steve Forbes, former Vice President Dan
Quayle, Rumsfeld and former Rep. Vin Weber (R-MN), now an extremely well-
connectedWashingtonlobbyist. Three other signatories became senior officials in the Bush
administration: Libby, Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams, now in charge ofMiddle Eastpolicy at the
National Security Council. Lower-ranking Bush officials who signed the statement are State
Department Counselor Eliot Cohen, Undersecretary of State for Democracy and Global
Affairs Paula Dobriansky, Aaron Friedberg, aPrincetonprofessor who served in Cheney’s
office from 2003-2005 as deputy assistant for national security, ex-ambassador to Iraq
Zalmay Khalilzad and Peter Rodman, an assistant secretary of defense. Four signatories
worked at the Pentagon or the NSC under Reagan or Bush the Elder: Frank Gaffney, Fred C.
Iklé, Stephen P. Rosen and Henry Rowen. Neo-conservative intellectuals and academics
who signed are Midge Decter, Francis Fukuyama, Donald Kagan and Norman Podhoretz.
Rounding out the list are three conservative Catholic or evangelical culture warriors: Gary
Bauer, William J. Bennett and Catholic theologian George Weigel.

[16] Associated Press, March 27, 1997.

[17] Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York:
Random House, 2002), p. 15. Pollack has since regretted this argument and has even
penned another book, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America , which
argues against an attack onIran.
[18] Project for a New American Century, Rebuilding America’s Defenses (Washington,DC,
September 2000), pp. ii, iv.
[19] James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York:
Viking, 2004), pp. 198-210.
[20] Ibid., p. 211.
[21] Rebuilding America’s Defenses, p. ii.