Shivanki Prasad

2022/1075

Sociological Thinkers III

I.A. Assignment

Discuss the concept of Erving Goffman's concept of stigma in the context of identity construction.

Introduction

Classical European sociology largely centered on macro-level structures of society that shape collective
life. Émile Durkheim, for instance, analyzed how social facts and institutions (like religion or the division
of labor) exert coercive power over individuals, emphasizing the primacy of collective conscience and
structure over the individual. Karl Marx focused on economic and class structures, arguing that one’s
identity and life chances are fundamentally conditioned by their position in the class hierarchy (e.g.
bourgeoisie or proletariat) within the capitalist system. Max Weber acknowledged individuals’ subjective
meanings (verstehen) but his works largely examined large-scale organizations (bureaucracy, the state, the
church) and historical processes of rationalization and disenchantment. In these accounts, the individual
appears as a product of social structure – shaped by norms, class relations, or bureaucratic rules – rather
than as an autonomous center of action.

However, early 20th-century North American sociological traditions shifted focus towards the individual,
investigating how identity is actively constructed through daily social interactions. This shift is evident in
the works of symbolic interactionists like George Herbert Mead and Erving Goffman. Mead emphasizes
the social construction of self through symbolic interaction, while Goffman applies it to specific situations
when one’s identity is “spoiled” by stigma. These ideas shift focus to the micro-level: Mead in
understanding the genesis of the self through social experience, and Goffman in examining how
individuals cope with “stigma”. They look at how society lives within the individual (in Mead’s theory
of self) and how individuals maneuver within society (in Goffman’s analyses of stigma and social
identity). In this essay I will first explore Mead’s account of the socially constructed self and then delve
deeply into Goffman’s insights on stigma and identity management. Finally, there is an attempt to apply
these ideas to understand caste hierarchy as an interactional order.

Mead on the Self

George Herbert Mead’s Mind, Self and Society (1934) is an account of how the self arises through social
interaction. Mead argues that the self is not something that we are born with rather, the self emerges
from social experience. As Mead puts it, “The self is something which has a development; it is not
initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity”. An infant has organic
impulses, but no conscious self, in the sense, of an identity that is aware of itself. Self-awareness develops
only with communication and role-taking. It “arises in the process of social experience and develops
as a result of his relations to the social processes and other individuals within that process.” It is
through countless interactions with parents, family, playmates, and later the wider society that a child
learns to see itself and develop self-concept, which may be seen as their identity.

The mechanism in this development is symbolic communication, especially language, and the activity of
role-taking i.e. taking the attitude of the others in “play”. Symbolic communication also allows us to
communicate with ourselves i.e. to think. We learn to view our own actions from the standpoint of others,
which leads to self-awareness. Mead breaks down this developmental process into stages namely, play
and game. In play, a child assumes the role of others. For example, a little girl might play “teacher” and
in that moment adopt the attitude of an imagined teacher towards an imagined pupil; or a little boy
pretends to be a doctor treating a patient. In play, the child is taking on these roles but not coordinating
multiple perspectives. It’s an imaginative acting out of another. As Mead explains, “the pure play attitude
which we find in the case of little children” involves children enacting vague personalities that are around
them (a parent, a doctor, a hero, etc.), and by “playing at the expression” of these roles the child is
actually learns to guide her own behavior by anticipating how another would respond. A child playing
“teacher” will scold her imagined pupil as she has heard her own teacher scold her or her peers; in doing
so she is, seeing herself (the child/doll) from the teacher’s point of view. Through play, the child’s self is
being built as an object of awareness. It’s unstructured and the child flips between roles without a stable
organization.

The mature phase is reached in game. In rule-governed game like baseball, the child must take the roles
of all the other participants simultaneously and understand the rules of the game that structure
everyone’s behavior. Mead highlights the fundamental difference between play and game: in a game, the
attitudes of the other players which the participant assumes organize into a sort of unit, and it is that
organization which controls the response of the individual. A child playing baseball must not only know
her own role as the pitcher but also the roles of the catcher, the batters, the baserunners, etc., and the
common rules of the activity. She must anticipate how each player will act with the other toward a
common goal of winning the game. Thus, the player’s acts are determined by his assumption of the action
of the others who are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else on that
team, at least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular response. In the game the child develops
an internal representation of the organized set of others’ attitudes. Mead calls this the generalized
other. It is essentially the perspective of the larger community or group itself, taken as a whole. The
attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community. The generalized other is an
abstract amalgamation of others in a society. Only when one takes the perspective of the community at
large, can they have a fully developed self. It is now that they can navigate complex social worlds and
also reflect on oneself.

Mead argues that thinking itself is an internal dialogue in which we take the role of the generalized other
toward our own possible actions. We carry in our heads an awareness of how “people in general” (or
specific generalized others like “people in my town” or “members of my profession”) would judge our
actions, and we converse with ourselves accordingly. Self-reflection becomes the essence of mind and
selfhood in Mead’s theory.

An outcome of the social genesis of self is that the self has a dual structure, the distinction of the “I”
and the “me.” This dual structure is in constant dialogue. The “me” is the self as an object – the
accumulated understanding of how others see me, the roles I have taken, the norms I’ve internalized. It is
essentially the organized set of attitudes of others that I have adopted as part of myself. The “I” is the self
as subject, the spontaneous, initiating part of action that responds to the “me.” When I consider what
“people like me” (or significant others or my community) expect in a given situation, that is me seeing
myself as an object (the “me”). When I then choose how to act or make a gesture, that is the agentic “I”
responding. Mead defines the terms as such: “The ‘I’ is the response of the organism to the attitudes of
the others; the ‘me’ is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes.”. The
community speaks to the individual through the “me” (social norms, duties, expectations) and the “I”
answers back with our unique reaction. “I” is also the source of novelty and individuality. It cannot be
predicted by others or even by ourselves. Once the “I” acts, the action is perceived and registered in
memory, becoming part of the “me”. We can never catch the “I” in real time, because as soon as we
become aware of it, it’s part of the objectified self (“me”). “The ‘I’ does not get into the limelight; we talk
to ourselves, but do not see ourselves. The ‘I’ reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the
attitudes of others. … Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the ‘me’ and we react to it as an
‘I.’” Thus the self is in constant internal conversation: the community’s voice (me) and the individual
reply (I). This framework explains both how society inhabits the individual (since the “me” is built from
social attitudes) and how individual agency is possible (through the innovative response of the “I”).

Mead’s theory conveys identity as socially constructed and dynamic. Identity formation is not a private
psychological unfolding but an ongoing social accomplishment. A simple example: consider how a child
learns to be “honest.” The child initially might lie to avoid punishment, but through interactions (parents
scolding, stories extolling honest heroes, teachers praising truth-telling) the child takes on the perspective
of an “honest person” as valued by the community. Eventually, being honest becomes part of the child’s
me (the kind of person I am), and an impulse to lie triggers guilt because the generalized other’s voice in
the self says “lying is wrong.” Yet the child (now an adult) might face a situation where telling the truth
could hurt a friend – here the active I must decide how to respond, perhaps bending the norm creatively.
This little moral scenario shows the interplay of internalized society (me) and individual judgment (I).

At this stage it becomes clear to us that the self is not something one possesses from birth, rather, it is an
ongoing social process. We develop the self by absorbing the perspectives of the society (forming a
“me”), and we express our individuality through our responses (the “I”). This theoretical framework laid
by Mead is essential for Goffman, as he examines how individuals continually adjust and present their
selves in society. Now, we turn to Goffman, who shows what happens when that socially formed self
bears a mark that society devalues – that is, when one possesses stigma.

Goffman on Stigma

Erving Goffman’s concept of stigma provides profound insights into identity construction by highlighting
the ways individuals navigate their identities within the frameworks of societal expectations and
interpersonal interactions. In Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963) Erving
Goffman analyses of how individuals navigate society when they possess stigma. Goffman is specifically
concerned with what he calls “spoiled identity” – cases where a person’s social identity (how they are
perceived and categorized by others) is marred by a stigma, causing them to be seen as less than a full,
normal person. Goffman builds on the original meaning of the term stigma (marks on the body in ancient
times to signify a disgraced or morally flawed status) but extends it to any attribute, trait, or condition that
leads a person to be categorically discredited in social interactions. According to him, stigma represents
an attribute that is deeply discrediting, reducing the individual from a “whole and usual person to a
tainted, discounted one”. A crucial starting point is Goffman’s distinction between a person’s “virtual
social identity” and their “actual social identity.” When we encounter someone, or even anticipate it, we
automatically form a set of assumptions and expectations about what kind of person they are based on
norms and categorization. For example, if we meet someone at a certain powerful position, say a military
person or IAS officer, we have assumptions about their competence or manners. Goffman calls this
virtual social identity the identity we impute to someone based on assumptions. The actual social
identity is the reality: the attributes and characteristics the person truly has.

In a normal interaction, the virtual and actual align closely enough that nothing seems amiss – our
expectations are met or at least not dramatically contradicted. Stigma occurs when there is a gap
between virtual and actual social identity. If the person has an attribute that deviates from our
expectations in a way that is both noticeable and negatively valued. Goffman describes this vividly:
“While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes him
different from others ... and of a less desirable kind – in the extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly
bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted,
discounted one.” These attributes of deviance or undesired difference is what Goffman terms a stigma.
Stigma also exists between a person and a social setting with certain expectations. For example, being
unable to read is a stigma in a literate society, but if no one could read it wouldn’t be a stigmatizing
failing; or having a facial tattoo is stigmatizing in a polite business environment but might confer status in
a gang.

Goffman identifies three broad types of stigma that cover most instances:

 “Abominations of the body” – physical deformities or disabilities. These include visible

physical impairments, disfigurements, or other bodily differences that society treats as unwanted
(e.g. missing limbs, disfiguring scars, blindness, obesity, etc.).

 “Blemishes of individual character” – this refers to stigmas of personality, behavior, or moral

standing. Examples Goffman gives are traits inferred from known records or conduct: “weak
will, unnatural passions, treacherous beliefs, dishonesty”, which might be associated with
mental disorders, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality (as viewed in that
era), unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behavior. These are essentially
stigmas not immediately visible on the body but known through reputation or disclosure, marking
the person as morally or mentally deficient in the eyes of the “normals.”

 “Tribal stigmas” – traits of lineage or group identity, such as race, ethnicity, religion, or caste,
which can “contaminate” all members of a family. These are stigmas you are born into (the term
tribal reflecting how whole groups can be stigmatized). For instance, in some contexts simply
being of a certain race or from a despised minority group is enough to stigmatize an individual,
regardless of their personal qualities.

Despite differences in these types, Goffman stresses that “in all of these various instances of stigma the
same sociological features are found.” A person who might otherwise have been accepted in ordinary
interactions has a trait that can break the smooth flow of interaction and undermining the claims of his
other attributes. The stigmatized person possesses an “undesired differentness” from what is anticipated.
Those who meet him may recoil, or subtly avoid, or treat him as “not quite human” and on this
assumption they experience discrimination, through which their life chances are effectively reduced. We
develop a “stigma theory”, an ideology to explain why that person is inferior and to justify treating them
as such. For example, societies have elaborate theories about the laziness of the unemployed, the
sinfulness of the diseased (as in old, religious notions that plague or AIDS sufferers deserved it), or the
lesser intelligence of certain ethnic groups to rationalize stigma. In daily language, we use specific slurs
and labels (“cripple,” “bastard,” “moron,” etc.) that impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis
of a single trait.

One negative attribute may cast doubt on a person’s entire character. A criminal record, for instance,
might lead people to assume the individual is also untrustworthy in unrelated areas; a facial disfigurement
might (unfairly) lead others to assume the person is also unpleasant or incapable in general. Goffman
refers to this as “a wide range of imperfections… on the basis of the original one” being imputed. The
result is a deeply “spoiled” social identity. For example, someone who has schizophrenia (actual identity)
is subjected to devaluation by their virtual identity as “crazy”.

Goffman introduces a distinction between two situational aspects of stigma: being discredited versus
discreditable. A discredited individual is one whose stigma is immediately known or visible in the
interaction. For example, someone in a wheelchair or with a large facial birthmark, or a person of an
outcast minority where that minority is despised. Here, the stigma is apparent to others. The stigmatized
person and the “normals” around become aware of stigma. This awareness adds tension to the encounter.
Say, in a social gathering where one guest is disabled; everyone may act as if nothing is unusual, yet
everyone may feel slightly on edge, not knowing whether to acknowledge or ignore. The discredited
person thus faces the task of managing this tension that their known stigma creates in interactions. A
discreditable individual, on the other hand, has a stigma that is not immediately apparent to others i.e.
it is concealable or not yet revealed. Here, the challenge is different: it is not managing the reaction of
others to a known stigma, but managing the information so as to control who knows and who doesn’t.
This leads to a whole array of decisions for the individual. For instance, an ex-convict when meeting new
people or in a workplace, they can choose to pass as “normal” since there are no outward signs – but this
means constantly deciding what to reveal and what to hide. Goffman contrasts the situations with a
poignant example: a convict in prison is discredited (everyone around knows his condition, though they
may politely act as if he’s normal), whereas once he is an ex-convict in broader society, he becomes
discreditable, interacting with people who do not know of his past. The ex-patient then faces “unwitting
acceptance” from others who are prejudiced against “people like him” but don’t realize he is one – a
potentially fragile acceptance that could turn to rejection if his secret is discovered. Thus, he conceals
information “about his real social identity, receiving and accepting treatment based on false suppositions
concerning himself”. This practice – hiding discrediting facts to pass as “normal” – Goffman calls
passing.

The stigmatized individual practices certain stigma management strategies. Goffman highlights
various responses stigmatized individuals may adopt to manage their identities and social situations. One
response is attempting to correct the stigma, if possible, by trying to modifying or removing the
stigmatizing attribute. Another strategy involves achieving mastery in activities that are typically assumed
inaccessible to stigmatized individuals, thus challenging societal perceptions. Some stigmatized
individuals represent their stigma unconventionally, embracing or highlighting it to confront societal
biases. Others might find secondary gains in their stigma, deriving social or economic advantages from
their stigmatized status. Some also reassess the limitations imposed by "normal" standards, questioning
and redefining the societal definitions of normality. Goffman details the “techniques of information
control” that passing individuals deploy – from concealing telltale signs to managing documents and
personal history. Not everyone can or chooses to pass. For the discredited, different strategies apply, like
“covering.” Covering refers to techniques used to reduce the prominence or impact of a known
stigma in social situations. Even when a stigmatized person doesn’t (or can’t) hide the stigma, they often
try to make it as “unobtrusive” as possible, so that interaction can proceed more comfortably. Goffman
notes that many who could pass choose instead to reveal their stigma but then manage how others
perceive it. They make efforts to ensure that stigma does not dominate in the interaction.

In "mixed contacts"— when the stigmatized and normal are in the same social situation. These encounters
are characterized by discomfort, mutual unease, and often such that the normal and stigmatized may
arrange life so as to avoid such interactions. Normals often attempt to conceal their discomfort through
politeness or overcompensation, while the stigmatized try to manage the impressions and mitigate
tension. Goffman notes that these encounters are marred with anxiety as the stigmatized person is
vulnerable to misunderstanding, avoidance, or patronizing behavior, whereas the normals are navigating
their own biases. During mixed interactions one can see various situations emerge ranging from self-
isolation by the stigmatized, to confusion and hyper-self-consciousness. Incidental impropriety may be
interpreted as an expression of stigmatized differentness. They may resort to defensive “cowering” or
“hostile bravado”. Covering can involve modifying personal appearance or habits to minimize stigma.
One type of covering is when a stigmatized person adheres as closely as possible to standards of
“normalcy” in all other behaviors, downplaying the traits most associated with the stigma. Even
“normals” can engage in covering on behalf of the stigmatized – for instance, not staring, or politely
changing the subject if the stigma comes up. Covering is to make these interactions easier so the stigma
does not dominate the relationship. Goffman frames passing and covering as part of the broader arts of
impression management… through which the individual exerts control over how others see him.”
Goffman argues that the stigmatized individual, particularly one that possesses discredited stigma, has
reason that lead to anxious unanchored interaction leading to an infinite regress of mutual consideration.

A stigmatized individual will often find sympathetic others who are willing to adopt their standpoint and
share their humanity and make them “feel normal.” Goffman introduces is the idea of “the own” and “the
wise” in the social network of the stigmatized. “The own” refers to others who share the same stigma –
fellow sufferers, so to speak. Interacting with “his own kind” is often a great relief for a stigmatized
person: among those who truly understand the experience, one can let the social guard down. A blind
person among other blind people doesn’t need to explain anything about blindness; a gay person among
other gay friends can be themselves without fear of judgment. “The own” thus form a kind of community,
and often supportive groups or subcultures emerge (such as Deaf communities using sign language,
recovery groups for alcoholics, patient support groups, etc.). When we explore the group life of the
stigmatized persons, involves representation to the normal. They often collectively voice their feelings
through publications sensitizing others to their identity. An ideology is often formulated- their complaints,
aspirations, politics etc. Moral tales are provided in biographical or autobiographical forms illustrating a
desirable code of conduct for them. When a person with a particular stigma acquires a high position, they
are also expected to represent the group. Those who share the noted person’s stigma become accessible to
normal immediately around them and subject to a subtle transfer of credit or discredit to themselves.
“The wise” are people who are not themselves stigmatized, but who are intimately familiar with the
stigma experience and sympathetic to it. For example, a nurse who works with leprosy patients, or the
spouse of a blind person, or an activist lawyer defending an ostracized minority. The wise know the
“secret life” or the behind-the-scenes reality of the stigmatized group and, importantly, they accept the
stigmatized individuals as full humans. Because of their closeness, wise persons are often treated by the
stigmatized as “honorary” members, the “marginal men” who stand halfway – they know what the
general normal public does not. Before the wise, “the individual with a fault need feel no shame nor exert
self-control, knowing that in spite of his failing he will be seen as an ordinary person.”. Family members
of a stigmatized person usually become “wise” – they know the truth and they still love and accept the
person. However, Goffman notes that being wise can carry a “courtesy stigma.” Society may slightly
stigmatize those associated with the stigmatized (e.g., the family of an inmate or the friend of a very
unpopular person might themselves be viewed with a bit of suspicion or disapproval). This puts the wise
in an awkward position, but many accept it as the price of solidarity.

As a stigmatized individual moves through life, they develop what Goffman terms, a “moral career”. He
presents it as a sequence of changes in how they view their stigma and themselves. Through the
socialization process the stigmatized person learns and incorporates the standpoint of the normal,
acquiring the beliefs of society towards the stigma they possess. They further learn that they possess said
stigma and become aware of the consequences of it. The timing and interplay of these phases forms
important patterns making each experience of stigma distinct and unique. Early on a person might feel
great shame and try intensely to pass; later they might “come out” or embrace their identity and find pride
in it. Goffman gives examples of many autobiographies of stigmatized people describe a journey from
concealment to eventual self-acceptance and maybe activism. Acquiring a stigma (such as becoming
disabled later in life) likewise involves going through phases of learning how to manage interactions and
adjusting one’s identity.

Goffman’s analysis, strongly echoing Mead’s ideas about self and society, is how the stigmatized
individual’s identity is shaped by both the wider society as well as those like them in terms of their
self-concept. Their fellow stigmatized “own” group typically urges the person to embrace their stigma
as part of their identity, even to be proud and see value in it. “Pride Parades” can be seen as an
example of this, or gay activists telling a closeted person to come out, instead of trying to minimize
stigma, they accentuate them as a badge of identity. This is a form of resistance to the society that
stigmatizes them. They seek to redefine the stigma as something neutral or even positive. On the other
extreme is the stance of the wider society and its normals, urging the stigmatized individual to accept
the mainstream values and strive to fit in as much as possible. The society tells the stigmatized not to
define themself by their stigma, rather overcome it so that people will respect you as an individual. The
message here is to minimize the stigma (“it’s just inconvenient”) and to reject any separate category
(“don’t call them cripples, they’re just people”). According to this out-group alignment, the person should
neither be ashamed (because “you’re just like everyone else, your affliction is nothing in itself”) nor
particularly identify with others who have it (since that would be “dwelling” on it). They should attempt
to appear as normal as possible, without necessarily hiding the fact – basically, a call for
“normalization” of self. One should not “fight society” or flaunt the stigma, but rather earn society’s
acceptance by good behavior and personal achievement in spite of the stigma.

Erving Goffman’s concept of stigma gives insights into identity construction by highlighting the ways
individuals navigate their identities within the frameworks of societal expectations and interpersonal
interactions. Stigma transforms one’s social identity into a special case of social failure – the person is
seen as a flawed instance of what they ought to be. The stigmatized individual can respond by hiding the
flaw (passing), by deemphasizing it (covering), by bonding with others in the same boat (own group), by
seeking allies among the wise, or by openly challenging society’s judgment (in-group pride) or conversely
by internalizing society’s standards and trying to measure up (out-group alignment). Through these
mechanisms, stigma plays a powerful role in identity construction. Goffman’s analysis demonstrates that
identity is not merely an internal or psychological state but a dynamic product of social interaction,
constantly negotiated in light of the expectations and responses of others. The stigmatized individual must
not only manage their own sense of self but also the definitions that others impose upon them. Stigma
thus becomes not just a mark of difference but a structure of social experience that fundamentally shapes
how identity is lived and understood.

Caste Hierarchy as an Interactional Order

Having explored Mead’s and Goffman’s frameworks, I now attempt to apply their insights to the context
of caste-based social hierarchies, particularly the experience of Dalits (formerly “untouchables”) in
Indian village life. The caste system is a classic example of what Goffman would call a “tribal stigma” –
a stigma of group identity transmitted by birth and lineage. Dalits are born into a social category that is
historically regarded by the dominant castes as defiled or impure, which marks them with an ascribed
spoiled identity. While caste oppression certainly has structural and economic dimensions it is powerfully
enacted and reinforced through everyday interactions and rituals of deference. Caste hierarchy persists
despite untouchability being legally abolished in India. It is through interactional behaviors – the
gestures, bodily distancing, speech patterns, and spatial arrangements – that caste status continues to be
encoded in daily life.

In traditional settings, an “untouchable” person’s very presence among upper-caste people is governed by
rules akin to Goffman’s interaction codes for stigmatized and “normal.” Dalits historically were expected
to display deference in the presence of upper castes depicting their lower status. For example, Dalits
often had to stand at a distance from higher-caste individuals to avoid even their shadow touching them.
As Ann Grodzin has pointed out in her ethnographic study In the Time of Trees and Sorrows, they might
be required to remove their footwear, and bow or speak with a submissive tone when addressing upper-
caste persons. The situation is particularly worse for lower caste women as these acts of deference have to
be enacted in front of men in the household as well. These expectations persist in the modern day as well.
News reports often document brutal assaults for not showing deference. Recently a young Dalit boy was
brutally assaulted for winning a wrestling match against upper caste opponents. There have been reports
of violence for wearing sandals and sunglasses in the presence of higher-caste villagers – a direct
transgression of an unwritten rule that Dalits must go barefoot as a sign of respect and humility in front of
the dominant caste. His wife noted, “Even men who come by cycle have to get down and push it into the
village” – meaning Dalits are not allowed to ride bicycles into certain villages; they must dismount and
walk, so as not to appear “above” their station. Such extreme punishments for minor acts illustrate how
caste hierarchy is vigilantly enforced through micro-level norms of comportment.

Dalits also face everyday segregation in interaction: they are often not allowed to enter the homes or
temples of the upper castes, must use separate wells or water taps, and in tea stalls or village meetings
they may be made to sit apart or use separate cups. We see several interactional restrictions: invisible
“lines” not to be crossed (spatial segregation within the village), prohibition on sharing drinking vessels
(to avoid the upper caste being “polluted” by touch), and enforced inferior seating for children.

Dalits who have migrated to urban areas develop what may be called covering behaviors to navigate
daily life without discrimination. Goffman’s idea of information control can be observed as some Dalits
who migrated to cities have been known to attempt passing as a higher caste, when possible, by using
different surnames or not divulging their origin. However, in a tight-knit villages, this is nearly impossible
as everyone’s caste is known. So, the strategy is more about covering and coping. In Goffman’s terms, a
Dalit in a high-caste area is “discredited” from the start, and “normals” (the upper castes) react with
active avoidance and exclusion. The burden is on the Dalit individual to “know their place” and adhere
to the rules – much like a stigmatized person practicing covering or self-policing to minimize trouble.
They might refrain from speaking unless spoken to around upper castes (to avoid drawing attention), or
they downplay any personal accomplishments in mixed company (so as not to threaten the status
hierarchy). Historically, some Dalits even had to wear certain markers (like a broom tied behind their
back to sweep away their footprints, or a pot hung from their neck to catch their spittle) to literally cover
or erase traces of their presence in shared spaces – a grotesque literalization of “covering” stigma.

Mead’s concept of the generalized other helps us understand how such interactional patterns get
internalized. For a child born Dalit comes to know about their inferior status through play and then more
organized interaction in games. A Dalit child playing in school with other children might face exclusion
or find that even in play, they are relegated to the role of servant or given orders by higher-caste kids –
learning their expected social role. In real village games or events, if a Dalit child tries to take a leading
role, they might be reprimanded. Similarly, upper-caste children learn to see Dalits as “dirty” or beneath
them (often through observing the behaviors of those around them), and Dalit children learn to expect
exclusion. Through such interactions, they may internalize a generalized other that says “people like me
are supposed to be subordinate.” This is shaping their self-concept of ‘me’. They are expected to accept
servility and discrimination as normal (a tragic testament to the power of social conditioning on the self),
while influence modern egalitarian ideas and constitutional values can lead to psychological conflicts.
This has been depicted in the film Sujata, which takes us through the journey of an “untouchable” girl
adopted by an upper-caste family.

Here, I have tried to present caste oppression is an interactional order. Micro-level acts of deference and
discrimination literally embody the macro hierarchy in everyday life. Understanding this through
Mead and Goffman highlights the tragedy of it – how thoroughly social life can imprison the self – and
also possibilities for change, since if people can redefine situations and practice new interactions, even
deeply entrenched hierarchies can be undermined. Every time a Dalit asserts themselves in interaction,
refusing to accept discrimination, and every time an upper-caste person treats a Dalit with genuine
respect, this rigid and unfair system is broken. It happens through interactions in classrooms, markets, and
politics, through countless encounters where we recognize our common humanity first.

References:

Mead, G.H. 1934 Mind, Self and Society, Part III

Goffman, E. 1963 Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity

CEC Lectures on Microsociology, Symbolic Interactionism, G.H. Mead, and Goffman

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