(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BARNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

ESTATE OF BARNES, DECEASED v. FELIX ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–1239. Argued January 22, 2025—Decided May 15, 2025

Respondent Roberto Felix, Jr., a law enforcement officer, pulled over
Ashtian Barnes for suspected toll violations. Felix ordered Barnes to
exit the vehicle, but Barnes began to drive away. As the car began to
move forward, Felix jumped onto its doorsill and fired two shots inside.
Barnes was fatally hit but managed to stop the car. About five seconds
elapsed between when the car started moving and when it stopped.
Two seconds passed between the moment Felix stepped on the doorsill
and the moment he fired his first shot.
Barnes’s mother sued Felix on Barnes’s behalf, alleging that Felix
violated Barnes’s Fourth Amendment right against excessive force.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix, applying the
Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” rule. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, explaining that the moment-of-threat rule requires asking only
whether an officer was “in danger at the moment of the threat that
resulted in [his] use of deadly force.” 91 F. 4th 393, 397. Under the
rule, events “leading up to the shooting” are “not relevant.” Ibid. Here,
the “precise moment of threat” was the “two seconds” when Felix was
clinging to a moving car. Id., at 397–398. Because Felix could then
have reasonably believed his life in danger, the panel held, the shoot-
ing was lawful. Id., at 398.
Held: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during
a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re-
quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from “the per-
spective of a reasonable officer at the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U. S. 386, 396. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re-
quires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” County of Los An-
geles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 427–428; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S.
2 BARNES v. FELIX

Syllabus

1, 9. That analysis demands “careful attention to the facts and circum-

stances” relating to the incident. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396.
Most notable here, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry has no
time limit. While the situation at the precise time of the shooting will
often matter most, earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a
reasonable officer would have understood and responded to later ones.
Prior events may show why a reasonable officer would perceive other-
wise ambiguous conduct as threatening, or instead as innocuous.
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. 765, well illustrates this point. There,
an officer’s use of deadly force was justified “at the moment” partly
because of what had transpired in the preceding period. Id., at 777.
The moment-of-threat rule applied below prevents that sort of at-
tention to context, and thus conflicts with this Court’s instruction to
analyze the totality of the circumstances. By limiting their view to the
two seconds before the shooting, the lower courts could not take into
account anything preceding that final moment. So, for example, they
could not consider the reasons for the stop or the earlier interactions
between the suspect and officer. And because of that limit, they could
not address whether the final two seconds of the encounter would look
different if set within a longer timeframe. A rule like that, which pre-
cludes consideration of prior events in assessing a police shooting, is
not reconcilable with the fact-dependent and context-sensitive ap-
proach this Court has prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-force case
cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chrono-
logical blinders.
The Court does not address a separate question about whether or
how an officer’s own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the
reasonableness analysis. The courts below never confronted that is-
sue, and it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. Pp. 4–9.
91 F. 4th 393, vacated and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KAVANAUGH,

J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@[Link], of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–1239
_________________

JANICE HUGHES BARNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS RE-

PRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ASHTIAN
BARNES, DECEASED, PETITIONER v.
ROBERTO FELIX, JR., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 15, 2025]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

A police officer’s use of deadly force violates the Fourth
Amendment when it is not “objectively reasonable.” Gra-
ham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989). And that inquiry
into reasonableness, we have held, requires assessing the
“totality of the circumstances.” Id., at 396 (quoting Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 9 (1985)).
The question here is whether that framework permits
courts, in evaluating a police shooting (or other use of force),
to apply the so-called moment-of-threat rule used in the
courts below. Under that rule, a court looks only to the cir-
cumstances existing at the precise time an officer perceived
the threat inducing him to shoot. Today, we reject that ap-
proach as improperly narrowing the requisite Fourth
Amendment analysis. To assess whether an officer acted
reasonably in using force, a court must consider all the rel-
evant circumstances, including facts and events leading up
to the climactic moment.
I
On the afternoon of April 28, 2016, Roberto Felix, Jr., a
2 BARNES v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

law enforcement officer patrolling a highway outside Hou-

ston, received a radio alert about an automobile on the road
with outstanding toll violations. Felix soon spotted the car,
a Toyota Corolla, and turned on his emergency lights to in-
itiate a traffic stop. The driver, Ashtian Barnes, pulled over
to the highway’s shoulder.
Parking his own car just behind, Felix walked to the Co-
rolla’s driver-side door and asked Barnes for his license and
proof of insurance. Barnes replied that he did not have his
license with him, and that the car was a rental in his girl-
friend’s name. As he spoke, Barnes rummaged through
some papers inside the car, causing Felix to tell him several
times to stop “digging around.” Felix also commented that
he smelled marijuana, and asked if there was anything in
the car he should know about. Barnes responded that he
might have some identification in the trunk. So Felix told
him to open the trunk from his seat. Barnes did so, while
also turning off the ignition. All that happened (as a dash-
cam recording of the incident shows) in less than two
minutes.
Then things began moving even faster. With his right
hand resting on his holster, Felix told Barnes to get out of
the car. Barnes opened the door but did not exit; instead,
he turned the ignition back on. Felix unholstered his gun
and, as the car began to move forward, jumped onto its door-
sill. He twice shouted, “Don’t fucking move.” And with no
visibility into the car (because his head was above the roof),
he fired two quick shots inside. Barnes was hit, but man-
aged to stop the car. Felix then radioed for back-up. By the
time it arrived, Barnes was dead. All told, about five sec-
onds elapsed between when the car started moving and
when it stopped. And within that period, two seconds
passed between the moment Felix stepped on the doorsill
and the moment he fired his first shot.
Barnes’s mother, Janice Barnes, sued Felix on her son’s
behalf. The suit, brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleged
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

Opinion of the Court

that Felix had violated Ashtian Barnes’s Fourth Amend-

ment rights by using excessive force against him.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Felix.
The court explained that to prevail on her claim, Mrs.
Barnes needed to show that Felix’s use of force was “objec-
tively unreasonable.” 532 F. Supp. 3d 463, 468 (SD Tex.
2021). In the usual excessive-force case, the court noted,
the inquiry into reasonableness would involve considering
a variety of circumstances. See id., at 468–469. But when
an officer has used deadly force, the court continued, “the
Fifth Circuit has developed a much narrower approach.”
Id., at 469. Then, a court could ask only about the situation
existing “at the moment of the threat” that sparked the fatal
shooting. Ibid. (quoting Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F. 3d 985,
991 (CA5 2011); emphasis in original). The District Court
identified that moment as “the two seconds before Felix
fired his first shot,” when he was standing on the doorsill of
a moving vehicle. 532 F. Supp. 3d., at 471. At that moment,
the court found, an officer could reasonably think himself
“at risk of serious harm.” Id., at 472. And under the Fifth
Circuit’s rule, that fact alone concluded the analysis. The
court explained that it could not consider “what had tran-
spired up until” those last two seconds, including Felix’s de-
cision to jump onto the sill. Id., at 471. Although a “more
robust examination” might have aided in assessing the rea-
sonableness of the shooting, the court was “duty bound” by
“Circuit precedent” to “limit[ its] focus” to the “exact mo-
ment Felix was hanging onto Barnes’s” moving car. Id., at
472.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that it too was
“[b]ound” by “this Circuit’s moment of threat doctrine.” 91
F. 4th 393, 394, 397 (2024). Under that rule, the panel
agreed, the “inquiry is confined to whether the officer[]”
was “in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in
[his] use of deadly force.” Id., at 397. Any prior events
“leading up to the shooting,” including actions the officer
4 BARNES v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

took, were simply “not relevant.” Ibid. (quoting Harris v.

Serpas, 745 F. 3d 767, 772 (CA5 2014)). And here, as the
District Court found, the “precise moment of the threat”
was the “two seconds” when Felix was clinging to a moving
car. 91 F. 4th, at 397–398. Because Felix could then have
reasonably believed his life in danger, the panel concluded,
his decision to shoot “did not violate Barnes’s constitutional
rights.” Id., at 398.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Higginbotham (who also
authored the panel opinion) expressed “concern” with the
Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-threat doctrine. Ibid. He
thought that rule inconsistent with this Court’s directive to
assess the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, includ-
ing deadly force, by “look[ing] to the totality of circum-
stances.” Id., at 399. Under the totality approach, Judge
Higginbotham wrote, a court could consider not just the
“precise millisecond” when an officer deploys force, but eve-
rything that “ha[d] transpired up until” that time. Ibid.
And with that wider focus, Judge Higginbotham would
have found that Felix’s shooting of Barnes was unreasona-
ble. See id., at 401.
We granted certiorari to address whether, in resolving
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, courts may ap-
ply the moment-of-threat rule just described. See 603 U. S.
___ (2024). We hold they may not because that rule con-
stricts the proper inquiry into the “totality of the circum-
stances.”
II
A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive
force during a stop or arrest is “analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 395; see Amdt. 4 (ap-
plying to “seizures” of “persons”). The “touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ ” as measured in
objective terms. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403
(2006). So the question in a case like this one, as this Court
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

Opinion of the Court

has often held, is whether the force deployed was justified

from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,”
taking due account of both the individual interests and the
governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U. S., at
396; County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 428
(2017).
That inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re-
quires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” Id., at
427–428; Garner, 471 U. S., at 9. There is no “easy-to-apply
legal test” or “on/off switch” in this context. Scott v. Harris,
550 U. S. 372, 382–383 (2007). Rather, the Fourth Amend-
ment requires, as we once put it, that a court “slosh [its]
way through” a “factbound morass.” Id., at 383. Or said
more prosaically, deciding whether a use of force was objec-
tively reasonable demands “careful attention to the facts
and circumstances” relating to the incident, as then known
to the officer. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. For example, the
“severity of the crime” prompting the stop can carry weight
in the analysis. See ibid.; Garner, 471 U. S., at 11. So too
can actions the officer took during the stop, such as giving
warnings or otherwise trying to control the encounter. See
id., at 12; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U. S. 389, 397
(2015). And the stopped person’s conduct is always relevant
because it indicates the nature and level of the threat he
poses, either to the officer or to others. See ibid.; Graham,
490 U. S., at 396.
Most notable here, the “totality of the circumstances” in-
quiry into a use of force has no time limit. Of course, the
situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be
what matters most; it is, after all, the officer’s choice in that
moment that is under review. But earlier facts and circum-
stances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have
understood and responded to later ones. Or as the Federal
Government puts the point, those later, “in-the-moment”
facts “cannot be hermetically sealed off from the context in
6 BARNES v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

which they arose.” Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-

riae 14. Taking account of that context may benefit either
party in an excessive-force case. Prior events may show, for
example, why a reasonable officer would have perceived
otherwise ambiguous conduct of a suspect as threatening.
Or instead they may show why such an officer would have
perceived the same conduct as innocuous. The history of
the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known
to the officer, thus may inform the reasonableness of the
use of force.
The Court’s decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S.
765 (2014), well illustrates the point. The excessive-force
claim there concerned the fatal shooting of a driver at the
end of a “dangerous car chase” lasting more than five
minutes. Id., at 768. The driver had sped away from a traf-
fic stop on a well-used road, and tried to outrun as many as
six police cruisers at speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles
per hour. Eventually, the fleeing car ran into one of the
cruisers and came “to a near standstill.” Id., at 776. The
driver, though, still tried to escape, pumping the gas in a
way that sent his wheels “spinning” and then putting the
car into reverse. Ibid. At that point, one of the officers fired
several shots into the car. In a suit brought against the
officer, the driver’s daughter contended that those shots
were taken when the chase was “already over.” Id., at 777.
But this Court rejected that claim based on everything that
had happened during the incident—the driver’s “outra-
geously reckless” behavior over the prior “five minutes,” as
well as his last-second efforts to again take flight. Id., at
776. Given all of those events, the Court explained, a rea-
sonable officer would have concluded that the driver was
“intent on resuming” his getaway and, if allowed to do so,
would “again pose a deadly threat for others.” Id., at 777.
In short, the shooting was justified “at the moment” it oc-
curred partly because of what had transpired in the preced-
ing period. Ibid.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

Opinion of the Court

The moment-of-threat rule applied in the courts below

prevents that sort of attention to context, and thus conflicts
with this Court’s instruction to analyze the totality of the
circumstances. Recall that the District Court and Fifth Cir-
cuit limited their view to the two seconds before the shoot-
ing, after Felix had stepped onto the doorsill of Barnes’s car.
See supra, at 3–4. Those courts believed that, under Fifth
Circuit precedent, they could not take into account any-
thing preceding that final moment. See 532 F. Supp. 3d, at
471 (excluding analysis of “what had transpired up until
the shooting itself”); 91 F. 4th, at 397 (agreeing that “ac-
tions leading up to the shooting are not relevant”). So, for
example, they could not consider the reasons for the stop or
the earlier conduct of, and interactions between, the sus-
pect and officer. And because of that limit, they could not
address whether the final two seconds of the encounter
would look different if set within a longer timeframe. It is
as though the Court in Plumhoff could consider only the in-
stant when the chased car was at a “near standstill,” and
not the earlier time when it zigzagged down a busy roadway
at speed. 572 U. S., at 776. To be sure, historical facts will
not often matter as much as they did there to the reasona-
bleness analysis. See supra, at 6. And some of those facts
may not be relevant at all. But no rule that precludes con-
sideration of prior events in assessing a police shooting is
reconcilable with the fact-dependent and context-sensitive
approach we have prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-
force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if
it has put on chronological blinders.
That point is so evident that not even Felix quarrels with
it; his defense of the decisions below instead relies on taking
a different view of their meaning and of the question they
raise. First, the agreement with what we have said: Yes,
Felix acknowledges, prior events are not “off limits” in the
reasonableness inquiry, for they may “inform the perspec-
tive of the reasonable officer.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 79; Brief for
8 BARNES v. FELIX

Opinion of the Court

Respondent 2. Just so. But now the divergence: According

to Felix, the courts below acted consistently with that all-
times-considered principle. The Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-
threat doctrine, Felix argues, in fact allows courts to assess
many pre-shooting facts and circumstances—and courts ap-
plying it often do so. See id., at 20 (citing other Fifth Circuit
decisions). All that the doctrine bars is a single kind of in-
quiry—into whether an officer’s earlier error itself “created
the need for deadly force.” Id., at 21; see Tr. of Oral Arg.
53. And on that issue, Felix submits, the Fifth Circuit is
right: “[A]n officer doesn’t lose his right to defend himself
just because” he previously “made a mistake.” Ibid.
But whatever might be said of Fifth Circuit law gener-
ally, the decisions below applied a rule about timing. As
shown above, both lower courts took pains to explain that,
in evaluating the shooting’s reasonableness, they could look
only to a two-second snippet of the encounter. See supra,
at 3–4. And because that was the reasoning in the case be-
fore us, that is the reasoning we must address. It could
make no difference to our decision here if the Fifth Circuit
in other cases eschewed a strict time limit, as Felix claims.
And anyway, we are not sure Felix correctly describes the
overall state of Fifth Circuit law. Consider Harris v.
Serpas—a Fifth Circuit decision relied on below. See 91 F.
4th, at 397. The court there noted the plaintiffs’ recital of
several historical facts—actions of both the suspect and the
officer in the period prior to the shooting. See 745 F. 3d, at
772. And the court recognized that this Court’s decisions
directed an inquiry into the “the ‘totality of the circum-
stances.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Graham, 490 U. S., at 396). But
then came the following: “This [Circuit], however, has nar-
rowed that test” in deadly force cases, holding that the in-
quiry there is “confined to whether the [officer] was in dan-
ger at the moment of the threat that resulted in the
[officer’s] shooting.” Ibid. (alterations in original). The
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

Opinion of the Court

problem with the statement is apparent. As we have ex-

plained, a court cannot thus “narrow” the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances inquiry, to focus on only a single moment. It
must look too, in this and all excessive-force cases, at any
relevant events coming before.
We do not address here the different question Felix raises
about use-of-force cases: whether or how an officer’s own
“creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reason-
ableness analysis. Brief for Respondent 22; see supra, at 8.
As in another of our recent Fourth Amendment cases, that
issue is not properly before us. See Mendez, 581 U. S., at
429, n. The courts below never confronted the issue, pre-
cisely because their inquiry was so time-bound. In looking
at only the two seconds before the shot, they excluded from
view any actions of the officer that allegedly created the
danger necessitating deadly force. See supra, at 3–4. So,
to use the obvious example, the courts below did not address
the relevance, if any, of Felix stepping onto the doorsill of
Barnes’s car. And because they never considered that issue,
it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. The ques-
tion presented to us was one of timing alone: whether to
look only at the encounter’s final two seconds, or also to con-
sider earlier events serving to put those seconds in context.
With that matter resolved, we return everything else to
the courts below. It is for them now to consider the reason-
ableness of the shooting, using the lengthier timeframe we
have prescribed.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals and remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–1239
_________________

JANICE HUGHES BARNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS RE-

PRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ASHTIAN
BARNES, DECEASED, PETITIONER v.
ROBERTO FELIX, JR., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 15, 2025]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS,

JUSTICE ALITO, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I agree that the officer’s actions
during the traffic stop in this case should be assessed based
on the totality of the circumstances. I write separately to
add a few points about the dangers of traffic stops for police
officers, particularly when as here the driver pulls away in
the midst of the stop.
Even for routine traffic violations, traffic stops are
“fraught with danger to police officers.” Michigan v. Long,
463 U. S. 1032, 1047 (1983). An “inordinate risk confront[s]
an officer as he approaches a person seated in an
automobile.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110
(1977) (per curiam). That is in part because officers operate
at a “tactical disadvantage” when “approaching an
unknown vehicle, with limited visibility and unpredictable
threats.” Brief for National Fraternal Order of Police as
Amicus Curiae 4. As this Court noted nearly 50 years ago,
“a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs
when the officers are making traffic stops.” Mimms, 434
U. S., at 110 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
218, 234, n. 5 (1973)). Traffic stops remain highly
dangerous today. See Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of
2 BARNES v. FELIX

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and

Assaulted, 2023 (2024) (Table 27). On April 8, 2023, two
officers were shot and killed at an intersection in Cameron,
Wisconsin, after stopping a car for a warrant and welfare
check on the driver.1 On December 8, 2024, an officer was
shot and killed after he pulled over a pickup truck with
expired license plates in a Super 8 motel parking lot in
Terrell, Texas. See Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici
Curiae 1, and n. 4. The list goes on and on.2
Officers cannot let their guard down and assume that any
particular traffic stop will be safe—even if a driver is pulled
over for nothing more than a speeding violation, a broken
taillight, or the like. The driver may be drunk, on drugs,
armed, or some combination thereof. Or the driver may
have committed (or may be about to commit) a serious
crime. “People detained for minor offenses” such as
ordinary traffic violations “can turn out to be the most
devious and dangerous criminals.” Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U. S. 318,
334 (2012). Timothy McVeigh, the man responsible for the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing, was stopped for a missing
license plate, which ultimately led to his apprehension for
the bombing. See ibid. Likewise, serial killer Ted Bundy
was pulled over based on a stolen-vehicle alert in Pensacola,
Florida. When informed that he was under arrest, Bundy
kicked the officer’s legs out from under him, and the two
struggled over the officer’s gun before the officer was able
——————
1 See Officer Down Memorial Page, Police Officer Emily Ann

Breidenbach, [Link]
ann-breidenbach; Officer Down Memorial Page, Police Officer Hunter
Timothy Scheel, [Link]
hunter-timothy-scheel.
2 To be sure, officers sometimes use excessive force during traffic stops.

When that happens, officers of course should be held to account for their
actions. See Brief for Current and Former Law Enforcement Officials as
Amici Curiae 22; Brief for California State Sheriffs’ Association et al. as
Amici Curiae 10.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

to subdue and arrest Bundy. See Bundy v. Dugger, 850

F. 2d 1402, 1422 (CA11 1988); see also Brief for State of
Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 11–12, and n. 12.
So even though most traffic stops end without incident,
traffic stops are nonetheless inherently risky for police
officers. And when, as in this case, the driver suddenly
pulls away in the midst of a stop, the risks multiply. A
driver speeding away from a traffic stop could easily
endanger bystanders and other drivers—especially if the
fleeing driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, as
might well be the case when a driver flees. Moreover, the
very “fact that a suspect flees when suspected of a minor
offense,” such as speeding or a failure to pay tolls, “could
well be indicative of a larger danger.” Lange v. California,
594 U. S. 295, 331 (2021) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in
judgment). Fleeing from the traffic stop could suggest that
the driver is preparing to commit or has committed a more
serious crime—and is attempting to evade detection or
arrest. The driver may have illegal drugs or an illegal gun
in the car. Or the driver may be unlawfully in the country
and fear removal if apprehended. He might have a warrant
out for his arrest. He could have an abducted child in the
car. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. Or as the tragic 2025 New
Year’s terrorist attack in New Orleans illustrates, the
driver might intend to use the car as a weapon. See id., at
24.
The possibilities are many. But the key point is a
commonsense one: A driver who speeds away from a traffic
stop can pose significant dangers to both the officer and the
surrounding community.
The question when a driver flees, therefore, is not merely
whether the underlying traffic violation “presents risks to
public safety”—it is also “whether flight,” and what that
flight might indicate or enable, “does so.” Lange, 594 U. S.,
at 331 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). In those
circumstances, in other words, it is not only the “severity of
4 BARNES v. FELIX

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

the crime” that prompted the stop that is relevant to the

“totality of the circumstances” inquiry. Graham v. Connor,
490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). The
Fourth Amendment analysis must also take account of the
suspect’s attempt “to evade” the officer “by flight.” Ibid.
What should the officer do when a driver flees from a
traffic stop? There are no easy or risk-free answers. Every
feasible option poses some potential danger to the officer,
the driver, or the public at large—and often to all three.
And an officer in that situation must make a split-second
choice among those various dangerous options.
First, the officer could simply let the driver go. But
because the fleeing driver might be a threat to the
community, letting the driver go may exacerbate the
dangers, rather than mitigate them. Encouraging officers
to stand back and allow drivers to take off would also create
“perverse incentives” for those who are stopped by the
police. Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 385 (2007). If doing
nothing in response to a fleeing driver became a known and
regular practice among police officers, that would
presumably embolden some drivers who otherwise might
have thought twice about taking off.
Of course, the officer could let the driver go in the moment
but then attempt to catch the driver by, for example,
tracking the car’s license plate or reviewing surveillance
footage. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. But after letting the driver
go, the police may not be able to later track down the car or
the driver of the car. Even if the police are able to do so, the
escaped driver may pose a serious risk to the public in the
interim. And given that the driver has already shown a
propensity to evade law enforcement by fleeing a traffic
stop, attempting to execute an arrest upon finding the
driver could itself be dangerous for the police and others.
Second, the officer could get back in his police car and
give chase, or could radio other officers to pursue the driver.
But a high-speed chase likewise can be exceptionally
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

dangerous to the officer, the driver, and others on the road.

“Vehicular pursuits” are “often catastrophic.” Lange, 594
U. S., at 324 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment).
Many real-world examples demonstrate as much. Plumhoff
v. Rickard involved a “ ‘dangerous car chase’ ” in which the
driver “tried to outrun as many as six police cruisers at
speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour,” ending in
the “fatal shooting” of the driver. Ante, at 6 (quoting 572
U. S. 765, 768 (2014)). In Scott v. Harris, multiple police
cars “with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring” chased
the driver “for nearly 10 miles” while “he ignored their
warning to stop,” culminating in an officer ramming the
driver off the road. 550 U. S., at 384. Moreover, a recent
study concluded that a significant percentage of those killed
in police chases are not the fleeing drivers but rather are
passengers or bystanders. From 2017 through 2022, more
than 500 bystanders were reportedly killed as a result of
police chases.3
Third, the officer might try to shoot out the tires of the
fleeing car, or otherwise try to hinder the car’s movement,
in order to bring it to a stop. But shooting at a car,
especially its tires, can be “dangerous” and is often
“ineffective.”4 Even if the officer manages to hit the tires,
the driver could lose control and crash into others on the
road. That course of action also poses the risk of the officer
accidentally shooting the driver or innocent passengers.
Fourth, as happened here, the officer could attempt to
stop the fleeing driver at the outset by jumping on or
reaching into the car. The dangerousness of that option is
readily apparent. Perhaps the driver will hit the brakes
once he realizes an officer is clinging to the car or
——————
3 See S. Neilson, J. Gollan, & J. Haseman, First-of-Its-Kind Database:

Majority of People Killed in Police Chases Aren’t the Fleeing Drivers,

San Francisco Chronicle (Feb. 2024).
4 Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Dept., Field Operations Support

Services Newsletter: 15–14 – Shooting at Vehicle Tires (2025).

6 BARNES v. FELIX

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

attempting to reach through the window. But if the driver

does not slow down, then the officer may suffer serious and
perhaps fatal injuries. The officer could try to fire his
weapon to incapacitate the driver and bring the car safely
to a stop. But the car may be just as likely to go careening
into traffic, thereby threatening the safety of the officer,
other drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and more.
I could go on. The point here is that when a driver
abruptly pulls away during a traffic stop, an officer has no
particularly good or safe options. None of the options
available to the officer avoids danger to the community, and
all of them require life-or-death decisions that must be
made in a few seconds in highly stressful and unpredictable
circumstances.
Of course, when an officer uses force against a fleeing
driver, the judiciary still must assess any resulting Fourth
Amendment claim under the standard of objective
reasonableness. Under this Court’s precedents, that
inquiry involves “a careful balancing of ‘the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests’ against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U. S., at
396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8 (1985)). In
conducting that analysis, judges should keep in mind that
it is one thing to dissect and scrutinize an officer’s actions
with the “20/20 vision of hindsight,” “in the peace of a
judge’s chambers.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 396 (quotation
marks omitted). It is quite another to make “split-second
judgments” on the ground, “in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Id., at 397. In analyzing
the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct at a traffic stop,
particularly traffic stops where the driver has suddenly
pulled away, courts must appreciate the extraordinary
dangers and risks facing police officers and the community
at large.