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Federalism, development and the

changing political dynamics in
Ethiopia

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Assefa Fiseha*

In the last two and half decades, Ethiopia has undertaken remarkable political and economic
changes at the center of which is the transformation of the country from a highly homogenizing
and centrist rule to a federal system that aims to manage the country’s complex, politically
mobilized ethnonational diversity. Ethiopia continues to register impressive economic perfor-
mance but at the same time is facing political instability. This article seeks to explain two major
paradoxes: Why has the federal system, with its promise of self-rule that ensures autonomous
self-government and representation in federal institutions, not been able to ensure political sta-
bility, and how does one explain the emerging protests and uncertainties? Two factors explain
the puzzle. The idea that development is centrally designed and managed along with the identifi-
cation of poverty as an existential threat against which all resources have to be mobilized means
that development takes an overriding priority thus compromising self-rule. While federalism
and the developmental state are two major pillars of the EPRDF-led government, they have not
been aligned well, as the latter became an overriding [Link] outcome as witnessed in the
latest protests is new mobilization and conflict unleashed by growing ethnonationalism. The
vanguard party that has monopolized political power and overshadowed the institutions also
sidelined the political opposition while emboldening hardliners leading to political instability.

1. Introduction and outline

Federalism and devolution were often unpopular political projects in post-colonial
Africa. Most of the countries in the continent were associated with “imperial presi-
dency” and one-party rule from the perspective of which federalism was viewed as
a colonial tool of divide and rule that may facilitate state fragmentation in the con-
text of artificially drawn borders. Most of these countries transplanted the European
“nation state” along with its myth that each state must serve a single nation and the
normative assumptions of centralized and homogenizing political system despite the

* Associate Professor, Center for Federalism and Governance, Addis Ababa University. Email: assefafish@
[Link].

I•CON (2019), Vol. 17 No. 1, 151–176 doi:10.1093/icon/moz008

152 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

enormous diversity on the ground. The result was the concentration of power and
resources in a ruling elite that also promoted its own language and culture to be the
state’s language and culture, imposed it on ethno national minorities while marginal-
izing them from power thereby paving the way for conflict.1
The nation state, in other words, did not aim to provide political and cultural space
for diversity; instead, the pursuit of unity and territorial integrity at the expense of
ethnonational minorities remained the leading priority for African states. After the
end of the Cold War, however, federalism and devolution became a means to “domesti-

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cate the Leviathan”2 by transferring power from the all-powerful center to subunits. It
was in this context that Ethiopia adopted a federal system following the collapse of the
military junta in 1991. The initial signs of this political dispensation were remarkable.
Several news sources reported on Ethiopia’s political and economic transformation
in the last two decades. On March 13, 2014, Time published an article3 that reported
on Ethiopia’s socio-economic progress. Other news sources have since then reported
on Ethiopia becoming “Africa’s next hegemon”4 and Ethiopia should lead Africa as
a model for its economic transformation. Several hydroelectric dams are boosting its
economy and it plans to be the energy giant of the Horn region, exporting electricity
to neighboring countries.
Remarkable in the evolution of the Ethiopian federal system is the political will
and commitment of the political leadership to enhance the political and administra-
tive institutions of the constituent units and improve the life of the ordinary people
through anti-poverty policies and programs. When the federal process began in 1995,
the regional states hardly had any experts owing to centuries of centralization and
lack of political will from the centrist elite. Realizing this key challenge the new leaders
established new institutional mechanisms specifically geared to upgrade the capacity
of the existing and newly recruited civil servants and political figures in the states.
Impressed by the ability of the state to use limited resources for effective transforma-
tion Rene Lefort wrote “with a mixture of resolve, efficiency, integrity and clear sight-
edness (this trend) had no equivalence anywhere else in Africa.”5 This development
was instrumental in realizing the goals of the new constitution’s promise of self-rule.
Despite the aforementioned successes, the federation has been under immense
stress since 2015. Widespread and unprecedented anti-regime public protests have
been ebbing and flowing for three years, leading to political uncertainty. Paradoxically,

1
For the limitations of the nation state, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New
International Politics of Diversity 61–62 (2007).
2
Nico Steytler, Domesticate the Leviathan: Constitutionalism and Federalism in Africa, 24 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp.
L. 272 (2016). Federalism and devolution have been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. Several
African countries such as South Africa (1993), Kenya (2010), Sudan (2005), South Sudan (2011), and
Somalia (2012) have introduced some form of federalism.
3
Michael Schuman, Forget the BRICs [Brazil, Russia, India and China]; Meet the PINEs [Philippines, Indonesia,
Nigeria and Ethiopia], Time, March 13, 2014, [Link]
4
Harry Verhoeven, Africa’s Next Hegemon: Behind Ethiopia’s Power Plays, Foreign Affairs, Apr. 12, 2015,
[Link]
5
Rene Lefort, The Ethiopian Economy: Developmental State vs. The Free Market, in Understanding Contemporary
Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi 367 (Gerard Prunier & Eloi Fiequet eds., 2015).
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 153

the protests began a few months after the ruling party claimed a “100 percent win”
in the 2015 general elections. In response, the federal government, unable to handle
the ­emerging crisis through the normal state institutions, declared a country-wide
emergency twice in less than two years (2016 and 2017). How does one explain the
­paradox between an impressive economic performance on one hand and growing
political instability on the other? Based on focus group discussion, interviews, and
analysis of the constitution and informed by the rich literature on how to politically
integrate diversity in divided societies, the article traces the key sources of the emerg-

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ing political tension in the ideology of the developmental state and its focus on cen-
trally designed state-led development that compromised the autonomy of the states
in a context of growing ethnonationalism unleashed by self-rule. While federalism
and the developmental state are two major pillars of the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front)-led government, they have not been aligned well, as
the latter became an overriding ideology. This is further aggravated by the vanguard
party that has monopolized political power and weakened the institutions and self-
rule, sidelined the political opposition, and emboldened hardliners leading to political
instability. The article argues for a more inclusive political system, recommends the
building of the institutions currently overshadowed by the party, strict enforcement
of the political autonomy of the states, and a comprehensive policy for promoting
shared values to counterbalance growing ethnonationalism and to ensure cohesion
among the several groups as a way out.
The article is divided into three major parts. Section 1 provides the background and
political context that led to the emergence of ethnonational federation. Section 2 elabo-
rates the divergent views reflected during the making of the constitution and how eth-
nonational federalism was entrenched in the constitution, its key pillars and the risks
associated with it. Section 3 traces the various dimensions explaining the shift from a
focus on ethnonational rights’ self-rule to the political ideology of the developmental
state and its impact on autonomy of the states. Section 4 provides the conclusion.

1.1. Background
Political mobilization in Ethiopia underwent transformation from a regional/provin-
cial form to an ethnonational one only in the twentieth century largely in reaction to
extreme centralization of power in the hands of a centrist political elite.
Un museo di popoli—museum of peoples—was the concept Conti Rossini coined to
express Ethiopia’s enormous diversity.6 Since the Axumite era, Ethiopia existed in what
Clapham called “devolved autocracy”7 with the King of Kings serving as a pillar of
unity and several regional forces8 representing diversity exercising important powers
such as taxation, maintenance of local security, and regulation of trade.9 To some

6
C. Conti Rosini, Etiopia e Genti d’Etiopia 169 (1937). See Ethiopian Const. art. 39(5).
7
Christopher Clapham, The Ethiopian Experience of Devolved Government, 1 Ethiopian J. Fed. Stud. 18 (2013).
8
On occasions the center lost dominance as in Yodit/Gudit’s attack on the Christian empire in the tenth cen-
tury; the campaign of Imam Ahmed (1527–1543); and Age of Princes (Zemene Mesafint 1769–1855).
9
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855–1991 (2d ed., 2001).
154 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

degree central power was also open to regional forces. The more powerful provincial
kings alone, or in coalition with others, were sometimes contenders for the throne
itself.10 The fact that the imperial power was open to potential contenders of power
from the several provinces meant that state power was less ethnicized at least before
the emergence of the modern state. Greenfield wrote: “struggles and rivalry lay
between regions, later perhaps provinces, and not between tribal groups … tribalism
had no place in Ethiopian politics.”11
The decentralized feudal state structure changed radically with the emergence of

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a strongly centralized unitary state toward the last quarter of the nineteenth century
spearheaded by Emperor Menlik II (1889–1913) that was further consolidated during
the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974),12 an absolute monarch, followed
by the military “socialist” regime (1974–1991) that replaced it, giving rise to a pro-
tracted civil war and political instability for the most part of the last century.13 With
the emergence of the centralized unitary state, Addis Ababa became not only the capi-
tal of Showa, Menlik’s home province, but also of Ethiopia. With the central govern-
ment expanding (others would say reclaiming back its previous territories) its control
to the south and south west along with the gabar system (which provided land—a
critical resource—to the imperial army in the conquered territories and left the local
people landless and servants of the new lords),14 Showa then emerged as the epicenter
of power, resources, and homogenizing centrist state (using the Amharic language
and Orthodox Christian religion), liquidating quasi-autonomous kingdoms. The new
ruling elite, distinct both in terms of class and identity, was to become a source of
resentment that later led to the 1974 Revolution.15 The military junta made gestures
to address the emerging demands from ethnonational groups when it came to power
and toward the end of its era. It declared all nationalities to be equal but did not end the
marginalization from power and resources and failed to ensure the right to self-rule.
More important, its rigid insistence on military solutions to political issues blocked all
hopes for peace. An obliterated form of regional self-rule was included in the 1987
constitution, but by then it was too little too late to attract an already emboldened
ethnonational groups.16
The process of centralization and homogenization was, however, far from smooth.
It faced serious challenges initially in the form of unsuccessful provincial rebellions
headed by nobilities, various peasant protests, and later, in a more radical form,
by university students.17

10
Donald Levine, Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture 154–155 (1965); John Markakis,
Ethiopia: Anatomy of Traditional Polity 39 (1974).
11
Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History 46 (1965) (reprinted 2013).
12
Ethiopian Const. Rev. art. 4.
13
Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest: Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century (1991).
14
Christopher Clapham, The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay 34 (2017).
15
Ethiopian Const. Rev. arts. 125 and 126; 1987 Const. art. 116
16
Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution: 1974–1987 (1993).
17
Tareke, supra note 13.
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 155

The resistance against the regime was intensified during the early 1970s as most
of the sources of discontent were articulated by young, radical, and left-oriented uni-
versity students (Ethiopian Student Movement, or ESM). The ESM’s slogans “land to
the tiller,” “end to national oppression,” “equality of religion,” and “social justice”
were very popular in their challenge to the imperial regime.18 The ESM argued that
post-Menlik Ethiopia constituted a “prison house of nationalities”19 and the “nation
building” project was a failure. The activists called for an end to “national oppression”
through the right to self-determination to the nationalities.20 Since the 1970s, the

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nationality question, that is, addressing the claims by ethnonational groups to self-
rule, fair representation in public institutions, and ensuring equality, has remained a
crucial point in the agenda of Ethiopia’s political parties.
As leftist organizations, nearly all sympathized with the nationality question but
could not agree on how to address it. While a section of the ESM chose to address the
nationality question along class lines,21 ethnonational liberation movements, however,
rejected the subjugation of the nationality question to class and chose to mobilize their
supporters along ethnonationalist bases in order to end the repression. Ethnonational
groups held that a new and democratic Ethiopia could only be constructed through
the voluntary and consensual association of its parts, the “nation, nationalities and
the peoples.”22 The Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) is one among many such
groups that subscribed to this view and that posed a major threat against the military
since February 1975. The TPLF leaders adopted a view that regional identity can co-
exist with Ethiopian identity. Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the chief architect,
said: “The Nile/Abay river has no life without its tributaries, Ethiopia also makes little
sense without its diversity.”23 This project, as articulated by the TPLF, grew among
other marginalized groups in the country and thus was later shared among the four
coalitions of the ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO, 1989), the Southern
Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM, 1992), and the Amhara National
Democratic Movement (ANDM, 1980s). It was this strongly mobilized ethnonational
coalition that removed the junta by force and that emerged as an architect of the post-
1991 political reform since then.

2. Entrenching ethnonational diversity through federalism

Having seen why ethnonational groups were mobilized, it is time to reflect, albeit
briefly, how the new constitution proclaimed in 1995, following the transitional gov-
ernment’s (1991–1994) attempt to accommodate this emerging force. This will be

18
Kiflu Tadese, The Generation (vol. 1, 2014).
19
Ernest Gellner, Nation and Nationalism 85 (1983); Tadese, supra note 18, at 121.
20
Bahru Zewde, The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement 1960–1974, 218 (2014).
21
Id. at 261.
22
Tareke, supra note 13, at 202.
23
Interview with a senior party member of the TPLF, March 15, 2010, Addis Ababa.
156 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

analyzed based on the general literature on federalism and power sharing—two of the
well-known alternatives for managing politically mobilized diversity.
Four divergent views were reflected on how to deal with ethnonational-based diver-
sity both during the transition and during the making of the constitution. Centrist
political elites under the slogan “Ethiopia first”24 insisted that one should demonstrate
absolute loyalty to the overarching state and aimed to entrench unity and territorial
integrity of the country. According to this elite, it is hardly possible to combine self-
rule with the Ethiopian statehood. The ethnonationalist groups in reaction insisted

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one should demonstrate absolute loyalty to substate identity.25 The moderate ones that
one may call the instrumentalists26 did not fully rule out federalism based on geog-
raphy possibly based on division of provinces along historic lines and not based on
ethnicity. Some of the moderate opposition political parties often prescribe geographic
or territorial based federalism. Its ideological roots are often linked to American fed-
eralism. Yet the parties do not realize that in such federations the same majority at
federal level also enjoys a majority at substate level and hence is largely a nation state
federation that has little to offer to strongly mobilized ethnonational groups.27
It is vital to note that federalism or devolved forms of governments often have space for
both identities (the overarching and substate identity) and do not insist that one should
eliminate the other. On the contrary, both identities are preconditions that manifest them-
selves in the form of unity in diversity. Unity is one’s loyalty to the overarching state, one’s
positive identification with the institutions, common citizenship and symbols of the state
while diversity is manifestation of substate identity that people enjoy at a substate or local
government level. The most crucial point is the ability of the political elite at various levels
to keep a fair balance. As the recent dynamics demonstrate,28 unregulated ethnonation-
alism focusing on building subnational identity at the expense of overarching symbols of
the state and common citizenship nurtured over the years generates a weak “we belong”
feeling and sets a fertile ground for conflict and fragmentation.29
The fourth view represented by the EPRDF held that a new and democratic Ethiopia
could only be constructed through the voluntary and consensual association of its
parts, the “nation, nationalities and the people.”30 As the EPRDF considers itself as
successor of the ESM of the 1970s, it committed itself to provide political solution to
the nationality question.31 Political reality32 dictated by ethnonationalist mobilization
24
This slogan is the major theme of the centrist political elite.
25
The Oromo Liberation Front was once a champion of this view.
26
Refer to The Third Way (2010), by Lidetu Ayalew (a vocal opposition figure), which prescribes to federal-
ism but not on an ethnic basis.
27
See John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, & Richard Simeon, Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring
Debate in Conflict Regulation, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration of Accommodation?
(Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008).
28
See section 3.1 for details.
29
For comparative insights, see Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, & Yogendra Yadiv, Crafting State Nations: India and
Other Multinational Democracies 9, 14 (2011).
30
Tareke, supra note 13, at 202.
31
See Sarah Vaughan, The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991: Its Origins, History and
Significance (1994).
32
For details on the secession clause, see Tesfa Bihonegn, Federalization with Constitutional Guarantee to
Secession: Controversies, Paradoxes and Imponderables, 25 Regional & Fed. Stud. (2015).
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 157

and its leftist ideological commitment seem to be the explanations for this develop-
ment. However, some contend that a Marxist-Leninist response to the national-
ity question aimed to neutralize, not foster, ethnonationalism as the final goal is to
achieve voluntary integration and unity through the machinations of a vanguard
party and universal values such as socialist indoctrination.33 Thus self-determination
seems to be an interim right and yet is anchored as a constitutional right hinting at the
dilemma between granting such a right to an ethnonationalist group in its full sense
versus constraining it through the vanguard party system, a paradox illustrated later

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in this article.
States have responded quite differently to demands by mobilized ethnonational
groups.34 For countries with deep divisions35 where ethnonational groups are politi-
cally mobilized and identity is politically salient, the two well-recognized alternatives
are power sharing and federalism or a combination of both.
The works of Arend Lijpart36 and of late O’Leary and McGarry37 have articulated
the various elements of consociational as opposed to majoritarian democracy. The
inclusion of the major political actors in the political institutions through a propor-
tional electoral system along with representation of the different groups in public
institutions is one of the vital elements. Power sharing, unlike federalism, often takes
non-territorial form.38 In other words, it is often recommended for societies that are
deeply divided by identity differences, but the groups are found to be geographically
intermixed. Through a combination of power sharing that enables them to influence
policymaking at the center and autonomy that entitles them to decide issues related
to language, education, and culture, the groups are believed to contribute to political
stability.
One could not rule out the relevance of power sharing in the Ethiopian context
given the fact that none of the ethno-national groups taken alone constitute a “50
plus 1” majority. O’Leary has argued that in a context where there is no staatsvolk (a
dominant group that enjoys absolute majority and hence has the demographic advan-
tage), political instability will prevail unless there is an inclusive political system that
brings the major political actors to power.39 The solution he proposed is to have an
executive power sharing among the major political actors. Since the establishment of

33
Sarah Vaughan, Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Edinburgh
University), 170–171.
34
Richard Simeon, Managing Conflicts of Diversity, in Building on and Accommodating Diversities 54 (Ronald
Watts & Rupak Chattopadhyay eds., 2008).
35
This expression refers to cases in which identity-based politics have a high degree of prevalence exceeding
that accorded to alternative forms of political mobilization such as ideological, class, and gender, and the
relationship between groups is affected by deep levels of mistrust making it less cooperative. See Donald
Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals, Process, in The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design,
Conflict Management and Democracy 18 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002).
36
Arend Lijphart, Consociationalism and Federalism: Conceptual and Empirical Links, 12 Canadian J. Pol. 499
(1979).
37
John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Elements 1–51 (2004).
38
Id. at 10–12; Simeon, supra note 34, at 64.
39
Brendan O’Leary, An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation? A Neo-Diceyian Theory of the Necessity of a
Federal Staatsvolk, and of Consociational Rescue, 7 Nations & Nationalism 273 (2001).
158 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

the Ethiopian federation, both as a result of constitutional principle (article 39(3)) and
practice, there is every attempt to reflect the country’s diversity in the establishment
of the executive, which is the central element of politically integrating diversity. The
federal executive power, a key institution in African political context, is fairly shared
among the four coalitions of the ruling party and its affiliates. The issue, however, is
representation meant for some only in the nominal and not real sense. The OPDO and
ANDM in particular had a legitimacy crisis until recently and thus a section of the
Oromo and Amhara used to think they were not genuinely represented in the federal

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institutions; hence the narrative of marginalization and protests. The ruling party in
Ethiopia claims to be a coalition, but it is only so in the limited (ethnic) sense. It is not
a coalition in the true sense as members of the ruling party are ideologically the same
and the coalition does not include major political actors from the opposition that do
not share its ideology. Besides a crucial element of power sharing, the proportional
electoral system is missing in Ethiopia as article 54 of the Constitution provides for the
first-past-the-post electoral system.
The two-decade-and-a-half political practice under a vanguard party as well as the
recent protests have made it clear that the costs of sidelining the political opposition
are very high and may, as witnessed in 2015 and 2016, lead to political instability.
Thus designing an inclusive political system to accommodate the political opposition
remains a critical question of the day.40
It is vital to mention that successful federations that are diverse often combine fed-
eralism with power sharing. Groups often are found at times intermixed and in other
places geographically concentrated. Thus combining the two offers a best solution. It
is for this reason that the late Elazar argued that consociational federations are best
fit for divided societies.41 It is here that one finds the major limitation of the Ethiopian
federal system. That it is run by a vanguard party implies that it has strong democratic
deficit. It has also no power-sharing element in the consociational sense. The system
thus remains fragile as left-outs continue to threaten it. Addressing the democratic
deficit through electoral reform followed by a genuine power sharing among the major
political actors would possibly be the ideal solution.
The highest form of accommodating ethnonationalist groups particularly when
they are found territorially concentrated and are politically mobilized as in Ethiopia
is through federalism.42 As Livingston long articulated, the essence of federalism is
not in the constitution or the institutions alone but in the social and political diversity
that necessitates the adoption of federalism.43 The geographic distribution of diversity
remains a vital factor. If mobilized, ethnonational groups are found concentrated in a
certain defined area, and federalism remains a relevant alternative. Through its com-
bination of constitutionally entrenched division of power as well as the principles of
shared rule and self-rule,44 it allows mobilized groups to enjoy political autonomy at

40
For limitations of coalition government, see Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies 53–103 (1977).
41
Daniel Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace 57 (1994).
42
See McGarry, O’Leary, & Simeon, supra note 27.
43
William Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, 67 Pol. Sci. Q. 81 (1952).
44
Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism 12 (1987).
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 159

subunit level while ensuring representation at federal level. Through the institutions
of shared rule and representation in federal institutions, ethnonationalist groups
are given the opportunity to influence decision-making at the center. The logic of
this form of federalism is that ethnonationalist groups can only respect the institu-
tions of governance and thus contribute to stable federation when they are granted
a satisfactory combination of influence at the center and meaningful autonomy at the
substate level with regard to their own affairs.45 This somehow determines whether
­ethnonationalist groups will remain loyal to the overarching federation or will prefer

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to fight or walk away from it. As it recognizes more than one public identity (at the
federal and substate levels) and aims to secure coexistence among them, it remains a
key instrument for polity building and managing diversity. The sharing of executive
power albeit in the limited sense mentioned above and the second chamber (HoF) that
currently has 153 members representing 76 nationalities indirectly elected by the
states plays a critical role in the allocation of subsidy, the main source of revenue for
the states and resolution of disputes are examples.46 Yet as the HoF has no lawmaking
functions, regional states have no avenue to influence lawmaking at the center. In this
sense the Ethiopian federal system betrays the principle of shared rule significantly.
The federal system in Ethiopia shares some of the basic features of federal polities
but it also has distinct elements. The division of powers between the federal govern-
ment and the states described elaborately in the constitution might not explain the
distinct features of the Ethiopian federal system. Beyond serving as another center of
power, the states have the additional and critical role of empowering ethnonational
groups that are considered founders of the new federal dispensation. The constitution
is viewed as a political contract and the result of the “free will of nations, nation-
alities and peoples” that are politically mobilized, territorially grouped, and declared
sovereign (article 8). It insists on the need for some congruence between the nation
and nationalities and the territory of their regional states in order to ensure self-
rule. Moreover, article 39 ensured three principal group rights. First: “every nation,
nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination,
including the right to secession.” This right often overshadowed by the right to secede
confers ethnonational groups the more important right to internal self-determination.
Second, it ensured each nationality with “the right to speak, to write and to develop
its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture and to preserve its
history.” Third, nationalities have also “the right to full measure of self-government
which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that
they inhabit and to equitable representation in the state and federal governments … .”
Thus, the Ethiopian federal system is designed to accommodate and empower “the
nations, nationalities and peoples” primarily through the provision of territorial and
political autonomy to geographically concentrated ethnonational groups (article
46(2)). While each nationality taken alone is a minority at the federal level, larger ethno­
national groups become a majority at regional state and local levels and thus dominate
45
Lijphart, supra note 36, at 500.
46
For details on the HoF, see Assefa Fiseha, Constitutional Adjudication through Second Chamber in Ethiopia, 16
Ethnopolitics 295 (2017).
160 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

the political institutions of self-rule. The constitution dictates regional states to be orga-
nized on “the basis of settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people
concerned.” In effect, language is a key factor in redrawing the boundary of the con-
stituent units. The major ethnonational groups have established their own regional
states with their own constitutions and mandates. Of the nine regions, six of them (i.e.,
the Afar, Oromo, Tigray, Somali, Amhara, and Harari) directly represent empowerment
of specific ethnonational groups, allowing the group to control the regional and local
political institutions. The ultimate objective of granting territorial autonomy for an eth-

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nonational group in a federal or quasi federal arrangement is to transform the ethnon-
ational group that may be a minority at the national level to a majority at the substate
level so that it will exercise meaningful political autonomy and self-government while at
the same time ensuring representation in the national political process.47
The post-1991 federal system has brought ethnocultural justice to historically mar-
ginalized groups in the country, particularly in the area of language, culture, local
self-government, and the promotion of their own histories. It has also built the politi-
cal and administrative institutions of the regional states. Self-rule, albeit in the lim-
ited sense (see section 3.3), along with the allocation of resources from the center,
has significantly enhanced access to education, health, and basic infrastructure. The
country has also seen peaceful transfer of power twice since 1991, albeit within the
same party—a new trend in Ethiopia’s recent political history.
Critics have, however, aired their concern stating that the Ethiopian federal system
by empowering ethnonational groups to self-rule and by providing resources and the
media at their disposal may weaken common ties. Emboldened ethno-national groups
and their elites may, by focusing on the politics of difference, in the end have indepen-
dent nationhood as their objective. It is thus a high-risk strategy that may eventually
bring about the country’s disintegration.48 Some of the above symptoms were clearly
manifested in the pre-election debates in 2005 where some leaders from the oppo-
sition fomented ethnic hatred.49 The signs were also visible in the recent protests in
which carrying the federal flag in some remote districts was considered by hardliner
ethnonational elites as a crime. Intra-unit minorities in the states have largely been
discriminated in the states by dominant ethnonational groups that think they “own”
the territory and regional state political institutions exclusively. State institutions such
as the police, whose main role is to ensure peace and order and prevent crimes, often
took sides in intergroup conflicts and aggravated the problem.50 So-called Special

47
Kymlicka, supra note 1, at 177; Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems 165 (2008).
48
Minase Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact upon Unity, Human Rights and Development, 20
Suffolk Transitional L. Rev. 1 (1996).
49
A key figure from the opposition Bedru Adem in a widely televised speech on the eve of the 2005 election read
to his audience “let them go to where they came from” widely understood to imply to the Tigrayan community
associated with the ruling party as if they came from another continent. See Asqual, May 10, 2015.
50
In Gambella (2015), regional state police were found to be part of the problem in the intergroup con-
flict between Anuak and Nuer, local police taking sides alongside its community. See Tracing the Source
of Ethnic Clashes in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region, [Link]
nic-clashes-ethiopia-gambella-region/[Link]; James Jefferey, Oromia–Somali Conflict: Ethnic
Violence Displaces Hundreds of Thousands of Ethiopians, IRIN, Nov. 10, 2017, [Link]
analysis/2017/11/08/ethnic-violence-displaces-hundreds-thousands-ethiopians.
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 161

Forces (Liyu Hayle) of the regional states whose constitutional status remains dubious
are close to replacing the defense function. It should be noted that national defense is
an exclusive mandate of the federal government. While the federal education policy
required states to promote the federal working language in schools, in some parts of
the Oromia regional state this was largely seen as a continuation of the old regime
and they resisted it.51 Regional state figures have also been active in foreign affairs, an
exclusive mandate of the federal government.
The federal system has also shaped and transformed the nature of intergroup rela-

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tions and tensions over the years. The fact that the disputed areas coincided with the
administrative boundaries between regional governments seems to have transformed
the conflict between local communities to conflicts between regional states.52 The
recent (2017) Oromia–Ethio–Somali conflict53 is perhaps the worst example in which
local political elites, the media, and police apparatus took sides in the conflict causing
death and displacement to hundreds of thousands from both sides and threatening
the peace and stability of the country.54
Societies with deep divisions require strong social capital that connects them across
ethnonational and religious boundaries.55 Thus building institutions and systems
that nurture shared values (such as strengthening common bonds that tie the people,
shared and inclusive history, inclusive symbols and monuments, conscious promotion
of common citizenship that transcends ethnic and religious divides,56 as well as lead-
ers that bridge ethnonational boundaries), though, is critical to counterbalance grow-
ing ethnonationalism, “build the we belong feeling,” and keep the interdependence
between unity and diversity. Federalism like our body system (such as respiratory, cir-
culatory, or digestive systems) works well if each system (units) remains autonomous
but is interlinked and coordinated to the whole and the whole remains greater than its
parts. Nor can the parts exist without the whole. As Nico and Yash Ghai argue “The
slogan unity in diversity means more than the recognition and accommodation of
diversity; it also entails the integration of such diversity”57 through various policies and

51
The irony being that hardliner Oromo ethnonational elites blame the federal government for not ensur-
ing representation of Oromos in the federal civil service, while it is the elite itself that is partly the source
of the problem as they resist to learn the working language.
52
Asnake Kefale, Federalism: Some Trends of Ethnic Conflicts and their Management in Ethiopia, in The Quest for
Peace in Africa 51 (A. G. Nhema ed., 2004).
53
For details, see Harry Verhoeven, An Eastern Problem for Ethiopia’s New Leader, [Link]
com/indepth/opinion/[Link]. When all this was
happening, the federal government was nearly absent—hence the view by many Mengist yelem? Is not
there a federal government in this country?
54
See Yohanes Anberbir, The Reporter (Amharic) [Report to Parliament about the conflict], [Link]
[Link]/[Link]/article/6322.
55
See Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civil Strife: Hindus and Muslims in India (2002), where he argues
strong social capital has the potential to moderate the ugly sides of ethno nationalism and thus can
reduce conflicts.
56
According to a former opposition political leader, Lidetu Ayalew, common citizenship and Ethiopian unity
was abandoned during the making of the constitution in 1995 in favor of nationality rights. Paper pre-
sented at the Sheraton Hotel, Addis Ababa, October 15, 2016 (on file with author).
57
Nico Steytler & Yash Ghai, Devolution: What can Kenya Learn from South Africa?, in Kenyan–South African
Dialogue on Devolution 465 (Nico Steytler & Yash Ghai eds., 2015).
162 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

the political process to counter centrifugal forces unleashed by self-rule. It is about, in

the words of David Miller, “nesting identity”58 through federalism—an identity that is
aware of itself unleashed by self-rule but is also about becoming aware of the identity
of others, respecting, recognizing, and accommodating them as well. It assumes inter-
group interaction to build cohesion among groups.59 It is not about non-interactive
existence of parallel and segregated identities. It is also about the coexistence of mul-
tiple identities where two or more identities feel that they belong both to the smaller
(substate) community and to a larger and overarching political community and they

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do not think that both are mutually exclusive. Yet the Ethiopian federal system lacks a
comprehensive policy for nesting diversity and for creating cohesion among them as it
emphasizes nationalities’ right to self-rule.

3. The new shift: Aligning federalism and development

The initial phase of the federal process certainly focused mainly on addressing the
demands of politically mobilized ethnonational groups through self-rule. Yet the system
slowly began to evolve differently when the ethnonational elite controlled state power,
leading to central government hegemony over the states. This was particularly visible
with the emergence of the political ideology of the developmental state nearly a decade
after the adoption of the federal system. As illustrated in the following sections this devel-
opment brought its own dynamics which at times clashed with the values and institutions
of federalism and states’ autonomy as outlined in the constitution, giving rise to conflict.
While the constitution provides for modest policymaking mandates to states subject to
federal-wide standards, many of the critical development projects are centrally designed
and this has brought resentment from the states. While administration of land belongs
to the states, federal laws regulating land extend the mandate of the federal government
to administer land, making state mandate hollow. The federal government even violates
the constitution by inducing the states to delegate their mandate of administering land
while the constitution envisages only downward delegation. All these developments fuel
ethnonationalism and the perception of marginalization from the states.
Three interrelated developments elaborated in following sections highlight the shift
in orientation from self-rule to a centralized federal practice: the Addis Ababa Oromia
Integrated Development Plan, the developmental state, and land-related laws and pol-
icies. As outlined in the next section, all are results of a centralized decision-making
(political practice) compromising the constitutional autonomy of the states and their
role in policymaking, giving rise to tension between centrally designed development
and an emerging ethno-nationalism unleashed by self-rule.

3.1. Addis Ababa–Oromia Integrated Development Plan

The first good indicator of a political shift from focus on constitutionally designed eth-
nonational rights to self-rule to centrally designed development is the blueprint for the
58
David Miller, Nationality in Divided Societies, in Multinational Democracies 304 (Alain Gagnon & James Tully
eds., 2001).
59
See Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future (2012).
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 163

expansion of the federal capital, entitled “Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Oromia
Integrated Development Plan,” issued in 2014, which provides for “a megacity of
between 8 to 10 million in the coming 25 years,” a plan that aimed to integrate (its cri-
tique argue expand) twenty times the current size of the federal capital. Decades back
the focus was, as provided in the article 49(5) of the Constitution, to address the con-
cerns of ethno national groups and hence stipulated Addis Ababa is geographically
found within Oromia National Regional State and thus “[T]he special interest of the
State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the uti-

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lization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative
matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia shall be
respected.” “Lately, the focus has been on “integration and development.” Yet the city
is facing challenges as the seat of three governments: the city government, the federal
government, and the government of Oromia National Regional State. Geographically,
it falls within the boundary of Oromia Regional State, one of the largest states in terms
of geography and population.
While the idea of building one political and economic community and politically
integrating Ethiopia’s diverse ethnonational groups is crucial, the process of doing it
could be a source of political conflict unless carefully balanced with regional state’s
autonomy and other competing interests. While not inherently contradictory,60 the
marriage between building one political and economic community and developmental
state61 (the political ideology that stipulates Ethiopia’s economic development is state
led, and is centrally designed and managed as well as the identification of poverty as
existential threat and main enemy against which all resources need to be mobilized as
reflected in the integrated development plan, large-scale agricultural investment proj-
ects, and land-related laws/policies) that has centralizing drive on the one hand and
federalism on the other is becoming problematic. The ability of the developmental state
to deliver the much needed economic transformation is primarily hindered by a less
institutionalized, weak, and neglected civil service. This institution suffers from lack of
a competent and skilled civil service. Political loyalty and merit equally compete in the
recruitment, retention, and promotion of civil servants.62 It is now very clear that the
much talked about mega-development projects that were hoped to be completed five
years ago are now at risk.63 Municipal services are falling way below expectations and
becoming a major source of grievances throughout the country. As argued in this sec-
tion, additional tension emerges when combined with federalism as the latter requires

60
India has carefully balanced federalism and developmental state for nearly four decades during
the Congress-led era (1949–1990). See Atul Kohli, State Directed Development: Political Power and
Industrialization in the Global Periphery (2004).
61
For details, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–
1975, 275 (1982).
62
After the 2005 election crisis EPRDF increased its party members massively (estimated to be eight mil-
lion). The massification applied to the civil service. Party members had preferential access to state allo-
cated benefits be it to education or loans. Merit was to be sacrificed in the process. See Alex De Waal, The
Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power 169 (2015). In a way this is a
paradox.
63
For details, see Yohanes Anberbir, Sugar Corporation That Runs 77 billion birr Projects in Trouble, The
Reporter (Amharic) (vol. 21, no. 1073), May 10, 2017 (Ginbot 3, 2008 E.C.).
164 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

the engagement of the states in the development process currently missing.64 The inte-
grated plan designed under the new rhetoric of building “one political and economic
community” plans to integrate (some Oromo elites would claim “annex” Oromo terri-
tory)65 the city with the neighboring Oromo villages but without engaging, as required in
federalism, the legislative bodies of the three governments concerned.
The plan was designed by the political leadership with the help of technocrats
but contains few details about the political, legal, and economic implications of the
integration. Ethiopia’s government routinely adopts such top-down approaches to

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policymaking that involve little genuine public consultation before implementation.
The design and the process of making it manifests a long-standing problem of overly
top-down policymaking in Ethiopia. Crucial development plans are designed behind
closed doors without necessarily consulting stakeholders. Such policies are often made
public at the implementation stage.66 The three relevant legislative bodies (the federal
parliament, Addis Ababa City Council, and Oromia regional state) have not debated
and agreed on the integrated development plan. The three governments, though con-
trolled by the same ruling party, represent three different interests. The federal govern-
ment has the constitutional duty to make sure that the federal capital is managed and
fits well with international standards.
Addis Ababa is also a cosmopolitan city with no less than four million people. Its
residents expect an efficient urban governance system and an administration that
is elected and accountable to its voters. The city is also seat of the Oromia National
regional state which has a “special interest” in the city. Growing Oromo ethnonation-
alism coupled with poorly managed urban expansion to the outskirts of the federal
capital has produced tension. Legal and illegal occupation of land by urban rich elites
and the subsequent eviction of Oromo farmers67 from the surroundings have been key
mobilizing factors for Oromo elites and Oromo opposition parties both in June 2014
and, during the widespread protests in Oromia regional state, early 2016. Oromia
regional state thus is a key stakeholder when it comes to issues that affect the federal
capital. Ironically, however, the process of making the plan and its implementation
was conducted as if Ethiopia is a unitary state. Allegedly influenced by the develop-
mental state and the age-old practice of centrally designed development projects,
the failure to consider all three major stakeholders in the process of designing the
integrated development plan was to become a major trigger to the protests in Oromia
regional state that caused loss of life and destruction of property in early 2016. When
news of the Addis Ababa master plan spread in May 2014, protests erupted on at
least eight university campuses by students who called for it to be scrapped because

64
See Assefa Fiseha, Ethiopia: Development with or without Freedom?, in Human Rights and Development: Legal
Perspectives from and for Ethiopia 101 (Eva Brems, Christophe Van der Becken, & Solomon Abay eds.,
2015).
65
“Oromia is not for sale” was the slogan during the widespread protest in Oromia in 2016. See René
Lefort, Unrest in Ethiopia: The Ultimate Warning Shot?, [Link]
unrest-in-ethiopia-ultimate-warning-shot.
66
Lefort, supra note 5, at 361.
67
For details, see Muradu Abdo, State Policy and Law in Relation to Land Alienation in Ethiopia (2014)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Warwick), 157 [Link]
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 165

it represented an “annexation of Oromo territory.” Eleven people were reportedly

killed and the plan’s implementation was postponed. Rumors of a new effort by the
federal government to implement the “Master plan” combined with growing ethnon-
ationalism68; discontent as a result of the failure on the part of Oromia regional state
to deliver69 an increased sense of marginalization; regional state political leadership
detached from the people; and perception of weak, corrupt, and incompetent regional
state leadership led to widespread protest and unrest in Oromia regional state during
late 2015 and early 2016, causing loss of life and destruction of property that even-

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tually forced70 the federal government to abandon the plan.71 There is thus a growing
tension between federalism and development projects as the former is sidelined.

3.2. Powers related to land and large-scale agricultural investments

The second indicator of a shift from focus on ethno-national rights to self-rule to cen-
trally designed development relates to laws and policies issued by the federal govern-
ment regulating land. It goes without saying that in a country where the life of an
estimated 80 percent of the population is dependent on land, land is the basic social,
cultural, and economic foundation of society. It is also a basic and scarce resource.
The government’s policy and law on land has, therefore, a serious impact on nearly all
aspects of life, rural and urban.
The Ethiopian Constitution stipulates a peculiar type of concurrent power that
separates legislative and administrative powers between the federal and state govern-
ments. This feature of concurrency is provided for in article 51(5) and article 52(2)(d)
of the Constitution. Article 51(5) of the Constitution authorizes the federal govern-
ment to enact laws regarding the utilization and conservation of land and other natu-
ral resources, historical sites and objects. Article 52(2)(d) provides the states with the
power to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws.
This would seem to imply that setting the norms related to utilization and conserva-
tion of land and other natural resources is a mandate of the federal government while
implementing these norms and laws belongs to the states. Hence the Constitution
separates the legislative and administrative aspects of the use of land and natural
resource. But this should be seen at the background of article 40(3), which stipulates
“The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is
exclusively vested in the state and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property

68
See Lefort, supra note 65; Why Oromo Protests Isn’t Just a Protest against a “Master Plan”? [Link]
[Link]/why-oromo-protests-isnt-just-a-protest-against-a-master-plan/; see also Ezekiel Gebissa,
The Oromo Dilemma: The National Question and Democratic Transition, Addis Standard, June 2016, http://
[Link]/oromo-dilemma-national-question-democratic-transition/.
69
See, e.g., Ezekiel Gebissa, Oromo Protests, the Martinets Message Meets its Match, Addis Standard, http://
[Link]/oromoprotests-the-martinets-message-meets-its-match/.
70
William Davison, Twitter, WhatsApp Down in Ethiopia Oromia Area After Unrest, Bloomberg News, Apr. 12,
2016; see also The Reporter (Amharic) (vol. 22, no. 1771), April 19, 2016 (Miazia 11/2009 E.C.). The
total number of people killed in all protests remains contested: the government estimate being 669 and
the political opposition as well as human rights reports indicate higher figures.
71
OPDO Press Release, Ethiopia: OPDO Passes a Resolution to Abandon Master Plan, [Link]
ries/[Link].
166 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to
other means of exchange” (emphasis added).
Given that the Constitution emphasizes the right to self-rule to ethnonational
groups, it is hardly possible to think of the right to self-rule without a defined terri-
tory and control over land at the constituent state level. This conception of land and
its strong links with the right to self-rule provides a broad constitutional safeguard
to the nationalities as joint owners of land with the state. But the increased role of
the federal government without ensuring the right of nationalities over land in terms

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of consultation and benefit sharing is increasingly becoming a source of tension and
resentment. This is exactly what was happening when the federal government began
to lease land to domestic and foreign agricultural investors in some of the states.
With a view to enforcing its mandate over land, the federal government has issued
several proclamations relating to the use of land by invoking article 51(5) of the
Constitution as its source of authority. These include Proclamations 818 (2014),72
721 (2011), 574 (2008), 455 (2005), 89 (1997), Council of Ministers Regulation
Number 283/2013,73 and Proclamation 886 (2015).74 The first proclamation regu-
lates all urban centers in the country including those falling within the mandate of
urban local governments. The second proclamation deals with allocation of urban
land on lease for “developmental activities.” That proclamation broadly defines the
“developmental activities” and sets the maximum lease period for a specific “devel-
opmental activity”. It further regulates the manner in which the land lease rate is
determined and evictions of illegal landholders are undertaken.
The third proclamation regulates urban planning, while the fourth one deals
with matters relating to rural and urban land expropriation. Regulation Number
283/2013 establishes a federal government agency to administer (defined in the reg-
ulation as identify, demarcate, take possession, supervise, and control—an express
mandate of the states) land allocated for large-scale agricultural investment in the
states which has also the power to establish agricultural investment zones. The last
one, named industrial park proclamation, establishes federal industrial parks in the
regional states and the federal investment board chaired by the prime minister and
other senior government officers allocates land (which may be under the administra-
tion of the regional states) to industrial parks (articles 22 and 25). Based on these
federal proclamations, the regional states, more specifically the cities in the regional
states, allocate urban and rural lands for development, prepare town planning, evict

72
Article 3 of Proclamation no. 818/2014 deals with Registration of Urban Land Holding in all urban
areas across the country. Not only the mandate of states but also that of urban local governments have
been expropriated by this proclamation.
73
Regulation Number 283/2013 establishes Ethiopian Agricultural Investment Land Administration
Agency (federal one) that has the mandate to administer and allocate land exceeding 5,000 hectares in
the regional states to investors.
74
Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia: Re-Enactment of Urban Lands
Lease Holding Proclamation no. 272 (2002); Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic
Ethiopia: A Proclamation to Provide for Urban Plans no. 574 (2008); Federal Negarit Gazeta of the
Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia: Expropriation of Landholdings for Public Purposes and Payment
of Compensation Proclamation no. 455 (2005).
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 167

illegal landholders, expropriate lands for development purposes, and allocate land for
large-scale agricultural investment and industrial parks. The new laws have blurred
where the legislative power of the federal government ends and the administrative
power of the states begins with respect to land and natural resources. The issue here is
whether the power of the federal government to enact laws related to urban and rural
land also extends to imply administration of land, a mandate expressly stipulated by
the federal constitution to the states but has now been taken over by the above-men-
tioned laws and regulations.

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As the above laws indicate, there is a substantial shift in extending the mandate of
the federal government to include the power of administering and implementing land
that falls within the mandate of the states. The latest laws extend the mandate of the
federal government to include even mandates of urban and rural land administration
that falls within local governments.
Contrary to the intention of the framers, the federal government employing party
machinery coerced regional states to delegate the power to administer land in their
respective territories to the federal government in 2010/2011.75 A decision of the top
leadership of the ruling party which has never been given legal status in the form
of proclamation or regulation required states to delegate their mandate of admin-
istering land to the federal government. Article 50(9) of the Constitution does not,
however, allow upward delegation by the states to the federal government. The alleged
claim for this development is that foreign and domestic large-scale agricultural invest-
ment needs to be centrally managed because regional states, particularly those on
the periphery, do not have the capacity to manage it. The land is thus centrally leased
to commercial agricultural farmers. The assessment is that large-scale agricultural
commercial farming has been a disaster and the federal government finally decided
to suspend it in March 2016.76 The pitfall is that there was no clear political, admin-
istrative, and legal framework to conduct feasibility studies and proper follow-up. The
obligation of investors to the local community, for example, in terms of employment
opportunities that transform their way of life and share from benefits and the environ-
mental and development of local infrastructure, is not well articulated.77 The whole
process was not carefully designed and managed and there was little engagement of
the regional states and the population concerned.78 Despite the rhetoric that land is
common property of nations, nationalities, and peoples, their role in large-scale agri-
cultural investment remained marginal as it was centrally designed and implemented.
Thus “creating one political and economic community” and developmental state
is used as a means to design mega-development policies without taking into account
the federal principle of a constituent unit’s autonomy to self-rule and coordina-
tion of joint development plans among concerned federal and state institutions.

75
See Minutes of the Constitutional Assembly v. IV on article 50 for details.
76
See Daniel Zenebe, public relations, Ethiopian Agricultural Investment Administration
Agency, Ethiopia: Agency Suspends Giving Land for Investors, [Link]
alerts/4522-ethiopia-agency-suspends-giving-land-for-investors.
77
Lefort, supra note 5, at 374–375.
78
For details, see Barren Farmlands, The Reporter (vol. 21, no. 1060), Dec. 31, 2016.
168 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

Shared rule as well requires that regional states have the institutional mechanisms
to influence policymaking at the federal level. This is missing in Ethiopia as the HoF,
though a house of nationalities, has no role in lawmaking. The idea that develop-
ment is centrally designed and managed, along with the identification of poverty
as an existential threat against which all resources have to be mobilized, means
that development takes an overriding priority and central role. Federalism, nations,
and nationalities’ right to self-rule and associated rights to land thus become dis-
posable for the sake of development. The current tension is partly the result of a

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shift from a focus on federalism to the ideology of the developmental state. Unless
federalism and development are carefully aligned through the engagement of the
regional states in development projects and thus make development to be feder-
alism and nationality rights friendly as envisaged in the Constitution (articles 8,
and 39), the outcome as witnessed in the Integrated Development Plan is ethno­
national mobilization and conflict. As is well known, land is scarce and a critical
resource for a country. The emerging tension resulting from the centralization of
mandates related to land and a shift from federalism and nationalities’ right to self-
rule to development and transfer of land to federal government and investors is in
a way a reversal of the old slogan “land to the tiller” to land to the rich and to the
ever centralizing federal government. This has compromised self-rule, giving rise to
ethnonational mobilization and conflict.

3.3. Dominant party system and the need to accommodate political

pluralism
The relevance of power sharing in the consociational sense to the Ethiopian federal
system was highlighted in section 2. Successful multi-ethnic federations often com-
bine federalism with power sharing. Yet twenty-five years experience in Ethiopia has
resulted in single dominant party that controls power at all levels and compromised
the autonomy of the states while marginalizing the political opposition. The system
thus remains fragile as left-outs continue to threaten it. The latest “100 percent win”
in the 2015 election by the ruling party followed by widespread protests in itself
speaks volumes. Addressing the democratic deficit through electoral reform followed
by a genuine power sharing among the major political actors would possibly be the
ideal solution.

(a) Impact on regional state autonomy

In theory, the division of power envisaged in the Constitution (articles 51 and
52) along with the right to self-rule allows the states to design their own socio-
economic and development policies that fit their local context subject only to broad
federal-wide standards set in the Constitution. However, a clearer picture of the
federal system in Ethiopia can be drawn if one looks at the operation of the party
system until the start of the protests. Many critics point to this as the most obvi-
ous limitation of Ethiopia’s federalism, particularly the paradox between gener-
ously granted constitutional powers to the states and a centralized federal system
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 169

in practice, which arises from the hegemonic nature of the party system. Leaving
out the current uncertainties,79 the guiding ideology of the ruling party is “revolu-
tionary democracy.”80 This is an ideology that was rigidly implemented during the
civil war and that continued even after the adoption of the new constitution that
enshrines political pluralism and multiparty democracy. Revolutionary democracy
promotes an exclusive control of power (at all levels of governments) by a vanguard
party that assumes a leading and hegemonic role. The effect is that the ruling party
controls not only the institutions of the federal government but also all the regional

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state governments in the federation either directly through its member parties (the
four coalitions each lead the four relatively influential states) or indirectly through
affiliated parties that control the other five states.81 The design of major policies and
the nomination, election, and appointment of key political figures both at the fed-
eral and regional state level are made and effected through the centralized party
structure. Thus, the role of federalism and the regional states has until recently
been reduced to merely serving as implementing rubber-stamping institutions of
a vanguard party at the helm of power, the institutions being subservient to party
interests. The federal system has thus so far been politically, not institutionally, led
and a crisis within the party as it happened in 2001 and 2016 resulted in a crisis
of governance countrywide, the institutions playing a small role. The implication is
that the autonomy of the states is limited in practice, and the party structure over-
shadows and weakens the federal and regional government institutions. The party
structure and its decision-making procedures undermine the federal division of
power and subordinate the state governments to the whims of the party.82 In this
regard, Ethiopia is not as federal as promised by the Constitution. In reaction to
weak regional state leadership and a perception of lack of regional state autonomy
that failed to ensure the right of the Oromos in Addis Ababa and did not resist the
“integrated development plan.” “We want genuine self-rule”83 was one of the popu-
lar slogans during the widespread protests in Oromia in early 2016. Self-rule is thus
compromised through the party apparatus in addition to the developmental state
ideology illustrated in previous sections.
The ruling party along with its ideology of “revolutionary democracy” and hege­
monic control of power has also made multiparty democracy a farce.84 The ruling
party claims, particularly following the 2010 national and regional state elections,

79
It is not clear yet but EPRDF after Meles seem to have loosened its “democratic centralism,” regional state
figures emerging more visibly giving the impression of a weak center.
80
For details, see Gebru Asrat, Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia (Amharic) 148–149 (2015); Jean-
Nicolas Bach, Abyotawi Democracy: Neither Revolutionary nor Democratic, a Critical Review of EPRDF’s
Conception of Revolutionary Democracy in Post-1991 Ethiopia, 5 J. East African Stud. 641 (2011).
81
Assefa Fiseha, Theory versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism, in Ethnic
Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (David Turton ed., 2006).
82
Id.
83
Lefort, supra note 65.
84
Some have already hinted that “while federalism may survive the EPRDF, the present political framework
is so dependent on the regime that created it and its survival is unlikely,” see Christopher Clapham, Post
War Ethiopia: The Trajectories of Crisis, 36 Rev. Afr. Pol. Econ. 191 (2009).
170 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

that Ethiopia needs an Awra/vanguard/dominant party.85 This claim is illustrated in

various documents of the ruling party citing examples from other countries such as
Japan (from 1954 to 1993).86 Yet the analogy is problematic because there seems to
be a thin line that differentiates between hegemonic and dominant party systems. In
a dominant party system, the political system is not against multipartyism as such
but it happens that voters satisfied with the performance of the Liberal Democratic
Party continue to elect the same party in consecutive elections. In this system there
is a regular and free election and opposition parties take part in the competitive elec-

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tion. There is little or no complaint about the electoral process on the basis of voting
irregularities or fraud. The outcome of the election is also respected by both the win-
ners and the losers. There is no fear that if the party loses an election it will engage in
“extra-legal measures” to stay in power.87
The hegemonic party system is a bit different. To a large extent this type of party
system is not competitive and yet it is not the same as a one-party state.88 The same
party controls more than 50 percent of the power for consecutive elections (two to
three terms).89 There are various restrictions placed on political parties that want to
engage in elections. Complaints on the electoral process are very common as either
of the parties might engage in various kinds of election rigging. Political pluralism is
far from ascertained as well. As is well known, competition and uncertainty of out-
comes are vital elements of a democratic electoral process.90 In a hegemonic party
type, there are indicators that hint at the certainty of the outcome: the hegemonic
party will retain power. More importantly, there is no guarantee that if the hegemonic
party loses the election it will transfer power peacefully. It is uncertain at least.
As indicated above, the EPRDF, following the 2010 election, declared itself a domi-
nant party. The ruling party has controlled power since 1991 (five consecutive lec-
tions) and with the exception of the third term where the opposition had 171 seats, it
enjoyed more than 95 percent control of power. It is also difficult to ignore the vari-
ous election irregularities mentioned by several international observers. True or not,
in nearly all five elections held between 1995 and 2015, various kinds of electoral
irregularities have been reported.91 Despite the constitution proclaiming a multiparty
system, the reality has been a hegemonic party in power where the opposition plays
a little role.

85
See, e.g., Addis Raey Hamle-Nehase, 2002 E.C v. 3 No. 3 Bulletin of EPRDF: 30–38.
86
See Giovanni Sartori, Party and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis 109 (1976).
87
Id.; see also Jose Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy 29–30 (2007).
88
See Cheibub, supra note 87, at 29–30.
89
Matthijs Bogaards, Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa, 43 Eur. J. Pol. Res.
174–175 (2004).
90
See Cheibub, supra note 87.
91
Even the moderate Jimmy Carter stated critical shortcomings. See Comments by Christopher Clapham on
the Ethiopian crisis written in mid-November 2005, [Link]
on_Ethiopia_crisis.html, and Jon Abbink, Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia
and Its Aftermath, 105(419) Afr. Aff. 187 (2006); also Terrence Lyons, Ethiopia in 2005: The Beginning of
a Transition? 25 CSIS: Africa Notes (Jan. 2006).
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 171

While the opposition remained fragmented with only a dozen seats in the 547-seat
parliament in the first two elections, some progress was seen in the third term (2005–
2010). In the 2005 election, following a more open and relatively democratic process,
the opposition gained 171 seats in parliament and won all seats of the Addis Ababa
City Council, but disagreements among the opposition itself and with the EPRDF led
to violent demonstrations in June and November 2005, which resulted in losses of
life and destruction of property and imprisoning of some of opposition party leaders.
The political context after the 2005 election crisis is even more worrisome.

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Authoritarian tendencies from the ruling party92 and fragmented opposition together
yielded a one-party electoral outcome in 2010 when only one seat went to an opposi-
tion and another one to an independent candidate. In the 2015 elections no single
seat went to the opposition. The effect is that participation in political life is restricted
to the members of the ruling party and its allies,93 leaving a large section of society
unrepresented and in disarray. As a result, some have gone to the extent of concluding
that the multiparty system in Ethiopia has given rise to a one-party state.94 This sce-
nario certainly hints where Ethiopia’s democratization process is heading. In essence,
elections are becoming “ritual performances,” a formal routine process without com-
petitive electoral policy options to the voter. Opposition parties, however fragmented,
exist but are tolerated or provided controlled freedom95 as long as they do not pose a
major threat to the ruling party in its bid to stay in power to implement developmental
goals. This scenario has weakened moderates in the opposition and led to widespread
social movements and street protests emboldening hardliners. As some argue “In
Ethiopia, an election victory of 100 percent of parliamentary seats sends the message
to potential rebels that there is only one game in town and that to imagine otherwise
would be futile.”96 This is exactly what transpired in 2016. When the political opposi-
tion was weakened and lost political space in parliament, the discontented section of
society was left with little option than the social media and outlawed parties outside
the country. During the protests in Oromia and the Amhara region, it was all clandes-
tine and as The Reporter rightly wrote, “it was a revolution without leaders,”97without
leaders in the sense that the leaders were not the traditional loyal opposition figures
but clandestine and new ones using social media as an outlet.
Providing space to political pluralism thus remains the top priority, if Ethiopia is to
avoid further protest and violence. Indeed the protests in Oromia and other parts of

92
Repressive laws that restricted the role of civil society groups and the political opposition were issued giv-
ing rise to what the political opposition calls “narrowing down of the political space.” See Abbink, supra
note 91.
93
Leonardo Arriola & Terrence Lyons, Ethiopia: the 100% Election, 27 J. Democracy 76 (2016)
94
Kjetil Tronvoll, Briefing: The Ethiopian 2010 Federal and Regional Elections: Re-establishing One Party State,
110 Afr. Aff. 1 (2010).
95
This was a common expression used by the ruling party following the aftermath of the 2005 election cri-
sis telling the opposition that their freedom is symbolized by “chicken with a long rope” where its freedom
is limited by the size of the rope to which it is tied.
96
Arriola & Lyons, supra 93, at 86.
97
See Rebellion without leaders: Where is Ethiopia Heading?, The Reporter (Amharic) (vol. 21, no. 1702), Aug.
21, 2016 (Nehase 15, 2008 E.C.)
172 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

the country following a 100 percent electoral win in May 2015 are clear signs demon-
strating that the dominant party system is deeply fractured. It is unusual to witness a
discontent of this magnitude immediately after a 100 percent election victory. In this
respect the promise by the new leaders of the EPRDF to conduct free and fair elections
in 2020 is a major step forward provided that it is preceded by key political reforms.
The developments following the latest protests also indicate that the post-Meles
transition is not yet over. As mentioned, under Meles the federal system rested in tacit
practice on three pillars: (i) a “big man”—Meles himself, whom Clapham dubs “the

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philosopher-king of the EPRDF”98; (ii) democratic centralism (his main tool); and
(iii) the vanguard party. With all three fast-changing, multiple centers of power are
emerging. The collegial political body at the center that appeared after Meles opened
a window of opportunity for regional states to exercise meaningful self-rule as well
as influence at federal level has given way to an apparently weakened center: the “big
man” has passed on, democratic centralism is in rivalry with ethnonationalism99 and
the vanguard party fragmenting.
For some this new trend has been interpreted as “since the death of Meles Zenawi,
the top part of the power structure has exploded into a multiplicity of competing cen-
ters. . . . Ethiopia at present is like a ship without a skipper, with respectful but pas-
sive crew and a faltering engine”100 or lately “the federal center is disintegrating.”101
Alarming in this regard is that with the center weakening, emboldened ethnonation-
alist leaders with competing and at times conflicting interests are emerging as default
leaders at regional state level. With many of the political issues unresolved and the
protests mounting in two of the bigger regional states (Oromia and Amhara102), Prime
Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn resigned in February 2018 amidst the turmoil. Haile
Mariam’s six-year (2012–2018) era of federalism and governance was the weakest
government Ethiopia has seen in its modern history, characterized by indecisiveness
and anarchy reminiscent of the Era of the Princess.

98
Meles’s former ally and close friend Alex De Waal wrote “Meles’s political praxis became detached from
the collective leadership and party apparatus, and he was increasingly running party and government as
a one man show.” See De Waal, supra note 62, at 163; Clapham, supra note 14, at 69.
99
As previously mentioned, the slogan of the ruling party has been that its struggle was “class in content
but ethno-nationalist in form.” Current realities show that ethnonationalism has trumped class. More
critically, powerful political figures seem to have preferred to head their respective regional states rather
than occupying positions at federal level. A vital issue, then, is what the federal government would look
like if it were run mainly by deputies—and what the long-term implications of this would be. Nigeria in
the early 1960s underwent a similar trend, one which eventuated in civil war and the secession threat
from Biafra. The military intervened, leading to major political surgery and the emergence of thirty-six
smaller states to ensure Nigeria’s unity and territorial integrity.
100
Lefort, supra note 5, at 391.
101
Rene Lefort, “Ethnic Clashes” in Ethiopia: Setting the Record Straight, Open Democracy, [Link]
[Link]/ren-lefort/ethnic-clashes-in-ethiopia-setting-record-straight.
102
Growing youth unemployment, failure to deliver services and grievances related to it, a repeated nar-
rative of perception of marginalization, and the failure to provide political solution to the emerging
issues all combined were more than enough to cause havoc in the Amhara regional state. Interview with
Member of Parliament from the regional state, Addis Ababa, January 15, 2018.
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 173

At the time of writing, the country has entered uncharted terrain with Desalegn’s
resignation and a new, young, charismatic, and populist prime minister, Dr. Abiy
Ahmed, having come to power in April 2018.103 He has delivered compelling speeches
and his narrative of federalism is a change from the past, stressing as its core messages
unity, love, forgiveness, and building bridges between communities. As a prime minis-
ter coming from the OPDO (the Oromo wing of the ruling coalition that was forced to
change leadership following the protests), he reshuffled the cabinet, appointing more
Oromos to key federal positions.104 He released thousands of prisoners, including

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high-profile opposition figures, ended the state of emergency, called for dialogue and
reconciliation with political parties in the diaspora, reached out to different sectors of
society, and initiated various reforms. Ethiopia has thus felt some sense of hope about
its prospects for democracy.
Now that many of the formerly “terrorist” factions of the OLF and Ginbot 7, as well
as the different loyal opposition groups, old and new, are invited to operate peace-
fully in the country, the remaining key step is to start wholehearted inclusive dialogue
and negotiation, bring about the necessary political and legal reform, and enter into
the long-awaited democratization track. Success in this field, difficult as it may be,
determines Ethiopia’s future as a country. But it has risks. Some have drawn parallels
with the USSR in the early 1990s.105 The key issue, then, is: Can the Prime Minister
democratize Ethiopia without risking disintegration, given a context in which ethno­
national-based subunits have begun to behave as if they were on the road to secession?
A major challenge associated with the ongoing reform is the prime minister’s dar-
ing decision to start on all the issues all at once. Opening up all the issues at once
and the entering into the country of political parties with conflicting ambitions and
ideologies (some calling for transitional government and dismantling of ethnic feder-
alism and others demanding its genuine implementation) may bring unintended con-
sequences; some even say it could lead to a nightmare scenario for an already-fragile
coalition and political system. What may lead to a better outcome is taking focused,
step-by-step reforms while maintaining internal party cohesion to the extent possible
and at the same time broadening the social base.
One also needs to mention that many of the prime minister’s reform-oriented deci-
sions are made while bypassing pre-existing institutions; however weak the latter may
be, this has created some resentment among senior party and government figures in
the coalition.106 To be sure, his predecessors also sidelined such institutions, but then

103
This is the first prime minister in the EPRDF’s history to be elected despite sizable dissent from within his
party (108 votes in favor of 171 votes in total).
104
The OPDO now controls, among other things, the presidency, the Office of the Prime Minister and
Attorney-General, revenue authority, and foreign affairs. The prime minister also restructured the mili­
tary and security apparatus, something often perceived as the TPLF’s domain, by bringing in further
actors to this sector from the other coalition members of the ruling party.
105
See Alemayehu Woldemariam, Ethiopia’s Charismatic Leader: Riding the Wave of Populism or
Reforming Ethnic Federalism?, Ethiopia Observer, [Link]
ethiopias-charismatic-leader-riding-the-wave-of-populism-or-reforming-ethnic-federalism/.
106
Some party members already issued a press release accusing the prime minister of acting without proper
consultation and infesting the party with an “alien ideology.”
174 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

at least the party had some life; now it seems in disarray. While the prime minister’s
efforts in reaching out to the public outside the party constituency are received well by
many, given the hostility and tension the country has felt since the protests erupted,
these sorts of efforts are not without consequence.
First, the prime minister is broadening his social base outside the party in what appears
to be a deliberate flouting of the party apparatus, perhaps in anticipation of the need
to break it up.107 This would be risky, as the ruling party was the flag-bearer of both of
development and (with all its limitations) federalism, and it is difficult to foretell a possible

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successor to it given the fragmented nature of the opposition and of Ethiopia’s political cul-
ture. It should be noted that despite all the odds, the EPRDF was able to elect and hand over
power to its new leader peacefully in the midst of a dire political crisis: a rare phenomenon
in Ethiopia’s recent political history. The EPRDF has been a formidable force and the sec-
ond-longest-serving governing entity after Emperor Haile Selassie. Triggering its break-up
may cost Ethiopia, and Ethiopians, dearly. Given the emerging fragmentation, ideological
vacuum within the ruling party, weak institutions and the lack of clear political road map
from the leadership, what holds Ethiopia and Ethiopians together? This is risky because
emboldened ethno nationalism is stepping in to fill the vacuum everywhere.
Second, the wave of changes and reforms being conducted at times bypasses institu-
tions such as federalism and Parliament. The federal government has already removed
heads of five regional states (Gembella, the South, Afar, etc) violating constitutional
principles of self-rule. This is a paradox given that the new leadership came in from
Oromia, the very regional state that opposed centralized federalism and central inter-
vention. The laws banning certain parties as terrorists remain in force: Parliament has
not repealed them, and yet decisions are made as if these laws do not exist anymore.
Given, furthermore, that it is the ruling party that has not officially repealed them, this
may cause discord within its structures. As noted by Addis Fortune “His popular rheto-
ric may have pleased a large number of the public, but his accountability lies with the
180-member EPRDF Council that has elected him. . . .”108 It is too early to tell what the
settled trend will be, but how the prime minister goes about finding a balance between
garnering popular support, securing his internal party constituency, and pursuing
his personal ambitions (Ethiopians are well too familiar with the one-man show) is a
matter that needs careful observation. In view of these multifaceted challenges, this
new phase in post-1991 Ethiopia has made the country’s politics more hopeful and
interesting than at any other time—but risky as well.

4. Conclusion
Territorially based political mobilization has shown transformation in Ethiopia. While
regionalism and provincialism remained key sources of mobilization for a long period,

107
The rumor in town is that the United States and some countries from the Middle East are behind the
push for this, seeing as the EPRDF has had strong ties with China and has insisted on the ideology of the
developmental state.
108
Fineline, 19(947) Fortune, June 19, 2018, [Link]
abiy-ahmed-takes-things-has-begun-to-unnerve-many/.
 Federalism, development and the changing political dynamics in Ethiopia 175

with the emergence of a new ruling elite that is distinct both in terms of identity and
class along with its policy of homogenization and extreme centralization at the end of
the nineteenth century, ethnonationalism emerged as a visible force that challenged
the institutions of the centrist state. Federalism was adopted in 1995 in response to
mobilized ethnonational diversity. Comparative studies indicate that it is hardly pos-
sible to contain let alone unify mobilized ethnonationalist groups without some form
of federalism and power sharing.
When the federal process began in 1995, the role and commitment of the new polit-

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ical leaders to the federal system was critical in enhancing the political and admin-
istrative institutions of the newly born subunits. The new leaders established new
institutional mechanisms geared to upgrade the capacity of the existing and newly
recruited civil servants and political figures in the states. This was instrumental in
realizing the goals of the new constitution’s promise to self-rule.
The emergence of the state-led development assisted the state to deliver and ensure
continuous economic growth for a decade. This was remarkable compared to many
other African countries where the government institutions remain soft. This was very
crucial and perhaps there is little that federalism or decentralization alone can do to
contain political conflict. Economic growth and delivery of services in a context of
diversity is seen both as an end and a means to an end. It is an end as it improves the
livelihood of the people. But it is also a means to an end as with improved living stan-
dards, alternative forms of social and political mobilization such as class, ideology,
civil society, and gender will emerge that will hopefully moderate ethnonationalism.
Indeed, the ongoing political reforms by the new leaders of EPRDF can be threatened
unless they are able to sustain a growing economy. Millions of unemployed youth who
ignited the protests are waiting for the government to deliver more, not less.
State-led development was not, however, without consequences. As the “Addis
Ababa–Oromia integrated development plan” laws and policies issued by the fed-
eral government regulating land and the large-scale agricultural investment proj-
ects demonstrate, the idea of “creating one political and economic community” and
developmental state have made self-rule hollow. The idea that development is centrally
designed and managed along with the identification of poverty as an existential threat
against which all resources have to be mobilized means that development takes an
overriding priority and central role. Federalism, self-rule, and associated rights to
land are becoming disposable for the sake of development. Unless federalism and
development are carefully aligned through consultation with stakeholders in devel-
opment projects and unless development is made federalism and nationality rights
friendly as envisaged in the constitution, the outcome as witnessed in the protest to
the “Integrated Development Plan” and the widespread protests is becoming a source
of discontent and a new source of mobilization and conflict. Both the vanguard party
and the developmental state have compromised self-rule and caused resentment in the
regional states.
Given that the Addis Ababa–Oromia integrated development plan was the trigger
to the protests in Oromia and is related to massive expansion of the city, it is very odd
indeed to find the federal capital Addis Ababa as the political and economic center
176 I•CON 17 (2019), 151–176

even after two decades of federal practice. Not more than half of the country’s invest-
ment is located in and around the capital. This is a major paradox in a federal system
that has to be urgently addressed. Regional state and other cities need to be the focus
of development and the gap has to be narrowed down.
Federalism and democratization are operating in the context of weak institutions
which are overshadowed by the vanguard party and the emergence of a one-party
dominated political process that by sidelining the political opposition failed to provide
space for peaceful political dissent while emboldening hardliners, leading to politi-

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cal instability. Otherwise it is not common to witness a discontent of this magnitude
immediately after a 100 percent election victory. That the federal system has so far
been run by a hegemonic single party implies that it has a strong democratic deficit.
It has also no power-sharing element in the consociational sense. The system thus
remains fragile as left-outs continue to threaten it. The solution lies in a more inclusive
political system, which might be achieved by means of electoral reform that brings the
major political actors to power through power sharing, by means of strict enforcement
of and respect for the political autonomy of the states, and by means of a comprehen-
sive policy for promoting shared values that cut across ethnonational boundaries.
Strengthening the institutions that are overshadowed by the vanguard party also
remains critical. Most of the issues are as old as the federal system (administrative
boundary disputes among regional states; status of intra unit minorities and right of
citizenship; aligning federalism and development; Oromia’s special interest in Addis
Ababa; weak system of accountability and checks and balances) and yet remain unre-
solved. The institutions have not been responsive because they are overshadowed by
the party and have little life of their own. Political leaders were not able to emerge
crossing ethnonational boundaries and bring political solutions that match the mag-
nitude of the problem. Respective legislative bodies that were hoped to shed light on
the crisis and take appropriate political measures were nowhere to be seen. Federalism/
devolution at its core is also about changing and institutionalizing the nature of state
power in Africa: is the state (federal, regional state, and local) a neutral actor that
does things in the interest of its people or an instrument in the service of the politi-
cal elite? Federalism/devolution is about opening up the system, bringing more actors
at various levels, and improving the life of the ordinary people in terms of bringing
peace, economic growth, and social justice. It is not about the political elite enriching
themselves. Without that goal, federalism/devolution cannot bring magic; in fact it
can even be a problem as it turns multiple centers of power (federal, state, local) to
multiple sources of corruption. Thus there is an urgent need to build an institutional
system of checks and balances and institutionalize the rule of law to ensure account-
ability to the political system.