chapter 1

Material Objects

I assume that, whatever else may be true of us, you and I are material
objects, so clarifying what these are, as I will attempt to do in this chapter,
will help us to understand our nature. Even if it turns out that my
assumption is false, and we are not material objects, it will be instructive
to ask what they are, for we certainly seem to be intimately related to them,
whether that relation is identity or not.
It cannot be clear from the outset what I mean to ask when I raise the
question: What is a material object? Hence, I will begin the chapter with
some preliminary points about what I am looking to do.
After these preliminaries, I will develop an account of what it is for some
things to compose a material object at a particular time. Because a material
object composed of some things at one time may be composed of different
things at other times, I will also need an account of the changing compos-
ition of material objects. Having supplied these, I will move on to develop
some ideas about what happens when objects come apart or combine.
Finally, I will consider an objection arising from thought experiments in
which various things are glued to, or otherwise bonded to, organisms.
I confront still more objections in the next chapter.

Preliminaries
It goes without saying that material objects are things, but while that is so,
it is also true that some things are not material objects. Among the things
“thing” refers to (at least arguably) are properties (such as redness), events
(e.g., the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln), numbers (e.g., the number 1),
and classes and sets (such as the set of words that begin with the letter “t”).
“Thing” may also refer to an object, and while the terms “thing” and
“object” come close to being synonymous, “object” seems to cover less
territory than does “thing,” as is suggested by the fact that, at least in some
contexts, we tend to reserve “object” for concrete individuals. I will not
7

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 8 Material Objects
discuss the nature of everything that counts as a “thing.”1 I will consider
only a small patch of the territory covered by “thing” – only some things,
only some of what there is, namely material (or physical) objects such as
tables, boulders, and raccoons, which typically I will simply call “objects.”2
I should point out, right off the bat, that I intend to develop the answer
to my question (What is a material object?) by replacing it with another.
The question I will replace it with is roughly: When (by virtue of what) do
things compose (or make up) a material object? I will attempt to identify
the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for some things to compose
an object. If I can supply these conditions, I can also answer certain related
questions about objects. For example, suppose, as seems evident, that some
things make up a composite object if and only if that object exists. Then
once we identify the conditions under which some things compose an
object, we will have a useful answer to the question: What is it for
a composite object to exist?
I intend my account to be principled. I take it to be consistent with
plausible assumptions about objects, such as the following:
- the part–whole relationship is transitive, and
- different objects cannot be made of the same constituents at the same
time, except in the sense that some objects are parts of others.
However, I should emphasize at the outset that the views I offer are
rough. Worse yet, I do not attempt to do justice to the (large and
burgeoning) literature on the metaphysics of objects. There, one finds
ideas ranging from the extreme eliminativist view that the only objects
are simples (simples are objects that have no parts other than

1
According to W. V. O. Quine (1948), to be is to be the value of a variable. Equivalently: to be
a thing is to be the value of a variable. On its face, “to be is to be the value of a variable”
suggests that the existence of things is dependent in some way on language or on formal
systems of logic, which is a view I reject. Quine did too; he was not telling us what there is,
but rather what our theories commit us to (which is consistent with the thesis that the grounds
for concluding that things exist is that swatches of our most successful scientific theory
quantify over variables that take those things as values). This seems to be his view in the
last few paragraphs of “Two Dogmas” [Quine, 1951]).
Quine’s slogan reminds us that we use the term “thing” for any of the items we speak or write
about.
2
If we restrict the term “object” (as opposed to “thing”) so that it refers solely to material objects, as
I want to do, then the term “object” is a count noun. Van Inwagen treats “object” as the most general
count noun (van Inwagen 2019, p. 176, note 6). I would quarrel with this treatment if it commits us
to the claim that if any bona fide count noun applies to some thing or things then “object” applies to
that thing or things. (I will raise doubts about that claim in Chapter 2.) In any case, I take it that this
usage leaves open the possibility that some objects are not material, and I may as well repeat that in
this book I will be using “object” as an abbreviation for “material object.”

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 Material Objects 9
themselves – they are objects that lack proper parts) arranged in a multitude
of ways – chairwise, catwise, dogwise, and so forth – to the extreme
permissivist view that any combination of things makes up an object.
(Some eliminativists – the moderates – allow for exceptions; for example,
Peter van Inwagen, whose book Material Beings [1990] greatly influenced the
view of objects I sketch here, considers organisms to be composite material
objects. He also thinks that they are the only composite material objects. My
own view is a more moderate form of eliminativism.) I will aim to supply just
enough detail to make claims I defend in later chapters intelligible. I will
hope that what I say strikes the reader as being coherent and plausible and
that it also derives support from the ways it helps us to solve puzzling
problems, such as those involving splitting and transplanting brains, which
I discuss in later chapters.

Material Objects
Very roughly, I suggest, a composite (material) object is something made of
things that have physical features that enable those things to resist coming
apart. “Physical” features, such as mass, shape, and momentum, are the
properties and relations that are investigated by the physical sciences. An
example of a composite object is an organism. Another example is a watch.
By contrast, dust particles that are currently scattered across the universe
compose no object just now. It may be that objects not made up of other
objects – say one of the atoms posited by Democritus – could not come
apart, could not disintegrate (which is not to rule out the possibility of their
ceasing to exist). If such things exist, they count as objects as I understand
them, albeit as non-composite objects, of course. But perhaps all objects
are composite objects. Maybe all objects are made of “gunk,” which David
Lewis defined as “an individual whose parts all have further proper parts”
(1991, p. 20). Maybe some are gunky; maybe there is no gunk. (It also seems
conceivable for an object to be made up uniformly of some sort of material
such that each gob of it is qualitatively similar to the next – the same
material all the way through, all the way down – much as a pat of butter is
the same stuff as the stick from which it is sliced.) I will have nothing more
to say about objects that are not composite. My discussion will concern
composite objects.
Although objects resist disintegration, what composes them may change
considerably over time: an object composed of some things at one time
may be composed of different things at another time. Take my truck, for
instance. Earlier today, I took it in for maintenance, and the mechanic

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 10 Material Objects
replaced the spark plugs, so what it was composed of yesterday is different
from what it is composed of now. Eventually, I will want to address what
needs to be true of an object if it is to undergo changes in composition.
First, however, let us address a simpler question. I just said that, at each
time an object exists, it is composed of some things at that time (though
possibly of other things at other times). I think we can assume that an
object is composed of things at a time by virtue of the fact that those things
are related to each other in some way at that time. Our first question is:
What is that relation? How must things be interrelated at a time for them
to make up an object at that time? My watch is currently an assembly of
various sprockets, springs, and other doohickeys. It is because these parts
are interrelated in some way that they make up something at the current
moment. What is that relation?
We can state the question more carefully if we use the letter R as
a variable ranging over relations, the letter x as a variable ranging over
things, and the letter t as a variable ranging over times. Following van
Inwagen (1990, pp. 26–29), we can use the expression “the xs” as a plural
variable and the expression “the xs compose y at time t” as shorthand for
the xs are all parts of y at t and no two of the xs overlap and every part of
y overlaps at least one of the xs at t.
(I will use the terms “compose” and “make up” the same way. Things
overlap when they share a part.) The question, then, is, by virtue of what
relation Rc is the following true:
necessarily, some things, the xs, compose an object at time t if and only if the
xs are Rc-related at t.3
The answer supplies us with an account of composition.

Composition
Here is my first pass at an answer to this question:
simple bonding: necessarily, some things, the xs, compose an object at time
t if and only if the xs are bonded at t.4

3
Compare van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question (1990, p. 30).
4
This seems to be roughly the view that Andrea Sauchelli (2017) takes. Although I reject simple
bonding, in some other ways Sauchelli’s views overlap with mine. Compare Fei Xu’s (1997) discussion
of “bare particulars” in “From Lot’s Wife to a Pillar of Salt: Evidence that Physical Object is a Sortal
Concept.”

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 Composition 11
(I add the qualifier “simple” to the term “simple bonding” because, for
reasons that will become clear later, I will need to distinguish different sorts
of bonding.) In saying that some things are bonded at a time, I mean that
due to their physical features (perhaps relations holding among them),
each resists (is impeded from) being moved farther apart from the others at
that time. (I do not mean to imply that they touch each other.) For
example, if, at some particular time, one atom, call it A1, is chemically
bonded to another atom, A2, and neither is bonded to anything else, then
A1 and A2 compose an object at that time. If a third atom, A3, is chemically
bonded directly to one of the first two, but not to both, and not to anything
else, then A1, A2, and A3 together compose an object: by virtue of the array
of chemical bonds, no one of the atoms is easily separated (moved farther
apart) from the remaining atoms. We can add that things that are bonded
at one time may still be bonded after these things are moved apart a bit, as
these things might continue to resist separation even as the spaces between
them are increased in size. For example, magnetic force might continue to
hinder the separation of some things after they are moved apart slightly.
(More on this later.) Of course, the bonds by which objects are composed
are not limited to chemical and magnetic forces; nuts, bolts, and screws
hold together some of the things that compose my car. To uphold the
convention that everything is part of itself, we can stipulate that everything
is bonded to itself.
It would be nice if we could make do with the formulation I am calling
simple bonding. Unfortunately, however, it needs refinement, as can be seen
once we notice that it implies that any bonded pair (and any bonded triple
and so forth) of things that are among the things that make up an object is
also an object. For example, not only do bits of clay that are stuck together
compose an object, the bonded bits that make up the bits compose an
object. Each object may include within itself a large number of further
objects, each distinct from the others. Some may overlap. One may differ
from another by as little as a single atom.
To avoid these implications, I suggest we say that (with one qualification
I will mention soon) the things that compose an object at a time include
everything that is bonded to any of those things at that time. A smallish bit
of clay embedded in a clay statue is not an object on its own because that bit
is also bonded to other bits. An assembly of just two atoms does not make
up an object if either is also bonded to another – a third – atom. Instead,
the object the atoms help make up extends outward to include everything
bonded to anything bonded to the two atoms. To capture this idea, let us
say that some things, the xs, are maximally bonded (in a preliminary sense

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 12 Material Objects
I will need to modify soon) if and only if the xs are simply bonded and the
xs include everything simply bonded to any of the xs (compare van
Inwagen 1990, p. 63). (That is, the xs are simply bonded, and there are
no ys such that the ys are simply bonded and the xs are properly among the
ys.) Then we can revise the simple bonding formulation as follows:
preliminary version of maximal bonding: necessarily, some things, the xs,
compose an object at time t if and only if the xs are maximally bonded at t.
Without a doubt, the account could use further refinement, but I will
mention just two qualifications (which themselves could be clearer!) that
seem necessary. (Readers losing patience with the refinements may wish to
skip down to the next section.)
The first qualification I have in mind concerns the fact that some bonds
are too weak to count as holding an object together. (In referring to the
strength of the bonds between two things, I mean to refer to the combined
force of all of the bonds between them.) Presumably, the relevant bonds
must exceed some threshold in strength, but I will not attempt to specify
what the cutoff point is. Strong bonds hold much of our planet (much of
its outer crust, for example) together. Many objects on or near its surface
are held in place only by gravity. It is not clear to me whether the objects
resting on the planet’s surface, together with the remainder of the planet,
form an object (whether these objects are parts of the object we call Earth).
Nor is it clear to me whether, together, Earth and its satellite compose an
object, or whether Earth and various other bodies compose an object called
a galaxy, or a universe, if held together only by weak gravitational force.
A related problem arises once we consider that some bonds holding
things together are substantially stronger than others. Very strong bonds
hold atoms together; the same goes for molecules. Imagine a universe
containing nothing but three solid iron, qualitatively identical, cube-
shaped magnets, each 1 inch on a side, clinging together in a row, held
by strong magnetic force. None of the cubes would be an object in itself,
according to the preliminary account of composition we have formulated.
Instead, the universe we are picturing would contain one 3-inch-long
rectangular object composed entirely of iron atoms. Yet, it seems that
each cube is an object and that it is a proper part of the larger, rectangular
object. Consider any one of the cubes. The bonds holding that cube itself
together – the bonds among the iron atoms of which it is composed – are
much stronger than the magnetic bonds holding the three cubes together.
Hence each cube is an object in its own right, even while being part of the
larger rectangular object.

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 Composition 13
Apparently, the relationship between an object and its parts hinges on
the strength of the bonds among those parts. We can exploit this point to
refine our account a bit further. (The stronger than relation is transitive, so
there should be no failure in the transitivity of the part–whole relation.)
So how should we qualify the account? My suggestion is this. Let’s say
that some things, the xs, are maximally bonded if and only if the xs are
simply bonded, and they include everything whose bonds to any of the
xs are at least as strong as the weakest bond among the xs. While we are at it,
we can add some details concerning the proper parts of objects. Consider
the following conditions:
(1) The xs are maximally bonded in the qualified sense: they are simply
bonded, and they include everything whose bonds to any of the xs are
at least as strong as the weakest bond among the xs.
(2) The ys are among the xs.
(3) The bonds among the ys are significantly stronger than the bonds
among some other xs.
(4) The ys include everything bonded to any of the ys at least as strongly.
If condition (1) holds, then the xs compose an object. If all four conditions
hold, then not only do the xs compose an object, the ys compose an object
as well, and the object that the ys compose is a proper part of the object that
the xs compose.
We can repackage these claims into a refined account of composition as
follows:
maximal bonding
- necessarily, some things, the xs, compose an object at time t if and only if
the xs are simply bonded, and they include everything whose bonds to
any of the xs are at least as strong as the weakest bond among the xs.
- necessarily, if O1 is an object that is composed of the xs at time t, then
some things, the ys, compose an object, O2, that is a proper part of O1 if
(1) the ys are among the xs; (2) the bonds among the ys are significantly
stronger than the bonds among some other xs; and (3) the ys include
everything bonded to any of the ys at least as strongly.
On this view, each magnetic cube in our example is an object in its own
right, even though it clings to other cubes. At the same time, the tri-part
assembly of cubes is an object, as the cubes are bonded together but not to
anything beyond the trio. However, no two of the cubes, taken together,
compose anything, as each cube in each pair is bonded with another cube
as strongly as it is bonded to the cube in its pair. Call the cubes C1, C2, and

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 14 Material Objects
C3. Say C1 clings to C2, and C2 to C3. Unlike that of C1, C2, and C3, the
combination of C1 and C2 is not an object because the bond between C1
and C2 is not stronger than the bond between C2 and C3. Aside from things
(such as iron atoms) smaller than the cubes, the described universe contains
only four objects: C1, C2, C3, and the object they compose.
Now consider a universe like the one just described, except that, in it,
a small piece of paper is glued to C3. Because (as we can stipulate) the bond
between the piece of paper and C3 is far weaker than that between the
cubes, together C1, C2, and C3 still compose an object in exclusion of the
bit of paper. Nevertheless, C1, C2, C3, and the paper compose an object as
well. Similarly, when a cotton ball is glued to a massive metal safe, the
object that is the safe remains in existence, while at the same time, a new
object comes into existence, composed of the safe, glue, and cotton ball.

Persistence
I have been addressing the question: What does it take for things to
compose an object at a particular time? But answering that question
gives us only part of the picture of the composition of an object, for
presumably objects that are made up of some things at one time may be
made up of other things at other times. To complete our picture, we need
to address a further question, namely, by virtue of what relation Rp is the
following true:
Necessarily, an object O1 existing at some time t1 is identical to an object O2
existing at a later time t2 if and only if O1 is composed of the xs at t1 and O2 is
composed of the ys at t2 and the xs and ys are Rp-related?5
The answer to this question will give us the persistence conditions for
composite objects. In other words, it will provide us with an account of
persistence.
We can get a head start by taking advantage of work done in the previous
section. If the account of composition laid out there is correct, then the
account of persistence must conform to it. What we say about the persist-
ence of things over time must conform to what we say about their
composition at each time. This assumption, together with our account of
composition itself, implies that at every moment a composite object exists,
it is composed of things that are maximally bonded.

5
Note that the relation Rp is not the relation involved in composition. I designated the latter as Rc.

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 Persistence 15
I would make several further claims about persistence. If an object is
composed of the xs at time t1, it will remain in existence from t1 to
a subsequent time t2 and will be composed of the ys at t2 if any of the
following conditions is met:
(1) The object’s composition does not change:
(a) the xs remain maximally bonded from t1 through t2, and
(b) the ys are identical to the xs.
(2) The object loses some components and does not gain any others:
(a) some things, the zs and the vs together, are identical to the xs,
(b) the quantity of zs is small relative to the quantity of xs,
(c) at some time during t1 through t2, each of the zs ceases to be
bonded to any of the vs (by the time t2 comes around, none of the
zs is bonded to any of the vs),
(d) the vs remain bonded from t1 through t2,
(e) no things that are not among the xs come to be bonded to the
xs during t1 through t2, and
(f) the ys are identical to the vs (the ys are those of the xs that are still
bonded at t2).6
(3) The object loses none of its components but does gain others:
(a) at each time during t1 through t2, the xs remain bonded,
(b) some things, the us, are not among the xs,
(c) the quantity of us is small relative to the quantity of xs,
(d) the us are (all of the) additional things that come to be bonded to
the xs during the interval t1 through t2, and they remain bonded
to the xs through to t2, and
(e) the ys are identical to the xs and the us together.
(4) The object loses some components and gains others:
(a) some things, the zs and the vs together, are identical to the xs,
(b) the quantity of zs is small relative to the quantity of xs,
(c) at some time during t1 through t2, each of the zs ceases to be bonded
to any of the vs (by t2, none of the zs is bonded to any of the vs),
(d) the vs remain bonded from t1 through t2,
(e) some things, the us, are not among the xs,
(f) the quantity of us is small relative to the quantity of xs,

6
A refinement is needed here, to accommodate the fact that an object cannot be reduced to one of its
proper parts. Condition 2 holds except in the case that, at time t1, the vs themselves compose an
object.

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 16 Material Objects
(g) the us are (all of the) additional things that come to be bonded to
the vs during the interval t1 through t2, and they remain bonded
to the vs through to t2, and
(h) the ys are identical to the vs and the us together.
These points about the things that compose an object at different times
will help me to shape the account of persistence I seek, but to complete the
account and to ease the discussion to come, I will need to coin some terms.
I will say that the ys incrementally replace the xs over the interval of time t1
through t2 if and only if
- the xs are maximally bonded at t1, and
- any of the four above-mentioned conditions – 1, 2, 3, or 4 – is met.
(Given 1, the ys may replace the xs even though they are the xs.)
I will also say an object undergoes incremental changes when the things that
compose it undergo any of these four sorts of incremental replacement.
I will not apply this term – “incremental change” – to other sorts of
changes an object may undergo, whether those changes are gradual or
not. For example, it will not apply to qualitative changes such as variations
of color or shape. An object that is a billiard ball does not undergo an
incremental change solely by coming to be a slightly darker shade of blue,
or by taking on a color that is slightly closer to purple, or by becoming
slightly less spherical.
Using this new terminology, I can sum up my remarks about persist-
ing objects this way: An object that exists at some time remains in
existence when its components undergo incremental replacement
(when the object changes incrementally) over some interval of time.
But if that is true, then an object will also remain in existence when its
constituents incur a series of incremental replacements. Such a series
occurs when the xs that compose some object at some time are incre-
mentally replaced by the zs, and then the ws incrementally replace the
zs, and so on. When such a series begins with the xs and leads up to
a replacement by the ys ending at some time t, let us say that, at t, the
xs give way to the ys through a series of incremental replacements (or more
simply: the xs give way to the ys at t).
I can now offer an account of persistence, which we may call the
incrementist account:
incrementism: necessarily, an object O1 existing at some time t1 is identical to
an object O2 existing at a later time t2 if and only if O1 is composed of the
xs at t1 and O2 is composed of the ys at t2 and the xs give way to the ys at t2.

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 Incremental Change 17
Equivalently: the object that the xs compose at t1 is the object that the
ys compose at t2 if and only if the xs give way to the ys at t2.7

Incremental Change
I said that objects may undergo incremental changes – their parts may
undergo incremental replacement – over time. Let’s see if I can make the
idea of an “incremental” replacement clearer.
In stating what is involved in incremental replacement, I said that an
object composed of the xs may survive a loss of constituents if the quantity
of lost constituents is “small in proportion” to the quantity of original xs. I
also said that an object composed of the xs may acquire constituents when
the xs come to be bonded to a quantity of additional things that is “small in
proportion” to the quantity of xs. The words “small in proportion” could
be clearer, and so could the quantities I mean to compare.
Consider a universe that, at some time t, contains (1) a row of 100
qualitatively identical cube-shaped magnets made of solid iron that cling
together, and (2) one additional magnet that is qualitatively like the others
but is not near them. Together, at time t, the 100 magnets compose an
object, of which the 101st is not a part. If that 101st magnet is now moved
over and attached to the others, then the object that consisted of 100
magnets at time t will have grown larger. Its constituents will have been
augmented incrementally. What is added is small in proportion to what it
was added to. (It isn’t merely that a 100-magnet-long object exists at time t,
and then, a bit later, an even longer object exists. Our story concerns an
object that comes to have an additional constituent: the object before the
101st magnet is added to it is one and the same object as the object that
gained the 101st magnet as a constituent.) If instead of attaching the 101st
magnet we removed one of the original 100, the object would have been
diminished incrementally.
My explanation of incremental replacements refers to two quantities:
that of the xs and that of what is added to or taken from the xs. It makes
sense to speak of these quantities only if certain conditions hold. If we
assume that all bonded things and all things that augment them have mass,
we can define incremental augmentation in terms of mass, as follows: An
augmentation is incremental if and only if the mass of what is added is

7
Note that an object that is composed of some things, the xs, at one time might come to be composed
of other things, the ys, at a later time and then, still later, it might come to be composed of the xs once
again. These might be cycled through an object several times.

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 18 Material Objects
small in proportion to the mass of what is augmented. Similar remarks
apply to incremental diminishment: A reduction is incremental if and only
if the mass of what is removed is proportionately small.
When is the mass of what is removed small enough to count as an
incremental diminishment? There is no determinate answer, I would
think. It seems clear that the mass of what is removed is small enough
if it equals, or is less than, 1 percent of the mass of the object that is
reduced. It also seems clear that the diminishment is incremental only if
the reduction is less than 50 percent. As to whether the mass of
a diminishment counts as incremental if it is 10 or 30 or 40 percent of
the mass of the object that becomes smaller, I cannot say. (It cannot be
arbitrary to limit reductions to less than 50 percent; unless we do, our
account will have consequences that are impossible, such as one object
becoming two.) Similar indeterminacy arises in the case of incremental
augmentation. It is clear that the mass of an addition is small enough to
count as incremental if equal to or less than 1 percent of the mass of what
it augments. It is also clear that it must be less than 100 percent (or else it
will be possible for two objects to become one).8
Note that the account on offer imposes no restrictions on how quickly
changes may occur if they are to count as incremental. Imagine that
mechanics work on my truck several times during the day, and although
each time they work on my truck, the mechanics change its components
very little, they end up replacing 60 percent of it by the end of the day.
Then they could just as easily have slowed down and taken two days to
make the same incremental changes (and charged me more), or worked
faster and done the job in an hour.

8
I doubt that the incrementist account applies to subatomic phenomena, such as gluons. I would be
happy if it applies higher than at the atomic level. As for whether it applies at the atomic level
(whether it describes the conditions under which things compose individual atoms, and under which
individual atoms persist), I hold out some hope, but there are plenty of worries. Just one worry is that,
for an atom with enough protons, the loss of a proton may constitute an incremental change, yet take
that atom from one place on the periodic table to another, since an atom’s number of protons
determines its classification as an element. Can an atom persist through an elemental transformation?
I am inclined to think so, on the grounds that an atom could persist after gaining or losing a neutron,
and the mass of a neutron is only slightly greater than that of a proton. Gaining or losing a neutron
should have roughly the same impact on whether an individual atom persists as gaining or losing
a proton does. However, I can imagine someone taking the view that an atom’s place on the periodic
table is essential to it, which suggests that protons and neutrons have very different implications for
an atom’s persistence. (Chemists will say that gaining or losing a proton changes the “identity” of an
atom, but in doing so they mean to say that the atom will be classified differently. A change in the
number of its protons is of special interest because it sharply affects the chemical properties of the
atom – how it reacts with other chemicals. A change in the number of neutrons typically has little
effect on an atom’s chemical properties.)

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 Density and Hardness 19
Let me further clarify incremental change by contrasting it with (what
I will define as) fission and fusion. I will say that two or more objects fuse if
and only if they (or the things that compose them) come to compose an
object O that did not exist prior to their merger. An object O fissions if and
only if the things that compose O come to compose two or more objects
and thereby end O’s existence. For example, pressing together two equally
massive wads of clay results in their fusion. It is an incremental change for
neither, so, in coming to compose an object, they thereby bring it into
existence. When an object O gains or loses a part as the result of O’s
incremental change, O and the part neither fuse nor fission.
An object O might come to be “part” of others in two importantly
different senses. Let us say:
- O is assimilated by one or more objects if and only if the things that
compose O come to be part of the other objects, thereby ending O’s
existence.9
- O is subsumed by another object if and only if O becomes a proper part
of it (so O remains in existence).
When an object O undergoes an incremental augmentation, O will assimi-
late or subsume some things. If a small wad of clay is pressed into a wad of
clay that is much larger (but equally dense), the latter assimilates the
former. If a small bit of metal is glued to a large block of wood, the latter
subsumes the former. Fusion also involves assimilation or subsumption,
but it is a newly formed object that assimilates or subsumes the objects that
fuse.
Incrementism could use further refinement but is adequate, I hope, for
the work I expect it to do. In the next several sections, I will attempt to
clarify the account further by bringing out some of its implications. (At this
point, readers who want to follow the main thread might prefer to move on
to the next chapter.)

Density and Hardness

Earlier, in discussing the composition of objects, I said that the bonds
holding an object together must meet a minimum threshold of strength.
However, their strength may change, and remain above the minimal
threshold. How densely packed the molecules composing an object are
may also change over time, as some such changes will be consistent with the

9
Contrast the way van Inwagen defines “assimilation” (1990, p. 96).

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 20 Material Objects
fact that their bond strength remains above the threshold. Let me elaborate
a bit on this point.
When the bonds holding together the components of one object are
significantly stronger than the bonds holding together the components of
a second object, let us say that the former is harder than the latter (and that
the latter is softer). Objects normally survive some degree of hardening and
softening. I am inclined to agree with Descartes that a piece of wax (or
metal) normally survives when the molecules that compose it change their
state from that of a solid to that of a liquid (involving a weakening of
bonds) or go from being liquid to being solid (involving a strengthening of
bonds).
Although the persistence of an object is consistent with its transitioning
from a liquid to a solid state, the transition to a gaseous state is another
matter, as gas particles spontaneously move away from each other, and
disperse. The behavior of gas particles is just the opposite of the behavior of
things that compose objects. (Nevertheless, an intriguing question arises
concerning an object O that is currently in a liquid state. If heated, the
molecules that compose O may come to be a gaseous state. O will not exist
while these are in a gaseous state, but if they cool enough to liquefy, does
the very same liquid object O pick up its existence where it left off? More
on this sort of question in the section called Disassembly and Reassembly,
later in this chapter.)10

Shape Shifting
An object survives changes in its shape, changes brought about when its
constituents are rearranged, as long as these remain bonded together. The
changes may be dramatic and sudden. By way of illustration, consider an
object, discussed earlier, that consisted of a row of 100 magnets. If these
remain bonded while their positions are shifted, the object composed by
the magnets remains in existence. Something similar occurs in the case of
a piece of clay or Play-Doh, or Descartes’s piece of pliable beeswax, whose
shape may be changed considerably from one moment to the next.
10
Further complications would arise on the assumption that an object’s persistence depends directly
on whether it undergoes various changes in volume. If an object O consists of a small lead weight
glued to a large cotton ball, do we greatly diminish O’s volume if we separate the weight from the
ball? Do we instead greatly diminish O’s mass? Curtis Brown asks a related question: if the molecules
in a tiny region of Wad are extremely dense but together comprise half of Wad’s mass, does
removing them from Wad really end Wad’s existence? Cases like this may suggest that whether
an object undergoes incremental change depends on the mass density of the things in various regions
of that object. But I will not pursue the issue.

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 Disassembly and Reassembly 21
In fact, incrementism implies that very little is essential to objects. Shape
is just one of their contingent features. A feature is contingent to an object
just if the object could exist (could have existed) without having that
feature. Its essential features are those without which it could not exist.
On the incrementist account, the essential features of objects concern their
composition at a time and over time, and nothing else, so objects are quite
versatile.
Bodies of water, such as rivers, are examples of extreme shape-shifters.
Because water molecules in bodies of water are bonded (the molecules cling
to each other, which is why water floating in space will form a sphere), it is
as easy to step into the same river twice as it is to step into the same lake or
onto the same moving snake more than once. A river is made up of a long,
sinuous body of water that is fed by runoff from rain and melting snow and
ice and that flows into a larger body of water, such as a sea. It seems
plausible to say that a river is actually an extension of the sea into which it
flows, but we tend not to. Let that go. In any case, the water that is added to
a river at a time, or lost at a time, is small in proportion to the total quantity
in the river as a whole, so it changes incrementally. We might say the same
about waterfalls, assuming that the water in the fall is bonded. The amount
of water that is added and lost at a time is small in proportion to the whole
waterfall.

Disassembly and Reassembly

Incrementism is not consistent with some widespread views concerning
taking objects apart then putting them back together again. Even if merely
in passing, I had better say something about this fact.
Many objects that are instruments are disassembled for convenient
storage. The parts are then reassembled before being put to use. Objects
that are automobiles or watches are dismantled for thorough repair and
cleaning, and these parts are then reassembled. (Why am I using the odd
locution “objects that are automobiles or watches” instead of the words
“automobiles” or “watches”? More on this later.) When the parts are
reassembled, does it bring back the original object? Is the automobile itself
reassembled? That is, does the automobile stop existing upon being com-
pletely disassembled, then return to existence when the parts are reassem-
bled, leaving a gap in its existence? If so, the incrementist account will need
modification.
Incrementism does allow for something we might call the incremental
disassembly and reassembly of an object. For example, an object that is

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 22 Material Objects
a car continues to exist after a small part (a part with a relatively small mass)
of it is removed, followed by another small part, and another. It remains in
existence when these are reattached, small piece by small piece. But if
roughly half of it is suddenly separated from the other half, it fissions,
which ends its existence. Similarly, if the object is whittled down, incre-
mentally, to (say) the motor, then the sudden removal of half of that ends
the existence of the remaining (motor-sized) object. Ordinarily, people are
not fussy about the proportions of the things that are disassembled and
reassembled. The commonsense view is that (something like) the following
principle is true:
disassembly: objects may be taken completely apart then reassembled.
Incrementism forces us to be quite selective. It implies, for example, that
if we attempt to begin our disassembly and reassembly of an object that is
a car by suddenly separating it into two equal halves, we will fail, as division
ends its existence, and bringing the halves back together results in the
existence of an object that is distinct from both the original car and from
each of the halves.
Should we side with the commonplace view over incrementism?
Perhaps, but I will not here assume that the disassembly principle
holds, and in what follows I will generally assume it does not. (If you
think that a liquid object can be brought back into existence after an
interval of time during which its molecules are in a gaseous state, you are
likely to side with the commonplace view. The eerie behavior of hydras,
discussed in Chapter 3, may also convince you, assuming you think
hydras can reassemble – not merely duplicate – themselves.)11

11
If we did go with the commonplace view, we would need to modify incrementism to allow for the
possibility of gaps in an object’s existence. We would also have to deal with some formidable
obstacles to the disassembly principle. (I thank Eric Olson for helpful remarks about this principle.)
For example, we would need to solve (Thomas Hobbes’s version of) the Ship of Theseus puzzle
(Hobbes 1655, II.11.7). Suppose we accept incrementism, and say that an object will persist over time
if we gradually swap some of its parts with new parts. Say we do this to a wooden ship, the USS
Theseus, starting on the first day of 2020, replacing one of its constituent planks with a new one on
one day, then a different part of the ship on another day, and so forth, until after a year’s time the
ship we end up with is composed of none of the things it was composed of back on January 1, 2020.
Now suppose that I collected all of the parts that were discarded over the course of the year 2020, and
I hire a crew to assemble them exactly as they were on the first day of 2020. Call the ship my crew
assembles on January 1, 2021, the USS Hobbes. Obviously, the USS Hobbes is not identical to (not the
same ship as) the USS Theseus, although, on the day I finish assembling it, it is not only indistin-
guishable from the USS Theseus as it was on the first day of 2020, it is composed of the very same
things, right down to the very same molecules. So if we deny that the USS Theseus continues its
existence as the USS Hobbes, don’t we have to reject the disassembly principle?

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 Gluing Cats to Kids 23
Gluing Cats to Kids
If I glue a cat to a child, would this bring an object into existence –
an object composed of the cat and the child, or rather an object
composed of the cat molecules, the child molecules, and the glue
molecules? It would if incrementalism is correct, but is this some-
thing we can accept?
Peter van Inwagen appeals to this sort of example (he imagines joining
people together in various ways) as a means to reject the idea that bonding
(of any sort) among things suffices for them to compose a material object.
In his view, what I did to the cat and the child might annoy the cat and the
child and its parents, but it brings no new material objects into the world.
There is no such thing as the cat-glued-to-the-child. If van Inwagen is
correct, then nothing like incrementism can be correct.
However, I do not think his objection is compelling. It seems quite
plausible to say that gluing together artifacts, or inanimate things, results
in new objects: gluing together bits of pre-formed plastic results in a model
airplane, and binding bricks with mortar results in a wall. Anyone who
accepts this view (which van Inwagen would not) probably will also accept
the view that gluing together organisms results in new objects. Why should
we be reluctant to think that we could make an object, say a makeshift hut,
by gluing together, in an appropriate way, the kids in the local kindergarten
school and/or the cats roaming the neighborhood? I am inclined to think we
can explain away any reluctance we might have without rejecting the view.

Well, we would have a problem if our basis for accepting the disassembly principle were something
like the following principle:
same parts: an object composed of the xs at some time is identical to the object the
xs compose any time the xs are assembled.
What we said about the USS Hobbes implies that the same parts principle is false.
If we reject the same parts principle, we might still claim that composite objects can be reassem-
bled in certain circumstances, even though, in the Hobbes case, my crew did not reassemble the USS
Theseus. However, further problems arise. Consider a variant of the Theseus Puzzle. Suppose that on
January 1, 2020, the crew of the USS Theseus took their ship completely apart, and gave the parts to
me. Gradually over the course of the next year, part by part, I ask the crew of my own ship, the USS
Luper (which has the same design as the USS Theseus), to swap these out with the parts of my ship, so
that, a year later, on January 1, 2021, my ship is composed of the very parts the USS Theseus was
composed of just before it was disassembled on January 1, 2020. Now suppose that, the same day,
January 1, 2021, I have my crew take my ship completely apart (maybe, inspired by what Carlos
Fitzcarrald did in the Amazon jungle, I want my ship transported to the other side of a mountain).
Later I have my crew reassemble the parts. Has my crew reassembled the USS Luper? Have they
reassembled the USS Theseus? The one claim is no more plausible than the other is, and both cannot
be true, so neither is. If we want to accept the idea that composite objects may be disassembled and
later reassembled, we will have to rule out such branching cases.

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 24 Material Objects
Here are some possible causes of reluctance:
- the belief that organisms such as cats and kids matter, but organisms that
organisms compose (such as cat-kids) do not;
- the fact that organisms are cemented together rarely and only briefly;
- the worry that organisms are assimilated by the objects they compose.
Now, it is true that, while we care about cats for various reasons and
children for various reasons, we are not much interested in cat-kids. The
cat-kid derives any value it has from that of the cat and the child, each of
which is better off detached. (In this regard, we might compare the objects
that result from gluing together hot dogs and hand grenades, or parachutes
and anvils: parachutes and anvils have their uses, but the glued-together-
combination – not so much.) It is also true that the cat is unlikely to remain
glued to the child for long, if for no other reason than that anyone who
came across a cat-child would separate the two. But why should we think
that objects must last? A final point is something I will not be able to
establish until later in the book, namely that, while organisms may come to
compose an object, they are never assimilated into the object they
compose.

Summing Up
Let’s review. We have clarified what it is for a composite object to exist at
a time and over time by analyzing the conditions under which things
compose it at a time and over time. Some things, the xs, make up an
object, O, at a time t1 if and only if the xs are maximally bonded then (the
xs are simply bonded and include everything simply bonded to any of the
xs). The object O that is composed of the xs at time t1 may be made up of
other things at a subsequent time t2. It is made up of some things, the ys, at
t2 if and only if the xs give way to the ys at t2. Over time, objects may change
only incrementally (unless we allow for the possibility of an object being
disassembled then reassembled). Incremental changes are ones in which
the mass of what is added (removed) is small as compared to the object’s
mass before the addition (removal).
I hope to have provided a plausible and reasonably clear account of
material objects. However, I am mindful that it faces formidable objections.
In the next chapter, I will attempt to fend off some of these.

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