(p.

i) Rationality and the Reflective Mind

([Link]) ([Link]) Rationality and the Reflective
Mind

2011

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stanovich, Keith E., 1950-

Rationality and the reflective mind / Keith Stanovich.
p. cm.
ISBN 978-0-19-534114-0
1. Reasoning (Psychology) 2. Individual differences. 3.
Intellect. 4. Cognition. I. Title.
BF442.S727
2010 153.4'3—
dc22
2010036746

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in USA
on acid-free paper
(p.v)
Dedication
([Link]) For my friend Marilyn
 ([Link]) Preface
In this book, I explore how data on individual differences in
reasoning have implications for dual-process theory and the Great
Rationality Debate in cognitive science. These same data on
individual differences also have profound implications for how we
understand the relationship between the concepts of intelligence
and rationality, and the latter chapters of the book explore this
relationship. My longtime colleague, Richard West, has worked with
me on all of these issues and co-authors several of the chapters.
More recently, Maggie Toplak of York University, has worked with us
on the intelligence/rationality relationship and on a conceptual
framework for assessing rational thought and is the co-author of
Chapter 10. No one could ask for two more dedicated colleagues
who make every day we work together full of anticipation and fun.

My intellectual debts in writing this book are immense and are

represented in the wide literature that I cite. Special note, though, goes
to the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Their early
studies inspired my interest in rational thinking tasks that were new
to psychology at the time. More recently, the work of Jonathan Evans
and David Over provoked me to make my own contributions to dual-
process theory. Jonathan was one of Oxford’s reviewer’s for this
book, and went way beyond the call of duty with his review. He
provided many pages of ([Link]) extremely apt suggestions that have
been incorporated during several revisions of this book. Jonathan is a
truly generous scholar.
Oxford’s other reviewer was anonymous, but that scholar provided
many useful suggestions as well.

My editor at Oxford University Press, Catharine Carlin, is thanked for

her enthusiasm for the project and for her patience in waiting for me
to bring it to completion. Several conferences were seminal in
allowing me to discuss these ideas at length: the Fourth International
Thinking Conference in Durham, England; the Conference on Dual-
Process Theories of Reasoning and Rationality in Cambridge, England,
organized by Jonathan Evans and Keith Frankish; a workshop on dual-
process theory at the University of Virginia organized by Tim Wilson
and Jonathan Evans; the Sixth International Thinking Conference in
Venice, Italy; and the NSF
Workshop on Higher Cognition in Adolescents and Young Adults
organized by Valerie Reyna.

My empirical research on some of the issues discussed in this

volume was made possible by support received from the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and by the
Canada Research Chairs program. Many members of the
Stanovich/West/Toplak lab (a joint lab linking the University of Toronto,
James Madison University, and York University) in the past decade
have contributed in some way to the research of our own that is
cited in this volume. Lab members, past and present, thanked for
their participation are Maria Grunewald, Caroline Ho, Carol Kelley,
Judi Kokis, Eleanor Liu, Robyn Macpherson, Sarah Mannino, Kimberly
Marsh, Russ Meserve, Laura Page, George Potworowski, Walter Sá,
and Geoff Sorge.
([Link]) Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Dual-Process Theory and the
Great Rationality Debate
Keith E. Stanovich
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter begins with a discussion of Great Rationality Debate
in cognitive science—the debate about how much irrationality to
attribute to human cognition—detailing the contrasting positions
of the Panglossians and Meliorists. It then discusses individual
differences in the Great Rationality Debate, dual process theory,
and the features of Type 1 and Type 2 processing. It argues that
the statistical distributions of the types of goals being pursued by
Type 1 and Type 2 processing are different and that important
consequences for human self-fulfillment follow from this fact. An
overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Keywords: rationality, human cognition, irrationality, Panglossians, Meliorists,
dual process theory, Type 1 processing, Type 2 processing, self-fulfillment

The term rationality has a strong and a weak sense. The strong
sense of the term is the one used in cognitive science and it
will be the one used throughout this book. However, a weaker
sense of the term has sometimes influenced—and hence
confused—arguments in the so-called “Great Rationality Debate”
in cognitive science. The influence of the weak sense of the term
has also impeded investigation into individual differences in
rational thought which, as I hope to show in this book, has
important implications for arguments in the Great Rationality
Debate.
Dictionary definitions of rationality tend to be of the weak sort—
often seeming quite lame and unspecific (“the state or quality of
being in accord with reason”). The meaning of rationality in
modern cognitive science (the strong sense) is, in contrast, much
more specific and prescriptive than this. The weak definitions of
rationality derive from a
categorical notion of rationality tracing to Aristotle (man as the
rational animal). As de Sousa (2007) has noted, such a notion of
rationality as “based on reason” has as its opposite not
irrationality but arationality. Aristotle’s characterization is
categorical—the behavior of entities is either based on thought
or it is not. Animals are either rational or arational.

In its stronger sense (the sense employed in cognitive science

and in this book), rational thought is a normative notion. Its
opposite is irrationality, and irrationality comes in degrees.
Normative models of optimal judgment and decision making
define perfect rationality in the noncategorical view employed in
cognitive science. Rationality (and irrationality) come in degrees
defined by the distance of the thought or behavior from the
optimum defined by a normative model. de Sousa (2007) points
out that the notion of rationality in Aristotle’s sense cannot be
normative. Other animals may be arational, but only humans can
be irrational. As de Sousa (2007) puts it, “if human beings can
indeed be described as rational animals, it is precisely in virtue of
the fact that (p.4) humans, of all the animals, are the only ones
capable of irrational thoughts and actions” (p. 7).
Hurley and Nudds (2006) make a similar point when they argue
that, for a strong sense of the term:

“ironically, rationality requires the possibility that the

animal might err. It can’t be automatically right, no matter
what it does…. when we say that an agent has acted
rationally, we imply that it would have been a mistake in
some sense to have acted in certain different ways. It can’t
be the case that anything the agent might do would count
as rational. This is normativity in a quite weak sense.” (p. 2)
The weak sense they are referring to is an Aristotelian
(categorical) sense, and no cognitive scientist is using rationality
in this sense when claiming that an experiment has
demonstrated human irrationality.

When a cognitive scientist terms a behavior irrational he/she

means that the behavior departs from the optimum prescribed
by a particular normative model. The scientist is not implying
that no thought or reason was behind the behavior. Some of the
hostility that has been engendered by experimental claims of
human irrationality no doubt derive from an influence (perhaps
tacit) of the Aristotelian view—the thought that
cognitive psychologists are saying that certain people are
somehow less than human when they are said to behave
irrationally. Nothing could be further from the case. All cognitive
psychologists accept the de Sousa (2007) view that “man the
rational animal” deserves Aristotle’s appellation and its corollary
that humans are the only animal that can potentially display
irrationality.

Some of the heat in the Great Rationality Debate is no doubt

caused by reactions to the term irrationality being applied to
humans. As mentioned, lingering associations with the
Aristotelian categorical view make charges of irrationality sound
more cutting than they actually are. In the literature, we could
do better to signal that it is the noncategorical, continuous sense
of rationality and irrationality that is employed in cognitive
science. When we find a behavioral pattern that is less than
optimally rational, we could easily say that it is “less than
perfectly rational,” rather than that it is irrational—with no loss
of meaning.
Perhaps if this had been the habit in the literature, the rationality
debate in cognitive science would not have become so heated.
For this reason, I will use the (p.5) term irrationality sparingly
(except for the descriptions of the Great Rationality Debate in
this chapter and in Chapter 8) and instead refer more often to
continuous variation in rational thought. Such an emphasis also
highlights the theme of the volume—that there are indeed
individual differences in rational thought and that understanding
the nature of these differences might have important theoretical
implications.
It should also be noted that in the view of rationality taken in this
volume, rationality is a personal entity and not a subpersonal
one (Bermudez, 2001; Davies, 2000; Frankish, 2009). A memory
system in the human brain is not rational or irrational—it is
merely efficient or inefficient (or of high or low capacity). Thus,
subprocesses of the brain do not display rational or irrational
properties per se, although they may contribute in one way or
another to personal decisions or beliefs that could be
characterized as such. Rationality concerns the actions of an
entity in its environment that serve its goals. Of course, one
could extrapolate the notion of environment to include the
interior of the brain itself and then talk of a submodule that
chose strategies rationally or not. This move creates two
problems. First, what are the goals of this subpersonal entity—
what are its interests that its rationality is trying to serve? This is
unclear in the case of a subpersonal entity. Second, such a move
regresses all the way down. We would need to talk of a neuron
firing
being either rational or irrational (“turtles all the way down!”) 1.
As Oaksford and Chater (1998) put it, “the fact that a model is
optimizing something does not mean that the model is a rational
model. Optimality is not the same as rationality…. Stomachs
may be well or poorly adapted to their function (digestion), but
they have no beliefs, desires or knowledge, and hence the
question of their rationality does not arise” (p. 4, 5).

(p.6) The Great Rationality Debate

Cognitive scientists recognize two types of rationality: epistemic
and instrumental. Epistemic rationality concerns how well beliefs
map onto the actual structure of the world. It is sometimes
called theoretical rationality or evidential rationality (see Audi,
1993, 2001; Foley, 1987; Harman, 1995; Manktelow, 2004;
Over, 2004).

The simplest definition of instrumental rationality is: Behaving in

the world so that you get exactly what you most want, given the
resources (physical and mental) available to you. Somewhat
more technically, we could characterize instrumental rationality
as the optimization of the individual’s goal fulfillment.
Economists and cognitive scientists have refined the notion of
optimization of goal fulfillment into the technical notion of
expected utility. The model of rational judgment used by
decision scientists is one in which a person chooses options
based on which option has the largest expected utility (see
Baron, 2008; Dawes, 1998; Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Wu, Zhang, &
Gonzalez, 2004). One of the fundamental advances in the
history of modern decision science was the demonstration that if
people’s preferences follow certain patterns (the so-called
“axioms of choice”—things like transitivity and freedom from
certain kinds of context effects), then they are behaving as if
they are maximizing utility—they are acting to get what they
most want (Edwards, 1954; Jeffrey, 1983; Luce & Raiffa, 1957;
Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). This is what
makes people’s degrees of rationality measurable by the
experimental methods of cognitive science. Although it is
difficult to assess utility directly, it is much easier to assess
whether one of the axioms of rational choice is being violated.
This is why the seminal heuristics and biases research program
inaugurated by Kahneman and Tversky has focused on the
causes of thinking errors.

As will be apparent in the remainder of this book, rationality has

multiple components. It is hard to measure the optimal
functioning of all these
components—that is, to specify whether “perfect” rationality has
been attained. Researchers have found it much easier to
measure whether a particular rational stricture is being violated
—that is, whether a person is committing a thinking error, rather
than whether their thinking is as good as it can be. This is much
like our judgments at a sporting event, where, for example, it
might be difficult to discern whether a (p.7) quarterback has put
the ball perfectly on the money, but it is not at all difficult to
detect a bad throw.
In fact, in many domains of life this is often the case as well. It is
often difficult to specify what the best type of performance might
be, but performance errors are much easier to spot. Essayist Neil
Postman (1988) has argued, for example, that educators and
other advocates of good thinking might adopt a stance more
similar to that of physicians or attorneys. He points out that
doctors would find it hard to define “perfect health,” but despite
this, they are quite good at spotting disease. Likewise, lawyers
are much better at spotting injustice and lack of citizenship than
defining “perfect justice” or ideal citizenship. Postman argues
that like physicians and attorneys, educators might best focus on
instances of poor thinking that are much easier to identify as
opposed to trying to define ideal thinking. The literature on the
psychology of rationality has followed this logic in that the
empirical literature has focused on identifying thinking errors,
just as physicians focus on disease. Degrees of rationality can be
assessed in terms of the number and severity of such cognitive
biases that individuals display. Failure to display a cognitive bias
becomes a measure of rational thought.
A substantial research literature—one comprising literally
hundreds of empirical studies conducted over several decades—
has firmly established that people’s responses sometimes
deviate from the performance considered normative on many
reasoning tasks. For example, people assess probabilities
incorrectly, they test hypotheses inefficiently, they violate the
axioms of utility theory, they do not properly calibrate degrees of
belief, their choices are affected by irrelevant context, they
ignore the alternative hypothesis when evaluating data, and they
display numerous other information processing biases (Baron,
2008, Evans, 2007a; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Demonstrating
that descriptive accounts of human behavior diverged from
normative models was a main theme of the heuristics and biases
research program inaugurated by Kahneman and Tversky in the
early 1970s (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). The term heuristics refers to why people often
make
errors in choosing actions and in estimating probabilities—
because they use mental shortcuts (heuristics) to solve many
problems.

Researchers working in the heuristics and biases tradition tend

to be so-called Meliorists (Stanovich, 1999, 2004). They
assume that human (p.8) reasoning is not as good as it could be,
and that thinking could be
improved. The dictionary definition of meliorism is “the doctrine
that the world tends to become better or may be made better by
human effort.” Thus, a Meliorist is one who feels that education
and the provision of information could help make people more
rational—could help them more efficiently further their goals and
bring their beliefs more in line with the actual state of the world2.
Stated this way, Meliorism seems to be an optimistic doctrine,
and in one sense it is. But this optimistic part of the Meliorist
message derives from the fact that Meliorists see a large gap
between normative models of rational responding and descriptive
models of what people actually do. Emphasizing the gap, of
course, entails that Meliorists will be attributing a good deal of
irrationality to human cognition.

Over the last two decades, an alternative interpretation of the

findings from the heuristics and biases research program has
been championed. Contributing to this alternative interpretation
have been evolutionary psychologists, adaptationist modelers,
and ecological theorists (Anderson, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby,
1996; Gigerenzer, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Todd &
Gigerenzer, 2000). They have reinterpreted the modal response
in most of the classic heuristics and biases experiments as
indicating an optimal information processing adaptation on the
part of the subjects. These investigators have argued that the
research in the heuristics and biases tradition has not
demonstrated human irrationality at all. This group of theorists—
who argue that an assumption of maximal (p.9) human rationality
is the proper default position to take—have been termed the
Panglossians. This position posits no difference between
descriptive and normative models of performance because
human performance is actually normative.
But how could a Panglossian position be maintained in light of
the findings mentioned previously—particularly the many
demonstrations that human performance deviates from
normative models of rationality? The Panglossian theorists have
several responses to this question, but two predominate. First,
they argue that the normative model being applied is not
appropriate because the subject’s interpretation of the task is
different from what the researcher assumes it is. Second, they
argue
that the modal response in the task makes perfect sense
from an evolutionary perspective.

The contrasting positions of the Panglossians and Meliorists

define the differing poles in what has been termed the Great
Rationality Debate in cognitive science—the debate about how
much irrationality to attribute to human cognition3. Tetlock and
Mellers (2002) have noted that “the debate over human
rationality is a high-stakes controversy that mixes primordial
political and psychological prejudices in combustible
combinations” (p. 97). The great debate about human rationality
is a “high-stakes controversy” because it involves nothing less
than the models of human nature that underlie economics, moral
philosophy, and the personal theories (folk theories) we use to
understand the behavior of other humans. For example, a very
influential part of the Panglossian camp is represented by the
mainstream of the discipline of economics that is notable for
using strong rationality assumptions as fundamental tools.
The difference between the Panglossian and the Meliorist was
captured colloquially in an article in The Economist magazine
(February 14, 1998), where a subheading asked “Economists
Make Sense of the World (p.10) by Assuming that People Know
What they Want. Advertisers Assume that They Do Not. Who Is
Right?” The Meliorist thinks that the advertisers are right—people
often do not know what they want and can be influenced so as to
maximize the advertiser’s profits rather than their own personal
utility. A Panglossian view of perfect rationality in the
marketplace would need to defend the view that people take
only from advertising what optimizes their consumption utility. In
contrast, the Meliorist does not assume that consumers will
process the advertiser’s information in a way that optimizes
things for the consumer (as opposed to the advertiser).
Thus, Meliorists are much more sympathetic to government
attempts to regulate advertising because, in the Meliorist view,
such regulation can act to increase the utility of the total
population. This is just one example of how the Great Rationality
Debate has profound political implications.

A reconciliation of the views of the Panglossians and Meliorists

is possible, however, if we take two scientific steps. First, we
must consider data patterns long ignored in the heuristics and
biases literature
—individual differences on rational thinking tasks. Second, we
must understand the empirical patterns obtained through the
lens of a modified and updated dual-process theory. A concern
for individual differences has also led me to posit a substantial
modification of
dual-process theory and to emphasize a tripartite model of mind.
Together, an updated dual-process theory and individual
difference analyses provide a way to reconcile the warring camps
in the Great Rational Debate in cognitive science.

Individual Differences in the Great Rationality Debate

Panglossians and Meliorists often argue about the appropriate
normative model to apply to a particular task. Interestingly, these
disputes sometimes rely on empirical outcomes, although this
reliance on empirical data is rarely noticed because it is often
implicit. For example, Panglossian theorists use data patterns to
justify their critiques, but they rely exclusively on the modal
response. Some Panglossians argue that because the descriptive
is simply indexed to the normative, the latter can simply be “read
off” from a competence model of the former (Cohen, 1982, terms
(p.11) this the Norm Extraction Method). For example, Stein (1996)
noted that this seems to follow from the Panglossian view that
“whatever human reasoning competence turns out to be, the
principles embodied in it are the normative principles of
reasoning…. This argument sees the reasoning experiments as
revealing human reasoning competence, and, thereby, as also
revealing the norms” (p. 231).
Panglossians taking this stance view the response that most
people make (the modal response) also as the normative
response.

Stein (1996) notes that this type of Panglossian position “rejects

the standard picture of rationality and takes the reasoning
experiments as giving insight not just into human reasoning
competence but also into the normative principles of
reasoning…. The norms just are what we have in our reasoning
competence; if the (actual) norms do not match our
preconceived notion of what the norms should be, so much the
worse for our reconceived notions.” (pp. 233–234). Stein (1996,
p. 239) terms an extreme form of this strategy—that of
explaining away all normative/descriptive gaps in terms of
incorrect norm application—the “reject-the-norm strategy.”
Notably, this strategy is used exclusively by the Panglossian
camp in the rationality debate, although this connection is not a
necessary one.
Specifically, the reject-the-norm strategy is exclusively used to
eliminate gaps between descriptive models of performance and
normative models. When this type of critique is employed, the
normative model that is suggested as a substitute for the
normative model is one that coincides
perfectly with the descriptive model of the subjects’ performance
—thus preserving a view of human rationality as ideal. It is rarely
noted that the strategy could be used in just the opposite way—
to create gaps between the normative and descriptive. Situations
where the modal response coincides with the standard normative
model could be critiqued, and alternative normative models could
be suggested that would result in a new normative/descriptive
gap. But this is never done. The Panglossian camp, often highly
critical of empirical psychologists (“Kahneman and Tversky …
and not their experimental subjects, commit the fallacies” Levi,
1983, p. 502), is never critical of psychologists who design
reasoning tasks in instances where the modal subject gives the
response the experimenters deem correct. Ironically, in these
cases, according to the Panglossians, the same psychologists
seem never to err in their task designs and interpretations.
(p.12) It is quite clear that Cohen’s (1979, 1981, 1986) trenchant
criticisms of experimental psychologists would never have been
written had human performance coincided with the standard
normative models that the psychologists were using. The fact
that the use of the reject-the-norm strategy is entirely contingent
on the existence or nonexistence of a normative/descriptive gap
suggests that the strategy is empirically, not conceptually,
triggered (norms are never rejected for purely conceptual
reasons when they coincide with the modal human response).
This means that in an important sense, the norms being
endorsed by the Panglossian camp are conditioned (if not
indexed entirely) by descriptive facts about human behavior.
Gigerenzer (1991) is clear about his adherence to an empirically
driven reject-the-norm strategy:
“Since its origins in the mid-seventeenth century…. When
there was a striking discrepancy between the judgment of
reasonable men and what probability theory dictated—as
with the famous St.
Petersburg paradox—then the mathematicians went back
to the blackboard and changed the equations (Daston,
1980). Those good old days have gone…. If, in studies on
social cognition, researchers find a discrepancy between
human judgment and what probability theory seems to
dictate, the blame is now put on the human mind, not the
statistical model.” (p. 109)

That Gigerenzer and Cohen concur here—even though they have

somewhat different positions on normative justification—simply
shows how widespread is the acceptance of the principle that
descriptive facts about human behavior should condition our
notions about the
appropriateness of the normative models used to evaluate behavior.

Interestingly, the descriptive component of performance around

which Panglossian theorists almost always build their
competence models (which, recall, index the normative in their
view) is the central tendency of the responses (usually the mean
or modal performance tendency). But if we are going to “read
off” the normative from the descriptive in this way, why is this
the only aspect of group performance that is relevant? Do the
pattern of responses around the mode tell us anything? What
about the rich covariance patterns that would be present in any
multivariate experiment? Are these totally superfluous—all norm-
relevant behavioral information residing in the mode? My
research group (p.13) (Stanovich & West, 1999, 2000) has argued
in several papers that if something about the normative must be
inferred from the descriptive, then there is more information
available than has traditionally been relied upon.
How should we interpret situations where the majority of
individuals respond in ways that depart from the normative
model applied to the problem by reasoning experts? Thagard
(1982) calls the two different interpretations the populist
strategy and the elitist strategy: “The populist strategy, favored
by Cohen (1981), is to emphasize the reflective equilibrium of
the average person…. The elitist strategy, favored by Stich and
Nisbett (1980), is to emphasize the reflective equilibrium of
experts.” (p. 39) Thus, Thagard (1982) identifies the populist
strategy with the Panglossian position and the elitist strategy
with the Meliorist position.
But there are few controversial tasks in the heuristics and
biases literature where all untutored laypersons disagree with
the experts. There are always some who agree. Thus, the issue is
not the untutored average person versus experts (as suggested
by Thagard’s formulation), but experts plus some laypersons
versus other untutored individuals. What has largely been
ignored is that although the average person in the classic
heuristics and biases experiments might well display an
overconfidence effect, underutilize base rates, ignore P(D/∼H),
violate the axioms of utility theory, choose P and Q in the
selection task, commit the conjunction fallacy, and so forth, on
each of these tasks, some people give the standard normative
response. For example, in knowledge calibration studies,
although the mean performance level of the entire sample may
be represented by a calibration curve that indicates
overconfidence, some people do display near perfect calibration.
Likewise, in probabilistic assessment, although the majority of
subjects might well ignore the noncausal baserate evidence, a
minority of subjects
often makes use of this information in exactly the way
prescribed by Bayes’ theorem. A few people even respond
correctly on the notoriously difficult abstract selection task
(Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993; Stanovich & West, 1998a,
2008b).

In short, some people give the response traditionally

considered normative, and others do not. There is variability in
responding on all of these tasks. So it is incorrect to say that a
specific experiment shows that people, in general, display a
particular irrational thought pattern or response pattern. The
experiment might instead be said to show that the (p.14) average
person, or perhaps the modal person, displays suboptimal
thinking. Other people, often a minority to be sure, do not. Might
anything be learned from this variability?
One aspect of this variability that researchers have examined
is whether it is correlated at all with cognitive sophistication. The
question has been: Do people who display more complex
cognition tend to give the response traditionally considered
normative? Or, alternatively: Do people who display more
complex cognition tend to give the modal response—the
response that is justified by the alternative interpretations of
these tasks favored by the Panglossians? We might take the
direction of this association as a validation of the alternative
normative models of either the Panglossian or the Meliorist.
Stanovich and West (1999) termed this the
understanding/acceptance assumption—that those who more fully
understand the normative issues at stake are more likely to
accept the correct normative model4. In short, the point is that
more reflective and engaged reasoners are more likely to affirm
the appropriate normative model for a particular situation.
From an individual differences standpoint, more sophisticated
reasoners tend to be more reflective and engaged reasoners.
Individual differences in cognitive sophistication have been
indexed in three different ways in the research literature—
developmentally, by intelligence, and by cognitive style.
Developmentally, it is straightforward to assume that
adolescents are more cognitively sophisticated than young
children and that, (p.15) in turn, adults are more cognitively
advanced than adolescents. The question then becomes whether
cognitive developmental level, as indexed by age, is correlated
with performance on rational thinking tasks. In contrast, for a
group of subjects of the same age, the natural index of cognitive
ability is intelligence test performance. The question then
becomes whether cognitive developmental level, as indexed by
intelligence, is correlated with performance on rational
thinking tasks. Intelligence, however, is not an exhaustive
measure of cognitive functioning. For one thing, intelligence
tests fail to tap important metacognitive strategies and cognitive
styles that are critical components of what has been termed the
reflective mind (see Chapter 2 and Stanovich, 2009a, 2009b;
Sternberg, 2003). These components of cognition travel under a
variety of names in psychology; thinking dispositions or
cognitive styles are the two most popular, and I will use the
former here. These are the third measure of cognitive
sophistication that has been employed in this literature.
What do the data say about these relationships—about the
correlations between performance on rational thinking tasks and
age, intelligence, and thinking dispositions? The data on
intelligence are most extensive, and this has been the individual
differences variable employed in most of the work in my own lab.
Intelligence displays positive correlations with rational thinking
on a variety of heuristics and biases tasks, but not all (Stanovich
& West, 1998c, 2000, 2008b; West & Stanovich, 2003; West et
al., 2008). On some tasks, there is no correlation. However, there
is never a negative correlation—that is, it is never the case that
subjects giving the non-normative response that is defended by
the Panglossians are higher in intelligence than those giving the
normative response5. (p.16) The two sides of the great debate
about human rationality can be reconciled if these findings are
set within the context of dual-process theory.

Dual-Process Theory: The Current State of Play

The idea that the brain is composed of many different
subsystems (see Aunger & Curtis, 2008) has recurred in
conceptualizations in many different disciplines—from the society
of minds view in artificial intelligence (Minsky, 1985); to Freudian
analogies (Ainslie, 1982); to discussions of the concept of
multiple selves in philosophy, economics, and decision science
(Ainslie, 2001; Schelling, 1984). In fact, the notion of many
different systems in the brain is by no means new. Plato (1945)
argued: “we may call that part of the soul whereby it reflects,
rational; and the other, with which it feels hunger and thirst and
is distracted by sexual passion and all the other desires, we will
call irrational appetite, associated with pleasure in the
replenishment of certain wants” (p. 137).
What is new, however, is that cognitive scientists are beginning
to understand the biology and cognitive structure of these
systems (Evans & Frankish, 2009) and are beginning to posit
some testable speculations
about their evolutionary and experiential origins. I will build
on the current consensus that the functioning of the brain can
be characterized by two different types of cognition having
somewhat different functions and different strengths and
weaknesses. There is a wide variety of evidence6 that has
converged on the conclusion that some type of (p.17) dual-
process notion is needed in a diverse set of specialty areas
not limited to: cognitive psychology, social psychology,
neuropsychology, naturalistic philosophy, decision theory, and
clinical psychology.
Evolutionary theorizing and neurophysiological work also have
supported a dual-process conception. In fact, a dual-process view
was implicit within the early writings in the groundbreaking
heuristics and biases research program7. As Kahneman (2000)
notes, “Tversky and I always thought of the heuristics and biases
approach as a two-process theory” (p. 682).

Table 1–1 illustrates how ubiquitous dual-process models are

in psychology and related fields by listing a variety of such
theories that have appeared during the last couple of decades.
Table 1–1 also lists some common terms for the dual processes.
The details and terminology of the various dual-process
theories differ, but they all share a family resemblance. My
purpose here is not to adjudicate the differences among the
models. Instead, I will gloss over differences and instead start
with a model that emphasizes the family resemblances.
The family resemblances extend to the names for the two
classes of process. The terms heuristic and analytic are two of
the oldest and most popular (see Evans, 1984, 1989). However,
to attenuate the proliferation
(p.18)

Table 1.1 Some Alternative Terms for Type 1 and Type 2

Processing Used by Various Theorists

Theorist Type 1 Type 2

Bargh & Chartrand automati conscious
(1999) c processin
processin g
g
Bazerman, want self should self
Tenbrunsel, & Wade-
Benzoni, (1998)
Bickerton (1995) online thinking offline thinking

Brainerd & Reyna gist processing analytic

(2001) processing
Theorist Type 1 Type 2
Chaiken et al. (1989) heuristic systemati
processin c
g processin
g
Evans (1984, 1989) heuristic analytic
processin processing
g
Evans & Over (1996) tacit thought explicit thought
processes processes

Evans & Wason (1976; type 1 processes type 2 processes

Wason & Evans, 1975)

Fodor (1983) modular central processes

processes
Gawronski & associative propositional
Bodenhausen
(2006) processes processes
Haidt (2001) intuitive system reasoning system

Johnson-Laird (1983) implicit explicit

inferences inferences
Kahneman & Frederick intuition reasoning
(2002, 2005)

Lieberman (2003) reflexive system reflective system

Loewenstein (1996) visceral factors tastes

Metcalfe & Mischel hot system cool system

(1999)
Norman & Shallice contention supervisory
(1986) scheduling attentional
system
Pollock (1991) quick & inflexible intellection
modules

Posner & Snyder (1975) automati conscious

c processin
activatio g
n
Reber (1993) implicit cognition explicit learning

Shiffrin & Schneider automati controlle

(1977) c d
processin processin
g g
Sloman (1996) associative rule-based system
system
Smith & DeCoster (2000) associative rule-
processing based
processin
g
Strack & Deutsch (2004) impulsive system reflective system
 Theorist Type 1 Type 2
Thaler & Shefrin doer planner
(1981)
Toates (2006) stimulus-bound higher order

Wilson (2002) adaptive conscious

unconscious

of nearly identical theories, I suggested the more generic terms

System 1 and System 2 in a previous book (Stanovich, 1999).
Although these terms have become popular, there is an
infelicitousness to the System 1/System 2 terminology. Such
terminology seems to connote that the two processes in dual-
process theory map explicitly to two distinct brain systems. (p.19)
This is a stronger assumption than most theorists wish to make.
Additionally, both Evans (2006b) and Stanovich (2004) have discussed
how terms such as System 1 or heuristic system are really
misnomers because they imply that what is being referred to is a
singular system. In actuality, the term used should be plural
because it refers to a set of systems in the brain that operate
autonomously in response to their own triggering stimuli and are
not under higher-level cognitive control. I have suggested (Stanovich,
2004) the acronym TASS (The Autonomous Set of Systems) to
describe what is in actuality a heterogeneous set.
Using the acronym TASS was a step forward in clearing up some
of the confusions surrounding autonomous processes. For similar
reasons, Evans (2008, 2009; see also Samuels, 2009) has
suggested a terminology of Type 1 processing versus Type 2
processing to mark autonomous versus nonautonomous
processing. The Type 1 terminology signals that autonomous
processing might result from the operations of a variety of
different subsystems. The Type 1/Type 2 terminology captures
better than previous terminology that a dual-process theory is
not necessarily a
dual-system theory (see Evans, 2008, 2009, for an extensive
discussion). For these reasons, I will rely most heavily on the
Type 1/Type 2 terminology in this volume. An even earlier
terminology resulting from Evans (1984, 1989)—heuristic
versus analytic processing—will also be employed on
occasions when it is felicitous.

Properties of Type 1 and Type 2 Processing

In my view, the defining feature of Type 1 processing is its
autonomy—the execution of Type 1 processes is mandatory
when their triggering stimuli are encountered, and they do not
depend on input from high-level control systems. Autonomous
processes have other correlated
features—their execution is rapid, they do not put a heavy load
on central processing capacity, they tend to operate in parallel
without interfering with themselves or with Type 2 processing—
but these other correlated features are not defining. Autonomous
processes would include behavioral regulation by the emotions;
the encapsulated modules for solving specific adaptive problems
that have been posited by evolutionary psychologists; processes
of implicit learning; and the automatic (p.20) firing of overlearned
associations. Type 1 processes conjoin the properties of
automaticity, quasi-modularity, and heuristic processing, as
these constructs have been variously discussed in cognitive
science8.

It is important to emphasize that Type 1 processing is not limited

to modular subprocesses that meet all of the classic Fodorian
(1983) criteria. Type 1 processing encompasses processes of
unconscious implicit learning and conditioning. Also, many rules,
stimulus discriminations, and decision-making principles that
have been practiced to automaticity (e.g., Kahneman & Klein,
2009; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) are processed in a Type 1
manner. This learned information can sometimes be just as much
a threat to rational behavior as are evolutionary modules that fire
inappropriately in a modern environment. Rules learned to
automaticity can be overgeneralized—they can autonomously
trigger behavior when the situation is an exception to the class of
events they are meant to cover (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Hsee &
Hastie, 2006).
Type 2 processing is nonautonomous. Type 2 processing
contrasts with Type 1 processing on each of the correlated
properties that define the latter. It is relatively slow and
computationally expensive. Many Type 1 processes can operate
at once in parallel, but Type 2 processing is largely serial. Type 2
processing is often language-based, but it is not necessarily so.
One of the most critical functions of Type 2 processing is to
override Type 1 processing. This is sometimes necessary
because autonomous processing has heuristic qualities. It is
designed to get the response into the right ballpark when solving
a problem or making a decision, but it is not designed for the
type of fine-grained analysis called for in situations of unusual
importance (financial decisions, fairness judgments, employment
decisions, legal judgments, etc.). Heuristics depend on
(p.21) benign environments. In hostile environments, they can be
costly (see Hilton, 2003; Over, 2000; Stanovich, 2004, 2009b). A
benign environment means one that contains useful (i.e.,
diagnostic) cues that can be exploited by various heuristics (e.g.,
affect-triggering cues, vivid and salient stimulus components,
convenient anchors). Additionally, for
an environment to be classified as benign, it also must contain no
other individuals who will adjust their behavior to exploit those
relying only on heuristics. In contrast, a hostile environment for
heuristics is one in which there are few cues that are usable by
heuristic processes or there are misleading cues (Kahneman &
Klein, 2009). Another way that an environment can turn hostile
for a heuristic processor is if other agents discern the simple cues
being used and the other agents start to arrange the cues for
their own advantage (e.g., advertisements, or the deliberate
design of supermarket floorspace to maximize revenue).
All of the different kinds of Type 1 processing (processes of
emotional regulation, Darwinian modules, associative and
implicit learning processes) can produce responses that are
irrational in a particular context if not overridden. For example,
often humans act as cognitive misers (see Stanovich, 2009b) by
engaging in attribute substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002)
—the substitution of an easy-to-evaluate characteristic for a
harder one, even if the easier one is less accurate. For example,
the cognitive miser will substitute the less effortful attributes of
vividness or affect for the more effortful retrieval of relevant
facts (Kahneman, 2003; Li & Chapman, 2009; Slovic & Peters,
2006; Wang, 2009). But when we are evaluating important
risks—such as the risk of certain activities and environments for
our children—we do not want to substitute vividness for careful
thought about the situation. In such situations, we want to
employ Type 2 override processing to block the attribute
substitution of the cognitive miser.
To override Type 1 processing, Type 2 processing must display at
least two related capabilities. One is the capability of
interrupting Type 1 processing and suppressing its response
tendencies. Type 2 processing thus involves inhibitory
mechanisms of the type that have been the focus of work on
executive functioning (Aron, 2008; Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009;
Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007; Miyake et al., 2000; Zelazo,
2004). But the ability to suppress Type 1 processing gets the
job only half done.
Suppressing one response is not helpful unless there is a better response
(p.22) available to substitute for it. Where do these better
responses come from? One answer is that they come from
processes of hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation that
are a unique aspect of Type 2 processing. When we reason
hypothetically, we create temporary models of the world and test
out actions (or alternative causes) in that simulated world.
However, to reason hypothetically, we must have one critical
cognitive capability—we must be able to prevent our
representations of
the real world from becoming confused with representations of
imaginary situations. The so-called “cognitive decoupling
operations” that make this possible have implications for how we
conceptualize both intelligence and rationality, and they will be
the focus of several chapters of this book.

Dual-Process Theory and Human Goals:

Implications for the Rationality Debate
The findings on individual differences that I discussed briefly
above can be used to reconcile the positions in the Great
Rationality Debate. My proposal (see Stanovich, 2004), is that
the statistical distributions of the types of goals being pursued
by Type 1 and Type 2 processing are different and that
important consequences for human self-fulfillment follow from
this fact. The greater evolutionary age of some of the
mechanisms underlying Type 1 processing accounts for why it
more closely tracks ancient evolutionary goals (i.e., the genes’
goals), whereas Type 2 processing instantiates a more flexible
goal hierarchy that is oriented toward maximizing overall goal
satisfaction at the level of the whole organism9. (p.23) Because
Type 2 processing is more attuned to the person’s needs as a
coherent organism than is Type processing 1, in the minority of
cases where the outputs of the two systems conflict, people will
often be better served by executing a system override of the
Type 1-triggered output (the full argument is contained in
Stanovich, 2004).
From within this framework, I have previously criticized some
work in evolutionary psychology and adaptive modeling for
implicitly undervaluing instrumental rationality by defending
nonnormative responses made by many subjects in reasoning
experiments. Many such instances occur when there is a conflict
between the responses primed by Type 1 and Type 2 processing
and the former dominates. Such situations are interpreted within
the framework I have outlined as reflecting conflicts between
two different types of optimization—fitness maximization at the
subpersonal genetic level and utility maximization at the
personal level. Evolutionarily adaptive behavior is not the same
as rational behavior. Evolutionary psychologists obscure this by
sometimes implying that if a behavior is adaptive, then it is
rational. Such a conflation represents a fundamental error of
much import for human affairs. Definitions of rationality must be
kept consistent with the entity
whose optimization is at issue. To maintain this consistency, the
different “interests” of the replicators and the vehicle must be
explicitly recognized (Dawkins, 1976/1989; Dennett, 1995).

A failure to differentiate these interests is at the heart of the

disputes between researchers working in the heuristics and
biases tradition and their critics in the evolutionary psychology
camp. In several much-cited papers, the empirical
demonstrations of a gap between descriptive and normative
models of reasoning have been reinterpreted by various
evolutionary psychologists, adaptationist modelers, and
ecological theorists10. These theorists have reinterpreted the
modal response in most of the classic heuristics and biases
experiments as indicating an optimal (p.24) information
processing adaptation on the part of the subjects. In the
extreme, these investigators have argued that the research in
the heuristics and biases tradition has not demonstrated any
human irrationality at all.

First, it certainly must be said that the evolutionary

psychologists are on to something with respect to the tasks they
have analyzed, because in each case the adaptive response is
the modal response in the task—the one most subjects give.
However, work from my research lab has been triangulating a
data pattern relevant to this discussion—an analysis of
patterns of covariation and individual differences across these
tasks. We have found, as I discussed previously, a very
interesting data pattern that holds across many tasks in this
dispute: cognitive ability often (but not always) dissociates
from the response deemed adaptive on an evolutionary
analysis. For example, it is to the credit of the Oaksford and
Chater (1994) model of optimal data selection that it predicts the
modal PQ response in the Wason four-card selection task. But
we are left with the seemingly puzzling finding (see Stanovich &
West, 1998a, 1998c, 2008b; West et al., 2008) that the response
deemed optimal under such an analysis (P and Q) is given by
subjects of lower general intelligence than the minority giving
the response originally deemed correct by Peter Wason (i.e., P
and not Q).
A similar puzzle surrounds findings on the Linda conjunction
problem, covariation detection paradigm, probability learning
paradigm, and belief bias effect in argument evaluation
tasks11. We have found the same pattern in all of these tasks
—the response that is consistent with many evolutionary
analyses (optimal foraging and so forth) is the modal response,
but the most cognitively able subjects give the response that has
traditionally been considered instrumentally rational. Thus, there
are
two basic patterns that must be reconciled—the modal pattern
and the pattern of individual differences—and I have argued that
dual-process theories do this if it is assumed that individuals of
higher cognitive ability have a higher probability of successfully
overriding the Type 1 response. (p.25) In the model to be
presented in this book, I will explain why this is the case.

The evolutionary psychologists are probably correct that most

Type 1 processing is evolutionarily adaptive. Nevertheless,
their evolutionary interpretations do not impeach the position
of the heuristics and biases researchers that the alternative
response given by the minority of subjects is rational at the
level of the individual. Subjects of higher analytic intelligence
are simply more prone to override Type 1 processing and to use
Type 2 processing to produce responses that are epistemically
and instrumentally rational. This rapprochement between the
two camps that my colleague Richard West and I have
championed in several papers (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000) has
also been advocated in several articles by Samuels and Stich
(Samuels & Stich, 2004; Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2002;
Samuels, Stich, & Tremoulet, 1999), who have argued for a
similar synthesis.

The Rest of This Book: Complications in Dual-

Process Theory and Their Implications for the
Concepts of Rationality and Intelligence
Given the multifarious nature of human rationality, no one would
expect the rapprochement described above to completely end
the Great Rationality Debate. It, of course, is a tentative
synthesis conceptualized at a fairly gross level of analysis. In an
attempt to further understand the source of human rational
and irrational behavior, I will introduce several complications to
this basic dual-process model in subsequent chapters. These
complications will be driven by the need to accommodate
findings related to individual differences generated by my lab
and several others. I will end up defending a tripartite model of
mind that derives from fractionating the notion of Type 2
processing. This alteration in
dual-process theory has strong implications for how we
understand the overarching constructs of intelligence and human
rationality. My purpose is not to sketch a comprehensive theory
of the architecture of cognition (in the manner of Carruthers,
2006), but instead to focus on those aspects of a revised
tripartite theory that explicate the concept of intelligence and
that of human rationality.
(p.26) In Chapter 2 I argue that it is useful to distinguish the
algorithmic level of processing from the reflective level when
discussing Type 2 processing. Individual differences in the
former reflect the efficiency of the functional cognitive
machinery that carries out mental tasks.
Individual differences at the reflective level result from variance
in higher-level goal states and epistemic thinking dispositions.
Measures of intelligence index individual differences at the
algorithmic level.
Measures of cognitive styles and thinking dispositions index
individual differences at the reflective level. In this chapter, I
summarize empirical evidence indicating that thinking
dispositions and intelligence predict independent variance in
performance on various measures of rational thinking.

In Chapter 3, I identify the key operations of the algorithmic mind

and the reflective mind that support human rationality. The key
function of the algorithmic mind is to sustain the processing of
decoupled secondary representations. Secondary representations
are copies of primary representations that are not directly
connected to input processes or output processes. It is argued in
this chapter that measures of fluid intelligence are in part
indicating the ability to sustain such offline representations. The
ability to sustain decoupled representations is critical to human
rationality because it underlies hypothetical thinking—the
simulation activities we use to synthesize a response that is
better than the response primed by the autonomous mind. The
reflective mind, in contrast, sends out the call to begin these
types of activities—to interrupt autonomous processing and to
begin simulation activities that will result in a response better
than that computed by Type 1 autonomous mechanisms.
In Chapter 4, the full tri-process model (autonomous level,
algorithmic level, and reflective level) of the mind is fleshed out.
Fully decoupled cognitive simulation is distinguished from
another type of Type 2 cognition termed serial associative
cognition. Three different types of cognitive decoupling are also
distinguished. In the override case, decoupling involves taking
offline the connection between a primary representation and
response programming. In the second case—the case of
comprehensive simulation—decoupling involves segregating
simulated models of the world from primary representations. A
third type of decoupling involves interrupting serial associative
cognition—that is,
(p.27) decoupling from the next step in an associative sequence that
would otherwise direct thought. Chapter 5 contains speculations
on the evolutionary origins of Type 2 processing and describes
what I have termed the Master Rationality Motive and its origins.

Chapter 6 uses the tri-process model and other distinctions

introduced in the book to develop a taxonomy of rational thinking
errors that have been revealed in the heuristics and biases
literature. The taxonomy is used to classify a large number of
tasks and effects from the literature on judgment and decision
making. This chapter also stresses the importance of knowledge
bases (so-called “mindware”) in determining the rationality of
beliefs and actions. Chapter 7 contains a comprehensive review
of what is known about the connections between intelligence and
the reasoning biases related to human rationality. Overall, the
associations are surprisingly modest. There is great variability,
however. Some
well-known thinking biases are virtually independent of cognitive
ability. Others do show modest associations. Chapter 7 presents
a model of performance on heuristics and biases tasks that
explains why some tasks associate with intelligence and others
do not.

Having sketched out a model of how and when cognitive ability

associates with heuristics and biases tasks in Chapters 6 and
7, in Chapter 8 I use the model to summarize the empirical
findings on the nature of the relationship between intelligence
and rational thought. It is argued that the relative dissociation
between intelligence and rationality is consistent with the tri-
process model sketched in earlier chapters and reinforces the
usefulness of that framework. This chapter revisits the Great
Rationality Debate in cognitive science in light of the findings
on individual differences discussed in previous chapters.
Chapter 9 explores the social consequences of the modest
association between rational thinking and intelligence. It is
argued that an understanding of the implications of the modest
association helps to check the imperialism of the intelligence
concept in folk psychology.
Extant IQ tests do not measure rational thought, but instead are
good indicators (in their fluid g component) of algorithmic-level
decoupling ability. We should thus not fold rationality into the
concept of intelligence, because the most notable operational
indicators of the latter do not begin to index the former. That is
indeed the thrust of the data (p.28)
discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Simply put, those data indicate
that knowledge of a person’s intelligence does very little to
predict how they will do on measures of rational thinking.
The data presented in this book indicate that the rankings of
individuals on assessments of rational thinking would be different
from rankings on intelligence. At present, of course, there is no
IQ-type test for rationality—that is, a test of one’s RQ (rationality
quotient). In Chapter 10, we argue that it is time to start talking
about such a thing. We argue that assessing rationality more
explicitly is what is needed to draw more attention toward
rational thinking skills and to highlight the limitations of what
intelligence tests assess. In Chapter 10, we defend the
proposition that there is nothing conceptually or theoretically
preventing us from developing such a assessment device. In fact,
we know the types of thinking processes that would be assessed
in such an instrument, and we have in hand prototypes of the
kinds of tasks that would be used in the domains of both
instrumental rationality and epistemic rationality. We
demonstrate this in Chapter 10 by laying out a framework for the
assessment of rational thought complete with examples.

Notes:
(1) I am referring here to a joke that has circulated widely. A
version of it is in Steven Hawking’s A Brief History of Time
(1988). One version has philosopher William James after a lecture
on the solar system being approached by a determined elderly
lady. “We don’t live on a ball rotating around the sun,” she says.
“We live on a crust of earth on the back of a giant turtle.” James
decides to be gentle: “If your theory is correct, madam, what
does this turtle stand on?” The lady says, “The first turtle stands
on the back of a second, far larger turtle, of course.” “But what
does this second turtle stand on?” says James. The old lady
crows triumphantly. “It’s no use, Mr. James—it’s turtles all the
way down!”
(2) It is important to note that the Meliorist recognizes two
different ways in which human decision-making performance
might be improved. These might be termed cognitive change
and environmental change. First, it might be possible to teach
people better reasoning strategies and to have them learn rules
of decision making that are helpful (see Stanovich, 2009b). These
would represent instances of cognitive change. Additionally,
however, research has shown that it is possible to change the
environment so that natural human reasoning strategies will not
lead to error (Gigerenzer,2002; Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman,
2009; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). For example, choosing the right
default values for a decision would be an example of an
environmental change. In short, environmental alterations (as
well as cognitive changes) can prevent rational thinking
problems. Thus, in cases where teaching people the
correct reasoning strategies might be difficult, it may well be
easier to change the environment so that decision making errors
are less likely to occur.

(3) This debate has generated a very substantial literature of

often heated arguments (Cohen, 1981; Doherty, 2003; Edwards
& von Winterfeldt, 1986; Evans & Over, 1996; Gigerenzer,
1996; Jungermann, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983, 1996;
Koehler,1996; Koehler & James, 2009; Krueger & Funder, 2004;
Kuhberger, 2002; Lee, 2006; Samuels & Stich, 2004; Stanovich,
1999, 2004, 2010a; Stanovich & West, 2000; Stein,1996; Stich,
1990; Vranas, 2000).

(4) We derived this assumption from an argument that Slovic

and Tversky (1974) made years ago, although it was couched in
very different terms in their paper and thus was hard to discern.
Slovic and Tversky (1974) argued that descriptive facts about
argument endorsement should condition the inductive inferences
of experts regarding appropriate normative principles. In
response to the argument that there is “no valid way to
distinguish between outright rejection of the axiom and failure to
understand it” (p. 372), Slovic and Tversky observed that “the
deeper the understanding of the axiom, the greater the
readiness to accept it” (pp. 372–373). We named their argument
and turned it into an individual difference prediction (Stanovich &
West, 1999). Note that another way of framing the
understanding/acceptance principle is to view it as stressing that
a normative/descriptive gap that is disproportionately created by
subjects with a superficial understanding of the problem provides
no warrant for amending the application of standard normative
models (in the manner that the Panglossians who attack the
standard norm advise).
(5) The data on thinking dispositions largely parallels that on
intelligence. A variety of the thinking dispositions display positive
correlations with rational thinking on a variety of heuristics and
biases tasks, but not all. On some tasks, there is no correlation.
However, there is never a negative correlation—that is, it is never
the case that subjects giving the
non-normative response that is defended by the Panglossians
are higher on efficacious thinking dispositions (e.g., need for
cognition) than those giving the normative response (Bruine de
Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Klaczynski & Lavellee, 2005;
Kokis et al., 2002; Ku & Ho, 2010; LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003; Parker
& Fischhoff, 2005; Ricco, 2007; Smith & Levin, 1996; Stanovich &
West, 1999; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; West et al., 2008). The
data on developmental trends are not quite so consistent,
however (see Stanovich, Toplak, West, 2008), in part because
there are
many fewer developmental comparisons than there are studies
of intelligence or thinking dispositions. Age is correlated with the
use of causal baserates (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Kokis et al.,
2002). However, the developmental research on framing effects
is quite confusing. Some studies have failed to find a
developmental trend (Levin & Hart, 2003; Levin, Hart, Weller, &
Harshman, 2007) and others have actually found that sometimes
framing effects increase with age (Reyna & Ellis,1994). In
contrast, belief bias does attenuate with age (Kokis et al., 2002),
as does the gamblers fallacy (Klaczynski, 2000, 2001; Klaczynski
& Narasimham, 1998). Performance on the four-card selection
task improves with age (Overton, Byrnes, & O’Brien, 1985).
(6) The evidence for a dual-process view encompasses a
variety of specialty areas (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; Evans, 1984,
2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2009; Evans & Over, 1996; Evans &
Wason, 1976; Feldman Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Ferreira,
Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006; Frankish, 2004;
Haidt, 2001; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Johnson-Laird,
1983; Lieberman, 2007, 2009; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Sloman,
1996, 2002; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Smith & Decoster,2000;
Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000; Sun, Lane, & Mathews,
2009). The wide convergence includes a growing body of
neurophysiological research (Bechara, 2005; Camerer,
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; DeMartino, Kumaran, Seymour &
Dolan, 2006; Frank, Cohen, & Sanfey, 2009; Goel & Dolan, 2003;
Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Lieberman,
2003; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein & Cohen, 2004; Prado &
Noveck, 2007; Sanfey, 2007; Toates, 2005, 2006; Westen,
Blagov, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). Dual-process computational
architectures have been implemented as computer models that
mimic human data patterns. For example, Schneider and Chein
(2003) describe one such architecture involving a modular
connectionist structure that reflects automatic processing in the
brain. It is monitored by a symbolic control system “whose
signals alter functional connectivity within the architecture,
thereby enabling a wide variety of cognitive operations” (p. 534).
(7) On the dual-process view implicit within the heuristics
and biases approach, see Kahneman (2003), Kahneman and
Frederick (2002, 2005), and Kahneman and Tversky (1982a,
1996).

(8) There has been much research on each of the different

kinds of Type 1 processing (e.g., Atran, 1998; Aunger & Curtis,
2008; Brase, 2004; Buss, 2005; Carruthers, 2006; Evans, 2003,
2006a; Ferguson & Zayas, 2009; Fodor, 1983; Kahneman &
Klein, 2009; Lieberman, 2000 2003; Oatley,
1992; Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Pinker, 1997; Smith, Patalino, &
Jonides, 1998; Willingham, 1998, 1999). Likewise, there is a large
literature on the concepts of modularity and automaticity in
cognitive science (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Barrett &
Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006; Coltheart, 1999; Evans,1984,
2006b, 2008, 2009; Samuels, 2005, 2009; Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977; Sperber, 1994).

(9) It is also possible that humans pursue goals that are

neither in their genes’ interests nor in their interests as a person.
There are two ways this might occur. One is that the modern
world has shifted from the contingencies present in the
environment of evolutionary adaptation, rendering evolutionarily
instantiated goal structures neither fitness- enhancing nor helpful
to the vehicle. This is what gene-culture
co-evolution theorists Richerson and Boyd (2005) term the “big
mistake.” Another way that humans can end up with goals
serving neither vehicle nor genes’ interests is when a parasitic
cultural replicator has infected a host, yielding goal-directed
behavior that duplicates the cultural replicator but that is not
fitness enhancing nor efficacious for the host (Blackmore, 1999;
Dawkins, 1993; Dennett, 1991, 1995, 2006; Distin, 2005; Hull,
2000; Laland & Brown, 2002; Lynch, 1996; Mesoudi, Whiten, &
Laland, 2006; Stanovich, 2004). In Chapter 6, this situation will
be discussed as one category in a taxonomy of thinking errors.
(10) This strand of the Great Rationality Debate is represented
by several influential papers and summaries (e.g., Chater &
Oaksford, 2001; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, 1996, 2005;
Gigerenzer, 2007, 2008; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2007; Todd &
Gigerenzer, 2000, 2007; Todd, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2005).

(11) This research from my own lab is reported in a variety of

publications (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich,
2002; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1997,
1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1999, 2008b; West & Stanovich, 2003;
West et al.,2008).
Differentiating the Algorithmic Mind
and the Reflective Mind
Keith E. Stanovich
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0002

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter argues that it is useful to distinguish the algorithmic
level of processing from the reflective level when discussing
Type 2 processing. Individual differences in the former reflect
the efficiency of the functional cognitive machinery that carries
out mental tasks. Individual differences at the reflective level
result from variance in higher-level goal states and epistemic
thinking dispositions. Measures of intelligence index individual
differences at the algorithmic level. Measures of cognitive styles
and thinking dispositions index individual differences at the
reflective level.
The chapter summarizes empirical evidence indicating that
thinking dispositions and intelligence predict independent
variance in performance on various measures of rational
thinking.
Keywords: Type 2 processing, individual difference, cognitive ability, algorithmic
mind, reflective mind, rational thinking, thinking dispositions

A major theme throughout the past 40 years of research in

psychology and cognitive science is that humans are cognitive
misers (Dawes, 1976; Simon, 1955, 1956; Taylor, 1981; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974). When approaching any problem, our
brains have available various computational mechanisms for
dealing with the situation. These mechanisms embody a tradeoff,
however. The tradeoff is between power and expense. Some
mechanisms have great computational power—they can solve a
large number of problems and solve them with great accuracy.
However, this power comes with a cost. These mechanisms take
up a great deal of attention, tend to be slow, tend to interfere
with other thoughts and actions we are carrying out, and they
require great concentration that is often experienced as aversive.
They represent Type 2 processing. In contrast, other brain
mechanisms are low in
computational power but have the advantage that they are low
in cost. These mechanisms do not permit fine-grained
accuracy, but they are fast-acting, do not interfere with other
ongoing cognition, require little concentration and are not
experienced as aversive. They are the Type 1 processes
discussed in the previous chapter, which are sometimes also
termed heuristic processes.

Humans are cognitive misers because their basic tendency is to

default to Type 1 processing mechanisms of low computational
expense. Using less computational capacity for one task means
there is more left over for another task if they both must be
completed simultaneously. This would seem to be adaptive.
Nevertheless, this strong bias to default to the simplest
cognitive mechanism—to be a cognitive miser—means that
humans are often less than rational. Increasingly in the
modern world, we are presented with decisions and problems
that require more accurate responses than those generated by
heuristic processing. Type 1 processes often provide a quick
solution that is a first approximation to an optimal response.
But modern life often requires more precise thought (p.30) than
this. Modern technological societies are in fact hostile
environments for people reliant on only the most easily
computed automatic response. Think of the multimillion-dollar
advertising industry that has been designed to exploit just this
tendency. Modern society keeps proliferating such situations
where shallow processing is not sufficient for maximizing
personal happiness—precisely because many structures of
market-based societies have been designed explicitly to exploit
such tendencies. Being cognitive misers will seriously impede
people from achieving their goals.
In this discussion, I do not mean to imply that using such
shortcuts is always wrong. To the contrary, there is a rich
literature in psychology showing that in many situations, such
heuristic processing is quite useful. In fact, they are so useful
that one group of influential psychologists has been led to
extoll their advantages even to the extent of minimizing the
usefulness of the formal rules of rationality1. Nevertheless,
although clearly acknowledging the usefulness of heuristics,
my emphasis in this book will be the opposite—to highlight the
dangers of using these heuristics in too many situations,
including those that modern society has deliberately designed to
trap cognitive misers. When we are over-reliant on heuristic
processing we lose personal autonomy. We give up our thinking
to those who manipulate our environments, and we let our
actions be determined by those who can create the stimuli that
best
trigger our shallow automatic processing tendencies.

The number of situations where the use of heuristics will lead us

astray may not be large, but such situations may be of unusual
importance. The importance of a thinking strategy is not
assessed by simply counting the number of instances in which it
is engaged. We cannot (p.31) dismiss Type 2 thinking by saying
that heuristics will get a “close enough” answer 98% of the time,
because the 2% of the instances where heuristics lead us
seriously astray may be critical to our lives. A small subset of all
the decisions we will make in our life might end up being the
dominating factors in determining our life satisfaction. Deciding
what occupation to pursue, what specific job to take, who to
marry, how to invest, where to locate, how to house ourselves,
and whether to have children may, when we look back on our
lives decades later, turn out to have determined everything. Yet,
in terms of raw numbers, these might represent only 20 to 30
decisions out of thousands that we have made throughout our
lives. The 20 to 30 decisions may also be quite unique, and this
may render heuristics unhelpful for two reasons. Events that are
small in number and not recurring give Type 1 implicit learning
mechanisms no chance to abstract information that could be
used heuristically. Second, if they are unique, they are probably
unprecedented from an evolutionary point of view, and thus
there is no chance that Type 1 processing resulting from
evolutionary adaptations could help us. For both of these
reasons, it is doubtful that relying solely on Type 1 processing
will be adequate. The “quick and dirty” answers that heuristics
are likely to provide could lead us seriously astray.

Unpacking Type 2 Functioning Using

Individual Differences
We know from over three decades of work in the heuristics and
biases tradition that exclusive reliance on the heuristic
processing tendencies of Type 1 sometimes results in suboptimal
responding2. The thinking (p.32) errors resulting from Type 1
processing are not limited to the laboratory. These errors have
been shown to occur in such important domains as financial
planning, medical decision making, career decisions, family
planning, resource allocation, tax policy, and insurance
purchases. Thus, one of the most important capabilities of Type 2
processing is the ability to interrupt and override the
autonomous processing of Type 1 subsystems. One of the
primary arguments of this book is that the logic
of the override of autonomous subsystems needs to be
understood in terms of two levels of processing. The reason for
this is described in the following paragraphs.

The autonomous set of systems (TASS) will implement their

short-leashed goals unless overridden by mechanisms
implementing more global goals of p\ersonal well-being. But
override itself is initiated by higher-level control—that is, the
algorithmic level of the analytic system (Newell, 1982;
Stanovich, 1999) is conceptualized as subordinate to higher-level
goal states and epistemic thinking dispositions, some of which
have been studied empirically3. These goal states and epistemic
dispositions exist at what might be termed the reflective level of
processing—a level containing control states that regulate
behavior at a high level of generality. Such high-level goal states
are common in the intelligent agents built by artificial
intelligence (AI) researchers (Franklin, 1995; Pollock, 1995; A.
Sloman, 1993; A. Sloman & Chrisley, 2003).

My attempt to differentiate the levels of control involved in

Type 2 processing actually creates a kind of tripartite theory of
mind. Figure 2–1 presents the tripartite proposal in a simple
form. In the spirit of Dennett’s (1996) book, Kinds of Minds, I
have labeled the traditional TASS (the source of Type 1
processing) as the autonomous mind, the algorithmic level of
Type 2 processing the algorithmic mind, and the reflective level
(p.33)

of Type 2
processing the
reflective mind.
Dennett’s “kinds
of minds”
terminology helps
to mark the
distinction I
would like to
emphasize in this
book and should
do no harm as
long as we
respect the Figure 2.1. The Tripartite Structure and
caveat that it the Locus of Individual Differences.
refers to
hierarchies of
control rather
than separate
systems, with all
the additional
theoretical baggage that the “systems” terminology sometimes carries.

My position on these terminology and definitional issues in dual-

process theory is well-captured in a statement by Gilbert (1999):

“Few of the psychologists whose chapters appear in this

volume would claim that the dual processes in their
models necessarily correspond to the activity of two
distinct brain structures ….
Psychologists who champion dual-process models are not
usually stuck on two. Few would come undone if their
models were recast in terms of three processes, or four, or
even five. Indeed, the only number they would not happily
accept is one, because claims about dual processes in
psychology are not so much claims about how many
processes there are, but claims about how many processes
there aren’t. And the claim is this: There aren’t one.” (pp. 3–4)
(p.34) These preliminaries aside, what might motivate a
tripartite model? First, it might be noted that researchers in AI
take the possibility of a tripartite structure quite seriously (see
A. Sloman & Chrisley, 2003; Samuels, 2005). It thus has
precedent in at least some subdisciplines of cognitive science.
However, are there any other reasons, aside from the precedent
in AI research, for accepting this alternative structure? First, it
must be acknowledged that there is no way that the distinctions
between the algorithmic and reflective mind will cleave as nicely
as those that have traditionally differentiated Type 1 and 2
processing (the dashed line in Fig. 2–1 signals this) because the
algorithmic and reflective mind will both share properties (e.g.,
capacity-limited serial processing) that differentiate them from
the autonomous mind.
Nonetheless, there are reasons for giving the
algorithmic/reflective distinction some consideration. The
empirical work on individual differences in rational thought that
was discussed in the previous chapter provides one such
rationale. This relatively unique focus on individual differences
has motivated our attempt to separate aspects of Type 2
processing that had heretofore been conflated. I call this
emphasis on individual differences unique only in the context
of the heuristics and biases research tradition. Of course,
psychology as a whole—with its subfield of psychometrics—is
no stranger to individual differences. But that perspective was
largely missing from the Great Rationality Debate and from most
early dual-process theorizing.
So what have we found? First, we have found that individual
differences in some very important critical thinking pitfalls such
as the tendency toward myside thinking and the tendency toward
one-sided thinking are relatively independent of intelligence
(Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a). We take this to indicate that
the critical thinking skills necessary to avoid myside bias and
one-side bias are instantiated at the reflective level of the mind
as opposed to the algorithmic level. Second, across a variety of
tasks from the heuristics and biases literature, it has consistently
been found that rational thinking dispositions will predict
variance in these tasks after the effects of general intelligence
have been controlled4. In these empirical studies, the rational
thinking dispositions (p.35)
examined have encompassed assessments of epistemic
regulation such as actively open-minded thinking and
dogmatism (Stanovich & West, 1997, 2007), assessments of
response regulation such as the Matching Familiar Figures Test
(Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert, & Philips, 1964), and assessments
of cognitive regulation such as need for cognition (Cacioppo et
al., 1996). That thinking dispositions and cognitive ability both
explain unique variance in rational thinking is one of the
foundational data patterns supporting the fractionation of Type 2
processing that is proposed in the tripartite model of this book.

Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions

Partition the Algorithmic and the Reflective Mind
The difference between the algorithmic mind and the reflective
mind is captured in the well-established distinction in the
measurement of individual differences between cognitive ability
and thinking dispositions. The former are measures of the
efficiency of the algorithmic mind. In contrast, thinking
dispositions (sometimes termed cognitive styles) are measures
of the functioning of the reflective mind. Many thinking
dispositions concern beliefs, belief structure, and, importantly,
attitudes toward forming and changing beliefs. Other thinking
dispositions that have been identified concern a person’s goals
and goal hierarchy.
Examples of some thinking dispositions that have been
investigated by psychologists are: actively open-minded thinking,
need for cognition (the tendency to think a lot), consideration of
future consequences, typical intellectual engagement, need for
closure, superstitious thinking, and dogmatism.

The literature on these types of thinking dispositions is vast5, and my

purpose is not to review that literature here. It is only necessary
to note (p.36) that the types of cognitive propensities that these
thinking disposition measures reflect are: the tendency to collect
information before making up one’s mind, the tendency to seek
various points of view before coming to a conclusion, the
disposition to think extensively about a problem before
responding, the tendency to calibrate the degree of strength of
one’s opinion to the degree of evidence available, the tendency
to think about future consequences before taking action, the
tendency to explicitly weigh pluses and minuses of situations
before making a decision, and the tendency to seek nuance and
avoid absolutism. In short, individual differences in thinking
dispositions are assessing variation in people’s goal
management, epistemic values, and epistemic self-regulation—
differences in the operation of the reflective mind.
The cognitive abilities assessed on intelligence tests are not of
this type. They are not about high-level personal goals and their
regulation, or about the tendency to change beliefs in the face
of contrary evidence, or about how knowledge acquisition is
internally regulated when not externally directed. Theorists
have indeed come up with definitions of intelligence that
encompass such things. For example, intelligence is sometimes
defined in ways that encompass rational action and belief
(Stanovich, 2009b). However, despite the popularity of such
theoretical stipulations, the actual measures of intelligence in
use assess only algorithmic-level cognitive capacity. No current
intelligence test that is even moderately used in practice
assesses rational thought or behavior.
Thinking disposition measures are telling us about the
individual’s goals and epistemic values—and they are indexing
broad tendencies of pragmatic and epistemic self-regulation at a
high level of cognitive control. The empirical studies cited in
Footnote 4 indicate that these different types of cognitive
predictors are tapping separable variance, and the reason that
this is to be expected is because cognitive capacity measures
(like intelligence tests) and thinking dispositions map on to
different levels of analysis in cognitive theory. Figure 2–1 reflects
this theoretical conjecture (Stanovich, 2002, 2009a, 2009b). It is
proposed that variation in fluid intelligence largely indexes
individual differences (p.37) in the efficiency of processing of the
algorithmic mind. In contrast, thinking dispositions index
individual differences in the reflective mind.
One further reason for endorsing a tripartite structure is that
breakdowns in cognitive functioning in the three kinds of minds
manifest very
differently. For example, disruptions in algorithmic-level
functioning are apparent in general impairments in intellectual
ability of the type that cause mental retardation (Anderson,
1998, 2005). And these disruptions vary quite continuously.
Disruptions to the autonomous mind, in contrast, often reflect
damage to cognitive modules that result in very discontinuous
cognitive dysfunction such as autism or the agnosias and
alexias6. Importantly, Bermudez (2001; see also Murphy & Stich,
2000) notes that they are traditionally explained by recourse to
subpersonal functions (see Davies, 2000, Frankish, 2009, for
discussions of personal and subpersonal constructs). In complete
contrast are many psychiatric disorders (particularly those such
as delusions), which implicate functioning in what I here call
the reflective mind. Bermudez (2001) argues that the
“impairments in which they manifest themselves are of the
sort that would standardly be explained at the personal
level, rather than at the subpersonal level. In the terms of
Fodor’s dichotomy, psychiatric disorders seem to be
disorders of central processing rather than peripheral
modules …. Many of the symptoms of psychiatric disorders
involve impairments of rationality—and consequently that
the norms of rationality must be taken to play a vital role in
the understanding of psychiatric disorders.” (pp.
460–461)

Thus, there is an important sense in which rationality is a more

encompassing construct than intelligence. The reason is that
rationality is an organismic-level concept. It concerns the actions
of an entity in its environment that serve its goals. It concerns
both levels of analysis—the algorithmic and the reflective levels.
To be rational, an organism must have well-calibrated beliefs
(reflective level) and must act appropriately (p.38) on those beliefs
to achieve its goals (reflective level). The organism must, of
course, have the algorithmic-level machinery that enables it to
carry out the actions and to process the environment in a way
that enables the correct beliefs to be fixed and the correct
actions to be taken.
Thus, individual differences in rational thought and action can
arise because of individual differences in intelligence (an
algorithmic-level construct) or because of individual differences
in thinking dispositions (a reflective-level construct). To put it
simply, the concept of rationality encompasses two things
(thinking dispositions and algorithmic-level capacity), whereas
the concept of intelligence—at least as it is commonly
operationalized—is largely confined to algorithmic-level capacity.
Thus, it
is clear from Figure 2–1 why rationality and intelligence can come
apart. As long as variation in thinking dispositions is not perfectly
correlated with intelligence, then there is the statistical
possibility of dissociations between rationality and intelligence.
Substantial empirical evidence indicates that individual
differences in thinking dispositions and intelligence are far from
perfectly correlated. Many different studies involving thousands
of subjects (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Bates & Shieles,
2003; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Fleischhauer et al., 2010; Goff &
Ackerman, 1992; Noftle & Robins, 2007) have indicated that
measures of intelligence display only moderate to weak
correlations (usually less than 0.30) with some thinking
dispositions (e.g., actively open-minded thinking, need for
cognition) and near zero correlations with others (e.g.,
conscientiousness, curiosity, diligence).
It is important to note that the thinking dispositions of the
reflective mind are the psychological mechanisms that underlie
rational thought.
Maximizing these dispositions is not the criterion of rational
thought itself. Rationality involves instead the maximization of
goal achievement via judicious decision making and optimizing
the fit of belief to evidence. The thinking dispositions of the
reflective mind are a means to these ends. Certainly high levels
of such commonly studied dispositions as reflectivity and belief
flexibility are needed for rational thought and action. But the
highest levels of such thinking dispositions are not necessarily
the maximal levels. One does not maximize the reflectivity
dimension, for example, because such a person might get lost in
interminable pondering and never make a decision. Similarly,
one does not maximize the thinking disposition of belief
flexibility either, because such a person (p.39) might end up with
a pathologically unstable personality. Reflectivity and belief
flexibility are “good” cognitive styles (in that most people are not
high enough on these dimensions, so that “more” would be
better), but they are not meant to be maximized.

Intelligence Tests and Critical Thinking Tests

Partition the Algorithmic from the Reflective Mind
The difference between the reflective mind and the algorithmic
mind is captured operationally in the distinction that
psychologists make between tests of intelligence and tests of
critical thinking. To a layperson, the tasks on tests of cognitive
capacities (intelligence tests or other aptitude measures) might
seem superficially similar to those on tests of critical
thinking (in the educational literature, the term critical thinking is
often used to cover tasks and mental operations that a cognitive
scientist would term indicators of rational thought). An outsider
to psychometrics or cognitive science might deem the
classification of tasks into one category or the other somewhat
arbitrary. In fact, it is far from arbitrary and actually reflects the
distinction between the reflective mind and the algorithmic mind.

Psychometricians have long distinguished typical performance

situations from optimal (sometimes termed maximal)
performance situations (Ackerman, 1994, 1996; Ackerman &
Kanfer, 2004; Cronbach, 1949; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts,
2002). Typical performance situations are unconstrained in that
no overt instructions to maximize performance are given, and
the task interpretation is determined to some extent by the
participant. The goals to be pursued in the task are left
somewhat open. Typical performance measures are measures of
the reflective mind—they assess, in part, goal prioritization and
epistemic regulation. In contrast, optimal performance situations
are those where the task interpretation is determined externally
(not left to the participant) and the participant is instructed to
maximize performance and is told how to do so. Duckworth
(2009) has discussed the surprisingly weak relation between
typical and maximal performance across a variety of domains.
For example, Sackett, Zedeck, and Fogli, (1988) found that there
were very low correlations between the maximal item processing
efficiency (p.40) that supermarket cashiers could attain and the
typical processing efficiency that they usually attained.
All tests of intelligence or cognitive aptitude are optimal
performance assessments, whereas measures of critical or
rational thinking are often assessed under typical performance
conditions. This means that tests of intelligence are constrained
at the reflective level (an attempt is made to specify the task
demands so explicitly that variation in high-level thinking
dispositions are minimally influential). In contrast, tests of critical
or rational thinking are not constrained at the reflective level (or
at least are much less constrained). Tasks of the latter, but not
the former, type allow high-level personal goals (and epistemic
goals) to become implicated in performance.
Consider the type of syllogistic reasoning item usually examined
by cognitive psychologists studying belief bias effects (see
Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005;
Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994):
 Premise 1: All living things need
water. Premise 2: Roses need
water.

Therefore, Roses are living things.

Approximately 70% of the university students who have been

given this problem incorrectly think that the conclusion is valid
(Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999;
Stanovich & West, 1998c). Clearly, the believability of the
conclusion is interfering with the assessment of logical validity.

The important point for the present discussion is that it would not
be surprising to see an item such as the “rose” syllogism (i.e., an
item that pitted prior belief against logical validity) on a critical
thinking test. Such tests do not constrain high-level thinking
dispositions and, in fact, attempt to probe and assess the nature
of such cognitive tendencies to bias judgments in the direction of
prior belief or to trump prior belief with new evidence. Thus, for
example, an exercise on the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking
Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 1980) requires that respondents
reason regarding the proposition: Groups in this country who are
opposed to some of our government’s policies should be
permitted unrestricted freedom of press and speech. Obviously,
this is an issue on which prior opinion might be strong. However,
to do well on a test such (p.41) as this, one has to set aside prior
opinion because one must evaluate whether arguments relevant
to the proposition are strong or weak, independent of prior belief.
When such tests are well-designed, strong and weak arguments
are presented supporting both the “pro” side of the proposition and
the “anti” side of the proposition. Regardless of prior opinion, on
some items the respondent is presented with a conflict between
prior opinion and argument strength. Thus, the respondent must
regulate how much to weigh the structure of the argument
versus the prior belief. The test directly taps reflective-level
epistemic regulation.
In using items with such content, critical thinking tests such as
the Watson-Glaser create (even if the instructions attempt to
clarify) ambiguity about what feature of the problem to rely
upon—ambiguity that is resolved differently by individuals with
different epistemic dispositions. The point is that on an
intelligence test, there would be no epistemic ambiguity created
in the first place. Such tests attempt to constrain reflective-level
functioning to isolate processing abilities at the algorithmic level
of analysis. It is the efficiency of computational abilities
under optimal (not typical) conditions that is the focus of IQ
tests. Variation in high-level thinking dispositions would
contaminate this algorithmic-level assessment.

I do not wish to argue that intelligence tests are entirely

successful in this respect—that they entirely eliminate reflective-
level factors; I argue only that the constructors of the tests
attempt to do so. Additionally, it is certainly the case that some
strategic control is exercised on intelligence test items, but this
tends to be a type of micro-level control rather than the
activation of macro-strategies that are engaged by critical
thinking tests. For example, on multiple-choice IQ-test items, the
respondent is certainly engaging in a variety of control processes
such as suppressing responses to identified distracter items.
Nonetheless, if the test is properly designed, then they are not
engaging in the type of macro-level strategizing that is common
on critical thinking tests—for example, deciding how to construe
the task or how to allocate effort across differing construals.
Thus, you will not find an item like the “rose” syllogism on an
intelligence test (or any aptitude measure or cognitive capacity
measure). Instead, on a cognitive ability test, a syllogistic
reasoning item would be (p.42) stripped of content (all As are Bs,
etc.) to remove any possible belief bias component. In complete
contrast, in the reasoning and rational thinking literature,
conflict between knowledge and validity is often deliberately
created to study belief bias. Thus, cognitive ability tests
eliminate the conflict between epistemic tendencies to preserve
logical validity and the tendency to project prior knowledge. In
contrast, critical thinking tasks deliberately leave reflective-level
strategic decisions unconstrained, because it is precisely such
epistemic regulation that they wish to assess. Of course, this is
why debates about the normative response on rational thinking
measures have been prolonged in a way that has not
characterized IQ tests7. The more a measure taps the reflective-
level psychology of rationality, the more it will implicate
normative issues that are largely moot when measuring
algorithmic-level efficiency.
Critical thinking skills of the type that underlie the unbiased
processing of evidence have repeatedly shown a connection to
thinking dispositions independent of intelligence. For example,
Schommer (1990) found that a measure of the disposition to
believe that knowledge is certain predicted the tendency to draw
one-sided conclusions from ambiguous evidence even after
verbal ability was controlled. Kardash and Scholes (1996) found
that the tendency to properly draw inconclusive inferences from
mixed
evidence was negatively related to belief in certain knowledge
and positively related to a measure of need for cognition
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). Furthermore, these relationships were
not mediated by verbal ability because a vocabulary measure
was essentially unrelated to evidence evaluation. Likewise,
Klaczynski (1997; see also Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski
et al., 1997; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Klaczynski & Robinson,
2000) found that the degree to which participants criticized
belief-inconsistent evidence more than belief-consistent evidence
was unrelated to cognitive ability.
(p.43) Results from my own laboratory have converged with those
of Schommer (1990) and Kardash and Scholes (1996) in
indicating that thinking dispositions can predict argument
evaluation skill once cognitive ability is partialled out. We have
developed an argument evaluation task in which we derive an
index of the degree to which argument evaluation is associated
with argument quality independent of prior belief (see Stanovich
& West, 1997, 1998c; Sá et al., 1999). We have consistently
found that even after controlling for cognitive ability, individual
differences on our index of argument-driven processing can be
predicted by measures of dogmatism and absolutism (Rokeach,
1960), categorical thinking (Epstein & Meier, 1989), openness
(Costa & McCrae, 1992), flexible thinking (Stanovich & West,
1997), belief identification (Sá et al., 1999), counterfactual
thinking, superstitious thinking (Stanovich, 1989; Tobacyk &
Milford, 1983), and actively open-minded thinking (Sá et al.,
2005; Stanovich & West, 1997).

Thinking Dispositions as Independent

Predictors of Rational Thought
Thus, to fully understand variation in tests of unbiased reasoning
(the basic skill on many critical thinking tests), we need to
consider variation at the reflective level as well as at the
algorithmic level of cognitive analysis. Indeed, this seems to be
true for many other tasks in the heuristics and biases literature
as well. For example, we have linked various measures of
thinking dispositions to statistical reasoning tasks of various
types (Kokis et al., 2002; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West,
1998c, 1999, 2000). One such task derives from the work of
Nisbett and Ross (1980), who studied the tendency of human
judgment to be overinfluenced by vivid but unrepresentative
personal and testimonial evidence and to be underinfluenced by
more representative and
diagnostic statistical evidence. Studying the variation in this
response tendency is important because, as Griffin and Tversky
(1992) argue, “the tendency to prefer an individual or ‘inside’
view rather than a statistical or ‘outside’ view represents one of
the major departures of intuitive judgment from normative
theory” (pp. 431–432). The quintessential problem (see Fong,
Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986) involves choosing between
contradictory car (p.44) purchase recommendations—one from a
large- sample survey of car buyers and the other the heartfelt
and emotional testimony of a single friend. Fong et al. (1986)
and Jepson, Krantz, and Nisbett (1983) have studied a variety of
such problems and we have examined a number of them in our
own research. We have consistently found that dispositions
toward actively open-minded thinking are consistently
associated with reliance on the statistical evidence rather than
the testimonial evidence. Furthermore, this association remains
even after cognitive ability has been controlled.
We have examined a variety of other critical and rational
thinking tasks and have consistently found the same pattern.
For example, we have examined the phenomenon of outcome
bias in decision evaluation (Baron & Hershey, 1988)—the
tendency to rate decision quality according to the outcome of the
decision even when the outcome provides no cues to the
information available to the decision maker. We again found that
the ability to avoid outcome bias was associated with dispositions
toward actively open-minded thinking and that this tendency did
not solely result from differences in cognitive ability. Similar
results were found for a variety of other hypothesis testing and
reasoning tasks (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Kokis et al.,
2002; Stanovich, 1999, 2009b; Stanovich & West, 1998c, 2000;
Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; West et al., 2008). I have argued
elsewhere that the thinking dispositions that serve as good
independent predictors in these studies tend to be those that
reflect a tendency toward cognitive decontextualization—the
tendency to strip unnecessary context from problems
(Stanovich, 1999, 2003, 2004). Such dispositions serve to
counter one aspect of what I have termed the fundamental
computational bias of human cognition. That aspect is the
tendency to contextualize a problem with as much prior
knowledge as is easily accessible. This fundamental
computational bias was useful in our evolutionary history, but
modern bureaucratic societies often require that this bias be
overridden. Many tasks in the heuristics and biases literature
tap the ease with which we recognize this necessity.

In summary, throughout several of our studies, normative responding on

a variety of problems from the heuristics and biases literature
was moderately correlated with cognitive ability. Nevertheless,
the magnitude of the associations with cognitive ability left
considerable room for the possibility that the remaining reliable
variance might index (p.45) systematic variation in reflective-level
psychological tendencies. In fact, it was rarely the case that once
capacity limitations had been controlled, the remaining variations
from normative responding were unpredictable (which would
have indicated that the residual variance consisted largely of
random error). First, in several studies, we have shown that there
was significant covariance among the scores from a variety of
tasks in the heuristics and biases literature after they had been
residualized on measures of cognitive ability (Stanovich, 1999;
see also Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005;
West et al., 2008). Second, in the studies just reviewed, the
residual variance (after partialling cognitive ability) was also
systematically associated with cognitive styles relating to
epistemic regulation. Both of these findings are indications that
the residual variance is systematic.
Finally, not only are aspects of rational thought predicted by
thinking dispositions after intelligence is controlled, but the
outcomes of rational thought are likewise predicted by variation
in characteristics of the reflective mind. For example, Bruine
de Bruin, Parker, and Fischhoff (2007) recruited a sample of
360 citizens who resembled the demographics of the 2000 U.S
Census for their area and administered a battery of rational
thinking tasks. They then formed a composite score reflecting
overall rational thinking skill and found that it was correlated
(negatively) with a composite measure of poor decision-making
outcomes (e.g., bouncing checks, having been arrested, losing
driving privileges, credit card debt, eviction). Importantly,
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) found that variance in their
decision outcome measure was predicted by rational thinking
skill after the variance associated with cognitive ability had
been removed.
Duckworth and Seligman (2005) found that the grade point
averages of a group of eighth graders was predicted by
measures of self-discipline after the variance associated with
intelligence was partialled out. A longitudinal analysis showed
that self-discipline was a better predictor of changes in grade
point average across the school year than intelligence. A
converging finding is that the personality variable of
conscientiousness
—which taps the higher-level regulatory properties of the
reflective mind—has been shown to predict (independent of
intelligence) academic
performance and measures of performance in the workplace
(Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Higgins, Peterson, Pihl, & Lee, 2007).
(p.46) Finally, Tetlock (2005) studied expert political forecasters, all
of whom had doctoral degrees (and hence were presumably of
high intelligence), and found that overconfidence was related to
thinking dispositions that tapped epistemic regulation.

In short, there is a substantial amount of research indicating

the psychometric separability of the aspects of rational thought
connected to intelligence from the rational thinking tendencies
linked to thinking dispositions of the reflective mind.

Notes:
(1) Gigerenzer is an influential champion of this view
(Gigerenzer, 2002, 2007; Brandstatter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig,
2006; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000,
2007; see also Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). His view is
controversial, however (in rebuttal, see Broder & Newell, 2008;
Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008; Evans, 2007; Evans
& Over, 2009; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996;
Newell, 2005; Oppenheimer, 2003; Over, 2000; Stanovich, 2004).
It is important to note that it is doubtful whether many of the
heuristics studied by the Gigerenzer group fit the category of
Type 1 processes (see Broder & Newell,2008; Evans, 2007a;
Evans & Over, 2010; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman &
Klein, 2009).
(2) There is voluminous evidence that exclusive reliance on
the heuristic processing tendencies of Type 1 sometimes results
in suboptimal responding (Baron,2008; Evans, 2007a; Gilovich,
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 2006; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1973, 1996, 2000; Koehler & Harvey, 2004;
Nickerson,2004, 2008; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974, 1983, 1986) and that such thinking errors are
not limited to the laboratory (Ariely, 2008; Åstebro, Jeffrey, &
Adomdza, 2007; Baron, 1998; Baron, Bazerman, & Shonk, 2006;
Belsky & Gilovich, 1999; Berner & Graber, 2008; Camerer, 2000;
Chapman & Elstein, 2000; Croskerry, 2009a, 2009b; Dawes,
2001; Hilton, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Lichtenstein &
Slovic, 2006; Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009; Myers,
2002;Prentice, 2003; Reyna et al., 2009; Stewart, 2009;
Sunstein, 2002, 2005; Taleb, 2001,2007; Tavris & Aronson, 2007;
Tetlock, 2005; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Ubel, 2000).
(3) Thinking dispositions will be discussed later in this
chapter, but the literature on the type of disposition I am
referring to here is growing (e.g.,
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Duckworth &
Seligman, 2005; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Sá, Kelley, Ho, &
Stanovich, 2005; Stanovich & West, 1997, 1998c, 2007; West et
al.,2008).

(4) This evidence is substantial and growing (Bruine de Bruin

et al., 2007; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski &
Lavallee, 2005; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Kokis et al., 2002;
Ku & Ho, 2010; Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, &
Farrelly,2004; Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Parker &
Fischhoff, 2005; Sá & Stanovich, 2001; Stanovich & West, 1997,
1998c, 2000; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; Toplak, Liu, Macpherson,
Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007; West et al., 2008).

(5) Many publications review parts of the literature on

thinking dispositions (e.g., Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997;
Baron, 1985, 2008; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Dole & Sinatra, 1998;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Norris & Ennis, 1989; Perkins,
1995; Schommer, 1990; Stanovich, 1999; Sternberg, 1997c,
2003; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997; Strathman, Gleicher,
Boninger, & Edwards, 1994).

(6) Several empirical and theoretical papers discuss individual

differences in the autonomous mind (Anderson, 2005; Kanazawa,
2004; Reber, 1992, 1993; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Vinter
& Detable, 2003; Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982).

(7) Again, see the literature on the Great Rationality Debate

mentioned in the previous chapter (e.g., Bagassi & Macchi, 2006;
Cohen, 1981; Gigerenzer, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996;
Keys & Schwartz, 2007; Koehler, 1996; Kuhberger, 2002;
Lopes,1991; Manktelow, 2004; Margolis, 1987; Nickerson, 2008;
Over, 2002, 2004; Prentice, 2003; Samuels & Stich, 2004;
Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2002; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002;
Stanovich, 1999, 2004; Stein, 1996; Tetlock & Mellers, 2002;
Vranas, 2000).
The Key Functions of the Reflective
Mind and the Algorithmic Mind that
Support Human Rationality
Keith E. Stanovich
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0003

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter identifies the key operations of the algorithmic mind
and the reflective mind that support human rationality. The key
function of the algorithmic mind is to sustain the processing of
decoupled secondary representations. Secondary
representations are copies of primary representations that are
not directly connected to input processes or output processes. It
is argued that measures of fluid intelligence are in part indicating
the ability to sustain such offline representations. The ability to
sustain decoupled representations is critical to human rationality
because it underlies hypothetical thinking—the simulation
activities we use to synthesize a response that is better than the
response primed by the autonomous mind. The reflective mind,
in contrast, sends out the call to begin these types of activities—
to interrupt autonomous processing and to begin simulation
activities that will result in a response better than that computed
by Type 1 autonomous mechanisms.
Keywords: rationality, algorithmic mind, reflective mind, secondary
representations, simulation

The reflective mind and the algorithmic mind both have a key
function that serves to support human rationality. Both functions
operate to create an aspect of reasoning that has received
considerable attention in parts of the dual-process literature—
hypothetical thinking (Evans, 2003, 2006b, 2007a; Evans &
Over, 1996, 2004). Evans (2006b) has made the important
argument that “the analytic system is involved whenever
hypothetical thought is required” (p. 379). Stated in the form of
a conditional, Evans’ assertion is: If hypothetical thought is
required, then
the analytic system is involved. Such a formulation
preserves an important point I will make later—not all
Type 2 thought involves hypothetical thinking.

Hypothetical thinking is the foundation of rationality because it

is tightly connected to the notion of autonomous system
override (see Stanovich, 2004). Type 2 processing must be able
to take early response tendencies triggered by TASS offline and
be able to substitute better responses. But from where do these
better responses come? One answer is that they come from a
process of cognitive simulation1. In Chapter 1, I explained
why responses that have survived a selective process during
simulation are often better choices than responses triggered by
the autonomous mind.

So the key mechanism of the reflective mind that supports

human rationality is the mechanism that sends out a call to
begin cognitive (p.48) simulation or hypothetical reasoning more
generally. Individual differences in the operation of this
mechanism contribute to differences in rational thinking.
Correspondingly, there is a key operation of the algorithmic
mind that supports hypothetical thinking and is characterized by
large individual differences. Cognitive simulation and
hypothetical reasoning depend on the operation of cognitive
decoupling carried out by the algorithmic mind. Cognitive
decoupling has been discussed in related and somewhat differing
ways by a large number of different investigators coming from a
variety of different perspectives, not limited to: developmental
psychology, evolutionary psychology, artificial intelligence, and
philosophy of mind2. I shall emphasize the origins of the
concept in developmental psychology because of a useful
theoretical link to important models of the origins of Type 2
processing (see Chapter 5).

To reason hypothetically, we must be able to prevent our

representations of the real world from becoming confused with
representations of imaginary situations. For example, when
considering a goal state that is different from the one we
currently have, we must be able to represent our current goal
and the alternative goal and keep straight which is which.
Likewise, we need to be able to differentiate the representation
of an action about to be taken from representations of potential
alternative actions we are trying out in cognitive simulations.
Otherwise, we would confuse the action about to be taken with
alternatives that we were just simulating.

The potential for confusion among representational states (sometimes

termed representational abuse) has been a major issue for
developmental psychologists trying to understand the
emergence of pretense and pretend play in children (e.g., a child
saying “this banana is a phone”). Playing with the banana as a
phone must take place without actual representations of banana
and phone in the mind becoming confused or indistinct. In a
much-cited article in the early theory of mind literature, (p.49)
Leslie (1987) provided a model of pretence that made use of the
concept of cognitive decoupling. Leslie’s (1987) model can best
be understood by adopting a terminology later used by Perner
(1991). In the latter’s view, a primary representation is one that
is used to directly map the world and/or is also rather directly
connected to a response.
Leslie (1987) modeled pretense by positing a so-called
“secondary representation” (to use Perner’s [1991] terms) that
was a copy of the primary representation but that was
decoupled from the world so that it could be manipulated—that
is, be a mechanism for simulation (see Fig. 3–1). Nichols and
Stich (2003) model this cognitive decoupling as a separate
“Possible Worlds Box” (PWB) in which the simulations are carried
out without contaminating the relationship between the world
and primary representation.
For Leslie (1987), the decoupled secondary representation is
necessary to avoid representational abuse—the possibility of
confusing our simulations with our primary representations of
the world as it actually is. The cognitive operation of decoupling,
or what Nichols and Stich (2003) term cognitive quarantine,
prevents our representations of the real world from becoming
confused with representations of imaginary situations. To engage
in exercises of hypothetical thinking and high-level cognitive
control, one has to explicitly represent a psychological attitude
toward the state of affairs as well as the state of affairs itself
(p.50) (Dienes & Perner, 1999; Evans & Over, 1999). Thus, decoupled
representations of actions about to be taken become representations
of potential actions, but the latter must not infect the former while
the mental simulation is being carried out.

As Leslie (1987) notes, the ongoing simulation leaves intact the

tracking of the world by the primary representation: “Meanwhile
the original primary representation, a copy of which was raised to
a second order, continues with its definite and literal reference,
truth, and existence relations. It is free to continue exerting
whatever influence it would have on ongoing processes” (p. 417).
Nonetheless, dealing with secondary representations
—keeping them decoupled—is costly in terms of cognitive capacity.
Evolution has
guaranteed the
high cost of
decoupling for a
very good
reason. As we
were becoming
the first
creatures to rely
strongly on
cognitive
simulation, it Figure 3.1. Cognitive Decoupling (Based on Leslie, 1987).
was especially
important that
we
“unhooked” from
the world too
much of the
time.
Thus, dealing with primary representations of the world always
has a special salience. Glenberg (1997) argues that an indication
not
of the difficulty of decoupling is a behavior such as closing one’s
eyes while engaged in deep thought—or looking up at the sky or
averting one’s gaze (see Doherty-Sneddon, Phelps, & Clark,
2007). Such behaviors are attempts to prevent changes in our
primary representations of the world from disrupting ongoing
simulation—that is, the transformation of a secondary
representation.
Decoupling operations must be continually in force during any
ongoing simulations, and I have conjectured (Stanovich, 2001,
2004, 2009a) that the raw ability to sustain such mental
simulations while keeping the relevant representations
decoupled is likely the key aspect of the brain’s computational
power that is being assessed by measures of fluid intelligence
(on fluid intelligence, see Carroll, 1993; Horn & Cattell, 1967;
Horn & Noll, 1997; Kane & Engle, 2002; Unsworth & Engle, 2005).
Decoupling—outside of certain domains such as behavioral
prediction (so-called “theory of mind”)—is a cognitively
demanding operation.
Language appears to be one mental tool that can aid this
computationally expensive process. Language provides the
discrete representational medium that greatly enables
hypothetical thinking to flourish as a culturally acquired mode of
thought (see Flynn, 2007). For example, hypothetical thought
involves representing assumptions, and linguistic (p.51) forms such
as conditionals provide a medium for such
representations (Carruthers, 2006; Evans, 2007a; Evans & Over, 2004).

Decoupling skills vary in their recursiveness and complexity. The

skills discussed thus far are those that are necessary for
creating what Perner (1991) calls secondary representations—
the decoupled representations that are the multiple models of
the world that enable hypothetical thought. At a certain level of
development, decoupling becomes used for so-called
“metarepresentation”—thinking about thinking itself 3.
Decoupling processes enable one to distance oneself from
representations of the world so that they can be reflected upon
and potentially improved. The use of metarepresentational
abilities in such a program of cognitive reform would be an
example of what has been termed the quest for broad rationality
(Elster, 1983)—the cognitive critique of the beliefs and desires
that are input into the implicit calculations that result in
instrumental rationality (see Stanovich, 2004).

The level of cognitive decoupling ability also has implications for

everyday functioning in real life. For example, Kane et al. (2007)
used an experience-sampling method to study 124
undergraduates over a 7-day period—signaling them eight times
daily to see if their minds were currently wandering from their
present activity. Subjects with lower working memory capacity
reported more instances of mind wandering.
This study provides a real-life example of how sustained
decoupling ability cashes out in the real world. People with more
ability to sustain decoupling (conjectured here to be indicated by
measures such as working memory that load heavily on fluid
intelligence) are less likely to have their ongoing cognitive
simulations degenerate into serial associative cognition. In a
related study of the real-world consequences of sustained
decoupling ability, Pronk et al. (2010) found that measures of
sustained decoupling (a variety of executive functioning
measures) predicted the disposition of forgiveness as well as the
development of forgiveness over a 5-week period. People with
more ability to sustain decoupling displayed more forgiveness.
Those higher in executive functioning (p.52) were found to be
better at suppressing negative rumination about the
transgression.
In summary, the reflective mind initiates the call to interrupt
Type 1 processing and it signals the need to decouple
representations to begin simulation operations. Both of these
high-level control operations serve the dictates of human
rationality. As discussed in the first two chapters, Type 1
processing will, if unimpeded, sometimes result in non-normative
responding, as the heuristics and biases literature amply
demonstrates.
However, the generation of a superior response often
necessitates running cognitive simulations, and the signal to
decouple representations for this purpose is a function of the
reflective mind.

In contrast, sustaining the decoupling operations over time is the

key function of the algorithmic mind that supports human
rationality, and it is the operation that accounts for several other
features of Type 2 processing—particularly its seriality and most
importantly its computational expense. In short, we are beginning
to understand the key computational function of the algorithmic
mind that supports human rationality—taking representations
offline and sustaining them offline (Bickerton, 1995; Toates,
2005, 2006). I have discussed here two such types of cognitive
decoupling. The first involves taking Type 1 processing offline
and holding the response representation that it has primed in
abeyance. The second involves the type of cognitive decoupling
illustrated in Figure 3–1 and discussed by Leslie (1987)—the
copying of a primary representation and its use in cognitive
simulation.
I have argued that individual differences in fluid intelligence
are a key indicator of the variability across individuals in the
ability to sustain decoupling operations (Stanovich, 2001,
2009b). For this conceptualization, I rely on the
Cattell/Horn/Carroll (CHC) theory of intelligence (Carroll, 1993;
Cattell, 1963, 1998; Horn & Cattell, 1967). Sometimes termed
the theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence (symbolized
Gf/Gc theory), this theory posits that tests of mental ability tap,
in addition to a general factor, a small number of broad factors,
of which two are dominant4. Fluid intelligence (Gf) reflects
reasoning abilities (p.53) operating across of variety of domains
—particularly novel ones. It is measured by tasks of abstract
reasoning such as figural analogies, Raven Matrices, and series
completion. Crystallized intelligence (Gc) reflects declarative
knowledge acquired from acculturated learning experiences. It is
measured by vocabulary tasks, verbal comprehension, and
general knowledge measures. Ackerman (1996) discusses how
the two dominant factors in the CHC theory reflect a long
history of considering two aspects of intelligence: intelligence-as-
process (Gf ) and intelligence-as-knowledge (Gc).
It is becoming increasingly apparent that one of the critical
mental operations being tapped by measures of fluid intelligence
is the cognitive decoupling operation I have discussed in this
chapter. This is becoming clear from converging work on
executive function and working memory5. First, there is a
startling degree of overlap in individual differences on
working memory tasks and individual differences in measures
of fluid intelligence. Second, it is becoming clear that working
memory tasks are only incidentally about memory. Or, as Engle
(2002) puts it:

“WM capacity is just as important in retention of a single

representation, such as the representation of a goal or of
the status of a changing variable, as it is in determining
how many (p.54) representations can be maintained. WM
capacity is not directly about memory—it is about using
attention to maintain or suppress information. WM
capacity is about memory only
indirectly. Greater WM capacity does mean that more
items can be maintained as active, but this is a result of
greater ability to control attention, not a larger memory
store” (p. 20).

Hasher, Lustig, and Zacks (2007) concur with this view when
they conclude that “our evidence raises the possibility that what
most working memory span tasks measure is inhibitory control,
not something like the size of operating capacity.” (p. 231)

In a parallel argument, it has been proposed that the reaction

time tasks that have been found to correlate with fluid
intelligence (see Deary, 2000; Neubauer & Fink, 2005) do so not
because they tap into some factor of “neural speed” but instead
because they make attentional demands that are similar to those
of some working memory tasks (see Conway et al., 2002). Such
an interpretation is suggested by the evidence in favor of the so-
called “worst performance rule”—that the slowest trials on a
reaction time task correlate more strongly with intelligence than
does the mean reaction time or the fastest reaction time trials
(Coyle, 2003). Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Sub, and
Wittmann (2007) have confirmed the worst performance rule
most elegantly by showing that a latent working memory factor
was more highly correlated with the parameter reflecting the tail
of the distribution (the exponential parameter) than with the
parameters reflecting the Gaussian part of the distribution. On
the present view, the tail of the distribution is disproportionately
made up of trials on which goals have momentarily deactivated
because of partially failed decoupling, and such failures are more
likely in those of lower fluid intelligence.
Lepine, Barrouillet, and Camos, (2005) report an experiment
showing that working memory tasks with simple processing
components are actually better predictors of high-level cognitive
performance than are working memory tasks with complex
processing requirements—as long as the
former are rapidly paced to lock up attention. Likewise, Salthouse
and Pink (2008) found that the very simplest versions of working
memory tasks did not show attenuated correlations with fluid
intelligence and that the correlation with fluid intelligence did not
increase over trials. (p.55)
They argued that their results suggest that “the relation between
working memory and fluid intelligence is not dependent on the
amount of information that must be maintained, or on processes
that occur over the course of performing the tasks” (p. 364).
Research outcomes such as these are consistent with Engle’s
(2002) review of evidence indicating that working memory tasks
really tap the preservation of internal representations in the
presence of distraction or, as I have termed it, the ability to
decouple a secondary representation (or metarepresentation)
from a primary representation and to manipulate the former. For
example, he describes an experiment using the so-called
“antisaccade task.” Subjects must look at the middle of a computer
screen and respond to a target stimulus that will appear on the
left or right of the screen. Before the target appears, a cue is
flashed on the opposite side of the screen. Subjects must resist
the attention-capturing cue and respond to the target on the
opposite side when it appears. Subjects scoring low on working
memory tasks were more likely to make an eye movement
(saccade) in the direction of the distracting cue than were
subjects who scored high on working memory task.
That the antisaccade task has very little to do with memory is
an indication of why investigators have reconceptualized the
individual difference variables that working memory tasks are
tapping. Individual differences on such tasks are now
described with a variety of different terms (attentional control,
resistance to distraction, executive control), but the critical
operation needed to succeed in them—and the reason they
are a prime indicator of fluid intelligence—is that they reflect
the ability to sustain decoupled representations. Such
decoupling is an important aspect of behavioral control that is
related to rationality6.
(p.56) My view of individual differences in cognitive decoupling as
the key operation assessed by measures of fluid intelligence was
anticipated by Thurstone (1927), who also stressed the idea that
intelligence was related to inhibition of automatic responses:

“Intelligence is therefore the capacity of abstraction,

which is an inhibitory process. In the intelligent
moment the impulse is inhibited while it is still only
partially specified, while it is still only
 loosely organized ….The trial-and-error choice and
elimination, in intelligent conduct, is carried out with
alternatives that are so incomplete and so loosely
organized that they point only toward types of behaviour
without specifying the behaviour in detail.” (p. 159)

So-Called “Executive Functioning” Measures Tap

the Algorithmic Mind and Not the Reflective
Mind
One interesting implication that follows from the distinction
between the algorithmic mind and reflective mind is that the
measures of so-called “executive functioning” in the
neuropsychological literature actually measure nothing of the
sort. The term executive implies that these tasks assess the
most strategic (often deemed the “highest”) level of cognitive
functioning—the reflective level. However, a consideration of the
tasks most commonly used in the neuropsychological literature
to assess executive functioning (see Jurado & Rosselli, 2007;
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish,
2003) reveals that almost without exception they are optimal
performance tasks and not typical performance tasks and that
most of them rather severely constrain reflective-level
functioning. Thus, because reflective-level functioning is
constrained, such tasks are largely assessing individual
differences in algorithmic-level functioning. This is the reason
why several studies have shown very strong correlations
between executive functioning and fluid intelligence7.
(p.57) Consider some of the classic tasks in the neuropsychological
literature on executive function (see Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996;
Salthouse et al., 2003). In the critical part of the Trailmaking
Test, the subject must, in the shortest time possible, connect
with a line a series of numbered and lettered circles going from 1
to A to 2 to B to 3 to C, and so forth. The rule is specified in
advance, and there is no ambiguity about what constitutes
optimal performance. There is no task interpretation required of
the subject. Cognitive decoupling is required, however, to keep
the right sequence in mind and not revert to number sequencing
alone or letter sequencing alone. Thus, the task does require
algorithmic-level decoupling in order to suppress TASS from
disrupting performance by defaulting to an overlearned rule. But
the task does not require reflective control in the sense that I
have defined it here (or it does in only the most basic sense by
requiring a decision to comply with
the tester or experimenter).

The situation is similar regarding another test of executive

functioning from the neuropsychological literature, the Stroop
Test. The subject is explicitly told to name the color and not read
the word, and optimal performance is clearly defined as going as
fast as possible.
Algorithmic-level decoupling is needed to suppress the automatic
response from TASS to read the word. But strategic-level
reflective control never enters the picture. The response
requirements of the task are very basic and the task set is
dictated externally. It is a test of suppression via algorithmic-
level decoupling pure and simple.

Fluency tasks are also commonly used to measure executive

functioning (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Salthouse et al., 2003).
Here, the subject simply articulates as many words as they can
from a specified category (words beginning with the letter F,
names of red things, etc.). Again, in such a task there is no
reflective choice about what rule to use. The task requirements
are entirely specified in advance, and the assessment concerns
merely the efficiency of execution.
(p.58) A widely used measure of executive functioning, the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, &
Curtiss, 1993; Rhodes, 2004), does begin to tap more reflective
processes, although variance in suppression via decoupling is
still probably the dominant individual difference component
that it taps. In the WCST, the subject sees a set of target cards
containing shapes varying in color, form, and number. The
instructions are to correctly sort new cards in a deck by
grouping them with the correct target card. The subject must
discover the dimension (color, form, or number) that should be
the basis of the sort, and at predetermined points, the correct
dimension of sort is changed on the subject without warning.
Although the basic task structure is set by the examiner, there
may well be some reflective involvement in the rule discovery
stages of the task. Nevertheless, once the rule is switched,
suppression of the tendency to sort by the previous rule is
probably the dominant influence on performance. This
suppression is carried out by algorithmic-level decoupling
abilities and is probably why the task is correlated with fluid
intelligence (Salthouse et al., 2003).
The tasks I have discussed so far come from the
neuropsychological literature. However, more precise
experimental tasks have been used in the literature of cognitive
psychology to measure exactly the same construct as the
neuropsychological executive function measures. These
more precise tasks—stop signal paradigms, working memory
paradigms, time sharing paradigms, inhibition paradigms of
various types (see Salthouse et al., 2003)—are all subject to
exactly the same arguments just made regarding the
neuropsychological measures. The more precise experimental
measures are optimal performance tasks (not typical
performance tasks), and they severely constrain reflective-level
functioning. All measure algorithmic-level decoupling power,
which is why they display a considerable degree of overlap with
fluid intelligence (Gray et al., 2003; Kane & Engle, 2002; Hasher
et al., 2007; Salthouse et al., 2003; Salthouse & Davis, 2006;
Salthouse & Pink, 2008). Individual differences in the reflective
mind are only tangentially implicated. This is because tapping
reflective processes requires measures of typical performance,
and tasks whose instructions leave the reflective level
unconstrained so that individual differences in epistemic
regulation and cognitive allocation (e.g., need for cognition)
become implicated in performance beyond simply the
computational power to sustain decoupling operations.
(p.59) This point about the laboratory measures has been made
before by Salthouse et al. (2003): “The role of executive
functioning may also be rather limited in many laboratory tasks
because much of the organization or structure of the tasks is
provided by the experimenter and does not need to be
discovered or created by the research participant” (p. 569).
Jurado and Rosselli (2007) credit Lezak (1983) with the
observation that executive function tasks are problematic “in
that goal setting, structuring and decision making are behaviors
which need to be assessed, yet their assessment is highly
structured within the examination. The examiner is the one
usually determining when and how the task must be executed”
(p. 219).

In short, my argument is that executive processes are misnamed

in the psychological literature. Executive functioning measures
are nothing of the kind—at least as most people would
understand the word “executive.” These tasks might instead be
better termed measures of supervisory processes. They assess
the ability to carry out the rules instantiated not by internal
regulation (true executive control) but by an external authority
that explicitly sets the rules and tells the subject what
constitutes maximal performance. The subject does not set the
agenda in these tasks (as is the case in many tasks in the
rational thinking and critical thinking literatures) but instead
attempts to optimize criteria explicitly given to them. The
processes assessed by such tasks do involve
algorithmic-level decoupling (which is why they are so highly
related to fluid intelligence), but they are supervisory in nature—
decoupling is used to screen out distracting stimuli and make
sure the externally provided rule remains the goal state.

In contrast, processes of the reflective mind operate to set the

goal agenda or they operate in the service of epistemic
regulation (i.e., to direct the sequence of information pickup).
Such processes that set and regulate the goal and epistemic
agendas are little engaged by so-called “executive function tasks.”
The term executive thus can lead to theoretical confusion in the
literature. More importantly, it contributes to the tendency to
overlook the importance of measuring variation in the reflective
mind. The term executive mistakenly implies that everything
“higher up” has been taken care of or that there is no level
higher than what these executive functioning tasks measure. (p.60)

Notes:
(1) There is a large and growing literature on cognitive
simulation (e.g., Atance & Jackson, 2009; Barrett, Henzi, &
Dunbar, 2003; Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009; Buckner & Carroll,
2007; Byrne, 2005; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Decety & Grezes,
2006; Dougherty, Gettys, & Thomas, 1997; Evans, 2007a; Evans
& Over, 2004; Goldman, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982b;
Nichols & Stich, 2003; Oatley, 1999; Roese, 1997; Schacter &
Addis, 2007; Sterelny, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007;
Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001).
(2) Cognitive decoupling has been discussed in many
different disciplines, although not always under that name
(Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Carruthers, 2000, 2006; Clark &
Karmiloff-Smith, 1993; Corballis, 2003; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000;
Dennett, 1984; Dienes & Perner, 1999; Evans & Over, 1999;
Glenberg, 1997; Jackendoff, 1996; Lillard, 2001; Nichols & Stich,
2003; Perner, 1991, 1998; Sperber, 2000; Sterelny, 2001;
Suddendorf, 1999; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; M. Wilson,
2002).
(3) There are many subtleties surrounding the concept of
metarepresentation (see Dennett, 1984; Nichols & Stich, 2003;
Perner, 1991; Sperber 2000; Sterelny, 2003; Suddendorf &
Whiten, 2001; Whiten, 2001).

(4) There is a large literature on the theory and on the

processing correlates of Gf and Gc (see Daniel, 2000; Duncan et
al., 2008; Geary, 2005; Gignac, 2005; Horn & Noll, 1997; Kane &
Engle, 2002; Mackintosh &
Bennett, 2003; McArdle, et al., 2002; McGrew, 1997; McGrew &
Woodcock, 2001; Taub & McGrew, 2004). In addition to Gf and
Gc, other broad factors at the level termed stratum II are things
like memory and learning, auditory perception, and processing
speed (see Carroll, 1993, for a full account).

(5) Executive function tasks all seem to involve some type of

cognitive decoupling, and they have substantial correlations with
fluid intelligence (Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam,
2001; Duncan, et al., 2000; Duncan, et al., 2008; Fuster, 1990;
Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Goldman-Rakic, 1992; Gray, Chabris,
& Braver, 2003; Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; Kane, 2003; Kane &
Engle, 2002; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003; Salthouse &
Davis, 2006). Working memory tasks show substantial
correlations with fluid intelligence (Colom, Rebollo, Palacios,
Juan-Espinosa, & Kyllonen, 2004; Conway, Cowan, Bunting,
Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Engle,
2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Geary,2005;
Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008; Kane, Bleckley,
Conway, & Engle,2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Kane, Hambrick, &
Conway, 2005; Kane, Hambrick, Tuholski, Wilhelm, Payne, &
Engle, 2004; Lepine, Barrouillet, & Camos, 2005; Salthouse &
Pink, 2008; Sub et al., 2002; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).

(6) Consistent with my argument are the findings of a study

of children ages 3 to 5 years by Atance and Jackson (2009).
They found some relations between different tasks that were
viewed as measures of future thinking: delay of gratification,
mental time travel, planning, and prospective memory. The
tasks were correlated with each other, but the associations
disappeared once age and a proxy measure of cognitive ability
were partialled from the correlations. I would argue that what
the age and cognitive ability measure were partialling was the
ability to sustain cognitive decoupling, which is the common
component of all future-oriented thinking.
(7) Strong correlations between executive functioning and
fluid intelligence have been found in many studies (Buehner,
Krumm, & Pick, 2005; Colom et al., 2004; Conway et al., 2003;
Engle et al., 1999; Friedman, Miyake, Young, DeFries, Corley, &
Hewitt, 2008; Gray et al., 2003; Kane et al., 2005; Kane et al.,
2004; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger,
Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; Salthouse et al., 2003; Unsworth &
Engle, 2005, 2007).
The Tri-Process Model and
Serial Associative Cognition
Keith E. Stanovich
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0004

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter fleshes out the full tri-process model (on
autonomous, algorithmic, and reflective levels) of the mind. Fully
decoupled cognitive simulation is distinguished from another
type of Type 2 cognition, a cognition termed serial associative
cognition. Three different types of cognitive decoupling are also
distinguished. In the override case, decoupling involves taking
offline the connection between a primary representation and
response programming. In the second case—the case of
comprehensive simulation—decoupling involves segregating
simulated models of the world from primary representations. A
third type of decoupling involves interrupting serial associative
cognition—that is, decoupling from the next step in an
associative sequence that would otherwise direct thought.
Keywords: tri-process model, cognitive simulation, Type 2 cognition, cognitive
decoupling, comprehensive simulation, serial associative cognition

The current tripartite view of the mind has begun to look

somewhat like that displayed in Figure 4–1. Previous dual-
process theories have emphasized the importance of the
override function—the ability of Type 2 processing to take early
response tendencies triggered by Type 1 processing offline and
to substitute better responses. This override capacity is a
property of the algorithmic mind and it is indicated by the arrow
labeled A in Figure 4–1. However, previous dual-process theories
have tended to ignore the higher-level cognitive function that
initiates override in the first place. This is a dispositional property
of the reflective mind that is related to rationality. In the model in
Figure 4–1, it is represented by arrow B, which represents, in
machine intelligence terms, the call to the algorithmic mind to
override the Type 1 response by taking
it offline. This is a different mental function than the override
function itself (arrow A), and in Chapter 2, I have presented
evidence indicating that the two functions are indexed by
different types of individual differences—the ability to sustain
the inhibition of the Type 1 response is indexed by measures of
fluid intelligence, and the tendency to initiate override
operations is indexed by thinking dispositions such as
reflectiveness and need for cognition.

Figure 4–1 represents another aspect of cognition that is

somewhat neglected by previous dual-process theories.
Specifically, the override function has loomed large in dual-
process theory but less so the simulation process that computes
the alternative response that makes the override worthwhile.
Figure 4–1 explicitly represents the simulation function as well as
the fact that the call to initiate simulation originates in the
reflective mind. The decoupling operation (indicated by arrow C)
is carried out by the algorithmic mind and the call to initiate
simulation (indicated by arrow D) by the reflective mind. Again,
two different types of individual differences are associated with
the initiation call and the (p.62)

decoupling
operator
—specifically,
rational
thinking
dispositions
with the former
and fluid
intelligence
with the latter.
Finally, Type 2
processing Figure 4.1. A More Complete Model of the Tripartite Structure.
operations
receive inputs
from the
computations of
the
autonomous
mind via so-
called
processes”
(arrows labeled
G).
“preattenti good discussions of the importance of these preattentive
Particularly
processes in fixing the content of Type 2 processing have been
presented by Evans (2006b, 2007a, 2008, 2009).

The model in Figure 4–1 defines a third critical function for the
algorithmic mind in addition to Type 1 processing override and
enabling simulation via decoupling. The third is a function that is
termed serial
associative cognition in Figure 4–1 (arrow labeled E). This
function is there to remind us that not all Type 2 processing
involves strongly decoupled cognitive simulation. There are types
of slow, serial cognition that do not involve simulating
alternative worlds and exploring them exhaustively.
Their existence points up the reason for my earlier statement (in
Chapter 3): All hypothetical thinking involves the analytic system
(Evans & Over, 2004), but not all Type 2 processing involves (p.63)
hypothetical thinking. Serial associative cognition represents this
latter category.

There are less expensive kinds of Type 2 processing that we

tend to fall back on when Type 1 mechanisms are not
available for solving the problem. Recall that the category of
Type 1 processes is composed of affective responses; previously
learned responses that have been practiced to automaticity;
conditioned responses; and adaptive modules that have been
shaped by our evolutionary history. These cover many situations
indeed, but modern life still creates many problems for which
none of these mechanisms are suited. Consider Wason’s (1966)
four-card selection task, which has generated a vast literature
(e.g., Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993; Evans & Over, 2004).
There have been many theories proposed to explain why
subjects respond to it as they do1. The abstract version of the
problem is often presented as follows. Imagine four rectangles,
each representing a card lying on a table. Each one of the cards
has a letter on one side and a number on the other side. Here
is a rule: If a card has a vowel on its letter side, then it has an
even number on its number side. Two of the cards are letter-
side up, and two of the cards are number-side up. Your task is
to decide which card or cards must be turned over to find out
whether the rule is true or false. Indicate which cards must be
turned over. The four cards confronting the subject have the
stimuli K, A, 8, and 5 showing.
The correct answer is A and 5 (the only two cards that could
show the rule to be false), but the majority of subjects answer
(incorrectly) A and 8 (showing a so-called “matching bias”). Evans
(2006b) has pointed out that the previous emphasis on the
matching bias (Evans, 1972, 1998; Evans & Lynch, 1973) might
have led some investigators to infer that Type 2 processing is not
occurring in the task. In fact, matching bias (p.64) might be
viewed as just one of several such suggestions in the literature
that only the shallowest of thinking occurs. In contrast, however,
Evans (2006b) presents evidence indicating that there may be
Type 2 processing occurring during the task—even on the part of
the majority who do not give the normatively correct response (P
and Q) but instead give the PQ
response.

First, in discussing the card inspection paradigm (Evans, 1996)

that he pioneered (see also Lucas & Ball, 2005; Roberts &
Newton, 2001), Evans (2006b) notes that although subjects look
disproportionately at the cards they will choose (the finding
leading to the inference that heuristic, Type 1 processes were
determining the responses), the lengthy amount of time they
spend on those cards suggests that analytic Type 2-thought is
occurring (if only to generate justification for the heuristically
triggered choices). Second, in verbal protocol studies, subjects
can justify their responses (indeed, can justify any set of
responses they are told are correct; see Evans & Wason, 1976)
with analytic arguments—arguments that sometimes refer to the
hidden side of cards chosen.
I think it is correct to argue that Type 2 cognition is occurring in
the task, but I also want to argue that it is not full-blown
cognitive simulation of alternative world models. It is Type 2
processing of a shallower type.
When think-aloud protocols were analyzed, it has seemed that
most subjects were engaging in some slow, serial processing, but
of a type that was simply incomplete. A typical protocol from a
subject might go something like this: “Well, let’s see, I’d turn the
A to see if there is an even number on the back. Then I’d turn the
8 to make sure a vowel is in the back.” Then the subject stops.
Several things are apparent. First, it makes sense that subjects
are engaging in some kind of Type 2 processing. Most Type 1
processes would be of no help on this problem. Affective
processing is not engaged, so processes of emotional regulation
are no help. Unless the subject is a philosophy major, there are
no highly practiced procedures (logic) that have become
automatized that would be of any help. Finally, the problem is
evolutionarily unprecedented, so there will be no Darwinian
modules that would be helpful.
The subject is left to rely on Type 2 processing, but I would argue
that the processing is seriously incomplete in the example I
have given. The subject has relied on serial associative
cognition rather than exhaustive simulation of an alternative
world—a world that includes situations in which the rule is
false. The subject has not constructed the false (p.65) case—a
vowel with an odd number on the back. Nor have they gone
systematically through the cards asking the question of whether
that card could be a vowel/odd combination. Answer: K (no), A
(yes), 8 (no), 5 (yes). Such a procedure yields the correct choice
of A and 5. Instead, the subject with this protocol started from
the model given—the rule as true—and then just worked through
implications of what would be expected if the
rule were true. A fully simulated world with all the possibilities—
including the possibility of a false rule—was never constructed.
The subject starts with the focal rule as given and then just
generates associates that follow from that. The fact that they
refer to hidden sides of the cards does not mean that they
have constructed any alternative model of the situation beyond
what was given to them by the experimenter and their own
assumption that the rule is true.

Thus, it is correct to argue that Type 2 processing is occurring in

this task, but I also want to argue that it is not full-blown
cognitive simulation of alternative world models. It is thinking
of a shallower type—cognition that is inflexibly locked into an
associative mode that takes as its starting point a model of the
world that is given to the subject. It is cognition that is not rapid
and parallel (in the manner of the systems contained in the
autonomous mind) but is nonetheless inflexibly locked into an
associative mode that takes as its starting point the model of
the world that is most easy to construct.
In fact, an exhaustive simulation of alternative worlds would
guarantee correct responding in the task. Instead, in the
selection task, subjects accept the rule as given, assume it is
true, and simply describe how they would go about verifying it.
They reason from a single focal model— systematically
generating associations from this focal model but never
constructing another model of the situation. This is what I
would term serial associative cognition with a focal bias. It is how
I would begin to operationalize the satisficing bias in Type 2
processing posited in several papers by Evans (2006b; Evans,
Over, & Handley, 2003).

The Cognitive Miser and Focal Bias

One way to contextualize the idea of focal bias is as the second
stage in a framework for thinking about human information
processing discussed in Chapter 2—the idea of humans as
cognitive misers. Humans (p.66) are cognitive misers because
their basic tendency is to default to processing mechanisms of
low computational expense. Humorously, Hull (2001) has said
that “the rule that human beings seem to follow is to engage the
brain only when all else fails—and usually not even then” (p. 37).
More seriously, Richerson and Boyd (2005) have put the same
point in terms of its origins in evolution: “In effect, all animals are
under stringent selection pressure to be as stupid as they can get
away with” (p. 135).
There are, in fact, two aspects of cognitive miserliness. Dual-
process theory has heretofore highlighted only Rule 1 of the
Cognitive Miser: Default to Type 1 processing whenever possible.
But defaulting to Type 1 processing is not always possible—
particularly in novel situations where there are no stimuli
available to domain-specific evolutionary modules nor, perhaps,
any information with which to run overlearned and
well-compiled procedures that the autonomous mind has
acquired through practice. Type 2 processing procedures will be
necessary, but a cognitive miser default is operating even there.
Rule 2 of the Cognitive Miser is: When Type 2 processing is
necessary, default to serial associative cognition with a focal
bias (not fully decoupled cognitive simulation).

Evans (2006b) draws attention to Rule 2 of humans as cognitive

misers by emphasizing a satisficing principle in his conception of
Type 2 processing. The notion of focal bias is a way of conceiving
of just what Type 2 satisficing is in terms of actual information
processing mechanics. My proposal is, simply, that it amounts to
a focal bias with an additional tendency not to interrupt serial
associative cognition with a decoupling call from the reflective
mind.

The notion of a focal bias conjoins several closely related ideas in

the literature—Evans, Over and Handley’s (2003) singularity
principle, Johnson-Laird’s (1999, 2005, 2006) principle of truth,
focusing (Legrenzi, Girotto, & Johnson-Laird, 1993), the
effect/effort issues discussed by Sperber, Cara, and Girotto
(1995), and finally, the focalism (Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers,
Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000) and belief acceptance (Gilbert, 1991)
issues that have been prominent in the social psychological
literature. My notion of focal bias conjoins many of these ideas
under the overarching theme that they all have in common—that
humans (p.67)
will find any way they can to ease the cognitive load and process
less information. Focal bias combines all of these tendencies into
the basic idea that the information processor is strongly disposed
to deal only with the most easily constructed cognitive model.

So the focal model that will dominate processing—the only

model that serial associative cognition deals with—is the most
easily constructed model. The focal model tends to: represent
only one state of affairs (the Evan et al., 2003, singularity idea),
accept what is directly presented and models what is presented
as true (e.g., Gilbert, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 1999), is a model that
minimizes effort (Sperber et al., 1995), and ignores moderating
factors (as the social psychological literature has
demonstrated, e.g., Wilson et al., 2000)—probably because
taking account of those factors would necessitate modeling
several alternative worlds, and this is just what a focal
processing allows us to avoid. And finally, given the voluminous
literature in cognitive science on belief bias and the informal
reasoning literature on myside bias, the easiest models to
represent clearly appear to be those closest to what a person
already believes in and has modeled previously (e.g., Evans,
2002; Evans & Feeney, 2004; Nickerson, 1998; Stanovich &
West, 2007, 2008a).
Thus, serial associative cognition is defined by its reliance on a
single focal model that triggers all subsequent thought. Framing
effects, for instance, are a clear example of serial associative
cognition with a focal bias. As Kahneman (2003) notes, “the
basic principle of framing is the passive acceptance of the
formulation given” (p. 703). The frame presented to the subject
is taken as focal, and all subsequent thought derives from it
rather than from alternative framings because the latter would
necessitate more computationally expensive simulation
operations.
In short, serial associative cognition is serial and analytic (as
opposed to holistic) in style, but it relies on a single focal model
that triggers all subsequent thought. Such a view is consistent
with the aforementioned discussion of thinking during the
selection task and the conclusion that Type 2 cognition does
indeed occur even for the incorrect responders (see Evans,
2006b; Evans & Over, 2004). Incorrect responders are engaging
in serial associative cognition with a focal bias, but reflective
processes are not prone to send additional decoupling calls to
explore alternative models to the focal one.
(p.68) Consider an informal example of the difference between
a full simulation with alternative worlds and serial association
cognition. Here is a fully fleshed out simulation of alternative
worlds in everyday thinking:

Imagine I take a day to work at home. It occurs to me

that I will only have four such days the rest of this term,
so I must plan carefully. I have many work projects that
are commitments I must meet—commitments to students,
colleagues, and to university administration. On the other
hand, there are the projects that I am really passionate
about. Sadly though, I realize two things: that my
commitments have piled up quite a bit since my last free
day, and that on my previous three free days I have
chosen to work on my “passion projects” the entire day.
Weighing these considerations, I
 find that I feel obligated to work on some of my
commitments. In that arena, there are committee reports
due, partially completed reviews that I owe to two journals,
and one letter of recommendation I must write for a
graduate student. The letter can be written during a normal
working day, so that can eliminated. Regarding the
committees, I remember the saying that “no one on their
deathbed says that they regret not going to more
committee meetings.” Therefore I turn to a consideration of
the partially completed reviews that I owe to two journals.
Both are overdue about the same amount of time. One,
however, is much closer to completion, so I shall work on it.
Although this is clearly informal thought, it has many of the
characteristics of fully disjunctive reasoning—a fleshed out
simulation of alternative worlds. Instead of branching out into
irrelevant concerns, it concentrates on drilling down and making
sure all of the alternatives at each level of analysis are covered.
Two alternatives are fleshed out originally: passion projects
versus commitments. Reasons are given to rule out the former.
Regarding commitments, three are identified: committee reports
due, two partially completed reviews, and one letter of
recommendation. These are then, in turn, narrowed down. The
point is that at each stage, some semblance of an exhaustive set
of possibilities is considered—and the possibilities are all relevant
to the problem at hand, to the central problem situation, the key
alternative world, that is relevant to (p.69) solving the problem.
These are all characteristics of offline simulation (Fig. 4–1, arrow
C).
Now consider another example of informal thought, taking
place via serial associative cognition (arrow E):

Let’s see, I’m going downtown tomorrow. What should I do?

I was reading Money magazine last night and it looks like I
haven’t been saving enough for retirement. I’ll go see my
broker, that’s what I’ll do. If I go to his place I’ll take the
bus. Oh, I just remembered that there is a great sandwich
shop next to the bus station. I’ll arrange to go in about
lunchtime then and have that special mozzarella, tomato,
and basil on foccacia bread that I saw on the board there
once. I really do love foccacia. I think I’ll bring some home.
I’d like to have sandwiches on foccacia all week. I know a
good bakery on the east side that I bet would have great
foccacia. Let’s see though, bakery items sell out early in the
day. I better get down there early. I’ll take the first bus in
the morning….
This second example is as different as can be from the previous
example of informal thinking. Note, however, that the second
example still represents Type 2 thinking—it is serial and
relatively slow (at least compared to Type 1 processing), and it is
conscious rather than unconscious thought. Nevertheless, it is
different in important ways. The thinker is driven forward in
his/her thinking simply by the most salient association in the
current mental model being considered. At each stage in the
process, the thinker does not explore all of the options. The
thinking is only about the current objective that has popped into
consciousness via an associative process. Notice also how the
models being considered become “unclamped.” The issue of what to
do downtown was quickly transformed into the issue of saving for
retirement but before any options other than one (“go see your
broker”) for achieving this option was considered, the thinker
was on to a different issue (having a sandwich by taking a
noontime bus for lunch), and within a second this goal was lost
(to the goal of going downtown early to get some bread). In serial
associative cognition, models do not stay clamped long enough
for all the possibilities surrounding them to be fleshed out. The
thinking sequence shifts to anything that temporarily becomes
focal (because of vividness, (p.70) salience, availability, or
recentness) and generates primary associates from that focal
model.
Differentiating serial associative cognition from fully decoupled
simulation contributes to the understanding of the phenomenon
of mind wandering that Smallwood and Schooler (2006) have
analyzed. They conceive of mind wandering as “a shift of
attention away from a primary task toward internal information,
such as memories” (p. 946). If we assume that the primary task
to which they refer was necessitating fully explicit cognitive
simulation, we can conceive of mind wandering as a switch from
decoupled simulation to (the less cognitively demanding) serial
associative cognition. This is consistent with Smallwood and
Schooler’s (2006) description of mind wandering as sharing
“certain similarities with standard views of controlled processing,
however, there is an important difference. Controlled processing
is generally associated with the intentional pursuit of a goal.
Mind wandering, however, often occurs without intention….mind
wandering involves executive control yet seems to lack
deliberate intent” (p. 946). I would argue that what Smallwood
and Schooler are struggling to portray here are two different
kinds of Type 2 processing. One is an attempt to exhaustively
model an imaginary world that would facilitate the primary task.
The other is a less computationally expensive type of cognition
that proceeds successively
through the most convenient and salient associate of a single
(often incomplete) focal model. When the costly fully decoupled
cognition of the former type fails, cognition reverts to the less
costly (and often irrelevant to the task) second type of
processing, and when this happens we report that “my mind has
wandered.”

Smallwood and Schooler (2006) see paradoxes in the

phenomenon of mind wandering that are not apparent when it is
viewed from the current tripartite view. First, they note: that “the
central challenge for incorporating mind wandering into
executive models of attention is that our mind often wanders in
the absence of explicit intention. Generally, deliberate intent is
considered a hallmark of controlled processing, so the apparent
absence of intent from mind wandering challenges the
suggestion that both mind wandering and controlled processing
share working-memory resources” (p. 947). Second, they
speculate (see p. 956) on the adaptive value of mind wandering.
The latter, in the present view, is simply the result of a mind
structured with natural defaults toward the (p.71) least
computationally expensive cognition—defaults that occasionally
will trigger inefficaciously when more computationally expensive
cognition is underway. The former also presents no paradox
because it is not mind wandering (defaulting to serial associative
cognition) that requires intentionality, but instead it is intentional
goal pursuit that sustains the more cognitively demanding (and
perhaps aversive, see Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Navon, 1989)
simulation of alternative worlds. The deactivation of that goal
results in the default to serial associative cognition that we often
call mind wandering.
Having introduced the idea of serial associative cognition, we
can now return to Figure 4–1 and identify a third function of the
reflective mind—initiating an interrupt of serial associative
cognition (arrow F). This interrupt signal alters the next step in a
serial associative sequence that would otherwise direct thought.
This interrupt signal might stop serial associative cognition
altogether to initiate a comprehensive simulation (arrow C).
Alternatively, it might start a new serial associative chain (arrow
E) from a different starting point by altering the temporary focal
model that is the source of a current associative chain.
The preceding discussion identifies three different functions of
cognitive decoupling. In the override case, decoupling involves
taking offline the connection between a primary representation
and response programming in the autonomous mind (arrow A). In
the second case, the case of comprehensive simulation, it
involves segregating from
representational abuse multiple models undergoing simultaneous
evaluation and transformation (arrow C). Of course, these two are
related
—autonomous responses are often decoupled pending a
comprehensive simulation that determines whether there is a
better response. A third type of decoupling involves interrupting
serial associative cognition (arrow E)—that is, decoupling from
the next step in an associative sequence that would otherwise
direct thought. This third type of decoupling might shunt the
processor to comprehensive simulation or simply start a new
associative chain from a different starting point. In all three
cases, sustaining a decoupling operation is a function of the
algorithmic mind. The autonomous mind does not decouple
representations except when evolutionary adaptation has
created dedicated mental machinery for such decoupling in a
specific domain (e.g., the theory of mind module for behavioral
prediction of other agents).

(p.72) Converging Evidence in the Dual-Process Literature

The general tri-process model illustrated in Figure 4–1 meshes
well with other ongoing theoretical developments in dual-process
theory (see Evans, 2007a, 2008, 2009). Evans (2009), for
example, now sees the need to distinguish Type 3 processes
from Type 2 and Type 1. Type 3 processes, in his view, are
concerned with issues of control, conflict resolution, and resource
allocation. The Type 3 processes in his discussion correspond, in
the present tri-process theory, to the signals from the reflective
mind for the algorithmic mind to begin decoupling operations.
Theoretical speculations about the genetics of individual
differences have supported the distinction between thinking
dispositions and cognitive ability (computational capacity) that
underlies the differentiation of the algorithmic from the reflective
mind. For many years, evolutionary psychology had little to say
about individual differences because the field had as a
foundational assumption that natural selection would eliminate
heritable differences because heritable traits would be driven to
fixation (Buss, 2009). Recently however, evolutionary
psychologists have attempted to explain the contrary evidence
that virtually all cognitive and personality traits that have been
measured have heritabilities hovering around 50%. Penke,
Denissen, and Miller (2007) have proposed a theory that explains
these individual differences. Interestingly, the theory accounts
for heritable cognitive ability differences in a different way than it
accounts for heritable thinking dispositions and personality
variables.
The basis of their theory is a distinction that I will be stressing
throughout this book—that between typical performance
indicators and optimal performance indicators.

Penke et al. (2007) argue that “the classical distinction between

cognitive abilities and personality traits is much more than just a
historical convention or a methodological matter of different
measurement approaches (Cronbach, 1949), and instead reflects
different kinds of selection pressures that have shaped
distinctive genetic architectures for these two classes” (p. 550)
of individual differences. On their view, personality traits and
thinking dispositions (reflective-level individual differences)
represent preserved, heritable variability that is maintained by
different biological processes than intelligence (algorithmic-level
individual differences). Thinking dispositions and personality
traits are maintained (p.73) by balanced selection, most probably
frequency- dependent selection (Buss, 2009). The most famous
example of the latter is cheater-based personality traits that
flourish when they are rare but become less adaptive as the
proportion of cheaters in the population rises (as cheaters begin
to cheat each other), finally reaching an equilibrium.
In contrast, variability in intelligence is thought to be maintained
by constant changes in mutation load (Buss, 2009; Penke et al.,
2007). As Pinker (2009) notes:

“new mutations creep into the genome faster than natural

selection can weed them out. At any given moment, the
population is laden with a portfolio of recent mutations,
each of whose days are numbered. This Sisyphean
struggle between selection and mutation is common with
traits that depend on many genes, because there are so
many things that can go wrong …. Unlike personality,
where it takes all kinds to make a world, with
intelligence, smarter is simply better, so balancing
selection is unlikely. But intelligence depends on a large
network of brain areas, and it thrives in a body that is
properly nourished and free of diseases and defects ….
Mutations in general are far more likely to be harmful than
helpful, and the large, helpful ones were
low-hanging fruit that were picked long ago in our
evolutionary history and entrenched in the species …. But
as the barrel gets closer to the target, smaller and smaller
tweaks are needed to bring any further improvement ….
Though we know that genes for intelligence must exist,
each is likely to be small in effect, found in
 only a few people, or both ….The hunt for personality
genes, though not yet Nobel-worthy, has had better
fortunes. Several associations have been found between
personality traits and genes that govern the breakdown,
recycling or detection of neurotransmitters.” (p. 46)

Thus, according to the theory of Penke et al. (2007), the

evolutionary processes that sustain variability in thinking
dispositions and traits at the reflective level are different from
those that sustain variability in cognitive capacities at the
algorithmic level.

In addition to the theoretical commonalities discussed so far,

there are a number of further convergences that can be
discerned in the literature. For example, the three different
decoupling operations just discussed in (p.74) the previous section
map conceptually onto three of the most important operations
that have been discussed in the literature on executive
functioning2: inhibition, updating, and set shifting. In the
executive functioning literature, inhibition is measured with tasks
such as the Stroop test, the stop-signal paradigm (Logan, 1994),
and the antisaccade task where subjects must resist the
tendency to look in a cued direction and instead look in the
opposite direction. Updating is measured by working memory
tasks such as the n-back task and the keeping track task where
subjects must remember the last instance of several target
categories. Set shifting is measured with tasks such the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton et al., 1993) and the
Trailmaking Test (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Reitan, 1955,
1958). In the latter, the subject must, in the shortest time
possible, connect with a line a series of numbered and lettered
circles going from 1 to A to 2 to B to 3 to C, and so forth.
These three different aspects of executive functioning correspond
to the three types of decoupling operation discussed previously.
Inhibition is most similar to the use of decoupling to suppress a
response triggered by the autonomous mind. Updating in the
executive functioning literature indexes the ability to sustain
comprehensive simulation by segregating from representational
abuse a secondary representation as it undergoes evaluation and
transformation. Set shifting indexes the ability to interrupt serial
associative cognition—that is, to decouple from the next step in
an associative sequence that would otherwise direct thought.
This parsing of executive functioning maps well onto discussions
of that construct in the literature on attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD). Executive functioning deficits have been linked with
ADHD in several different theoretical accounts (Barkley, 1998;
Nigg, 2000, 2001;
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Sonuga-Barke, 2002, 2003). The
inhibitory function of executive tasks has been singled out by
theorists as a particular locus of processing difficulty in ADHD
(Barkley, 1998; Nigg, 2001). Friedman et al. (2007) tested this
directly by giving measures of (p.75) inhibition, updating, and set
shifting (measured as latent variables) to a large sample of late
adolescents (ages 16–17). Teacher-rated attentional problems at
earlier ages were most strongly related to the latent construct of
inhibition and least related to the latent construct of set shifting.
This finding would seem to indicate that childhood attentional
problems are most closely associated with the decoupling
operation that involves taking offline the connection between a
primary representation and response programming in the
autonomous mind. In a study of 10-year-old children, Handley et
al. (2004) observed that measures of inhibition became
particularly important in reasoning tasks where the use of logic
was necessary to trump prior belief.
Many findings in cognitive neuroscience 3 converge nicely with
some of the distinctions displayed in Figure 4–1. For example,
Botvinick, Cohen, and Carter (2004) and MacDonald, Cohen,
Stenger, and Carter (2000) describe a model of the function of
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) that maps nicely onto the framework
presented here. In their model, the ACC registers conflict during
information processing and triggers strategic adjustments in
cognitive control. Those adjustments in cognitive control are
largely implemented by the DLPFC. The ACC, according to
Botvinick et al. (2004), “detects internal states signaling a need
to intensify or redirect attention or control” (p. 539). As such, it
maps onto Figure 4–1 as one of the mechanisms of the
reflective mind that triggers the onset of cognitive decoupling.
The sustained decoupling itself is carried out by the DLPFC. The
model of Botvinick et al. (2004) maps into contemporary
theories of self-control that distinguish between the process of
goal–conflict recognition and goal–conflict resolution (Myrseth &
Fishbach, 2009).
Studies employing the Stroop task have supported the model of
Botvinick et al. (2004). They cite research indicating that after an
interference trial on which there was strong ACC activity,
relatively low interference was observed on a subsequent trial
and that subsequent trial (p.76) tended to have stronger DLPFC
activity. This pattern suggests that “the ACC response to conflict
triggers strategic adjustments in cognitive control,
which serve to reduce conflict in subsequent performance”
(Botvinick et al., 2004, p. 544). Mitchell et al. (2007) tested this
model of the ACC as a transient indicator of the need for a
change in control and the DLPFC as the mechanism sustaining
attentional focus on the new goal or belief state. They measured
brain activity in these areas during a thought suppression task
(“do not think of a white bear,” see Wegner, 1994, 2002) and found
that the temporal scopes of ACC and DLPFC activity were
different. ACC activity was transiently involved subsequent to the
occurrence of unwanted thoughts. DLPFC activity was present on
a more sustained basis during successful attempts at thought
suppression.
The findings of Mitchell et al. (2007) are again consistent with
the notion that DLPFC is indicating the operation of sustained
decoupling and that ACC is an indicator of signals from the
reflective mind that trigger the onset of decoupling operations.
Also consistent is research by De Neys, Vartanian, and Goel
(2008), who studied noncausal baserate problems where the
baserate conflicted with the indicant information. DLPFC activity
increased when subjects chose the baserate response over the
stereotype-based response, indicating that this brain region was
involved in inhibiting the stereotype-based response. The ACC
showed increased activity regardless of which response the
subject chose (baserate response or stereotype-based
response), indicating that the ACC was involved in detecting the
conflict but not in the sustained decoupling necessary to
suppress the stereotype-based response lodged in the
autonomous mind.
Geary’s (2005) model of ACC and DLPFC functioning fits nicely
with the model in Figure 4–1. First, he believes that both areas
are heavily involved when heuristic processing does not yield a
definitive answer to a problem. The ACC in his model signals
novelty or conflict. Second, the ACC activation initiates DLPFC
activity that signals the “explicit, controlled problem solving
needed to cope with the novel situation or resolve the conflict”
(p. 215). In the terms of my framework, the DLPFC carries out the
ongoing decoupling operations that are necessary for sustained
simulation and evaluation of alternative responses to be carried
out. The ACC is the part of the reflective mind that detects
situations (p.77) where decoupling operations may be needed.
Geary (2005) interprets the model of Botvinick et al. (2004) as
eliminating the homunculus problem that has bedeviled
discussions of controlled processing: “Novelty and conflict result
in automatic attentional shifts and activation of executive
functions is important, because it addresses the homunculus
question. The central
executive does not activate itself, but rather is automatically
activated when heuristic-based processes are not sufficient for
dealing with current information patterns or tasks” (Geary, 2005,
p. 215).

Consistent with this mapping of brain structures, in his review of

work in social cognitive neuroscience, Lieberman (2007) locates
the DLPFC in his C-system (i.e., reflective system) along with
medial prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex, medial parietal
cortex, medial temporal lobe, and rostral ACC (rACC).
Lieberman, however, locates the dorsal ACC (dACC) with his X-
system (i.e., reflexive system), along with the amygdala, basal
ganglia, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and lateral
temporal cortex. Nonetheless, Lieberman (2007) admits that the
classification of the rACC and dACC is complex and confusing.
Satpute and Lieberman (2006) cite evidence supporting the
differentiation of these structures. For example, they note that
the rACC seems to differentially respond to symbolic conflict and
the dACC to nonsymbolic conflict. However, this difference is
probably not sufficient to justify allocating the different
structures to totally different systems (reflexive and reflective in
Lieberman’s terms).
What might tempt a theorist into classifying the dACC as part of
the reflexive system is that it is associated with transient
processing—the sending of transient signals to begin the more
sustained process of cognitive decoupling. As Lieberman (2007)
notes:

“a number of neuroimaging studies have examined the

process whereby individuals intentionally override a
prepotent response or impulse. The two brain regions that
have consistently been associated with this process are
dACC and DLPFC (MacDonald et al. 2000). A number of
studies have implicated the dACC in detecting the conflict
between a current goal and the prepotent response rather
than in the process of exerting top-down control to
facilitate the appropriate response or inhibit the
inappropriate response (Botvinick et al. 2004).
Alternatively, LPFC has been more (p.78) closely tied to
maintaining the current goal in working memory and to
implementing the top-down control needed to produce
appropriate responses …. Similar LPFC activations are
present when individuals must inhibit beliefs in order to
reason correctly.” (p. 269)
I would stress, however, that the transient nature of the dACC
functioning is, alone, probably not enough to classify it as part
of the reflexive system. The conceptual level of the types of
conflicts that it detects
should probably be a more determining factor.

Evans’ (2009) distinction among Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3

processing is useful here. Lieberman (2007) is correct that
dACC activity is not indicating sustained decoupling activity
(which instead is most clearly indicated by DLPFC activity).
However, from this correct inference, it does not follow that dACC
activity is indicating Type 1 processing. Evans’ call for a third
category of process distinctions applies in this case. The
conflict detection and control switching indicated by dACC
activities falls more clearly within Type 3 processing in the
Evans’ (2009) framework. It is an indicator of activity of the
reflective mind in the present tripartite view.
Such an interpretation of the findings does highlight, however,
that higher-level control processes do not necessarily operate in
a sustained manner—that control may be redirected based on
fairly rapid processing. Decisions to redirect control might be
based on a variety of different cues that have different time-
courses. Detection of conflict as a cue to intensify decoupling
operations might have a brief time-course. More sustained
metacognitive judgments that result in control changes (see
Thompson, 2009) may tend to be more extended in time. For
example, Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre (2007) found that
sustained experiences of dysfluency increased Type 2
processing. For example, reading a degraded font or performing
under conditions suggesting dysfluency resulted in better
performance in syllogistic reasoning, better performance on
Frederick’s (2005) cognitive reflection test, and fewer probability
judgments based on representativeness (see also Alter &
Oppenheimer, 2009; Song & Schwarz, 2009).
That conflict detection can have varying time-courses highlights
the important point that the reflective mind is defined in
reference to levels (p.79) of control, not in terms of time. The term
reflective mind is defined in terms of cognition involving high-
level control change, not in terms of dictionary definitions of the
term reflective (thoughtfulness, contemplation, etc.). As such,
the term may be a bit of a misnomer.
High-level control change will often be extended in time, but not
always. For instance, consider Thompson’s (2009) argument that
the monitoring (and potential override) of Type 1 processing is
triggered (or not triggered) by an initial feeling of rightness (FOR)
that is processed along with the content of the Type 1
processing. The feeling of rightness leads to a judgment of
rightness at the reflective level. The lower the judgment of
rightness, the greater the probability of Type 2 intervention.
The important point for our present discussion is that Thompson’s
(2009) posited judgment of rightness is a reflective-level
operation regardless of the amount of time it takes. In some
cases, a strong feeling of rightness might very automatically yield
shallow monitoring of the Type 1 response. However, Thompson
(2009) notes “although in most cases, the strength of the FOR
should be a sufficient basis for judgment, there will be
circumstances in which the FOR may be explicitly discounted. For
example, if participants are given an alternative explanation for
the basis of their metacognitive experience, they are less likely to
rely on fluency of retrieval as a cue” (p. 181). The discounting
process might take time and thus result in a much more
extended judgment of rightness process than the case where a
very high FOR is registered immediately with no discounting
context. In short, the reflective level is about cognitive control,
not time. Likewise, at the end of her chapter, Thompson (2009)
speculates about the relationship between consciousness and
judgments of rightness. Consciousness will tend to be correlated
with the time such judgments take but, in my view, neither are
defining features of
reflective-level processing—which is defined in terms of levels of
control, not consciousness or time.

There is some evidence that ACC activity is most strongly

involved in situations of response conflict as opposed to mere
thought conflict, although it occurs in the latter as well (see
Mitchell et al., 2007). To the extent that it is associated with
response conflict, such a connection would suggest that ACC
activity is primarily associated with a
reflective-level signal to decouple for inhibitory purposes (Fig. 4–
1, arrow B)—to take offline the connection between a primary
representation and (p.80) response programming in an
autonomous system. Such a view would be consistent with the
model of Schneider and Chein (2003), who view the ACC
monitoring function as coming into play “when performance is
error prone and when prepotent automatic responses must be
overcome” (p. 550). In contrast, Schneider and Chein (2003) view
monitoring for frequent attentional shifts as taking place in the
posterior parietal cortex (PPC). Thus, in their view, the initiation
signal indicated by arrow F in Figure 4–1 has its source in a
different area (the PPC) than the initiation signal to begin
response override (arrow B), which has as its source the ACC.
Regardless of how that specific controversy in cognitive
neuroscience is resolved, the data, at a more macro-level of
analysis, are pointing to a differentiation between the reflective
level and the algorithmic level of processing—between initiation
signals to begin cognitive decoupling and the ability to sustain
decoupling itself.
Notes:
(1) The literature on the various different proposals is large
(Evans, 1972, 1996, 1998, 2006b, 2007a; Girotto & Tentori,
2008; Hardman, 1998; Johnson-Laird, 1999, 2006; Klauer, Stahl,
& Erdfelder, 2007; Liberman & Klar, 1996; Margolis, 1987;
Newstead & Evans, 1995; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2007;
Osman, 2007; Osman & Laming, 2001; Sperber, Cara & Girotto,
1995; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998a; Stenning &
van Lambalgen, 2004a, 2004b). On the many suggestions that
little thinking goes on in the task, see Hardman (1998), Margolis
(1987), Stanovich and West (1998a), and Tweney and Yachanin
(1985).
(2) Inhibition, updating, and set shifting are discussed in many
publications on executive functioning (Aron, 2008; Best et al.,
2009; Friedman, Haberstick, Willcutt, Miyake, Young, Corley, &
Hewitt, 2007; Friedman, Miyake, Corley, Young, DeFries, &
Hewitt, 2006; Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson,
& Witzki, 2000; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Salthouse et al.,
2003).

(3) The convergence can be seen in a literature that grows

daily (e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; DeMartino,
Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Frank, Cohen, & Sanfey,
2009; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Greene, 2005; Prado & Noveck, 2007;
Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006; van Veen &
Carter, 2006).
The Master Rationality Motive and
the Origins of the Nonautonomous
Mind
Keith E. Stanovich
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0005

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter elaborates on the uniquely human functionality of
the nonautonomous minds and speculates on the evolutionary
origins of Type 2 processing. These speculations involve
conjoining a concept much discussed in the literature with one of
the author's own invention. The more well-known concept is that
of metarepresentation, and the new concept is something
termed Master Rationality Motive (MRM). MRM is the motive that
drives the search for rational integration across our preference
hierarchies. The need for rational integration is probably a
function of the strength of the MRM, and individual differences in
the former probably arise because of individual differences in the
latter.
Thus, the MRM is what sustains the search for rational integration.
Keywords: Type 2 processing, metarepresentation, rational integration, rationality, MRM

In this book, I have focused on the nature of Type 2

processing in dual-process models. Both the reflective level
and algorithmic level of processing are nonautonomous, as I
defined it in Chapter 1. In this
chapter, I will elaborate on some of the uniquely human
functionality of the nonautonomous minds and speculate on the
evolutionary origins of Type 2 processing.

Although I have argued for the theoretical usefulness of

differentiating two levels within Type 2 processing in this
volume, there is no question that the distinction between the
reflective mind and the algorithmic mind is going to be harder to
draw experimentally than the more traditional distinction in
dual-process theory—that between TASS and nonautonomous
processing. Nonetheless, in Chapter 2, I argued that research
deriving from an individual differences perspective has
attempted to separate the former two by showing that measures
of thinking dispositions can predict aspects of rational thought
unaccounted for by measures of algorithmic processing capacity.

The central evolutionary question, however, is no doubt the

origins of Type 2 processing itself. The algorithmic and reflective
mind might be linked in this evolutionary story. My own
speculations involve conjoining a concept much discussed in the
literature with one of my own invention. The more well-known
concept is that of metarepresentation, and the new concept is
something I term the Master Rationality Motive.

Metarepresentation and Higher-Order Preferences

All multiple-process models of mind capture a phenomenal
aspect of human decision making that is of profound
importance—that humans often feel alienated from their
choices. We display what folk psychology (p.82) and philosophers
term weakness of will1. For example, we continue to smoke
when we know that it is a harmful habit. We order a sweet after
a large meal, merely an hour after pledging to ourselves that
we would not. In fact, we display alienation from our responses
even in situations that do not involve weakness of will—we find
ourselves recoiling from the sight of a disfigured person even
after a lifetime of dedication to diversity and inclusion.

This feeling of alienation—although emotionally discomfiting

when it occurs—is actually a reflection of a unique aspect of
human cognition: the use of Type 2 metarepresentational
abilities to enable a cognitive critique of our beliefs and our
desires. Beliefs about how well we are forming beliefs become
possible because of such metarepresentation, as does the ability
to evaluate one’s own desires—to desire to desire differently2.
Humans alone appear to be able to represent a model not only of
the actual preference structure currently acted upon but also of a
model of an idealized preference structure. There are two mental
capacities that enable thinking about higher-level preferences.
The first, cognitive decoupling, is an algorithmic-level construct
that has been discussed extensively in this book. The second
construct, which I will explore in this chapter, is more of a
thinking disposition at the reflective level.
In all hypothetical reasoning, a person must be able to represent
a belief as separate from the world it is representing. As has
been discussed,
decoupling skills prevent our representations of the real world from
(p.83) becoming confused with representations of imaginary
situations (simulations) that we create on a temporary basis to
predict the effects of future actions or to think of the
consequences of pursuing alternative goals and desires.
Metarepresentation occurs when a representational relationship
itself becomes decoupled (see Perner, 1991). Several theorists
have emphasized how the metarepresentational abilities of the
analytic system make possible a cognitive critique of our own
beliefs and desires (e.g., Carruthers, 2002; Dennett, 1984;
Stanovich, 2004).
Decoupling for this type of cognitive critique may be one of the
most important aspects of the analytic minds (algorithmic and
reflective) that relate to rationality. It may be even more
important—and perhaps even more computationally expensive3
—than decoupling for the purposes of redirecting serial
associative thought or for the purposes of inhibiting an
infelicitous TASS response that has been primed.

Cognitive decoupling underlies the ability to reason about

alternative preferences and to form higher-order preferences.
However, it is not in itself the motive for forming higher-level
preferences. There must be a motivational mechanism that
creates the need for such self-evaluation. In this chapter, I will
speculate about the nature of this motive and argue that it is
a dispositional variable at a high level of generality that is,
nonetheless, potentially measurable.
A metarepresentationally based critique of one’s beliefs is
important in epistemic calibration, and this operation has been
emphasized in the memetics literature (Dawkins, 1993;
Stanovich, 2004). Here, however, I would like to discuss
cognitive critique in the domain of desires. There is a
philosophical literature on the notion of higher-order evaluation
of desires4, and it is one that is of potential theoretical interest
for decision scientists (see Flanagan, 1996, for an insightful
discussion that is informed by cognitive science). For example,
in a classic paper on
second-order desires, Frankfurt (1971) speculated that only
humans have such (p.84) metarepresentational states. He
evocatively termed creatures without second-order desires (other
animals, human babies) wantons. To say that a wanton does not
form second-order desires does not mean that they are heedless
or careless about their first-order desires. Wantons can be
rational in the purely instrumental sense. Wantons may well act
in their environments to fulfill their goals with optimal efficiency.
A wanton simply does not reflect on his/her goals. Wantons want
—but they do not care what they want.
Nonwantons, however, can represent a model of an idealized
preference structure—perhaps, for example, a model based on a
superordinate judgment of long-term lifespan considerations (or
what Gauthier, 1986, calls considered preferences). So a
human can say: I would prefer to prefer not to smoke. This
second-order preference can then become a motivational
competitor to the first-order preference. At the level of second-
order preferences, I prefer to prefer to not smoke; nevertheless,
as a first-order preference, I prefer to smoke. The resulting
conflict signals that I lack what Nozick (1993) terms rational
integration in my preference structures. Such a mismatched
first-/second-order preference structure is one reason why
humans are often less rational than bees in an axiomatic sense
(see Stanovich, 2004, pp. 243–247). This is because the struggle
to achieve rational integration can destabilize first-order
preferences in ways that make them more prone to the
context effects that lead to the violation of the basic axioms of
utility theory (see Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009).
The struggle for rational integration is also what contributes to
the feeling of alienation that people in the modern world often
feel when contemplating the choices that they have made.
People easily detect when their high-order preferences conflict
with the choices actually made.

Of course, there is no limit to the hierarchy of higher-order

desires that might be constructed. But the representational
abilities of humans may set some limits—certainly three levels
seems a realistic limit for most people in the nonsocial domain
(Dworkin, 1988). However, third-order judgments can be called
upon to help achieve rational integration at lower levels. So, for
example, imagine that John is a smoker. He might realize the
following when he probes his feelings: He prefers his preference
to prefer not to smoke over his preference for smoking.
(p.85) We might in this case say that John’s third-order
judgment has ratified his second-order evaluation. Presumably
this ratification of his second-order judgment adds to the
cognitive pressure to change the first-order preference by
taking behavioral measures that will make
change more likely (entering a smoking secession program,
consulting his physician, staying out of smoky bars, etc.).

On the other hand, a third-order judgment might undermine the

second-order preference by failing to ratify it: John might prefer
to smoke more than he prefers his preference to prefer not to
smoke.
In this case, although John wishes he did not want to smoke, the
preference for this preference is not as strong as his preference
for smoking itself. We might suspect that this third-order
judgment might not only prevent John from taking strong
behavioral steps to rid himself of his addiction, but that over time
it might erode his conviction in his
second-order preference itself, thus bringing rational integration
to all three levels.

Typically, philosophers have tended to bias their analyses toward

the highest level desire that is constructed—privileging the
highest point in the regress of higher-order evaluations, using
that as the foundation, and defining it as the true self. Modern
cognitive science would suggest instead a Neurathian project in
which no level of analysis is uniquely privileged. Philosopher Otto
Neurath (1932/33; see Quine, 1960, pp. 3–4) employed the
metaphor of a boat having some rotten planks. The best way to
repair the planks would be to bring the boat ashore, stand on
firm ground, and replace the planks. But what if the boat could
not be brought ashore? Actually, the boat could still be repaired
but at some risk. We could repair the planks at sea by standing
on some of the planks while repairing others. The project could
work—we could repair the boat without being on the firm
foundation of ground. The Neurathian project is not guaranteed,
however, because we might choose to stand on a rotten plank.
For example, nothing in Frankfurt’s (1971) notion of
higher-order desires guarantees against higher-order judgments
being infected by memes (units of cultural transmission, see
Chapter 8) that are personally damaging.

Many philosophers have thought that unless we had a level of

cognitive analysis (preferably the highest one) that was
foundational, something that we value about ourselves (various
candidates in the philosophical (p.86) literature have been
personhood, autonomy, identity, and free will) would be put in
jeopardy. Hurley (1989), in contrast, endorses a Neurathian view
in which there does not exist either a “highest platform” or a so-
called true-self, outside of the interlocking nexus of desires. She
argues that “the exercise of autonomy involves depending on
certain of our values as a basis for criticizing and revising others,
but not detachment from all of them, and that autonomy does
not depend on a regress into higher and higher order attitudes,
but on the first step” (p.
364). In short, the uniquely human project of self-definition
begins at the first step, when an individual begins to climb the
ladder of hierarchical values—when a person has, for the first
time, a problem of rational
integration.

What Motivates the Search for Rational Integration?

But how do we know that a person is engaging deeply in such a
process of self-definition and rational integration? Interestingly,
perhaps the best indicator is when we detect a mismatch
between a person’s first- and second-order desires with which
the person is struggling: The person avows a certain set of
values that imply that they should prefer to do something
other than they do. In fact, they will often tell you that they
are struggling to find rational integration (without using those
terms, of course).
No dual-process theorist would posit that rational integration is
an automatic process. It is more likely an effortful process that
needs motivational force to initiate. An important philosophical
paper by Velleman (1992) provides guidance to psychologists in
modeling and measuring the mechanisms involved in the
process of rational integration. Velleman (1992) attempts to
unpack Frankfurt’s (1971) idea that “the agent’s role is to
adjudicate conflicts of motives” (p. 476). Under Frankfurt’s view,
Velleman notes, the role of adjudicator cannot be taken up by a
higher-order attitude itself, because these will be always subject
to review.
Velleman (1992) asks us to get used to that idea that practical
thought itself (Manktelow, 2004; Millgram, 2001; Over, 2004) is
propelled by a distinctive motive. For Velleman, that motive is:
“your desire to act in accordance with reasons, a desire that
produces behavior, in your name, by adding its motivational
force to that of whichever motives appear
(p.87) to provide the strongest reasons for acting” (p. 479). This
attitude, for Velleman, performs the function of agency.

I would contend that what Velleman (1992) has identified is a

motive at such a high level of generality that I have termed it
the Master Rationality Motive (MRM; Stanovich, 2008). It is the
motive that drives the search for rational integration across our
preference hierarchies. Importantly, Nozick (1993) has argued
that it is not a particular algorithm for rational integration that
is rational. Instead, what is rational is the felt need for rational
integration. The need for rational integration is probably a
function of the strength of the MRM, and individual differences
in the former probably arise because of individual differences
in the latter.
Thus, the MRM is what sustains the search for rational integration.

The Master Rationality Motive as a

Psychological Construct
The psychological literature on individual differences in rational
thought does contain some attempts to measure constructs
similar to the MRM. Epstein’s Head-Over-Heart scale (a precursor
to his rational-experiential inventory; see Epstein, Pacini, Heier,
& Denes-Raj, 1995; Epstein et al., 1996) is perhaps the measure
with the most overlap with the MRM5. Our own actively open-
minded thinking scale (Stanovich & West, 2007) taps a partially
overlapping construct. Recently, however, we have tried to be
more systematic and have compiled items from a variety of
existing scales and have tested new ones in an attempt to
measure the MRM in questionnaire form. Table 5–1 presents a
proposed MRM scale.

My conjecture is that the MRM scale will tap an individual

difference characteristic different from cognitive ability
(intelligence). Thus, it is proposed that it is a scale that could
capture unique variance in rational thinking after cognitive ability
has been partialled out. One reason for making this conjecture is
that there are already empirical indications that more micro-
thinking dispositions can predict variance in reasoning tasks.
(p.88)

Table 5.1 Items on the Master Rationality Motive Scale

Item Source
Intuition is the best guide in making
decisions. (R) Stanovich &
West (1997)
Certain beliefs are just too important to
abandon, no matter how good a case Sá, West, &
can be made against them. (R) Stanovich (1999)

I am only confident of decisions that Leary, Shepperd,

are made after careful analysis of all McNeil, Jenkins, &
available information. Barnes (1986)
I do not like to be too objective in the Leary, Shepperd,
wayI look at things. (R) McNeil, Jenkins, &
Barnes (1986)
 Item Source
After I make a decision, it is often Leary, Shepperd,
difficult for me to give logical reasons McNeil, Jenkins, &
for it. (R) Barnes (1986)
I believe in following my heart more Epstein, Pacini,
than my head. (R) Heier, & Denes-Raj
(1995)
It is more important to me than to
most people to behave in a logical Epstein, Pacini,
way. Heier, & Denes-Raj
(1995)
I like to gather many different types of
evidence before I decide what to do. New
I don’t feel I have to have reasons for item
what I do. (R)
I like to think that my actions are New
motivated by sound reasons.
item

New

item

I like to have reasons for what I do. New

item I don’t like to have to justify my actions. (R)
New
item
If a belief suits me and I am New item
comfortable, it really doesn’t matter if
the belief is true. (R)
Costa & McCrae
Item #2 from Facet 6 (Deliberation) of
the Conscientious domain of the NEO (1992) Costa &
PI-R
Item #4 from Facet 6 (Deliberation) of McCrae (1992)
the Conscientious domain of the NEO
PI-R
R = item reversed scored

For example, various thinking dispositions such as need for cognition

and actively open-minded thinking have been found to predict
(sometimes after control for cognitive ability) performance on a host
of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature6.

(p.89) This previous literature differs, however, from what I am

proposing here in two ways. First, the thinking dispositions
that have been studied are at a lower level of generality than
the MRM (Perkins & Ritchhart, 2004). Second, the criterion
variables have been limited to aspects of instrumental rationality
—for example, how well people satisfy the choice axioms of
utility theory or the strictures of Bayesian belief updating. As
such, the criterion variables have reflected aspects of what has
been
termed a thin theory of rationality (see Elster, 1983; Chapter 8
of Stanovich, 2004). Thin theories define rationality in terms
of current beliefs and desires. However, it is a broad notion of
rationality (one that critiques current beliefs and first-order
desires) that is most likely to have a unique connection to the
MRM.

Of course, I do not wish to paint the MRM in too essentialist a

fashion before investigation has even begun. The extent to
which it is a generic motive is yet to be determined. There may
well be a good degree of domain specificity in the extent to
which people strive to achieve rational integration. Nonetheless,
some degree of domain specificity might not necessarily be
antithetical to the MRM construct. The logic of memetics has
suggested that there are individual differences not only among
people but also among the beliefs that they host. Importantly,
beliefs differ in the extent of their so-called adversarial
properties (Blackmore, 1999; Dawkins, 1993; Lynch, 1996)—
how strongly they are structured to repel competing ideas.
Thus, how much the beliefs that are the source of higher-order
evaluations encourage or repel the process of rational
integration may be quite variable. This implies that domain
specificity in rational integration could well exist without
domain specificity in the MRM construct itself. Issues such as
this are the type of question about the MRM that future
research will need to answer.
Human thinking is not just confined to the pursuit of instrumental
rationality. Humans also are concerned about issues of broad
rationality. They attempt to critique current desires and goals
using their metarepresentational abilities. It is conjectured here
that the critique itself—and the consistency issues it raises—is
driven by a distinctive thinking (p.90) disposition at a high level of
generality, the MRM. Preliminary research on related constructs
encourages the view that this construct is measurable.

Evolutionary Origins of the Master Rational Motive

and Type 2 Processing
How did the MRM get lodged in the reflective mind? This issue is
a small part of the larger question of how Type 2 processing, in
general, arose. There are currently several related proposals for
answering both questions floating around in the literature, and
these proposals have enough similarity that I will attempt a
synthesis here.
Nozick (1993) has argued that in prehistory, when mechanisms
for revealing what is true about the world were few, a crude
route to reliable knowledge might have been just to demand
reasons for assertions by conspecifics. True propositions might
have been supported by more reasons and by reasons of better
quality. In a related proposal, Sperber (2000) posits that we have
a logico-argumentative module that is an evolutionary
adaptation for checking the consistency of the statements of
other people to enable us to develop “the proper calibration of
trust” (p. 135). These reason-checking procedures might
bootstrap metarepresentational abilities into existence because
they encourage
self-evaluation for purposes of internal consistency assessment.
In short, applying the MRM to the thoughts of the self might be a
cognitive (as well as cultural) achievement that follows the
development of consistency- checking procedures applied to
others (see also Carruthers, 2009).

Dennett (1996, pp. 126–127) has argued that the need to

respond to the justification queries of other conspecifics
helped shape the internal mental inquiry processes in the
direction of discrete categories
—categories that mesh well with the properties of language-
based thought. These discrete categories fostered by language
then become an ideal medium for representing one’s own
thoughts to oneself (see Carruthers, 2006). Some years ago,
philosopher Allan Gibbard (1990) anticipated all of these
proposals with his emphasis on consistency checking among
conspecifics—“the need to work through normative
commitments in community” (p. 74)—and his view that “to
prepare oneself to meet demands for consistency may require a
strong imaginative life. A person (p.91) will engage in imaginative
rehearsal for actual normative discussion; he practices by
holding himself to consistency” (p. 74). All of these views are,
despite subtle differences between them, sketching the
gene/cultural co-evolutionary history (see Richerson & Boyd,
2005) of the MRM—the desire to have reasons behind our
cognitive evaluations. This is, I conjecture, the master motive
that provides the motivational press to engage in internal
cognitive reform.
What about the evolution of Type 2 processing more generally?
My view is in no way original but is instead a synthesis of the
views of a variety of scholars (e.g., Carruthers, 2002, 2006;
Mithen, 1996, 2000, 2002; Sterelny, 2001, 2003). Sterelny
(2001), like many other theorists, links the development of
early simulation ability to the social intelligence hypothesis—
the idea that our ancient social life was the selection pressure
for the development of simulation abilities7. I follow a plethora
of such social intelligence proposals in assuming that the root of
hypothetical thinking is in the development of the at least quasi-
modular theory of mind (ToM) module. In the domain of
behavioral prediction, we were first able to track what Sterelny
(2001, 2003; see also Clark, 1997 pp. 167–168) calls robust
representations—representations that map very abstractly (i.e.,
theoretically) to a large variety of contingent and context-
dependent cues.

I follow Mithen (1996) in thinking that language helped to break

down an evolutionarily older modular mind by delivering
nonsocial information to the social module, or perhaps exapting
the modular social mind for hypothetical representation of the
nonsocial world. Carruthers’ (2000, 2002, 2006) notion of
language as a mediating representational system that serves to
integrate the modular mind would also serve here just as well.
The end result is a story similar to Mithen’s (1996):
“As soon as language acted as a vehicle for delivering
information into the mind (whether one’s own or that of
another person), (p.92) carrying with it snippets of nonsocial
information, a transformation in the nature of the mind
began…. language switched from a social to a general-
purpose function, consciousness from a means to predict
other individuals’ behavior to managing a mental database
of information relating to all domains of behavior” (p. 209).

Whatever the exact mechanism, we have a discontinuity between

social and nonsocial representation of hypotheticals. Overcoming
focal bias to construct hypothetical worlds in the social domain is
effortless because of the dedicated mental machinery (the ToM
module) that supports decoupling in that domain. Decoupling to
represent alternative worlds in other domains is effortful because
it is a derivative ability, evolutionarily late to the table.
On the issue of the origins of the nonautonomous systems,
perhaps even more can be said. For example, Sterelny (2001, p.
237) argues that simulation may be more developmentally
fundamental and evolutionarily basic than metarepresentation.
Following Goldman (1995), he argues that taking the agent’s
decision mechanisms offline in the service of conditional planning
solves the “trajectory” problem. The trajectory problem is the
issue of how, in its very early stages of evolution, a very basic
simulator could have helped. Simulating the self comes first in
this view, because simulating others “involves much more radical
shifts from the agent’s current state than does conditional
planning” (p. 238).
There is a family resemblance in all of these proposals. For
example, analogous to how Mithen (1996) argues that modules
dedicated to social information processing were recruited for
other tasks, Sterelny (2001) argues that these initial conditional
planning abilities and modeling of the minds of others via
simulation abilities then became recruited for other nonsocial
hypothetical reasoning tasks.

Alternatively, one could depict the evolutionary development in

terms of the boxology models employed by Nichols and Stich
(2003) in their book on ToM abilities. They depict the dedicated
mindreading system as including a mindreading coordinator to
update beliefs about agents and most importantly a Possible
Worlds Box (PWB), which embodies what I have been calling
decoupling operations—in essence, the mechanism that
prevents representation abuse in Leslie’s (1987) terms (p.93)
(see Chapter 3). The Mithen/Sterelny idea of simulation abilities
becoming recruited for other nonsocial hypothetical reasoning
tasks can be portrayed within the Nichols/Stich model. It
amounts to positing that the PWB eventually comes to exist as a
general mechanism (unattached to the theory of mind
apparatus) that is available to receive input from any domain. In
other domains, there would be no dedicated mindreading
coordinator, and perhaps this would account, in some as yet
unspecified way, for the fact that decoupling for hypothetical
thinking—that is, dealing with robust representations—is so
much harder in nonsocial domains.
One of the most complex activities that can take place in the
PWB is to manipulate and evaluate metarepresentations—
representations of one’s own representations. Metarepresentation
is involved when we evaluate whether we are satisfied with our
own preference structures and when we critique our own beliefs
(see Stanovich, 2004). It is a function that might have been
borrowed from ToM abilities (again, in the manner of Mithen’s
model of the nonsocial thought infecting the social).

It should be noted, however, that my conception of this is not

how Nichols and Stich (2003) see it, because their model is just
the opposite. They (see p. 65) view the PWB (a general
hypothetical reasoning device) being exapted for use in
behavior prediction and mindreading. I join many other
theorists however (e.g., Mithen, 1996, 2002; Tomasello, 1998,
1999) in seeing the causal direction running the other way—from
ToM to hypothetical reasoning abilities. This follows from the
idea that forming robust representations (see Clark, 1997;
Sterelny, 2001) and developing robust prediction abilities
probably originated in the social domain of
predicting the complex behaviors of others who were potentially
hostile (see Sterelny, 2003). Robust representation was probably
necessary in this social domain and developed in innate—if not
modular—mental machinery. This machinery was then used
more abstractly (in the manner of the PWB) for hypothetical
reasoning more generally. The decoupling abilities of the
algorithmic mind and the calls for decoupling from the reflective
mind are the modern remnants of this evolutionary history.

Whatever specific evolutionary explanation is true, the MRM

serves to reinforce the distinctions in the tripartite cognitive
model presented in this volume. The MRM is a high-level
control state that resides in the (p.94) reflective mind. It is,
indirectly, a sign that we need to posit the
reflective mind. It also demonstrates some of the important ways
that IQ tests are incomplete—an important theme in the
remaining chapters of this book. Nothing like the MRM is
assessed on IQ tests. Such tests assess algorithmic-level
functioning only—crystallized knowledge (Gc) plus decoupling
abilities (Gf). Variation in the “desire to act in accordance with
reasons” is a thinking disposition that needs to be assessed
under typical, not maximal, conditions. It is more related to
rationality than to intelligence. In fact, it is only one of a myriad
of rational thinking skills that go unassessed on IQ tests. The
relationship between intelligence and rational thought has
remained unexplored for many years. My research lab’s program
on individual differences in performance on heuristics and biases
tasks has been in an ideal position to explore this issue.
In the next chapters, an attempt is made to organize the
literature on rational thinking errors and biases and to look at
the data on the associations between these errors and
intelligence. A model for predicting which rational thinking
tasks will be associated with intelligence and which will not is
developed. The rational thinking skills that are missed by
intelligence tests will be highlighted by this model and it will
provide a framework for the development of formal procedures
to assess individual differences in rational thought that are
discussed in Chapter 10.

Notes:
(1) On being alienated from one’s choices, see Ainslie (2001,
2005). There is a large literature on so-called “akrasia (weakness
of the will)” in philosophy (Davidson, 1980; Stroud & Tappolet,
2003) and an equally large literature on problems of self-control
in psychology, economics, and neurophysiology (Ainslie, 1992,
2001; Baumeister & Vohs, 2003, 2007;
Berridge, 2003; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Loewenstein,
Read, & Baumeister, 2003; Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008;
Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000;
Rachlin, 1995, 2000).

(2) As noted in Chapter 3, many different disciplines deal with

the issue of metarepresentation (Dennett, 1984; Dienes &
Perner, 1999; Jackendoff, 1996; Sperber, 2000; Nichols & Stich,
2003; Stanovich, 2004). It is not uncontroversial to say that
humans alone appear to be able to metarepresent, but the
literature favoring this conclusion is growing (see Kaminski, Call,
& Tomasello, 2008; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008, 2009;
Povinelli & Bering, 2002; Povinelli & Giambrone, 2001;
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).
(3) Friedman et al. (2006) found that measures of fluid
intelligence were more highly related to the updating
component of so-called “executive functioning measures” than
to the inhibition or set shifting components (see also Friedman
et al., 2008).

(4) Many philosophers have discussed the conceptual

status of higher-order desires (Bratman, 2003; Dworkin,
1988; Harman, 1995
Lehrer, 1990, 1997; Lewis, 1989; Maher, 1993; Nozick, 1993; Taylor, 1989;
Watson, 1975).

(5) There has been a reasonable amount of work on the

rational- experiential inventory (see Bartels, 2006; Klaczynski
& Lavallee, 2005; Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, &
Farrelly, 2004; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

(6) This literature is growing (Bartels, 2006; Chatterjee et al.,

2000; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Kokis et al., 2002; Ku & Ho,
2010; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Newstead et al., 2004; Pacini &
Epstein, 1999; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Perkins & Ritchhart,
2004; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002; Simon, Fagley, & Halleran,
2004; Smith & Levin, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1998c, 1999,
2000; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; Verplanken, 1993).

(7) The literature on aspects of the social intelligence

hypothesis is huge (e.g., Baldwin, 2000; Cummins, 1996, 2002;
Dunbar, 1998; Gibbard, 1990; Goldman, 2006; Goody,1995;
Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007;
Humphrey, 1976,1986; Kummer, Daston, Gigerenzer, & Silk,
1997; Levinson, 1995; Mithen, 1996,2000, 2002; Tomasello,
1998, 1999; Whiten & Byrne, 1997).
A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Problems
Richard F. West
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0006

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter uses the tri-process model and other distinctions introduced in
the book to develop a taxonomy of rational thinking errors that have been
revealed in the heuristics and biases literature. The taxonomy is used to
classify a large number of tasks and effects from the literature on judgment
and decision making. The chapter also stresses the importance of knowledge
bases (so-called “mindware”) in determining the rationality of beliefs and
actions.
Keywords: rational thinking errors, judgment, decision making, knowledge bases, rational thought

The concepts introduced so far in this book provide the foundation for a
taxonomy of rational thinking problems that can be used to organize the
heuristics and biases literature. We need just one additional concept—but it
is an important one because it is often overlooked.

Dual-Process Theory and Knowledge Structures

An aspect of dual-process theory that has been relatively neglected is that
successful Type 2 override operations require both procedural and
declarative knowledge.
Although taking the Type 1 response priming offline might itself be
procedural, the process of synthesizing an alternative response often utilizes
stored knowledge of various types. During the simulation process,
declarative knowledge and strategic rules (linguistically coded strategies)
are used to transform a decoupled representation. In the previous dual-
process literature, override has been treated as a somewhat disembodied
process. The knowledge bases and strategies that are brought to bear on the
secondary representations during the simulation process have been given
little attention.

In fact, each of the levels in the tripartite model has to access knowledge to
carry out its operations (see Fig. 6–1). The reflective mind not only accesses
general knowledge structures but, importantly, accesses the person’s
opinions, beliefs, and reflectively acquired goal structure (considered
preferences, see Gauthier, 1986). The algorithmic mind accesses micro-
strategies for cognitive operations and production system rules for
sequencing behaviors and thoughts. Finally, the autonomous mind accesses
not only evolutionarily compiled encapsulated knowledge bases but also
retrieves information that has become tightly compiled and automatically
activated because of overlearning and practice.
 (p.96) It is important to note that what is displayed in Figure 6–1 are the
knowledge bases that are unique to each mind. Algorithmic- and reflective-
level processes also receive inputs from the computations of the autonomous
mind (see the G arrows in Fig. 4–1, which indicate the influence of
preattentive processes). The knowledge structures available for retrieval—
particularly those available to the reflective mind—represent crystallized
intelligence (Gc; intelligence-as-knowledge) in the Cattell/Horn/Carroll theory
of intelligence mentioned in Chapter 3. Recall that fluid intelligence (Gf;
intelligence-as-process) is already represented in the figure. It is the general
computational power of the algorithmic mind—importantly exemplified by the
ability to sustain cognitive decoupling.

Because the Gf/Gc theory is one of the most comprehensively validated

theories of intelligence available, it is important to see how both of its major
components miss critical aspects of rational thought. Fluid intelligence will,
of course, have some relation to rationality because it
(p.97) indexes the
computational power of the
algorithmic mind to sustain
decoupling. Because override
and simulation are important
operations for rational
thought, Gf will definitely
facilitate rational action in
some situations.
Nevertheless, the tendency
to initiate override (arrow B
in Fig.
4–1) and to initiate simulation
activities (arrow D in Fig. 4–1)
are both aspects of the
reflective mind unassessed by
intelligence tests, so the tests
will miss these components of Figure 6.1. Knowledge Structures in the Tripartite Framework.
rationality. These propensities
are instead indexed by
measures of typical
performance (cognitive styles
and thinking dispositions) as
opposed to measures of
maximal performance such as
IQ tests.
The situation with respect to Gc is a little different. Rational thought depends
critically on the acquisition of certain types of knowledge. That knowledge
would, in the abstract, be classified as crystallized intelligence. But is it the
kind of crystallized knowledge that is assessed on actual tests of
intelligence? The answer is no. The knowledge structures that support
rational thought are specialized (they cluster in the domains of probabilistic
reasoning, causal reasoning, and scientific reasoning). In contrast, the
crystallized knowledge assessed on IQ tests is deliberately designed to be
nonspecialized. The designers of the tests, to make sure the sampling of
vocabulary and knowledge is fair and unbiased, explicitly attempt to broadly
sample vocabulary, verbal comprehension domains, and general knowledge.
In short, Gc, as traditionally measured, does not assess individual differences
in rationality, and Gf will do so only indirectly and to a mild extent.

The knowledge, rules, procedures, and strategies that can be retrieved and used to
transform decoupled representations have been referred to as mindware, a
term coined by David Perkins in a 1995 book (Clark, 2001, uses it in a
slightly different way from Perkins’ original coinage). The mindware
available for use during cognitive simulation is in part the product of past
learning experiences. This means that there will be individual differences in
the ability to simulate better alternatives to a
TASS-based response. Indeed, if one is going to trump a TASS-primed
response with conflicting information or a learned rule, one must have
previously learned the information or the rule. If, in fact, the relevant
mindware is not available because it has not been learned, then we have a
case of missing mindware rather than a
TASS-override failure. This distinction in fact represents the beginning of a
taxonomy of the causes of cognitive failure (p.98) related to rational behavior
that we are currently using to organize the heuristics and biases literature
and to classify various practical problems of rational thinking—for example,
to understand the thinking problems of pathological gamblers (Toplak et al.,
2007).

With mindware problems established as a possible cause of rational thinking

problems, we are now in a position to lay out a taxonomy of thinking errors
that captures most of the effects studied in the heuristics and biases
literature1. We will see that the taxonomy captures the distinction between
rationality as process and rationality as content in a manner similar to the
way that process and content are partitioned in the fluid/crystallized (Gf/Gc)
theory of intelligence.

The Preliminary Taxonomy

A preliminary attempt at such a taxonomy is displayed in Figure 6–2.
Presented at the top of the figure are three classes of rational thinking error
that result from the human tendency to process information as a cognitive
miser. The three classes are listed in order of relative cognitive engagement.
The characteristic of the cognitive miser that is presented first is the
tendency to default to the response options primed by the autonomous
mind. It represents the shallowest kind of processing because no Type 2
processing is done at all. In the dual-process literature, this type of
processing default has sometimes been termed a failure to override TASS
processing. However, in the taxonomy we are presenting here, for something
to be considered a TASS override failure, Type 2 processing must lose out to
Type 1 processing in a conflict of discrepant outputs. If Type 2 processing is
not engaged at all, then it is not considered an override failure in our view.

In fact, the early heuristics and biases researchers were clearer on this point
than many later dual-process theorists. The distinction between impressions
and judgments in the early heuristics and biases work (see (p.99)

Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005, for a discussion) made it
clearer that non-normative responses often resulted not from a Type 2/Type 1
struggle but from intuitive impressions that are left uncorrected by the rules and
strategies that Type 2 processing can recruit. In fact, in many cases that have been
called override failure in the literature, (p.100) the subject probably does not even
consider overriding the TASS-based response (even when the mindware to do so is
readily available and well learned). In such cases, the subject does not recognize
the need for override or chooses not to sustain the necessary decoupling and
simulation with alternative mindware that would make override possible.
The second type of
processing tendency of the
cognitive miser that is
represented in Figure 6–2 is
to engage in serial
associative cognition with a
focal bias. This characteristic
represents a tendency to
over-economize during Type
2 processing
—specifically, to fail to
engage in the full-blown
simulation of alternative
worlds or to engage in fully
disjunctive reasoning
(Shafir, 1994; Toplak &
Stanovich, 2002).

The third category is that of

override failure—which
represents the least miserly
tendency because, here,
Type 2 cognitive decoupling Figure 6.2. A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Error Types.
is engaged. Inhibitory Type 2
processes try to take the
Type 1 processing of the
autonomous mind offline in
these cases, but they fail. So
in override failure, cognitive
decoupling does occur, but it
fails to suppress the Type 1 processing of the autonomous mind. Override
failure in this taxonomy encompasses what folk theory would call problems of
willpower or the problem of multiple minds (see Ainslie, 2001, 2005, for a
nuanced discussion of the folk concept of willpower in light of modern
cognitive science). Psychologists and economists often term these situations
as reflecting problems of self-control2.

However, there are more than just willpower and self-control issues in this
category. For some subjects, heuristics and biases tasks can also trigger
override problems because of an architecture of multiple minds. Sloman (1996)
points out that at least for some subjects, the Linda conjunction problem (see
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) is the quintessence of dual-process conflict. He
quotes Stephen Gould’s introspection that “I know the [conjunction] is least
probable, yet a little homunculus in my head continues to jump up and down,
shouting at me—‘but she can’t be a bank teller; read the description’ ” (Gould,
1991, p. 469). For sophisticated subjects such as Gould, resolving the Linda
problem clearly (p.101) involves a Type 1/Type 2 processing conflict, and in his
case, a conjunction error on the task would represent a true case of override
failure. However, for the majority of subjects in this task, there may well be no
conscious introspection going on—Type 2 processing is either not engaged or
engaged so little that there is no awareness of a cognitive struggle. Instead,
TASS-based heuristics such as representativeness or conversational pragmatics
trigger the response. The detailed controversies about the Linda task are
beyond our scope here3. The algorithmic and reflective minds (that carry out
Type 2 processing) have not lost a struggle when they have not been called
into the battle. For such subjects, committing the conjunction
error in the Linda problem represents a case of defaulting to the processing
of the autonomous mind (the first category in Fig. 6–2).

The next two categories of rational thinking error in Figure 6–2 concern
mindware problems. The first is termed a mindware gap—missing
knowledge of the rules and strategies of rational thought. In Figure 6–2, the
curved rectangles are meant to represent these missing knowledge bases.
The figure is not meant to represent an exhaustive set of knowledge
partitionings—to the contrary, only a minimal sampling of a potentially large
set of coherent knowledge bases is represented. Many domains of knowledge
in the areas of probabilistic reasoning, causal reasoning, logic, and scientific
thinking could result in irrational thought or behavior if they are not available
during simulation operations. The two represented in Figure 6–2 are
mindware categories that have been implicated in research in the heuristics
and biases tradition: missing knowledge about probability and probabilistic
reasoning strategies and ignoring alternative hypotheses when evaluating
hypotheses. The study of pathological gambling behavior, for example, has
focused on a class of missing mindware of particular relevance to that
condition: knowledge and procedures for dealing with probability and
probabilistic events (Keren, 1994; Rogers, 1998; Toneatto, 1999; Toplak et
al., 2007; Wagenaar, 1988). Many studies of such gamblers now administer
measures of knowledge (p.102) of regression to the mean, outcome bias, the
gambler’s fallacy, probability matching, baserate neglect, Bayesian
probabilistic updating, and covariation detection. However, these are just a
few of many mindware gaps that have been suggested in the literature on
behavioral decision making. There are many others, and the box labeled
“Many Domain-Specific Knowledge Structures” indicates this.

Note that the curved, double-headed arrow in this figure, indicating an

important relationship between the mindware gap category and miserly
processing. Most previous discussions in the dual-process literature have
simply assumed that mindware was available to Type 2 to allow it to
synthesize a response superior to that primed by Type 1 processing. If, in
fact, the mindware is not available because it has not been learned or at
least not learned to the requisite level to sustain override, then in this
taxonomy it is considered a mindware gap rather than any type of miserly
processing.

One interesting implication of the relation between miserly processing and

mindware gaps is that the fewer gaps one has, the more likely that an error
may be attributable to miserly processing. In contrast, errors made by
someone with little relevant mindware installed are less likely to result from
miserly processing than to mindware gaps. Of course, the two categories
trade off in a continuous manner with a fuzzy boundary between them. For
example, a well-learned rule that is not strongly enough applied might be
seen as a case of override failure. When a rule is less well-instantiated, there
is a point where it is so poorly compiled that it is not an alternative to the
Type 1 response, and thus the processing error becomes a mindware gap.

Although mindware gaps may lead to suboptimal reasoning, the next

category in the taxonomy is designed to draw attention to the fact that
not all mindware is helpful
—either to goal attainment or to epistemic accuracy. In fact, some acquired
mindware can be the direct cause of irrational actions that thwart our goals.
Such effects thus define the last category in the taxonomy of thinking errors
displayed in Figure 6–2: contaminated mindware4. The curved rectangles
represent problematic (p.103) knowledge and strategies. Again, they do not
represent an exhaustive partitioning (the
mindware-related categories are too diverse for that) but instead represent
some of the mechanisms that have received some discussion in the
literature. One is a subcategory of contaminated mindware that is much
discussed in the literature—mindware that contains evaluation-disabling
properties. Some of the evaluation-disabling properties that help keep some
mindware lodged in their hosts are: the promise of punishment if the
mindware is questioned; the promise of rewards for unquestioning faith in
the mindware; or the thwarting of evaluation attempts by rendering the
mindware unfalsifiable.

Another subcategory of contaminated mindware that has been discussed by

several theorists is a concept of “self” that serves to encourage egocentric
thinking (Blackmore, 1999; Dennett, 1991, 1995). The self, according to these
theorists, is a mechanism that fosters one characteristic of focal bias: that we
tend to build models of the world from a single myside perspective. The
egocentrism of the self was, of course, evolutionarily adaptive. However, for
many of the same reasons that the heuristics of the autonomous mind are
sometimes nonoptimal in a technological environment different from the
environment of evolutionary adaptation, the decontextualizing demands of
modernity increasingly require such characteristics. Consider, for example,
such modern social/psychological requirements: fairness, rule-following
despite context, even-handedness, sanctioning of nepotism, unbiasedness,
universalism, inclusiveness, contractually mandated equal treatment, and
discouragement of familial, racial, and religious discrimination. These
requirements are difficult ones, probably because they override processing
defaults related to the self.

Finally, the last subcategory of contaminated mindware pictured in Figure 6–

2 is meant to represent what is actually a whole set of categories: mindware
representing specific categories of maladaptive information. Similarly to the
missing mindware category, there may be many clusters of misinformation
that would support irrational thought and behavior. For example, the
gambler’s fallacy and many of the other misunderstandings of probability
that have been studied in the heuristics and (p.104) biases literature would fit
here (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Burns & Corpus, 2004; Croson & Sundali, 2005;
Nickerson, 2004; Roney & Trick, 2009). Of course, the line between missing
mindware and contaminated mindware might get fuzzy in some cases, and
the domain of probabilistic thinking is probably one such case.

Lay psychological theory is represented as the potential locus of

contaminated mindware and as the potential locus of a mindware gap in
Figure 6–2. Lay psychological theories are the theories that people have
about their own minds. Mindware gaps in this domain would be represented
by the many things about our own minds that we do not know—for example,
how quickly we will adapt to both fortunate and unfortunate events (Gilbert,
2006; Kahneman, 1999; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). Other things we think we
know about our own minds are wrong. These misconceptions represent
contaminated mindware. An example would be the folk belief that we
accurately know our own minds, what philosophers of mind call the
incorrigibility of introspection (Churchland, 1988). This contaminated
mindware leads people to incorrectly believe that they always know the
causes of their own actions (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and to think that
although others display thinking biases, they themselves have special
immunity from the very same biases (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005;
Pronin, 2006; Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007).
Heuristics and Biases Tasks in Terms of the Taxonomy
Table 6–1 illustrates how various well-known effects in the heuristics and
biases literature fit into the taxonomy. This again is not an exhaustive list but
instead reflects some of the effects that have received the most attention in
the literature. The first three Xs in the first column signify defaults to the
autonomous mind: vividness effects (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), affect
substitution (Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic & Peters, 2006), and impulsively
associative thinking. Defaulting to the most vivid or salient stimulus is a
common way that the cognitive miser avoids Type 2 processing. Likewise,
defaulting to affective valence is often used in situations with emotional
salience. Affect substitution is a specific form of a more generic trick of the
cognitive miser discussed by Kahneman and Frederick (2002): attribute
substitution—the substitution of an easy-to-evaluate characteristic for a
harder one, even if the easier one is less accurate. (p.105) (p.106)
Table 6.1. Classification of Several Tasks, Effects, and Processing Styles in Terms of a Taxonomy of Rational Thinking
Errors

The Cognitive Miser Mindware Gaps (MG) MG & CM Contaminated Mindware

(CM)
Tasks, Default to Foca Overrid Probabilit Alternativ Lay Evaluatio Self and
Effects, the l e y e Psychologic n Egocentri
and Autonomou Bias Failure Knowledg Thinking al Theory Disabling c
Processin s Mind e Strategie Processin
g Styles s g
Vividnes X
s effects
Affect
substitutio
n
X
Impulsivel
y
associati
ve
thinking X
Framing effects X

Anchoring X
effects
Belief bias X

Denominator X
neglect
Outcome bias X

Hindsight bias X
(“curse of
knowledge”
effects)
Self-control X
problems
Gambler’s X
fallacy

Noncausal X
baserates
Bias blind spot X
Causal
baserates X X

Conjunction X X
errors
Four card X X X
selection
task
 The Cognitive Miser Mindware Gaps (MG) MG & CM Contaminated Mindware
(CM)
Tasks,
Effects, Default to Foca Overrid Probabilit Alternativ Lay Evaluatio Self and
and the l e y e Psychologic n Egocentri
Processin Autonomou Bias Failure Knowledg Thinking al Theory Disabling c
g Styles s Mind e Strategie Processin
s g
Myside
processin X X
g
X X
Affective
forecastin
g errors
X X
Ignorin
g
P(D/∼H X X X
)
X X
Confirmation
bias
X X
Overconfidenc
e effects
X X
Probabilit
y X X
matching
Pseudoscientifi
c beliefs
Evaluability
effects
The effect in the next row of Table 6–1 is an example of a form of intellectual
laziness that we term impulsively associative thinking. Consider the following
problem, taken from the work of Levesque (1986, 1989) and studied by our research
group (see Toplak & Stanovich, 2002): Jack is looking at Anne, but Anne is looking
at George. Jack is married, but George is not. Is a married person looking at an
unmarried person? A) Yes, B) No, C) Cannot be determined.
The vast majority of people answer C (cannot be determined), when in fact
the correct answer to this problem is A (yes). To answer correctly, both
possibilities for Anne’s marital status (married and unmarried) must be
considered to determine whether a conclusion can be drawn. If Anne (p.107) is
married, then the answer is “Yes” because she would be looking at George,
who is unmarried. If Anne is not married, then the answer is still “Yes”
because Jack, who is married, would be looking at Anne.
Considering all the possibilities (the fully disjunctive reasoning strategy)
reveals that a married person is looking at an unmarried person, whether
Anne is married or not. The fact that the problem does not reveal whether
Anne is married immediately suggests to people that nothing can be
determined. Impulsively associative thinking results in the preponderance of
“cannot be determined” responses to this problem because the subject tends
not to look for all the information that can be inferred. Many people make the
easiest (incorrect) inference from the information given and do not proceed
with the more difficult (but correct) inference that follows from fully
disjunctive reasoning. Subjects look for any simple association that will
prevent them from having to engage in Type 2 thought (in this case,
associating Anne’s unknown status with the response “cannot be
determined”).

Another example of impulsively associative thinking is described in a chapter

by Kahneman and Frederick (2002). They describe a simple experiment in
which people were asked to consider the following puzzle: A bat and a ball
cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost?

Many people emit the response that first comes to mind—10¢—without

thinking further and realizing that this cannot be right. The bat would then
have to cost $1.10, and the total cost would then be $1.20 rather than the
required $1.10. People often do not think deeply enough to make this simple
correction, however, and many students at very selective universities will
answer incorrectly and move on to the next problem without realizing that
impulsively associative thinking has led them to make an error. Frederick
(2005) has found that when given this and other similar problems, large
numbers of students at MIT, Princeton, and Harvard display such impulsively
associative thinking.

The second default of the cognitive miser is to utilize serial associative

cognition with a focal bias. Framing effects represent the classic example of
this default in the heuristics and biases literature5. For example, (p.108) in
discussing the mechanisms causing framing effects, Kahneman has stated
that “the basic principle of framing is the passive acceptance of the
formulation given” (2003, p. 703). The frame presented to the subject is
taken as focal, and all subsequent thought derives from it rather than from
alternative framings because the latter would require more thought. One of
the most compelling framing demonstrations is from the early work of
Tversky and Kahneman (1981):

Decision 1. Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program A
is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is a one-
third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability
that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor,
Program A or Program B?

When given this problem, most people prefer Program A—the one that saves
200 lives for sure. There is nothing wrong with this choice taken alone.
However, inconsistent responses to another problem define a framing effect:

Decision 2. Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of
an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the
exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as
follows: If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program D is
adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. Which of the two programs would
you favor, Program C or Program D?

When presented with Decision 2, most people prefer Program D. Thus, across
the two problems, the most popular choices are Program A and Program D.
The problem here is that Decision 1 and Decision 2 are really the same
decision—they are merely redescriptions of the same situation. Program A
and C are the same—that 400 will die in Program (p.109) C implies that 200
will be saved, which is precisely the same number saved (200) in Program A.
Likewise, the two-thirds chance that 600 will die in Program D is the same
two-thirds chance that 600 will die (“no people will be saved”) in Program B.
Many people show inconsistent preferences—their choice switches
depending on the phrasing of the question. This is an example of a problem
with very transparent equivalence. When presented with both versions of the
problem together, most people agree that the problems are identical and
that the alternative phrasing should not have made a difference. Such a lack
of so-called “descriptive invariance” is a very fundamental violation of some
of the simplest strictures of rational thought (see Tversky & Kahneman,
1981, 1986).

Anchoring effects are listed next in Table 6–1 and, of course, refer to the
inappropriate anchoring and insufficient adjustment that have been
reported in the literature (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Stewart, 2009). For
example, in a classic experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
demonstrated that the anchoring tendency is much too mindless—that it
does not bother to assess for relevance. They had subjects watch a spinning
wheel, and when the pointer landed on a number (rigged to be the number
65) they were asked whether the percentage of African countries in the
United Nations was higher or lower than this percentage. After answering
higher or lower to this question, the subjects then had to give their best
estimate of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations.
Another group of subjects had it arranged so that their pointer landed on the
number 10. They were also asked to make the higher or lower judgment and
then to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United Nations.
Now it is clear that because a spinning wheel was used, the number involved
in the first question was totally irrelevant to the task of answering second
question. Yet the number that came up on the spinning wheel affected the
answer to the second question. The mean estimate of the first group (the
group where the spinning wheel
stopped at 65) turned out to be significantly larger (45) compared to the mean estimate
(25) for the second group. Both groups are using the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic—the high anchor group adjusting down and the low group adjusting up
—but their adjustments are “sticky.” They are not adjusting enough because
they have failed to fully take into account that the anchor is determined in a
totally random (p.110) manner. The anchoring and adjustment heuristic reveals
the operation of an inappropriate focal bias.

Override failure (the third category of thinking errors presented in the

columns of Table 6–1) is illustrated by a variety of effects: belief bias effects,
denominator neglect, outcome bias, hindsight bias, and self-control problems
such as the inability to delay gratification. Belief bias occurs when people
have difficulty evaluating conclusions that conflict with what they think they
know about the world (Evans et al., 1983). It is most often assessed with
syllogistic reasoning tasks in which the believability of the conclusion
conflicts with logical validity (discussed in Chapter 2). Belief bias provides a
classic example of the failure of sustained decoupling. In a syllogism such as:
All living things need water; Roses need water; Therefore, Roses are living
things; subjects must suppress the tendency to endorse a valid response
because of the “naturalness” (see Kahneman, 2003) of the conclusion—roses
are flowers.

Another phenomenon from the heuristics and biases literature that illustrates
the failure of sustained decoupling is the phenomenon of denominator
neglect. Epstein and colleagues (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick &
Epstein, 1992; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) demonstrated that it can result in a
startling failure of rational judgment. Adults in several of his experiments
were presented with two bowls that each contained clearly identified
numbers of jelly beans. The first held 9 white jelly beans and 1 red jelly
bean. The second held 92 white jelly beans and 8 red. A random draw was to
be made from one of the two bowls, and if the red jelly bean was picked, the
participant would receive a dollar. The participant could choose which bowl
to draw from. Although the two bowls clearly represent a 10% and an 8%
chance of winning a dollar, a number of subjects chose the 100 bean bowl,
thus reducing their chance of winning. The majority did pick the 10% bowl,
but a healthy minority (30%–40% of the participants) picked the 8% bowl.
Although most of these participants in the minority were aware that the large
bowl was statistically a worse bet, that bowl also contained more enticing
winning beans—the 8 red ones. In short, the tendency to respond to the
absolute number of winners, for these participants, trumped the formal rule
(pick the one with the best percentage of reds) that they knew was the
better choice. That many subjects were aware of the poorer probability but
failed to resist picking the large bowl is indicated by comments from (p.111)
some of them, such as the following: “I picked the one with more red jelly
beans because it looked like there were more ways to get a winner, even
though I knew there were also more whites, and that the percents were
against me” (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994, p. 823).

Override failures thus often have a different phenomenology than the errors
in the other two categories of miser errors (defaulting to the autonomous
mind and displaying a focal bias). In the case of override failure, but not in
the other two, the subject is often aware of a cognitive struggle—that is, the
subject is conscious of being an organism with multiple minds. When our
thinking is affected by vividness (or any aspect of accessibility) or when we
substitute affect for a more difficult judgment, we
are often unaware of alternative ways of thinking. Similarly, when a person is
presented with a problem, they are often not even aware that there is an
alternative framing. They are not aware that they are failing to think as much
as they could. When people are engaged in myside thinking (which derives in
part from focal bias, see Table 6–1), they often are not aware of alternative
ways of processing information. In contrast, even those who chose the 10%
bowl in the Epstein jelly bean task were probably tempted by the larger
number of “winners” in the 8% bowl.

Likewise, in self-control situations, people have no trouble at all realizing that

they are made up of multiple minds and that an override of the autonomous
mind is necessary. In fact, they are all too aware of it. The struggle
between minds is, in fact, almost the defining feature of these situations.
They are situations where we have to resist temptation: where we have to
get up and make breakfast despite wanting to sleep; have to resist an extra
$3 coffee in the afternoon because we know the budget is tight this month;
or are on a diet and know that our snack should be carrots and not chips.
Here, the internal struggle is palpably real. It is only too apparent to us in
these instances that there are parts of our brains at war with each other.
Our natural language even has a term to designate these instances:
willpower. Willpower is a folk term, but in the last two decades, cognitive
researchers have begun to understand it scientifically6.
(p.112) Table 6–1 portrays two examples of mindware gaps: the gambler’s fallacy
(Roney & Trick, 2009) and missing probability knowledge that leads to the
failure to appreciate the importance of noncausal baserates (Bar-Hillel, 1980;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Koehler, 1996; Sloman, Over, Slovak, &
Stibel, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Listed next is the effect known as
the bias blind spot—the fact that people view other people as more biased
than themselves (Pronin, 2006). The bias blind spot is thought to arise
because people have incorrect lay psychological theories. They think,
incorrectly, that biased thinking on their part would be detectable by
conscious introspection. In fact, most social and cognitive biases operate
unconsciously. The incorrect lay theory that they do not might be viewed as
either contaminated mindware or the result of a mindware gap.

Multiply-Determined Problems of Rational Thought

Several of the remaining tasks and effects illustrated in Table 6–1 represent
irrational thought problems that are hybrids. That is, they are codetermined
by several different cognitive difficulties. It is no surprise that some of the
most complex tasks are those that are among the most contentious in the
heuristics and biases literature. Thus, the taxonomy argues indirectly that
non-normative responding on some of these tasks is overdetermined. For
example, conjunction errors on tasks such as the Linda problem could result
from attribute substitution in the manner that (p.113) Tversky and Kahneman
(1983) originally argued; from conversational defaults of the type discussed
by a host of theorists (e.g., Girotto, 2004; Hilton, 1995; Politzer & Macchi,
2000); and/or from missing mindware—that is, inadequately instantiated
probabilistic mindware that impairs not just probabilistic calculations but also
the tendency to see a problem in probabilistic terms.

It is similar with the four-card selection task. Table 6–1 reflects the conjecture that focal
bias (usually termed matching bias in the context of this task, see Evans,
1972, 1998; Evans & Lynch, 1973) is implicated in selection task
performance, as are the interpretational defaults emphasized by many
theorists7. But Table 6–1 also captures the way that the task was often
treated in the earliest years of research on it—as a proxy for Popperian
falsifiability tendencies (see Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2004b). From this
latter standpoint, problems in dealing with the task might be analyzed as a
missing mindware problem. Certainly training programs in the critical
thinking literature consider the generation of alternative hypotheses and
falsification strategies as learnable mindware (Nickerson, 2004; Nisbett,
1993; Ritchhart & Perkins, 2005).

Another thinking error with multiple determinants is myside processing 8.

Excessive myside thinking is no doubt fostered by contaminated mindware—our
notion of “self” makes us egocentrically think that the world revolves around
ourselves. But a form of focal bias may be contributing to this error as well—
the bias to base processing on the mental model that is the easiest to
construct. What easier model is there to construct than a model based on
our own previous beliefs and experiences? Such a focal bias is different from
the egocentric mindware of the self. The focal bias is not egocentric in the
motivational sense that we want to build our self-esteem or sense of self-
worth.
The focal bias is simply concerned with conserving computational capacity,
and it does so in (p.114) most cases by encouraging reliance on a model from
a myside perspective. Both motivationally driven “self” mindware and
computationally driven focal biases might be contributing to myside
processing, making it another multiply-determined bias.

Errors in affective forecasting are likewise multiply-determined. Affective

forecasting refers to our ability to predict what will make us happy in the
future, and people turn out to be surprisingly poor at such predictions
(Gilbert, 2006; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz,
& Stone, 2006; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999; Wilson et al., 2000;
Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). People often make choices that reduce their
happiness because they find it hard to predict what will make them happy.
For example, they underestimate how quickly they will adapt to both
fortunate and unfortunate events. One reason that people overestimate how
unhappy they will be after a negative event is that they have something
missing from their lay psychological theories—the personal theories they use
to explain their own behavior. They fail to take into account the
rationalization and emotion-dampening protective thought they will engage in
after the negative event (“I really didn’t want the job anyway,” “colleagues told
me he was biased against older employees”). People’s lay theories of their
own psychology do not give enough weight to these factors, and thus they
fail to predict how much their own psychological mechanisms will damp down
any unhappiness about the negative event.

Another important source of affective forecasting errors is focal bias.

Researchers in the affective forecasting literature have theorized specifically
about focalism interfering with hedonic predictions (“predictors pay too
much attention to the central event and overlook context events,” p. 31,
Hsee & Hastie, 2006). For example, a sports fan overestimates how happy
the victory of the home team will make him 2 days after the event. When
making the prediction, he fixates on the salient focal event (winning the
game), simulates the emotion he will feel in response to the event, and
projects that same emotion 2 days into the future. What does not enter into
his model—because
such models are not easy to construct in imagination (hence too effortful for
the cognitive miser)—is the myriad other events that will be happening 2
days after his game and that will then impinge on his happiness in various
ways (it is the case that most of these other events will not be as happiness-
inducing as was (p.115) winning the game). In a much-cited study, Schkade
and Kahneman (1998) found that subjects from the Midwest and California
were about equal in life satisfaction. However, when predicting the
satisfaction of the other, both the Midwestern and California subjects thought
that California subjects would be more satisfied with life. The comparative
judgment made focal an aspect of life, the weather, that in fact was not one
of the most important dimensions in life satisfaction (job prospects, financial
considerations, social life, and five other factors ranked higher). As Schkade
and Kahneman (1998) have argued, “ ‘nothing that you focus on will make as
much difference as you think’ ” (p.
345). Thus, as Table 6–1 indicates, errors in affective forecasting are a
complex mix of focal bias and gaps in lay psychological theories.

Finally, Table 6–1 lists several other effects in the heuristics and biases
literature that are multiply-determined. For example, the much debated
concept of confirmation bias (Evans, 1989, 2007a; Klayman & Ha, 1987;
Nickerson, 1998) is listed. Depending on how it is defined, it could result
from focal bias or from a failure to have instantiated the thinking mindware
that prompts a consideration of alternative hypotheses. In more
motivationally based accounts, however, confirmation bias might arise
because of evaluation-disabling strategies embodied in contaminated
mindware.

Of course, Table 6–1 is not meant to be exhaustive. It is very much a

preliminary sketch, and it is not meant to be the final word on many
definitional/conceptual issues. The taxonomy is meant to serve an organizing
function, to provoke research on the conjectures implicit within it, and to
demonstrate how a framework deriving from
dual-process theory might bring some order to the unwieldy heuristics and
biases literature.

Missing Input from the Autonomous Mind

In subsequent chapters, we will discuss the linkage between each of the
major categories in Table 6–1 and intelligence. However, for completeness,
another category needs to be introduced here. It was not included earlier
because it is not a fully cognitive category.
(p.116) If override failure is characterized as arising from too much output
from the autonomous mind, an additional category of cognitive dysfunction
might be characterized as arising from too little—that is, missing—output
from the autonomous mind. Cognitive neuroscientists have uncovered cases
of mental pathology that are characterized by inadequate behavioral
regulation from the emotion subsystems in the autonomous mind—for
example, Damasio’s (1994, 1996; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson,
1994; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985) well-known studies of patients with damage
in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These individuals have severe
difficulties in real-life decision making but do not display the impairments in
sustained attention and executive control that are characteristic of
individuals with damage in dorsolateral frontal regions9. Instead, they are
thought to lack the emotions that constrain the combinatorial explosion of
possible actions to a manageable number based on somatic
markers stored from similar situations in the past.

The key insight here is that there are two ways in which the behavioral
regulation involving the autonomous mind can go wrong. The override
failures discussed previously are one way. In these situations, the signals
shaping behavior from the autonomous mind are too pervasive and are not
trumped by Type 2 processing. The second way that behavioral regulation
involving the autonomous mind can go awry has the opposite properties. In
this case, the automatic regulation of goals by the autonomous mind is
absent and Type 2 processing is faced with a combinatorial explosion of
possibilities because the constraining function of autonomous modules such
as emotions is missing. Behavioral regulation is not aided by crude but
effective autonomous signals that help to prioritize goals for subsequent
action.

There is empirical evidence for rationality failures of the two different types.
Dorsolateral prefrontal damage has been associated with executive
functioning difficulties (and/or working memory difficulties) that can be
interpreted as the failure to override automatized processes. (p.117) In
contrast, ventromedial damage to the prefrontal cortex has been associated
with problems in behavioral regulation that are accompanied by affective
disruption. Difficulties of the former, but not the latter, kind are associated
with lowered intelligence (see Bechara et al., 1998; Duncan et al., 1996;
Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1994; Kimberg et al., 1998; Shallice, 1988).

A laboratory marker for the type of problem that Damasio had observed was
developed by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994). In their task
(Iowa Gambling Task), the participant sat facing four decks of cards (labeled
A, B, C, and D), was given
$2000 of play money, and was told to choose cards from any deck. Two
decks (A and B) contained high rewards on the back but had enough
intermittent high penalties on them that the expected values of the decks
were negative. Two other decks (C and D) contained low rewards but low
enough penalties so that they had positive expected values.

Bechara et al. (1994) found that normal subjects began by sampling all of the
decks with perhaps a slight bias toward the “bad” decks A and B but by the final
50 trials had migrated away from the low-expected-values decks A and B and
ended up making most of their final choices from “good” decks C and D (the
high-expected-value decks).
Patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage also begin by sampling all the
decks, but their preference for the high-reward A and B decks did not
diminish throughout the testing period. Despite being conscious of rewards
and penalties in their environments (when queried, the patients say they
know that decks A and B are risky and generally bad), they consistently
repeated acts that were inefficacious.

Damasio (1994) argued that individuals with ventromedial prefrontal

damage seem to lack emotional systems that mark positive and negative
outcomes with evaluative valence and that regenerate these valences the
next time a similar situation arises.
Damasio’s famous case of Elliot is an instance of what we will call here the Mr.
Spock problem, naming it after the Star Trek character depicted as having
attenuated emotions. Elliot had a problem in decision making because of a
lack of regulatory signals from emotion subsystems in the autonomous mind.

There is increasing evidence that the Mr. Spock form of rational thinking problem may
extend beyond extreme clinical cases such as that of (p.118)

Elliot (with measurable

ventromedial prefrontal
damage). Several groups of
people with problems of
behavioral regulation perform
poorly on the Iowa Gambling
Task despite having near
normal intelligence10. (p.119)
For example, Petry, Bickel, and
Arnett (1998) found that heroin
addicts also displayed more
disadvantageous choices in the
Iowa Gambling Task than
controls of equal intelligence.
Stanovich, Grunewald, and
West (2003) examined the
performance of a nonclinical
sample of adolescents who
were experiencing problems of
behavioral adjustment
(multiple school suspensions)
on the Iowa Gambling Task
(this time playing for real Figure 6.3. An Expanded Taxonomy of Thinking ErrorTypes.
money). Like Damasio’s (1994)
patients, our participants with
suspensions did not differ from
their controls in general
intelligence. The students with
multiple suspensions in our study made significantly more choices from “bad” decks A
and B. Other studies of subjects without overt brain damage have also shown
subpar performance on the Iowa Gambling Task—for example, pathological gamblers
(Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci, & Bellodi, 2002; Toplak et al., 2007), criminal
offenders (Yechiam et al., 2008), patients with neurological disorders (Labudda et al.,
2009; Sinz et al., 2008), and patients with psychiatric disorders (Nakamura et al.,
2008). Likewise, neuropsychological research has demonstrated a variety of mental
disabilities—for example, alexithymia (difficulty in identifying feelings) and
schizophrenia—that implicate defects in various types of autonomous monitoring
activities that are independent of intelligence (Bechara, 2005 Bermudez, 2001;
Coltheart & Davies, 2000; Mealey, 1995; Murphy & Stich, 2000; Nichols & Stich, 2003;
Weller, Levin, Shiv, & Bechara, 2007).
With the introduction of the Mr. Spock problem, we can now present a fuller
taxonomy of the categories of rational thinking error, and it is illustrated in
Figure 6–3. Each of the six categories represents a separate explanation of
why human thought and action are sometimes irrational. Next, we will
examine, both empirically and theoretically, the relation between each type
of rational thinking error and intelligence. (p.120)

Notes:
(1)Other taxonomies have been introduced into the literature, but they are
not based on the type of dual-process model that is the inspiration for our
framework (e.g., Arkes, 1991; Oreg & Bayazit, 2009; Reyna, Lloyd, &
Brainerd, 2003; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).

(2)Some of the literature on self-control was cited in the previous

chapter (see Baumeister & Vohs, 2003, 2007; Gailliot & Baumeister,
2007; Loewenstein, Read, &
Baumeister, 2003; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; O’Donoghue & Rabin,
2000; Rachlin, 1995, 2000).

(3)There is a large literature on alternative interpretations of responses on

the Linda task (see Adler, 1984, 1991; Dulany & Hilton, 1991; Girotto,
2004; Hertwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008; Hilton, 1995; Lee, 2006; Mellers,
Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001; Politzer & Macchi, 2000; Politzer & Noveck,
1991).

(4)Many theorists speculating on the properties of cultural replication would

allow for the possibility of mindware that not only does not help support
rational thought and behavior but is itself a direct cause of irrational action
(Aunger, 2000, 2002; Blackmore, 1999, 2005; Dawkins, 1993; Dennett,
1991, 2006; Distin, 2005; Hull, 2000; Laland & Brown, 2002; McKay &
Dennett, 2010; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2006; Richerson & Boyd, 2005;
Stanovich, 2004).

(5)The literature on framing effects is vast (see Epley, Mak, & Chen Idson,
2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, 2000; Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, Gaeth,
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; Maule & Villejoubert, 2007; Schneider et al.,
2005; Whitney, Rinehart, & Hinson, 2008).

(6)Our colloquial notion of willpower usually refers to the ability to delay

gratification or to override visceral responses prompting us to make a
choice that is not in our
long-term interests. This inability to properly value immediate and delayed
rewards is a source of irrationality that keeps many people from maximizing
their goal fulfillment. The logic of many addictions, such as alcoholism,
overeating, and credit card shopping, illustrate this point. From a long-term
perspective, a person definitely prefers sobriety, dieting, and keeping his
credit card debt low. However, when immediately confronted with a stimulus
that challenges this preference—a drink, a dessert, an item on sale—the
long-term preference is trumped by the short-term desire. Psychologists
have studied these situations using delayed-reward paradigms in which
people have been shown to display intertemporal preference reversal
(Ainslie,2001, 2005; Baumeister & Vohs, 2003, 2007; Green & Myerson,
2004; Herrnstein,1990; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Kirby, Winston, &
Santiesteban, 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2004; Milkman,
Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008; Rachlin,1995, 2000).

(7)I have previously cited the arguments for differing interpretational

defaults in this task (e.g., Gebauer & Laming, 1997; Klauer et al., 2007;
Margolis, 1987; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Osman, 2007; Sperber et al.,
1995; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2004a, 2004b).

(8)Various paradigms have been used to demonstrate myside processing

(Baron, 1995; Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo, & Schreiber, 2004; Klaczynski &
Lavallee, 2005; Perkins, 1985, 1995; Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a; Wolfe
& Britt, 2008).

(9)The difficulties and strengths of patients with damage in the ventromedial

prefrontal cortex and dorsolateral frontal regions have been well-
documented (e.g., Bechara, 2005; Duncan et al., 1996; Kimberg, D’Esposito,
& Farah, 1998; McCarthy & Warrington, 1990).

(10) It is important to emphasize that the Iowa Gambling Task is

deliberately designed so that the large rewards in decks A and B will be
overwhelmed by infrequent, but
large, penalties (thus resulting in negative expected value). As Loewenstein,
Weber, Hsee, and Welch, (2001) point out, it would be easy to design an
experiment with the opposite payoff structure—where the risky choices had a
higher payoff (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005).
Indeed, there are real-world examples of just this structure. If one is
investing for the long-term, stocks—riskier on a short-term basis—tend to
outperform bonds. It is an open question which structure (positive expected
value being associated with large variance or negative expected value being
associated with large variance) is more common in the real world.
Intelligence as a Predictor of
Performance on Heuristics and Biases
Tasks
(Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West)
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0007

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter reviews what is known about the connections
between intelligence and the reasoning biases related to human
rationality. Overall, the associations are surprisingly modest.
There is great variability, however. Some well-known thinking
biases are virtually independent of cognitive ability. Others do
show modest associations. The chapter presents a model of
performance on heuristics and biases tasks that explains why
some tasks associate with intelligence and others do not.
Keywords: intelligence, reasoning bias, human rationality, cognitive ability

In Chapter 2 it was stressed that rationality is a more

encompassing construct than intelligence because rationality is
an organismic-level concept. Variation in instrumental
rationality, for example, reflects variation in how well the
actions of an organism serve its goals.
Intelligence, in contrast, reflects the information processing
efficiency of algorithmic-level processing—it is an indicator of
processing at a subpersonal level.

Although rationality is a more encompassing construct than

intelligence, we would expect the two to be related because
rationality requires the algorithmic-level machinery that
enables the correct beliefs to be fixed (epistemic rationality)
and that enables the correct actions to be taken (instrumental
rationality). To provide a visual reminder of the situation,
Figure 7–1 duplicates Figure 2–1 of Chapter 2. It is clear from
the Figure that individual differences in rational thought and
action can arise because of individual differences in intelligence
(an algorithmic-level construct) or because of individual
differences in thinking dispositions (a
reflective-level construct).

Given the large role that intelligence plays in public discourse, it

is disconcerting to realize that it is a more restricted concept
than rationality. Although it is true that some definitions of
intelligence are broad and encompass aspects of rational
thought, this is not reflected at all in how intelligence is
measured in laboratories and in applied settings such as
hospitals and schools. The implications of adopting definitions of
intelligence that do not reflect how the construct is actually
measured in psychology will be discussed in Chapter 9 (see also
Stanovich, 2009b). For now, it is sufficient to note that in
psychology and among the lay public alike, assessments of
intelligence and tests of cognitive ability are taken to be the sine
qua non of good thinking. Critics of these instruments often
(p.122)

point out that IQ

tests fail to
assess many
domains of
psychological
functioning that
are essential. For
example, it is
often noted that
many largely
noncognitive
domains such as
socioemotional
abilities, Figure 7.1. The Tripartite Structure and the Locus of Individual Diff
creativity,
empathy, and
interpersonal
skills are not
assessed by
tests of cognitive
ability. However,
even these
standard
critiques
of intelligence tests often contain the unstated assumption that
although intelligence tests miss certain key noncognitive areas, they
encompass most of what is important cognitively. One of the goals of
this chapter and those that follow is to show that this unstated
assumption is unwarranted. Intelligence tests ignore important
aspects of thinking itself—tendencies toward rational thought.

As reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2, many tasks in the heuristics

and biases literature show moderate, but far from perfect,
correlations with intelligence. There are, in fact, reasons for
expecting some degree of
relationship between cognitive ability and individual differences
in the operation of thinking biases, even if the latter are not
directly assessed on intelligence tests. This follows from the fact
that theorizing in the heuristics and biases literature has
emphasized dual-process models of the type that were discussed
in Chapters 1 and 2. Such models embody the (p.123) assumption
that thinking biases result from tendencies toward miserly
processing1. Nonetheless, although the presence of thinking
biases might be universal, their ability to result in non-normative
choices varies from individual to individual because they are
sometimes overridden. The computational power needed to
override a computationally inexpensive but inefficacious
response might be related to intelligence, thus creating a
(negative) relationship between biased responding and cognitive
ability even though thinking biases are not directly assessed on
IQ tests2.

There has been some research indicating that cognitive ability is

modestly related to performance on several tasks from the
heuristics and biases literature. Stanovich and West (1997,
1998c, 1998d, 1999, 2000; see also Kokis et al., 2002; Sá, West,
& Stanovich, 1999; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; West & Stanovich,
2003; West et al., 2008) found correlations (p.124) with cognitive
ability to be roughly (in absolute magnitude): 0.35 to 0.45 for
belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, in the range of 0.25 to 0.35 for
various probabilistic reasoning tasks, in the range of 0.20 to 0.25
for various covariation detection and hypothesis testing tasks,
0.25 to 0.35 on informal reasoning tasks, 0.15 to 0.20 with
outcome bias measured within-subjects, 0.20 to 0.40 with
performance in the four-card selection task, 0.10 to 0.20 with
performance in various disjunctive reasoning tasks,
0.15 to 0.25 with hindsight bias, 0.25 to 0.30 with denominator
neglect, and 0.05 to 0.20 with various indices of Bayesian
reasoning. All correlations were in the expected direction. Other
investigators have found relationships of a similar effect size
between cognitive ability and a variety of tasks in the heuristics
and biases literature3.

In a commentary on this research on individual differences,

Kahneman (2000) pointed out that the correlations observed
may well have been inflated because most of the relevant
studies used within-subjects designs containing cues signaling
the necessity of overriding Type 1 processing (Bartels, 2006;
Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Frisch, 1993; Kahneman
& Tversky, 1982a; however, see Lambdin & Shaffer, 2009). He
has argued that a between-subjects test of the coherence of
responses represents a much stricter criterion and perhaps a
more
appropriate one because “much of life resembles a between-
subjects experiment” (p. 682, Kahneman, 2000). Shafir (1998)
makes a similar argument when speculating about why people’s
behavior is often at variance with their own normative intuitions.
He argues that this discrepancy “mirrors a discrepancy between
the nature of people’s everyday experiences and the conditions
that yield philosophical intuitions. In life, people typically
experience and evaluate things one at a time, as in a between-
subjects design, whereas many of the relevant intuitions result
from concurrent, within-subject introspections” (p. 72).
That the mental factors operative in within-subjects designs
might be different from those operative in between-subjects
designs suggests (p.125) that the individual difference factors
associated with biased processing in the two different
paradigms might also vary. LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) have
produced some data indicating that biases that are assessed
within-subjects display different relationships with individual
difference variables than biases assessed between-subjects.
They found that various framing effects were associated with
the need for cognition thinking disposition (see Cacioppo et al.,
1996) when evaluated on a within-subjects basis but were
independent of need for cognition when framing was assessed
between-subjects.
Kahneman’s (2000; see also Kahneman & Frederick, 2002)
conjecture is that these less transparent designs would reduce
the observed relationships between cognitive ability and the
judgmental biases. Much less is known about the relation
between cognitive ability and the tendency to make coherent
judgments in between-subjects situations. Thus, in a series of
studies, Stanovich and West (2008a, 2008b) attempted to
examine a variety of effects from the heuristics and biases
literature to determine whether cognitive ability was associated
with these biases as they are displayed in between-subjects
paradigms. In this series of experiments, we found that, to a
surprising degree, cognitive ability was independent of the
tendency to show a variety of rational thinking biases. We shall
present here a selection of representative findings from our
laboratory that illustrate this trend.

Intelligence and Classic Heuristics and Biases Effects

In one experiment, we examined some biases and effects that
are among the oldest in the literature (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1983): base-rate
neglect, framing effects,
conjunction effects, outcome bias, and anchoring biases. The
participants were 434 undergraduate students, and they were
partitioned into high- and low-cognitive-ability (intelligence)
groups based on their Total SAT scores4. Subjects completed
either Form A or Form B—that is, Form was (p.126) a between-
subjects variable. The analyses then examined whether the
magnitude of the effect or bias demonstrated by the task was
moderated by cognitive ability. One such analysis, for example,
examines whether, in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) context,
the effect of form interacted with SAT group.

The tasks, many of them classics in the literature, were as follows below.

Baserate Problem. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) much-studied

lawyer/engineer problem was employed as a probe of the degree
of baserate usage. The two versions were identical except that
the baserates given for the engineers and lawyers were switched
as a between-subjects variable (30 engineers and 70 lawyers in
Form A and 70 engineers and 30 lawyers in Form B). In Form A,
the problem was as follows:

A panel of psychologists has interviewed and administered

personality tests to 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in
their respective fields. On the basis of this information, thumbnail
descriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been
written. One of the descriptions is below. After reading the
description, please indicate, on a scale from 0 to 100, what you
think the probability is that the person described is an engineer.
Here is the description:

Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He

is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no
interest in political and social issues and spends most of his free
time on his many hobbies, which include home carpentry, sailing,
and mathematical puzzles.

The probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is
percent.
(p.127) Disease Framing Problem. This was the famous Asian disease
problem introduced by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) that was
discussed in the previous chapter.

Conjunction Problem. This problem was based on Tversky and

Kahneman’s (1983) much-studied Linda problem. Participants
read the following:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned
with issues of discrimination and social justice and also
participated in antinuclear demonstrations.

Participants then used a 6-point scale (i.e., 1 = extremely

improbable; 2 = very improbable; 3 = somewhat probable; 4 =
moderately probable; 5 = very probable; 6 = extremely
probable) to indicate the relative probability of three statements
that described Linda. The first two statements were identical for
the two groups of participants:

(1)It is that Linda is a teacher in an elementary school.

(2)It is that Linda works in a bookstore and takes
Yoga classes.

Each group then read one of two statements that differed in

whether they did or did not contain a conjunction of two
descriptions. Participants getting Form A read:

(3)It is that Linda is a bank teller and is active

in the feminist movement.

Participants getting Form B read:

(4)It is that Linda is a bank teller.

Outcome Bias. Our measure of outcome bias derived from a

problem investigated by Baron and Hershey (1988). Participants
receiving Form A read the positive outcome version: A 55-year-
old man had a heart condition. He had to stop working because
of chest pain. He enjoyed his work and did not want to stop. His
pain also interfered with other things, such as travel and
recreation. A successful bypass operation would relieve his pain
and increase his life expectancy from age 65 to age 70.
However, 8% of the people who have this operation die as a
result of the operation itself. His physician decided to go ahead
with the operation.
The operation succeeded. Evaluate the physician’s decision to go
ahead with (p.128) the operation. (1) incorrect, a very bad
decision; (2) incorrect, all things considered; (3) incorrect, but
not unreasonable; (4) the decision and its opposite are equally
good; (5) correct, but the opposite would be reasonable too; (6)
correct, all things considered; or (7) clearly correct, an excellent
decision.

Participants receiving Form B (negative outcome) evaluated a medical

decision that was designed to be objectively better than the
first: 2% chance of death rather than 8%; 10-year increase in
life expectancy versus 5-year, and so forth. However, it had an
unfortunate negative outcome—death of the patient.

Anchoring and Adjustment Problems. The two problems used here

were adapted from an anchoring and adjustment problem in
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and one used by Epley and
Gilovich (2004). Prior to making an estimation of a particular
value, participants answered a question containing a small or
large anchor value. The Form A version is given, with the Form B
value in brackets:

1. Do you think there are more or less than 65 [12] African

countries in the United Nations? (a = more; b = less); How
many African countries do you think are in the United
Nations?
2. Is the tallest redwood tree in the world more that 85
[1000] feet tall? (a = more; b = less); How tall do you
think the tallest redwood tree in the world is?

Table 7–1 displays, for each of the experimental tasks, the mean
response as a function of Form (A vs. B) and cognitive ability
group (low vs. high SAT). Table 7–1 also contains, for each of the
experimental tasks, an analysis that examines whether the
magnitude of the effect or bias demonstrated by the task was
moderated by cognitive ability. This was done by examining, in
an ANOVA context, whether the effect of Form interacted with
SAT group.
The first analysis indicates that there was a significant baserate
effect on the engineer/lawyer problem (F[1,430] = 35.93, MSE =
472.2, p 〈.001). The mean probability that Jack was one of the
engineers was lower in the 30% baserate condition (60.8% for
the entire sample) than the mean probability that Jack was one
of the engineers in the 70% baserate condition (73.4% for the
entire sample). However, the effect of (p.129)
Table 7.1 ANOVA (Form x SAT) and Mean Scores as a Function of Form (A vs. B) and SAT; Results From
a Parallel Regression Analysis are Also Indicated

Source Mean (SD in

Cell)
Form B
F(1,430) ηp 2 Form A
Baserate problem
(Engineer/Lawyer
problem)
Form 35.93** 0.07 30 Engineers 70 Engineers
* 7
SAT 4.47* 0.01 Low SAT 57.4 (25.6) 72.3 (18.2)
0
Form x SAT 1.30 0.00 High 64.2 (26.5) 74.3 (14.6)
3 SAT
Form x SAT interaction in regression: F = 1.43, R2 change for interaction = 0.003

Framing problem
(Asian Disease)

Form 50.98** 0.10 Gain Frame Loss Frame

* 6
SAT 4.81* 0.01 Low SAT 3.00 (1.24) 3.67 (1.13)
1
Form x SAT 1.48 0.00 High SAT 3.11 (1.16) 4.05 (1.16)
3
Form x SAT interaction in regression: F = 0.08, R2 change for interaction = 0.001

Conjunction problem
(Linda problem)
Form 120.5** 0.21 Bank teller Feminist bank
* 9 teller
SAT 0.24 0.00 Low SAT 2.53 (1.03) 3.46 (1.13)
1
Form x SAT 4.66* 0.01 High SAT 2.36 (0.98) 3.73 (1.19)
1
Form x SAT interaction in regression: F = 4.15*, R2 change for interaction = 0.008

Outcome Bias
Form 20.50** 0.04 Positive Negative Outcome
* 5 Outcome
SAT 10.09** 0.02 Low SAT 5.79 (1.07) 5.12 (1.26)
3
Form x SAT 3.88* 0.00 High SAT 5.91 (0.87) 5.65 (1.04)
9
Form x SAT interaction in regression: F = 4.34*, R2 change for interaction = 0.009

Anchoring
(African Countries)
Form 219.1*** 0.338 Large anchor Small anchor
Source Mean (SD in Cell)
F(1,430) ηp 2 Form A Form B
SAT 1.37 0.00 Low SAT 45.2 (26.4) 14.4 (14.4)
3
Form x SAT 2.53 0.00 High SAT 40.0 (22.7) 15.2 (11.0)
6
Form x SAT interaction in regression: F = 3.82, R2 change for interaction = 0.006

Anchoring
(Redwoods)
Form 461.0** 0.52 Small anchor Large anchor
* 0
SAT 0.09 0.00 Low SAT 126.1 (88.4) 977.4 (580.4)
0
Form x SAT 0.05 0.00 High SAT 128.6 (77.3) 998.5 (580.6)
0
Form x SAT interaction in regression: F = 0.19, R2 change for interaction = 0.001

2
Note: ηp = partial eta squared; df on Redwoods is 426 *p 〈 .05, **p 〈 .01, ***p 〈 .001
 (p.130) baserate failed to interact with cognitive ability, as the Form by
SAT group interaction was not significant (F[1,430] = 1.30, MSE =
472.2). To the extent there is any hint of an interaction in the
means, it is in the opposite direction from the expected finding. The
low SAT group was slightly more sensitive to baserates than the high
SAT group.

The next task displayed in Table 7–1 is the disease framing task,
and it is clear that both groups displayed the expected framing
effect on this problem—the loss frame (Form B) resulted in a
greater preference for the risky option. The main effect of frame
type (Form) was significant, but the effect of frame type failed to
interact with cognitive ability, as the Form by SAT group
interaction was not significant. To the extent there is any hint of
an interaction in the means, it is again in the opposite direction
from the expected finding. The high SAT group displayed a
slightly larger framing effect.
The next task displayed in Table 7–1 is the conjunction problem
(Linda problem). The means of both groups displayed the
expected conjunction fallacy—Linda was judged more probably a
feminist bank teller than a bank teller. The main effect of Form
was highly significant and there was a significant Form by
cognitive ability interaction (F [1,430] = 4.66, MSE = 1.18, p
〈.05) although the size of the effect was small (η p 2 = .011).
Additionally, the interaction was in the opposite direction from the
expected finding—the high SAT group was more
susceptible to the conjunction fallacy.

The next task displayed in Table 7–1 is the outcome bias

problem. The means of both groups displayed the expected
outcome bias—the decision with the positive outcome was
rated as a better decision than the decision with the negative
outcome, despite the fact that the latter was objectively
better. The main effect of outcome (Form) was highly
significant, and there was a significant Form by cognitive
ability interaction (F[1,430] = 3.88, MSE = 1.13, p 〈 0.05),
although the size of the effect was small (ηp 2 = 0.009). This
interaction was in the expected direction—the low SAT group
displayed more outcome bias.

The remaining two analyses in Table 7–1 concern the two

anchoring and adjustment problems. In the African countries
item, it is clear that both groups displayed the expected
anchoring effect—the large anchor resulted in higher estimates
of the number of African countries in the United Nations (mean
for the entire sample = 42.6) than did the small anchor (mean
for the entire sample = 14.9). The number of African
 (p.131) countries in the United Nations is actually 53. The main
effect of anchor magnitude (Form) was highly significant (p 〈
.001). However, the effect of anchor magnitude failed to interact
with cognitive ability, as the Form by SAT group interaction was
not significant.

Results were similar for the redwoods problem. Both groups

displayed the expected anchoring effect—the large anchor
resulted in higher estimates of the height of the tallest
redwood (mean for the entire sample = 989.0 feet) than did
the small anchor (mean for the entire sample = 127.4 feet).
The tallest redwood tree is actually 370 feet high. The main
effect of anchor magnitude (Form) was highly significant (p 〈
.001). However, the effect of anchor magnitude failed to
interact with cognitive ability, as the Form by SAT group
interaction was not significant.

Thus, across all of the ANOVAs, only two of the six interactions
between Form and cognitive ability were statistically significant,
and only one of these (that for outcome bias) was in the direction
of reduced judgmental bias on the part of the group higher in
cognitive ability. Of course, some information is lost—and power
reduced—by dichotomizing on the cognitive ability variable
(SAT). Thus, Table 7–1 also presents the results of a continuous
analysis for each task in which the significance of the Form by
cognitive ability interaction was tested in a regression analysis in
which SAT was used as a continuous variable rather than as a
dichotomous variable. Immediately below the ANOVA in Table 7–
1 is presented the F ratio for the test of the interaction: the Form
by SAT
cross-product when entered third in the equation predicting item
response after Form and SAT. In addition to the F ratio, the R2
change for the interaction is presented.

The regression analyses converged completely with the results

from the ANOVAs. Only two of the six interaction terms reached
statistical significance and only one of those, that for outcome
bias, was in the expected direction—the degree of outcome bias
was larger for the group lower on the SAT. The significant
interaction term for the Linda problem indicated a data pattern in
the opposite direction—the conjunction fallacy was displayed to a
greater extent by the group with higher SAT scores.

In summary, this experiment produced very little evidence

indicating that cognitive ability was related to judgmental biases
when the latter were assessed in between-subjects designs. In
six comparisons (p.132) involving five different classic effects from
the heuristics and biases literature, only one comparison
provided any indication that cognitive
ability attenuated a judgmental bias. Even in that case (outcome
bias) the effect was extremely modest. The variance associated
with the interaction effect was less than 1% in both the ANOVA
and in the regression analysis. We shall summarize results in the
remainder of this chapter rather than provide statistics. More
detailed statistics are available in the published papers.

We have studied many more such effects from the heuristics

and biases literature and have found data patterns that are
largely converging—many between-subjects biases are
remarkably dissociated from intelligence. This was true when
we tested so-called “less-is-more” effects in decision making.
Much empirical work has gone into determining whether
humans adhere to the axioms of choice5 (transitivity,
independence, reduction of compound lotteries, etc.).
However, a between-subjects comparison makes it possible to
test an even simpler requirement of rational choice—that people
prefer more to less (e.g., prefer $6 to $5). Of course, one would
not bother testing such a proposition in a within-subjects
situation. Nonetheless, it has been shown that given the proper
context, in between-subjects comparisons, people sometimes
prefer less to more. For example, Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and
MacGregor (2002; see also Bateman, Dent, Peters, Slovic, &
Starmer, 2007) found that people rated a gamble with 7 in 36
chance to win $9 and 29 in 36 to lose 5¢ more favorably than a
gamble with 7 in 36 chance to win $9 and 29 in 36 chance to win
nothing. Indeed, they reported that the latter gamble was even
rated less desirable than a gamble having a 7 in 36 chance to
win $9 and 29 in 36 to lose 25¢. Presumably, in a (p.133) between-
subjects design, the representation of the numerically small loss
highlights the magnitude and desirability of the $9 to be won.
Likewise, the phenomenon of proportion dominance can result in
people preferring less to more in a between-subjects design.
Slovic et al. (2002) reported a study in which people rated a
safety measure that would save 150 lives less favorably than a
safety measure that would save 98% of 150 lives at risk (see also
Bartels, 2006; Slovic & Peters, 2006). Their explanation of this
“less-is-more” effect exhibited in a between-subjects design is
that saving 150 lives is more diffusely good than saving 98% of
some target figure because the 98% is more evaluable (see
Bartels, 2006; Hsee, 1996; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, &
Bazerman, 1999; Hsee & Zhang, 2004)—it is close to the upper
bound on a percentage scale. We (Stanovich & West, 2008b)
have found that all of these “less-is-more” effects are largely
independent of intelligence.
In another experiment involving 729 university students, we
examined the non-normative economic behavior of honoring
sunk costs—the tendency to persist in a negative expected value
activity because a significant investment has already been made
(Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Additionally, we
examined the economically inefficient tendency to pursue the
maximum relative savings rather than the maximum absolute
savings (Thaler, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Using between-subjects designs, we found that neither of these
thinking errors were related to intelligence.

Slovic et al. (2002; Slovic & Peters, 2006) have suggested that
judgments about the risks and benefits of various activities and
technologies derive not from separable knowledge sources
relevant to risk and benefit but instead derive from a common
source: affect. Evidence for this conjecture derives from the
finding that ratings of risk and reward are negatively correlated
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic & Peters,
2006), both across activities within participants and across
participants within activities. When something is rated as having
high benefits it tends to be seen as having low risk, and when
something is rated as having high risk, it is seen as having low
benefits. Finucane et al. (2000) argued that such a finding is non-
normative because the risk/benefit relationship is most likely
positive in a natural ecology. Their argument is that of the four
cells in a high/low partitioning of risk and benefit, one of the cells
—that for activities of high risk and low (p.134) benefit—must be
vastly underpopulated. This is because activities of this type are
usually not adopted, and they are often proscribed by authorities
even when they are. If the high-risk, low-benefit quadrant is
underpopulated, then the overall risk/benefit of activities in the
actual world must be positively correlated.

In a study involving 458 participants, we investigated whether the

non-normative tendency to view risk and reward as negatively
correlated was attenuated in individuals high in cognitive ability.
The non-normative tendency to view risk and reward as
negatively correlated was not attenuated by high cognitive
ability within the range that we studied. In fact, each of the four
negative correlations was higher in the high-SAT group than in
the low-SAT group.

Omission bias is the tendency to avoid actions that carry some

risk but that would prevent a larger risk (Baron, 1998; Baron &
Ritov, 2004; Bazerman, Baron, & Shonk, 2001). People often do
not realize that by failing to act they often subject themselves
and others to greater risk. Our
research group examined whether the extent of omission bias
was attenuated by cognitive ability and, as with so many of the
between- subjects effects we have examined, it was not.

The theory of reference-dependent preferences (Bateman,

Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1997; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) predicts a
large difference in willingness- to-accept (WTA) and willingness-
to-pay (WTP) valuations. Stanovich and
West (2008b) examined individual differences in WTA/WTP
discrepancies and another effect predicted by prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): the certainty effect. Prospect
theory predicts that people overweight probability differences
that make an outcome certain over similar probability differences
that do not (a violation of the standard assumptions of utility
theory). Neither of these non-normative tendencies were
moderated by intelligence.
One of the broadest cognitive biases is known as the “bias blind
spot” (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). Bias is relatively easy to
recognize in the decisions of others but often difficult to detect
in our own judgments. We found that across a wide range of
cognitive biases, the tendency to magnify the biases of others
and minimize our own was not attenuated by high intelligence
(Meserve, West, & Stanovich, 2008). If anything, the tendency
was increased by high intelligence, not because (p.135) the more
intelligent subjects were in fact less biased but instead because
they tended to assume that they would be less biased.

Belief Bias and Myside Bias

Critical thinking is often thought to entail the ability to decouple
prior beliefs and opinions from the evaluation of evidence and
arguments6. The literature on Bayesian reasoning (e.g., de
Finetti, 1989; Earman, 1992; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983;
Howson & Urbach, 1993) provides justification for the emphasis
on unbiased evidence evaluation in the critical thinking literature.
The key reasoning principle captured by Bayes’ theorem is that
the evaluation of the diagnosticity of the evidence (the likelihood
ratio) should be conducted independently of the assessment of
the prior odds favoring the focal hypothesis. The point is not that
prior beliefs should not affect the posterior probability of the
hypothesis. They most certainly should. A Bayesian analysis is an
explicit procedure for factoring in such prior beliefs. The point is
that they should not be factored in twice. Prior beliefs are
encompassed in one of two
multiplicative terms that define the posterior probability, but
the diagnosticity of the evidence should be assessed
separately from the prior belief.

Thus, the concern in the critical thinking literature for

segregating prior belief from evidence evaluation receives
support from the Bayesian literature: “The interpretation of new
evidence may be affected by previous beliefs, thereby subverting
the independence of the likelihood ratio and priors” (Fischhoff &
Beyth-Marom, 1983, p. 247). Nevertheless, people often fall short
of this rational ideal by displaying both belief bias and myside
bias. Belief bias occurs when people have difficulty evaluating
conclusions that conflict with what they think they know about
the world. It is most often assessed with syllogistic reasoning
tasks in which the believability of the conclusion conflicts with
logical validity (see Chapter 2). Similarly, people display myside
bias when they evaluate (p.136) evidence, generate evidence, and
test hypotheses in a manner biased toward their own opinions.
The degree of belief bias has been found to be negatively
associated with cognitive ability7. Myside bias, in contrast, seems
to be much less strongly associated with cognitive ability,
particularly when it is assessed in a between-subjects format
(Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a).
The theory outlined in Chapter 2 explains this pattern of results
regarding individual differences. Syllogistic reasoning tasks with
validity/knowledge conflict are still quite constrained at the
reflective level because the instructions for such tasks often
explicitly direct the subject to ignore prior knowledge and focus
on validity. Thus, although the validity/belief conflict in such
tasks appears to create room for individual differences in
interpretation and goal priority, the instructions constrain the
variability in such factors by heavily biasing task interpretation
and goal choice.
However, other tasks in the literature have much less
constraint. For example, Klaczynski and colleagues (Klaczynski
& Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Klaczynski &
Robinson, 2000) presented participants with flawed
hypothetical experiments that led to either opinion-consistent
or -inconsistent conclusions. Participants critiqued the flaws in
the experiments, and they evaluated the strength of the
conclusion that could be drawn from each experiment without
any explicit instruction to set aside their prior opinions.
Interestingly, in this paradigm, the myside bias observed (the
tendency to rate the opinion- consistent experiment higher than
the opinion-inconsistent experiment) (p.137) displayed extremely
modest associations with measures of
cognitive ability (the majority of such correlations in the
Klaczynski experiments were nonsignificant).

The lack of explicit instructions to detach prior opinion from

experiment evaluation in the Klaczynski (1997) paradigm
probably left reflective-level functioning relatively unconstrained
and decreased the association between myside bias and
algorithmic-level functioning. However, even this paradigm
contains cues that might help participants interpret what the
experimenter might deem optimal performance (in this case, a
lack of myside bias). The experiments are run within subjects—
that is, each participant evaluates both opinion-consistent and -
inconsistent experiments. Such designs provide an important cue
that part of the experimental demand is to avoid bias.
Thus, a between-subjects design, in not containing cues to the
variable of interest, might even further reduce the relationship
between myside bias and individual difference variables. This
was found in several paradigms that Stanovich and West (2007,
2008a, 2008b) introduced to study
so-called “natural myside bias.” Natural myside bias is the
tendency to evaluate propositions from within one’s own
perspective when given no instructions to avoid doing so and
when there are no implicit cues (such as within-subjects
conditions) to avoid doing so. An example of one of our
experiments (Stanovich & West, 2008b) illustrates a between-
subjects myside paradigm. Subjects (458 university students)
were randomly assigned to either a myside group (Ford Explorer
condition) or an otherside group (German car condition). In the
Ford Explorer condition8, the group read the following problem:

According to a comprehensive study by the U.S.

Department of Transportation, Ford Explorers are 8 times
more likely than a typical family car to kill occupants of
another car in a crash. The Department of Transportation in
Germany is considering (p.138) recommending a ban on the
sale of the Ford Explorer in Germany. Do you think that
Germany should ban the sale of the Ford Explorer? Subjects
answered on the following scale: definitely yes (scored as
6), yes (scored as 5), probably yes (scored as 4), probably
no (scored as 3), no (scored as 2), definitely no (scored as
1).
Participants were also asked: Should the Ford Explorer be
allowed on German streets, just like other cars? They
answered on the same scale as the previous question.

The German Car group read the following problem:

 According to a comprehensive study by the U.S.
Department of Transportation, a particular German car is 8
times more likely than a typical family car to kill occupants
of another car in a crash. The
U.S. Department of Transportation is considering
recommending a ban on the sale of this German car.
Subjects answered the following two questions on the scale
presented above: (1) Do you think that the United States
should ban the sale of this car? (2) Do you think that this
car should be allowed on U.S. streets, just like other cars?

The paradigm used in this experiment was successful in creating

a myside bias effect. On the ban-the-car question, the mean for
the Ford Explorer (myside) condition was significantly lower
(3.61, SD = 1.23) than the mean for the German car (otherside)
condition (4.34, SD = 1.23; t[456] = –6.33, p
〈 .001, Cohen’s d = .593). Subjects were more likely to think
that the German car should be banned in the United States
than they were to think that the Ford Explorer should be
banned in Germany.
Correspondingly, on the “allowed on the streets like other cars”
question, the mean for the Ford Explorer (myside) condition was
significantly higher (3.82, SD = 1.19) than the mean for the
German car (otherside) condition (2.86, SD = 1.20; t[456], =
8.59, p 〈 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.805). Subjects were more likely
to think that the Ford Explorer should be allowed on German
streets like other cars than they were to think that the German
car should be allowed on U.S. streets like other cars.
However, both cognitive ability groups displayed myside bias
effects of roughly equal magnitude. The bias toward the rights of
the Ford Explorer in Germany and against the rights of the
German car in the United States was not attenuated by cognitive
ability in the range studied in this sample.

(p.139) Why Thinking Biases Do and Do Not Associate

with Cognitive Ability
The myside effect thus represents another cognitive bias that is
not strongly attenuated by cognitive ability. In several of the
experiments discussed in this chapter, we have shown that a
wide variety of cognitive biases are surprisingly dissociated from
cognitive ability. We say surprisingly because ever since
Spearman (1904) first discovered positive manifold, intelligence
indicators have correlated with a plethora of cognitive abilities
and thinking skills that are almost too large to
enumerate9. However, we do not mean to imply that effects
from the heuristics and biases literature are invariably
independent of intelligence. To the contrary, at the beginning of
the chapter, several thinking biases were mentioned that display
correlations in the range of 0.15 to 0.45 with intelligence. This
raises the obvious question of why certain thinking biases
correlate with cognitive ability and others do not. In the
remainder of this chapter, we will present a framework that
helps to explain when we should expect correlations between
cognitive ability and thinking biases and when we should not.
Table 7–2 presents a selection of effects and biases from the
literature that have failed to correlate with cognitive ability and a
selection of those that do10. Kahneman (2000) offers the
beginning of an explanation of why certain rational thinking tasks
might show associations with cognitive ability and others may
not. He begins his argument by making a distinction between
coherence rationality and reasoning rationality.
Reasoning rationality “requires an ability to reason correctly
about the information currently at hand without demanding
perfect consistency among beliefs that are not simultaneously
evoked” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005, p. 277). In contrast,
“coherence is much stricter … coherence requires choices and
beliefs to be immune to variations
(p.140)

Table 7.2 Thinking Heuristics, Biases, and Effects Classified in

Terms of Their Associations with Cognitive Ability
Tasks/Effects that fail to correlate
with cognitive ability Tasks/Effects that
correlate with cognitive
Noncausal baserate usage ability
(Stanovich & West, 1998c, 1999,
2008b) Causal baserate usage
(Kokis et al., 2002;
Stanovich & West, 1998c,
Conjunction fallacy between- 1998d)
subjects (Stanovich & West,
2008b) Outcome bias between-
and within-subjects
(Stanovich & West,
Framing between-subjects 1998c, 2008b)
(Stanovich & West, 2008b)
Framing within-subjects
(Bruine de Bruin, et al.
2007; Frederick, 2005;
Parker & Fischhoff, 2005;
Stanovich & West, 1998b,
1999)
Tasks/Effects that fail to correlate Tasks/Effects that
with cognitive ability correlate with cognitive
Anchoring effect (Stanovich & ability
West, 2008b) Denominator neglect
(Kokis et al., 2002;
Evaluability Less is More Effect Stanovich & West, 2008b)
(Stanovich & West, 2008b)
Probability matching
(Stanovich & West, 2008b;
Proportion dominance effect West & Stanovich, 2003)
(Stanovich & West, 2008b)
Hindsight bias
Sunk-cost effect (Stanovich & (Stanovich & West,
West, 2008b; Parker & Fischhoff, 1998c)
2005)
Ignoring P(D/NH)
Risk/Benefit confounding (Stanovich & West,
(Stanovich & West, 2008b) 1998d, 1999)
Covariation detection
Omission bias (Stanovich & West, (Stanovich & West,
2008b) 1998c, 1998d; Sa et al.,
1999)

One-side bias, within- Belief bias in syllogistic

subjects (Stanovich & reasoning (Macpherson &
West, 2008a) Stanovich, 2007;
Stanovich & West, 1998c,
Certainty effect (Stanovich & 2008b)
West, 2008b)
Belief bias in modus
ponens (Stanovich & West,
Willingness to pay/Willingness 2008b)
to accept difference (Stanovich
& West, 2008b) Informal argument
evaluation (Stanovich &
West, 1997, 2008b)
Myside bias: between and within-
S (Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Four-card selection task
Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Sá, (Stanovich & West, 1998a,
Kelley, Ho, & Stanovich, 2005; 2008b; Toplak & Stanovich,
Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a, 2002; Valentine, 1975)
2008b; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003)
EV maximization in
Newcomb’s problem (Stanovich & gambles (Benjamin &
West, 1999; Toplak & Stanovich, Shapiro, 2005;
2002) Frederick, 2005)

Overconfidence effect
(Bruine de Bruin et al.,
2007;
 Tasks/Effects that fail to correlate Tasks/Effects that
with cognitive ability correlate with cognitive
ability
Stanovich & West, 1998c)
(p.141) of framing and context. This is a lot to ask for, but an inability
to pass between-subjects tests of coherence is indeed a significant
flaw” (Kahneman, 2000, p. 682). Kahneman and Frederick (2002; see
Kahneman, 2000), utilizing a dual-process framework, argue that
correlations with cognitive ability will occur only in the intermediate
range of difficulty. There, they argue:
“intelligent people are more likely to possess the relevant
logical rules and also to recognize the applicability of
these rules in particular situations. In the terms of the
present analysis, high-IQ respondents benefit from
relatively efficient System 2 operations that enable them
to overcome erroneous intuitions when adequate
information is available. When a problem is too difficult
for everyone, however, the correlation is likely to reverse”
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 68).
The phrase “possess the relevant logical rules and also to
recognize the applicability of these rules in particular situations”
suggests two conditions that have to be fulfilled for a
heuristically-based response to be overridden by Type 2
processing (Evans, 2003, 2006b, 2007a; Kahneman & Frederick,
2002; Stanovich, 1999). These two conditions are actually the
two sources of judgmental error that Kahneman and Tversky
(1982a), two-decades ago, labeled as errors of application and
errors of comprehension. The latter refers to errors that occur
because people do not recognize the validity of a norm that they
have violated. The former occurs when a person fails to apply a
rule that he/she has learned.
In the remainder of this chapter, we use two slightly different
terms for the loci of these problems. An error of comprehension
corresponds to a mindware gap as discussed in Chapter 6. In
contrast, errors of application can only occur when the relevant
mindware has been learned and is available for use in the
override process. Errors of application occur when people fail to
detect the situational cues, indicating that the heuristically
primed response needs to be overridden. We give this
requirement the label override detection (detecting the necessity
for heuristic override).
When it fails, it represents, in the taxonomy of Chapter 6 (see
Fig. 6–2), the first two categories of thinking error that result
from miserly processing—defaulting to the autonomous mind or
to serial associative cognition.
 (p.142) The above quote from Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
suggests that cognitive ability differences only arise when the
experimental task allows for variation in the presence of the
relevant mindware and in the override detection process. It will
be argued here that this analysis ignores another cause of non-
normative responding that might be an even more important
source of individual differences—what in the taxonomy of
Chapter 6 (see Fig. 6–2) is called override failure.

Most of the tasks in the heuristics and biases literature were

deliberately designed to pit a heuristically triggered response
against a normative response generated by Type 2 processing 11.
However, this means that even after the necessity for override
has been detected and the relevant mindware is available, the
conflict has to be resolved. Resolving the conflict in favor of the
Type 2 response may require cognitive capacity, especially if
cognitive decoupling must take place for a considerable period of
time. Cognitive decoupling is involved in inhibiting the heuristic
response and in simulating alternative responses (see Chapters 3
and 4). Recent work on inhibition and executive functioning has
indicated that such cognitive decoupling is very capacity-
demanding and that it is strongly related to individual differences
in fluid intelligence12.

It will be argued here that this third factor present in some

heuristics and biases tasks—the necessity for sustained cognitive
decoupling—is the major source of the variability in the
association between cognitive ability and task performance that
is displayed in Table 7–2. Building on (p.143) the conjectures of
Kahneman (2000) and Kahneman and Frederick (2002), our
framework for conceptualizing individual differences on heuristics
and biases tasks is displayed in Figure 7–2. The question
addressed in the first stage of the framework is whether, for a
given task, the mindware is available to carry out override
(whether the procedures and declarative knowledge are available
to substitute an analytic response for a heuristic one). If the
relevant mindware is not available, then the person must, of
necessity, respond heuristically. It is immaterial whether the
person detects the necessity for override or has the capacity to
sustain override if the normatively appropriate response is simply
not available. If the relevant mindware (probabilistic thinking
skills, falsifiability tendencies, sensitivity to contradiction, etc.) is
not present, then subjects will end up at what has been termed in
Figure 7–2 as path #1 to a heuristic

(p.144)response13. Because of a mindware gap, they will fail to

give the normative response.
If the relevant
mindware is
available, then
the next
question that
becomes
operative is
whether the
person detects
the need to
override the
heuristic
response. Even
if the relevant
mindware is
present, if the Figure 7.2. A Framework for Conceptualizing Individual Difference
subject does not
detect any
reason to
override the
heuristic
response, then
it will be
emitted (this is
path #2 to a
heuristic
response as labeled in Fig. 7–2). Many heuristics and biases tasks
lead people down this path. People do not detect the need to
override the response that comes naturally (Kahneman, 2003)
even though, in retrospect, they would endorse the norm that
the heuristic response violated.

The next choice point in Figure 7–2 concerns the task rather
than the participant. If the relevant mindware is present and if
the need for override has been noted, the question then
becomes whether or not the task requires sustained inhibition
(cognitive decoupling) to carry out the override of the heuristic
response. If not (or if the capacity required is low—this of
course may not be an all or nothing issue), then the Type 2
response will be substituted for the heuristic response. In
contrast, if the task requires sustained decoupling to carry out
override, then we must ask whether the subject has the
cognitive capacity that will be necessary. If so, then the Type 2
response will be given. If not, then the heuristic response will
be given (path #3 to the heuristic response in Fig. 7–2),
despite the availability of the relevant mindware and the
recognition of the need to use it.
For cognitive ability to associate with a bias, there must be
differences correlated with cognitive ability at some of the choice
points in the framework—that is, in some of the person
parameters that branch toward or away from heuristic paths. As
Kahneman (2000) notes, “a task will be too difficult if (1) System
1 favors an incorrect answer, and (2) System 2 is incapable of
applying the correct rule, either because the rule is unknown
[mindware gap] or because the cues that would evoke it are
absent [no override detection]” (p. 682). Performance on such a
task will be floored and will show no association with cognitive
ability. (p.145) Some of the tasks in Table 7–2 are no doubt of this
type (between-
subjects conjunction effects for example). However, several of
the tasks in Table 7–2 without associations with cognitive ability
cannot be viewed as displaying floor effects. For a cognitive
ability difference to be observed, there must be differential
cleaving by intelligence at some of the critical nodes in Figure 7–
2—that is, there must be a correlation between intelligence and
at least one of the person parameters. It is also important to
realize that the partitioning of cognitive ability groups at each of
the nodes might vary from task to task. We will advance here,
however, a generic conjecture about the source of associations
with cognitive ability. The conjecture is that the primary source
of associations with cognitive ability in heuristics and biases
tasks is the way that people are partitioned by person parameter
#3 (“Does the person have the decoupling capacity to sustain
override?”).

Cognitive Decoupling, Mindware Gaps, and

Override Detection in Heuristics and Biases Tasks
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is evidence in the literature
indicating that tests of fluid intelligence (see Carroll, 1993; Horn
& Cattell, 1967; Horn & Noll, 1997) directly tap the ability to
sustain the decoupling of representations from the world so that
cognitive simulations can be run that test the outcomes of
imaginary actions. Thus, there is probably a substantial
differential in the cleaving at node #3 based on cognitive ability
(Duncan et al., 2008; Kane & Engle, 2002; Salthouse et al.,
2003). In contrast, we conjecture that for many tasks in the
heuristics and biases literature, the other two parameters show
only modest differential partitioning based on cognitive ability.
Regarding parameter #1 and the availability of mindware, it is
true that the rules, knowledge, and strategies available to the
analytic system to
use in heuristic system overrides are partly the product of past
learning experiences. One might expect that people with more
cognitive ability would profit more from learning experiences.
However, the relevant mindware for our present discussion is not
just generic procedural knowledge, nor is it the hodge-podge of
declarative knowledge that is often used to assess crystallized
intelligence on ability tests. Instead, it is a (p.146) very special
subset of knowledge related to how one views probability and
chance; whether one has the tools to think scientifically and the
propensity to do so; the tendency to think logically; and
knowledge of some special rules of formal reasoning and good
argumentation. At least among the restricted range of the
university students typically tested in these studies, acquiring
these sets of skills and knowledge bases might be, experientially,
very haphazard. Thus, the correlation between this parameter
and intelligence, although certainly positive, might be lower in
magnitude than we might think.
Although it is true that more intelligent individuals learn more
things than the less intelligent, much information relevant to
rationality is acquired rather late in life, and the explicit
teaching of this mindware is very spotty and inconsistent. For
example, the tendency to think of alternative explanations for
a phenomenon leads to the ability to more accurately infer
causal models of events. Such principles are taught very
inconsistently (by either explicit or implicit means). Or take, for
example, the conjunction rule of probability, the violation of
which is illustrated in the Linda problem. Kahneman and
Tversky (1982a) report that tests of rule endorsement and
argument endorsement conducted after participants had made
the conjunction error revealed that statistically sophisticated
psychology graduate students did endorse the rule they had
violated (they possessed the relevant mindware but did not
detect the necessity for override). However, a majority of
statistically naïve undergraduate students failed to endorse the
conjunction rule—they lacked the relevant mindware (“much to
our surprise, naive subjects did not have a solid grasp of the
conjunction rule,” p. 127, Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a). The lack
of uniform teaching and learning conditions for the acquisition of
this mindware might attenuate any natural correlation with
intelligence that there would be if it were taught under
uniform conditions.
Turning next to override detection (parameter #2), it would
seem to be as much a thinking disposition as it is an aspect of
cognitive capacity.
Overrride detection should relate to constructs like need for cognition,
for instance (see Cacioppo et al., 1996). As such, it seems as
much an aspect of the reflective level of processing as an aspect
of the algorithmic level. Consistent with this interpretation,
individual differences in override detection become apparent in
typical performance situations rather than optimal performance
situations (Ackerman, 1994, 1996). That is, (p.147) they become
apparent in performance situations that are unconstrained in
that no overt instructions to maximize performance are given,
and the task interpretation is determined to some extent by
the participant. Because override detection parses, in terms of
the structure of cognitive abilities, at least partially with thinking
dispositions, we think that person parameter #2 in the
framework is less the source of associations with cognitive
ability than is parameter #3 (which is more exclusively a
function of the algorithmic level).
Additionally, it should be noted that there are two ways that the
influence of parameter #2, as a generator of individual
differences, becomes attenuated: essentially by floor effects (as
Kahneman [2000] argues) but also by ceiling effects. Certain
tasks in between-subjects designs (perhaps anchoring problems
or the Linda problem) give so few cues to the possibility of
heuristic/analytic conflict that this parameter is probably floored
for most subjects. Conversely, the instructions in other tasks
(e.g., belief bias assessed with syllogisms) and some situations
in real life (“the salesperson is trying to sell you—don’t forget”)
are so explicit in calling attention to heuristic/analytic conflict
that this parameter is probably near ceiling.
The case of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning is probably a good
illustration of our argument that it is parameter #3 (the
decoupling capacity parameter) that is the primary generator of
associations with cognitive ability in rational thinking tasks (see
De Neys, 2006a, 2006b). The mindware available to reason
logically on these simple categorical syllogisms (parameter #1)
is probably pretty uniformly present in the samples of university
students examined in most studies in the reasoning literature.
The procedures needed to reason through the syllogisms used in
these studies (e.g., the invalid syllogism: all A are B, all C are B,
therefore all C are A) are within the mindware of the vast
majority of the students in research studies. In one study
(Stanovich & West, 2008b), the percentage correct in the neutral
condition (84.1%) was almost as high as the percentage correct
in the consistent condition (85.0%), where belief and validity
were in alignment.

Additionally, as just mentioned, the instructions on this task probably

ceiling out parameter #2—override detection. Recall that the
instructions sensitize the participants to potential conflict
(between argument validity and the truth of argument
components). Thus, parameters #1 (p.148) and #2 probably leave
little room for any individual difference variable to associate with
performance.

In contrast, the syllogistic reasoning task does require sustained

cognitive decoupling (De Neys, 2006b). For example, in the
“rose” syllogism (All flowers have petals; roses have petals;
therefore, roses are flowers
—which is invalid), subjects must suppress the tendency to
endorse a valid response because of the “naturalness” of the
conclusion—roses are flowers. This response must be held in
abeyance while reasoning procedures work through the partially
overlapping set logic indicating that the conclusion does not
necessarily follow and that the syllogism is thus invalid. The
reasoning process may take several seconds of perhaps
somewhat aversive concentration (see Botvinick et al., 2004;
Glenberg, 1997; Kahneman, 1973; Navon, 1989)—seconds during
which the urge to foreclose the conflict by acceding to the
natural tendency to affirm “roses are flowers” (by responding
“valid”) must be suppressed. Such response suppression during
reasoning is closely related to the inhibitory and conflict
resolution processes being studied by investigators examining
the construct of executive functioning (e.g., Botvinick et al.,
2004; Salthouse et al., 2003). Individual differences in such
inhibitory processes have been found to be strongly associated
with individual differences in fluid intelligence.
Our conjecture here amounts to an endorsement of what Evans
(2007b) calls the quality hypothesis regarding cognitive
ability:individuals higher in cognitive ability are more likely to
compute the correct response given that they have engaged in
Type 2 processing. The alternative hypothesis—the quantity
hypothesis—is that individuals higher in cognitive ability are
more likely to engage in Type 2 processing. Our hypothesis is
that the effect of cognitive ability is more qualitative than
quantitative, to use Evans’ terms: individuals higher in cognitive
ability are more likely to compute the correct response given
that they have engaged in Type 2 processing, but they are not
much more likely to actually engage in Type 2 processing.
Cognitive ability is more related to maximal/optimal processing
(which stresses the algorithmic mind) than it is to typical
performance (which more closely tracks the reflective mind).
We conjecture that many of the other tasks that do show
associations with cognitive ability (second column of Table 7–2)
are tasks that (p.149)
involve some type of inhibition and/or sustained cognitive
decoupling. For example, in within-subjects tests of outcome bias
(Stanovich & West, 1998c), the appearance of the second item
gives a pretty clear signal to the subject that there is an issue of
consistency in their responses to the two different forms—that is,
the within-subjects design probably puts parameter #2 at ceiling,
thus ensuring that it is not the source of any associations with
cognitive ability that are obtained. Detecting the need for
consistency is not the issue. Instead, the difficulty comes from
the necessity of inhibiting the tendency to downgrade the
decision in the negative outcome condition, despite its having a
better rationale than the positive outcome decision. Even in the
between-subjects version of this task, one group of participants—
those getting the negative outcome version—is alerted to the
potential conflict between the seemingly good reasons to have
the operation and the shockingly bad outcome. Subjects must
suppress the desire to sanction the decision, decouple their
knowledge of the outcome, and simulate what they would have
thought had they not known the outcome. Indeed, this condition
creates a situation similar to those of various “curse of
knowledge” paradigms14.
Note that the two cognitive ability groups show no difference in
mean ratings in the positive outcome condition (see Table 7–1),
which does not necessitate heuristic system override. The
difference is entirely in the negative outcome condition in which
sustained suppression is required.

The “curse of knowledge” logic of the negative item in the

outcome bias task is similar to that in hindsight bias paradigms
(e.g., Christiansen- Szalanski & Williams, 1991; Fischhoff, 1975;
Pohl, 2004), which have also shown associations with cognitive
ability (Stanovich & West, 1998c). In hindsight paradigms, the
marking of the correct response sensitizes every respondent to
the potential conflict involved—between what you know now and
what you would have known without the correct response being
indicated. Thus again, parameter #2 must be at ceiling.
However, there is a need for sustained decoupling in the task, so
whatever association between bias and cognitive ability exists on
the task (p.150) (a modest one; see Stanovich & West, 1998c) is
likely generated by individual differences in parameter #3.
Within-subjects framing paradigms probably have a similar logic.
The appearance of the second problem surely signals that an
issue of consistency is at stake (putting parameter #2 at ceiling)
and virtually all of the university students in these studies have
acquired the value of consistency (parameter #1 is also at
ceiling). The modest cognitive ability
associations that are generated by this task probably derive from
lower cognitive ability participants who cannot suppress the
attractiveness of an alternative response despite the threat to
consistent responding that it represents—in short, from variation
in parameter #3. In contrast, between-subjects framing situations
probably drive parameter #2 to a very low value (few people
recognize that there is a conflict to be resolved between a
potentially different response to an alternative framing), thus
eliminating associations with individual differences (in the
manner suggested by Kahneman, 2000).
The logic of the Linda problem is similar. Transparent, within-
subjects versions are easier because they signal the conflict
involved and the necessity for override. Such versions create at
least modest associations with cognitive ability. In the between-
subjects version, however, individual differences are
eliminated entirely because this design obscures the
heuristic/analytic conflict and puts parameter #2 at floor.

As a final example, consider the difference between causal and

noncausal baserates15 illustrated in Table 6–2. Noncausal
baserate problems (p.151) trigger conflict detection in so few
participants that parameter #2 is floored and hence cognitive
ability differences are eliminated. In contrast, in a classic causal
baserate problem such as the Volvo versus Saab problem (see
Footnote 15)—where clearly relevant aggregate information is
pitted against indicant information—the aggregate information
has a causal relationship to the criterion behavior and thus
clearly signals that there are two pieces of information in
conflict. Parameter #2 is near ceiling, and individual differences
are determined largely by parameter #3 (the sustained
decoupling parameter), which is, we conjecture, linked to
individual differences in cognitive ability. Thus, causal—but not
noncausal—baserate problems show cognitive ability differences.
It is important to note that this interpretation does not contradict
the results of De Neys (De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys &
Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De
Neys et al., 2008; Franssens & De Neys, 2009), who
demonstrated that various implicit measures of performance on
noncausal baserate problems (decision latencies, unannounced
recall, brain activation, autonomic arousal) indicated that conflict
between baserate and indicant information was detected and
that when indicant information was overridden, inhibition areas
of the brain were activated (lateral prefrontal cortex). Unlike the
(p.152) classic 70/30 lawyer/engineer problem of Kahneman and
Tversky (1973), very extreme baserates were used in the De
Neys work, for
example: “In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the
participants there were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers.” These
extreme numbers serve to draw attention to the baserate and
move parameter #2 to ceiling from its relatively low level in the
traditional 70/30 version of the problem. The problem is turned
from one where the pitfall is override detection to one where the
central task is to inhibit the stereotype that is automatically
triggered and replace it with reliance on the extreme baserate.
Thus, individual differences in these extreme baserate problems
would be determined largely by parameter #3 (the sustained
decoupling parameter), and it is thus to be expected that
inhibition areas of the brain would be activated on trials where
successful override is achieved.
Likewise, because this version of the paradigm results in a
moderate- to-high value of parameter #2, it is expected
under our model that
various implicit measures (including brain activation) would
indicate that conflict between baserate and indicant information
was detected.

Of course, with this discussion of what creates associations

between biases and cognitive ability, we do not mean to draw
attention away from the left side of Table 7–2. There, it is
apparent that a startlingly wide range of rational thinking
tendencies appear to be independent of intelligence within the
range existing in a university sample. These include many tasks
that test some very basic strictures of rational thought. For
example, the absence of framing and context effects are
performance patterns that ensure that people’s choices are
utility maximizing. The failure to adhere to these strictures leads
to descriptive models of human rationality that have profound
public policy implications (Camerer et al., 2003; Lilienfeld et al.,
2009; Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009; Mitchell, 2005;
Prentice, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). But adherence to these
strictures of utility maximization were unrelated to cognitive
ability in our sample. Within the range of intelligence that we
studied, individuals of the highest cognitive capacity were no
less likely to display baserate neglect, the conjunction fallacy,
myside bias, anchoring effects, the sunk cost effect, proportion
dominance, and a host of other cognitive biases.
The framework in Figure 7–2 illustrates why rationality will not be
uniformly related to intelligence. Instead, that relationship will
depend on the degree that rational responding requires
sustained cognitive (p.153) decoupling. When the heart of the task
is recognizing the need for heuristic override, and the override
operation itself is easily accomplished, no sustained decoupling
is necessary and rational thinking will depend more on the
operations of the reflective mind than on those
of the algorithmic mind (see Chapter 2 and Stanovich, 2009a,
2009b). Thus, relationships with intelligence will be attenuated.
Additionally, as Kahneman (2000) has argued, when detecting
the necessity for override is very difficult (parameter #2 is low),
performance overall will be quite low and no relationships with
cognitive ability will be evident.

Conversely, however, highly intelligent people will display fewer

reasoning biases when you tell them what the bias is and what
they need to do to avoid it. That is, when parameters #1 and #2
are ceilinged and considerable cognitive capacity is needed to
sustain decoupling while the correct response is computed, then
highly intelligent people will do better in a rational thinking task.
However, if there is no advance warning that biased processing
must be avoided (as is the case in many between- subjects
designs), then more intelligent individuals are not much more
likely to perform any better on the task. Another way to phrase
this is to say that often, people of higher cognitive ability are no
more likely to recognize the need for a normative principle than
are individuals of lower cognitive ability. When the former believe
that nothing normative is at stake, they behave remarkably like
other people (equally likely for example to be “anchored” into
responding that redwoods are almost 1000 feet tall!; see Table
7–1). If told, however, that they are in a situation of normative
conflict and if resolving the conflict requires holding a prepotent
response in abeyance, then the individual of high cognitive ability
will show less of many different cognitive biases.
An important caveat to the model presented in Figure 7–2 is that
which rational thinking tasks yield a conflict between heuristic
and analytic responses is not fixed but instead is a function of
the individual’s history of mindware acquisition. Early in
developmental history, the relevant mindware will not be present
and the heuristic response will be inevitable—no conflict will
even be detected. Someone with no training in thinking
probabilistically—or, for that matter, logically in terms of subset
and superset—may experience no conflict in the Linda problem.
As experience with statistical and probabilistic thinking grows, a
person will begin to experience more of a conflict because
relevant mindware is
(p.154) available for use in the simulation of an alternative
response. The final developmental stage in this sequence might
well be that the mindware used in simulation becomes so tightly
compiled that it is triggered in the manner of a natural heuristic
response. Some statistics instructors, for example, become
unable to empathize with their students for whom the basic
probability axioms are not transparent. The instructor
can no longer remember when these axioms were not primary
intuitions. This final stage of processing is perhaps captured by
developmental models of heuristic versus analytic processing
that trace a trajectory where fluent performance looks very
heuristic16.

Under the view presented here, there turn out to be numerous

circumstances under which rational thought will dissociate from
cognitive ability. First, cues to the necessity for override might
be missing, thus leading most individuals to respond
heuristically regardless of cognitive ability. Second, cues to the
need for override might be present, but the disposition to
respond to such cues may not be correlated with algorithmic
capacity. If this is the case, there will be no association with
cognitive ability as long as there is no need for sustained
decoupling. The disposition to spot a heuristic/analytic conflict
is not necessarily related to the computational power needed
(in some situations) to resolve the conflict in favor of the analytic
response. Thinking dispositions that relate to override cue
detection are not assessed on intelligence tests (see Stanovich,
2009b) and are thus not part of the intelligence construct. In
the next chapter, we will explore more thoroughly the
conditions that lead to a dissociation between intelligence and
rational thinking.

Notes:
(1) The earlier versions of these models contained the
assumption that this miserly processing always involved
defaulting to the autonomous mind. More contemporary
models (see Evans, a; Stanovich, 2009a; Chapter 4 of the
present volume) have allowed for the possibility of miserly
Type 2 processing.

(2) We reiterate here Evans’ (2008) point that it is wrong to

equate Type 2 processing with normatively correct responding
and Type 1 processing with normatively incorrect processing.
First, both types of processing are most often normatively
correct. It is also possible for a situation to trigger a Type 1
response that is normatively correct and a Type 2 response that
is normatively incorrect. The only claim that most dual-process
theorists make is that the converse is statistically more likely.
Evans’ (2008) point illustrates why certain terms for the two
processes in dual-process theory are infelicitous. For example,
Epstein’s (1994) terminology (experiential system and rational
system) mistakenly implies that Type 2 processing always yields
a response that is normatively rational (and perhaps
pragmatically that the experiential system does not). Gibbard’s
(1990) labeling of Type 2 processing as emanating from a
“normative control
system” mistakenly implies the same thing (that Type 2
processing is always normative), as does Klein’s (1998) labeling
of Type 2 strategies as “rational choice strategies.” Rationality is an
organismic-level concept and should never be used to label a
subpersonal process. Our face recognition systems are not
rational or irrational. They are, instead, either efficient or
inefficient. A second point is that intelligence might
associate with unbiased responding for two different reasons—
first, that individuals higher in cognitive ability are more likely to
compute the correct response given that they have engaged
Type 2 processing (what Evans [2007b] calls the quality
hypothesis regarding cognitive ability). The second (what Evans
[2007b] calls the quantity hypothesis) is that individuals higher in
cognitive ability are more likely to see the need for Type 2
processing.
(3) Some of this literature was cited in earlier chapters (e.g.,
Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; De Neys, 2006b;
DeShon, Smith, Chan, & Schmitt, 1998; Handley, Capon,
Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005;
Newstead et al., 2004; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Perkins &
Ritchhart, 2004; Peters et al. 2006; Valentine, 1975).

(4) The majority of our studies employed university students

as participants. There is thus a restriction of range in our
samples. The higher and lower SAT groupings are partitionings of
the upper half and lower half of the sample. The low SAT group is
not low in an absolute sense; they simply are of lower cognitive
ability relative to their counterparts in that particular study.
Certainly, it is true that individuals with average and above
average cognitive ability are over-represented in samples
composed entirely of university students. Thus, the magnitude of
the correlations involving SAT obtained in these studies is
undoubtedly attenuated because of restriction of range.
However, the fact that the range of the samples studied is
somewhat restricted, makes many of the findings (of near zero
correlations between cognitive ability and many aspects of
rational thought) no less startling. It is quite unexpected that
across even the range of ability in a university population there
would be so little relation between rational thought and cognitive
ability.
(5) The model of rational judgment used by decision
scientists is one in which a person chooses options based on
which option has the highest expected utility (Baron, 1993,
1999; Dawes, 1998; Fishburn, 1981, 1999; Gauthier, 1975;
Kahneman,1994; Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993;
McFadden, 1999; Pratt, Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1995). It has been
proven through several formal analyses that if people’s
preferences follow
certain logical patterns (the so-called “axioms of choice”), then
they are behaving as if they are maximizing utility (Edwards,
1954; Jeffrey, 1983; Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Savage, 1954; von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).

(6) See the literature on decoupling opinion from

evaluation (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Baron, 1991, 2000;
Evans, 2002; Kuhn, 1991, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 2006;
Nickerson, 1998; Perkins, 1995, 2002; Stanovich, 1999, 2004;
Sternberg, 1997c, 2001, 2003).

(7) There are substantial literatures on both belief bias

(Evans, 2002; Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans, Newstead,
Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000) and
myside bias (Baron, 1991; Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo, &
Schreiber, 2004; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Klaczynski &
Robinson, 2000; Nussbaum & Kardash, 2005; Perkins, 1985;
Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991; Sá, Kelley, Ho, &
Stanovich,2005; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003). The moderate
correlation of the former with intelligence (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994;
Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004; Kokis et al.,
2002; Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sá, West, & Stanovich,
1999; Simoneau & Markovits, 2003; Stanovich & West, 1997,
1998c; however, see Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999) and
the lack of correlation of the latter with intelligence are
reasonably well-documented (Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996;
Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000;
Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sá et al., 2005; Toplak &
Stanovich, 2003)
(8) These were the relevant crash statistics for the Ford
Explorer at the time the study was conducted, see Vehicle
design versus aggressivity, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT HS
809 194), Retrieved February 23, 2002, from NHTSA website
[Link]
11/DOT_HS_809194.pdf.

(9) A large number of cognitive abilities correlate with

intelligence (e.g., Ackerman, Kyllonen, & Richards, 1999;
Carroll, 1993; Deary, 2000, 2001; Deary, Whiteman, Starr,
Whalley, & Fox, 2004; Lubinski, 2000, 2004; Lubinski &
Humphreys, 1997).

(10) We would reiterate here the warning that there is a

restriction of range in our samples because our studies
employed university students as participants.

(11) For ease of communication, we are using the term heuristic response
to refer to responses that emanate from the autonomous mind or
responses based on serial associative cognition (see Evans, a). It
should be stressed again that the connection between normative
responding and Type 2 processing is not invariable (see Evans,
2008). Rational responses can, and often do, originate from the
autonomous mind and irrational responses from contaminated
mindware substituted by Type 2 processing. The only assumption
that most dual-process theorists make is the weak assumption
that in cases of conflict between the two, the response generated
by Type 2 processing is a statistically better bet.
(12) We have previously cited the work on decoupling and fluid
intelligence (e.g., Conway et al., 2001; Conway et al., 2003;
Duncan et al., 1996; Duncan et al., 2008; Engle, 2002; Friedman
et al., 2008; Geary, 2005; Gray et al., 2003; Kane & Engle,2002,
2003; Salthouse et al., 2003; Salthouse & Davis, 2006; Unsworth
& Engle, 2005,2007).

(13) The reader is reminded again that for ease of

communication, we are using the term heuristic response to refer
to responses that emanate from the autonomous mind or
responses based on serial associative cognition.

(14) There are many different “curse of knowledge” paradigms

(see Birch, 2005; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989;
Gilovich, Medvec, & Sativsky, 1998; Keysar & Barr, 2002;
Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 2003).

(15) Baserates that have a causal relationship to the criterion

behavior (Ajzen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980, 1990; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1979) are often distinguished from noncausal
baserate problems—those involving base rates with no obvious
causal relationship to the criterion behavior. A famous noncausal
problem is the well-known cab problem (see Bar-Hillel, 1980;
Lyon & Slovic, 1976; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982): “A cab was
involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies,
the Green and the Blue, operate in the city in which the accident
occurred. You are given the following facts: 85 percent of the
cabs in the city are Green and 15 percent are Blue. A witness
identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the
witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night
of the accident and concluded that the witness correctly
identified each of the two colors 80 percent of the time. What is
the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue?”
(Amalgamating the baserate and the indicant according to
Bayes’ rule yields .41 as the posterior probability of the cab
being blue.) The causal variant of the same problem substitutes
for the first fact the phrase “Although the two companies are
roughly equal in size, 85% of cab
accidents in the city involve Green cabs and 15% involve Blue
cabs” (p. 157, Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Another type of
causal baserate problem is structured so that the participant
has to make an inductive inference in a simulation of a real-
life decision. The information relevant to the decision is
conflicting and of two different types. One type of evidence is
statistical: either probabilistic or aggregate base-rate information
that favors one of the bipolar decisions. The other evidence is a
concrete case or personal experience that points in the
opposite direction. The classic Volvo versus Saab item (see p.
285 of Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986) provides an example. In
this problem, a couple is deciding to buy one of two otherwise
equal cars. Consumer surveys, statistics on repair records, and
polls of experts favor the Volvo over the Saab.
However, a friend reports experiencing a severe mechanical
problem with the Volvo he owns. The participant is asked to
provide advice to the couple. Preference for the Volvo indicates a
tendency to rely on the large- sample information in spite of
salient personal testimony. A preference for the Saab indicates
reliance on the personal testimony over the opinion of experts
and the large-sample information.

(16) There are many models of cognitive abilities that view

the endpoint of the performance trajectory as reflecting
properties of autonomous processing (Ericsson & Charness,
1994; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Klein, 1998; Reyna, Lloyd, &
Brainerd,2003; Reyna et al., 2005; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
Rationality and Intelligence: Empirical
and Theoretical Relationships and
Implications for the Great Rationality
Debate
Keith E. Stanovich
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0008

Abstract and Keywords

Having sketched out a model of how and when cognitive ability
associates with heuristics and biases tasks in Chapters 6 and 7,
this chapter uses the model to summarize the empirical findings
on the nature of the relationship between intelligence and
rational thought. It argues that the relative dissociation between
intelligence and rationality is consistent with the tri-process
model sketched in earlier chapters and reinforces the usefulness
of that framework. This chapter revisits the Great Rationality
Debate in cognitive science in light of the findings on individual
differences discussed in previous chapters.
Keywords: cognitive ability, intelligence, rational thought, rationality, Great
Rationality Debate, individual differences

Having sketched out a model of how and when cognitive ability

associates with heuristics and biases tasks in Chapter 7, this
chapter will use the taxonomy of Chapter 6 to summarize the
empirical findings on the nature of the relationship between
intelligence and rational thought. Each of the major categories
displayed in Figure 8–1 (which recapitulates Fig. 6–3) represents
a separate explanation of why human thought and action are
sometimes irrational.

Intelligence and Rationality Associations in Terms

of the Taxonomy
The Mr. Spock problem represents the most clear-cut category because it
is likely to be as prevalent in high-IQ individuals as in low-IQ
individuals. The reason is that these problems result from
inadequate (or incorrect) input from the autonomous mind (e.g.,
from modules of emotional regulation). Variation in the
subprocesses of the autonomous mind tend to be independent
of intelligence1. Thus, the Mr. Spock prob (p.156)

lem is just as
likely to occur in
individuals of
high intelligence
as in individuals
of lower
intelligence.

The next
category
(defaulting to
the autonomous
mind and not
engaging at all
in Type 2
processing) is
the most
shallow Figure 8.1. An Expanded Taxonomy of Thinking Errors.
processing (p.157)
tendency of the
cognitive miser.
Although the
ability to sustain
Type 2 cognitive
decoupling is, of
course, related
to intelligence,
the
tendency to engage in such processing or to default to
autonomous processes is a property of the reflective mind that is
not assessed on IQ tests. Consider the Levesque (1986, 1989)
problem mentioned in Chapter 6 (e.g., “Jack is looking at Anne
but Anne is looking at George”) as an example of avoiding Type 2
processing. The subjects who answer this problem correctly are
no higher in intelligence than those that do not, at least in our
sample of university students (Toplak & Stanovich, 2002). In
unpublished work with other versions of tasks sharing the logic of
this problem, we have found statistically significant associations
with intelligence, but the associations were small in absolute
magnitude.
Disjunctive reasoning problems such as the Levesque problem
(see Shafir, 1994) require the decoupling of cognitive
representations and the
computation of possible worlds with the decoupled
representations—one of the central operations of algorithmic
mind discussed in Chapter 3 (and one of the processes at the
heart of fluid intelligence). But clearly one has to discern the
necessity of disjunctive reasoning in this situation to answer
correctly. One has to avoid the heuristic reaction: “Oh, since we
don’t know whether Anne is married or not we cannot determine
anything.” And with respect at least to this particular problem,
Toplak and Stanovich (2002) observed that individuals of high
intelligence were no more likely to do so. The reflective-level
cognition of individuals of high intelligence is no more likely to
send instructions to engage in decoupling operations to the
algorithmic level. No doubt, were they sent, the decoupled
operations would be more reliably sustained by people of higher
intelligence (they differ on parameter #3 in the model presented
in Fig. 7–2). But intelligence is of no use in this task unless the
instruction is sent to engage in the modeling of possible worlds.
There is, however, one theoretical reason why one might expect
a positive correlation between intelligence and the tendency of
the reflective mind to initiate Type 2 processing. The reason is
that it might be assumed that those of high intelligence would be
more optimistic about the potential efficacy of Type 2 processing
and thus be more likely to engage in it. Indeed, some tasks
designed to trap the cognitive miser do show a positive
correlation with intelligence. One is the task studied by Frederick
(2005) and mentioned in Chapter 6: A bat and a ball cost (p.158)
$1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? Frederick (2005) found that the correlation
between intelligence and a set of such similar items is in the
range of 0.43 to 0.46. Gilhooly and Murphy (2005; Gilhooly &
Fioratou, 2009) found that the correlations between performance
on a set of insight problems somewhat different than those 2 used
by Frederick (2005) and various measures of sustained
decoupling ability (i.e., measures of fluid intelligence) were in the
range of
0.20 to 0.45. Correlations with disjunctive reasoning tasks were
lower in the Toplak and Stanovich (2002) study. Correlations of
this magnitude leave plenty of room for dissociations between
rationality and intelligence. That is, the scatterplot of such a
relationship would contain many cases of poor rational thought
despite substantial intelligence, and numerous cases of highly
rational thought conjoined with lower-
than-average intelligence. Of course, the correlations observed
in all of these investigations are attenuated somewhat by
restriction of range in the university samples.
A somewhat more demanding strategy of the cognitive miser
displayed in Figure 8–1 is to rely on serial associative
processing with a focal bias. It is a more demanding strategy in
that it does involve Type 2 processing. It is still a strategy of the
miser, however, in that it does not involve fully fleshed-out
mental simulation (see Evans, 2006b, 2007a, 2009, on satisficing
in Type 2 processing). Framing effects (see Chapters 6 and 7)
provide examples of the focal bias in the processing of the
cognitive miser. When between-subjects framing effects are
examined, the tendency to display this type of bias is virtually
independent of intelligence. When examined within-subjects, the
tendency to avoid framing does show a very small correlation
with intelligence (for individual (p.159) differences work on
framing using both types of designs, see Bruine de Bruin et
al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Stanovich & West, 1998b,
1999, 2008b). Within a university sample, individuals of the
highest intelligence are almost as likely to display irrational
framing effects as those of lower intelligence. The same is true
with anchoring effects (see Table 7–1). Among a university
sample, anchoring biases are virtually independent of cognitive
ability.
The next category of thinking error in Figure 8–1 is override
failure. In this case, inhibitory processes try to take the
processing of the autonomous mind offline to substitute an
alternative response, but the decoupling operations fail to
suppress the Type 1 response (or fail to sustain decoupling long
enough for an alternative response to be computed). We would
expect that this category of cognitive failure would have the
highest (negative) correlation with intelligence. This is because
intelligence indexes the computational power of the algorithmic
mind that can be used for the decoupling operation.
Theoretically, however, we should still expect the correlation to
be somewhat less than perfect. The reflective mind must first
trigger override operations before any individual differences in
decoupling can become apparent.
In dealing with the data involving override failure, we might
begin by distinguishing so-called “hot override” from so-called “cold
override.” The former refers to the override of emotions, visceral
drives, or short-term temptations (by analogy to what has been
called “hot” cognition in the literature; see Abelson, 1963). The
latter refers to the override of overpracticed rules, Darwinian
modules, or tendencies of the autonomous mind that are not
necessarily linked to visceral systems (by analogy to what has
been called “cold” cognition in the literature).

In the domain of hot override, we know most about delay of gratification

situations. Mischel (Ayduk & Mischel, 2002; Mischel &
Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) pioneered
the study of the delay of gratification paradigm with children.
The paradigm has many variants, but the essence of the
procedure is as follows. Age-appropriate rewards (e.g., toys,
desirable snacks) are established, and the child is told that
he/she will receive a small reward (e.g., one marshmallow) or
a larger reward (e.g., two marshmallows). The child receives the
larger reward if, after the experimenter leaves the room, the
child waits until the experimenter returns and does not recall
the experimenter by ringing a bell. (p.160) If the bell is rung
before the experimenter returns, the child receives only the
smaller reward. The dependent variable is the amount of time
that child waits before ringing the bell3.

Rodriguez, Mischel, and Shoda (1989) observed a correlation of

0.39 between measured intelligence and delay in the Mischel
paradigm. Likewise, in a similar study of young children, Funder
and Block (1989) observed a correlation of 0.34 between
intelligence and delay. Consistent with the idea that this
paradigm involves the reflective mind as well as the algorithmic
mind, Funder and Block found that personality measures
predicted delay after the variance associated with intelligence
had been partialled out.
Data from adults converge with these findings (Kirby, Winston, &
Santiesteban, 2005). There is a large literature on the extent to
which adults discount monetary amounts into the future. Many
different paradigms have been used to assess how people
compare a smaller reward immediately over a larger reward in
the future and how much larger the future reward has to be to tip
the preference (Green & Myerson, 2004; Loewenstein, Read, &
Baumeister, 2003; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen,
2004). Higher intelligence is associated with a greater tendency
to wait for the larger monetary reward. However, Shamosh and
Gray (2008) meta-analyzed this literature and found that across
24 different studies, the correlation between the tendency to
wait for delayed larger rewards and intelligence averaged 0.23.
Delayed-discounting paradigms are laboratory tasks. Real-life
override failures in adults correlate with intelligence too. The
correlations are modest, however. For example, the control of
addictive behaviors such as smoking, gambling, and drug use are
often analyzed in terms of override failure (Ainslie, 2001, 2005).
Thus, it is interesting that Austin and Deary (2002) report
analyses of the longitudinal Edinburgh Artery Study looking at
whether intelligence might be a long-term protective (p.161) factor
against both smoking and drinking (presumably through the
greater ability to sustain inhibition of the autonomous mind).
They found no evidence at all that longitudinally, intelligence
served as a protective against problem drinking. There was a
very small but significant longitudinal link between intelligence
and smoking.

The correlations in the studies of Rodriguez et al., (1989), Funder

and Block (1989), and Austin and Deary (2002) and in the data
of Shamosh & Gray (2008) were statistically significant, but they
are, by all estimates, moderate in absolute magnitude. They
leave plenty of room for dissociations between intelligence and
successful override of autonomous systems.

A very similar story plays out when we look at the relationship

between intelligence and “cold” override failure. Two cold override
tasks discussed in Chapter 6 provide examples: belief bias tasks
(“roses are living things”) and denominator neglect (pick from
bowl with 1 of 10 red vs. 8 of 100 red; see Denes-Raj & Epstein,
1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
Successful override correlates with intelligence in the range of
0.35 to 0.45 for belief bias task and in the range of 0.25 to 0.30
for the Epstein task (Kokis et al., 2002; Macpherson & Stanovich,
2007; Stanovich & West, 1998c, 2008a, 2008b). Two other
examples of override failure (see Table 6–1) are outcome bias
and hindsight bias, and both show significant, but small,
correlations with cognitive ability. Both are examples of “curse
of knowledge” effects that demand sustained decoupling (Birch,
2005; Keysar & Barr, 2002; Royzman et al., 2003).
Outcome bias shows correlations of from 0.15 to 0.25 with
intelligence (Stanovich & West, 1998c, 2008b). Likewise,
hindsight bias displays a correlation of 0.25 with intelligence
(Stanovich & West, 1998c).

Continuing down in the taxonomy in Figure 8–1, we see that

irrational behavior can occur for a fifth reason: the right
mindware (cognitive rules, strategies, knowledge, and belief
systems) is not available to use in decision making. We would
expect to see a correlation with intelligence here because
mindware gaps most often arise from lack of education or
experience. However, as argued in Chapter 7, this correlation,
although certainly positive, might be smaller in magnitude than
is commonly thought. Although it is true that more intelligent
individuals learn more things than less intelligent individuals,
much knowledge relevant to
(p.162) rationality (and many thinking dispositions) are picked
up rather late in life. Explicit teaching of this mindware is not
uniform in the school curriculum at any level. Because principles
are taught very inconsistently,
some intelligent people may fail to learn these important aspects
of critical thinking. Correlations with cognitive ability have been
found to be roughly (in absolute magnitude) in the range of 0.25
to 0.35 for various probabilistic reasoning tasks, 0.20 to 0.25 for
various covariation detection and hypothesis testing tasks, and
0.05 to 0.20 for various indices of Bayesian reasoning—again
relationships allowing for substantial discrepancies between
intelligence and the presence of the mindware necessary for
rational thought. These correlations are derived from a variety of
investigations (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Kokis et al., 2002;
Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Peters et al., 2006; Sá et al., 1999;
Stanovich & West, 1998c, 1998d, 1999, 2000, 2008b; Toplak &
Stanovich, 2002; West & Stanovich, 2003). Some of these data
are from studies of children spanning a wide range of ability. The
adult samples employ mostly range-restricted university
samples.
Regarding the sixth category in Figure 8–1—contaminated
mindware—we would of course expect more intelligent
individuals to acquire more mindware of all types based on their
superior learning abilities. This would result in them acquiring
more mindware that fosters rational thought. However, this
superior learning ability would not preclude more intelligent
individuals from acquiring contaminated mindware—that is,
mindware that literally causes irrationality. Many parasitic belief
systems are conceptually somewhat complex. Examples of
complex parasitic mindware would be Holocaust denial (Lipstadt,
1994; Shermer, 1997) and many financial get-rich-quick schemes
as well as bogus tax evasion schemes. Such complex mindware
might even require a certain level of intelligence to be enticing to
the host. George Orwell conjectured in this vein when discussing
political attitudes in the World War II era: “There is no limit to the
follies that can be swallowed if one is under the influence of
feelings of this kind…. One has to belong to the intelligentsia to
believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool”
(1968, p. 379).
This conjecture is supported by the results of a study
commissioned by the \rs (Consumer Fraud Research Group,
2006). The study found that the investment fraud victims (p.163)
had significantly more education than a comparison group—
68.6% of the investment fraud victims group had at least a BA
degree compared to just 37.2% in the control group. Finally,
surveys show that pseudoscientific beliefs have a quite high
prevalence among those of high intelligence (Chatillon, 1989).
Also suggestive is a study reported by Zagorsky (2007) in which
a regression analysis showed a positive beta weight for
intelligence as a predictor of income but a
negative beta weight for intelligence as a predictor of wealth and
financial distress (debt problems, bankruptcy, etc.). Income is
more dependent on IQ-type selection devices used by selective
schools, corporations, and the military (SAT, GRE, LSAT, GMAT,
ASVAB, etc.). In contrast, wealth management and personal
financial decision making involve much more the rational
thinking skills that go largely unassessed by conventional IQ tests
and intelligence test proxies such as the SAT.

Summary of the Relationships

In the aggregate, across the different categories of thinking error
displayed in Figure 8–1, the correlations between intelligence and
the various types of thinking error seem to be remarkably
modest. The Mr. Spock problem is largely independent of
intelligence. The various ways that the cognitive miser avoids
computationally expensive information appear to correlate in the
range of 0.25 to 0.40 with intelligence at the highest—that is,
when they correlate with intelligence at all. However, there are
many effects and biases that result from miserly processing
tendencies that show virtually no correlation at all with
intelligence in university samples—for example, myside bias,
anchoring effects, and between-subjects framing effects framing.
Mindware gaps show correlations with intelligence in the range of
0.20 to 0.40. Correlations involving contaminated mindware are
largely unknown but are unlikely to be larger than this in
university samples. The bias blind spot, arising because of a
mindware gap and contaminated mindware, is at least as robust
among the highly intelligent (Meserve et al., 2008). It certainly
shows no positive correlation with intelligence.
Collapsing across all of these categories of cognitive error, it
must be said that the correlations with intelligence are
surprisingly modest. (p.164) The context for such a statement is
the general esteem with which intelligence is held in folk
psychology. In psychology and among the lay public alike,
assessments of intelligence and tests of cognitive ability are
taken to be the sine qua non of good thinking. It is surprising
when they are so little correlated with cognitive tasks that
measure processes that are so important. In 2002, Daniel
Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for work done with
his longtime collaborator Amos Tversky (who died in 1996). Their
work inaugurated the so-called “heuristics and bias research
program,” one of the most successful intellectual projects in all of
cognitive science. It is a profound historical irony of the
behavioral sciences that the Nobel Prize was awarded for studies
of cognitive
characteristics that are entirely missing from the most well-
known mental assessment device in the behavioral sciences—the
intelligence test (and its many proxies, such as the SAT). This
might not be such an important omission if it were the case that
intelligence was a strong predictor of rational thinking, but as
we have seen, it is not.

In Chapters 2 and 3, the concepts of rationality and

intelligence were theoretically differentiated. In Chapter 7 and
8, it was shown that the concepts separate in actual human
performance—they are empirically separable as well. This
theoretical and empirical separation has implications for the
Great Rationality Debate that was discussed at beginning of
this book. It also has profound social implications. In the
remainder of this chapter, I discuss how the relative
dissociation has implications for the Great Rationality Debate. In
the remaining chapters, we will explore the social implications of
the modest correlation between the two.

Individual Differences, the Reflective Mind, and the

Great Rationality Debate
In previous chapters, I have established that rationality
requires three different classes of mental characteristic. First,
algorithmic-level cognitive capacity is needed for override and
simulation activities to be sustained. Second, the reflective mind
must be characterized by the tendency to initiate the override of
suboptimal responses generated by the autonomous mind and
to initiate simulation activities that will result in a (p.165) better
response. Finally, the mindware that allows the
computation of rational responses needs to be available and
accessible during simulation activities.

Because there are individual differences in each of these three

domains, there will be individual differences in rational thought
and action. The Panglossian position in the Great Rationality
Debate has obscured the existence of individual differences in
rational thought and its underlying components. In particular,
Panglossian philosophers have obscured the importance of the
reflective mind. Philosophical treatments of rationality by
Panglossians tend to have a common structure. Such treatments
tend to stress the importance of the competence/performance
distinction and then proceed to allocate all of the truly important
psychological mechanisms to the competence side of the
dichotomy.
For example, Rescher (1988) argues that “to construe the data
of these interesting experimental studies [of probabilistic
reasoning] to mean that people are systematically programmed
to fallacious processes of reasoning—rather than merely that
they are inclined to a variety of (occasionally questionable)
substantive suppositions—is a very questionable step…. While all
(normal) people are to be credited with the capacity to reason,
they frequently do not exercise it well” (p. 196). There are two
parts to Rescher’s (1988) point here: the “systematically
programmed” part and the “inclination toward questionable
suppositions” part (or, as Rips [1994] puts it, whether incorrect
reasoning is “systematically programmed or just a peccadillo,” p.
394). Rescher’s (1988) focus (like that of many who have dealt
with the philosophical implications of the idea of human
irrationality) is on the issue of how humans are “systematically
programmed.” “Inclinations toward questionable suppositions”
are only of interest to those in the philosophical debates as
mechanisms that allow one to drive a wedge between
competence and performance—thus maintaining a theory of
near-optimal human rational competence in the face of a host of
responses that seemingly defy explanation in terms of standard
normative models.
Analogously to Rescher, Cohen (1982) argues that there really
are only two factors affecting performance on rational thinking
tasks: “normatively correct mechanisms on the one side, and
adventitious causes of error on the other” (p. 252). Not
surprisingly given such a conceptualization, the processes
contributing to error (“adventitious causes”) are of (p.166) little
interest to Cohen (1981, 1982). In his view, human performance
arises from an intrinsic human competence that is impeccably
rational, but responses occasionally deviate from normative
correctness due to inattention, memory lapses, lack of
motivation, and other fluctuating but basically unimportant
causes (in Cohen’s view). There is nothing in such a conception
that would motivate any interest in patterns of errors or
individual differences in such errors.
One of the goals of this volume is to reverse the figure and
ground in the rationality debate, which has tended to be
dominated by the particular way that philosophers frame the
competence/performance distinction. From a psychological
standpoint, there may be important implications in precisely the
aspects of performance that have been backgrounded in this
controversy (“adventitious causes,” “peccadillos”). That is, whatever
the outcome of the disputes about how humans are
“systematically
programmed,” variation in the “inclination toward questionable
suppositions” is of psychological interest as a topic of study in its
own right. The experiments discussed in this volume provide at
least tentative indications that the “inclination toward
questionable suppositions” has some degree of domain
generality and that it is predicted by thinking dispositions that
concern the epistemic and pragmatic goals of the individual and
that are part of the reflective mind.

Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1993; see Johnson-Laird, 2006)

articulate a view of rational thought that parses the
competence/performance distinction much differently from that
of Cohen (1981, 1982, 1986). It is a view that highlights the
importance of the reflective mind and leaves room for individual
differences in important components of cognition. At the heart of
the rational competence that Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1993)
attribute to humans is not perfect rationality but instead just one
meta-principle: People are programmed to accept inferences as
valid provided that they have constructed no mental model of
the premises that contradict the inference. Inferences are
categorized as false when a mental model is discovered that is
contradictory. However, the search for contradictory models is
“not governed by any systematic or comprehensive principles”
(p. 178).
The key point in Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s (1993) account is that
once an individual constructs a mental model from the premises,
once (p.167) the individual draws a new conclusion from the model,
and once the individual begins the search for an alternative
model of the premises that contradicts the conclusion, the
individual “lacks any systematic method to make this search for
counter-examples” (p. 205). Here is where
Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s (1993) model could be modified to
allow for the influence of thinking styles in ways that the
impeccable competence view of Cohen (1981) does not. In this
passage, Johnson-Laird and Byrne seem to be arguing that there
are no systematic control features of the search process. But
epistemically related thinking dispositions may in fact be
reflecting just such control features. Individual differences in the
extensiveness of the search for contradictory models could arise
from a variety of cognitive factors that, although they may not be
completely systematic, may be far from “adventitious”—factors
such as dispositions toward premature closure, cognitive
confidence, reflectivity, dispositions toward confirmation bias,
and ideational generativity.
In Chapter 2, I mentioned the conjecture that many thinking
disposition measures were good predictors of rational thought
because they tapped
the propensity toward decontextualization that commonly results
when Type 1 processes are overridden by Type 2 processing. The
decontextualizing requirement of many heuristics and biases
tasks is a feature that is emphasized by many critics of that
literature who, nevertheless, fail to see it as implying a research
program for differential psychology. For example, I have argued
that to contextualize a problem is such a ubiquitous reasoning
style of human beings that it is one of a very few so-called
Fundamental Computational Biases of information processing
(Stanovich, 2003, 2004). Thus, it is not surprising that many
people respond incorrectly when attempting a psychological task
that is explicitly designed to require a decontextualized
reasoning style (contrary-to-fact syllogisms, argument
evaluation, etc.). But recall the empirically demonstrated
variability on all of these tasks. The fact that some people do
give the decontextualized response means that at least some
people have available a larger repertoire of reasoning styles
(they can flexibly reason so as to override Fundamental
Computational Biases if the situation requires).
Many Panglossian philosophers ignore this variability (see
Stanovich, 1999, for a fuller discussion of this tendency). For
example, Rescher (1988) (p.168) defends responses that exhibit
the gambler’s fallacy on the grounds that people assume a
model of saturation that is valid in other domains (e.g., food
ingestion, sleep) and that “the issue may well be one of a
mistaken factual supposition rather than one of fallacious
reasoning” (pp. 195–196). His argument stresses the
enthymematic character of much human reasoning. But, again,
the fact remains that many people do not reason
enthymematically in this or other reasoning problems and
instead give the normative response, and this means that at
least some people have available a larger repertoire of reasoning
styles (they can flexibly reason enthymematically and
nonenthymematically as the task requires). Or, at the very least,
it means that certain people are more easily shifted out of their
natural enthymematic reasoning style.
My argument here rests on two empirical findings discussed
extensively in this volume: (1) there is substantial variance in
responding on most rational thinking tasks; (2) thinking
disposition measures can predict that variance even after
cognitive ability has been controlled. Another way of framing my
argument is in terms of Dennett’s (1987) so-called “intentional
stance,” which he marries to an assumption of idealized
rationality. Dennett (1988) argues that we use the intentional
stance for humans and dogs but not for lecterns because for the
latter “there is no
predictive leverage gained by adopting the intentional stance” (p.
496). However, in several experiments discussed in this volume,
it has been shown that there is additional predictive leverage to
be gained by relaxing the idealized rationality assumption of
Dennett’s (1987, 1988) intentional stance and by positing
measurable and systematic variation in
intentional-level psychologies (i.e., in the reflective mind).
Knowledge about such individual differences in people’s
intentional-level psychologies can be used to predict variance in
the normative/descriptive gap displayed on many reasoning
tasks. Consistent with the Meliorist conclusion that there can be
individual differences in human rationality, the results show that
there is variability in reasoning that cannot be accommodated
within a model of perfect rational competence operating in the
presence of performance errors and computational limitations.
The idea that humans have computational limitations that keep
them from being fully rational has spawned another position in
the Great Rationality Debate that Stanovich (1999) termed the
Apologist position. (p.169) Like the Meliorist, the Apologist accepts
the empirical reality and nonspuriousness of
normative/descriptive gaps, but the Apologist is much more
hesitant to term them instances of irrationality. This is because
the Apologist takes very seriously the stricture that to
characterize a suboptimal behavior as irrational, it must be the
case that the normative model is computable by the individual. If
there are computational limitations affecting task performance,
then the normative model may not be prescriptive, at least for
individuals of low algorithmic capacity. Prescriptive models are
usually viewed as specifying how processes of belief formation
and decision making should be carried out, given the limitations
of the human cognitive apparatus and the situational constraints
(e.g., time pressure) with which the decision maker must deal
(Baron, 2008). From the Apologist’s perspective, the descriptive
model is quite close to the prescriptive model and the
descriptive/normative gap is attributed to a computational
limitation.
Although the Apologist admits that performance is suboptimal
from the standpoint of the normative model, it is not irrational
because there is no prescriptive/descriptive gap.

However, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, the Apologist stratagem

will not work for all of the irrational tendencies that have been
uncovered in the heuristics and biases literature. First, some
cognitive biases are completely independent of intelligence
(algorithmic capacity)—for example, myside bias. Others are, in
fact, correlated with cognitive
capacity, but the magnitude of the correlations (0.25–0.45)
leaves ample opportunity for rational thinking and cognitive
ability to dissociate, so that there will be plenty of people with
high cognitive ability thinking irrationally, and plenty with
modest cognitive abilities who are responding normatively.
Finally, there is the finding that there is reliable variance in
rational thinking after cognitive ability is controlled and that
the reliable variance is associated with thinking dispositions in
theoretically predictable ways. These thinking dispositions reflect
control features of the reflective mind that can lead to responses
that are more or less rational. They are one of the main
sources of the individual differences in rational thought that I
have been exploring in this volume. Such thinking dispositions
vary systematically from individual to individual and are the
source of what Meliorists consider the variance in the
irrationalities in human cognition. Unlike the Panglossian, who
assumes uniform rationality, the Meliorist is accepting of
variability in rational thought.

(p.170) Skepticism About Mindware-Caused Irrationalities

In the Great Rationality Debate, there is considerable contention
surrounding one particular type of human irrationality—that
caused by contaminated mindware. This aspect of the rationality
debate borders on the disputes in the memetics literature about
the possibility of truly nonfunctional mindware (Blackmore, 1999,
2005; Dawkins, 1993;
Dennett, 1991, 2006; Distin, 2005; Hull, 2000; Stanovich, 2004).
I will argue that those who dispute the idea of irrationality
causing contaminated mindware are making what I term a
grain-size error. A grain-size error occurs when theorists focus
on mindware content that is too broad and complex. For
example, Dawkins (1993) and Blackmore (2000) have famously
claimed that most religions are essentially
“copy-me” memeplexes, “backed up with threats, promises, and
ways of preventing their claims from being tested” (Blackmore,
2000, pp. 35–36). Their arguments have spawned a series of
rebuttals by investigators who study the psychology of religion
(Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2004; Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2004; Boyer,
2001, 2003; Wilson, 2002). These critics of the
Dawkins/Blackmore argument differ among themselves. Some
believe that religion is an evolved adaptation. Others think it is a
byproduct of a series of cognitive modules that evolved for other
purposes (agent detection, theory of mind, etc.). All of them see
the ubiquitous presence of religious belief as grounded in
biology. Regardless of whether the
theorist takes an adaptationist or a byproduct stance toward
religion, they oppose the Dawkins/Blackmore position that
religion is a meme virus—a “copy-me” instruction that not
only is not functional for the human host but may actually be
deleterious.

I would argue that all of these theorists—Dawkins and Blackmore

as well as their critics—are focused on the wrong grain-size. The
debate should not be about whether religion itself is
contaminated mindware but about the specific content that tends
to go into the “slots” created by the confluence of cognitive
modules that support religion, according to some theorists (see
Atran, 2002; Bloom, 2004; Boyer, 2001; Hood, 2009). As one
commentator on these debates stated, “the bottom line,
according to byproduct theorists, is that children are born with a
tendency to believe in omniscience, invisible minds, immaterial
souls—and then they grow up in cultures that fill their minds,
hard-wired for belief, with (p.171)
specifics” (p. 8, Henig, 2007). The model here is analogous to
those of language. Memetics can accept much of this model
without dispute. The fundamental insight behind my grain-size
argument is simply that the “specifics” matter. It matters
whether the content going into the
hard-wired “slots” serves the hosts interest (for indeed, it is well-
accepted that vehicle interests can diverge from replicator
interests; see Dawkins, 1982; Stanovich, 2004). In the case of
religion, it matters whether the “specifics” are slaughtering
infidels or whether the specifics are ministering to the poor in
Calcutta. The specifics that go into the slots can be more or less
rational for the individual.

Atran (2002), for example, produces an example of the grain-size

error in making the argument that cultural knowledge is
constrained. He describes a study of people interpreting a
cartoon with a group of fish together and a single outlier fish on
the outside of the group. Chinese participants interpret the lone
fish as an outcast, whereas Americans interpret the lone fish as
more daring and intelligent. Atran (2002) acknowledges that it
seems that “such robust and systematic cultural differences
actually reinforce the memeticist’s claim” (p. 258). However,
Atran (2002), aligning himself with the evolutionary
psychologist’s emphasis on evoked rather than transmitted
culture, chooses to emphasize the cultural constraints in the
situation rather than the variability. He calls on us to notice that
“members of neither cultural group interpret the animated fish
cartoon simply as changing patterns of illumination, as a lifeless
screen, as a moving cluster and point, as a temporal sequence of
clusters and point …. or any of the infinitely many
other logically possible interpretations of the scene observed” (p. 258).

These are constraints surely, but I would argue that they are so
loose that they demarcate only a belief structure of large grain
size. More to the point is to ask whether these constraints limit
the belief structures demarcated to only fitness-increasing or
vehicle-enhancing beliefs. If not, then these biological constraints
are at a large enough grain size that they leave untouched the
fundamental memetic insight: that a belief may spread without
necessarily being true or helping the human being who holds the
belief in any way.
Cosmides and Tooby (1994), in an essay published in an
economics journal to introduce economists to evolutionary
psychology, provide a classic example of the grain-size problem.
In a series of points laid out (p.172) like a series of axioms, they
argue that because “natural selection built the decision-making
machinery in human minds” (p. 328) and because “this set of
cognitive devices generates all economic behavior”, “therefore
… the design features of these devices define and constitute the
human universal principles that guide economic decision
making” (p. 328).
These postulates lead Cosmides and Tooby (1994) to the
grandiose claim that “evolutionary psychology should be able to
supply a list of human universal preferences, and of the
procedures by which additional preferences are acquired or
reordered” (p. 331). But to the extent that the claim is true, it is
true only because the grain size of the predictions will be all
wrong. The economics literature is not full of studies debating
whether humans who are dying of thirst prefer water or shelter or
whether men prefer 23-year-old females for mates rather than
75-year-old females. Instead, the literature is full of studies
trying to determine the rationale for such fine-grained judgments
as, for example, whether a poorly designed briefcase produced
by an athletic shoe company will adversely affect the family
brand name (Ahluwalia & Gurhan-Canli, 2000). Economists and
psychologists are not debating the reasons for preferences
among basic biological needs. Instead, they are debating the
reasons for fine-grained preferences among highly symbolic
products. Even after we grant evolutionary assumptions such as
people using clothes purchases for some type of modern
dominance or sexual display, we have not progressed very far in
explaining how brand names wax and wane in the fashion world,
how price-elastic such purchases will be, and/or what kind of
substitutability there will be among these types of goods. The
predictions that we can make from the postulates of
evolutionary psychology are at too gross a level to be useful. As
is the case with religion, all of the action is at the lower level of
content specifics
—precisely the area where memetic insights might be most useful.

Even a theorist as nuanced as Aunger (2000) makes a

version of the grain-size error. He argues

“good indirect evidence for memes would consist of

establishing that there is an independent dynamic to
cultural change which cannot be assigned to the goal-
directed activity of people…. This is why memes are
commonly invoked to explain maladaptive cultural traits,
why advocates often gravitate (p.173) toward examples of
memes which seem ‘irrational’ for individuals…. The
problem is that—except for the odd trait here and there—
culture is overwhelmingly adaptive for people, allowing our
species to dominate our home planet in fairly spectacular
fashion.” (p. 208)
Yes, it is true that culture has allowed our species to dominate
our home planet in a fairly spectacular fashion. But it is not
the adaptiveness or self-replicating nature of culture per se
that we are debating in the Great Rationality Debate—it is the
specific cultural contents and whether they are nonfunctional for
their human host (and thus are rightly classified as
contaminated mindware). Aunger (2000) implicitly acknowledges
this with his “odd trait here and there” comment (although I
disagree with his quantitative assessment).

The debate over memes has indeed been contentious. There is,
in fact, much hostility directed toward the meme concept.
Certainly some of the professional hostility stems from territorial
encroachment. Memetic theorists have come in with a new
language and colonized areas previously occupied by disciplines
that had claimed the study of cultural evolution for themselves
such as anthropology and sociology. Aunger’s quote here, in
alluding to issues of rationality, reveals another source of
hostility. Controversies over how to conceive human rationality—
and over the existence of human irrationality—have loomed
large in many academic disciplines, not restricted to economics,
philosophy, psychology, and legal studies. Many important
theories in these disciplines are committed to understanding
humans from the standpoint of assumptions of optimality,
rationality, and functionality. There are strong Panglossian
default values built into the language of many of these
disciplines. Panglossian theorists in these disciplines have also
benefited from the default values built into folk language. For
example, the term
belief, both in folk language and in many areas of psychology,
suggests something reflectively chosen or at least something
that is characterized by an active commitment by the person’s
“true self.” The very term belief directs attention away from the
memetic insight—that you may be holding beliefs that are not
true and that are not serving your goals in any way.

In any case, theorists using a grain size that is too large play into
the hands of Panglossians who wish to deny the possibility of
contaminated (p.174) mindware. Of course, culture itself is
functional. It is probably the case that religion itself has some
functionality. But to move from these banalities to the
assumption that there cannot be any component of these huge
memeplexes that leads to irrational behavior is beyond what
either evolutionary psychology or cultural anthropology has
demonstrated.

Notes:
(1) Subprocesses of the autonomous mind might not be
totally independent from intelligence, but they tend to be
considerably dissociated (Anderson, 2005; Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Kanazawa, 2004; Reber, 1992, 1993; Reber, Walkenfeld, &
Hernstadt, 1991; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Toplak, Sorge,
Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010; Vinter & Detable, 2003; Vinter
& Perruchet, 2000; Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982). It is important
to understand that intelligence tests assess only those aspects of
cognitive functioning on which people tend to show large
differences. What this means is that intelligence tests will not
routinely assess all aspects of cognitive functioning—only those
on which people tend to show large individual differences. There
are many kinds of Type 1 processing that are important for us as
a species but on which there tend not to be large differences
between people in the efficiency of functioning. Face recognition,
syntactic processing, gaze direction detection, and kin
recognition provide four examples of such domains.
(2) Not all insight problems are of the type used by Frederick
to reveal the tendency to default to the cognitive miser’s
response. The key aspect of the problems in Frederick’s (2005)
Cognitive Reflection Test is that they strongly prime a heuristic
response that must be overridden. Some classic insight problems
are difficult because the correct answer is not obvious, but they
do not prime a contradictory heuristic response. Such insight
problems would not be candidates for Frederick’s (2005)
Cognitive Reflection Test because they require no Type 1
processing override
because an alternative response need not be inhibited.
Also, such problems would not be the best measures of
miserly processing.

(3) It should be noted that other investigators interpret the

failure to delay in the Mischel paradigm not as a failure of the
override function but instead as indicating flawed reward and
reward-discounting mechanisms in the autonomous mind (e.g.,
Sonuga-Barke, 2002, 2003). If this alternative interpretation is
correct, then it reclassifies failure in the Mischel paradigm as an
instance of the Mr. Spock problem rather than failure of override.
The Social Implications of Separating
the Concepts of Intelligence and
Rationality
Keith E. Stanovich
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0009

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter explores the social consequences of the modest
association between rational thinking and intelligence. It argues
that an understanding of the implications of the modest
association helps to check the imperialism of the intelligence
concept in folk psychology.
Extant IQ tests do not measure rational thought, but instead are
good indicators of algorithmic-level decoupling ability. Thus, we
should not fold rationality into the concept of intelligence,
because the most notable operational indicators of the latter do
not begin to index the former.
Knowledge of a person's intelligence does very little to predict
how they will do on measures of rational thinking.
Keywords: rational thinking, intelligence, decoupling, association, ability

In psychology and among the lay public alike, assessments of

intelligence and tests of cognitive ability are taken to be the sine
qua non of good thinking. Of course, adhering to the strictures of
instrumental and epistemic rationality is a prime example of
“good thinking.” Yet this type of good thinking appears to be
surprisingly independent of intelligence. Of course, the extent to
which it is surprising depends on our conceptualization of
intelligence. Some conceptualizations of intelligence (see
Matthews et al., 2002; Neisser et al., 1996; Sternberg &
Detterman, 1986) define it as, at least in part, the ability to adapt
to one’s environment. But surely the tendency to make judicious
decisions that serve one’s goals is part of what we mean by
adaptation to the environment. Such a definition conflates
rationality and intelligence and makes it impossible for the two to
dissociate. Yet the results just reviewed in Chapters 7 and 8
indicate considerable dissociation. So what is
happening here?

Broad Versus Narrow Concepts of Intelligence

What is happening here is that we are bumping up against an old
controversy in the study of cognitive ability—the distinction
between broad and narrow theories of intelligence 1. Broad
theories include aspects of functioning that are captured by the
vernacular term intelligence (adaptation to the environment,
showing wisdom and creativity, etc.), whether or not these
aspects are actually measured by existing tests of intelligence.
Narrow theories, in contrast, confine the concept of intelligence
to the (p.176) set of mental abilities actually tested on extant IQ
tests. Narrow theories adopt the operationalization of the term
that is used in psychometric studies of intelligence,
neurophysiological studies using brain imaging, and studies of
brain disorder. This definition involves a statistical abstraction
from performance on established tests and cognitive ability
indicators. It yields a scientific concept of general intelligence
usually symbolized by g or, in cases where the CHC
(Carroll/Horn/Cattell) theory is adopted, fluid intelligence (Gf),
crystallized intelligence (Gc), and other broad factors.
The finding of a considerable dissociation between intelligence
and performance on heuristics and biases tasks would be
surprising under two of three possible views of the
rationality/intelligence relationship. Under a broad view of
intelligence the findings are surprising because rationality is
encompassed by intelligence and thus the two things are
conceptually precluded from dissociating. The findings would
also be surprising under a narrow concept of intelligence and an
expectation of a strong positive manifold among adaptive
thinking tendencies such as intelligence and rationality. It is only
a narrow view of intelligence (restricted to what the tests
actually measure) without the assumption that intelligence
guarantees rationality (either causally or associatively) that can
accommodate the results presented in the last two chapters.
In fact, the tripartite model of mind presented in Figure 2–1
represents exactly this third case. It provides a framework for
understanding why intelligence sometimes dissociates from
thinking biases related to rationality. In the view presented in
this book, rationality is a more encompassing construct than
intelligence. Rationality is an
organismic-level concept. It concerns the actions of an entity in
its environment that serve its goals. It is indexed by thinking
dispositions
tapping individual differences in the reflective mind as well as
fluid intelligence, which taps individual differences in the
algorithmic mind—especially the ability to sustain cognitive
decoupling. By differentiating Type 2 processing into an
algorithmic and reflective level of processing, it becomes easier
to see that extant intelligence tests give short shrift to the
reflective level of processing.

The findings reported here highlight the importance of

recognizing rational thinking skills because they are not tapped
by using intelligence tests as a proxy. In fact, broad theories of
intelligence have implicitly (p.177) undervalued rational thinking by
encompassing such skills under definitions of intelligence. The
problem with such a stance is that it ignores the fact that none
of the most well-known intelligence tests measure rational
thinking in any way. In another book (Stanovich, 2009b)
I have argued that it is simply perverse for psychologists to
adopt a definition of intelligence that is not at all reflected in
what is measured by the tests most well-known to the public.

Such broad views of intelligence cause confusion, even among

leading intelligence theorists themselves. An example of the
confusion caused by broad definitions is illustrated in discussions
of the so-called “Flynn effect” in the study of intelligence. Flynn
(1984, 1987; see also Neisser, 1998) systematically documented
what some restandardizations of IQ tests had merely suggested
—that IQs were rising over time. Overall IQs seem to have risen
about 3 points per decade since about 1930. The gains are larger
for Gf than for Gc. Neisser (1998) edited a book on explanations
for the Flynn effect (nutrition, urbanization, schooling, television,
preschool home environment, etc.). Interestingly, Flynn (1998)
himself favored none of these explanations. Instead, he believed
that the intelligence gains were in some sense not “real.” In
short, he argued that there have been IQ gains but not
intelligence gains, according to his definition. As evidence for his
position, he pointed to the lack of cultural flowering that he feels
would result from a true intelligence increase. For him, contrary
trends are indicated by the fact that “the number of inventions
patented in fact showed a sharp decline over the last generation”
(p. 35) and that Who’s Who books of eminent scientists are not
bursting at the seams.
But under a narrow definition of intelligence—in terms of what
cognitive ability tests actually measure—there is no puzzle in the
fact that rising IQs are not associated with the type of cultural
achievements mentioned by Flynn. The tests do not measure
rationality or creativity—things that
might really lead to a cultural explosion of the type that Flynn
is looking for. Flynn has tacitly adopted some sort of
environmental adaptation definition of intelligence that
departs from what the tests actually measure. Thus, what
some see as a paradox created by the Flynn effect (that IQ
gains over the past generation have not been paralleled by
concomitant societal achievements) is no paradox at all if we
maintain a narrow definition of intelligence. It is only puzzling
because we find it (p.178) hard to keep in mind that although our
folk concept of intelligence might include adaptation to the
environment, the tests on which the gains have been shown do
not measure that at all. The tests measure an important
decoupling ability that is a critical mental skill, but one that, as
I have shown in this book and elsewhere (Stanovich, 2004,
2009b), falls short of what is needed for fully rational thought
and behavior.
My own view of the Flynn effect is that schooling and modernity
in general have increased decontextualizing thinking styles and
also the use of language as a decoupling tool (Evans & Over,
2004). These mechanisms represent mindware (like rehearsal
strategies in short-term memory) that can increase algorithmic-
level functioning—particularly the decoupling operation by
making it less demanding of capacity and unnatural.
Schooler (1998) explores a similar hypothesis in the Neisser
volume (see also Greenfield, 1998; Williams, 1998).
Interestingly, in a recent book, Flynn (2007) has altered his
earlier position and now views the IQ gains as real—the result of
the spread of scientific thinking making hypothetical thought
more habitual.

Adopting a narrow view of intelligence—restricting it to what the

tests actually measure—will make it easier emphasize cognitive
processes and skills that go beyond the mechanisms of the
algorithmic mind. These additional processes and skills will be
separately named and measured and not merely subsumed
under an imperialistic concept of intelligence—an imperialistic
conception that is ultimately dishonest in not measuring the
mechanisms within its proposed construct.

Intelligence Imperialism
In commenting on the history of his multiple intelligences theory,
Howard Gardner relates that he considered other terms, such
as skills or capacities, but then realized “that each of these
words harbored pitfalls, I finally elected to take the bold step of
appropriating a word from psychology and stretching it in new
ways…. I was proposing an expansion
of the term intelligence so that it would encompass many
capacities that had been considered outside its scope” (pp. 33,
34, 1999). Similarly, Robert Sternberg argues that “the time
perhaps has come to expand our notion and everyone’s notion of
what it means to be intelligent” (p. 69, 2003). (p.179) Clearly one
of the goals here is to emphasize that there are aspects of
cognitive life that are important outside of narrow intelligence as
measured by IQ tests. This is a goal that I share with many broad
theorists.
However, it is important to note that the issue should not be
framed dichotomously as broad theories of intelligence versus
narrow theories. This is because, significantly, broad theorists do
not agree among themselves. For example, Gardner (1999)
warns that “Sternberg and I agree more on our criticism of
standard intelligence theory than on the direction that new
theoretical work should follow” (p. 101). Similarly, Gardner
(1999) rejects the concepts of creative intelligence, moral
intelligence, and emotional intelligence—types of “intelligences”
that are quite popular with some other broad theorists. He goes
on to warn that “we cannot hijack the word intelligence so that it
becomes all things to all people—the psychometric equivalent of
the Holy Grail” (p. 210). But, in fact, if we concatenate all of the
broad theories that have been proposed by various theorists—with
all of their different “intelligences”—under the umbrella term
intelligence, we will have encompassed virtually all of mental life.
Intelligence will be “everything the brain does”—a vacuous
concept.
I do not see why everything in human nature, cognitively
speaking, has to have the label intelligence, particularly when
there are readily existing labels (both scientific labels and folk
labels) for some of those things (rationality, creativity, wisdom,
critical thinking, open-minded thinking, reflectivity, sensitivity to
evidence). In fact, I feel that if we continue this tendency to label
every positive cognitive trait with the term intelligence, that will
just add to the inappropriate societal deification of IQ tests that
Sternberg, Gardner, and I are united in deploring. Consider a
thought experiment: Imagine that someone objected to the
emphasis given to horsepower (engine power) when evaluating
automobiles. They feel that horsepower looms too large in
people’s thinking. In an attempt to
de-emphasize horsepower, they then begin to term the other
features of the car things like “braking horsepower” and “cornering
horsepower” and “comfort horsepower.” Would such a strategy
serve to make people less likely to look to engine power as an
indicator of the “overall quality” of a
car? I think not. I think it would instead serve to make more
salient just the feature that the person wished to de-
emphasize. Just as calling “all good car things” horsepower
would serve to emphasize (p.180) engine power, I would argue
that calling “all good cognitive things” intelligence will contribute
to the deification of IQ test scores2.

Such a strategy will impede educational efforts to foster other

cognitive characteristics. For example, critical thinking skills
vanish under broad definitions of intelligence. All critical
thinking or rationality assessments become part of intelligence
if the latter is conceptualized broadly. And again, intelligence test
producers gain from these broad definitions because people will
continue to associate the broad concept of intelligence with these
tests. How could they not? The tests carry the label “intelligence,”
and the producers of the tests are not eager to discourage the
association with broad theories. For example, it took real
chutzpah for David Wechsler to define intelligence in his book as
“the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act
purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively with his
environment” (p. 7, 1958), despite authoring an IQ test with his
name on it that measured no such thing!
Broad views of intelligence that spread the term over a variety of
other constructs are in part motivated by a desire to tame the
valuation and prestige of IQ tests. The strategy seems to be to
downplay the importance of IQ tests by broadening the definition
of intelligence to make them only a small part of this larger
concept—a strategy of dilution. But stretching the intelligence
concept by dumping into it other positively valued things will not
succeed in breaking the link with IQ tests for two reasons. The
first reason is that the effects of the 100-year history of
associating IQ tests with the concept intelligence are not going to
be easily attenuated. Second, even in the expanded concept of
the broad view, the IQ test component remains the easiest
component to measure—and the most measurable component
will always end up (p.181) dominating all other components, no
matter how broad or encompassing the concept.
If I am right, then the strategy of the broad theorists ends up
giving us the worst of all worlds—an intelligence concept more
prestigious than ever (because all kinds of other good things
have now been associated with it) and the value of IQ tests
further inflated through its association with the new broadened
view of intelligence! More importantly, short shrift is given to
the concept of rationality because it is not separately named
(but instead conflated with and lost within the intelligence
concept). There is no imperative to actually assess rationality,
because its
semantic space has been gobbled up by the broadened view of
intelligence. It will be even harder than it already is to stress that
IQ -tests do not measure rational thinking. Although most people
recognize that IQ tests do not encompass all of the important
mental faculties, we often act (and talk) as if we have forgotten
this fact. Where else does our surprise at smart people doing
foolish things come from if not from the implicit assumption
that rationality and intelligence should go together? Adopting a
narrow view of intelligence (as I do in this book) will help to
attenuate our surprise at this phenomenon and to create
conceptual space in which we can value other abilities—
specifically, the ability to form rational beliefs and to take
rational action.
Professional psychologists will immediately recognize the relation
of my stance to E. G. Boring’s infamous dictum, and this
recognition may cause some of them to balk at my proposal.
Boring’s dictum was that we should define intelligence as what
the intelligence tests measure. However, what made Boring’s
suggestion objectionable was that neither he nor anyone else at
the time (1923) knew what the tests measured. Because of this,
Boring’s definition of intelligence was truly circular. The situation
now is totally different. We now know—from the standpoint of
information processing and cognitive neuroscience—what the
tests measure.
Unlike some critics of the traditional intelligence concept, I
think there has been some justification in the inertia of the
psychometric establishment regarding changes in IQ tests and
in the (narrow) intelligence concept itself. Traditional
intelligence research is a progressive research program in the
sense that philosophers of science use that term. There is every
indication that work in the traditional paradigm is carving (p.182)
nature at its joints. First, the field has a consensus model in
the form of the CHC theory (Carroll, 1993). Much work has gone
into uncovering the cognitive subcomponents of fluid
intelligence. We now know that there is substantial overlap in
the variance in Gf and the variance in measures of working
memory capacity. The overlap is not 100%, but regression
weights in structural equation models are on the order of 0.7 to
0.8 (Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). Importantly, the
computational features of working memory have also been
identified during the same period. The most critical insight has
been that the central cognitive function tapped by working
memory tasks is cognitive decoupling—the ability to manipulate
secondary representations that do not track the world in one-to-
one fashion as do primary representations.
Cognitive decoupling appears to be the central cognitive
operation accounting for individual differences in Gf, and
because of its role in simulation and hypothetical thinking,
cognitive decoupling is a crucial mental capacity. Thus,
traditional intelligence tests converge on something important in
mental life. They represent the fruits of a scientific research
program that is progressively carving nature at an appropriate
and important joint. This conclusion is often obscured in
introductory presentations of intelligence research to beginning
students. Introductory psychology textbooks often present to
students the broad versus narrow theory of intelligence
controversy—usually with a bias toward the former, because it is
easier to present nontechnically. Later in the same chapter, the
textbook will often make reference to “how difficult it is to
measure something as complex as intelligence.” But, of course,
there is a bias being displayed here. Intelligence is not difficult to
measure on the narrow view. It is the broad view that causes the
measurement problems. In addition to tests, we also have
laboratory measures that index Gf and Gc pretty precisely in
terms of information processing capabilities. It is a point in favor
of the narrow concept that we have a reasonably stable
construct of it and ways to reliably measure it.
Although I clearly do not wish to minimize the importance of
cognitive decoupling, in this book I have emphasized that
measuring it alone will provide an incomplete characterization
of cognitive functioning.
Decoupling operations are crucially important in hypothetical
reasoning (Evans, 2007a). Nevertheless, cognitive decoupling as
measured on these tests is still a property of the algorithmic
mind that is assessed under maximal, rather than typical,
conditions. Such measures do not assess (p.183) how typical it is for
a person to engage in decoupling operations. They do not assess
the propensity of the reflective mind to use such decoupling
abilities. They do not assess the tendency to engage in
hypothetical thinking to aid problem solving. The ability to
sustain cognitive decoupling does not guarantee rationality of
behavior or thought. When we measure Gf, we measure a critical
aspect of the engine of the brain but not the skill of the driver.

Intelligence Misidentified as Adaptation and

the Deification of Intelligence
One type of broad definition of intelligence that has strong imperialist
tendencies is represented by those definitions that emphasize
intelligence as “adaptation to the environment,” like that of
Wechsler quoted previously. Such definitions appropriate large
areas of instrumental rationality into the definition of
intelligence. To define intelligence as adaptation to the
environment when the best known tests of the construct do not
assess any such thing creates tremendous potential for
confusion. Such confusion was apparent in discussions of the
Flynn effect in the study of intelligence discussed earlier in this
chapter. That the Flynn effect is thought to present a puzzle
shows how difficult it is not to deify intelligence by broadening
the definition of it beyond what the tests measure.
Such deification of intelligence can have a truly perverse moral
consequence that we often fail to recognize—the denigration of
those who score low on conventional IQ tests. Such denigration
goes back to the very beginnings of psychometrics as an
enterprise. Sir Francis Galton would hardly concede that those
low in IQ could feel pain:

“The discriminative facility of idiots is curiously low;

they hardly distinguish between heat and cold, and
their sense of pain is so obtuse that some of the more
idiotic seem hardly to know what it is. In their dull lives,
such pain as can be excited in them may literally be
accepted with a welcome surprise.” (p. 28, 1883).

There is a historical tendency, as Robert Sternberg (2003) has

noted, to “conflate scores on tests of intelligence with some kind
of personal value” (p. 13). This tendency appears in modern life
in many guises. (p.184) As Sternberg (2003) suggests, intelligence
has come to signify something like one’s personal essence—
some indication of personal worth. The deification of IQ and the
denigration of low intelligence are now so complete that people
would rather have a high IQ than almost any other physical or
mental quality. Note, for example, how the diagnosis of mental
retardation has been reduced by almost half in the last three to
four decades, accompanied by the explosion of the incidence of
disabilities whose definitions—particularly those definitions
aimed at parents—stress the presence of normal IQ3 (e.g.,
learning disabilities, ADHD, Asperger’s Syndrome). This shift is in
part a function of social changes, consumerism infecting
diagnostic categories, and ascertainment biases introduced by
schools, clinicians, and parents. Many parents, for example, are
much more accepting of diagnostic categories that do not have
“low IQ” attached. But many people seem not to have
appreciated an ironic implication of accepting a broad definition
of intelligence. If a
broad definition is accepted, particularly one that emphasizes the
“adaptation to the environment” criterion, then all of the
categories of disability that have exploded in recent years will
have to be regarded in a new light. Many cases of emotional
disorders, behavioral disorders, and ADHD would also now
represent cases of low intelligence, because the primary features
of these disabilities is that they represent poor adaptations to the
environment.

It is fascinating to speculate about whether some of these

categories of disability would have become so popular had the
broad theorists won the day several decades ago. Imagine that
the behavior of an ADHD child was routinely termed “low
intelligence” in folk psychology. (p.185) A response to the thought
experiment might be that we would still notice “some difference”
between an ADHD child (or even an emotionally disturbed child)
and a child with intellectual disability. But it is important to
recognize the implication of this response. Such a response
means that we can notice and label Gf in folk psychology. As
indicated earlier in this chapter, scientific evidence does
converge on the conclusion that conventional IQ tests pick out a
class of mental operations of considerable importance. The
problem is just that folk psychology values those mental
operations—and the tests used to measure them—too much. Gf
is a mechanism, not a soul.

Strategies for Cutting Intelligence Down to Size

My strategy for taming the intelligence concept is different than
that of the broad theorists. I have argued that we should adopt a
narrow view of intelligence (it is what the tests measure) and
restrict intelligence to that. We can tame intelligence in folk
psychology by pointing out that there are legitimate scientific
terms for the other valued parts of mentality and that some of
these are measurable. This strategy uses to its advantage a
fact of life that many critics of IQ test have lamented—that
intelligence tests are not going to change any time soon. The
tests have the label intelligence, and it is a mistake to ignore
this fact.

My strategy is to open up some space for rationality in the

lexicon of the mental and, in doing so, tame the intelligence
concept. Thus, it is important to prevent intelligence from
absorbing the concept of rationality by confining the former
concept to what the tests actually measure—a practice having
the not inconsiderable advantage of getting usage in line with
the real world of measurement and testing. We have
coherent and well-operationalized concepts of rational action and
belief formation. We have a coherent and well-operationalized
concept of intelligence, narrowly defined. No scientific purpose is
served by fusing these concepts, because they are very different.
To the contrary, scientific progress is made by differentiating
concepts.

My argument is, essentially, that we would value IQ tests less if

we would take care to label the things they do not assess
(rationality) and not let the term intelligence incorporate those
other things. I think that folk (p.186) psychology does now
differentiate rationality and intelligence somewhat but that
folk psychology could be reformed to do this even more.

My feeling that folk psychology could be reformed to further mark

the intelligence/rationality distinction is based on a study I
conducted with my longtime colleague Richard West some years
ago (see Chapter 4 in Stanovich, 2009b). We had subjects write,
in a quite open-ended manner (and counterbalanced, of course),
about what they thought that intelligence was, what they
thought rationality was, and what they thought about the
relationship between the two. Theories of intelligence were
considerably less broad when the subjects had previously been
asked to give their folk theories of rationality. Their responses
seemed to indicate that folk psychology does distinguish between
intelligence and rationality. Of course, this might have been
more true in our experiment because previous questions drew
attention to the concept of rationality and perhaps suggested the
possibility of separating it from intelligence. But this is just my
point: When they were given the term rationality (which they do
not tend to think of spontaneously), our subjects had no trouble
differentiating rationality from intelligence. In fact, in their
responses
they often described the possibility of intelligent people
acting irrationally.

Referring to the title of this section of the chapter, we need to

cut down to size our conceptualization of intelligence. We need
to control the tendency to incorporate all important mental
qualities into it or to append it to every valued mental quality
that we wish to praise or highlight. Instead, we should
conceptualize intelligence narrowly as what the tests measure.
By constricting the term intelligence, we will create conceptual
space for other qualities (rational thinking) that are currently
given short shrift because they are not measured on IQ tests.
Our culture’s fixation on the intelligence concept has obscured
other mental qualities that society needs at least as much. This
is the case because, as
we saw in Chapters 7 and 8, intelligence is no inoculation
against irrational thought and behavior.

Society’s Selection Mechanisms

The ability or inability to think rationally profoundly affects
people’s lives. Yet we fail to teach the tools of rational thinking in
schools and (p.187) refuse to focus our attention on them as a
society. Instead, we keep using intelligence proxies as selection
devices in a range of educational institutions from exclusive
preschools to graduate schools. Corporations and the military are
likewise excessively focused on IQ measures.
Consider the example of Ivy League universities in the United
States. These institutions are selecting society’s future elite.
What societal goals are served by the selection mechanisms
(e.g., SAT tests) that they use? Social critics have argued that the
tests serve only to maintain an economic elite. But the social
critics seem to have missed a golden opportunity to critique
current selection mechanisms by failing to ask the question
“Why select for intelligence only and ignore rationality
completely?”
In short, we have been valuing only the algorithmic mind and not
the reflective mind. This is in part the result of historical
accident. We had measures of algorithmic-level processing
efficiency long before we had measures of rational thought and
the operation of the reflective mind. The dominance and
ubiquitousness of early IQ tests served to divert attention from
any aspect of cognition except algorithmic-level efficiency. And
then, because of this historical accident, we have been trying to
back out of this mistake (overvaluing the algorithmic part of the
mind) ever since.
The lavish attention devoted to intelligence (raising it, praising it,
worrying when it is low, etc.) seems wasteful in light of the fact
that we choose to virtually ignore another set of mental skills
with just as much social consequence—rational thinking
mindware and procedures. Popular books tell parents how to
raise more intelligent children, educational psychology textbooks
discuss the raising of students’ intelligence, and we feel
reassured when hearing that a particular disability does not
impair intelligence. There is no corresponding concern on the
part of parents that their children grow into rational beings, no
corresponding concern on the part of schools that their students
reason judiciously, and no corresponding recognition that
intelligence is useless to a child unable to
adapt to the world.

I simply do not think that society has weighed the

consequences of its failure to focus on irrationality as a real
social problem. Because of inadequately developed rational
thinking abilities—because of the processing biases and
mindware problems discussed in this book—physicians choose
less effective medical treatments; people fail to accurately
assess (p.188) risks in their environment; information is misused
in legal proceedings; millions of dollars are spent on unneeded
projects by government and private industry; parents fail to
vaccinate their children; unnecessary surgery is performed;
animals are hunted to extinction; billions of dollars are wasted on
fraudulent medical remedies; and costly financial misjudgments
are made4. Distorted processes of belief formation are also
implicated in various forms of ethnocentric, racist, sexist, and
homophobic hatred.
It is thus clear that widespread societal effects result from
inadequately developed rational thinking dispositions and
knowledge. In the modern world, the impact of localized irrational
thoughts and decisions can be propagated and magnified
through globalized information technologies, thus affecting large
numbers of people. That is, you may be affected by the irrational
thinking of others even if you do not take irrational actions
yourself. This is why, for example, the spread of pseudoscientific
beliefs is everyone’s concern. For example, police departments
hire psychics to help with investigations, although research has
shown that their use is not efficacious. Jurors have been caught
making their decisions based on astrology. Major banks and
several Fortune 500 companies employ graphologists for
personnel decisions, although evidence indicates that graphology
is useless.
Given the social consequences of rational versus irrational
thinking, the practical relevance of this domain of skills cannot
be questioned. Why, then, do the selection mechanisms used by
society tap only
algorithmic-level cognitive capacities and ignore rationality? It
makes little sense to test for the narrow concept of intelligence
and then confer rewards as if someone had been vetted on the
larger, broader concept.
There are moral and ethical issues raised by this sleight of hand
that are almost never mentioned.
(p.189) In fact, the issue of the differential privileging of some
cognitive skills over others deserves more explicit public
discussion. For example, some philosophers have found
demonstrations of irrationality in the
cognitive science literature implausible because, they say, the subjects
—mostly college students—“will go on to become leading
scientists, jurists, and civil servants” (Stich, 1990, p. 17).
Actually, I do think that these philosophers have drawn our
attention to something startling, but I derive a completely
different moral from it. Most jurists and civil servants, in my
experience, do seem to have adequate algorithmic-level
cognitive capacities. However, despite this, their actions are
often decidedly suboptimal. Their performance often fails to
measure up, not because they lack working memory capacity or
memory retrieval speed, but because their dispositions toward
rationality are sometimes low. They may not lack intelligence,
but they do lack some rational thinking skills.
The poor performance of the college students in the experiments
in the literature on reasoning and decision making is not in the
least paradoxical. The college students who fail laboratory
tests of decision making and probabilistic reasoning are indeed
the future jurists who, despite decent cognitive capacities, will
reason badly. These students have never been specifically
screened for rationality before entering the laboratory. And they
will not be so assessed at any other time. If they are at elite state
universities or elite private schools, they will continue up the
academic, corporate, political, and economic ladders by passing
SATs, GREs, placement tests, and performance simulations that
primarily assess the algorithmic mind. Rationality assessment
will never take place.
But what if it did? It is an interestingly open question, for
example, whether race and social class differences on
measures of rationality would be found to be as large as those
displayed on intelligence tests. Suggestively, Sternberg (2004)
finds that race and class differences on measures of practical
intelligence (the aspect of his broad view of intelligence that is
closest to rationality) are less than they are on IQ tests. The
framework that I have outlined in this volume would at least
predict that rankings of individuals on assessments of rational
thinking would be different from rankings on intelligence. The
reason is that rationality involves thinking dispositions of the
reflective mind not assessed on intelligence tests.
Indeed, perhaps assessing rationality more explicitly is what is
needed to draw more attention toward rational thinking skills
and to highlight
(p.190) the limitations of what intelligence tests assess. At
present, of course, there is no IQ-type test for rationality—
that is, a test of one’s rationality quotient (RQ). But it might
at least help the debate to start talking about such a thing. I
am not saying that an RQ test could be
constructed tomorrow. Such instruments are not constructed on
the back of an envelope. It would, of course, take an ETS-like
effort, costing millions of dollars. But the point is that practically,
in terms of the cognitive technology now in place, it is doable.
Only issues of demand and cost prevent it.

Rather than debate the logistics of such an endeavor, the main

point I wish to emphasize here is that there is nothing
conceptually or theoretically preventing us from developing
such a test. We know the types of thinking processes that would
be assessed by such an instrument, and we have in hand
prototypes of the kinds of tasks that would be used in the
domains of both instrumental rationality and epistemic
rationality. There is no limitation on constructing an RQ test
that comes from the technology of ability surrounding rational
thought. We will demonstrate this in Chapter 10 by laying out a
framework for the assessment of rational thought.

Notes:
(1) The distinction between broad and narrow theories of
intelligence is discussed in a variety of sources (Baron, 1985;
Gardner, 1983, 1999; Perkins, 1995, 2002; Stanovich,
2009b; Sternberg, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2003; Sternberg &
Detterman, 1986; Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998).

(2) Broad theorists might argue that there are higher

correlations among the features of automobiles than there are
among the intelligences they propose. I think the data on this
conjecture is not in yet (Klein, 1997; Willingham, 2004), and
even if a quantitative difference were obtained, I doubt that it
would substantially reduce the force of the thought
experiment. The point is that when Gardner (1999) states “I put
forth the intelligences as a new definition of human nature,
cognitively speaking” (p. 44), he is adding positive valence to
the term intelligence and to its closest associates: IQ tests and
scores.
(3) Issues surrounding issues of prevalence can be complex
(see Barbaresi et al., 2005; Friend, 2005; Gernsbacher,
Dawson, & Goldsmith, 2005; Gordon, Lewandowski, & Keiser,
1999; Kelman & Lester, 1997; Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, 2007;
Parsell, 2004). I would, however, insert a couple of additional
caveats here. First, studies have indicated that ADHD is, in fact,
associated with somewhat lower than normal intelligence
(Barkley, 1998), but this empirical finding is not stressed at all on
websites and informational packets directed to parents. Second,
the tendency for information directed to the public to stress the
high intelligence of
individuals with learning disabilities is scientifically unjustified,
because if learning disabilities were properly diagnosed, they
would be just as prevalent in individuals with low IQs as in
individuals with high IQs (Stanovich, 2005; Stuebing et al.,
2009; Stuebing et al., 2002).

(4) These examples are drawn from a variety of sources

(Ariely, 2008; Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Baron, 1998, 2008;
Bazerman, Baron, & Shonk, 2001; Camerer, 2000; Chapman &
Elstein, 2000; Gigerenzer, 2002; Gilovich, 1991; Groopman,
2007; Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Hilton, 2003; Kahneman &
Tversky, 2000; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Margolis, 1996;
Myers, 2002; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006; Sunstein, 2002, 2005;
Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Taleb, 2001, 2007). On the study of
hatred, see Sternberg (2005).
The Assessment of Rational Thought
Keith E. Stanovich
Richard F. West
Maggie E. Toplak
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0010

Abstract and Keywords

The data presented in this book indicate that the rankings of
individuals on assessments of rational thinking would be different
from rankings on intelligence. At present, of course, there is no
IQ-type test for rationality—that is, a test of one's RQ (rationality
quotient). This chapter argues that it is time to start talking
about such a thing. Assessing rationality more explicitly is
what is needed to draw more attention toward rational
thinking skills and to highlight the limitations of what
intelligence tests assess. It defends the proposition that there is
nothing conceptually or theoretically preventing us from
developing such an assessment device. The chapter lays out a
framework for the assessment of rational thought complete
with examples.
Keywords: intelligence, rationality, rational thinking, IQ test

To this point, we have established that rationality is a more

encompassing construct than intelligence, narrowly defined. We
have seen, from a conceptual standpoint, the components of
rationality that IQ tests miss. What if we were to attempt to
assess the larger concept—rational thought? As psychologists,
we would turn to how the concept of rationality has been
operationalized within cognitive science.

A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking

Rationality is a multifarious concept—not a single mental
quality. Cognitive scientists have developed ways to test both
epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality as they were
defined in Chapter 1.
For example, psychologists have studied aspects of epistemic
rationality such as the ability to avoid reasoning errors, including:
the tendency toward overconfidence in knowledge judgments;
the tendency to ignore base-rates; the tendency not to seek to
falsify hypotheses; the tendency to try to explain chance events;
the tendency toward self-serving personal judgments; the
tendency to evaluate evidence with a myside bias; and the
tendency to ignore the alternative hypothesis.

Additionally, psychologists have studied aspects of instrumental

rationality such as the ability to avoid such reasoning errors as:
the tendency to show inconsistent preferences because of
framing effects; the tendency to show a default bias; the
tendency to substitute affect for difficult evaluations; the
tendency to overweight short-term rewards at the expense of
long-term well-being; the tendency to have choices overly
affected by vivid stimuli; and the tendency for decisions to be
affected by irrelevant context.
(p.192) In terms of concepts discussed in the tripartite model
presented in this book, Figure 10–1 shows a conceptual
structure for rational thought that could serve as a framework
for assessment efforts. The first division in Figure 10–1 indicates
that rational thought can be partitioned into fluid and crystallized
components by analogy to the Gf and Gc of the
(p.193) Cattell/Horn/Carroll fluid-crystallized theory of intelligence
(Carroll, 1993; Horn & Cattell, 1967). Fluid rationality encompasses
the process part of rational thought—the thinking dispositions of the
reflective mind that lead to rational thought and action. The top part
of Figure 10–1 illustrates that unlike the case of fluid intelligence,
fluid rationality is likely to be multifarious
—composed of a variety of cognitive styles and dispositions. Some of
these styles and dispositions will be related (e.g., actively open-
minded thinking and objective reasoning styles) but others probably
will not—research on the interrelationships among these thinking
dispositions is in its infancy. As a multifarious concept, fluid
rationality cannot be assessed with a single type of item in the
manner that the homogeneous Raven Progressive Matrices, for
example, provides a good measure of Gf.

Crystallized rationality is likewise multifarious. The bottom part of

Figure 10–1 illustrates that the concept of crystallized rationality
reflects the taxonomy that was developed in Chapter 6. That
chapter illustrated how problems with rational thinking in the
domain of mindware come in two types—mindware gaps and
contaminated mindware. Mindware gaps occur because people
lack declarative knowledge that can facilitate rational thought—
they lack crystallized facilitators (as indicated in Fig.
10–1). A
different type of
mindware
problem arises
because not all
mindware is
helpful—either
to attaining our
goals
(instrumental
rationality) or to
having accurate
beliefs
(epistemic
rationality). It
occurs when a
person has
acquired one (or
more) of the Figure 10.1. A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking
crystallized
inhibitors listed
in Figure 10–1.
Figure 10–1
presents
components of
rationality that
are of all three
types—components of fluid rationality as well as some of the
most common crystallized facilitators and crystallized inhibitors.
Figure 10–1 should not be mistaken for the kind of list of “good
thinking (p.194)
styles” that appears in textbooks on critical thinking, however. In
terms of providing a basis for a system of rational thinking
assessment, it goes considerably beyond such lists in a number
of ways. First, unlike the many committee-like attempts to
develop feature-lists of critical thinking skills (e.g., Facione,
1990), our conceptual components are grounded in paradigms
that have been extensively researched within the literature of
cognitive science. This will be illustrated more concretely when
we discuss Table 10–1. Second, many textbook attempts at lists
of “good thinking styles” deal only with aspects of fluid
rationality and give short shrift to the crystallized knowledge
bases that are necessary supports for rational thought and
action. In contrast, our framework for rationality assessment
emphasizes that crystallized knowledge underlies much rational
responding (crystallized facilitators) and that crystallized
knowledge can also be the direct cause of irrational behavior
(crystallized inhibitors).

Even more important than these points, and unlike many such
lists of thinking skills in textbooks, the conceptual components of
the fluid characteristics and crystallized knowledge bases listed
in Figure 10–1 are each grounded in a task or paradigm in the
literature of cognitive science. That is, they are not just
potentially measurable but, in fact, have been operationalized
and measured at least once in the scientific literature—and in
many cases (e.g., context effects in decision making; tendency to
enjoy thought; probabilistic reasoning), they have generated
enormous empirical literatures.
The components illustrated in Figure 10–1 reflect the tripartite
model of mind described in previous chapters. Fluid rationality
encompasses characteristics of both the reflective and the
algorithmic mind. Many components of rational thought, such as
actively open-minded thinking, the value placed on reason, and
the tendency to seek information, are clearly dispositions of the
reflective mind. Other components of fluid rationality such as
self-control skills may require sustained decoupling and thus
implicate the computational capacity of the algorithmic mind.
Crystallized facilitators and inhibitors are mindware accessed
by the reflective mind, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Operationalizing the Components of Rational Thought

Table 10–1 shows some of the paradigms that ground the
component concepts and that could be used as the basis for
constructing test items. Many of these are well-known to most
cognitive psychologists. For example, there are many paradigms
that have been used to measure the resistance to miserly
information processing, the first major dimension of fluid
rationality in Table 10–1. Many of these paradigms have been
extensively investigated and have yielded tasks that could be
used to devise assessment items. The study of belief bias—that
people have difficulty (p.195)

Table 10.1 Measurement Paradigms for the Major Dimensions

of Rational Thought
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
Major Measurement Source Example Item
Dimensions Paradigms for
Resistance Paradig Decide if the
Belief m
to miserly bias conclusion
information paradigm Evans, follows
processing s Barston, & logically from
Pollard (1983) the premises,
or Markovits & assuming the
Nantel (1989) premises are
absolutely
true: All
flowers have
petals; roses
have petals;
therefore,
roses are
flowers.
Attribute Assume that
substitution Kahneman & you are
(i.e., vividness Frederick presented
substitution; (2002); Slovic with two
affect et al. (2002); trays of
substitution; Denes-Raj & marbles that
denominator Epstein (1994) are spread in
neglect) a single layer
in each tray.
You must
draw out one
marble
(without
peeking, of
course) from
either tray. If
you draw a
black marble,
then you win
$100.
Consider a
condition in
which the
small tray
contains 1
black marble
and 9 white
marbles, and
the large tray
 contains 8
black
marbles and
92
white marbles.
From which
tray
would you
prefer to
select
a marble?
Cognitive Frederick A bat and a
(2005) ball
reflection test cost $1.10 in
total. The bat
costs a dollar
more than the
ball. How
much
does the ball
cost?
Disjunctive Toplak & Jack is looking
reasoning Stanovich at Ann, but
tasks (2002) Ann
is looking at
George. Jack is
married, but
George is not.
Is a married
person looking
at an
unmarried
person? A) Yes
B) No C)
Cannot
be determined
Accurate Finucane, Judgments of
perception of Alhakami, risks and
Slovic,
risks and & Johnson benefits
(2000) should
benefits be
independent.
For example,
information
about the
benefits of
nuclear energy
should not
reduce the risk
 estimate for
this source of
energy.
Proper use Tversky A cab was
of base- & involved in a
rates Kahnema hit-and-run
n (1982) accident at
night. Two
cab
companies,
the Green
and the
Blue, operate
in the city in
which the
accident
occurred. You
are given the
following
facts: 85% of
the cabs in
the city are
green and
15% are blue.
A witness
reported that
the cab in the
accident was
blue. The
court tested
the reliability
of the witness
under the
same
circumstances
that existed
on the night
of the
accident and
concluded
that the
witness called
about 80% of
the blue cabs
blue but
called 20% of
the blue cabs
 green. The
witness also
called about
80% of the
green cabs
green, but
called 20% of
the green
cabs blue.
What is the
probability
(expressed as
a percentage
ranging from
0
to 100%) that
the cab
involved in
Outcome bias Baron & the accident
paradigms; Hershey was blue?
status quo (1988); A 55-year-old
bias; Kahneman, man had a
endowment Knetsch, & heart
effects Thaler condition. He
(1990,1991) had to stop
working
because of
chest pain.
He enjoyed
his work and
did not want
to stop. His
pain also
interfered
with other
things, such
as travel and
recreation. A
type of
bypass
operation
would relieve
his pain and
increase his
life
expectancy by
5
 [15] years.
However, 8%
[2%] of the
people who
have this
operation die
from the
operation
itself. His
physician
decided to go
ahead with
the operation.
The operation
succeeded
[failed, and
the man
died].
Evaluate the
physician’s
decision to go
Hindsight ahead with
Fischhoff the operation.
bias
paradigms (1975) An immigrant
arriving at Ellis
or Pohl (2004) Island in 1900
was most
likely to be
from: (a)
England or
Ireland; (b)
Scandinavia;
(c) Latin
America;
*(d) Eastern
Europe
The correct
answer to
the item is
indicated by
an asterisk.
Please
indicate on
the scale
provided the
probability
 that you
would have
answered
this item
Diagnosti (Stanovich correctly.
c (2010a) Four-card
hypothesi selection
s testing task: If there
is a vowel on
one side of
the card, then
there is an
even number
on the other.
Your task is to
decide which
card or cards
must be
turned over to
find out
Kermer, whether the
Accuracy Driver- rule is true or
of Linn, false.
affective Wilson, &
forecastin Gilbert (2006) Part 1: How
happy/sad do
g you think
you will be if
you win/lose
this coin
toss?
Part 2: Now
that you
Resistance have
to myside Fischhoff, won/lost the
thinking; Slovic, & coin toss,
accurate Overconfidenc Lichtenstein how
self- e paradigms; (1977); happy/sad
evaluation fairness Messick are you right
paradigms; & Sentis now?
argument (1979);
evaluation Stanovich & Select the
test West (1997) correct
answer:
Absinthe is A)
a precious
stone or B) a
liqueur. What
is the
probability
that
 the
alternative
you selected
Unbiased Klaczynski is correct?
processing of (2000) or Taber In this part of
evidence & Lodge (2006) the task, we
will ask you
to read a set
of arguments
on gun
control and
tell us how
weak or
strong you
Absence of Framing Frisch believe each
irrelevant effects; (1993); argument is.
context preference Lichtenstein
effects in reversals & Slovic Decision 1.
decision (2006) Imagine that
making the United
States is
preparing for
the outbreak
of a disease
that is
expected to
kill 600
people. If
Program A is
adopted, 200
people will be
saved. If
Program B is
adopted,
there is a one-
third
probability
that 600
people will be
saved and a
two-thirds
probability
that no people
will be saved.
Which of the
two programs
would you
 favor?
Decision 2.
Imagine
that the
United
States is
preparing
for the
outbreak
that is
expected to
kill 600
people. If
Program C is
adopted, 400
people will
die. If
Program D is
adopted,
there is a
one-third
probability
that nobody
will die and a
two-thirds
probability
that 600
Avoidance of Jacowitz & people will
irrelevant Kahneman die. Which of
anchoring (1995) or the two
Epley & programs
Gilovich (2004) would you
favor?
Is the length
of the
Mississippi
Belief River greater
Actively than 3000
flexibility: Stanovich &
actively Open-Minded West (2008a); [less
Thinking Kruglanski & than 200]
open- Scale; need for Webster miles? What
closure; (1996); is the length
minded of the
Mississippi
River?
Agree or
disagree:
Changing your
mind is a sign
thinking dogmatism; Christie of weakness
belief (1991); Sá, (reflected
identification; West, & item).
epistemologic Stanovich
al (1999); Kuhn
understandin et al. (2000)
g
Value placed
on reason The Master Stanovich (2008) Agree or
and truth Rationality
Motive disagree: I
Scale like to think
that my
actions are
motivated by
sound
reasons.
Tendency to
Seek Measures of Cacioppo et al. Agree or
Information, need for (1996); Goff & disagree: I
enjoy cognition like the
and typical Ackerman responsibility
thought, and
fully process intellectual (1992) of handling a
information engagemen situation that
t requires a lot
of thinking.
There are five
Disjunctive blocks in a stack
reasoning Toplak & pictured in the
tasks Stanovich figure below.
(2002) Block 1 is on
the bottom
and Block 5 is
on the top.
Block 4 (the
second from
the top) is
green, and
Block 2 (the
second from
the bottom)
is not green.
Is there a
green block
directly on
top of a
non-green
block? A) Yes
B)
 No C) Cannot
be
Objectiv Separating determined
Kuhn (1991);
e fact from Dale states:
reasonin opinion and Watson &
Glaser (1980) Seat belts
g styles theory from should always
evidence; or Ricco
be worn to
recognizing (2007); make
the validity traveling by
and invalidity Stanovich
car safer; A
of informal & West (1997) critic’s
arguments; counter-
argument argument is:
evaluation There are
test times when
your life may
be saved by
your being
thrown free of
a car during
an accident
(assume
statement
factually
correct);
Dale’s
rebuttal is:
You are
several times
more likely to
be killed if
you are
thrown from a
car (assume
statement
factually
correct).
Indicate the
Sensitivity strength of
to Informal Dale’s
contradictio reasoning and rebuttal to
n; tendency argument the critic’s
to Baron (1995) counter-
argument.
or
Perkins (1985) Subsequent
or Toplak & to rating
their level of
seek evaluation Stanovich agreement with
(2003)
consistency in paradigms or positions
belief and Halpern expressed in
argument (2008) a series of
statements
(e.g., The cost
of gasoline
should be
doubled to
discourage
people from
driving),
participants
were asked to
write down
arguments
both for and
against the
position.

Sense of Locus of Lefcourt (1991) Agree or

self- Control Scales disagree:
efficacy When bad
things
happen, they
were just
going to
happen no
matter what
you did.
(reflected)

Prudently Temporal Kirby (2009); Would you

discounting discounting of Shamosh et al. prefer $55
the
future reward (2008) today, or $75
in 60 days?

Self-control Delay of Rodriguez, Which

skills gratification Mischel, & description
paradigms; Shoda (1989); best describes
time Steinberg you: Some
preference; et al. (2009); people would
future Strathman et rather be
orientation al. (1994) happy today
than take their
chances on
 what might
happen in the
future, but
other people
will give up
their
happiness
now so that
they can get
what they
want
in the future.
Fine-grained Measures of Bagby, Parker, Agree or
&
and Alexithymia Taylor (1994) disagree: I am
controlled
emotional often confused
regulation about what
emotion I am
feeling.
Emotional Iowa Gambling Bechara, Participants
regulation Task Damasio, choose from
related to Damasio, & four decks of
reward Anderson, cards, each of
(1994)
which is
associated
with
a different
potential
payoff. They
must learn to
avoid decks
that
produce high
immediate
gains but
larger
future losses.
Probabilistic Importance of Tversky & A certain town
reasoning sample size Kahneman is served by
two
(1974) or hospitals. In
Griffin the
& Tversky larger
(1992) hospital,
or Fong et al. about 45
babies
(1986) are born each
day, and in the
smaller
hospital
about 15
babies are
born each
day. As you
know, about
50% of all
babies are
boys. The
exact
percentage of
baby boys,
however,
varies from
day to day.
Sometimes it
may be
higher than
50%,
sometimes
lower. For a
period of 1
year, each
hospital
recorded the
days on which
more than
60% of the
babies born
were boys.
Which
hospital do
you think
recorded
more such
days?
A) The larger
hospital will
have more
days with
more than
60% boys.
B) The smaller
hospital will
have more
days with
more than
60% boys.
C) About the
 same for both
hospitals.
Consisten Bruine de In each time
t Bruin et al. frame, some
probabilit (2007); Peters item pairs
y et al. (2006) present
judgment nested subset
s and superset
events (e.g.,
dying in a
terrorist
attack is a
subset of the
superset
dying from
any cause).
To be scored
as correct,
the
probability of
a subset
event should
Sloman et al. not exceed
(2003); Jepson that of its
et superset
Resistance event.
to base- al. (1983)
rate Imagine that
disease X
Neglect occurs in one
in every 1000
people. A test
has been
developed to
detect the
disease.
Every time
the test is
given to a
person who
has the
disease, the
test comes
out positive.
But
sometimes
the test also
comes out
positive
 when it is
given to a
person who is
completely
healthy.
Specifically,
5% of all
people who
are perfectly
healthy test
positive for
the disease.
Imagine that
we have given
this test to a
random
sample of
Americans.
They were
selected by a
lottery. Those
who
conducted
the lottery
had no
information
about the
health status
of any of
these people.
What is the
chance that a
person found
Resistance to Ayton & to have a
gambler’s Fischer positive
fallacy (2004) or result
Burns actually has
& Corpus the disease?
(2004) or
Toplak et al., When playing
(2007) slot
machines,
people win
something
about 1 in
every 10
times. Lori,
however, has
just won on
her
 first three
plays.
What are her
chances of
winning the
next time she
plays?
Use of chance Fenton- Simulate the
in O’Creevy
explanatory et al. (2003); random
frameworks; Towse & Neil outcome of
understanding (1998) tossing a fair
random coin 150
times
processes in succession.
Understanding Nisbett et al. After the first
2
regression (1983); Fong et weeks of the
effects al. (1986) major league
baseball
season,
newspapers
begin to print
the top 10
batting
averages.
Typically, after
2
weeks, the
leading batter
often has an
average of
about .450.
However, no
batter in major
league history
has ever
averaged .450
at the end of
the season.
Why do you
think this is?
Recognizing Nisbett et al. An economist
biased and (1983); Fong et was arguing in
unbiased al. (1986) favor of a
samples guaranteed
minimum
income for
everyone. He
cited a recent
study of
several
hundred
people in the
United States
with inherited
wealth.
Nearly 92% of
those people,
he said,
worked at
some job that
provided
earned
income
sufficient to
provide at
least a
middle-class
life style. The
study
showed, he
said, that
contrary to
popular
opinion,
people will
work in
preference to
being idle.
Thus a
guaranteed
income policy
would result
in little or no
increase in
the number of
people
unwilling to
work.
Comment on
the
 economist’s
reasoning.
Diagnosti Doherty & Imagine you
c Mynatt are a doctor.
hypothesi (1990); A patient
s testing Mynatt et al. comes to you
(1993) with a red
rash on his
fingers. What
information
would you
want to
diagnose
whether the
patient has
the disease
“Digirosa?”
Which of the
following
pieces of
information
are necessary
to make the
diagnosis?
A) percentage
of people
without
Digirosa who
have a red
rash;
B) percentage
of people with
Digirosa; C)
percentage of
people
without
Digirosa; and
Accurate Lichtenstein D)
perception et al. (1978) percentage of
of risks people with
Digirosa who
have a red
rash
Consider all
the people
now living in
the United
States
 —children,
adults,
everyone.
Which cause
of death is
more likely?
A) dying in a
tornado; B)
dying of
Qualitative Stable Moore (1999) tuberculosis
decision preferences; or
theory adherence to Lichtenstein & Choose A or B:
insights basic Slovic A) You get
probability/utili (1971,1973); $0.40 for sure.
ty trade-offs in Frederick B) If a die
SEU theory; (2005) or comes up 1,
preferences in Benjamin & 2, or 3, you
line with SEU Shapiro get
axioms (2005); $1.58. If a
die comes
Scientific Birnbaum up 4, 5, or 6,
Knowledge of control you get
scientific concepts; (1999)
nothing.
reasoning causal variable
isolation; The city of
control group Greenhoot et Middletown
necessity; al. (2004); has had an
understanding Tschirgi unpopular
placebo and police chief
(1980); for the past 2
selection
effects Lehman years. He is a
et al. (1988); political
Lehman & appointee
Nisbett (1990) who is a
crony of the
mayor and he
had little
previous
experience in
police
administration
when he was
appointed.
The mayor
has recently
defended the
 police chief in
public
announcing
that in the
time since he
took office,
crime rates
decreased by
12%. What
evidence
would most
refute the
mayor’s claim
and instead
show that the
police chief
Avoidance Taber & may not be
of Lodge doing a good
confirmatio (2006) job?
n bias Search for pro
or con
information
about a highly
valenced
issue
Diagnosti Wasserman, (affirmative
c Dorner, & action, gun
covariatio Kao (1990) control, etc.)
n Imagine that
judgment you are a
research
chemist for a
pharmaceutic
al company.
You want to
assess how
well a certain
experimental
drug works
on psoriasis,
a severe skin
rash. In your
experiment,
you will give
 some rats the
drug and
others a
placebo,
which is
known to
have no effect
on psoriasis.
After the
experiment,
there will be
four types of
rats: Those
who did not
receive the
drug and
whose
psoriasis did
not improve,
Covariation Stanovich & and so forth.
detection free West Was the
of belief bias; (1998d); treatment
avoidance of Fiedler effective?
illusory (2004) As the cell
correlations above except
for an issue
with valence
and/or prior
belief, such
as: Do
couples who
Difference live together
between before
correlation marriage
and causation; Halpern have more
recognizing (2008); successful
spurious marriages?
correlation Burns (1997)
A recent
report in a
magazine for
parents and
teachers
showed that
adolescents
who smoke
cigarettes
also tend to
get low
 grades in
school. As the
number of
cigarettes
smoked each
day
increased,
grade point
averages
decreased.
One
suggestion
made in this
report was
that we could
improve
school
achievement
by preventing
adolescents
from
smoking.
Based on this
information,
would you
support this
idea as a way
of improving
the school
Understandin Oswald & achievement
g falsifiability Grosjean of
as a context (2004) or adolescents
for Gale & Ball who smoke?
confirmation; (2006,2009)
thinking of or I have made
the Tweney et al. up a rule for
alternative (1980) the
hypothesis construction
of sequences
of numbers.
For instance,
the three
numbers 2-4-
6 satisfy this
rule. To find
out what the
rule is, you
may
construct
other
 sets of three
numbers to
test your
assumption
about what
the rule is. I
will give you
feedback
about
whether your
set satisfies
my rule or
not. If you are
sure you have
the solution,
you may stop
testing and
tell me what
you believe
the rule to be.
[the rule is
Differentiatin Kuhn “increasing
g theory from (1991,19 numbers”]
evidence 92) “How do you
know that
this is the
cause?” “If
you were
trying to
convince
someone else
that your
view, [focal
theory
repeated
Appreciation here], is
of converging Stanovic right, what
evidence h evidence
(2010b) would you
give to try to
show this?”
The principle
of converging
evidence urges
us to base
conclusions on
 data that
arise from a
number of
slightly
different
experimental
Appreciating Jepson et sources.
the limits of al. (1983) The Caldwells
Personal and looked in
Observation, Consumer
Testimonials, Halpern
Reports and
and Single- (2008) there they
Case Evidence found that the
consensus of
the experts
was that the
Volvo was
superior to
the Saab. Mr.
Caldwell
called up
friends. One
Volvo owner
hated his car.
Which car do
Logical you think the
validity Caldwells
judgment should buy?
tasks Evans, For “All A are B”
Handley, evaluate
Harper, & logically:
Johnson-Laird
(1999) 1. No A are B
2. Some A are B
3. Some A
are not B
4. All B are A
5. No B are A
6. Some B are A
7. Some B
are not A
Answer:
conclusions
2 and 6 are
 necessary; 4
and 7 are
possible (but
not
necessary);
and 1, 3, and
Economi Cost/Benefit Larrick, et al. 5 are
c reasoning; (1993) or impossible.
thinking limited NCEE
resource When a
(2005); person rents
reasoning
Larrick, an apartment,
who benefits
Recognizin et al. (1990) from the
g transaction?
opportunit
y costs Larrick, et al. What are the
(1990); costs
Thaler involved in
(1985,1987) attending
Avoiding university.
sunk costs List all of the
costs you
can.
Arkes &
Blumer You are
(1985) staying in a
hotel room
on vacation.
You paid
$6.95 to see
a movie on
pay TV. After
5 minutes,
you are bored
and the
movie seems
pretty bad.
Would you
continue to
watch the
movie or not?
Understandin
g Heath (2001) A customer
externalities walks in to a
small
convenience
store and
gives the
store’s
owner $8 for
a six-pack of
 beer. The
owner of the
store hands
over the six-
pack. After this
transaction is
complete,
describe the
gains and
losses to
everyone
affected by
this
transaction.
Awareness of Wagenaar & Pollution
the Index:
logic of Sagaria 1970–3;
(1975);
exponential Dorner (1996) 1971–7;
growth and 1972–20;
compounding 1973–55;
1974–148;
1975
-?
Understanding Komorita & Two players
commons Parks (1994); must choose
to
dilemmas, Shafir & either
Tversky
zero-sum, and (1992) cooperate or
nonzero-sum compete with
games the other
player
while being
blind to the
other’s choice.
Recognizing Nisbett et al. Harold, a boys
regression (1983) football coach
effects that says the
encourage following of his
buying high and experience:
selling low “Every year we
add 10–20
younger boys
to
the team on
the
basis of their
 performance at
the try-out
practice.
Usually the
staff and I are
extremely
excited about
two or three
of these kids
—but they
usually turn
out to be no
better than
the rest.”
Why do you
suppose that
the coach
usually has to
revise
downward his
opinion of
players that
he originally
thought were
Appropriate Thaler
mental (1980,1985,19 brilliant?
accounting and 87) Imagine that
understanding you go to
of fungibility purchase a
calculator for
$30. The
salesperson
informs you
that the
calculator
you wish to
buy is on sale
for $20 at the
other branch
of the store
which is ten
minutes away
by car.
Would you
 drive to the
other store?
Option A: Yes,
Option B: No
Imagine that
you go to
purchase a
jacket for
$250. The
salesperson
informs you
that the
jacket you
wish to buy is
on sale for
$240 at the
other branch
of the store
which is ten
minutes
away by car.
Would you
drive to the
other store?
Option C: Yes,
Option B: No

Superstitious Paranormal, Stanovich Agree or

(1989)
thinking and Superstitious or Tobacyk & disagree: If
you
belief in the Thinking, and Milford (1983); break a mirror,
paranormal Luck Scales; Fenton- you will have
illusion of O’Creevy et al. bad luck.
control (2003) or
Thompson
(2004)

Belief in the Faith in Epstein et al. Agree or

Intuition
superiority of Scale (1996) disagree: My
intuition initial
impressions
of people are
almost
always right.

Overreliance Bias Blind Spot Pronin, Lin, & Psychologists

on folk Test Ross (2002) have claimed
wisdom
and folk that people
psychology show a “self-
serving”
tendency in
that
they take
credit
for success but
deny
responsibility
for failure.
Questions to
participants:
A) To what
extent do you
believe that
you
show this
effect
or tendency?
B) To what
extent do you
believe the
average
American
shows this
effect or
tendency?
Belief in High value Eckblad & Agree or
paced
“special” on Chapman disagree:
nongrounded (1983)
expertise knowledge Horoscopes are
sources right too often
for it to be a
coincidence.
Financial Financial Chen & Volpe What is the
best
misconception Literacy/ (1998); way to
s Illiteracy Mandell
Scales (2009); NCEE minimize the
(2006) dollar amount
in finance
charges on a
 credit card?
Incorrigibility Accuracy of Kermer, Part 1: How
of affective Driver-Linn, happy/sad do
introspection forecasting Wilson, & you think
(overoptimist Gilbert (2006) you will be
ic theories of if you
one’s own win/lose
introspective this coin
powers) toss?
Part 2: Now
that you
have
won/lost the
coin toss,
how
happy/sad
are you right
now?
Bias Blind Pronin, Lin, & Psychologists
Spot Test Ross (2002) have shown
that people
tend not to
trust media
sources that
contradict
their views.
Questions to
participants:
A) To what
extent do you
believe that
you show this
effect or
tendency?
B) To what
extent do
you believe
the average
American
shows this
effect or
Dysfunction Measures of Terjesen, tendency?
al personal irrational Salhany, &
beliefs Agree or
personal Sciutto (2009) disagree: If
beliefs or Lindner et important
al. (1999) people
dislike me,
it is
because I
am an
unlikable,
 bad person.
A notion of Unbiased Klaczynski & Belief-
self that processing Gordon consistent
encourages of evidence (1996) conclusions
egocentric were drawn
processing from those
experiments
that yielded
results that
cast
participants’
religions in a
positive light.
Belief-
inconsistent
conclusions
were drawn
from research
that yielded
results
casting
participants’
religions in a
negative
light.
Unbiasedness
is defined as
rating the
quality of the
experiment
independent
of its level of
belief
consistency.
Self-
perception Weinstein (1980) Compared to
biases and other
unrealistic students—
optimism same sex as
you—what do
you think are
the chances
that the
following
 events will
happen to you:
You will get a
good job before
graduation.
(p.196) (p.197) (p.198) (p.199) (p.200) (p.201) (p.202) (p.203) (p.204) (p.205)

(p.206) (p.207) (p.208) (p.209) (p.210) processing

(p.211) (p.212) (p.213)

data
pointing toward conclusions that conflict with what they think they
know about the world—has yielded many such items (e.g., Evans,
Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Markovits &
Nantel, 1989).

Good decision making is partly defined by decisions that are not

unduly affected by irrelevant context (the third major dimension
of fluid rationality in Table 10–1). Two paradigms that assess the
latter tendency have each generated enormous literatures.
Resistance to framing has been measured with countless tasks
(e.g., Levin et al., 2002; Maule & Villejoubert, 2007), as has the
resistance to irrelevant anchoring in decisions (e.g., Epley &
Gilovich, 2004,2006; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995).

As a final example of an area of rational thinking with a dense

history of empirical research and with paradigms that could
serve as assessment devices, consider the tendency to conform,
qualitatively, to the insights of normative decision theory—the
second major dimension of crystallized rationality facilitators in
Table 10–1. Since the early 1950s (see Edwards, 1954),
psychologists have studied the tendency to adhere to the axioms
of expected utility theory with a variety of tasks and paradigms
(e.g., Baron, 2008; Dawes, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000;
Wu et al., 2004).
Not all of the concepts of rational thought listed in Table 10–1
have potential measurement paradigms with as much
background research on them as those we have just singled out,
but most of them do. For the reader not as conversant with the
literature of cognitive psychology as the last several paragraphs
have presumed, we have listed in Table 10–1 a source for each of
the potential measurement paradigms. That is, Table 10–1 points
the reader to specific studies or review papers in the research
literature that contain examples of tasks that could be adapted to
serve as actual test items. In most cases, the citations in Table
10–1 will allow the reader to uncover an extensive literature on
such tasks (as in the examples in the previous paragraphs). At a
minimum, the citations provide clear guidance on how such task
items might be developed.

The citations in Table 10–1 are to papers that will lead the reader to
empirical studies containing measurement paradigms that would
make a good source of assessment items. The citation is not
intended as a reference to the classic introduction of the effect,
or to the paper with priority of discovery, or to the most historic
or most cited paper. This is (p.214) because often the best source
for test items is not the paper in which the effect/task was
introduced. For example, for framing effects, we have listed
Frisch (1993) as the pointer citation because it contains a large
number of framing items (we could equally have cited Levin et
al., 1998, 2002) rather than the classic Tversky and Kahneman
(1981) paper where framing was introduced with the now-
famous Asian Disease problem.
The far right column of Table 10–1 presents an example of an
item type from each of the measurement paradigms. The reader
is warned that because of the size of Table 10–1 (i.e., number of
different paradigms), many of these items have been truncated,
abridged, or paraphrased so that they fit into a reasonable
space. They are not meant to be literal exemplars that could be
immediately inserted into a test but are there merely to give the
reader unfamiliar with the measurement paradigm a flavor of
what is being measured. Items of that type are explicated in
detail in the citations given.
Some measurement paradigms appear in Table 10–1 more than
once. For example, diagnostic hypothesis testing appears as a
measure of resistance to miserly processing and as a measure of
probabilistic reasoning. Likewise, the accuracy of affective
forecasting appears as a measure of resistance to miserly
processing and as a measure of contaminated mindware (belief
in absolutely accurate introspection).
These measurement paradigms are complex in this manner
simply because some tasks tap more than one rationality
dimension.

Table 10–1 illustrates the basis for our position that there is no
conceptual barrier to creating a test of rational thinking.
However, this does not mean that it would be logistically easy.
Quite the contrary, we have stressed that both fluid and
crystallized rationality are likely to be more multifarious than
their analogous intelligence constructs. Likewise, we are not
claiming that there exist comprehensive assessment devices for
each of these components with adequate psychometric
properties.
However, in virtually every case, laboratory tasks that have
appeared in the published literature give us, at a minimum, a
hint at what comprehensive assessment of the particular
component would look like. In fact, in some cases, there exist
fully developed measures with
adequate psychometric properties (e.g., measures of self- efficacy; see
Lefcourt, 1991).

Nonetheless, there might be technical problems involved in

measuring some of these constructs, particularly in the different
domains of (p.215) fluid rationality. Some may necessitate more
naturalistic assessment techniques than those used to assess
cognitive abilities. For the reasons discussed in Chapters 2 and
3, many of these domains must be assessed under typical rather
than maximal performance conditions (see Duckworth, 2009). As
such, were they to become actual assessment domains in real
life, they might be subject to coaching effects. Several of the
domains that are thinking dispositions measured by self-reports
might be problematic in this respect, for example: actively open-
minded thinking, the value placed on truth, and objective
reasoning styles.
However, many measures of other dimensions—such as the
tendency toward miserly processing and to be affected by
irrelevant context are less subject to this criticism. Assessing
framing effects, base-rate neglect, and the accurate perception
of risks would likewise be less subject to nonefficacious coaching
effects.

The meaning of nonefficacious coaching effects needs to be

explained, and we will do so by way of an analogy to the
controversy about “teaching to the test” in education. The practice
of “teaching to the test” is a bad thing when it raises test
performance without truly affecting the larger construct being
assessed. If a teacher learns that a statewide history assessment
will contain many questions on the Great Depression and
concentrates on that during class time to the exclusion of other
important topics, then the teacher has perhaps increased the
probability of a good score on this particular test but has not
advanced more general historical knowledge. This is
nonefficacious coaching. But in education, not all coaching in
anticipation of assessments is of this type. Early reading skills
provide the contrast to assessments of history knowledge.
Imagine that teachers knew of the appearance of subtests
measuring decoding skills on a statewide early reading test and
“taught to” that test. In this case, the teachers would in fact be
teaching the key generalizeable skills of early reading (see
Stanovich, 2000; Vellutino, Fletcher, Snowling, & Scanlon, 2004).
They would be teaching the most fundamental underpinning of
the construct “early reading.” This would be efficacious “teaching
to the test.”

The point here is that the coachability of a skill does not necessarily
undermine the rationale for including the skill in an assessment. To put it
colloquially, some “coaching” is little more than providing “tricks”
that lift assessment scores without really changing the
underlying skill, (p.216) whereas other types of coaching result in
changes in the underlying skill itself. There is no reason to
consider the latter type of coaching a bad thing and thus no
reason to consider an assessment domain to be necessarily
problematic because it is coachable. Thus, it is important to
realize that many rational thinking domains may be of the latter
type—that is, amenable to what we might call virtuous coaching.
If a person has been “coached” to always see the relevance of
base-rates, to always explore all of the disjunctive possibilities,
to routinely reframe decisions, to consider sample size, and to
see event spaces and thus the relevance of probabilistic thinking
—then one has increased rational thinking skills and tendencies.
If the existence of assessment devices spawns such coaching
then it seems that, for those of us arguing for the importance of
rational and critical thinking in education, then this can be
nothing but a good thing.
Thus, with these caveats in mind, Table 10–1 displays, in visual
form, what we mean when we claim that the measurement of
rational thought is conceptually possible with the use of currently
available instruments.
Nonetheless, the complexity of Table 10–1 illustrates that
measuring rational thought could be logistically daunting. For
example, the factor structure of Table 10–1 is still
undetermined. We do not know the correlational relationships
between the major dimensions or the measurement paradigms.
This means that we do not know whether it might be possible to
measure several features by measuring just a few with high
multicollinearity.

Work on the structure of rational thought is nascent, but there

are indications that there may be considerable separability in
these components (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Klaczynski,
2001; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Slugoski, Shields, & Dawson,
1993; Stanovich & West, 1998c, West et al., 2008). It may be
that, to get reasonable coverage of the domains listed in Table
10–1, each of the domains would have to be assessed separately.
It might be that a comprehensive assessment of rational thought
could not be accomplished in a single sitting. Although this
represents a logistical problem, a diffuse factor structure does
not negate the importance of assessing individual differences in
rational thought. Rational thought does not require a g-factor to
justify its measurement. More important will be research linking
these rational thinking tendencies to real-life decision making,
and a reasonable
amount of such research has (p.217) already been conducted
(Baron, Bazerman, & Shonk, 2006; Camerer, 2000; Fenton-O’Creevy
et al., 2003; Groopman, 2007; Hilton, 2003; Milkman, Rogers, &
Bazerman, 2008; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).

Table 10–2 illustrates that these types of thinking skills have

been linked to real-life outcomes. There, for each measurement
paradigm listed in Table 10–1, an association with a real-life
outcome is indicated. It is clear from the table that a large
number of these assessment domains have been linked with
important real-world outcomes. Not all the linkages in the table
are of equal strength or empirical documentation. Although we
have listed only one or two citations for each cell, there is often
a much more voluminous literature documenting real-world
associations. In other cases, the studies cited are virtually the
only ones documenting an empirical connection to a real-world
outcome. Regardless of this variability, it is impressive that
there are documented real-world connections for all of these
many components of rational thought.
With respect to Table 10–2, it is acknowledged that in the
majority of cases, a causal connection has not yet been
established by empirical research. We do not know, in most
cases, whether the association between a rational thinking skill
and an outcome would remain if intelligence were partialled out.
In a few selected studies, however, it has been shown that
rational thought makes an independent predictive contribution.
For example, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) found that avoiding
sunk costs, conjunction errors, and overconfidence was related to
a Decision Outcomes Inventory of 41 negative outcomes (such as
loan default, drunk driving, receiving parking tickets, and missing
flights) and that this connection survived statistical control for
cognitive ability.
Clearly more work remains to be done on tracing the exact nature of the
connections—that is, whether they are causal. The sheer number of
real-world connections, however, serves to highlight the
importance of the rational thinking skills in our framework.
Panglossians sometimes attempt to devalue the heuristics and
biases research tradition by claiming that the effects
demonstrated there only obtain in laboratory tasks and not in
real life. One of several purposes of Table 10–2 is to provide an
easily accessible demonstration that such a claim is nonsense.

In short, the assessment of rational thought will be determined

by the importance of the content domains listed in Table 10–1
and by the fact that they fit within extant conceptual models of
reasoning and judgment.
(p.218)
Table 10.2 Association Between Aspects of Rational Thought
and Real-World Outcomes
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
Major Measureme Source for Association
Dimensions nt Associatio with Real-
Paradigms n with World
Real-World Outcome
Outcome
Resistance Hastie &
to miserly Belief Penningto Jurors use
information bias n (2000) prior
processing paradigm knowledge in
s constructing
narratives of
a legal case
even when
instructed
not to do so.
Attribute
substitution Wang (2009) In the National
(i.e., vividness Basketball
substitution; Association,
affect scoring
substitution; performance
denominator (a vivid
neglect) behavior)
overpredicts
salary and
All-Star
balloting
compared
with
nonscoring
statistics
when the
latter are
equated for
contribution
to winning
outcomes.
Cognitive
reflection Toplak, Liu, Problem
Macpherso gamblers
n, are higher
Toneatto, than
&
Components of Rational
Thought Stanovic control
h (2007) groups on
measures of
impulsivity
and lower on
measures of
Johnson, reflectivity.
Disjunctive Hershey, Flight
reasoning Meszaros, passengers
& mispriced
Kunreuthe insurance for
r (2000) component
risks by not
thinking
disjunctively
about the
components.
Accurate Sivak & The relative
perception of Flannaga risks of flying
risks and n (2003); and driving
benefits Gigerenzer shifted after
(2006) September
11,
2001 in a
manner that
cost hundreds
Resistance to Steen of lives.
base-rate (1990);
Gigerenzer, Calls for
neglect mandatory
Hoffrage, &
Ebert AIDS testing
(1998) ignore the
implications
of low base-
rates; AIDS
counseling
likewise
ignores the
implications
of base-rates.
Components of Rational Thought
Outcome bias Johnson et al. Insurance
paradigms; (2000); purchase
status quo Samuelson & decisions as
bias;
endowment Zeckhauser well as utility
effects (1988); purchases
have been
Johnson & shown to be
Goldstein influenced by
(2006); status quo
Thaler & biases; organ
Benartzi donations are
(2004) higher in
countries
with
presumed
consent;
default
values
strongly
affect
pension
investment
choices.

Hindsight Pohl (2004) Hindsight bias

bias is posited to
paradigms lower the
general
motivation to
learn because
it is highest in
those least
knowledgeabl
e in the
domain.

Diagnostic Kern & Medical

hypothesis Doherty students
failed
testing (1982) to choose
diagnostic
symptoms
when
assessing
diseases.

Accuracy of Kermer, Subjects

affective Driver-Linn, mispredicted
Components of Rational Thought
forecasting Wilson, & their level of
Gilbert happiness
(2006) after actual
monetary
gains and
losses.
Resistance
to myside Overconfidenc Bruine de Degree of
thinking; e paradigms; Bruin et al. overconfidenc
accurate fairness (2007); e was related
paradigms; Hilton to a Decision
self- argument (2003); Outcomes
evaluation Inventory of
evaluation test Odean 41 negative
outcomes
(1998) such as loan
default and
drunk driving;
predictions of
currency
exchange
rates by
corporate
treasurers are
overconfident.
Financial
professionals
are
overconfident.
Unbiased Investors in a
processing of political
evidence prediction
Forsythe, stock market
Nelson,
Neumann, & exchange
Wright made
(1992) investment
decisions that
were
influenced by
which
candidate
they hoped
would
Components Rational
of Thought
win.
Absence of Framing Hilton Professional
effects; (2003);
irrelevant preference Camerer stock market
context reversals (2000) traders
effects
in decision overweight
making single-day
losing
positions;
generally,
traders sell
losing
positions
too little and
sell winning
positions too
much.
Avoidance of Stewart The size of
irrelevant (2009); minimum
anchoring Northcraft & payment
Neale (1987) requirements
affects the
size
of the partial
payment of
credit card
debt; the
evaluation of
home values
by
real estate
agents is
affected by
the
listing price.
Major Measurement Source for Association
Dimensions Paradigms Association with Real-
World
with Outcome
Real-World
Outcome
Belief Epistemologic Sinatra & Epistemologic
al al
flexibility: understanding Pintrich beliefs are
(2003)
Components of Rational Thought
actively related to the
efficiency of
open-minded learning.
thinking

Value placed The Master Toplak, Liu, Problem

on reason and Rationality Macpherson, gamblers
truth Motive Scale Toneatto, & performed
Stanovich worse than
(2007) controls on a
measure of
commitment
to
thought rather
than intuition.
Tendency to Measures of Cacioppo, Moderate
seek need for Petty, correlations
information, cognition and Feinstein, & with anxiety,
enjoy thought, typical Jarvis (1996) neuroticism,
and fully intellectual and
process engagement procrastinatio
n.
information Disjunctive Redelmeier Making more
&
reasoning Shafir (1995) treatment
options
available to a
physician
made
it more likely,
not less, that
they would
refer a patient
to a specialist.
Objective Recognizing the Watson & Moderate
reasoning validity and Glaser correlations
(2006)
styles invalidity of with job
informal performance
in
arguments a variety of
occupations.
Tendency to Informal Capon & Kuhn Shoppers have
seek reasoning (1979) difficulty
consistency comparison
Components of Rational Thought
shopping
among
products of
different
sizes.

Sense of Planning; Locus Ameriks, The propensity

self-efficacy of Control Caplin, & to plan has
Scales
Leahy been linked to
(2003);
Lefcourt lifetime
wealth
(1991) accumulation;
locus of
control
has been
related to
achievement
in
school and in
sports, as well
as to various
health
outcomes.
Prudently Temporal Kirby, Petry, Research has
&
discounting discounting of Bickel (1999) revealed an
the
future reward association
between
future
discount rates
and heroin
addiction.
Self-control Delay of Duckworth & Self-discipline
skills gratification Seligman measures
paradigms; (2005); predict school
time
preference; Mischel, grades
future Shoda, & longitudinally,
orientation Rodriguez independent of
(1989) intelligence.
Delay of
gratification
measured at
age 4 years
predicted
college
Components Rational
of Thought
entrance
exam
performance
later in life.
Fine-grained Measures of Lumley & Problem
and Alexithymia Roby (1995) gamblers
controlled
emotional performed
regulation worse than
controls on
measures of
alexithymia.
Emotional Iowa Gambling Yechiam, Criminal
regulation Task Kanz, offenders
Bechara,
related to Stout, performed
reward Busemeyer, worse than
Altmaier, & controls on
the
Paulsen Iowa Gambling
(2008) Task.
Crystallized Rationality: Crystallized Facilitators

Major
Dimension Measuremen Source Association
s t Paradigms for with Real-
Associatio World
n with Outcome
Real-
World
Probabilisti Importance Outcome
c of sample Researchers
reasoning size Tversky & run
Kahnema experiments
n (1971) of insufficient
power
because of
the failure to
fully
appreciate
the
Consisten importance of
t Kramer & sample size.
probabilit Gigerenze
y r (2005) Newspapers
judgment regularly
s confuse p
(outcome
Components of Rational
Thought B/outcome A)
with p
(outcome
A/outcome B)
Koehler, In studies of
Proper use Brenner, & medical
of base- Griffin personnel,
rates (2002) lawyers,
stockbrokers,
sportswriters,
economists,
and
meteorologist
s, the authors
concluded
that the base
rate
likelihood
was a “major
predictor of
miscalibration
in experts’
everyday
judgments”
(p. 714).
Sundali & Actual
Resistance to Croson gamblers
gambler’s (2006) videotaped in
fallacy a casino
displayed the
gambler’s
fallacy.

Wagenaar Problem
(1988); gamblers
Use of chance resist chance
in Explanatory Malkiel as an
frameworks; (2008) explanation
understanding of patterns
random they see in
processes events; stock
market
Components of Rational
Thought
investors
mistakenly
think that they
can “beat the
market”
because they
fail to
appreciate the
role of chance.
Crystallized Rationality: Facilitators
Crystallized
Major Measurement Source for Association
Dimensions Paradigms Association with Real-
World
with Outcome
Real-World
Outcome
Understanding Toplak, Liu, Problem
regression Macpherson, gamblers were
effects Toneatto, & less able to
Stanovich recognize
(2007) situations with
the potential
for regression
effects.
Recognizing Wainer Failure to
(1993)
biased and recognize the
unbiased importance of
samples selection
effects leads
media
commentators
to misinterpret
the
implications of
SAT test
scores.
Diagnostic Groopman Physicians and
hypothesis (2007); clinical
testing Croskerry psychologists
Components of Rational Thought
(2009a); fail to engage
Lilienfeld in diagnostic
(2007); hypothesis
Baker,
McFall, & testing.
Shoham
(2009)
Accurate Sunstein Hazard
perception of (2002) regulations
risks reflect the
mistaken
human belief
that the risks
and benefits
of
various
activities are
negatively
related.
Qualitative Stable Bruine de Properly
decision preferences; Bruin et al. applying basic
theory
insights adherence to (2007) rules of choice
basic was inversely
probability/ related to a
utility
trade-offs in Decision
SEU
theory; Outcomes
preferences in Inventory of
41
line with SEU negative
axioms outcomes such
as loan default
and drunk
driving.
Knowledge of Scientific Offit (2008); Bogus autism
control
scientific concepts; Pashler, treatments
causal
reasoning variable McDaniel, such as
isolation; Rohrer, & facilitated
control
group necessity; Bjork (2009) communicatio
 n
understanding proliferated
placebo effects because of a
failure to
Components of Rational
Thought
appreciate the
necessity of
scientific
control;
likewise,
unproven
educational
fads such as
“learning
styles” persist
because they
are not
subjected to
test by true
experimental
control.
Avoidance of Gibson, Basketball
fans
confirmation Sanbonmats overestimated
u,
bia & Posavac the chance
s that
(1997) a team would
win the
championship
when that
team
was made
focal.
Diagnostic Chapman & Clinicians
covariation Chapman perceive
judgment (1969) connections
between
Rorschach
responses and
diagnoses that
are not
present.
Covariation King & Belief in
detection free Koehler pseudoscience
of s
belief bias; (2000); such as
avoidance of Gilovich & graphology,
Components of Rational Thought
illusory Savitsky and astrology
is
correlations (2002) fostered by
the
phenomenon
of illusory
correlation.
Difference Baumeister, Educators
have
between Campbell, based many
correlation and Krueger, & programs on
causation; Vohs (2003) the
assumption
recognizing that high self
spurious esteem leads
to
correlation better
achievement
when the
direction of
cause, if it
exists at all,
is
the opposite.
Understanding Wood, Spurious
falsifiability as Nezworski, associations
a
context for Lilienfeld, & are common in
confirmation; Garb (2003); Rorschach
thinking of the McHugh interpretation,
alternative (2008) and
hypothesis pseudoscience
s
such as
recovered
memory are
maintained
through
unfalsifiable
arguments.
Differentiating Offit (2008); The
theory from Spitz (1997) pseudoscience
evidence of facilitated
communicatio
n
as a treatment
for autism was
Components of Rational
Thought
not critically
assessed
because of a
failure to
differentiate
theory and
evidence. The
same is true in
the famous
Clever Hans
case, a classic
in behavioral
science.
Appreciation of Begley, S. The failure to
converging (2007); appreciate the
Jordan
evidence (2007); principle of
Nijhuis
(2008) converging
evidence
contributes to
the denial of
the evidence
suggesting
human-caused
global
warming.
Appreciating Lilienfeld Clinical
the
limits of (2007); psychologists
Dawes
personal (1994); continue to
Baker,
observation, McFall, & ignore more
testimonials, Shoham valid actuarial
and
single-case (2009) evidence in
evidence favor of
personal
experience
and
so-called
 “clinical
intuition.”
Crystallized Rationality: Crystallized Facilitators
Components of Rational Thought
Major Measurement Source for Association
Dimensions Paradigms Association with Real-
with World
Real-World Outcome
Outcome
Rules of Logical
logical Johnson-Laird
consistency validity (1982) Government
judgment documents
and validity tasks describing
citizen
benefits
often require
interpretation
in terms of
logical
Economic Sunstein relationships.
thinking (2002)
Cost/Benefit Environment
reasoning; al and other
limited government
resource regulations
reasoning are written
inefficiently
because of a
lack of
attention to
cost–benefit
Larrick, reasoning.
Nisbett, &
Morgan Salary levels
Recognizin (1993) were related
g to the ability
opportunit to recognize
y costs opportunity
Bruine de costs.
Bruin et al. Committing
(2007) the sunk cost
Avoiding fallacy was
sunk costs related to a
Decision
Outcomes
Components of Rational
Thought Inventory of
41 negative
outcomes
such as loan
default and
drunk
driving
Understanding Heath (2001) Most people in
externalities
the United
States do not
realize that,
because of
externalities,
gasoline
prices are too
low rather
than too high.
Awareness of
the logic of Paulos (2003) People save too
exponential little, fail to
growth and recognize the
compounding pitfalls of
pyramid
schemes, and
invest
foolishly
because of
ignorance of
the
mathematics
of
compounding
.
Understandin
g commons Bazerman, Oceans are
dilemmas, Baron, & overfished and
zero-sum, Shonk traffic jams
and nonzero- (2001) exacerbated
sum games because of the
failure to
recognize
commons
dilemmas.
Components of Rational
Thought
Malkiel (2008) Failure to
Recognizing recognize
regression regression
effects effects in a
random walk
leads stock
market
investors to
buy high and
sell low.
Appropriate
mental Thaler Many people
accounting (1985,19 have money
and 92) in savings
understandin accounts
g of while
fungibility simultaneousl
y carrying
credit card
debt at much
higher
Crystallized Rationality: Crystallized interest rates.
Inhibitors
Major
Dimensions Measureme Source for Association
nt Association with Real-
Paradigms with World
Real-World Outcome
Outcome
Superstitio
us thinking Fenton-
and belief Paranormal, O’Creevy et A measure of
in the Superstitiou al. (2003); illusion of
paranormal s Thinking, Barber & control was
and Luck Odean (negatively)
Scales; (2000) related to
Illusion of several
Control measures of
stock traders’
performance,
including
their
remuneration;
personal
Components of Rational Thought
investors
trade
too much and
thus lower
their
investment
returns.
Belief in the Faith in Epstein, Small
Intuition observed
superiority of Scale Pacini, correlations
intuition Denes-Raj, & with
Heier (1996) depression,
anxiety, and
stress in
nonselected
samples.
Overreliance Folk Lilienfeld, The many
psychology
on folk Lynn, errors in folk
wisdom Ruscio,
& Beyerstein psychology
(2010) have been
documented in
publications
like Lilienfeld
et
al. (2010):
“we
use only 10%
of
our
brainpower”;
left-brain right
brain clichés;
“opposites
attract.”
Belief in High value Toplak, Liu, Problem
“special” placed on Macpherson, gamblers are
expertise nongrounded Toneatto, & higher in
knowledge Stanovich measures of
sources (2007) belief in
phenomena
not grounded
in evidence.
Components of Rational Thought
Financial The belief
misconceptio Financial literacy Jarvis
ns that reward
(2000); can become
Valentin decoupled
e (1998) from risk
contributes
to the
proliferation
of Ponzi and
pyramid
schemes.
Incorrigibility
of Accuracy Schooler, People who
introspection of Ariely, & spent the
(overoptimist affective Loewenstei most on their
ic Theories of forecastin n (2003) New Year’s
one’s own g Eve
introspective celebrations
were the most
disappointed.
powers) Bias Blind Hilton (2003) Professionals
Spot Test
such as
doctors and
investment
bankers have
been shown
to have little
insight into
which cues
influence
their
decisions.
Crystallized Rationality: Crystallized Facilitators
Major
Dimensions Measurement Source for Association
Paradigms Association with Real-
with World
Real-World Outcome
Outcome
Dysfunction
al personal Measures of Epstein &
beliefs irrational Meier Small-
personal (1989)
beliefs to-moderate
correlations
 Components of Rational
Thought with alcohol
and drug
problems.
A notion of
self that Unbiased Forsythe, Successful
encourages processing of Nelson, investors in
egocentric evidence Neumann, a political
processing & Wright prediction
(1992) stock market
exchange
showed less
of a
tendency to
overestimate
the number
of other
people who
shared their
preferences.
Self-
perception Dillard, Unrealistic
biases, and Midboe, & optimism
unrealistic Klein predicts
optimism (2009) negative
events with
alcohol
longitudinally
over a 2-year
period after
the incidence
of earlier
negative
events is
partialled out.

(p.219) (p.220) (p.221) (p.222) (p.223) (p.224) (p.225) (p.226) (p.227) Their
importance, and hence the necessity for assessment, stands or falls
on the conceptual model, not on any future psychometric finding. An
oversimplified example will illustrate the point. Imagine that highway
safety researchers found that braking skill was causally associated
with lifetime automobile accident frequency, that knowledge of the
road rules was causally associated with lifetime automobile accident
frequency, that city driving skill was causally associated with lifetime
automobile accident frequency, that cornering skill was causally
associated with lifetime automobile accident frequency, that
defensive driving was causally associated with lifetime automobile
accident frequency,
and a host of other relationships. In short, collectively, these skills
define a construct called “overall driver skill.” Of course we could ask
these researchers whether driving skill is a g-factor or whether it is
really 50 little separate skills. But the point is that the outcome of
the investigation of the structure of individual differences in driving
skill would have no effect on the conceptual definition of what
driving skill is. It may have logistical implications for measurement,
however. Skills that are highly correlated might not all have to be
assessed to get a good individual difference metric. But if they were
all causally related to accident frequency, they would remain part of
the conceptual definition of overall driver skill.

It is likewise with rational thinking. There is independent

evidence in the literature of cognitive science that the cognitive
components in Table 10–1 form part of the conceptual definition
of rational thought. If several components or measurement
paradigms turn out to be highly correlated, assessment will be
more efficient and logistically easier. However, the outcome of
such a correlational investigation will neither enhance nor
diminish the status of these components as aspects of rational
thought. Conversely, finding that many of the components or
measurement paradigms are separable in individual difference
analyses in no way detracts from the importance of the
assessment of any component. It would, however, have logistical
implications by making the comprehensive assessment of
rational thought time-consuming and unwieldy. In short, the
point is that psychometric findings do not trump what cognitive
scientists have found are the conceptually essential features of
rational thought and action.
The point that psychometric findings do not trump a concept
that has theoretical or practical importance can be appreciated
by simply looking at other areas of cognitive science that are as
incompletely (p.228) developed as rational thought. Take, for
example, the important area of children’s developing theory of
mind (ToM; Goldman, 2006; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004;
Nichols & Stich, 2003; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Like rationality,
ToM has been found to have a variety of subcomponents
(Baron-Cohen, 1995), and there is, as yet, less-than-complete
agreement in characterizing them (Goldman, 2006; Nichols &
Stich, 2003). No
g-factor of ToM skills has yet been identified. The many
laboratory tests of the construct remain important for theoretical
purposes, although they have yet to yield a psychometric gold-
standard standardized test. ToM has been linked to real-world
outcomes such as school learning, but the causal nature of these
links have not been established nor have the links been
unambiguously shown to be independent of intelligence. Despite
the nascent status of the concept, it remains an essential one in
cognitive science with great promise for practical impact in
educational psychology. We would not want to lesson the
research effort on the concept just because its proponents
cannot answer questions about its psychometric structure.

All of this is not to deny that it would obviously be useful to really

know the structure of rational thinking skills from a psychometric
point of view. Our research group has contributed to clarifying
that structure. We have found that certain rational thinking tasks
consistently correlate with each other even after cognitive ability
has been partialled out. For example, we have found that the
ability to avoid belief bias in syllogistic reasoning is related to the
ability to reason statistically in the face of conflicting case
evidence and that this relationship is maintained after
intelligence is partialled out (Stanovich & West, 1998c; West et
al., 2008). Additionally, our group has consistently found rational
tasks that are predicted by thinking dispositions after cognitive
ability has been partialled
—particularly tasks involving statistical reasoning and informal
argumentation (Kokis et al., 2002; Stanovich & West,
1997,1998c; West et al., 2008).

Our point here is to emphasize that the importance of assessing

rational thought is not contingent on any empirical outcome, and
it especially is not contingent on any type of psychometric
outcome. We want to spur efforts at assessing components of
rational thought, and thus in this early stage of the endeavor we
do not want the effort to be impeded by protests that it cannot
be measured because its psychometric (p.229) structure is
uncertain. That structure will become clarified once our call for
greater attention to the measurement of this domain is heeded.
We do not fail to measure something because of lack of
knowledge of the full structure of its domain. We would not fail to
measure braking skill if we were ignorant of its precise
relationship to cornering ability or knowledge of road rules.
If neither the fluid nor crystallized components of rational
thought cluster in the manner of a g-factor (which we suspect),
then rational thought will be a difficult concept to practically
assess in its entirety. But again, we should not shirk from
measuring something just because it is logistically difficult—
particularly if the domain is important. Economists and public
policy experts measured the size of their country’s gross
domestic product (GDP) in 1950 despite (by present standards)
primitive statistical tools and data-gathering technology. The
myriad components of the GDP
(wheat, corn, ingots produced, heavy machinery produced,
clothing, financial services, etc.) were each an important
component of GDP in and of themselves. It was not an argument
against measuring them that they were hard to measure, that
there were myriad components, and that we did not know how all
of the components hung together statistically. In 1950,
economists measured what they could with the tools they had,
and they simply hoped that better knowledge via better tools lay
in the future. We are at a similar juncture in the measurement of
the multifarious concept of rational thought.
We are at a similar nascent stage when it comes to determining
the malleability of rational thinking—that is, when it comes to
addressing the teachability and trainability of rational thinking
skills. Nonetheless, there has been some progress on this
question. Table 10–3 addresses the issue of the potential
malleability of these skills. For each paradigm that partially
defines a major dimension, we have listed at least one study that
shows that the skill is possibly malleable via training, education,
or experience. Each of the rational thinking skills in question has
at least some direct or indirect evidence indicating that it is to
some extent malleable.
The types of evidence listed in the Table 10–3 differ in terms of
the strength of the inference that can be drawn. Some are true
training studies using random assignment to experimental
groups. Of course, such studies provide the strongest evidence
that training does result in measurable increases in a rational
thinking skill. Nevertheless, we have also (p.230)

Table 10.3 Training, Education, Experience, and Knowledge

Effects on the Components of Rational Thought
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
Major Measureme Source for Evidence for
Dimensions nt Training or Training,
Paradigms Experienti Education, or
al Effect Experiential
Resistance Effect
to miserly Macpherso
Belief n & Decontextualizing
information bias Stanovich instructional set
paradigm (2007) resulted in
s
Components of Rational Thought
Fluid Rationality
processing Evans, significantly
less myside
Newstea bias than
d, Allen,
& Pollard nondirective
(1994) instructions
Debiasing
instructions
reduced belief
bias on
syllogistic
reasoning tasks
Attribute
substitution Fong, Rule training,
(i.e., vividness Krantz, & training using
substitution; Nisbett examples, and a
affect (1986); combination of
substitution; Fong rule training and
denominator & Nisbett training using
neglect) (1991) examples
resulted in
significantly
better
performance on
statistical
reasoning
problems
involving
vividness
substitution
(Saab/Volvo
problem). These
training effects
Cognitive were
Reflection Test maintained after
2 weeks.
Duckworth,
Ragland, Training effects
Sommerfel have been
d, & Wyne shown on tasks
(1974); related to the
Egeland Matching
(1974); Familiar Figures
Zelniker, Test (MFFT), a
measure
capturing the
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
Cochavi, & dimension of
Yered reflectivity and
(1974); impulsivity.
Zelniker,
Jeffrey,
Ault, &
Disjunctive Parsons Facilitation
reasoning (1972) found on
tasks Evans, disjunctive
Newstead, reasoning tasks
& Byrne when it was
(1993) made clear in
the problem
that alternatives
needed to be
generated and
tested.
Accurate Participants
perception of with higher
risks and Dieckmann, numeracy skills
benefits Slovic, & were more likely
Peters to rely on stated
(2009) likelihoods and
less likely to
focus on
narrative
evidence in risk
assessment
Resistance to than those with
base-rate lower numeracy
neglect skills.
Case, Base-rate
Fantino, & training with
Goodie case cues
(1999) reduced base-
Outcome bias rate neglect in a
paradigms; sample of
status quo Thaler college
bias; & students.
Sunstei Status quo and
n endowment
(2008) effects are
easily
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality

endowment remedied by
effects changing default
values—that is,
by
changing the
environment
rather than the
cognition of
individuals.
Hindsight bias Fischhoff Asking
paradigms (1982; participants to
2002);
Arkes, consider
Faust,
Guilmette, alternative
&
Hart (1988) explanations and
contrary
evidence
reduced
hindsight
bias.
Diagnostic Moutier, Participants
hypothesis Angeard, & trained to inhibit
testing Houdé the matching
bias
(2002) on the selection
task displayed
better
performance
than
participants who
did not receive
training.
Accuracy of Richard, Participants who
van
affective der Plight, were asked to
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
generate
negative
feelings such as
regret and
reported
adoption of
safer sex
practices than
respondents
who were asked
to report on the
behaviors
themselves.
Those
respondents
who had to
focus on
anticipated
feelings showed
less risky
behavior 5
months after
the initial
experiment.
Resistance
to myside Overconfidenc Fischhoff Asking
thinking; e paradigms; (1982; participants to
accurate fairness 2002); consider
paradigms; Arkes, alternative
self- Argument Christense explanations
evaluation Evaluation n, Lai, & and contrary
Test Blumer evidence
(1987) reduced
Lichtenstei overconfidence.
n, & Participants
Fischhoff who received
(1980) intensive
training on
probability
assessment
with feedback
on performance
significantly
reduced
overconfidence
ratings.
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
Unbiased Macpherso Decontextualizi
processing of n & ng instructional
evidence Stanovich set resulted in
(2007) significantly
Toplak less myside
& bias than
Stanovic nondirective
h (2003) instructions
Increasing
years of
university
education was
correlated with
less myside
bias—that is,
less of a
tendency to
generate more
arguments and
evidence in
Major Measurement favor of a
Dimensions Paradigms previously held
Source for position.
Training
Absence of or Evidence for
Framing Experienti
irrelevant effects; Training,
context preference al Effect Education, or
effects in reversals Experiential
Peters, Effect
decision Västfjäll,
making Slovic, Participants
Mertz, higher in
Mazzocco, numeracy skills
& Dickert were less
(2006) susceptible to
Almashat, framing effects
Ayotte, than
Edelstein, participants
& lower in
Margrett numeracy skills.
(2008) Notably,
numeracy skill
effects were
not eliminated
when IQ was
entered.
Participants who
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
were asked to
list the
advantages and
disadvantages
of hypothetical
medical
decision-
making
treatments did
not show a
framing effect,
relative a
control group
who was not
Avoidance of instructed to
Galinsky consider
irrelevant &
anchoring advantages and
Mussweile disadvantages.
r (2001)
Mussweile Regarding the
r, Strack, anchoring effect
& Pfeiffer on first offers in
(2000) buyer–seller
Mumma negotiations,
& Wilson this study
(1995) demonstrated
that the
anchoring effect
can be
eliminated if the
negotiators
considered the
alternatives of
one’s opponent,
and if the
negotiators
considered their
own target
prices and ideal
outcomes.
Anchoring
effects were
reduced when
participants
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
were prompted
to use a
“consider the
opposite”
strategy.
Debiasing
strategies of
“consider the
opposite” and
cues to take
notes on the
cues prior to
making
judgments
reduced
anchoring
effects.
Belief
flexibility: Actively Schomm Education was
actively er (1998) associated with
open-minded epistemological
open-minded thinking scale;
thinking beliefs related
need for to the
closure; complexity and
dogmatism; certainty of
belief knowledge.
identification;
Value placed epistemologica
on reason l Miller &
and truth understanding Rollnick One main
(2002); component of
The Master Miller & motivational
Rationality Rose interviewing
Motive (2009); therapy involves
Scale Hodgins, the therapist
Currie, assisting with
Currie, & creating and
Fick, amplifying a
2009) discrepancy
between clients’
present behavior
and their
broader goals.
This therapy
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
has been shown
to positively
change a
number of
health and
mental health
outcomes, such
as
cardiovascular
rehabilitation,
diabetes
management,
hypertension,
illicit drug use,
problem
drinking,
gambling, and
smoking.
Tendency to
seek Measures of Cacioppo, Educational
information, need for Petty, level is
enjoy cognition Feinstein, associated with
thought, and and typical & Jarvis need for
fully process intellectual (1996) cognition.
information engagemen
t
Disjunctive Evans, Facilitation
reasoning Newstead, found on
tasks & Byrne disjunctive
(1993) reasoning task
Shanteau, when it was
Grier, made clear in
Johnson, & the problem
Berner that alternatives
(1991) needed to be
generated and
tested.
Trainee nursing
students were
given scenarios
to evaluate
alternative
choices of
action with
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
patients. With
training using an
alternative-
by-outcome
trade-off table
that incorporated
explicit
consideration of
all options and
comparison of
options the
trainee nursing
students made
better choices.
Objective Separating fact Kuhn College students
reasoning from opinion (1989,199 generated more
and 1)
styles theory from genuine evidence
evidence; and alternative
recognizing the theories than
validity and noncollege
invalidity of students.
informal
arguments;
argument
evaluation test
Major Measurement Source for Evidence for
Dimensions Paradigms Training or Training,
Experientia Education, or
l
Effect Experiential
Effect
Sensitivity to Informal Toplak & Increasing years
contradiction; reasoning and Stanovich of university
tendency to argument (2003) education were
seek evaluation correlated with
consistency in paradigms less myside
belief and bias—that is, less
argument of a tendency to
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
generate more
arguments and
evidence in favor
of a previously
held position.
Sense of Locus of Aronson, Interventions
Control that
self-efficacy Scales Fried, & emphasized
Good malleable,
(2002);
Blackwell, changeable
Trzesniewsk aspects of
i,
& Dweck learning, as
(2007) compared to fixed
abilities,
resulted
in significant
improvements in
grades and
changes in
motivation.
Prudently Temporal Fishbach & Experimental
discounting the discounting of Trope manipulations of
(2005)
future reward externally
imposed
self-control
strategies helped
participants
overcome the
unexpected
short-term costs
of decisions to
pursue long-term
benefits.
Self-control Delay of Diamond, Executive
function
skills gratification Barnett, (EF) training
paradigms; Thomas, & curriculum
time
preference; Munro resulted in
future (2007) significance
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
orientation increase in
cognitive
control skills,
including
inhibitory
control,
working
memory and
cognitive
flexibility, as
compared to a
balanced
literacy
program in
preschool
children.
Fine-grained
and Measures of Elliott & The focus of
controlled Alexithymia Greenberg therapy based
emotional (2007); Pos,
on process-
regulation Greenberg, experiential
& Warwar emotion theory
(2009) is to help
clients
understand
their emotions,
to help them
reflect and re-
evaluate their
emotions, and
to expose them
to more
adaptive
emotional
responses. This
therapy has
been shown to
improve
symptoms in
disorders of
Emotion Iowa Brand, affective
al Gambling Laier, dysfunction,
regulatio Task Pawlikowsk such as
n related i, & depression.
to
In a task
measuring
decision
making
Components of Rational Thought
Fluid Rationality
reward under risk
(Game of Dice
Task),
participants who
Markowitsch completed the
(2009) task with
feedback
outperformed
participants who
received no
feedback.
Participants
who used
calculative
decision
strategies, such
as using
mathematical
operations, also
performed
better than
those who did
not use such
strategies.
Crystallized Rationality: Crystallized
Facilitators
Major
Dimension Measuremen Source for Evidence for
s t Paradigms Training or Training,
Experiential Education, or
Effect Experiential
Importance Effect
Probabilisti Lehman
c of sample & Nisbett Undergraduate
reasoning size (1990) training in social
Fong, science and
Krantz, & psychology
Nisbett significantly
(1986); improved
Fong performance on
& Nisbett statistical and
(1991); methodological
Kosonen & reasoning
Winne related to the
(1995) law of large
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
numbers.
Training formal
rule properties
and presenting
sample problems
on the law of
large
numbers
resulted
in improved
statistical
reasoning
performance.
Consistent Agnoli & Participants who
probability Krantz received training
(1989)
judgments Moutier & on concepts of
Houdé algebra, such as
(2003) using Venn
diagrams to
explain logical
relations of
inclusion,
disjunction, and
overlap, did
significantly
better
on conjunction
problems.
Participants
trained to inhibit
the conjunction
fallacy on a
frequency
judgment task
displayed better
performance on
probability
judgment.
Major Measurement Source for Evidence for
Dimensions Paradigms Training or Training,
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
Experientia Education, or
l Effect Experiential
Resistance to Effect
Case,
base-rate Fantino, & Base-rate
neglect Goodie training with
(1999) case cues
reduced base-
rate neglect in a
sample of
Ladouceur, college
Resistance to Sylvain,
gambler’s Boutin, students.
fallacy Lachance, Pathological
Doucet, gamblers who
Leblond, & received
Jacques training in
(2001) statistical
concepts
related to
gambling, such
as randomness
and
independence,
met fewer
diagnostic
criteria for
gambling,
Fong, showed less
Krantz, & desire to
Use of chance Nisbett gamble, and
in explanatory (1986) gambled less
frameworks; frequently than
understanding a waitlist
random control group.
processes
Rule training,
training using
examples, and a
combination of
rule training and
training using
examples
resulted in
significantly
better
performance on
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
statistical
reasoning
problems
involving
inferences
about random
Understandin Lehman variation.
g regression & Nisbett Undergraduate
effects (1990) training in
Lehman, social science
Lempert, and psychology
& Nisbett significantly
(1988) improved
performance on
statistical and
methodological
reasoning.
Graduate
training in
medicine and
psychology was
associated with
better
performance
on statistical
Recognizing Lehman and
biased and & Nisbett methodological
unbiased (1990) reasoning.
samples Lehman, Undergraduate
Lempert, training in
& Nisbett social science
(1988) and psychology
significantly
improved
performance on
statistical and
methodological
reasoning.
Graduate
training in
medicine and
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
psychology was
associated with
better
performance on
statistical and
methodological
reasoning.
Diagnostic Platt & Participants who
hypothesis Griggs were instructed
(1993) to
testing provide reasons
for their
selections
and were
provided
with explicated
rules displayed
significant
facilitation on
selection task
performance.
Accurate Davids, Participants who
perception of Schapira, had higher
risks McAuliffe, & numeracy
Nattinger knowledge were
(2004); better able to
use
Schwartz, risk reduction
data
Woloshin, to adjust risk
Black, & estimates for
Welch understanding
(1997) the
risk of breast
cancer.
Qualitative Stable Donkers, Study found that
decision theory preferences; Melenberg, more educated
&
insights adherence to van Soest, subjects were
basi (2001) more likely to
c
probability/utility choose options
trade-offs in SEU that maximized
theory; expected utility
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
preferences in
line with SEU
axioms
Knowledge Scientific Schaller, Students
of scientific control Asp, received
reasoning concepts; Ceynar training in
causal variable Roseil, & statistical
isolation; Heim concepts,
control group (1996) including the
necessity; Kuhn & logic of analysis
understanding Dean of covariance,
placebo and (2005) relative to a
selection control group.
effects One week later,
participants
who received
the statistical
training were
better able to
identify a
confound in a
presented task
than the control
group.
Students who
participated in a
computer-based
program on
scientific
enquiry skills
were compared
to students in a
control group
who
participated in a
typical science
class. Students
in the
experimental
group made
significantly
more
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
valid inferences
about
manipulations
than students in
the control
group.
Avoidance of Wiley (2005) Participants who
confirmation bias had high prior
knowledge on a
controversial
issue
were better able
to recall
arguments on
both sides of the
issue in
comparison to
participants who
had low prior
knowledge.
Diagnostic Klahr & Direct explicit
covariation Nigam instruction about
(2004)
judgment a strategy for the
control of
variables was
helpful to
children
in Grades 3 and
4
who were
learning
experimental
design.
Major Measurement Source for Evidence for
Dimensions Paradigms Training or Training,
Experiential Education, or
Effect Experiential
Effect
Covariation Leshowitz, Students who
detection free of Jenkens, received teacher
belief bias; Heaton, & directed lessons
in
avoidance of Bough evaluating the
(1993)
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality

illusory scientific basis of

correlations advertisements
in
magazines and
newspapers
outperformed the
control group in
evaluating the
claims made in
the new
advertisements.
Difference Leshowitz,
Undergraduate
between DiCerbo, &
students
involved
Correlation and Okun (2002) in an
instructional
causation; program in
recognizing methodological
spurious reasoning with
an
correlation emphasis on
understanding
correlation and
causation
outperformed a
control group.
Understanding O’Brien & Young adults
falsifiability as Overton benefited from
a
context for (1980); contradiction
confirmation; Overton, training on
thinking of the Byrnes, & conditional
alternative O’Brien, reasoning tasks.
hypothesis (1985)
Differentiating Kuhn & Students
theory from Pease participated in a
(2008)
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
forecasting of
earthquakes.
From pre- to
post-test,
students
showed an
increase in their
reliance on using
and integrating
evidence to
explain results
and a decrease
in
exclusive
reliance
on a theory-based
explanation.
Appreciation of Halpern This concept is
converging (2003); widely taught in
evidence Stanovich critical thinking
(2010); courses and
Wade & scientific
Tavris methodology
(2008)
courses under
the
assumption that
it
is teachable.
Appreciating the Kuhn & Students
limits of Pease participated in a
personal (2008)
observation, computer-based
testimonials, program on
and
single-case scientific enquiry
evidence skills that
examined the
forecasting of
earthquakes.
From pre- to
post-test,
students
showed a
decrease in their
reliance on
single
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
case instances.
Rules of logical Logical validity Lehman & Undergraduate
consistency judgment tasks Nisbett training in
natural
and validity (1990) science and
Cheng, humanities
Holyoak, training
displayed
Nisbett, & significantly
Oliver improved
(1986);
Klaczynski performance on
&
Laipple problems in
(1993) conditional logic.
Klauer, Training in
Stegmaier, applying logical
&
Meiser rules plus
(1997). application to
concrete
problems
resulted in better
performance on
selection task
problems.
Training in a
truth
table evaluation
task resulted in
substantial
performance
improvements
on
propositional
syllogistic
reasoning.
Economic Cost/Benefit Larrick, Participants who
thinking reasoning; Morgan, & were trained on
limited Nisbett cost-benefit rules
resource
reasoning (1990) (including the
sunk cost
principle
and the
derivative
extra-cost
principle)
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
performed
better on
reasoning on
these types of
problems, in
comparison to a
group that
received no
Recognizing training.
Larrick,
opportunity Nisbett, Students who
costs & had taken more
Morgan economics
(1993) courses were
Frederick, more likely to
Novemsky, recognize
Wang, opportunity
Dhar, & costs. Explicit
Nowlis mention of lost
(2009) opportunity cost
on purchases
resulted in more
selections that
acknowledged
the lost
opportunity, as
compared to a
condition that
made no
Avoiding mention of lost
sunk costs Fennema opportunities.
& Perkins Participants
(2008 trained in sunk
costs in
managerial
accounting
courses
performed
better on tasks
requiring them
to assess
whether to
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
proceed on
projects or to
discontinue
because of sunk
costs relative to
untrained
students.
Major Measurement Source for Evidence for
Dimensions Paradigms Training or Training,
Experiential Education, or
Effect Experiential
Effect
Understanding Burkett This concept is
externalities (2006) widely taught in
economics
courses under
the
assumption that
it
is teachable.
Awareness of Banks & Numeracy levels
the
logic of Oldfield are associated
exponential (2007) with higher
growth and wealth.
compounding
Understanding Axelrod & Players in
iterative
commons Hamilton prisoner’s
dilemmas, (1981) dilemma games
zero-sum, and McNeel where the
number
nonzero-sum (1973) of interactions is
games Dawes, Van not known in
de kragt, & advanced can
Orbell learn a
(1988)
cooperative
strategies such
as
TIT-FOR-TAT.
Participants
playing
prisoner’s
dilemma games
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
were trained to
cooperate when
the outcomes
are presented in
terms of their
own gains, as
opposed to their
gains relative to
the other
player.
Participants
were asked to
make a single
anonymous
binary choice
between
cooperation and
defection
involving
substantial
amounts of
money. They
displayed high
rates of
cooperation
when the
benefits of
cooperating
accrued to
members of a
group that
Recognizing Lehman, discussed the
regression Lempert, problem.
effects that & Nisbett
encourage (1988) Graduate
buying high training in
and selling medicine and
low psychology was
associated with
better
performance
on statistical
and
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
methodological
reasoning.
Appropriate Larrick, Students who
mental Nisbett, had taken more
accounting and & economics
understanding Morgan courses were
of fungibility (1993) more likely to
recognize the
net benefit rule.
Crystallized Rationality: Crystallized Inhibitors
Major
Dimensions Measurement Source for Evidence for
Paradigms Training Training,
or Education, or
Experienti Experiential
Superstitio al Effect Effect
us thinking Paranormal,
and belief Superstitious Echeburu Pathological
in the Thinking, and a, Baez, gamblers in a
paranormal Luck Scales; & treatment group
illusion of Fernandez receiving
control - cognitive
Montalvo restructuring,
(1996) such as
Banzige challenging
r beliefs about
(1983) illusion of
Miller, control, had
Wozniak, higher rates of
Rust, abstinence from
Miller, & gambling 6
Slezak months after
(1996) treatment
compared to a
waitlist control
group.
Older adults
(median = 67
years)
participated in a
two- session
course on
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
parapsychology.
Pre-/post-test
comparisons on
the Belief in the
Paranormal Scale
indicated an
enduring shift
toward
skepticism.
Counter-
attitudinal
advocacy was
effective in
increasing
students’
skepticism about
paranormal
beliefs.
Belief in the Faith in Kowalski & A refutational
Intuition
superiority of Scale Taylor approached that
(2009)
intuition involved
activating, then
immediately
countering, a
misconception
was found to
decrease college
students’
agreement with
common
misconceptions
such as “Human
intuition is
remarkably
accurate and
free
from error.”
Overreliance Folk Wisdom Kowalski & A refutational
on folk wisdom Tests Taylor approached that
(2009)
Components of Rational
Thought

Fluid Rationality
and folk involved
psychology activating, then
immediately
countering, a
misconception
was found to
decrease college
students’
agreement with
common
misconceptions
such as “A
schizophrenic is
someone with a
split personality.”
Crystallized Rationality: Inhibitors
Crystallized
Major Measurement Source for Evidence for
Dimensions Paradigms Training or Training,
Experiential Education, or
Effect Experiential
Effect
Belief in High value Furnham & Time spent in
“special” placed on McGill medical school
(2003)
expertise nongrounded was positively
knowledge associated with
sources increased
skepticism about
alternative
medicine.
Financial Financial Bhandari, Participants
misconceptions Hassanein, provided with
Literacy/Illiteracy &
Scale Deaves textual feedback
s
(2008) and graphical
representations
that provided
information
about
investment
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
options showed
a lowered
impact of
investment-
related
cognitive
biases, such as
insufficient
diversification
in financial
portfolios.
Incorrigibility
of Accuracy Richard, Participants who
introspection of van der were asked to
(overoptimist affective Plight, & focus on their
ic theories of forecastin de Vries anticipated,
one’s own g (1996) postbehavioral
introspective feelings in
powers) relation to
unsafe sex and
risk-taking
behavior were
more likely to
generate
negative
feelings such as
regret and
reported
adoption of
safer sex
practices than
respondents
who were asked
to report on the
behaviors itself.
Those
respondents
who had to
focus on
anticipated
feelings showed
less risky
behavior five
months after
the initial
Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
experiment.
Bias Blind Pronin, & Participants who
Spot Test Kugler were educated
(2007) about the role of
nonconscious
processes were
more likely to
avoid the bias
blind spot error.
Dysfunction
al personal Measures of Kendall, Individual and
beliefs irrational Hudson, family cognitive-
personal Gosch, behavioral
beliefs Flannery- therapy
Schroeder interventions
& Suveg addressing
(2008) irrational
Bentz, anxieties were
Williamson, superior to a
& Franks treatment using
(2004) family-based
education,
attention, and
support in
children and
adolescents with
anxiety
Participants who
were in a group
receiving
instructions to
consider
alternative
positive
information
displayed
significantly
reduced
pessimistic
predictions of
 Components of Rational
Thought Fluid Rationality
future
events
relative to
the control
group.
A notion of
self that Unbiased Toplak Increasing
encourages processing of & years of
egocentric evidence Stanovic university
processing h (2003) education was
correlated with
less myside
bias—that is,
less of a
tendency to
generate more
arguments and
evidence in
favor of a
Self- previously held
perception Rose & position.
biases, and Windschi
unrealistic tl (2008) Egocentric
optimism weighting and
optimism
decreased
across rounds
in a full
feedback
condition.
(p.231) (p.232) (p.233) (p.234) (p.235) (p.236) (p.237) (p.238) (p.239) (p.240)
(p.241) (p.242) (p.243) included other, weaker types of
(p.244)
evidence in Table 10–3. For example, we have included some studies
showing that levels of a rational thinking skill are correlated with
educational level and/or experience. Such correlational evidence is of
course suggestive, but it is not definitive evidence that the skill is
teachable or trainable. Nonetheless, it is impressive that, given so
many different areas of rational thought displayed in Table 10–3,
there is at least some type of evidence suggesting the trainability of
each one of them.

Of course, because the relationships among the components

have yet to be worked out, it is presently unclear whether
training on any one component of rational thought might
improve others. In the domain of crystallized facilitators, there is
certainly reason to believe that this might be the case. For
example, the many components of the major dimension of
“Knowledge of Scientific Reasoning” are often taught in courses
as an
interrelated set of thinking skills. Whether or not research has
shown the training of any particular component to generalize to
the learning of another, methodology instructors all over the
world are certainly proceeding under the assumption that this is
the case. They are also proceeding under the assumption that
any given component in the list under this domain of knowledge
is teachable. And this is true with respect to virtually all the areas
of crystallized facilitator and inhibitors: probabilistic reasoning,
decision theory insights, scientific reasoning, logic, economic
thinking, and avoidance of various aspects of superstitious
thinking. That is, whatever evidence exists in the actual scientific
literature for the trainability of such skills, major societal
institutions (schools) are proceeding under the pragmatic
assumption that such skills are teachable. The same is not true in
the domains of fluid rationality.
Our a priori expectation about the teachability of the various
thinking styles comprising the category of fluid rationality is
more complex. Some dimensions, such as actively open-minded
thinking and objective reasoning styles, might be more like
heritable personality traits (noting this is not, of course, to imply
that heritability is necessarily correlated with lack of
malleability). Other aspects of fluid rationality are harder to
characterize. For example, the three major dimensions of
rational thought that lead off the Table 10–3 (and Fig. 10–1) are:
resistance to miserly information processing; resistance to
myside thinking; and absence of irrelevant context effects.
Components of all three of these major (p.245) dimensions have
been successfully trained by teaching variants of a “consider the
opposite” or “consider the alternative” strategy (Almashat et al.,
2008; Arkes et al., 1987; Arkes et al., 1988; Fischhoff,
1982,2002; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Thus, perhaps the
findings on training are indicating that these major dimensions
are interrelated, something that will be determined by future
research.
The nature of the significant training effect on these three
dimensions does, however, highlight the complexity of classifying
rational thinking skills. It might seem that, because the training
strategy is essentially one of learning some declarative
knowledge (“think of the opposite”) and applying it, these
dimensions of rational thought must be classified as crystallized
and not fluid. We think not, because of a critical facet of the
training. The use of the instruction must be triggered quickly and
automatically in contexts where processing would be biased by
one-sided thinking. The strategy must be so “highly compiled,”
so to speak, that it
ends up operating in the manner of a thinking disposition.
Consequently, the skills that ensure these three positive
outcomes—resistance to miserly information processing;
resistance to myside thinking; and absence of irrelevant context
effects—actually do end up looking, from a processing point of
view, like other of the dispositions of fluid rationality (need for
cognition, actively open-minded thinking). Regardless of how
these issues of classification are finally resolved, we
acknowledge the taxonomic complexities here.

The Future of Research on Individual

Differences in Rational Thought
The issues about assessment raised in this chapter represent the
current point of our research program on individual differences in
rational thought. We began by examining whether individual
differences might have implications for the Great Rationality
Debate in cognitive science (see Chapter 1). In the course of
those investigations, we were led to the insight that individual
differences in rational thought might be used to fractionate the
notion of Type 2 processing (Chapters 2–4). In building an
alternative, tripartite view of cognition, we elaborated the idea of
the reflective mind. In addition to situating the concept of
rationality within (p.246) the tripartite model, our view also
contextualizes the concept of intelligence and emphasizes that
the concept should be defined as it is operationalized in cognitive
science—not according to the broader but unoperationalized
notions in folk psychology.
From the tri-process model of cognition, we were led to develop a
taxonomy of rational thinking errors that have been revealed in
the heuristics and biases literature (Chapter 6). Individual
differences have been found in virtually every task in this
taxonomy, and we have conducted numerous investigations of
the structure of this variability. For example, over the years we
have collected considerable data on the relationships between
aspects of rational thought and intelligence. Given the high
status of the latter concept in both the science of psychology and
in the public mind, the associations tend to be surprisingly
modest (Chapters 7 and 8). We have shown that this is to be
expected when intelligence and rationality are properly situated
within the tripartite model. Simply put, the data indicate that
knowledge of a person’s intelligence does very little to predict
how they will do on measures of rational thinking. In Chapter 9,
the social implications of this modest
association were explored.

One such implication was that if we value the parts of cognition

that are missed by IQ tests, we need to create assessment
devices for the parts of cognition that are missing. In this
chapter, we have tried to lay the foundations for such an effort.
In this and previous chapters, we have shown that there is no
conceptual obstacle to the development of such an assessment
device. At present, of course, there is no IQ-type test for
rationality—that is, a test of one’s rationality quotient (RQ).
However, we have shown that the field has in hand prototypes of
the kinds of tasks that would be used in the domains of both
instrumental rationality and epistemic rationality (see Table 10–
1). In this chapter, we hope to have motivated other researchers
to participate in developing versions of these prototypes that
might be used as assessment devices. There is value in
assessing rational thought because, as shown in this chapter,
rational thought is related to real-world consequences and it can
be taught.
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(p.302)
 (p.303) Author Index
Note: Page references followed by “t” denote tables.

Abelson, R. P., 159

Ackerman, P. L., 35n5, 38, 39, 45, 53, 139n9, 146, 198t
Addis, D. R.,
47n1 Adlam, A.,
53n5 Adler, J. E.,
101n3 Agnoli,
F., 235t
Ahluwalia, R., 172
Ainslie, G., 16, 82n1, 100, 112n6, 160
Ajzen, I., 150n15
Albert, J., 35
Alhakami, A., 133, 194t
Allen, J., 40, 136n7, 230t
Almashat, S., 232t, 245
Alter, A. L., 78
Altmaier, E., 221
Ameriks, J., 220t
Amir, O., 84
Ammirati, R., 32n2
Anderson, J. R., 8, 155n1
Anderson, M., 37, 37n6, 155n1
Anderson, S., 116, 117
Angeard, N., 231t
Ariely, D., 31, 84, 188n4, 225t
Arkes, H., 231t
Arkes, H. R., 20, 98n1, 133, 188n4, 207t, 231t, 245
Arkowitz, H., 184n3
Arnett, M., 119
Aron, A. R., 21, 74n4
Aronson, E., 32n2
Aronson, J., 234t
Aslin, R. N., 37n6, 155n1
Asp, C. H., 237t
Atance, C. M., 47n1, 48n2, 55n6
Atkinson, T. M., 53n5, 56, 57n7, 58
Atran, S., 20n8, 170, 171
Audi, R., 6, 230t
Aunger, R., 16, 20n8, 102n4, 172, 173
Austin, E. J.,
161 Axelrod, R.,
240t Axsom,
D., 66
(p.304) Ayduk, O., 159

Ayotte, B., 232t

Ayton, P., 20, 104, 133, 188n4, 201t
Baddeley, A. D., 53, 53n5
Baez, C., 241t
Bagassi, M., 42n7
Bagby, R. M., 199t
Baker, T. B., 222t, 223t
Baldwin, D. A., 91n7
Ball, L. J., 64, 205
Baltes, P. B.,
135n6 Banks, J.,
240t Banziger,
G., 241t
Bar-Hillel, M., 112, 150n15
Barbaresi, W., 184n3
Barber, B., 225t
Bargh, J. A., 18t, 20n8
Barkley, R. A., 74, 184n3
Barnes, B. D., 88t
Barnett, W. S., 234t
Baron, J., 6, 7, 31n2, 35n5, 44, 113n8, 127, 132n5, 134, 135n6, 136n7, 149n14,
169, 175n1, 188n4, 195t, 198t, 213, 217, 224t
Baron-Cohen, S., 155, 228
Barr, D. J., 149n14, 161
Barrett, H. C., 20n8
Barrett, J. L., 170
Barrett, L., 47n1
Barrouillet, P., 53n5, 54
Barston, J., 40, 136n7, 194t, 213
Bartels, D. M., 87, 88, 124, 133
Bateman, I., 132, 134
Bates, T. C., 38
Baumeister, R. F., 71, 82n1, 100n2, 100n5, 112n6, 160, 223t
Bayazit, M., 98n1
Bazerman, M. H., 8n2, 18t, 31n2, 82n1, 112n6, 133, 134, 152, 188n4, 217, 224t
Bechara, A., 17n6, 116, 116n9, 117, 119, 119n10, 221
Beck, S. R., 47n1
Begley, S.,
223t Bellodi, L.,
119 Belsky, G.,
31n2 Benartzi,
S., 219t
Benjamin, D., 140t, 203t
Bennett, E. S., 52n4
Benoit, A., 155n1
Bentz, B. G., 243t
Benz, B., 101n3
Berger, J., 104
Bering, J. M., 82n2, 170
Berish, D. E., 53n5, 56, 57n7, 58
Bermudez, J. L., 5, 37,
119 Berner, E. S., 31,
233t Berridge, K. C.,
82n1 Best, J. R., 21,
74n2
Beveridge, M., 124,
136n7 Beyerstein, B. L.,
225t Beyth-Marom, R.,
135 Bhandari, G., 242t
Bickel, W. K., 119, 220
Bickerton, D., 18, 52
Birch, S. A. J., 149n14,
161
Birnbaum, M. H., 203t
Bishop, M., 25, 42n7
Bjork, R., 222t
Bjorklund, D. F., 117
Black, W. C., 237t
Blackmore, S., 22, 89, 103, 103n4, 170
Blackwell, L.,
234t Blagov, P.,
17n6 Bleckley,
M., 53n5 Block, J.,
160, 161
Bloom, P., 170
Blount, S., 133
Blumer, C., 133, 207t, 231t
Bodenhausen, G. V., 18t
Boninger, D. S., 36n5
Boring, E. G., 181
Botvinick, M., 75, 76, 77, 148
Bough, T. L., 238t
Boutin, C., 236t
(p.305) Boyd, R., 22n9, 66, 91, 103n4

Boyer, P., 170

Brainerd, C. J., 16n6, 18t, 98n1,
154n16 Brand, M., 235t
Brandstatter, E., 30n1
Brase, G. L., 20n8
Bratman, M. E., 83
Braver, T. S., 53n5
Brenner, L., 221t
Brighton, H., 30n1
Britt, M. A., 113n8
Broder, A., 30n1
Brown, G. R., 22n9, 23n9, 103n4
BruinedeBruin, W., 15n5, 34n4, 44, 45, 124n3, 140t, 159, 162, 200t, 216, 217,
219t, 222t, 224t
Buckner, R. L., 47n1
Buehner, M., 56n7
Bunting, M. F., 53n5
Burkett, J. P., 240t
Burns, B. D., 104, 201t
Burns, W. C., 204t
Buschkuehl, M., 53n5
Busemeyer, J. R., 221
Bushey, B., 136n7
Buss, D. M., 20n8, 72, 73
Byrne, R. M. J., 13, 47n1, 63, 166, 167, 230t, 233
Byrne, R. W., 91
Byrnes, J. P., 16n5,
238t
Cacioppo, J. T., 32n3, 35, 35n5, 38, 42, 125, 146, 198t, 220t,
233t Call, J., 82n2, 91n7
Camerer, C. F., 17n6, 75n3, 149n14, 152, 188n4, 217, 219t
Camos, V., 53n5, 54
Campbell, J. D.,
223t Caplin, A.,
220t Capon, A., 124,
136n7
Capon, N., 220t
Cara, F., 63n1, 66
Carroll, D. C., 47n1
Carroll, J. B., 50, 52, 53n4, 139n9, 145, 182, 193
Carruthers, P., 20n8, 25, 48n2, 51, 83, 90, 91
Carter, C. S., 75, 75n3
Case, D. A., 231t, 236t
Cassidy, K. W., 149n14
Cattell, R. B., 50, 52, 145, 193
Cavedini, P., 119
Chabris, C. F., 53n5
Chaiken, S., 18t
Chan, D., 124n3
Chapman, G. B., 21, 31n2, 188n4
Chapman, J., 223t
Chapman, L. J., 209t, 223t
Charness, N., 154n16
Chartrand, T. L., 18t, 20n8
Chater, N., 5, 8, 23n10, 24, 63n1, 113n7
Chatillon, G., 163
Chatterjee, S.,
88n6 Chein, J.,
17n6, 80 Chelune,
G., 58 Chen, H.,
209t Cheng, P. W.,
239
ChenIdson, L.,
107n5 Chincotta,
D., 53n5 Chrisley,
R., 32, 34 Christal,
R. E., 57n7
Christensen, C.,
231t
Christiansen-Szalanski, J. J., 149
Christie, R., 197
Chugh, D., 8n2, 152, 217
Churchland, P. M., 104
Clark, A., 48n2, 91, 93, 97
Clark, J. K., 50
Cochavi, D., 230t
Cohen, J. D., 17n6, 75, 75n3, 160
Cohen, L. J., 9n3, 10, 12, 13, 42n7, 166, 167
Cohen, M., 17n6, 75n3
Colom, R., 53n5, 56n7
(p.306) Colombo, J., 113n8, 136n7

Coltheart, M., 20n8, 119

Conway, A. R. A., 53n5, 54, 57n7, 142n12, 182
Corballis, M. C., 47n1, 48n2, 82n2
Corley, R. P., 57n7, 74n2
Corpus, B., 104, 201t
Cosmides, L., 8, 23n10, 48n2, 171, 172
Costa, P. T., 43, 88t
Cowan, N., 53n5
Coyle, T. R., 54
Cramer, K. M., 136n7
Cronbach, L. J., 39, 72
Croskerry, P., 31n2, 222t
Croson, R., 104, 221t
Cummins, D. D., 91n7
Currie, G., 47n1, 233
Currie, S. R., 233
Curtis, V., 16, 20n8
Curtis-Holmes, J., 40, 213
Curtiss, G., 58
Damasio, A. R., 116, 117, 119, 119n10
Damasio, H., 116, 117, 119n10
Daniel, M. H., 52n4
D’Annucci, A., 119
Darley, J. M., 17n6
Daston, L., 91n7, 112
Davids, S. L., 82n1, 237t
Davidson, D., 82n1
Davies, M., 5, 37, 119
Davis, H. P., 53n5, 58, 142n12
Dawes, R. M., 6, 29, 31n2, 132n5, 188n4, 213, 223t, 240t
Dawkins, R., 22n9, 23, 83, 89, 103n4, 170, 171
Dawson, K. A.,
216 Dawson, M.,
184n3 Day, D.,
35
Dean, D. J., 237t
Deary, I. J., 54, 139n9, 160
Deaves, R., 242t
Decety, J., 47n1
DeCoster, J., 17n6, 18t
DeFries, J. C., 57n7, 74n2
DeMartino, B., 17n6, 75n3
Denes-Raj, V., 87, 88t, 110, 111, 161, 194t, 225t
DeNeys, W., 76, 124, 147, 148, 151
Denissen, J., 72
Dennett, D. C., 22n9, 23, 32, 48n2, 51n3, 82n2, 83, 90, 103, 103n4, 168, 170
Dennis, I., 124, 136n7
Dent, S., 132
DeShon, R. P., 124n3
DeSousa, R., 3, 4
D’Esposito, M., 116n9
Detable, C., 37n6, 155n1
Detterman, D. K., 175, 175n1
Deutsch, R., 18t
DeVries, N., 231t, 242t
Dhar, R., 239t
Diamond, A., 234t
DiCerbo, K. E., 238t
Dickert, S., 232t
Dieckmann, N. F., 230t
Diener, E., 114
Dienes, Z., 48n2, 50, 82n2
Dillard, A. J., 226t
Distin, K., 22n9, 103n4, 170
Doherty, M. E., 9, 196, 202, 219t
Doherty-Sneddon, G., 50
Dolan, R. J., 17n6, 75n3
Dole, J. A., 35n5
Donkers, B., 237t
Dörner, D., 207
Dorner, W. W.,
204t Doucet, C.,
236t
Dougherty, M. R. P., 30n1,
47n1 Driver-Linn, E., 196t,
210t, 219t
Duckworth, A. L., 32n3, 39, 45, 215, 221t
Duckworth, S., 230t
Dulany, D. E., 101n3
Dunbar, R., 47n1, 91n7
(p.307) Duncan, J., 52n4, 53n5, 116n9, 117, 142n12, 145

Dweck, C. S., 234t

Dworkin, G., 83n4, 84
Earman, J., 135
Ebbesen, E. B., 159
Ebert, A., 218
Echeburua, E., 241t
Eckblad, M., 209t
Edelstein, B., 232t
Edwards, W., 6, 9n3, 132n5, 213
Egeland, B., 230
Ehrlinger, J., 104
Elliott, R., 234t
Ellis, S., 16n5
Elstein, A. S., 31n2, 188n4
Elster, J., 51, 89
Emerson, M. J., 21, 74n2
Engell, A. D., 17n6
Engle, R. W., 17n6, 50, 52n4, 53, 53n5, 55, 57n7, 58, 142n12, 145
Ennis, R. H., 35n5
Epley, N., 78, 107n5, 109, 128, 197t, 213
Epstein, S., 43, 87, 87n5, 88n6, 88t, 110, 111, 123n2, 161, 194t, 209t, 225t, 226t
Erdfelder, E., 63n1
Ericsson, K. A., 154n16
Eslinger, P. J., 116
Evans, J. St. B. T., 7, 9, 13, 16, 16n6, 17, 17n6, 18t, 19, 20n8, 30n1, 31n2, 40, 47,
47n1, 48n2, 50, 51, 62, 63, 63n1, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 78, 110, 113, 115, 123n1,
124, 135n6, 136n7, 141, 142n11, 148, 158, 178, 182, 194t, 206t, 213, 230t, 233
Eyre, R. N., 78
Facione, P., 193
Fagley, N. S., 88n6
Fantino, E., 231t, 236t
Farady, M., 136n7
Farah, M. J., 116n9
Farrelly, D., 35n4, 87n5
Faust, D., 231t
Faust, M. E., 53n5
Fauth, J., 34n4, 136, 136n7, 211t
Feeney, A., 67
Feinstein, J., 32n3, 220t, 233t
FeldmanBarrett, L. F., 17n6
Fennema, M. G., 239
Fenton-O’Creevy, M., 201t, 209t, 217, 225t
Ferguson, M. J., 20
Fernandez-Montalvo, J., 241t
Ferreira, M. B., 17n6
Fick, G. H., 233
Fiedler, K., 204
Fink, A., 54
Finucane, M. L., 132, 133, 194t
Fioratou, E., 158
Fischer, I., 104, 201t
Fischhoff, B., 15n5, 32n2, 35n4, 45, 88, 124, 124n3, 135, 140t, 149, 159, 162,
196t, 216, 231t, 245
Fishbach, A., 75, 234
Fishburn, P. C., 132n5
Flanagan, O., 83
Flannagan, M. J., 218t
Flannery-Schroeder, E., 243t
Fleischhauer, M., 38
Fletcher, J. M., 215
Flynn, J. R., 50, 177, 178
Fodor, J. A., 18, 20n8
Fogli, L., 39
Foley, R., 6
Fong, G. T., 43, 44, 151, 200t, 201t, 202t, 230t, 235t, 236t
Forsythe, R., 219t, 226t
Fox, H. C., 139n9
Franco-Watkins, A. M., 30n1
Frank, M. J., 17n6, 75n3
Frankfurt, H., 83, 85, 86
Frankish, K., 5, 16, 17n6,
37 (p.308) Franklin, S., 32
Franks, S. F., 243t
Franssens, S., 151
Frederick, S., 17n7, 18t, 21, 30n1, 78, 99, 104, 107, 125, 139, 140t, 141, 142, 143,
157, 158, 158n2, 194t, 203t, 239t
Fried, C., 234t
Friedman, N. P., 21, 57n7, 74n2, 83n3, 142n12
Friedman, O., 228
Friend, M., 184n3
Friese, M., 17n6, 82n1
Frisch, D., 124, 197t,
214
Funder, D. C., 9n3, 160, 161
Furnham, A., 242t
Fuster, J. M., 53
Gaeth, G. J., 16n5, 107n5
Gailliot, M. T., 71, 100n5
Gale, M., 205
Galinsky, A. D., 232t, 245
Galton, F., 183
Garb, H. N., 223t
Garcia-Marques, L., 17n6
Gardner, H., 175, 179, 180n2
Gauthier, D., 84, 95, 132n5
Gawronski, B., 18t
Geary, D. C., 52n4, 53n5, 76, 77, 142n12
Gebauer, G.,
113n7 German, T.
P., 228
Gernsbacher, M. A., 53n5,
184n3 Gettys, C. F., 47n1
Giambrone, S., 82n2
Gibbard, A., 90, 91n7, 123n2
Gibson, B., 223t
Gigerenzer, G., 8, 8n2, 9n3, 12, 23n10, 30n1, 42n7, 91n7, 188n4, 218, 218t, 221t
Gignac, G. E., 52n4
Gilbert, D. T., 33, 66, 67, 104, 114, 196t, 210t, 219t
Gilhooly, K. J., 158
Gilinsky, A., 136n7
Gilovich, T., 31n2, 104, 109, 128, 149n14, 188n4, 197t, 213, 223t
Girotto, V., 63, 63n1, 66, 101, 113
Glaser, E. M., 40, 198t, 220t
Gleicher, F., 36n5
Glenberg, A. M., 48n2, 50, 148
Glumicic, T., 151
Goel, V., 17n6, 75n3, 76
Goff, M., 38, 45, 198t
Goldman, A. I., 47, 91n7, 92, 228
Goldman-Rakic, P. S., 53n5
Goldsmith, H. H., 184n3
Goldstein, D. G., 219t
Gonzalez, R., 6
Good, C., 234t
Goodie, A. S., 231t, 236t
Goody, E. N., 91n7
Gordon, D. H., 34n4, 42, 136, 136n7, 211t
Gordon, M., 184n3
Gorniak, S. L., 47n1
Gosch, E., 243t
Gould, S. J., 100
Graber, M. L., 31
Gray, J. R., 53n5, 57n7, 58, 142n12, 160, 161
Green, L., 112n6, 160
Greenberg, L. S.,
234t Greene, J.,
17n6, 75n3
Greenfield, P. M.,
178
Greenhoot, A. F., 113n8, 136n7, 203t
Grezes, J., 47n1
Grier, M., 233t
Griffin, D., 31n2, 43, 200t, 221t
Griggs, R. A., 237t
Grigorenko, E. L., 36n5
Groopman, J., 188n4, 217, 222t
Grosjean, S., 205t
Grunewald, M.,
119 Guilmette, T.,
231t Gurhan-Canli,
Z., 172 (p.309) Ha, Y.,
115
Haberstick, B. C., 74n2
Haidt, J., 17n6, 18t
Halleran, J. G., 88n6
Halpern, D., 198t, 204t, 206t, 238t
Hamann, S., 17n6
Hambrick, D. Z., 53n5, 182
Hamilton, W. D., 240t
Handley, S. J., 35n4, 65, 66, 75, 87n5, 124, 136n7, 206t
Hardman, D., 63n1
Hare, B., 91n7
Harley, C., 35n4, 87n5
Harman, G., 6, 83n4
Harnishfeger, K. K., 117
Harper, C., 206t
Harshman, L. A., 16n5
Hart, K., 231t
Hart, S. S., 16n5
Harvey, N., 31n2
Hasher, L., 21, 37n6, 53n5, 54, 58, 155n1
Hassanein, K., 242t
Hastie, R., 6, 188n4, 218t
Hawking, S., 5n1
Heath, J., 207t,
224t Heaton, R., 58,
74n2 Heaton, S.,
238t Hegarty, M.,
57n7
Heggestad, E. D., 35n5, 38
Heier, H., 87, 88t, 225t
Heim, S. J., 237t
Henig, R. M., 171
Henzi, P., 47n1
Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., 91n7
Hernstadt, R., 155n1
Herrmann, E., 91n7
Herrnstein, R. J., 112, 112n6
Hershey, J. C., 44, 127, 195t,
218t
Hertwig, R., 23n10, 30n1, 101n3
Hewitt, J. K., 57n7, 74n2
Higgins, D. M., 45
Hilbig, B. E., 30n1
Hilton, D. J., 21, 31n2, 101n3, 113, 188n4, 217, 219t, 225t
Hinson, J. M., 108n5
Ho, C., 32n3, 136n7, 140t
Ho, I. T., 15n5, 35n5, 88n6
Hodgins, D. C., 233
Hoffrage, U., 23n10, 218
Hofmann, W., 17n6,
82n1 Holyoak, K. J.,
82n2, 239 Hood, B. M.,
170
Horn, J. L., 50, 52, 52n4, 145, 193
Houdé, O., 231t, 235t
Howson, C., 135
Hsee, C. K., 20, 114, 118n10, 133, Hastie, R.
Hudson, J. L., 243t
Hull, D. L., 22, 66, 103n4, 170
Humphrey, N., 91n7
Humphreys, L. G.,
139n9 Hurley, S. L., 4,
86
Issacharoff, S., 152
Jackendoff, R., 48n2, 82n2
Jackson, L. K., 47n1,
55n6 Jacobs, J. E., 16n5
Jacowitz, K. E., 197t,
213 Jaeggi, S. M., 53n5
James, G., 9n3
Jarvis, C., 225t
Jarvis, W., 32n3, 220t, 233t
Jeffrey, R. C., 6, 132n5
Jeffrey, W. E., 230t
Jenkens, K., 238t
Jenkins, B., 88t
Jepson, C., 44, 201, 201t, 206t
Johnson, E. J., 218t,
219t Johnson, J., 233t
Johnson, S. M., 133, 194t
Johnson-Laird, P. N., 17n6, 18t, 31n2, 63n1, 66, 67, 135n6, 166, 167, 206t, 224t
Jones, L. L., 21
(p.310) Jonides, J., 20n8,

53n5 Jordan, S. D., 223t

Juan-Espinosa, M., 53n5, 56n7
Judd, B. B., 136n7
Jungermann, H., 9n3
Jurado, M. B., 56n7, 57, 59
Juslin, P., 30n1
Kagan, J., 35
Kahneman, D., 7, 9n3, 11, 17, 17n7, 18t, 20, 20n8, 21, 29, 30n1, 31n2, 42n7,
47n1, 67, 99, 100, 101n3, 104, 107, 107n5, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115,
124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 132n5, 133, 134, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148,
150, 150n15, 151n15, 152, 153, 154n16, 188n4, 194t, 195t, 197t, 200t, 213, 214,
221t
Kaminski, J., 82n2
Kanazawa, S., 37n6, 155n1
Kane, M. J., 50, 51, 52n4, 53n5, 57n7, 58, 142n12, 145, 182
Kanfer, R., 39
Kanz, J., 221
Kao, S. F., 204t
Kardash, C. A. M.,
136n7 Kardash, C. M.,
42, 43 Karmiloff-Smith,
A., 48n2 Kaufman, J. C.,
175n1 Kay, G., 58
Keiser, S., 184n3
Keller, R., 119
Kelley, C., 32n3, 136n7, 140t
Kelman, M., 184n3
Kendall, P. C., 243t
Keren, G., 101
Kermer, D. A., 196t, 210t, 219t
Kern, L., 219t
Keys, D. J., 42n7
Keysar, B., 149n14, 161
Kilts, C., 17n6
Kimberg, D. Y., 116n9, 117
King, R. N., 223t
Kirby, K. N., 112n6, 160, 199, 220
Kirkpatrick, L., 110, 161
Klaczynski, P. A., 15n5, 16n5, 34n4, 42, 87n5, 88n6, 113n8, 124n3, 136, 136n7,
137, 140t, 196t, 211t, 216, 239t
Klahr, D.,
237t Klar, Y.,
63n1
Klauer, K. C., 63n1, 113n7, 136n7, 239t
Klayman, J., 115
Klein, G., 20, 20n8, 21, 30n1, 123n2, 154n16
Klein, P., 180n2
Klein, W., 226t
Kleindorfer, P. R., 132n5
Knetsch, J. L., 195t
Koehler, D. J., 9n3, 31n2, 221t, 223t
Koehler, J. J., 9n3, 42n7, 112
Kokis, J., 15n5, 16n5, 24n11, 35n4, 43, 44, 88, 123, 136n7, 140t, 161, 162, 228
Komorita, S. S.,
207t Kosonen, P.,
235t Kowalski, P.,
241t Kramer, W.,
221t
Krantz, D. H., 43, 44, 151, 201, 230t, 235t, 236t
Krauss, S., 101n3
Krueger, A. B., 114
Krueger, J., 9n3, 223t
Kruglanski, A. W., 32n3, 35n5, 197t
Krumm, S., 56n7
Ku, K., 15n5, 35n5, 88n6
Kugler, M. B., 242
Kuhberger, A., 9, 42n7, 107n5
Kuhn, D., 135n6, 197t, 198t, 205t, 220t, 233t, 237t, 238t, 239t
Kumaran, D., 17n6, 75n3
Kummer, H., 91n7
Kunreuther, H. C., 132n5, 218t
Kurzban, R., 20n8
(p.311) Kyllonen, P. C., 53n5, 56n7, 57n7, 139n9

Labudda, K., 119

Lachance, S., 236t
Ladouceur, R., 236t
Lai, C., 231t
Laibson, D. I., 17n6, 160
Laier, C., 235t
Laland, K. N., 22n9, 23n9, 103n4
Lambdin, C., 124
Laming, D., 63n1, 113n7
Landfield, K., 32n2
Lane, S. M., 17n6
Larrick, R. P., 207t, 224t, 239t, 241t
Laughlin, J. E., 53n5
Lauriola, M., 16n5, 107n5
Lavallee, K. L., 15n5, 34n4, 42, 87n5, 88n6, 113n8, 124n3, 136, 136n7, 140t, 239t
Leahy, J., 220t
Leary, M. R.,
88t Leblond, J.,
236t
LeBoeuf, R. A., 15n5, 42n7, 125
Lee, A. G. M., 45
Lee, C. J., 6n3, 101n3
Lee, L., 84
Lefcourt, H. M., 199t, 214, 220t
Legrenzi, P., 66
Lehman, D. R., 203t, 235t, 236t, 239t, 240t
Lehrer, K., 83
Lempert, R. O., 236t, 240t
Lepine, R., 53n5, 54
Leshowitz, B., 238t
Leslie, A. M., 49, 50, 52, 228
Lester, G., 184n3
Levesque, H. J., 106,
157
Levi, I., 11
Levin, I. P., 15n5, 16n5, 89n6, 107n5, 119, 213, 214, Hart, S. S.
Levinson, S. C., 91
Lewandowski, L., 184n3
Lewis, D., 83n4
Lezak, M. D., 59
Li, M., 21
Liberman, N., 63n1
Lichtenstein, S., 32n2, 124, 188n4, 196t, 197t, 203t, 231t
Lieberman, M. D., 17n6, 18t, 20n8, 77, 78
Lilienfeld, S. O., 32n2, 152, 184n3, 222t, 223t, 225t
Lillard, A., 48n2
Lin, D. Y., 134, 209t, 210t
Lindner, H.,
210t Lipstadt,
D., 162
Liu, D., 228
Liu, E., 35n4, 218t, 220t, 222t, 225t
Lloyd, F. J., 98n1, 154n16, 188n4
Lodge, M., 196t, 203t
Loewenstein, G., 17n6, 18t, 75n3, 82n1, 100n2, 112n6, 118n10, 119n10, 133,
149n14, 152, 160, 225t
Logan, G. D., 74
Lopes, L., 42n7
Lubinski, D., 139n9
Lucas, E. J., 64
Luce, R. D., 6, 132n5
Lumley, M. A., 221t
Lustig, C., 21, 54
Lynch, A., 22n9, 89
Lynch, J. S., 63, 113
Lynn, S. J., 225t
Lyon, D., 150n15
Macchi, L., 42n7, 101n3, 113
MacDonald, A. W., 75, 77
MacGregor, D. G., 132
Mackintosh, N. J., 52n4
Macpherson, R., 35n4, 136n7, 140t, 161, 218t, 220t, 222t, 225t, 230t, 231t
Maher, P., 83
Mak, D., 107n5
Malkiel, B. G., 221t, 224t
(p.312) Mandell, L., 209t

Manktelow, K. I., 6, 42n7, 86

Margolis, H., 42n7, 63n1, 113n7, 188n4
Margrett, J., 232t
Markovits, H., 40, 136n7, 194, 213
Markowitsch, H. J., 235t
Mathews, R. C.,
17n6 Matthews, G.,
39, 175 Maule, J.,
108n5, 213 May, C.
P., 53n5
Mazzocco, K., 232t
McArdle, J. J., 52n4
McAuliffe, T. L., 82n1, 237t
McCarthy, R. A., 116n9
McClure, S. M., 17n6, 75n3, 112, 160
McCrae, R. R., 43, 88t
McDaniel, M., 222t
McElroy, T., J. J., Seta
McFadden, D., 132n5
McFall, R. M., 222t, 223t
McGill, C., 242t
McGrew, K. S.,
53n4 McHugh, P.,
223t McKay, R. T.,
103n4
McNeel, S. P., 240
McNeil, M. S., 88t
Mealey, L., 119
Medvec, V. H.,
149n14
Meier, P., 43, 123n2, 209t, 226t
Meiser, T., 239t
Melenberg, B.,
237t
Mellers, B. A., 9, 42n7,
101n3 Mertz, C. K., 232t
Meserve, R. J., 134, 163
Mesoudi, A., 22n9, 103n4
Messick, D. M., 169t
Meszaros, J., 218t
Metcalfe, J., 17n6, 18t
Meyers, J. M., 66
Midboe, A. M., 226t
Milford, G., 43, 209t
Milkman, K. L., 8n2, 82n1, 112n6, 152, 217
Miller, B. R., 241t
Miller, G. F., 72
Miller, P. H., 21
Miller, R. L., 241t
Miller, W. R., 233t
Millgram, E., 86
Mineka, S., 20n8
Minkoff, S. R. B.,
53n5 Minsky, M., 16
Mischel, W., 17n6, 18t, 82n1, 100n2, 159, 160, 199t, 221
Mitchell, G., 76, 152
Mithen, S., 91, 91n7, 92, 93
Miyake, A., 21, 57n7, 74n2
Molouki, S., 104
Moore, D. A., 203
Morgan, J. N., 224t, 239t, 241t
Morgenstern, O., 6, 132n5
Moutier, S., 231t, 235t
Moyens, E., 151
Mumma, G. T.,
232t Munro, A.,
134 Munro, S.,
234t Murphy, D.,
37, 119
Murphy, P., 158
Musch, J., 136n7
Mussweiler, T., 232t, 245
Myers, D. G., 32n2, 188n4
Myerson, J., 112n6, 160
Mynatt, C. R., 202, 202t
Myrseth, K. O. R., 75
Nakamura, M., 119
Nantel, G., 40, 194, 213
Narasimham, G., 16n5
Nattinger, A. B., 82n1, 237t
Naumer, B., 136n7
Navon, D., 71, 148
Neale, M. A., 219t
Neil, D., 201t
Neisser, U., 175, 177
(p.313) Nelson, F., 219t, 226t
Neubauer, A., 54
Neumann, G., 219t, 226t
Neurath, O., 85
Newell, B. R., 30n1, 32
Newport, E. L., 37n6, 155n1
Newstead, S. E., 13, 35n4, 40, 63, 63n1, 87n5, 88n6, 124n3, 136n7, 230t, 233
Newton, E. J., 64
Nezworski, M. T., 223t
Nichols, S., 47n1, 48n2, 49, 51n3, 82n2, 92, 93, 119, 228
Nicholson, N., 201t, 209t, 217, 225t
Nickerson, R. S., 31n2, 42n7, 67, 104, 113, 115, 135n6
Nigam, M.,
237t Nigg, J.
T., 74
Nijhuis, M., 223
Nilsson, H., 30n1
Nisbett, R. E., 13, 31n2, 43, 44, 104, 113, 151, 201t, 202t, 203t, 208t, 224t,
230t, 235t, 236t, 239, 239t, 240t, 241t
Noftle, E. E., 38
Noll, J., 50, 52n4, 145
Norman, D. A., 18t
Norris, S. P., 35n5
Northcraft, G. B.,
219t
Noveck, I. A., 17n6, 75n3, 101n3
Novemsky, N., 239t
Nowlis, S., 239t
Nozick, R., 83n4, 84, 87, 90
Nudds, M., 4
Nussbaum, E. M.,
136n7 Nystrom, L. E.,
17n6
Oaksford, M., 5, 8, 23n10, 24, 63n1, 113n7
Oatley, K., 20n8, 47n1
Oberauer, K., 54
O’Brien, D., 16n5, 238t
Odean, T., 219, 225t
O’Donoghue, T., 82n1, 100n2, 152
Offit, P. A., 222t, 223t
Ohman, A., 20n8
Okun, M. A., 238t
Oldfield, Z., 240t
Oliver, L. M.,
239 O’Neill, D. K.,
48n2
Oppenheimer, D. M., 30n1, 78, 98n1
Orbell, J. M., 240t
Oreg, S.,
98n1 Orwell,
G., 162
Osman, M., 63n1, 113n7
Oswald, M. E., 205t
Over, D. E., 6, 9, 16n6, 17n6, 18t, 21, 30n1, 42n7, 47, 47n1, 48n2, 50, 51, 62, 63,
65, 66, 67, 86, 112, 178
Overton, W. F., 16n5, 238t
Ozonoff, S., 56, 57, 74, 74n2
Pacini, R., 87, 87n5, 88n6, 88t, 110, 161, 225t
Palacios, A., 53n5, 56n7
Parker, A. M., 15n5, 35n4, 45, 88, 124n3, 140t, 159, 162, 216
Parker, J. D. A., 199t
Parks, C. D., 207t
Parsell, D., 184n3
Parsons, J., 230t
Pashler, H., 222t
Patalino, A. L., 20n8
Paulos, J. A., 224
Paulsen, J., 221
Pawlikowski, M., 235t
Payne, T., 53n5
Pease, M., 238t, 239t
Penke, L., 72, 73
Penn, D. C., 82n2
Pennington, B. F., 56, 57, 74, 74n2
Pennington, N., 218t
Perkins, D. N., 35n5, 88n6, 89, 97, 113, 113n8, 124n3, 135, 136n7, 175n1, 198t
Perkins, J. D., 239
(p.314) Perner, J., 48n2, 49, 50, 51, 51n3, 82n2, 83

Perrig, W. J., 53n5

Perruchet, P.,
155n1
Peters, E., 21, 104, 124n3, 132, 133, 162, 200t, 230t, 232t
Peterson, J. B.,
45 Petry, N. M.,
119
Petry, N. N., 220
Petty, R. E., 32n3, 220t, 233t
Pfeiffer, T., 232t
Phelps, F., 50
Philips, W.,
35 Pick, M.,
56n7 Pihl, R.
O., 45
Pink, J. E., 53n5, 54, 58
Pinker, S., 20n8,
73 Pintrich, P. R.,
220t Plato, 16
Platt, R. D., 237t
Pohl, R., 30n1, 149, 196t, 219
Politzer, G., 101n3, 113
Pollard, P., 40, 136n7, 194t, 213, 230t
Pollock, J. L., 18t, 32
Pos, A. E., 234t
Posavac, S. S.,
223t Posner, M. I.,
18 Postman, N., 7
Potenza, M., 16n5
Povinelli, D. J.,
82n2 Prado, J.,
17n6, 75n3 Pratt, J.
W., 132n5 Prelec,
D., 17n6
Prentice, R. A., 32n2, 42n7, 152
Pronin, E., 104, 112, 134, 209t, 210t, 242
Pronk, T. M., 51
Quine, W., 85
Rabin, M., 82n1, 100n2, 152
Rachlin, H., 82n1, 100n2, 112n6
Ragland, G. G., 230t
Raiffa, H., 6, 132n5
Ravenscroft, I., 47n1
Read, D., 82n1, 100n2, 160
Reber, A. S., 18t, 37n6, 155n1
Rebollo, I., 53n5,
56n7 Redelmeier, D.
A., 220 Reitan, R.
M., 74 Rescher, C.,
165
Rescher, N., 165, 167
Rettinger, D. A., 57n7
Reyna, V. F., 16n5, 16n6, 18t, 32n2, 98n1, 154n16, 188n4
Rhodes, B., 134
Rhodes, M. G., 58
Riboldi, G., 119
Ricco, R. B., 15n5,
198t Richard, R.,
231t, 242t Richards,
R., 139n9
Richerson, P. J., 22n9, 66, 91, 103n4
Riggs, K. J., 47n1
Rinehart, C. A., 108n5
Rips, L. J., 165
Ritchhart, R., 88n6, 89, 113, 124n3
Ritov, I., 134
Roberts, M. J.,
64 Roberts, R.
D., 39 Robins, R.
W., 38
Robinson, B., 34n4, 42, 136, 136n7, 140t
Roby, K. J., 221t
Rodriguez, M. L., 82n1, 100n2, 159, 160, 161, 199t, 221
Roese, N., 47n1
Rogers, P., 101
Rogers, T., 82n1, 112n6
Rohrer, D., 222t
Rokeach, M., 43
Rollnick, S., 233t
Roney, C. J. R., 104,
112 Rose, G. S., 233t
Rose, J. P., 243t
(p.315) Roseil, M. C., 237t
Rosman, B. L., 35
Ross, L., 31n2, 43, 104, 134, 209t, 210t
Rosselli, M., 56n7, 57, 59
Royzman, E. B., 149n14, 161
Ruscio, J., 225t
Rust, M. R., 241t
Sá, W., 24n11, 32n3, 35n4, 40, 43, 88t, 123, 136n7, 140, 140t, 162, 197t
Sackett, P. R., 39
Saffran, J. R., 37n6,
155n1 Sagaria, S. D.,
207t Salhany, J., 210t
Salthouse, T. A., 53n5, 54, 56, 57, 57n7, 58, 59, 74n2, 142n12, 145, 148
Salton, E., 88n6
Samuels, R., 9n3, 19, 20n8, 25, 34, 42n7
Samuelson, W., 219t
Sanbonmatsu, D. M., 223t
Sanfey, A. G., 17n6, 75n3
Sanft, H., 37n6, 155n1
Santiesteban, M., 112n6,
160
Sativsky, K., 149n14
Satpute, A. B., 77
Savage, L. J., 6, 132n5
Savitsky, K., 223t
Scanlon, D. M., 215
Schacter, D. L., 47n1
Schaller, M., 237t
Schapira, M. M., 82n1,
237t Schelling, T. C., 16
Schkade, D. A., 114, 115
Schlaifer, R., 132n5
Schmiedek, F., 54
Schmitt, N., 124n3
Schneider, S. L., 108n5
Schneider, W., 17n6, 18t, 20, 20n8, 80, 154n16
Schoemaker, P. J. H., 132n5
Scholes, R. J., 42, 43
Schommer, M., 36n5, 42, 43, 233t
Schooler, C., 178
Schooler, J. W., 70,
225t Schreiber, J., 16n5,
107n5
Schreiber, T., 113n8, 136n7
Schwartz, B., 42n7
Schwartz, L. M., 237t
Schwarz, N., 78, 114
Sciutto, M. J., 210t
ScottEdwards, C., 36n5
Seligman, M. E. P., 45, 221t
Semb, G., 113n8, 136n7
Sentis, K. P., 169t
Seymour, B., 17n6,
75n3 Shaffer, V. A.,
124
Shafir, E., 15n5, 42n7, 100, 124, 125, 157, 207t, 220
Shah, A. K., 98n1
Shah, P., 57n7
Shallice, T., 18t, 117
Shamosh, N. A., 160, 161, 199t
Shanteau, J., 233t
Shapiro, J., 140t, 203t
Sharabi, D., 88n6
Shefrin, H. M., 18t
Shepperd, J. A., 88t
Sherman, J. W., 17n6
Sherman, S. J., 17n6
Shermer, M., 162
Shields, H. A., 216
Shieles, A., 38
Shiffrin, R. M., 18t, 20, 20n8, 154n16
Shiloh, S., 88n6
Shiv, B., 119, 119n10
Shoda, Y., 82n1, 100n2, 159, 160, 199t, 221
Shoham, V., 222t, 223t
Shonk, K., 31n2, 134, 188n4, 217, 224t
Silk, J. B., 91n7
Simon, A. F., 88n6
Simon, H. A., 29
Simoneau, M., 136n7
(p.316) Sinatra, G. M., 35n5,

220t Sinz, H., 119

Sivak, M., 218t
Slezak, J., 241t
Sloman, A., 32, 34
Sloman, S. A., 17n6, 18t, 100, 112, 201t
Slovak, L., 112
Slovic, P., 14n4, 21, 104, 124, 132, 133, 150n15, 188n4, 194t, 196t, 197t, 203t,
230t, 232t
Slugoski, B. R., 216
Smallwood, J., 70
Smith, E. E., 20n8
Smith, E. R., 17n6, 18t
Smith, M. R., 124n3
Smith, S. M., 15n5,
88n6 Snowling, M.,
215 Snyder, C. R. R.,
18
Soane, E., 201t, 209t, 217, 225t
Sommerfeld, R. E., 230t
Song, H., 78
Sonuga-Barke, E., 74, 160n3
Sorge, G. B., 155n1
Spearman, C., 139
Sperber, D., 20n8, 48n2, 51n3, 63n1, 66, 67, 82n2, 90, 113n7
Spitz, H. H., 223t
Stahl, C., 63n1
Stanovich, K. E., 7, 8n2, 9n3, 13, 14, 14n4, 15, 15n5, 17n6, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23,
23n9, 24, 24n11, 25, 30n1, 32, 32n3, 34, 35, 35n4, 36, 36n5, 40, 42n7, 43, 44, 45,
47, 50, 51, 52, 63n1, 67, 82n2, 83, 84, 87, 88t, 89, 89n6, 93, 100, 103n4, 106,
113n8, 119, 121, 123, 123n1, 125, 133, 134, 135n6, 136, 136n7, 137, 140, 140t,
141, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155n1, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 167, 168, 170, 171,
175n1, 177, 178, 184n3, 186, 194t, 196t, 197t, 198t, 204t, 205t, 209t, 215, 216,
218t, 220t, 222t, 225t, 228, 230t, 231t, 234t, 238t, 243t
Starmer, C., 132, 134
Starr, J. M., 139n9
Staudinger, U. M.,
135n6 Steen, L. A.,
218t Stegmaier, R.,
239t Stein, E., 9n3, 11,
42n7 Steinberg, L.,
199 Stenger, V. A., 75
Stenning, K., 63n1, 113, 113n7
Sterelny, K., 47n1, 48n2, 51n3, 91, 92, 93
Sternberg, R. J., 15, 36n5, 135n6, 175, 175n1, 183, 184, 188n4, 189
Stewart, N., 32n2, 109, 219t
Stibel, J. M., 112
Stich, S. P., 9n3, 13, 25, 37, 42n7, 47n1, 48n2, 49, 51n3, 82n2, 92, 93, 119, 189,
228
Stone, A., 114
Stout, J. C., 221
Strack, F., 17n6, 18t, 82n1, 232t
Strathman, A., 36n5, 199
Stroud, S., 82n1
Stuebing, K.,
184n3 Sub, H.-M.,
53n5, 54
Suddendorf, T., 47n1, 48n2, 51n3, 82n2
Sugden, R., 134
Sun, R., 17n6
Sundali, J., 104, 221t
Sunstein, C. R., 8n2, 32n2, 152, 188n4, 217, 222t, 224t, 231t
Suveg, C., 243t
Sylvain, C., 236t
Taber, C. S., 196t,
203t Taleb, N., 32n2,
188n4
Taleb, N. N., 32n2, 188n4
Talley, J., 58
Tappolet, C., 82n1
Taub, G. E., 53n4
(p.317) Tavris, C., 32n2, 238t

Taylor, A. K., 241t

Taylor, C., 83n3
Taylor, G. J., 199t
Taylor, S. E., 29
Tenbrunsel, A., 18t
Tentori, K., 63n1
Terjesen, M. D., 210t
Tetlock, P. E., 9, 32n2, 42n7, 46
Thagard, P., 13
Thaler, R. H., 8n2, 18t, 32n2, 133, 152, 188n4, 195t, 207t, 208t, 217, 219t, 225t,
231t
Therriault, D. J., 53n5
Thomas, J., 234t
Thomas, R. P., 30n1, 47n1
Thompson, S. C., 209t
Thompson, V. A., 78, 79, 136n7
Thurstone, L. L., 56
Toates, F., 17n6, 18t, 52
Tobacyk, J., 43, 209t
Todd, P. M., 8, 23n10, 30n1
Tomasello, M., 82n2, 91n7, 93
Toneatto, T., 35n4, 101, 218t, 220t, 222t, 225t
Tooby, J., 8, 23n10, 48n2, 171, 172
Toplak, M. E., 15n5, 35n4, 44, 89n6, 98, 100, 101, 106, 119, 123, 136n7, 140t,
155n1, 157, 158, 162, 194t, 198t, 201t, 218t, 220t, 222t, 225t, 231t, 234t, 243t
Torrens, D., 136n7
Towse, J. N., 201t
Tremoulet, P. D.,
25 Trick, L. M., 104,
112
Trope, Y., 234
Trzesniewski, K., 234t
Tschirgi, J. E., 203t
Tugade, M. M., 17n6
Tuholski, S. W., 53n5
Tversky, A., 7, 9n3, 11, 14n4, 17n7, 29, 30n1, 31n2, 42n7, 43, 47n1, 100, 107n5,
108, 109, 112, 113, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 134, 141, 146, 150n15, 151n15,
152, 188n4, 195t, 200t, 207t, 213, 214, 221t
Tweney, R. D., 63n1, 205
Ubel, P. A., 32n2
Unsworth, N., 50, 53n5, 57n7, 142n12
Urbach, P., 135
Valentine, D. A., 124n3, 140t
Valentine, E. R., 225t
VandeKragt, A. J. C., 240t
vander Plight, J., 231t, 242t
vanLambalgen, M., 63n1, 113, 113n7
vanSoest, A., 237t
Vansteenwegen, D., 151
vanVeen, V., 75n3
Vartanian, O., 76
Vastfjall, D., 232t
Velleman, J. D., 86, 87
Vellutino, F., 215
Verplanken, B., 89n6
Villejoubert, G., 108n5, 213
Vinter, A., 37n6, 155n1
Vohs, K. D., 82n1, 100n2, 112n6, 223t
Volpe, R. P., 209t
vonNeumann, J., 6, 132n5
vonWinterfeldt, D., 9n3, 132n5, 213
Vranas, P. B. M., 9n3, 42n7
Wade, C., 238t
Wade-Benzoni, K., 18t
Wagenaar, W. A., 101, 207t, 221t
Wainer, H., 222t
Walkenfeld, F. F.,
155n1 Wang, J., 239t
Wang, L., 21, 218t
Warrington, E. K., 116n9
Warwar, S. H., 234t
Wason, P. C., 17n6, 18t, 63, 64
Wasserman, E. A., 204t
Watson, G., 40, 83, 198t, 220t
Weber, E. U., 118n10
(p.318) Weber, M., 149n14

Webster, D. M., 32n3, 35n5, 197t

Wegner, D. M., 76
Weinstein, N., 211t
Welch, H. G., 237t
Welch, N., 118n10
Weller, J. A., 16n5, 119
Wellman, H. M., 228
West, R. F., 9n3, 13, 14, 14n4, 15, 15n5, 17n6, 24, 24n11, 25, 32n3, 34, 35, 35n4,
40, 43, 44, 45, 63n1, 67, 87, 88t, 89n6, 113n8, 119, 123, 125, 133, 134, 136,
136n7, 137, 140, 140t, 147, 149, 150, 155n1, 159, 161, 162, 196t, 197t, 198t,
204t, 216, 228
Westen, D., 17n6
Whalley, L. J., 139n9
Wheatley, T., 66
Whiteman, M. C.,
139n9
Whiten, A., 22n9, 47n1, 51, 51n3, 91, 103n4
Whitney, P., 108n5
Wiley, J., 237
Wilhelm, O., 53n5,
54 Willcutt, E. G.,
74n2 Williams, C.
F., 149 Williams, W.
M., 178
Williamson, D. A., 243t
Willingham, D. T., 20n8, 180n2
Willman, P., 201t, 209t, 217, 225t
Wilson, D. S., 18t, 170
Wilson, M., 48n2
Wilson, S. B.,
232t
Wilson, T. D., 66, 67, 104, 114, 196t, 210t, 219t
Windschitl, P. D., 243t
Winman, A., 30n1
Winne, P. H., 235t
Winston, G. C., 112n6, 160
Wittmann, W. W., 54
Witzki, A. H., 21, 74n2
Wolfe, C. R., 113n8
Woloshin, S., 237t
Wood, J. M., 223t
Woodcock, R. W.,
53n4 Wozniak, W. J.,
241t Wright, H.,
35n4, 87n5 Wright,
J., 219t, 226t Wu, G.,
6, 213
Wyne, M. D., 230t
Yachanin, S., 63n1
Yechiam, E., 119,
221 Yered, J., 230t
Young, S. E., 57n7, 74n2
Zacks, R. T., 21, 37n6, 53n5, 54, 155n1
Zagorsky, J. L., 163
Zayas, V., 20
Zeckhauser, R. J., 219t
Zedeck, S., 39
Zeidner, M.,
39 Zelazo, P.
D., 21 Zelniker,
T., 230t Zhang,
J., 6, 133
 (p.319) Subject Index
Note: Page references followed by “f ” and “t” denote figures and
tables, respectively.

Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale, 197t,

233t Adaptive behavior, 23
Affect substitution, 104
Affective forecasting, 114–15, 196t, 210t, 219t, 225t, 231t, 242t
Affective valence, 104
Age, and cognitive sophistication, 14–15
“Akrasia.” See Weakness of will
Alexithymia, 119, 199t, 221t, 234t
Algorithmic mind, 32
and executive functioning measures, 56–
59 functioning, breakdown of, 37
key functions of, 47, 48, 52
and knowledge access, 95
and reflective mind, partition of, 35–43
Anchoring effects, 109–10
avoiding irrelevant, 197t, 219t, 232t
and intelligence, 128, 129t, 130–
31
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 75–77
“Antisaccade task,” 55
Apologist, 168–69
Application, errors of, 142
Arationality, 3
Argument evaluation paradigms, 196t, 198t, 219t, 231t, 234t
Argument-driven processing, 43
Aristotle, 3, 4
Artificial intelligence (AI), 32, 34
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 74–
75 and low intelligence, 184–85
Attribute substitution, 21, 104, 195t, 218t, 230t
Automaticity, 20
(p.320) Autonomous mind, 32,
37 behavioral regulation of,
116 defaulting, 98–101,
156
functioning, breakdown,
37 and knowledge
access, 95
 missing input from, 115–19
subprocesses of, 155n1
Autonomous processing. See Type 1
processing Autonomous Set of Systems, The
(TASS), 19, 32 “Axioms of choice,” 6, 132
Baserates, 126, 195t, 201t, 218t, 221t, 231t, 236t. See also Noncausal
baserates Bayesian reasoning, 135
Behavior
adaptive, 23
control, and sustained decoupling, 55
regulation of autonomous mind, 116
Belief bias, 42, 110. See also
Bias and intelligence,
135–38 paradigms, 194t,
218t, 230t of rational
thought, 212–13
Belief flexibility, 38–39, 197t, 220t, 233t
Beliefs, 37–38, 82, 173
adversarial properties, 89
dysfunctional personal, 210t, 226t, 243t
irrational personal, 210t, 226t, 243t
in “special” expertise, 209t, 225t,
242t in superiority of intuition, 209t,
225t
Between-subject design, 137
individual differences in, 124–25
“less or more” effect in, 133
Bias
belief bias, 42, 110, 135–38, 212–13
confirmation bias, 115, 203t, 223t, 237t
focal bias, 65–71, 100, 107–8, 113–15, 158–59
judgmental bias, 125, 131, 132
matching bias, 63–64, 113
myside bias, 135–38
omission bias, 134
outcome bias, 44, 127–28, 129t, 130, 131, 132, 149
thinking biases, 139–45, 140t
Bias blind spot, 112, 134, 163, 209t, 210t, 225t, 242t
Brain
mechanisms, 29
subsystems of, 5, 16
Cattell/Horn/Carroll (CHC) theory, 52, 176
Coachability of skill, 215–16
Cognitive ability. See also Intelligence
in algorithmic and reflective mind partition, 35–
39 and belief bias, 136
and heuristics and biases tasks’ performance, 123–24
 and judgmental biases, 125, 131
and myside bias, 136–37
and normative response,
44 and omission bias, 134
quality hypothesis, 148
quantity hypothesis, 148
and rational thought, 154, 169
thinking biases association with, 139–45, 140t
Cognitive change, 8n2
Cognitive decontextualization, 44
Cognitive decoupling, 22, 48–52, 182
capacity, 147–48, 153
and executive functioning, 53n5,
74 and fluid intelligence, 182
functions of, 71
and higher-order preferences, 82–83
(p.321)
and real-life functioning, 51
sustained, 51–52, 55
Cognitive misers, 98–100. See also Miserly
processing and focal bias, 65–71
hostile and benign environments for, 20–21
humans as, 21, 29
and intelligence, 156
and serial associative cognition, 65, 100
Cognitive quarantine, 49
Cognitive reflection test, 158n2, 194t, 218t,
230t Cognitive science
Great Rationality Debate in, 9
rationality in, 3, 4
Cognitive simulation, 22, 26, 47, 48, 50
Cognitive sophistication, individual differences in, 14–15
Cognitive styles. See Thinking dispositions
Coherence rationality, 139, 141
“Cold override,” 159, 161
Competence
and performance, distinction, 165, 166–67
Comprehension, errors of, 141
Confirmation bias, 115. See also Bias
avoidance of, 203t, 223t, 237t
Conflict detection, 78
Conjunction errors, 112–13
and intelligence, 127, 129t, 130
Consciousness, and rightness, 79
Consistency
 in belief and argument, 198t, 234t
checking, 90
probability judgments, 200t, 221t, 235t
Conspecifics, 90
Contaminated mindware, 102–4, 193
and intelligence, 162
skepticism about, 170
Converging evidence, 206t
appreciation of, 205t, 223t, 238t
in dual-process theory, 72–80
Cost/benefit reasoning, 207t, 224t, 239t
Critical thinking, 135
in algorithmic and reflective mind partition, 39–43
definition of, 39
and intelligence, 180
tests, 39–43
and thinking dispositions, 42
Crystallized intelligence, 53, 96, 97
Crystallized rationality, 192, 193
Culture, 171, 173
“Curse of knowledge” effects, 149, 161
Decision-making, 8n2, 101, 213, 197t, 219t, 232t
evaluation, 44, 45
Decoupling, 47–51, 73–80, 91–94
Delay of gratification
and intelligence, 159–60
paradigms, 199t, 221t, 234t
Delayed-discounting, and intelligence, 160–61
Denominator neglect, 110–11
Descriptive invariance, 109
Descriptive models, 10–16
Desires
first-order, 84
higher-order, 83
second-order, 83–84
Diagnostic covariation judgment, 204t, 223t, 237t
Diagnostic hypothesis testing, 196t, 202t, 219t, 222t, 231t, 237t
Disjunctive reasoning, 68, 157, 194t, 218t, 230t
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), 77,
78 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
75–77 (p.322) Dual-process theory, 10, 16–
19
complications of, 25–28
converging evidence in, 72–80
and human goals, 22–25
and knowledge structures, 95–98
 Type 1 and Type 2 processing. See Type 1 processing; Type 1 processing
Dysfluency, and Type 2 processing, 78
Dysfunctional personal beliefs, 210t, 226t, 243t
Economic thinking, 207–208t, 224t, 239t
Egocentric thinking, 103, 113, 211t, 226t,
243t Elitist strategy, 13
Emotional regulation
fine-grained and controlled, 199t, 234t
of reward, 199t, 221t, 235t
Endowment effects, 195t, 219t, 231t
Environmental change, 8n2
and rationality, 5
Epistemic rationality, 6, 191
Errors
of comprehension, 141
of application, 142
Evidence, unbiased processing of, 196t, 211t, 219t, 231t, 243t
Evidential rationality. See Epistemic rationality
Evolutionary psychology, 8, 23–25, 172
Executive functioning, 53, 74
and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 74–
75 and fluid intelligence, 56, 83n3
fluency tasks for measuring, 57
measures, and algorithmic mind, 56–59
Expected utility, 6
Fairness paradigms, 196t, 219t, 231t
Faith in Intuition Scale, 209t, 225t, 241t
Falsifiability, 205t, 223t, 238t
Feeling of rightness (FOR), 79
Financial literacy/illiteracy scales, 209t, 225t, 242t
Financial misconceptions, 209t, 225t, 242t
Fine-grained and controlled emotional regulation, 199t,
234t First-order desires, 84
Fitness maximization, 23
Fluency tasks, 57
Fluid intelligence, 36, 52–53, 96–97, 145
and cognitive decoupling, 182
and executive functioning, 56,
83n3 and sustained decoupling,
52
and working memory, 54–
55 Fluid rationality, 192, 193,
244
of rational thought, 212
Flynn effect, 177–78
Focal bias, 113–15. See also Bias
and cognitive miser, 65–
71
 serial associative cognition with, 65, 67, 69, 100, 107–8, 158–59
Folk Wisdom Tests, 241t
Forecasting, affective, 114–15
Forgiveness, and sustained decoupling,
51 Four-card selection task, 24, 63–64,
113
type 2 processing in, 64
Framing effects, 67, 107–9, 130, 214, 197t, 219t, 232t
and intelligence, 125, 127, 129t
between-subject, 158
Fundamental Computational Biases, 44, 167
Future, prudently discounting, 220t
(p.323) Gambler’s fallacy, 112, 201t, 221t,

236t Grain-size error, 170, 171–73

Great Rationality Debate, 3, 6–10, 164–
69 in cognitive science, 9
implication for, 22–25
individual differences in, 10–16
Gross domestic product (GDP),
229 Head-Over-Heart scale, 87
Heuristic response, 142n11,
158
detection of necessity to override, 144
mindware availability to override, 143–
44 sustained decoupling to override,
144 sustained inhibition to override,
144
Heuristics, 7, 19–21, 29, 30
in benign environments, 20–21, 29–31
heuristics and biases research program, 7–8,
164 in hostile environments, 20–21, 29–31
Heuristics, and biases tasks, 6–9
intelligence as performance predictor in,
121 in taxonomy, 104–12
Higher-order preferences, metarepresentation and, 81–86
Hindsight bias paradigms, 196t, 219t, 231t
“Hot override,” 159–61
Humans
as cognitive misers, 21, 29
and irrationality, 3, 4
Hypothetical reasoning, 22, 48, 93, 182
metarepresentation and, 82
Hypothetical thinking, 21–22, 26, 47, 49, 62–63
and language, 50
Illusion of control, 209t, 225t
Impulsively associative thinking, 106–7
Individual differences
in cognitive sophistication, 14–15
 conceptualizing, on heuristics and biases tasks, 143f
genetics in, 72–73
in Great Rationality Debate, 10–
16 locus of, tripartite model and,
122f
in rational thought, future prospects, 245–46
unpacking Type 2 processing using, 31–35
Informal reasoning, 198t, 234t
Informal thinking, 68, 69
Information, seeking and processing, 198t, 220t, 233t, 245t
Inhibition, 74, 75
Instrumental rationality, 6, 89, 191
Intelligence
anchoring problem, 128, 129t, 130–31
and algorithmic mind, 35–39
baserate problem, 126, 128, 129t, 130
and belief bias, 135–38
broad vs. narrow concepts of, 35–36, 175–78, 185–186
and cognitive miser, 156
and cognitive sophistication, 15
concept, stretching, 180
conjunction problem, 127, 129t, 130
vs. critical thinking, 39–43
crystallized. See Crystallized intelligence
definition of, 36, 175
deification of, 183–85
and delay of gratification, 159–60
disease framing problem, 127, 129t, 130
and executive functioning, 56–59
(p.324)
fluid. See Fluid intelligence
imperialism, 178–83
as knowledge, 53
measurement of, 182
and mindware problems, 161–63
misidentified as adaptation, 183–85
and Mr. Spock problem, 155–56
and override failure, 159–61
outcome bias problem, 127–28, 129t, 130
as performance predictor, 121
as process, 53
and rationality, 15, 37–38, 176
and rationality, taxonomical associations, 155–64
vs. rationality, distinction, 185–86
and selection mechanisms, 186–90
strategies for taming concept, 185–86
 tests, 39–43
and tripartite model, 121–
23 traditional concept,
181–82
Intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, 94, 180
“Intentional stance,” 168
Introspection, incorrigibility of, 104, 210t, 225t, 242t
Iowa Gambling Task, 117–19, 199t, 221t, 235t
Irrationality, 3–4, 170, 187. See also Rationality
personal beliefs, 210t, 226t, 243t
social costs of, 186–90
Judgmental bias, 125, 131, 132. See also Bias
“Kinds of minds,” 32–33
Knowledge of Scientific Reasoning, 203–205t, 222t, 237t, 244
Knowledge structures, and dual process theory, 95–98
Language, 91–92
and hypothetical thinking, 50
Lay psychological theory, 104, 112
“Less-is-more” effect, 132, 133
Levesque problem, 157
Limited resource reasoning, 207t, 224t,
239t Linda problem, 100, 101, 127, 129t,
130, 150 Locus of Control Scales, 199t,
220t, 234t
Logical validity, assessment of, 40, 206 t, 224t,
239t Luck scales, 209t, 225t, 241t
Master Rationality Motive Scale (MRM) scale, 81, 197t, 220t,
233t evolutionary origins of, 90–94
items, 87, 88t
as psychological construct, 87–90
Matching bias, 63–64, 113. See also
Bias
Maximal performance situations. See Optimal performance
situations Meliorists, 7, 8, 8n2, 9, 10, 169
Memes, 173
and rationality, 170–
74 Memory
working, 53–55, 182
Mental accounting, 208t, 225t, 241t
Mental retardation, diagnosis of,
184 Metarepresentation, 51, 55
and high-order preferences, 81–86
and hypothetical reasoning, 82
Possible Worlds Box and, 93
Mind. See also Algorithmic mind; Autonomous mind; Reflective
Mindwandering, 51, 70–71
Mindware, 97–98, 193
availability of, 143–44, 145–46, 147, 153–54
 contaminated, 102–4, 162, 170, 193
(p.325)
with evaluation-disabling properties, 103
problems, 98, 101–3
Mindware-caused irrationalities, 170–74
cultural constraints, 171, 173
religion, 170–71
Mindware gap, 101–2, 112, 193
and intelligence, 161–62
Miserly processing, 102, 123, 163, 194–96t, 212, 214, 218t, 230t. See also
Cognitive misers
Missing mindware, 113
Modularity, 20
Mr. Spock problem, 117
and intelligence, 155–56
Myside bias, 135–38. See also Bias
Myside thinking, 111, 113, 196t, 219t, 231t
National Association of Securities Dealers,
162 Natural myside bias, 137. See also Bias
Neurath, Otto, 85
Nonautonomous mind, origins of, 81. See also Autonomous mind
Nonautonomous processing. See Type 2 processing
Noncausal baserates, 13, 76,
112 vs. causal baserates,
150–51
and intelligence, 126, 128, 129t, 130
Nonefficacious coaching effects, 215
Normative decision theory, 213
Normative model, 10–16
Objective reasoning, 198t, 220t, 233t
Omission bias, 134. See also Bias
Opportunity costs, 207t, 224t, 239t
Optimal performance tasks, 39
for executive functioning measurement, 58
Optimality, 5
Outcome bias, 44, 149. See also Bias
and intelligence, 127–28, 129t, 130, 131, 132
paradigms, 195t, 219t, 231t
Overconfidence effects, 13
paradigms, 196t, 219t, 231t
Override detection, 141, 144, 146–47, 153
Override failure, 100, 110–11, 116, 159–61
Panglossians, 8–9, 10, 11, 165, 217
Paranormal scales, 209t, 225t,
241t Personality traits, 72–73
Populist strategy, 13
Possible Worlds Box (PWB), 49, 92
and metarepresentation,
93 Posterior parietal cortex
(PPC), 80 “Preattentive
processes,” 62
Preference reversals, 112, 125–127, 197t, 219t, 232t
Prefrontal cortex, 116-17
Primary representation, 49, 50
Prior beliefs, 40, 41, 135
Probabilistic reasoning, 101, 189, 200–203t, 221t, 235t
Proportion dominance, 133
Prospect theory, 134
Psychiatric disorders, 37
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 74–75, 184–85
Qualitative decision theory, 203t, 222t, 237t
Rational integration, 84, 85
motivation of search for, 86–87
Rational thought
aspects and real-world outcomes, association between, 218–
26t assessment of, 191
components, operationalizing,
212 dimensions, measurement
of, 194t framework structure,
216
(p.326)

independent evidence of, 227

individual differences in, future prospects, 245–
46 multiply-determined problems of, 112–15
problems, taxonomy of, 95
skills, malleability of, 229, 230t
training, 244
Rationality, 3. See also Irrationality
broad versus narrow view, 83,
89
definitions of, 3
coherence, 139, 141
crystallized, 192, 193
epistemic, 6, 191
and evolution, 22–25, 90
fluid, 192, 193, 212, 244
instrumental, 6, 191
and intelligence, 37–38
and intelligence, taxonomical associations, 155–64
perfect, 6–7
and selection mechanisms, 186–
90 strong sense of, 3, 4
tests for, 188–
89 thin theory
of, 89
 weak sense of, 3, 4
Rationality quotient (RQ), 190, 246
Reason and truth, value placed on, 197t, 220t, 233t
Reasoning
disjunctive, 68, 157
experiments, 11
hypothetical, 22, 48, 82, 93, 182
informal, 198t, 234t
limited resource, 207t, 224t, 239t
objective, 198t, 220t, 233t
probabilistic, 200–203t, 221t, 235t
rationality, 139
syllogistic, 40, 41–42, 136, 147, 148
Reference-dependent preferences, 134
Reflective level of processing, 32, 146
Reflective mind, 32–33, 79
and algorithmic mind, partition of, 35–
43 functioning, breakdown, 37
key functions of, 47
and knowledge access, 95
Reflectivity, 38–39
Regression effects
recognizing, 201t, 208t, 222t,
236t “Reject-the-norm strategy,” 11,
12
Religion, 170–71
Representational states, 48
Response conflict, 79
Reward
emotional regulation related to, 199t, 221t, 235t
temporal discounting of, 220t
Rightness. See Feeling of rightness (FOR)
Risk/benefit relationship, judgments about, 133–34, 194t, 218t, 203t, 222t, 230t
Robust representations, 91
Rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), 77
Sample size, importance of, 200t, 221t, 235t
Schizophrenia, 119
Second-order desires, 83–84
Secondary representation, 49, 50, 51
Selection mechanisms, and rationality, 186–
90 “Self,” definition of, 103
Self-control, 100, 111, 199t, 221t, 234t
reflecting problems of, 100
Self-definition, 86
Self-efficacy, 199t, 220t, 234t
Self-evaluation, 196t, 219t,
231t
 (p.327) Self-perception biases, 211t, 226t,

243t Sensitivity to contradiction, 198t, 234t

Serial associative cognition, 62–63
evolution of, 91–94
with focal bias, 65, 67, 100, 107–8, 158–59
informal thought via, 69
interrupt initiation of,
71 Set shifting, 74, 75
Simulation, 95
cognitive, 22, 47, 50
in nonautonomous mind, 92
vs. serial associative cognition, 61, 68-71
Social intelligence hypothesis, 91
Status quo bias, 195t, 219t, 231t
Stroop Test, 57, 75
Subpersonal entity, 5
Sunk costs, 133, 207t, 224t,
239t Superstitious thinking, 209t,
241t scales, 209t, 225t, 241t
Sustained decoupling, 110, 142, 148, 149, 152–53
and forgiveness, 51
to override heuristic response, 144
Syllogistic reasoning, 40, 41–42, 136, 147, 148
“Teaching to the test,” 215
Theoretical rationality. See Epistemic rationality
Theory of mind (ToM), 50, 91, 228
Thin theory of rationality,
89 Thinking
critical thinking, 39–43, 135, 180
egocentric thinking, 103, 113
hypothetical thinking, 26, 47, 49, 50, 62–63
impulsively associative thinking, 106–7
informal thinking, 68, 69
myside thinking, 111, 113
Thinking biases. See also Bias
association with cognitive ability, 139–45, 140t
Thinking dispositions, 15n5, 34, 35–36, 37, 38, 72–73
in algorithmic and reflective mind partition, 35–
39 vs. cognitive ability, 35-39
and cognitive sophistication, 15
and critical thinking, 42
as independent predictors of rational thought, 43–46
measures, for rational thought, 167
Thinking error, taxonomy of, 98, 99f, 118f, 156f
Third-order judgments, 84–85
 Time preference, 199t, 221t, 234t
Traditional intelligence research, 181–
82 Trailmaking Test, 57
Transient processing, 77
Tripartite model, 32–33, 33f, 37, 61, 62f, 72, 121
genetic evidence for, 72–73
knowledge structure in, 96f
and locus of individual differences, 122f
Type 1 processing, dual-process theory, 19–22, 29, 52, 123 n2
alternative terms for, 18t
overriding, 21, 47, 61, 98
Type 2 processing, dual-process theory, 19–22, 29, 64, 123 n2
alternative terms for, 18t
evolutionary origins of, 90–94
unpacking, using individual differences, 31–35
Type 3 processing, dual-process theory, 72
Typical performance situations, 39
(p.328) Understanding/acceptance assumption, 14, 14n4

Unrealistic optimism, 211t, 226t, 243t

Updating, 74, 75
Utility
expected utility, 6
maximization, 23
Valence, affective, 104
Virtuous coaching, 216
Vividness, 104
Wantons, 84
Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, 40, 41
Weakness of will, 82
Willpower, 82, 100, 111n6
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, 58
Within-subject design, individual differences in, 125
Working memory, 53–55, 182
and fluid intelligence, 54–55
“Worst performance rule,” 54