Unit Six – Interpretation of Laws

 Unit Objectives: Define, distinguish types and Apply rules of interpretation

6.1 – General Principles of Legal Interpretation
1. Definition of Interpretation
 Interpretation = The process of assigning meaning to legal texts.
 It involves uncovering the "soul of the law"—what lawmakers intended to convey (Garner, 2004).
 Two approaches in finding the meaning of the law:
o Literal interpretation (Grammatical): Strict focus on the text’s wording.
o Purposive interpretation (logical): Seeks the broader intent behind the law (Sujan, 2000).
2. Interpretation vs. Construction (Drawing conclusions beyond the text )

Interpretation Construction

Finds the exact meaning of words in a text. Draws conclusions beyond the text when gaps/conflicts exist.

Addresses implied meaning or reconciling contradictions (Paranjape,

Focuses on author’s intent.
2001).

Example: Clarifying "reasonable time" in a

Example: Resolving conflicts between two sections of a statute.
contract.

3. Why Interpretation is Necessary

 Ambiguity: words may have multiple meanings.
 Legislative Gaps: Laws cannot predict all future scenarios
 Vagueness vs. Over-Precision:
o Vagueness: Broad terms (e.g., "public order") need judicial clarification.
o Over-Precision: Strict wording may exclude unforeseen cases.
 Dynamic Application: Laws must adapt to new societal contexts (Cooley, 1970).
4. Practical Implications
 Courts interpret laws to align with policy goals and justice.
 Example: A vague constitutional right (e.g., "freedom of expression") requires interpretation to apply to digital speech.
6.2 – Types of Legal Interpretation
1. Grammatical vs. Logical Interpretation
 Grammatical Interpretation (literal interpretation)
o Focuses on the literal wording of the law.
o Words are given their ordinary, natural meaning (e.g., "vehicle" interpreted as cars, trucks).
o Applied when the text is clear and unambiguous (litera scripta principle).
 Logical Interpretation (purposive interpretation)
o Looks beyond the text to discern legislative intent (sententia legis).
o Used when the literal meaning leads to absurdity (illogical) or injustice.
o Example: Interpreting "freedom of speech" to include digital expression, though not explicitly stated.
2. Classification by Interpreter
A) Doctrinal Interpretation
 Conducted by legal scholars through writings, lectures, and critiques.
 Purpose: Influences judicial decisions by highlighting inconsistencies or proposing new theories.
B) Judicial Interpretation
 Performed by courts when resolving disputes about a law’s meaning.
 Binding Effect: Higher courts’ interpretations create precedents (e.g., Ethiopian Supreme Court rulings).
C) Legislative Interpretation
 Historically done by lawmakers (e.g., French kings). Modern systems avoid this to preserve judicial independence.
 Modern Practice: Laws include definitional clauses (e.g., Art. 2 of Ethiopian proclamations) to clarify terms.
3. Comparative Insights
 Civil Law vs. Common Law:
o Civil Law (e.g., France): Relies more on grammatical interpretation.
o Common Law (e.g., U.S./UK): Favors logical/purposive interpretation and judicial precedent.
 Ethiopia’s Hybrid Approach: Blends statutory definitions (common law technique) with judicial discretion.
6.2.2 – Interpretation of Statutes (Common Law Approach)
1. Definition of Statute
 A statute (or act) is a written law enacted by a legislative body (e.g., parliament or congress).
2. Tools for Statutory Interpretation in Common Law
 Courts and lawyers use two primary tools to resolve ambiguities: (canons of constructions and legislative history)
A. Canons of Construction
 Definition: Judicial maxims (Latin: canones) guiding how statutes should be read.
 Purpose: Limit judicial discretion by providing "neutral" rules for interpretation.
 Common Canons (with Latin Phrases):
1. Spirit vs. Letter: A law’s intent (spirit) may override its literal wording (Holy Trinity Church v. U.S.). example???
2. Derogation of Common Law: Laws altering common law are narrowly interpreted. Example ????????
3. Remedial Statutes: Laws addressing harms (e.g., civil rights) are broadly interpreted.
4. Criminal Statutes: Interpreted strictly to protect defendants (lenity principle).
5. Avoiding Constitutional Issues: Prefer interpretations that uphold constitutionality.
6. In Pari Materia: Laws on the same subject are read together.
7. Ejusdem Generis: General terms follow specific ones (e.g., "cars, trucks, and other vehicles" excludes airplanes).
8. Expressio Unius: Listing specific items excludes others (e.g., naming "cats, dogs" implies no coverage for birds).
Criticisms:
 Contradictory Pairs: For every canon, an opposite exists (e.g., broad vs. narrow reading).
 Presumptive Intent: Assumes uniform legislative intent, which may be fictional.
 Scholarly View: Called "bunk" by critics (Posner, 1983), yet still widely used in practice.
B. Legislative History
 Definition: Records of a statute’s drafting process (e.g., debates, committee reports, amendments).
 Purpose: Reveals lawmakers’ intent behind ambiguous language.
Components of Legislative History:
 Bill Versions: Changes in text show evolving intent.
 Committee Reports: Explain purpose and scope (most influential).
 Floor Debates: Contextualize contentious issues.
 Executive Statements: Presidential signing remarks may clarify goals.
Criticisms:
1. Democratic Legitimacy: Only reflects views of a few drafters, not the full legislature (Scalia, 1989).
2. Reliability: Post-hoc justifications may distort true intent.
Judicial Practice:
 U.S. courts weight legislative history but prioritize statutory text (Breyer, 1992).
 Ethiopia’s civil law tradition relies less on history, but emerging hybrid approaches may incorporate it.
3. Key Principles
 Legislative Intent is Paramount: Courts aim to effectuate the statute’s purpose, not guess lawmakers’ minds.
 Balancing Tools: Canons provide structure; history provides context. Neither is infallible.
Key Note: Statutory interpretation blends textual analysis (canons) and contextual inquiry (history) to align laws with their intended
purpose.

6.3 – Constitutional Interpretation

1. Definition and Purpose
 Constitutional Interpretation = The process of determining the meaning and application of constitutional provisions to effectuate the
intent of:
o Framers: Drafters who wrote the constitution.
o Ratifiers: The electorate or body that approved it (e.g., through referendum or legislative adoption).
 Key Challenge: Constitutions are products of compromise; language may be deliberately vague to bridge disagreements.
2. The Intent Debate: Framers vs. Ratifiers
 Framers’ Intent:
o Focuses on the drafters’ specific purposes (e.g., U.S. Federalist Papers).
o Criticism: Ignores that ratification gives the constitution legal force.
 Ratifiers’ Intent:
o Emphasizes the democratic legitimacy of those who approved the text (Mohammed Benti’s view).
o Example: Ethiopian Constitution’s ratification by regional representatives.
 Complexity: Group intentions are hard to pinpoint due to diverse stakeholders.

3. Peculiarities of Constitutional Interpretation

 Broad vs. Narrow Reading:

o Constitutions are framework documents, not detailed codes.
o Brandeis Stone’s View: Interpreted to fulfill "high purposes" (e.g., justice, democracy) rather than literal wording.
 Dynamic Nature:
o Must adapt to societal changes (e.g., expanding "free speech" to digital platforms).
o Contrast with statutory interpretation, which is more text-bound.

4. Who Interprets the Constitution?

 Judicial Models:
 o American Model (Decentralized): Ordinary courts (e.g., U.S. Supreme Court) interpret the constitution.
o European Model (Centralized): Specialized constitutional courts (e.g., Germany’s Constitutional Court).
 Ethiopian Model (Hybrid):
o House of Federation (HoF): Political body with ultimate interpretive power (Art. 62(1), advised by the Council of
Constitutional Inquiry (legal experts) (Art. 82).
o Debate:
 Critics: HoF may prioritize political bias over legal rigor. (Example read my LLM research: Hachalu
Adaba- Exhaustion local remedy under ACHPR)
 Supporters: Balances legal expertise (via Council) with political realism (HoF’s role in federalism).

5. Tools for Interpretation

 Textual Analysis: Plain meaning of words (e.g., "freedom of religion").

 Historical Context: Drafting debates, ratification records.
 Purposive Approach: Aligns interpretation with the constitution’s overarching goals (e.g., equality, federalism).
 Comparative Law: Borrowing principles from other jurisdictions (e.g., South Africa’s proportionality test).

6. Ethiopian Practice

 House of Federation’s Role:

o Resolves disputes like federal-state powers or human rights claims.
o Accessibility Issue: Limited public access compared to courts.
 Council of Constitutional Inquiry:
o Composed of lawyers to ensure legal rigor.

6.4 – RULES/TECHNIQUES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1. Introduction to Interpretation Rules

 Statutory interpretation involves applying legal principles to determine the meaning of ambiguous or unclear laws.
 Courts use established rules/techniques to ensure consistent and fair application of legislation.

2. Primary Rules of Interpretation

A. The Golden Rule

 Principle: Words should be given their ordinary, literal meaning unless this leads to absurdity or inconsistency (Lord Wensleydale).
 Application:
o Example: "Vehicle" in a traffic law includes cars, trucks, etc., unless context suggests otherwise.
o Limitation: Avoids unjust outcomes (e.g., R v. Allen where "marry" was interpreted as "go through marriage ceremony" to
prevent bigamy loopholes). How this can be its limitation?

B. Ejusdem Generis Rule

 Principle: General terms following specific ones are limited to the same class (genus) as the specifics.
 Example: "Dogs, cats, and other animals" excludes wild animals like lions.
 Exception: Does not apply if the list is exhaustive or the general term is unambiguous.

C. The Mischief Rule (Heydon’s Case)

 Principle: Interpret laws to suppress the "mischief" they aimed to remedy.

 Steps:
1. Identify the pre-existing common law gap/mischief.
2. Determine the legislature’s remedial intent.
3. Adopt an interpretation that advances the remedy.
 Case Example: Gorris v. Scott (1874) – A law requiring animal pens was meant to prevent disease, not storm-related losses.

D. Logical Interpretation

 Use: When literal meaning leads to absurdity or internal contradictions.

  Example: A law punishing "vehicles in the park" might exclude ambulances to avoid illogical outcomes.

E. Liberal Interpretation

 Types:
1. Restrictive: Narrow reading of penal/fiscal laws (e.g., tax statutes).
2. Extensive: Broad reading of rights-based laws (e.g., constitutional freedoms).

F. Historical Interpretation

 Principle: Use drafting history (e.g., preambles, debates) to clarify intent.

 Limitation: Courts often exclude legislative debates (Lord Wrenbury).

G. General Rules

1. Ordinary Meaning: Default to literal wording unless ambiguous.

2. Harmonious Construction: Read statutes as a whole to avoid contradictions.
3. No Judicial Legislation: Courts cannot "fix" legislative drafting errors.
4. Prospective Effect: Laws apply forward unless retroactivity is explicit.
5. Special Over General: Earlier special laws prevail over later general ones (Generalis specialibus non derogant).
6. Contextual Meaning: Words derive sense from surrounding text (noscitur a sociis).
7. Strict Construction of criminal Laws: Ambiguities benefit the accused.

3. Evolving Trends

 Judicial Activism: Modern courts use interpretation to promote social welfare (e.g., expanding locus standi in public interest
litigation).
 Balancing Literalism and Purpose: Increasing focus on legislative intent over rigid textualism.

Key Note: Interpretation rules bridge textual clarity and legislative intent, adapting to societal needs while preserving legal certainty.

6.4.2 – RULES OF INTERPRETATION IN ETHIOPIA

1. Introduction to Interpretation in Ethiopia

 Ethiopia lacks codified rules of statutory interpretation, as the 1960 draft on interpretation was never enacted.
 However, judges cannot interpret laws arbitrarily due to risks of inconsistency and injustice. To fill this gap, Ethiopian courts may:
o Apply the unpublished 1960 draft by analogy.

 Borrow from civil law systems (e.g., France, Germany).

 Use contract interpretation rules under the Civil Code (Articles 1731–1737), substituting "contract" with "law" and
"parties’ intent" with "legislator’s intent."

 Key Principle: The Civil Code’s contract rules (Arts. 1733–1737) provide the closest binding framework for statutory
interpretation.

2. Rules of Interpretation Under Ethiopian Civil Code

A. Clear Laws (Art. 1733)

 Rule: If the law is unambiguous, judges must apply it literally, even if the outcome seems unjust.

 Rationale: The legislature is presumed to mean what it says clearly.

 Exception: Literal application may be avoided if it leads to absurdity.

o Example: A law penalizing "all who inflict injury" would not apply to surgeons performing necessary operations, as this
would be an absurd result.

B. Lack of Clarity in Laws

  When laws are unclear due to ambiguity, vagueness, or legislative silence, judges must interpret them using the following methods:

I. Ambiguous Words (Art. 1736)

 Definition: A word with multiple meanings (e.g., "bank" = riverbank or financial institution).

 Solution: Contextual interpretation—read the entire law to infer the intended meaning.

II. Vague Words

 Definition: A word with no precise meaning (e.g., "reasonable time").

 Solution:
1. Contextual analysis (how the word is used elsewhere in the law).

2. Purpose-based interpretation (aligning with the law’s objective).

III. Unclear Legislative Intent

 Solution: Historical interpretation (exposé des motifs):

o Examine the law’s drafting history (e.g., research papers, legislative debates).

IV. Total Silence (No Law Exists)

 Issue: Judges cannot refuse to decide a case (denial of justice = breach of duty under Art. 420 Criminal Code).

 Solutions:
1. Refer to unpublished drafts or foreign laws (non-binding but persuasive).

2. Use general principles of justice (last resort).

V. Partial Silence (Incomplete Regulation)

 Types:
1. Illustrative Lists: Gaps can be filled by analogy (ejusdem generis).
 Example: If maize and barley are tax-exempt, wheat may be included (a pari reasoning).

 Stronger cases: A fortiori (e.g., if divorce dissolves marriage, death of both spouses logically does too).

2. Exhaustive Lists: Gaps imply exclusion (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
 Example: If only sheep are tax-exempt, goats are not (a contrario reasoning).

VI. Contradictory Laws

 Hierarchy Rule: Higher laws (Constitution) override lower ones (proclamations).

 Timing Rule: Newer laws repeal older ones (lex posterior derogat priori).

 Specificity Rule: Special laws prevail over general ones (lex specialis derogat generali).

3. Comparative Perspectives

 Civil Law Influence: Ethiopia follows literal and logical interpretation (like France/Germany), not common-law precedents.

 Judicial Restraint: Unlike in common law, Ethiopian judges cannot create binding precedents. (the exception is Federal cassation
Bench decision)

4. Practical Challenges
 1. No Binding Precedents: Unreported cases hinder consistency.

2. Political Influence: House of Federation’s constitutional interpretations may prioritize federalism over legal rigor.

3. Resource Gaps: Limited access to exposé des motifs or legislative history.

Key Note: Ethiopian judges blend Civil Code analogies, logical reasoning, and contextual analysis to interpret laws, ensuring fidelity to
legislative intent despite the lack of codified rules.