Managing Disputes

in the South China Sea:

The DOC and COC, and the
Maritime Security Architecture
of the Asia-Pacific

NguyeN NaM DuONg aND Ha aNH TuaN

Introduction
Conflicts in the South China Sea have been simmering in the past
year following China’s deployment of oil rig HD-981 in the waters
near the Paracels, and its land reclamation works in the Spratlys—both
of which caused serious tension in the Southeast asian and wider asia-
Pacific region. By mid-2015, the new status quo in the South China Sea
may have settled in China’s favor, given that China successfully installed
military bases in reclaimed landmasses in the Spratlys. In may 2015,

Nguyen Nam Duong is the Deputy Director General, Institute for Foreign Policy
and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Ha Anh Tuan is a researcher focusing on the South China Sea
at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

Second Quarter 2015 Vol. 43 No. 2 123

 regional concerns grew that the South China Sea dispute would entangle
other major powers after an incident in which a Chinese frigate closely
followed a uS littoral combat ship, the uSS Fort Worth, that was patrolling
near China’s newly reclaimed islands. Such incidents demonstrate how the
conflict has escalated dangerously, making it a greater threat to regional
peace and stability.
While the conflict in the South China Sea has been escalating quickly,
the region’s conflict management frameworks seem to have been unable
to keep up with the rapidly changing circumstances. These frameworks,
notably the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and Code of Conduct (COC),
have existed for a while, but have developed too slowly to be practicable.
It is feared that, even if the DOC and COC process were to be completed
in the near future, they might not be respected or adhered to enough
for them to be able to ensure continued maritime security in the region.
While the DOC and COC are more significant than ever, they need to be
accompanied by other, existing or new, complimentary processes that can
ensure their efficiency and workability.
This paper argues that existing conflict management processes, and
especially the DOC and COC, should be pursued in earnest, but also
need be embedded in a broader regional maritime security architecture
(RmSA) so as to be more feasible and efficient. Such a maritime security
architecture in the Asia-Pacific could serve as a regional platform for
dialogue and cooperation between conflicting parties and also between
other stakeholders who have vested interests in maintaining the stability
of the region’s maritime system. If built on and supported by such a
region-wide platform, existing efforts for managing disputes in the South
China Sea, such as the DOC and COC, have more chance of success, and
could deliver tangible results such as a higher level of trust among the
parties involved, and political commitment to peaceful settlement of
maritime disputes.

The DOC and COC

China’s armed seizure of the South Johnson Reef from Vietnam in
1988 and its adoption of the 1992 law on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone marked the re-emergence of the South China Sea as a
potential flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific in the post Cold War era. Against
this backdrop, ASeAN countries saw a growing need to construct a

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 managing Disputes in the South China Sea: The DOC and COC, and the maritime Security Architecture of the Asia-Pacific

set of commonly accepted norms and regulations on behaviour in the

South China Sea.
at the 25th aSeaN Ministerial Meeting (aMM) in Manila in July 1992,
aSeaN foreign ministers inked the aSeaN Declaration on the South
China Sea, the first ASeAN document that focused specifically on the
management of disputes and the promotion of maritime cooperation in
the region. As early as that time, this document envisaged the creation
of a legally binding code of conduct regulating behaviour in the region,
wherein all parties concerned “apply the principles contained in the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing
a code of international conduct over the South China Sea.”1
The 1995 Mischief Reef incident further demonstrated to aSeaN
leaders that, in order to manage potential maritime conflicts in the South
China Sea, they would need to develop a broader agreement between,
not only ASeAN countries, but also China, the most powerful claimant in
the South China Sea.

The DOC

In 2002, at the 8th ASeAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, after

several years of negotiation, Chinese and ASeAN countries’ leaders signed
the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, unanimously
hailed by relevant parties as a milestone in regional cooperation for
fostering peace and security in the South China Sea. China’s then Vice
Foreign minister Wang yi,wh o is currently serving as China’s Foreign
minister, argued that, although the DOC is not a conflict resolution
mechanism designed deal with territorial disputes in the South China Sea,
it can be used to promote peace in the region, and allow regional countries
to focus on their economic development.
The DOC, however, was not the final desired outcome of ASeAN-
China negotiation. Instead, it was a negotiated replacement for a
much awaited COC, which, once put in place, would be a legally
binding regulation on the behaviour of parties concerned in the
South China Sea dispute.
The DOC is, to date, the most important political document produced
by ASeAN to monitor and manage the activities and disputes in the South
China Sea. Interestingly, the document does not clearly set out the scope

1 ASeAN, “ASeAN Declaration on the South China Sea” (1922).

Second Quarter 2015 Vol. 43 No. 2 125

 of its application. It deliberately neglects to discuss the geographic areas
for cooperation in order to avoid one of the most basic and problematic
challenges in managing the territorial disputes in the South China Sea:
defining the areas of dispute in the region. By using the name “South
China Sea” in the title of the document while making no concrete
definition of this area’s scope in the text, the DOC allows signatories to
maintain flexible interpretations of maritime borders according to their
national interests.
The DOC is made up of ten points, which cover the legal basis for
the conduct of parties in the region, along with provisions to regulate
the behaviour of parties, and models for discussion and cooperation in
the South China Sea. The first point reaffirms countries’ commitment
to the purposes and principles of the united Nations (uN) Charter,
the 1982 uN Convention on the laws of the Sea (uNClOS), the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful
existence, and other universally recognised principles of international law.
Points 2 and 3 of the Declaration discuss confidence building measures
and the commitments to the spirit and basic principles of international
laws concerning maritime issues, namely the freedom of navigation in and
overflight above the South China Sea.
Points 4, 5, and 6 are the most important contributions of the DOC
to the management of maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Point
4 says: “the Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and
jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or
use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign
states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized
principles of international law, including the 1982 uN Convention on the
law of the Sea.”2 This touches on the territorial and jurisdiction disputes
in the South China Sea, urging parties to adhere to peaceful means,
such as consultation and negotiation, to deal with the disputes.
Point 5 suggests that countries should exercise self-restraint to avoid
further escalating tensions. The idea of self-restraint is referred to in a
variety of ASeAN’s prior political documents concerning the management
of disputes in the South China Sea, including the 1992 aSeaN Declaration

2 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” http://www.asean.org/asean/external-

relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea

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 managing Disputes in the South China Sea: The DOC and COC, and the maritime Security Architecture of the Asia-Pacific

on the South China Sea, and the 1997 aSeaN-China Joint Statement.3
One expert explained that the exercise of self-restraint can mean two
things. first, it means that all parties accept and maintain the present
status-quo. Second, it means that parties avoid taking actions that could
complicate the situation in the South China Sea.4
Point 6 lists potential areas for cooperation in the South China Sea in
the immediate future, even though a comprehensive and durable dispute
settlement agreement has not been reached. These areas of cooperation
are on relatively less sensitive issues, such as maritime environment
protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at
sea, and combatting transnational crimes.
Points 7, 8, and 9 encourage signatory states and other countries to
adhere to the provisions of the Declaration. Finally, point 10 reaffirms the
need for a legal-binding code of conduct in the South China Sea to further
promote peace and stability in the region.
After its signing, this Declaration became a key political document
often referred to by ASeAN when discussing the management of the
South China Sea disputes. That said, the DOC is considered an important
confident-building measure rather than the legally-binding document
required for maritime security cooperation amongst stakeholders in the
South China Sea.5 This means that an effective multilateral security
mechanism for maritime cooperation in the region is still absent.
In the period immediately following the signing of the DOC, there was
little progress in implementing it. One reason for this was that, between
2002 to 2007, China pursued a cooperative approach in the territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, and balanced its need to advance territorial
claims in the region with the need to maintain regional peace and stability
for development. In this relatively calm and peaceful environment,

3 article 2 of the 1992 aSeaN Declaration on the South China Sea says that the Declaration “[urges] all
parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of
all disputes.” Full text of this declaration can be found at: http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1992%20ASeAN%20
Declaration%20on%20the%20South%20China%20Sea-pdf.pdf (Accessed April 20, 2015).
Point 8 of the 1997 ASeAN-China Joint Statement says: “In the interest of promoting peace and stability as
well as enhancing mutual confidence in the region, the parties concerned agree to continue to exercise self-
restraint and handle relevant differences in a cool and constructive manner.” Full text of this document can
be found in ASeAN official website at: http://www.asean.org/news/item/joint-statement-of-the-meeting-
of-heads-of-stategovernment-of-the-member-states-of-asean-and-the-president-of-the-people-s-republic-of-
china-kuala-lumpur-malaysia-16-december-1997 (Accessed April 20, 2015)
4 Nguyen Hong Thao, “The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note,”
Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 34 (2003), pp. 281-282.
5 Sam Bateman, “Regime building in the South China Sea: Current Situation and Outlook,” Australian Journal
of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, Vol. 3(1) (2011), p. 25.

Second Quarter 2015 Vol. 43 No. 2 127

 aSeaN countries lost the momentum to push forward the implementation
of the DOC and kick-start negotiations on the creation of a COC.
The aSeaN-China Joint Working group (JWC) on the implementation
of the Declaration was not established until two years after the COD
was signed. By 2005, a draft version of the Guidelines for implementing
the DOC was proposed, with aSeaN expecting to conduct internal
consultation prior to meeting with China.6 Since China objected to this
point, arguing that territorial disputes can only be resolved bilaterally,
the draft was blocked.
ever since 2007, the security environment in the South China Sea started
to deteriorate, with China initiating an assertive approach to asserting
its territorial and maritime claims in the region. Tensions in the region
further escalated in 2009, when Beijing demonstrated its determination
to enforcing its ambition. This situation clearly demanded concrete action
from aSeaN, if it want to maintain a central role in regional affairs.
After the two cable-cutting incidents in may and June 2011, in which
Chinese ships deliberately ramped and cut the sonar-towing cables
of Vietnamese petroleum exploration ships inside Vietnam’s eeZ,
aSeaN pushed China to reach an agreement on the guidelines on the
implementation of the DOC.
The guidelines, adopted in July 2011 at the 44th aMM meeting in
Bali, Indonesia, became feasable after ASeAN abandoned its demand
of conducting internal consultations prior to meeting with China.
This measure calmed the escalating tensions in the South China Sea.
many observers see this document as short and “vaguely worded,” as it
mainly repeats the principles agreed upon by ASeAN and China that are
also included in ASeAN’s key documents. However, the creation of these
guidelines demonstrated aSeaN’s commitment to strengthening regional
unity and renewed the momentum needed to implement the DOC.
To implement these guidelines, aSeaN and China agreed, in January
2012, to establish four expert committees on environment protection,
search and rescue, scientific research, and transnational crimes. However,
no expert committee was established to promote cooperation on the more
sensitive issues of navigational safety and maritime communication.
The Guidelines, however, did not stopped China’s assertive actions in
the South China Sea for long. In early 2012, Beijing increased its paramilitary
operations in the Scarborough Shoals claimed by the Philippines, and took

6 Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASeAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A litmus Test for Community
Building?,” The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/-Carlyle_A_-Thayer/3813/article.html

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 managing Disputes in the South China Sea: The DOC and COC, and the maritime Security Architecture of the Asia-Pacific

control of this region in July of that year. China also expanded its plan
for petroleum exploration southwards, to areas inside Vietnam’s exclusive
economic zone. Facing China’s new wave of assertiveness, ASeAN unity
failed, as its members did not agree to issue a joint communiqué at the 45th
Amm meeting in Phnom Penh. That was the first time since its formation
that aSeaN did not issue a statement after its aMM meeting. This failure
resulted largely from the strong opposition of Cambodia, ASeAN’s
2012 chairman, to mentioning the situation in the South China Sea, since
they argued that this conflict was made up of bilateral issues between
claimant states.7
To minimize the negative impacts of such a failure in ASeAN unity,
Indonesian Foreign minister marty Natalegawa immediately embarked
on two days of diplomatic trips to five ASeAN capitals: manila, Hanoi,
Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Singapore. This succeeded in creating
a Declaration of aSeaN’s Six Principles on the South China Sea.
although this document mainly reiterated the principles already mentioned
elsewhere in key aSeaN documents, it signaled aSeaN’s awareness of
the need to create a regional mechanism for managing maritime disputes
in the South China Sea.

The COC

ever since September 2013, negotiations on the full and effective

implementation of the DOC and building of the COC between ASeAN
and China have run simultaneously. In regards to the COC , ASeAN will
continue its internal process of drafting a COC, while at the same time
maintaining communication with China through the aSeaN Chair.8
As already discussed, ASeAN has wanted a legally binding COC
since the beginning of China-ASeAN negotiations on the management
of disputes in the South China Sea at the end of the 20th century.
However, the completion of the DOC and China’s relatively peaceful
approach towards territorial disputes in the region led aSeaN to lose
its momentum in negotiating a COC in the decade following the signing
of the DOC in 2002. even after 2009, when disputes in the region
started to escalate and China took an assertive approach to enforcing its
7 Carlyle A. Thayer, “”Behind the Scenes of ASeAN’s Breakdown,” Asia Times Online, 27 July 2012, http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NG27Ae03.html
8 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Is the Philippines an Orphan?,” The Diplomat, 2 may 2012, http://thediplomat.
com/2012/05/is-the-philippines-an-orphan/

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 claim in the South China Sea, the COC negotiation process stagnated.
One reason for this was that China had no interests in pursuing such a
concrete negotiation.9 The official Chinese media publicly announced that
a binding agreement would be meaningless if earlier agreements are not
upheld, and that Beijing will only start COC negotiations when conditions
were ripe.
The creation of guidelines for the implementation of the DOC
re-opened discussions on the creation of a COC. The first meeting of
the ASeAN Working Group for drafting the COC was convened in
November 2011 in Indonesia. Jakarta proposed the first draft of the
components to be included in the COC. more than a month later, in early
January 2012, the Philippines introduced a full draft of the COC, although
certain ASeAN members critiqued its Articles III to VI for being too
descriptive about dispute settlement mechanisms. Internal ASeAN
negotiations on the COC at the working level continued until July 2012,
when the ASeAN Foreign ministers adopted the “key elements” of the
COC and agreed that ASeAN could work with China at the senior official
level to discuss the COC.
China initially maintained a tepid attitude in relation to COC
negotiations, arguing that it would only discuss the COC with aSeaN
when the timing was opportune and the country’s conditions were met.
However, once ASeAN started its own negotiation, Bejing was eager
to take part in the process. Since July 2013, China agreed with aSeaN
countries to start negotiation the building of the COC.
The first formal meeting between China and ASeAN to discuss the
feasibility of the COC was organized in mid-September 2013 in Suzhou,
China during the 6th China-ASeAN Senior Officials meeting (SOm) and
9th China-aSeaN Joint Working group meeting. The COC meeting did
not create a specific resolution, but instead allowed for an agreement on
a gradual negotiation progress and on consensus through consultations.
at the 8th ASeAN-China SOm in Bangkok in October 2014, the two
sides agreed on an initial set of principles—the first list of commonalities—
that identify commonalities among the countries involved in maritime
disputes in the South China Sea that could help govern behavior in the
region. a more detailed second list of commonalities was introduced at
the 13th aSeaN-China Joint Working group, thus informing negotiation
on the terms of the COC.
9 Shannon Tiezzi, “Why China Isn›t Interested in a South China Sea Code of Conduct,” The Diplomat,
26 February 2014, HTTP://THeDIPlOmAT.COm/2014/02/WHy-CHINA-ISNT-INTeReSTeD-IN-A-
SOuTH-CHINA-SeA-CODe-OF-CONDuCT/

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Despite aSeaN’s determination to complete a COC with China in

the near future, the regional group has not been able to address two vital
issues, namely the difference in interests amongst its members concerning
disputes in the South China Sea, and the dearth of sufficient trust and
confidence between ASeAN and China that would be needed if they
are to enter into a legally-binding treaty. Regarding ASeAN members’
differing interests, some non-claimant countries have fewer interests in
the disputes in the South China Sea, making them, along with some of
the claimants less proactive in creating a COS, and more hesitant about
antagonizing China. That has made aSeaN reluctant to draft its own
version of a COC without consulting China, and led, for example to the
death of Indonesia’s Zero Draft of the COC.
Concerning ASeAN-China confidence building, China’s assertive
behavior—particularly during its harassment of Vietnam’s petroleum
exploration ships in 2011 and seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from
the Philippines in 2012—has seriously deteriorated the confidence that
ASeAN may have had in China before the China-ASeAN COC
negotiations. more significantly, while discussion on a COC were
taking place, Beijing pursued certain activities that threatened regional
trust, stability, and security, including its unilateral deployment of the
CNOOC981 inside Vietnam’s eez in mid-2014, its blockade of Filipino
supply ships in the Second Thomas Shoal in March 2014, and its large-
scale land reclamation in the Spratlys starting in early 2014. These actions
have created a new status quo that favors China, and that may make any
discussion on the implementation of the DOC and negotiations on the
COC meaningless.
at the time of this article’s writing, China and aSeaN agreed
of the Joint Working Group’s proposals for early harvest measures,
such as the establishment of a hot-line platform among search and
rescue agencies and senior officials to manage contingencies at sea.
Discussions on the technical aspects of this measure are still underway.
However, as discussed, two key obstacles to ASeAN-China cooperation
have not yet been effectively addressed. China-ASeAN consultations and
negotiations are therefore not sufficient to ensure peace in the region,
although they are prerequisites for an agreement on the COC. Nevertheless,
such tactical measures as a hearly harvest mechanism may not lead to any
significant breakthrough in the completion of the COC.10
10 See more discussion on this issue in: Carlyle Thayer, “An ‘early harvest’ package for the Code of Conduct in
the South China Sea,” Paper presented at an International Conference on the South China Sea Disputes, Ton
Duc Thang university, Ho Chi minh City, July 2014.

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 A brief introduction of the historical developments of the DOC and
COC, and of what has been achieved in terms of regional cooperation
highlights that regional mechanisms are slow and fragile, and vulnerable
to the changing policies of China and Southeast asian countries. This is
especially true when such sensitive issues as sovereignty and territorial
disputes are in play.
China’s large scale land reclamation work in the South China Sea since
2014, along with Beijing’s unilateral deployment of its oil rig inside Vietnam’s
eez, show that the DOC and COC are not sufficient for effectively
addressing rising tensions in the region. However, the implementation
of the DOC and negotiation of the COC could contribute to a broader
regional maritime security architecture in the South China Sea.

The Evolving Maritime Security Architecture

in the Asia-Pacific

The concept of maritime security encompasses more than maritime

boundary disputes and overlapping territorial claims, as it also includes
non-traditional aspects of maritime security such as freedom of
navigation and overflight, maritime terrorism and transnational crimes,
the protection of marine environment, the safety of undersea cables, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In reality, the South China Sea
dispute is more than one over the Paracels, the Spratlys, and maritime
boundaries, and is fundamentally related to all of those issues. Given the
significance of the South China Sea to regional and global trade, these
disputes, if not properly managed, could pose a critical threat to regional
stability, and to countries beyond those directly involved in the conflict.
As discussed above, an incident at sea in mid-2015 dragged elements of
the uS-China power rivalry into the regional dispute. For these reasons,
a regional maritime security architecture to regulate maritime issues and
maritime relations is more necessary than ever, especially since the DOC/
COC process has yet to fully address all aspects of the current situation.
A regional maritime security architecture (RmSA) would be an
institutional framework for multilateral maritime security cooperation in
the region. This derives from the regional security architecture concept,
which implies the existence of regional security cooperation in all fields.
The concept of a "regional architecture" has been commonly used in
aSeaN’s documents, as well as in policy and academic circle in recent years.

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To date, there has not yet been a widely accepted definition of "regional
architecture," but it is generally understood to refer to an integrated system
of organizations, institutions, mechanisms, arrangements and processes
that preserve peace and stability in the region.11
The RMSa is connected to the regional maritime order, just as the
concept of “regional architecture” is closely linked to that of “regional
order.” “Regional order” describes the distribution of power and general
patterns of power relations among entities in a certain geographical area,
while “regional architecture” only refers to multilateral institutions that
promote cooperation among these entities. An RmSA can thus be seen as
the institutional expression of a regional maritime order.
In recent years, due to a number of variables, the Asia Pacific regional
architecture has undergone a remarkable transformation. While the old
regional architecture, which has existed since the beginning of the twenty-
first century, has not been destroyed, crucial changes have occurred.
Currently, the final shape of the regional architecture is clearing flux,
although some of its key features, along with those of the regional
maritime architecture, can be sketched out as follows:
(i) The relationship between China and the uS, the two dominant
powers of the Asia - Pacific, has become the defining variable of the
regional order and architecture. The uS-China relationship today is
characterized as one wherein the sole superpower is declining in strength,
while a new rising power has the potential to challenge the position of the
former. However, the level of economic interdependence between the two
powers has never been higher, requiring them to work together to address
regional and international issues. In this context, the uS has been trying
to maintain its status quo using a variety of measures to constrain China,
while China has been seeking to revise the current international system
dominated by the uS and Western countries, preferably through peaceful
means. However, China's recent behavior in the region has revealed that it
has vague definition for what it means to be peaceful. The latest incidents
in the South China Sea have proved that the maritime domain has become
the focal area of friction between the two superpowers.
Although the strategic competition between China and the uS
has been intensifying, the cooperation between the two has not been
11 Hillary Clinton shared her perspective on “regional architecture”: “Now, architecture is the art and science of
designing structures that serve our common purposes, built to last and to withstand stress. And that is what we seek to build: a
network of alliances and partnerships, regional organizations and global institutions that is durable and dynamic enough to help us
meet today›s challenges and adapt to threats that we cannot even conceive of, just as our parents never dreamt of melting glaciers or
dirty bombs.” See Hilary Clinton’s speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 9 August 2010,
available at http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy/conversation-us-secretary-state-hillary-rodham-clinton/p22896

Second Quarter 2015 Vol. 43 No. 2 133

 interrupted. Therefore, multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific region
still have the opportunity to develop with the involvement and support
of both powers. Competition and cooperation between the two powers
in multilateral institutions will be decisive in determining the evolution of
these institutions.
(ii) Bilateral security arrangements remain the backbone of the new
regional architecture. The uS-Japan alliance remains a pillar for other
regional security arrangements. On the other hand, the uS-led traditional
alliances no longer maintain the "hub-and-spokes" model that they
did during the Cold War. Instead, there has been more coordination
between uS-led alliances and amongst the “spokes” (Japan, Australia, the
Philippines, etc.). The uS itself encourages its allies to be more proactive
and to share responsibilities to alleviate the effect of America’s relative
decline in power. In light of recent developments in the South China
Sea, it seems that Japan and australia, the two closest american allies in
the Asia-Pacific, may find themselves more involved in various regional
maritime security issues.
(iii) multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific region can be sorted into
two different types: those of the first group are based on the coordination
of aSeaN (through aSeaN+1, aSeaN+3, aRf, eaS, aDMM+,
etc.) while those of the second ones are based on that of other non-
aSeaN institutions (aPeC, the TPP, SCO, CICa, etc.). In the future,
all of these will continue to co-exist, albeit while both competing with
and complementing each other. It is unlikely that any one institution will
evolve into an overarching framework that can cover the entire region.
The overlapping and intertwining manners and the low efficiency of these
multilateral institutions will remain the inherent characteristics of regional
cooperation in the Asia Pacific.
However, changes in the multilateral policies of major countries,
especially the united States, will cause changes in these regional institutions.
The active participation of the united States in the east Asia Summit
(eaS) would push eaS cooperation faster than that of other institutions.
The eAS has already been enthusiastically supported by Australia, India,
Japan, and several ASeAN countries. Given its advantage, eAS has the
potential to become a key institution for promoting political-security
dialogue and cooperation in the Asia Pacific. It may also serve to develop
links with institutions that enjoy the same membership such as ADmm+
and the expanded aSeaN Maritime forum.
Specifically in the maritime domain, the ASeAN-centered architecture

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deals with many aspects of maritime security cooperation. aSeaN

itself has set up the aSeaN Maritime forum (aMf) and the expanded
aSeaN Maritime forum (eaMf) to conduct strategic dialogues
on maritime cooperation issues. ASeAN has also adopted several
documents that promote cooperation such as the aSeaN Declaration
on Cooperation in Search and Rescue of Persons and Vessels in Distress
at Sea. In various ASeAN+1 mechanisms, ASeAN has pursued
maritime cooperation initiatives with several dialogue partners. Notably,
ASeAN and China established the ASeAN-China maritime Cooperation
Fund in 2011, which has already financed several cooperation projects.
With its regular inter-sessional meetings on maritime security, the aSeaN
Regional Forum (ARF) has proved to be an established mechanism in
this field. Among other documents, the ARF adopted a Workplan on
maritime security in 2011. The aDMM+ has also managed the expert
Working group on maritime security since 2011, which aim to explore
opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation, identify security risks
in the maritime domain, and share information on maritime issues.
While still a leaders-led forum, the eaS has already discussed maritime
security issues in its agenda. Various eAS statements have noted progress
on the DOC and COC, and have emphasized universal principles for
maritime cooperation such as uNClOS, and freedom of navigation
and overflight.
Overall, the instruments for maritime security cooperation do exist in
this region. These instruments have been operational for a while, albeit
with relatively modest results. each institution deals with different aspects
of maritime security, and they together make up a larger architecture
monitoring maritime issues in the region. The focus of these institutions
is on non-traditional aspects of maritime security, and they refrain from
touching on the sensitive issues of sovereignty and boundary disputes.
Notably, all of these instutions support the DOC and COC, not only
by consistently calling for the full implementation of DOC and early
conclusion of COC negotiations, but also by upholding DOC and COC
principles such as uNClOS, freedom of navigation and overflight, the
responsibility to manage disputes through peaceful negotation, and the
non-use of force, among others. These collective efforts have already
strengthened the DOC andCOC processes and made them an integral
part of the wider RMSa.

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 ASEAN and the Contemporary RMSA
In general, all countries in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the need
to build an RmSA to maintain regional peace and stability, and to avoid
the risk of large-scale armed conflicts arising from the sea. Such a RmSA
could act as a larger framework, and as the core of a multilateral maritime
order, that would manage conflicts in the South China Sea and in other
maritime zones. However, due to diverse national interests, each country
has been adopting a different vision about the final structure of the
evolving RmSA. Therefore, the future RmSA should be designed using
competition and compromises between the principal players of the region.
Being a principal player, ASeAN aims to build an RmSA based on the
"ASeAN way" and the basic governing principles of the region, especially
those drawing on uNClOS and other international law. The ASeAN-
led DOC and COC are themselves important pillars of the RmSA.
ASeAN supports a multi-layered RmSA, rather than a single overarching
institution, to promote maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
In that RmSA, ASeAN seeks to play a central role and serve as the driving
actor. Maintaining the central role of aSeaN in this regional architecture
is still one of the fundamental goals of aSeaN’s cooperation in the
current context.12 From ASeAN’s perspective, its having a central role
in the regional architecture is a prerequisite to maintaining peace and
stability, facilitating the development of its member countries, and to
ensuring that small and medium states remain independent and sovereign.
In multilateral settings, ASeAN’s "driver’s seat" continues to be recognized
by major countries, including China, who remain suspicious of each other.
However, in some critical matters, such as the South China Sea dispute,
China has applied a policy of "divide and rule," and constantly seeks to
reduce the role of aSeaN and its related mechanisms for dealing directly
with this conflict.
In order to maintain aSeaN centrality in the RMSa, it is necessary to
construct a closely integrated aSeaN in order to form a solid foundation
for its cooperation with dialogue partners. first and foremost, aSeaN
should squarely address problems related to its unity. ASeAN also
needs to promote the efficiency of existing institutions, define a sound
division of labour, and establish practical mechanisms for coordinating
amongst these institutions so that the RmSA can operate effectively and
respond decisively to emerging maritime security challenges in the region.

12 ASeAN Charter, Article 41, http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASeAN-Charter.pdf

136 The Indonesian Quarterly

 managing Disputes in the South China Sea: The DOC and COC, and the maritime Security Architecture of the Asia-Pacific

each institution in the RMSa should specialize in certain maritime security

issues, and ASeAN should be able to coordinate the entire RmSA.
The RmSA should refrain from discussing hard sovereignty issues and
should support and complement the DOC and COC in promoting
maritime cooepration.
furthermore, aSeaN should continue to accommodate the interests
of major countries in the ASeAN-led institutions, in order to establish a
hamonized equilibrium in the region. Among these institutions, the eAS
should receive attention from ASeAN and other eAS members. It should
be gradually institutionalized and work closely with the ADmm+ and
eaMf on maritime security issues.

Conclusion
While the effectiveness of the current RmSA still leaves much to be
desired, there is hardly any alternative to the architecture for the time to
come. Instead of constructing something new, it is more cost-effective
to furnish and upgrade the existing RMSa so that it can help nurture
the DOC and COC, and facilitate conflict management processes.
The dominant feature of the current RMSa is the centrality of
aSeaN, in nominally regulating and running the architectural structure.
Thus, strengthening the centrality of ASeAN will preserve the current
RMSa. at the same time, aSeaN needs to continue refreshing itself and
sharing responsibilities with its partners in order to strengthen this RmSA.
Similarly, the DOC and COC process, at some points, appears to be
disappointing, but should still not be abandoned altogether. like for the
RmSA, ASeAN should strive to maintain its centrality in the DOC and
COC process while also engaging China in it. It is apparent that aSeaN,
the DOC and COC, and the RMSa are closely linked and form parts of
a single regional maritime order in the Asia-Pacific. ASeAN norms based
on uNClOS and international law should become the basic principles of
this maritime order. By default, as well as by design, ASeAN should lead
and harmonize the DOC, COC, and the RmSA. While this task will by
no means be easy, it reflects the historic nature of the role ASeAN has to
play in this maritime region.

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