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No.28
FULL
COLOUR
THROUGHOUT
WAR IN UKRAINE
VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022
ISBN 978-1-804514-04-7
Note: In order to simplify the use of this book, all names, locations and geographic
designations are as provided in The Times World Atlas, or other traditionally accepted major
sources of reference, as of the time of described events.
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28
ABBREVIATIONS
APC armoured personnel carrier MRAP mine-resistant, ambush protected (vehicle)
ATGM anti-tank guided missile MRLS multiple rocket launch system
ATMS automated tactical control system MP Morskaya pekhota (Naval Infantry [marines]) (Russia)
BMD Boyevaya Mashina Desanta (airborne combat vehicle) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
BMP Boyevaya Mashina Pyekhoty (infantry combat vehicle) NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
BTG batalonnaja takticheskaja gruppa (battalion tactical ObrAA Independent Army Aviation Brigade (Ukraine)
group) (Russia and Ukraine) OK Operational Command (Ukraine)
BTR bronyetransportyor (armoured personnel carrier) OSK Strategic Operational Command or Military
CAA Combined Arms Army (Russia) District (Russia)
Division in addition to its common use in the West, division SBU Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny, Ukraine Security Service
(or divizion) is used to describe an artillery or air SIGINT signals intelligence
defence battalion in Russia and Ukraine SOF special operation forces
DPR Donetsk People’s Republic (para-state declared by SPG self-propelled gun
separatists in eastern Ukraine) SV Sukhoputnyje voyska (Ground troops) (Russia)
DshV Desantno-shturmovi viyska Ukrayiny (air assault TD/TO Territorial Defence (Ukraine)
troops) (Ukraine) UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
ELINT electronic intelligence UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
EW electronic warfare UN United Nations
FSB Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (also
Service) (Russia) ‘Soviet Union’)
GenStab Generalnyi shtab (General Staff) (Russia and Ukraine) UTCS Unitied Tactical Control System (Russia)
GRU Glavnoye Razvedyatelnoye Upravleniye (Main VDV Vozdushno-desantnye voyska (airborne
Intelligence Directorate) (Russia) troops) (Russia)
IADS integrated air defence system VKS Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space
IAP International Airport Force) (Russia)
IFV infantry fighting vehicle VMF Voyenno-morskoy flot (Russian Navy)
LPR Luhansk People’s Republic (para-state declared by VSRF Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (Armed
separatists in north-eastern Ukraine) Forces of the Russian Federation)
LOC Line of Control VVS Voyenno-vozdushnye sily Rossii (Russian Air Force, a
MANPAD man portable air defence (system) branch of the VKS from 2015)
MBT main battle tank ZSU Zbroini syly Ukrainy (Armed Forces of Ukraine)
2
WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022
1
FROM DECAY TO RESURGENCE
In late February 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Zbroini syly personnel), as did its budget, from 2.8 percent of the GDP in 1997,
Ukrainy, ZSU), surprised the entire world by mounting effective to slightly less than 1 percent in 2013. To say that this resulted in
resistance to its mighty Russian counterpart. However, what was plummeting readiness rates, non-existent training standards,
often overlooked was the immense amount of funding and sheer next to no periodic maintenance of available equipment, and no
energy the country invested into rebuilding its military in the acquisition of new weapons systems – would be an understatement,
aftermath of the 2014 debacle. because the situation was much worse. Before long, corruption –
already endemic within the political and economic system of the
From Giant to Dwarf country – spread into the armed forces too: draft dodging became
On 24 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet endemic, and numerous military bases fell into decay. Even so, this
Socialist Republic – then still a part of the Union of Soviet Socialist was not yet to be the lowest ebb of the ZSU. Still considered much
Republics (USSR, colloquially ‘Soviet Union’) – issued the Act of too big to be sustainable, it was subjected to further budget cuts.
Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. Taking place only two Conscription was abolished from the end of 2013, and in early 2014,
days after the failure of a coup d’état in Moscow run by hardliners Kyiv announced its intention to disband the 17th Tank Brigade. By
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and top ranks of the that time, the virtually only military operation still undertaken with
Soviet armed forces, and at the same time nearly all the other 15 any measure of success was the involvement of numerous battalion-
Soviet Republics declared their independence, this act signalled the sized detachments with different peacekeeping missions of the
beginning of the end of the USSR, the political and economic system United Nations (UN), and occasional joint exercises with NATO.
of which proved irreformable. Five months later, on 25 December Above all of this – and especially during the administration of
1991, the last General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail President Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, from 2010 until 2014
Gorbachev, officially declared the Soviet Union to be dissolved, with – the indoctrination of the ZSU was that an armed conflict with
effect from the following day. the Russian Federation was unthinkable. Moreover, Yanukovich
Until that point in time, the Soviet armed forces had maintained promulgated additional budget cuts and a downsizing of the total
a massive presence in Ukraine: indeed, the Carpathian, Kiev, and manpower to 120,900. Overall, the armed forces were well on the
Odessa Military Districts: a total of five armies and one army corps, way to being converted into an undertrained and underfunded
with 21 divisions, 6,500 main battle tanks (MBTs) and 7,000 other midget, barely sufficient to counter internal unrest.
armoured fighting vehicles – were all part of the second strategic
echelon, the primary purpose of which was to reinforce the first Maidan Uprising and Consequences
echelon in the event of a major military conflict with powers of the In November 2013, a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest spread
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central or Eastern over Ukraine. Sparked by the sudden decision of Yanukovich’s
Europe. Of course, Kiev – or Kyiv in Ukrainian – had no need of government not to sign an association agreement with the European
such a massive army and was hopelessly out of condition to sustain Union (despite an overwhelming parliamentary decision to do so),
it. Unsurprisingly, the Armed Forces of Ukraine spent the following but to establish closer ties to the Russian Federation instead, protests
two decades in an almost continuous process of downsizing and then began opposing widespread government corruption and the
reducing. By 2013, only a shadow of the former three Soviet military influence of oligarchy, abuse of power, and violation of human rights.
districts and its 21 divisions remained – primarily in the form of When the authorities attempted to violently disperse demonstrators,
giant ‘tank graveyards’, full of disused armoured fighting vehicles. on 30 November 2013, the situation escalated to a near civil war.
Under agreements reached with the Organisation for Security and Despite draconian anti-protest laws, demonstrations intensified
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the ground forces component of through early 2014, culminating in a series of street clashes in Kyiv
the ZSU was reduced to two tank brigades (1st and 17th), seven on 19–22 January. A month later, outright street battles erupted
mechanised brigades (24th, 28th, 30th, 51st, 72nd, 92nd and 93rd), between Maidan activists (named after the Maidan Nezalezhnosti –
four airborne (or airmobile) brigades (25th, 79th, 80th, and 95th), Independence Square – in Kyiv) and police, resulting in over 110
two artillery brigades (26th and 55th), and one mountain brigade deaths. Although signing an agreement about the creation of an
(128th). The special operation forces (SOF) component, was reduced interim government, on 21 February 2014, the writing was now on
to two regiments (3rd and 8th), and there were three artillery and/ the wall for the Yanukovich administration. He fled the country, and
or artillery rocket regiments (15th, 27th, and 107th), and the 39th was then officially removed from office.
Air Defence Regiment, as well as a miscellany of independent
battalions, foremost of which were two for reconnaissance purposes Tsar of Corruption
(54th and 74th), and two of Naval Infantry (1st and 501st). As of Yanukovich’s downfall was a ‘red line’ for the President of the Russian
2013, these forces were subjected to the control of two Operational Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Putin was an autocrat
Commands: North and South, and the VIII Army Corps. Ironically, established in power in Moscow in 1999 because – as a former
most of the units were still home-based in western Ukraine, in the officer of the Committee for State Security of the USSR (Komitet
same bases constructed during Soviet times, and positioned suitably Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, KGB), and then a director of the
for their rapid redeployment in the direction of central and western Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (Federalnaya
Europe. Overall strength of the ZSU decreased significantly: from sluzhba bezopasnosti, FSB) – he was the sole person in a position to
466,000 in 1996, to 214,850 in 2012 (including about 45,000 civilian guarantee unaccountability of the deeply corrupt, ailing President
3
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28
Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. To improve his public standing through a early 2015, first the Austrian government and then several others
demonstration of power, in August 1999 Putin provoked the Second did their best to breach the international isolation into which Putin
Chechen War through a series of false-flag bombings staged by the had manoeuvred his regime: the businesses of importing Putin’s gas
FSB, in which over 300 Russian civilians were killed in cold blood. and oil, and exporting cars and other commodities to the Russian
During the second half of 1999, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, were much too profitable for the Western oligarchy, than
Federation (Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii, VSRF) invaded to be abandoned ‘just for Ukraine’.
Chechnya, completely demolished and then conquered its capital
of Grozny, and, starting in May 2000, established a pro-Moscow Russo-Ukrainian War
regime. Although the large-scale armed resistance by Chechens Considering the above-mentioned, it is unsurprising that the ZSU
went on for nine years longer, Putin thus achieved his first military was caught entirely unprepared by the Russian invasion of Crimea –
victory which secured him a win in the presidential elections held and ill-prepared to face multiple dramas that were to follow through
in March 2000. 2014, and which, with hindsight, are considered the beginning of
Over the following years, Putin’s sole political program became the Russo-Ukrainian War, ongoing ever since.
the security of his own rule: nominally elected in democratic Still seething with rage, but cautious not to provoke the West,
elections, he ruled with the help of a rapidly growing propaganda Putin made his next move in March 2014, when a Russia-instigated
machinery that cultivated a cult of personality of him as macho, a armed insurrection erupted in the Donbass area in eastern Ukraine,
tough superhero, and a genius strategist, while building up a system which by mid-April had escalated into an armed uprising. Within
of corruption and patronage vastly superior to any kind of organised days, chaos reigned even at the top of the state, further adding to
crime, and making extensive use of force and repression to silence the misery, as key figures – including the Minister of Defence and
any kind of serious political opposition. While enriching himself the Director of the Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhby bezpeky
and his supporters thanks to massive increase in the price of oil Ukrayiny, SBU) – both fled to Russia. They were followed by a
and gas, and numerous major oil and gas export deals concluded number of other key figures, including the Chief of the General Staff
with the West, he initiated a reform of the VSRF in 2006, invaded of the Armed Forces and the Commander of the Naval Forces. By
Georgia in 2008, and began providing support to dictatorships in 11 March 2014, the new Minister of Defence admitted that out of
the Russian neighbourhood and beyond. Unsurprisingly, Putin 49,100 service personnel, only 6,000 were available for immediate
gradually developed strong antagonism vis-à-vis pluralism, and deployment, and that the inventory of operational equipment
began considering democracy to be the primary threat to his regime: totalled just 236 MBTs (out of 683 that were available), 650 infantry
he began fearing opposition to his – and to any other – dictatorship. fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, 131 self-propelled
Nowhere was this fear as obvious as in the case of Ukraine, which guns, and 105 multiple rocket launchers. In the best case, this meant
he repeatedly failed to subjugate through supporting ‘pro-Russian that each of the ZSU’s brigades could dispatch a single Battalion
politicians.’ Tactical Group (BTG) to the conflict zone. In reality, the situation
was often much worse. For example, when ordered into Donbass,
The Coup in Sevastopol the 24th Mechanised Brigade sent its 1st Mechanised Battalion
As soon as Yanukovich fled to Russia, during the night of 22 to including just four 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers, six BM-
23 February 2014, Putin convened a meeting of all chiefs of his 21 multiple rocket launcher systems (MRLS), a battery of 120mm
security services, and issued a directive to ‘return Crimea to Russia’. mortars, a company of 10 T-64 MBTs, a reconnaissance company
Only four days later, pro-Russian demonstrations were staged in and a few incomplete support units. In urgency, the Parliament then
Sevastopol, while masked Russian troops wearing no insignia – pushed through a law about a partial mobilisation: however, this
colloquially known as the ‘Little Green Men’ – captured all strategic failed to provide decisive results because the infrastructure for the
sites over the peninsula. In a rapid sequence of events, a pro-Russian draft of men had already been disestablished following the end of
government was established, which quickly declared independence compulsory service.
from Ukraine on 16 March 2014 and – only two days later – the
peninsula was formally annexed by Russia. Nightmares of 2014
Because the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula was enacted by Instead of joining the ZSU, thousands of Ukrainians found
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, this was an aggression, themselves with little choice but to form a wide array of volunteer
an invasion, and thus a blatant violation of international law and units. Some came into being on the initiative of the locals (see the
territorial integrity of Ukraine; a violation of the 1975 Helsinki Donbass Battalion); others were formed by political parties (Aidar,
Accords; a violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Azov and Sich battalions), while a few others were established with
Assurances, and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, the help of the authorities, resulting in the so-called Territorial
and Partnership between Moscow and Kyiv. Unsurprisingly, Defence (Dnipro-2 Battalion). Obviously, the combat efficiency
Putin’s action – misdescribed as ‘based on the principle of self- and equipment of such, ‘self-created’ units varied immensely –
determination of peoples’, and as an action against a ‘new country though in this way it actually provided a mirror image of what was
with which Russia had not concluded any treaties’ – was met with going on in the territories claimed by the self-declared Luhansk
fierce critique and condemnation by Kyiv.1 However, at home People’s Republic (LPR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR).
in Russia, another successful military action served to increase Nevertheless, it was with this mix of regular armed forces operating
Putin’s popularity right at a time when the country began to suffer as task forces, and volunteer units that the Ukrainians managed
economic stagnation caused by his corrupt system of rule. Atop to defeat the Separatists in the east: by late August 2014, they
of this, the West reacted with only lukewarm condemnations and significantly reduced the Separatist-controlled territory and were
economic sanctions: while the latter sufficed to cause additional close to reaching the border with Russia – only to see their progress
damage to the Russian economy, it soon proved too porous and reversed by a full-fledged Russian invasion.2
too little to have the desired effects. On the contrary, starting from
4
WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022
Artillery units of the VRSF had already begun to provide fire- in 2014, to 204,000 (and 46,000 civilians) in 2015. While the
support to the Separatists from late July 2014: on 22 August, amid strength of the force remained the same for the next several years,
intensified shelling of the advancing Ukrainians, the first BTGs of by 2016 all the military personnel were contracted professionals.
the Russian Army crossed the border, launching a direct military Nevertheless, conscription was reinstated as well, and through 2015
intervention in what was now an undeclared war. Using the a total of 138 recruitment offices were operational. Meanwhile,
‘People’s Militias’ of the LPR and the DPR both as a cover to hide the bulk of Territorial Defence units – and several volunteer units
their involvement and as expendable light infantry, the far better – created in the chaos of 2014 – was gradually integrated into the
equipped and trained, and numerically superior Russians quickly army in the form of motorised infantry battalions, and attached to
threw the Ukrainians back. In a series of fierce battles – like the existing manoeuvre brigades. Furthermore, before the end of 2015,
one for Donetsk International Airport (IAP) – they pushed all the the Army dissolved its VIII Corps and instead established four
way to Debaltseve before the frontlines stabilised. Although Russia Operational Commands (OKs): North, East, South, and West. Atop
attempted to hide its involvement, it was very obvious by the time of this, another corps-level formation came into being as a separate
the first phase of the conflict ended with the Minsk Protocol, on 5 command: the High Mobility Assault Forces (renamed the Airborne
September 2014, signed by Ukraine, Russia, LPR and the DPR. Putin Assault Troops in 2017), and the Special Forces Command was
exploited the resulting situation to install his favourites in both the established. Meanwhile, 15 manoeuvre brigades were either newly
LPR and the DPR but abstained from repeating the exercise of the established or reactivated and redeployed in the east and, in 2016,
Crimea annexation – apparently because by this time his forces, and the Territorial Defence resuscitated. Finally, a Reserve Corps was
those of his proxies, had managed to capture only about 50 percent created, including numerous reserve tank, motorised infantry, and
of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Following a series of ceasefire artillery brigades, meant to build-up a strategic reserve activated in
violations, in early 2015 the Minsk II agreements were signed by the event of war.
Russia and Ukraine, but a number of disputes prevented these from
ever being fully implemented: indeed, the second treaty merely froze Table 2: Build-up of ZSU Land Forces, 2014–2018
the 450-kilometre-long frontlines – the so-called ‘Line of Control’ Period Units activated
(LOC) – and limited exchanges of fire to repeated artillery barrages 14th, 53rd and 54th Mechanised, 57th and 59th
and minor infantry probes against enemy positions. By that point in 2014
Motorised, 81st Air Assault
time, losses were already heavy: the ZSU had 2,636 killed and 8,897
56th and 58th Motorised, 10th Mountain Assault,
wounded in the Donbass, and had to write-off over 800 armoured 2015
61st Jaeger
fighting vehicles by April 2016. The losses of the Russians and the
Separatist formations remain unknown.3 45th and 46th Air Assault, 35th and 36th Naval
Infantry.
2016–2018
Rebuilding the Ground Forces – on a Budget Reserve: 3rd, 4th, 5th Tank, 60th, 62nd, 63rd, 66th
To say that the Crimean debacle and a series of defeats in the Mechanised
Donbass during the second half of 2014 and early 2015 shocked the
entire Ukrainian defence establishment – if not the entire nation Qualitive Edge
– would be an understatement. All of a sudden, Ukraine had to The Ukrainian build-up was not only quantitative in nature, but
expand, reorganise, and improve its armed forces, and urgently so. qualitative too. The Ukrainians thoroughly reviewed their 2014–
While not appearing anywhere on the agenda for 23 years, the ZSU 2015 experience in order to identify their main shortcomings and
suddenly became the top priority of successive governments and address them as fast as they could. In turn, this led to a series of
this was nowhere more obvious than the rapidly increasing defence wide-ranging reforms in the army. Combat brigades and battalions
budget: from US$1.9 billion in 2013, to US$3.02 billion in 2018. were thus reshuffled to increase their firepower, noticeably by
Even then, and as massive as this increase might appear at the first reinforcing their artillery group, with an emphasis on their anti-tank
glance, it was still far from enough to enable an unimpaired build- arsenal, their flexibility, and logistical capabilities.5
up. The army had to be developed ‘on a budget’.4 Still predominant at the time, the Soviet military doctrine was
gradually abandoned and replaced by a mix of combat experiences
Table 1: Ukrainian Military and Russian and NATO practices.6 For example: headquarters up to
Spending, 2013–2020 the level of brigade were all reorganised along NATO lines, and the
% of GDP training of the officer corps focused drastically on the Auftragstaktik
Year % of GDP (MoD)
(World Bank) – enabling junior officers to act as they saw fit, on the spot, always
2013 0.97 1.58 in the interest of fulfilling the mission, and without first requesting
approval from superior commanders. Vast efforts were invested
2014 1.78 2.24
into building up and empowering an urgently needed corps of non-
2015 2.53 3.25 commissioned officers (NCOs) and their training along similar lines.
2016 2.63 3.15 Finally, Ukrainians took care to introduce as many new
2017 2.43 2.88 technologies as possible, including the deployment of mini-
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and to improve the
2018 N/A 3.19
communication infrastructure of the ZSO – and this both at tactical
2019 N/A 3.5 and strategic level: indeed, starting in 2015, a small team of the
2020 2.7 4.1 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supervised the development of
techniques and technology to counter the vastly superior Russian
Increased budget allocations enabled the ZSU to expand the capabilities in regards of communications intelligence (COMINT),
army from 165,500 (plus 44,500 civilian service men and women) electronic intelligence (ELINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT)
5
EUROPE@WAR VOLUME 28
– which, in 2014–2015 enabled the Russians to rapidly detect Table 3: ZSU, Ground Unit Exercises, 2013–20178
Ukrainian units and plaster their positions with artillery. Finally, Year Brigade-level Battalion-level
the Ukrainians routinely rotated their special forces operators
2013 0 7
through conventional units, to pass on their knowledge, and greatly
increased the number of snipers assigned to all of their units, and 2014 0 18
honed their tactics with an emphasis on targeting enemy officers. 2015 15 94
Training of the ZSU since 2015 experienced a dramatic 2016 20 125
improvement. While as of 2014, new recruits received just three
weeks of elementary training and battalion-level exercises were a 2017 35 168
rarity, basic training was stretched to two months and the number of
exercises skyrocketed, as described in Table 3. In this regard, it was Operational Reserves 1 and 2
the support of NATO that proved instrumental: from 2014 onwards, Of crucial importance for the overhaul of the land component
numerous instructors from various member countries routinely of the ZSU was a complete reconstitution and reform, and the
served in Ukraine. A NATO training support group was established establishment of the Operational Reserve System. Starting in 2016,
under a US-funded and led Joint Multinational Training Group- this aimed to bring both active and reserve units to full strength in
Ukraine (JMTG-U), to coordinate activities of hundreds of British, the event of war. The importance of the Operational Reserve System
Canadian, Lithuanian, Polish, and US instructors rotated through cannot be overemphasised, because budget constraints dictated that
Ukraine. This body alone managed to train about 10,000 Ukrainian the majority of active brigades to be kept at just 30–60 percent of
servicemen a year. The primary facility related to the JMTG-U their nominal strength, while brigades of the Reserve Corps were
became the Yavoriv Combined Army Training Centre, located near mostly at only 10 percent: correspondingly, both types of formations
the Polish border and fully equipped with Multiple Integrated Laser needed massive reinforcements by reservists before engaging in
Engagement System (MILES): at least five Ukrainian battalions high-intensity combat operations.
underwent the 55-day training curriculum there each year since Including 230,000 reservists, in 2020 the Operational Reserve
2015. In other cases, Ukrainian army units took part in multinational System was divided into two classes: the Operational Reserve 1
exercises, like Sea Breeze and Rapid Trident, while their skills were (OR-1), tasked with completing the effectiveness of the active
further enhanced through frequent and regular rotation in and out and reserve combat units in the event of mobilisation; and the
of the positions along the LOC, where they obtained plentiful first- Operational Reserve-2 (OR-2), where reservists were assigned to
hand combat experience in the course of relentless violations of the second-line units of the Army, or of the Territorial Defence. All
ceasefire agreement.7 reservists assigned to the OR-1 and OR-2 were recalled to refresh
their training – usually in their parent brigades – at least once every
two years, and in grand total, 41,000 troops served with the OR-1
and 66,000 with OR-2 between 2017 and 2020. In this fashion, the
ZSU built-up a strong body of reservists, who remained current in
their military functions, and whose parent brigades were capable of
rapidly switching to intensive combat operations.9
A row of overhauled and upgraded T-64s in the process of being handed over to the ZSU. (Ukrainian MOD)
6
WAR IN UKRAINE VOLUME 2: RUSSIAN INVASION, FEBRUARY 2022
Rearming by Overhauling artillery shell, named Kvitnyk. Atop of this, a large number of
Obviously, such a massive amount of active and reservist troops older armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, and anti-aircraft systems
required an appropriate amount of equipment – even more so were recovered from rusting in ‘open storage’ around the country,
because of the losses sustained in Donbas, and the limited defence refurbished and returned to service – many of them by small
budget. This is where the major factories, an entire complex of enterprises and workshops operated by the ZSU – enabling Ukraine
workshops, and the research and development enterprises that to bolster its armed forces at a relatively low cost. The price to pay
Ukraine inherited from the USSR came in handy. Indeed, as in was that much of the equipment was dated – a factor even more
the case of the ZSU, this sector was totally oversized for the needs important because several modernisation programs failed, while
upon independence, yet starved of significant orders from the the development of other new weapons systems was abandoned due
government and foreign customers over the following 20 years. to the lack of funding. In yet other cases, money was squandered
While up to 90 percent of the companies in question eventually had through endemic corruption. In particular, the ZSU was vexed by
to cease operating in the 1990s, those that survived did so thanks to the lack of facilities for production and storage of heavy artillery
orders from abroad. Amongst the most significant commercial deals ammunition. This became a crucial issue because of a series of
was a Pakistani order for 320 T-80UD tanks, which provided at least ‘mysterious incidents’ in several ammunition depots starting in
some respite. However, the majority of such deals were related to 2014, which destroyed up to 210,000 tons of 122mm artillery
small scale sales of overhauled surplus equipment inherited from rockets and 152mm shells, causing acute shortages of both – which
the Soviet armed forces, for example to Chad, Northern Macedonia, could not be solved even through urgent orders for replacements
or a few other customers in Africa. Research, development and from companies in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.11
production of new equipment remained limited to such designs as
the BTR-3 APC, T-64 Bulat and T-80 Oplot MBTs, and R-77 medium Defensive Weapons
range, active-radar homing, air-to-air missiles. Unsurprisingly, one The war of 2014 triggered constantly intensifying cooperation
local expert concluded: ‘Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, between Ukraine and several members of NATO – primarily in the
for 30 long years, Ukraine has ceased to be a country developing form of training, but also in terms of arms acquisitions. The USA
modern weapons.’10 provided the bulk of the latter (worth US$2.7 billion between 2014
As of 2010, what was left of the defence sector was brought under and 2017). Concerns of antagonising the Russians resulted in much
the control of the state-owned corporation Ukroboronprom. Even of the NATO-supplied equipment being of ‘non-lethal’ nature:
then, the defence industries experienced another setback in 2014: however, some was critical – especially in regards of communication,
at the time, most of it was still intensively cooperating with Russia, night vision equipment, and first-aid kids. Body armour – well-
but then all ties were cut off. Certainly enough, the resulting damage fitting to new, NATO-like uniforms with digital camouflage
was severe for both sides: Russia lost its source of a number of key patterns, introduced by the ZSU – a shipment of 230 High Mobility
components for most of its advanced and heavy weaponry, while Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV, colloquially ‘Humvee’),
Ukroboronprom lost its primary customers. Nevertheless, during and a few patrol boats were appreciated by Ukrainians. Weaponry
the following eight years of ‘no-peace, no war’ the capability of the began arriving only in late 2017, and then in the form of defensive
Ukrainian defence sector to not only overhaul and modernise, but systems, including 39 launchers and 210 FGM-148 Javelin medium
also to manufacture new equipment – ranging from mortars and anti-armour weapon systems, followed by 10 additional launchers
artillery pieces to armoured
vehicles, missiles and combat
aircraft – was to prove of crucial
importance.
Indeed, from 2014 onwards,
dozens of newly produced
systems were acquired by
the ZSU, including as many
as 500 T-64BV Model 2017,
T-72AMT, and T-84 MBTs, 200
BTR-4, BMP-1TS and BMP-
1U APCs, and several types
of mine-resistant, ambush
protected vehicles (MRAPs).
Furthermore, Ukroboronprom
– which as of 2017–2021
included 107 companies
employing 67,000 people –
launched licence production
of Israeli-designed Tavor
assault rifles, several types of
highly potent anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGMs; such as the
RK-3 Corsar and Stugna-P),
and the local variant of the Since 2014, the Ukrainian truck maker KrAZ has carried out licence production of the Canadian-designed STREIT
Krasnopol guided 152mm Group Spartan armoured personnel carrier. (Ukrainian MOD)
7
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