Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-017-9410-x
R E G U L A R A RT I C L E

Who are we and where are we Going: from Past Myths

to Present Politics

Sandra Obradović 1

Published online: 4 December 2017

# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Abstract Social groups, and the social identities which people develop as part of them,
are often experienced as stable and continuous over time. Thus, countries experiencing
rapid socio-political change often face the challenge of re-constructing the meaning of
the social group to adapt to the demands of the present, while simultaneously making
this re-construction appear as a natural progression of ‘our’ historical journey. In the
present paper, I ask the question of how, in times of socio-political change, the past is
used in the present, and the implications this has for how individuals represent their
nation’s future. Drawing on Serbia and its political movement towards EU integration,
the present article illustrates how developed and legitimized historical narratives, linked
to the myth of origin of a nation, become utilized to frame present challenges. In doing
so, it allows for uncertainties in the present to become anchored in established historical
narratives, which in turn have consequences for which political actions are deemed
acceptable and legitimate for the future.

Keywords Perceived collectivecontinuity . National identity . Historical representations .

Myths

Introduction

Scholars working on collective memory, identity, history and inter-group relations have
argued, and illustrated, that social groups, such as a nation, are frequently constructed
as stable over time and space (Alonso 1988; Jetten and Hutchison 2011; Jovchelovitch
2012; Liu and Hilton 2005; Penic et al. 2016; Sani et al. 2007). Sani et al. (2007) use
the concept of ‘perceived collective continuity’ to illustrate how groups perceive links

* Sandra Obradović
[email protected]

1
Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political
Science, London, UK
58 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

between their past, present and future, and the implications this has for intergroup
relations and political decision-making.
In the present paper, we ask the question of how, in times of socio-political change,
the past is used in the present, and the implications this has for how individuals
represent their nation’s future. The article begins by first discussing the social psycho-
logical literature on historical myths and narratives, and the role these play in providing
a sense of attachment to an essentialized version of national identity. Secondly, it draw
on social representations theory to argue that, the ability of historical myths to persist
over time is due to their adaptive nature, understood through the concept of ‘thema’.
Thirdly, drawing on qualitative data from Serbia, it illustrates the ways in which
developed historical narratives about a nation’s origins and identity become utilized
to anchor present politics, thus providing a template from which to understand socio-
political change. Lastly, the article discusses the implications of this for how individuals
come to conceptualize the future of their nation, and their role in shaping it.

Identity Continuity: Myths of Origin and Historical Narratives

For scholars interested in issues of national identification, nationalism and intergroup

relations, understanding the historical contexts in which these develop becomes crucial.
Because of this, there is a growing acknowledgment of the importance of history in
providing the material through which social groups, such as nations, are developed and
maintained, with scholars emphasizing the importance of promoting a psychology that
includes history in its analysis (Liu and Hilton 2005; Reicher and Hopkins 2001).
History becomes important as it tells a story of where a nation and its people come
from by providing it with foundational myths (Malinowski 1926) and historical charters
(Liu and Hilton 2005). These constructs bind the past with the present and future of a
nation and its people by defining the origins of the group, but also its role in relation to
other nations.
Liu and Hilton (2005) have argued that nations have particular ‘historical charters’
that define their identities and their role vis-à-vis other nations. A historical charter
provides a narrative of a group’s origins, which in turn functions to legitimizing present
socio-political actions intended to promote a future that is perceived as continuous with
the past. Considering this, Liu & Hilton argue that the different responses of England,
France and Germany to the 9/11 aftermath can be understood by the different historical
missions, and identities, of the nations.
The importance of drawing on history to legitimize not only the present, but also
proposed projects for the future, places historical myths and narratives at the centre in
creating a sense of stability and continuity in a nation. The idea of ‘perceived collective
continuity’ (Sani et al. 2007) conceptualizes the ways in which we see our social groups
and consequently social identities, as stable constructs moving through time. The
construction of a perceived collective continuity assures that Bwithin the national
imagination, we are rendered immortal, forever reproduced through the timelessness
of metaphorical genealogy^ (Alonso 1988, p.40). However, while perceived collective
continuity functions to essentialize a national identity as stable and outside of the
boundaries of time, it is important to note that historical continuity Bis not derived from
a passive act of perception [but rather] involves an active process of selection,
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 59

interpretation and construction^ which is always future-oriented (Reicher 2008, p.151).

Thus, an inclusion of history into the study of psychological phenomena does not entail
taking a deterministic and static approach to topics of interest, but rather it provides a
framework through which to understand how socio-political change becomes (and
dissent silenced) possible by embedding it within legitimized narratives of group
belonging (Obradović and Howarth 2017; Penic et al. 2016).
Because of the importance of perceived collective continuity and foundational myths
in providing a sense of belonging and stability to a group’s identity, in contexts of
proposed socio-political change, perceived threats to national identity (or group identity
more generally) frequently lead to unwillingness to support the change (Jetten and
Hutchison 2011; Sindic and Reicher 2009). Identity threats can be based on disrupting a
sense of continuity from the past, but also a perceived fear of how the group will fare in
the future. Thus, advocates of change are faced with the challenge of representing
socio-political change as a continuation, rather than rupture, of group identity (Reicher
and Hopkins 2001; Obradović and Howarth 2017). As Smith (1995) has argued,
nationalism should be understood as a form of ‘political archaeology’ where history
functions to rediscover, reinterpret and regenerate a national community.
However, as is often evident within both reified and lay perspectives on history, not
all historical events are given equal importance and emphasis within nations. Thus,
when studying how nations maintain a sense of continuity in times of change, we must
first understand what parts of history are given centrality to a collective identity, and
thus become the elements selected through political archaeology. In other words, we
must unpack the myths of origin beyond the content of the events themselves to
understand what they communicate about a nation’s identity. We can do this by drawing
on the social representations theory and the concept of thema, to understand how
supposedly fixed events of the past become re-negotiated and kept alive through times
of change.

Social Representations and Thema: Unearthing the Core of Identities

Myths of origin persist due to their dialogical nature. They are, like identities, con-
stantly re-presented and re-negotiated to provide a historically rooted legitimacy for
present ingroup goals and identities. The theory of social representations (hereafter
SRT) becomes a useful theoretical framework through which we can understand how
historical events become part of common-sense knowledge, and communicate some-
thing about who ‘we’ are, and how ‘we’ should act.
At the core of SRT (Moscovici 2000; Howarth 2006) is an emphasis on how we
make sense of the world and thus how knowledge is socially created and re-presented.
This becomes particularly relevant to understand in the study of how history, psychol-
ogy and politics become intertwined. For example, the popular saying that Bthose who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it^ (originally coined by George
Santayana) illustrates the powerful nature of history as a source of legitimacy in
shaping and mobilizing groups for certain political actions, supposedly intended to
safeguard the group for re-living past atrocities (or failures to hinder them).
Social representations of history thus serve a vital function in providing both the
content (meaning) of identities as well as providing an understanding of the processes
60 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

through which this meaning becomes shared, re-interpreted and resisted through
communication. The past, and the ways in which it is remembered, is thus constantly
in a process of reconstruction. Historical representations, and their corresponding
cultural signs and symbols, will become remembered or forgotten Bdepending on
their ability to fulfil the needs of different social, political and cultural functions^
(Jovchelovitch 2012, p.444). Social representations of history further provide an
addition to research on social (particularly national) identities in acknowledging
the importance of place and space in creating a sense of psychological attachment
to a physical reality (Hopkins and Dixon 2006). By considering how historical
events (often tied to specific territories or lands) shape identities and create a sense
of continuity, we can also understand how identities encompass a spatial dimen-
sion, which comes to have implications for geopolitics and the management of
boundaries and belonging.
The concept of ‘thema’ can be seen as the Bbasic starting point for generating social
representations^ (Markova 2000, p. 442). Originating in the work of Holton (1975),
thema and themata were originally defined as antinomies of thought found in science
(see also, Liu 2004). Developing this further, Markova (2000, 2003) argues that
common sense thinking is characterizes by antinomies of thinking, where opposites
such as Bwe/them^ come to shape our way of understanding the social world.
According to Markova (2000) not all antinomies become themata. Rather, this occurs
Bif, in the course of certain social and historical events, e.g., political, economic,
religious, and so on, they turn into problems and become the focus of social attention
and a source of tension and conflict.^ (Markova 2000, p. 184). Themata then, allow us
to explore Bthe socio-historical embeddedness^ of social representations in a non-
reductive way (Liu 2004, p. 254).
Applying the concept of thema to social representations of history and social
identities allows us to understand how an ingroup’s identity can be built on opposites.
For example, Jovchelovitch (2012) found that the oppositional nature of the founda-
tional myth of the Brazilian people functioned to celebrate the ‘mixedness’ of its
identity, and to allow for inclusion and endurance by being inherently dynamic and
complex. Similarly, in the context of Serbia, the myth of origin (discussed more in
detail below) emphasizes an identity that is simultaneously victimized and strong/
resilient (Bieber 2002). Thus, SRT in general, and the concept of thema in particular,
becomes useful for unearthing the links between foundational myths, ingroup identities
and the ways in which socio-political change becomes understood.

Continuity in Times of Change: The Case of Serbia

By understanding foundational myths, and the historical charters which they become
part of, through the concept of thema we can begin to unpack the dynamic function that
historical representations serve for national identities, and the role they come to play in
shaping how present socio-political changes are understood and oriented towards. The
present article focuses on unpacking how a particular historical event, the battle of
Kosovo, became a core myth through which ingroup identity was understood in Serbia,
but also intergroup relations and present politics. However, before we can unpack this,
we must give some context to the event itself.
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 61

The issue of the political status of Kosovo is perhaps the biggest hurdle for Serbia on
its path towards EU membership. Kosovo is a region in (or below) Southern Serbia that
declared independence from Serbia in 2008 (after years of conflict and with a predom-
inantly non-Serbian population). The territory holds a prominent identity position
among Serbs as it was the territory on which the legendary battle of Kosovo took
place in 1389 and has continued to be a site of conflict between Serbs and Kosovars in
the past 20 years. This story of the battle is one of both victory and defeat. Namely, in
1389 Prince Lazar led Serbia into battle against the more powerful Ottoman forces,
which were invading the country in an attempt to conquer it. As Bieber (2002, p. 96)
argues;

BAccording to the myth, on the eve of the battle, Knez Lazar was offered the
choice between establishing either a heavenly or an earthly kingdom. Lazar chose
the former, which prevented his victory the following day but ensured the
creation of a perpetual heavenly realm for the Serbian people.’

Consequently, from the fifteenth century and onwards (until the eighteenth century)
Serbia was under Ottoman rule, a period known as the epoch of Turkish slavery
(ĆirkoviĆ 2004, p. xx). The Kosovo myth gained significance only after this period
as the foundational myth of a newly independent Serbian state in the late 1800s (Bieber
2002). The reproduction of the myth through cultural symbols, songs, religious
holidays and celebrations has further solidified the image of Kosovo in Serbia,
making it an everyday and banal symbol of nationalism and national identity
(Billig 1995). It further legitimizes claims to the territory of modern-day Kosovo
by constructing the region as the physical embodiment of a psychological belong-
ing to the nation (Hopkins and Dixon 2006).
The narrative that the myth communicates is one which emphasizes how the Serbian
people were simultaneously victims (under Turkish power) but also strong and resilient
when faced with a seemingly more powerful opponent. In a way, the myth draws on an
oppositional pair of victory (spiritual) and defeat (physical), with the former proving
more significant on a symbolic level than the latter.
Although the EU is said to hold no position towards the independence issue,
continued efforts have been made to normalize relations between Serbia and
Kosovo. These efforts in turn have domestically led many to believe that Serbia
would (eventually) have to make a decision between EU membership and Kosovo
(Ker-Lindsay 2009, p.6), a trade-off with consequences extending far beyond the
sphere of geopolitics.

Method

The present paper asks the question of how, in times of socio-political change, the
past is used in the present, and the implications this has for how individuals
represent their nation’s future. It does so by drawing on qualitative data gathered
in Serbia, exploring how citizens perceive their country’s movement towards
joining the European Union, and the (positive/negative) implications this might
have for their collective future.
62 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

Study Design

As the aim of this study was to explore the ways in which lay representations of history
become part of understanding the present and future, a qualitative approach was
deemed most suitable. Particularly as research on social representations is best explored
Bin the in-between space we create in dialogue and negotiation with others^ (Howarth
2006, p.68). With this in mind, 12 focus group (FG) sessions were conducted between
April 2015 and April 2016 in four cities in Serbia, two in the North (Novi Sad and
Belgrade) and two in the South (Nis and Vranje) of the country. These comprised of
meeting the same 4 groups (one from each city) at three different time-points (April
2015, September 2015 and April 2016). The rationale behind this design was to
develop an iterative method through which in-depth tensions could be explored more
fully, by returning to the same participants with new questions, rooted in the discus-
sions from the previous session. Furthermore this design was seen as complimentary to
the theoretical framework both in terms of the focus on perceived continuity, but also
the emphasis that SRT places on communication. Namely, it highlights the role of
dialogue in the process of generating and re-negotiating socially shared knowledge, and
iterative FGs were seen as an innovative method for capturing this in situ. Lastly, the
selection of cities in the north and south reflected an interest in exploring the impor-
tance of physical proximity to Kosovo in shaping opinions, and understandings, of the
importance of the region for Serbian identity, and subsequently collective continuity in
the future.

Participants

32 individuals participated in this study, 10 of which were female and 23 male.

Participants ranged in age from 19 to 55, with median age 31 (at time of first FG
sessions; for participant demographics see Table 1). Participants were recruited through
snowballing. For each of the first FGs, one participant was contacted via telephone and
(if they accepted) came to serve as the point of contact for that particular city, helping
the researcher organize a setting in which to conduct the FG, as well as gain access to
other potential participants. The rationale behind the sampling choice of these individ-
uals was not to reach statistical representativeness or generalisability, but rather to
explore the diversity in beliefs and opinions expressed by a larger pool of individuals
from different parts of the country (Barbour and Kitzinger 1999, p.7). The first round of
FGs comprised of 7–9 participants. In some instances, certain individuals brought a
friend, co-worker or family member (particularly if they did not know any of the prior
invited participants). In order to maintain a good rapport with the participants, these
additional participants were allowed to join the FG discussions. However, due to the
nature of the study design, an average of 2 participants per FG did not attend the second
and third sessions.

Procedure

All FGs took place in ‘natural’ settings such as cafes and participant’s homes. Within
each group, participants were introduced to the moderator, the aims of the study, as well
as the intended procedure of the FG. Participants were told that Btogether with another
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 63

Table 1 Participant Demographics

Participant Gender Age Occupation City

1 Male 55 Business owner Belgrade

2 Female 28 Student (PhD) Belgrade
3 Male 27 Insurance Agent Belgrade
4 Female 28 NGO Employee Belgrade
5 Male 25 Engineer Belgrade
6 Male 29 Student Belgrade
7 Male 26 Engineer Belgrade
8 Male 27 Journalist Belgrade
9 Male 28 Unemployed Niš
10 Male 30 Unemployed Niš
11 Female 27 Retail Worker Niš
12 Female 24 Student Niš
13 Female 27 Unemployed Niš
14 Female 24 Student Niš
15 Male 28 Electrical Engineer Niš
16 Male 26 Medical Technician Niš
17 Female 50 Office clerk Niš
18 Male 31 Architect Novi Sad
19 Female 35 Architect Novi Sad
20 Male 31 Accountant Novi Sad
21 Male 31 Taxi Driver Novi Sad
22 Male 30 Unemployed Novi Sad
23 Male 28 Lawyer Novi Sad
24 Male 34 Waiter Novi Sad
25 Male 30 Military Employee Vranje
26 Female 28 Military Employee Vranje
27 Male 36 Unemployed Vranje
28 Male 57 Self-employed farmer Vranje
29 Female 55 Casino Employee Vranje
30 Male 47 Lawyer Vranje
31 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje
32 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje

5-7 people, you will discuss certain topics and questions that will be provided by the
moderator. All I ask you to do is state your honest opinion about these topics and
engage in discussion with the other participants.^ Following this, participants were
given an information sheet (which repeated some of this information) and a consent
form to sign. Also, to ensure confidentiality (and address any concerns about anonym-
ity) participants were asked to provide their name, age and occupation to the group
prior to the audio recording commenced and these were saved in collected field notes.
The topic guides for each three sessions followed the same format, including questions
64 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

covering themes of politics, identity, the past and the future (see Table 2). After
conducting the first round of FGs (April 2015), any remaining issues, tensions or
points of debate for each question were used to inform the topic guide for the second
session, thereby allowing the data-collection to follow an iterative design where the
researcher was able to go back to the participants to gain further insight on questions
which had remained unanswered. FG discussions lasted between 33 and 87 min, with
an average length of one hour and five minutes.
All FGs were conducted (and subsequently analysed) in Serbian. The ability to
conduct the FGs in Serbian overcame an important language barrier. However, while
the researcher is of Serbian ethnic-origin, she was not born nor has ever lived in Serbia
(which was disclosed to the participants). This positioned her as both an insider and
outsider in all group discussions and influenced the dynamics of the FG discussions in
an interesting way, as participants reflexively positioned the researcher as both a source
of Western knowledge and practice, but also a representative of a non-Serbian world that
inherently misunderstood the lived experiences of Serbian people. In order to ensure
participant confidentiality all names and identifiers were modified during transcription.

Analysis

The audio recorded FGs were transcribed verbatim and a thematic analysis was
conducted following the guidelines outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). All tran-
scripts were coded using NVivo 11, a qualitative data software program. The analytical
procedure was also iterative and consisted of firstly coding the transcripts from the first
set of FGs (hereon FG1), from which an initial codebook was developed and subse-
quently applied to FG2 and FG3 transcripts. As additional codes were added during the
analysis of FG2 and FG3 transcripts, the FG1 transcripts had to be re-analysed as well.
The analytical procedure was deductive, focusing on coding for references to change
(socio-political and cultural), historical events, political attitudes and references to the
past and the future. The data was coded on a semantic level, and the initial codebook
consisted of 76 codes. These were re-read and combined into themes. After revising
some themes, the final codebook included 72 Codes, 17 themes and three organizing
themes. For each organizing theme there were tensions that arose between the various
theme (i.e., between independence and inclusion) which captured the ‘essence’ of each
organizing theme, of which the various topics discussed became manifestations of.
These tensions are the basis of each of the three subsections of results, but also evident
in the extracts themselves.

Results

At the heart of the data, were tensions around managing a sense of continuity in times
of change. Namely, as the analysis will show, both the past, the present and the
future become understood through the foundational thema of Serbian identity;
victimhood and resilience. This antinomy functioned to both make sense of the
domestic and international context of Serbia, and became thematized due to the
tensions which arose around answering the question of ‘who we are’ and which
political direction we should take in the future.
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 65

Table 2 Focus Group Topic Guides

FG1: Topic Guide

General Questions to Start Discussion
1. There have been many discussions about Serbia joining the EU. What have been some of the benefits
and some of the downsides discussed?
Identity / Compatibility
2. What is your opinion about Serbia joining the EU? Are you for or against it?
Meta-perspective
3. Do you think Serbia is welcomed in the EU, from the perspective of other member countries?
Politics
4. Serbia has (or has had) a close relationship with Russia, which has at times conflicted with its
pro-EU politics. Do you think that Serbia should be more political oriented towards Russia or the EU?
Or both, if possible.
5. In many media reports, EU membership and the question of the status of Kosovo have been placed
in opposition. Do you think accepting Kosovo’s independence is worth it if it would guarantee Serbia
membership into the EU?
Future
6. When the year 2020 comes, the year by which politicians predict Serbia will have finally become
a member, what do you realistically think the situation will look like?
Identity (2)
7. Considering the past 25 years and everything that has occurred in Serbia and the region, do you think
that the people, as a nation, has changed in comparison with the past?
FG2: Topic Guide
General Question to Start Discussion
1. When we last met in April I asked you if you thought Serbia joining the EU was a good idea, has
your opinions changed at all since then?
Identity / Compatibility
2. Do you consider Serbian culture as compatible with European culture?
3. Do you think Serbia’s way of life is representative of a European way of life? How are they similar,
and how are they different?
Meta-perspective
4. Do you think that the majority of Serbia is pro- or against EU integration?
Politics
5. Since the EU integration process came on the Serbian agenda, there have been various government
in Serbia in support or against the process. Who are some of the most important politicians in this process?
6. do you feel like you can trust politicians in Serbia?
Future
7. If Serbia becomes a part of the EU in the future, do you think anything will change [in Serbia] and
if so, what exactly?
8. Do you think people in Serbia have a voice in shaping Serbia’s future and politics?
FG3: Topic Guide
General Question to Start Discussion
1. Within our last two FGs there’s been a lot of talk about the politics around Kosovo. What is the
historical significance of Kosovo?
2. What are some media sources (whether it is print or broadcast TV) which you use and consider
to be unbiased in their news-reporting?
Politics
3. What role do you think the media has is in shaping the political attitudes and opinions of people
in Serbia?
4. This year there is an election on the 24th April, do you plan to vote and if so, why?
Meta-perspective
5. Prompts 1 and 2: Texts from FGs in South (Nis and Vranje) introduced in North FGs
(Novi Sad and Belgrade) and vice-versa to stimulate discussion (specifically, the prompts selected
included both commonalities and differences to the discourses of the FG itself, and was intended to
function as a way of engaging with the perspective of an ‘Other’)
Future
6. If you had the possibility to imagine the future of Serbia, how would this Serbia look?
66 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

The results section is divided into three parts, each addressing one of these
‘tensions’. The first relates to how the political and symbolic meaning of Kosovo
is narrated and the implications this has for the construction of a Serbian identity,
the second considers how this narrative becomes utilized in explaining the
domestic socio-political context and addressing the tension of who is to blame
for a lack of progress, and the third section explores its application to meaning-
making on an international scale, which at root is a debate about how to
maintain a sense of sovereignty while becoming part of a seemingly hierarchical
and stigmatizing union.

Narrating Kosovo: Tensions between De Facto and de Jure

Within the various FGs over the one-year time frame, participants were asked about the
historical and political significance of Kosovo. Discussions often centred on the tension
between the historical and symbolic importance of the region and acknowledging the
political reality of Kosovo as a ‘de facto’ independent state. When asked about the
Battle of Kosovo, social representations of the historical event often drew on imagery
of heroic martyrdom;

Excerpt 1: Belgrade 3

M3: Uhm, the whole myth is primarily associated with the Battle of Kosovo and
everything that happened afterwards, and that whole, this great Serbian army,
which opposed an even greater Turkish army, and our glorified defeat.

Excerpt 2: Nis 3

W3: Well yes, a small Serbian army which defeated large Turkey [Ottoman
Empire]. Told as one of the greatest victories of Serbs.

These short excerpts illustrate that within both northern and southern cities in Serbia,
the battle of Kosovo is narrated in a similar manner. However, what differs is the
supposed outcome of the battle, illustrating the extent to which the battle is remembered
as both a victory and a defeat. When discussions moved from the socio-historical
representations to the political status of Kosovo, participants frequently used words
such as ‘cradle’ ‘root’ and ‘home’ to anchor the space within the boundaries of Serbian
belonging, not only as a part, but as encompassing a central place.

Excerpt 3: Novi Sad 3:

M6: I think the question [of the political status of Kosovo] becomes important in
Serbia because it represents the territory on which the first Serbian state was
constructed in the 7th century. It is the cradle of today’s national identity, and
from there, that was, how do I put this… a key territory which was Serbian, from
where, no matter how much Serbia expended or narrowed, it originated.
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 67

Excerpt 4: Vranje 3

M1: You see, the oldest Serbian monasteries are down there.

M5: Yes

M1: Orthodox monasteries, not only Serbian. So…, it’s not for nothing that it’s the
source of Serbian heritage.

W4: the cradle of Serbia.

M5: Yes, from where Serbia originated, from the beginning.

From these excerpts we see how the territory of Kosovo is constructed as the only
stable point in Serbian history, from which a sense of continuous national identity has
been build. As Hopkins and Dixon (2006, p.179) argue, Ba striking feature of much talk
about place and identity is the way in which it naturalises people’s relationships with
territory in politically significant ways.^ In relation to Serbia, the psychological
significance of the battle of Kosovo becomes embodied in the physical territory of
the region, intertwining attachment and continuity with geopolitical attitudes. This is
visible in the following excerpt;

Excerpt 5: Belgrade 2

W1: You know what, theoretically that sentence, BKosovo is not Serbia^ no one
will say that, but everything else beyond that has been done. So, what does that
mean to you when you publicly don’t say it but you have a liaison officer to
communicate with them, you have borders, I mean, I think we’ve already
recognized Kosovo, only that we’re not saying it….

W2: I don’t think there was ever a big problem saying like ‘Kosovo is lost’. But it’s
what comes after that. –

W1: It’s not lost, it’s its own state, that’s different

W2: But no, no, you can always add after that ‘currently’. So, there's always
that, this moment of the current arrangements in the world, Europe, and so
on, so that that’s simply the reality now, but I don’t think anyone thinks that
it’s something final.

In this exchange, we see the tension between participants when attempting to come
to terms with the political reality of Kosovo, a reality that stands at odds with a
perceived collective continuity of the Serbian identity. W2 evokes a statement of
temporality to argue that, despite the present (independent) status of Kosovo, the future
is uncertain, and therefore the current political reality is one that is malleable, and
potentially up for change. While this communicative strategy was common among
68 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

participants from northern cities, those who lived in the south were less likely to even
recognize the current political reality of Kosovo as ‘lost’. Instead, the proximity of
these participants to the physical space of the region and the border made the psycho-
logical attachment stronger and less flexible in accepting alternative representations of
the region where it belongs.
What this section has attempted to briefly illustrate is that, the foundational
myth of Serbia rests on the Battle of Kosovo myth, which highlights a thema
drawing on both victimhood and strength/resilience. This myth in turn becomes
both rooted in the present-day physical territory of Kosovo as well as the psycho-
logical identification individuals feel towards their nation, making any political
changes, which cause disruption to this continuity, considered threatening to the
nation as a whole. While the third section will explore this more closely in relation
to Serbia’s EU trajectory, the following section explores how this myth, and its
embeddedness within constructions of national identity, becomes part of framing
how individuals see their relationship vis-à-vis their political elites and the insti-
tutions they become affiliated with.

The People and Politicians: Managing Agency and Accountability

The myth of origin, and its foundational elements which give meaning to the
Serbian identity, also shape how individuals position themselves vis-à-vis their
state. Namely, similarly to how the Battle of Kosovo was represented through an
imagery of ‘heroic martyrdom’, so citizens conceptualize their relationship to their
political elites. When discussing the necessary changes needed to improve Serbia,
discussions centred around themes that emphasized a lack of ‘normality’ and
institutional order in the country, the powerlessness of the public to bring about
positive change and therefore the naivety of those who believed in change, but
also the corruption of politicians and continued efforts to suppress dissent and
promote a disenfranchised and docile citizenry. Consider a context in which
participants discussed how political and socio-economic progress of the nation
would become possible;

Excerpt 6: Vranje 2

M6: Under the condition that Serbia is governed intelligently.

M1: Intelligent governing means that a person is incorruptible. Honest, meaning,

he doesn’t have to be a specialist but he has to be honest.

W3: and how long will that last?

M2: it can’t

M1: hold on, just so we’re on the same page here. If I steal from my own house, I
don’t know, a TV, and sell it, my wife and kids have nothing to watch. Meaning, I
need that TV.
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 69

W5: That’s right, with this political perspective we haven’t done anything, we’ve
even gone backwards.

The importance of incorrupt leadership in order to achieve progress in Serbia

was an important theme that permeated discussions acknowledging that Serbia
was ‘lagging behind’ other European countries in its modernization and democ-
ratization. Within this type of argument then, it is the assumption that, while
the public is doing their part to move forward, this movement is being stifled,
and even overturned, by the political elite stealing from their Bown home^. As
one participant argued;

Excerpt 7: Belgrade 1:

M7: It’s a matter of the system, they [EU countries] have an orderly system and
then they act towards that specific model because they’ve learned to […] and I
don’t think at all that, okay it’s the Serbian mentality, okay, every nation has its
own mentality but it’s built over time and only at the level of an orderly state can
you see a country that serves its people and not the other way around.

W2: I respect the law and follow it, but then you come to a point where they
[criminals] don’t pay taxes and laugh in your face when you do. And then you
think, whatever, why should I give money to the state when it’s robbing me. And
then they force you to the other side, where you do everything opposite of what is
order and law, which isn’t your, or at least not my, choice.

M4: And then they tell you at the end ‘see how you [Serbs] are!’

W2: Yeah. But it’s not that we’re like that but that they’ve forced us to the tipping
point.

As this exchange illustrates, participants rationalize ‘corrupt’ behaviour on the part

of citizens as an adaptation to the malfunctioning situation that they’re in. In doing so
they highlight their ability to adapt, persevere and prove resilient, despite the continued
challenges they face. This exchange furthermore illustrates how the stigmatizing
representations attached to Serbia (as corrupt) are actually held by the political elites,
and not Serbian citizens themselves. Instead, by emphasizing resilience as an adaptive
strategy participants are able to reinterpret seemingly negative characteristics into
positive, and even envied, features of the Serbian people. This is evident in the
exchange below;

Excerpt 8: Vranje 1:

M6: Look at the past 25 years, this nation has survived so much trauma, from
economic crises, sanctions, poverty, wars, NATO aggressions, loss of workplace,
factories closing down, jobs being lost, territory being lost, uhm, all that influ-
ences a nation in a very stressful way. And it’s a real mystery –
70 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

W5: that we’ve survived

M6: that people are still surviving, still an exceptionally mentally well people, of
course we have out problems with –

M7: the limits of our tolerance

M6: meaning everyone is at the tipping point of their tolerance because of these
everyday stresses and trying to survive, but we’re still here. So I think that, had
any other nation experienced this, that would have been a disaster.

M1: People are more or less the same, the only difference is how the situation has
forced them to act.

M6: but that’s just proof of how resilient and capable we are as a people. We’re
ready to overcome any crisis.

W3: That’s how we grew up, that’s how we’ve learned [to be].

As the present section illustrated, Serbian individuals make a clear distinction between
a positive Serbia, embodied by the resilient people and a powerful, corrupt system
(driven by the decisions of politicians) which in turn victimizes them and forces them to
adapt to seemingly negative behaviours. We see how discourses on victimhood and
strength/resilience manifest themselves in positioning Serbs as bearers, and pro-
tectors, of a truly Serbian identity, one which is being stifled from its full potential
by the acts of greedy politicians. By drawing these links, the participants are
inevitably also constructing themselves as continuous with past Serbs, from which
they have Blearned^ to be resilient. In the domestic context, the antinomy of
victimhood/resilience is thematized in attempts to make sense of the present,
and distinguish between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ of the nation. Thus, extending
this further, the victimhood/resilience thema becomes a particular manifestation of
a more universal thema; we/them. While in the domestic context, this distinction is
made between we ‘the people’ and them ‘the politicians’, in the context of EU
integration, it is instead the we ‘the nation’ and them ‘the EU’ which is
problematized.

The Nation and the EU: Managing Independence and Inclusion

When discussing Serbia’s potential membership into the European Union, issues of
global powerlessness were central, and these highlighted how a potential future in the
EU would be one where Serbia would lose three crucial things; 1) sovereignty,
becoming a colony or cheap labour for the rest of Europe, 2) cultural continuity, being
forced to ‘Westernize’ and thus strip itself of Serbian values to be replaced by more
individualistic and capitalistic values, and 3) territory, as EU integration would, it was
speculated, lead to a choice between joining the union and keeping Kosovo as a part of
Serbian territory. We provide a quote for each to illustrate the functionality of the
victimhood/resilience thema.
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 71

Excerpt 9: Nis 2:

M2: The gist of the story is that we’re so small that we can’t play independent but
be so financially dependent of that same EU, that is over with. We’re being
blackmailed, a basic colony, we don’t have the opportunity, our budget is filled
with EU funds, I mean we don’t, we don’t, I think that that’s the reality of it. Values
and education and whether they want us to join or not, the reality is that we can’t
leave that [relationship] because our budget is being filled, we haven’t
bankrupted thanks to the fact that they’re pumping money into us, and that’s as
long as we do as we’re told.

M4: Yeah, we can’t make any kinds of demands.

The use of the word ‘colony’ and the implication that Serbia, due to its
financial instability has no agency over its own country and politics draws on
the victimhood element of the thema to position Serbia as moving towards
complete loss of sovereignty as part of the EU. The asymmetrical power-
relationship in turn also has consequences beyond politics and economics,
stretching into the area of cultural values.

Excerpt 10: Vranje 2:

M5: Although the last few years, I have to admit, that more and more people are
accepting those influences from the West, becoming worse.

M2: Before marriage used to be sacred, whatever either does, a divorce was
never an option, but recently –

6: but that’s coming from the West

W2: that the West.

M6: The Western system

M5: To not respect your parents or family

W4: nothing good has come from the west

M5: that’s right. It’s not like before, of course we’re still humanitarian but not the
same way as before, socially, that doesn’t exist anymore. Earlier, it wasn’t tied to
money nor the time of the year but simply, the system has changed.

When discussing how the present is different from the past, participants often
reference the influences of (Western) capitalism in bringing about values of materialism
and individualism, which in turn clash with the more Bwarmer^ (Novi Sad3, M4) nature
of Serbs. These discourses, occurring more frequently in the south than north, thus
72 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

highlight the assumed (and continued) disruption to a more collectivist Serbia through
the political integration into the EU. Thus, the antinomy of victimhood/resilience
becomes thematised in the context of present politics as goals such as EU
integration bring up tensions regarding how to maintain, and protect, a sense of
perceived collective continuity (Sani et al. 2007). It is not surprising that this was
discussed more in the south than north, as the southern cities are more rural and
experience less tourism and interaction with foreign travellers, thus creating more
distance and assumed differentiation from the non-Serbian other. It also empha-
sizes an underlying belief that Serbian cultural values are neither respected nor
wanted within the EU. This is particularly evident in quotes attributing stigmatiz-
ing representations to the beliefs of EU member-states, such as the following two
excerpts illustrate;

Excerpt 11: Novi Sad 2:

W2: And the Brits, Swedes and those [countries] look at us, not as second-class
citizens, but as tenth-class.

M3: Well when they think that we’re savages […]

M6: But see, that image will never change because we’ve literally, 20 years, been
presented as poor, miserable and guilty for everything in this region, and that
image will never change unless someone comes to this country and meets people.

What is interesting in this exchange is the positioning of Serbian individuals in

relation to these representations. While participants are aware of the negative represen-
tations of Serbs held by others, and the extent to which these are because of recent
political events, they are able to re-negotiate the actual source of these representations
(Howarth 2006). Namely, similarly to excerpt 7, we see how individuals actively resist
these stigmas by arguing that it is only when Bsomeone comes to this country and meets
people^, meaning that it is not the people themselves that embody these representa-
tions. Rather, these representations have been (wrongfully) imposed on the people,
again reaffirming a sense of victimhood. The thematization of the antinomy of
victimhood/resilience comes to the fore when discussions turn to tangible political
changes. Most problematic here, is of course the future status of Kosovo if Serbia joins
the EU, as participants speculated that the EU would use membership as a bargaining
chip to pressure Serbia into recognizing the independence of Kosovo.

Excerpt 12: Novi Sad 1:

M8: You know, we’re all aware that Kosovo is lost but my personal opinion is that
people wouldn’t accept this publicly because we know that it’s one of the
conditions that we’re asked to fulfil and who knows how many of these conditions
are yet to come if we publicly say ‘okay, Kosovo isn’t ours’. How much more can
they ask of us?
Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75 73

EU conditionality then, particularly in relation to Kosovo, becomes seen as a

normative pressure to strip Serbia of its ‘essence’, both geopolitically and psycholog-
ically in order to become a better fit within the superordinate union. These sacrifices in
turn are seen from a context of an asymmetric power-relationship, where Serbia is
dependent on the EU for sustenance but in turn risk losing their identity in the process.
This political tension with regards to EU integration is framed as a struggle between
being victimized (by being pressured to give up Kosovo) and staying resilient (by never
fully acknowledging or supporting its independence, no matter how ‘real’ it is).
Consequently, while most participants voice concerns and worries about EU integra-
tion, ultimately many of them see no other alternative for the future (i.e., excerpt 9).
The lack of alternatives comes not only from the censorship within the sphere of
politics (i.e., Penic et al. 2016), but more importantly, it becomes an ironic way of
sustaining a sense of continuity in the future. By representing themselves as powerless
(both domestically and internationally), individuals also strip themselves of any agency
or responsibility in bringing about change, instead commending themselves on their
ability to adapt, and adjust, to a corroding society. Ultimately then, these narratives
function to provide individuals with a sense of security and stability; while everything
around them is changing (potentially for the worst), at least they are able to maintain a
sense of continuity with the past, and the sufferings of previous generations of Serbs.

Conclusion

At the heart of both the theme of the domestic and international context is a tension of
answering the question of who we are, and in turn, how we should act. It was illustrated
that the battle of Kosovo, serving as a foundational myth to the Serbian nation,
communicates that Serbian identity is (and continues to be) an identity that is victim-
ized but resilient and strong, an underdog that does not surrender without a fight.
It is important to highlight here that this identity (as with all social identities) exists
and is kept alive within communities of others, whether real or imagined. That is,
B[m]eaning is always relational – and therefore the contestation of meaning can only
occur in relationship.^ (Howarth 2006, p.77). In the present context we saw the
meaning of history and identity be negotiated within a context of a domestic Other
(politicians) and international Other (EU community). Namely, the thema of victim-
hood/resilience, embedded within a context of we/them, was utilized to construct an
essentialized national identity, a process which functioned to adapt in-group identity to
a complex present and recent past, wrought with conflicts and ruptures. It further
functioned to distance participants from those conflicts and ruptures, by positioning
the ‘Other’ as a source of stigmatization (i.e., excerpts 7 and 11), against which a
positive sense of self was constructed and reaffirmed. This in turn allowed participants
to become the embodiment of collective continuity of a historically old nation, despite
circumstantial changes and challenges. Consequently, these processes of meaning-
making became part and parcel of their justifications for, and rejections of, various
political change.
What this study then tells us is that, while history might weigh on the present,
history is also utilized to give meaning to the present and to construct a particular
version of the future, which is seen as aligned with a sense of collective continuity, both
74 Integr Psych Behav (2019) 53:57–75

historical and cultural (Jovchelovitch 2012). By doing so, it inevitably has conse-
quences for the present-day politics which become deemed legitimate for attaining this
future, particularly when social knowledge and psychological attachment become
intertwined and linked with existing geopolitical tensions. The empirical example draw
on in this paper provides an interesting context in which to explore how these processes
are negotiated as they occur, and the importance of considering not only the role of
history, but also the role of place and space, in the construction of psychological
belonging (Hopkins and Dixon 2006).
Research on historical representations, national identity and socio-political change
should thus contemplate the importance of an interdisciplinary approach which con-
siders not only the psychology behind these processes, but also the history through
which they have developed, transformed and solidified, and the political consequences
they bring. The SRT, coupled with a temporal understanding of identity, has the
potential to allow us to do so. Namely, by considering how social representations
become part of constructing continuity and how they become anchored in existing
physical spaces, SRT can realize its full potential as a critical theory of both agency and
resistance (Howarth 2006). Thus, an interdisciplinary approach to socio-political
change would consider the ways in which the meaning attributed to political actions
emerge from the significance these actions have for promoting, or disrupting, a
perceived continuity of the group’s identity and historical narrative. This can only be
done by combining a thick description of the socio-historical context and an analysis of
its role in giving meaning to political and psychological processes of integration,
belonging and change.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest Author declares that she has no conflict of interest.

Human Participants All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance
with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki
declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

Informed Consent Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.

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Sandra Obradović is a PhD candidate in the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science at the
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Her research interests focus on exploring the
connections between history, national identity and socio-political change. Specifically, her current research
explores how processes of identity continuity, compatibility and recognition shape perceptions of suprana-
tional belonging and attitudes towards political change in the context of EU integration.
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