1.) GALANG vs.
REYES
Doctrine:
1. **Ownership through Accretion**: The principle stipulates that
land which emerges as a Result of a river’s natural change in
course belongs, ipso facto, to the owner of the property the new
course traverses. For one to claim ownership of an abandoned
river or creek bed through accretion, they must unequivocally
demonstrate the natural change of course.
2. **Standing in Annulment of Title Actions**: Private individuals
have the standing to file actions for annulment of title and
reconveyance if they assert a prior right of ownership over the
land before the disputed title’s issuance.
FACTS:
The legal battle between Spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang and Spouses
Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (later substituted by their legal
heir, Hermenigildo K. Reyes) revolves around the annulment of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928. The dispute began when the Reyeses
filed a case with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that
through fraudulent means, the Galangs acquired a certificate of title over a
piece of land that was formerly the bed of Marigman Creek. This creek
purportedly dried up and changed its course due to natural events,
inadvertently affecting the land owned by the Reyeses.
The case escalated through various legal channels, with the RTC initially
dismissing the Reyeses’ complaint due to lack of cause of action and
erroneously chosen remedy, concluding that the Galangs obtained the title
through proper legal procedures and that any allegations of fraud were
unsubstantiated.
Dissatisfied, the Reyeses appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
reversed the RTC’s decision and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-928
and the reconveyance of the land to the Reyeses. The CA held that based on
evidence, the land in dispute was indeed part of the abandoned creek bed
and thus should belong to the Reyeses. The Galangs contested this decision
but were denied, prompting them to seek redress from the Supreme Court
(SC).
ISSUE:
The Supreme Court was tasked with determining:
1. Whether the Reyeses could initiate an action for the annulment of a
Free Patent Title and reconveyance of land;
2. Whether the Reyeses successfully established their claim over the
disputed land.
RULING;
The Supreme Court held that the Reyeses had the standing to file an action
for annulment of title and reconveyance, differentiating between actions for
reversion (which would require the government to act) and actions for
annulment of title based on prior ownership claims, where private individuals
have the standing.
However, on the matter of proving their ownership and the fraudulent
registration by the Galangs, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and
found the evidence presented by the Reyeses insufficient. The Supreme
Court noted that the Reyeses failed to convincingly demonstrate that the
land was the dried-up bed of Marigman Creek acquired through natural
accretion. Without substantial proof of the creek’s alleged natural course
change and the ensuing dry bed’s reclassification into private land, the
Supreme Court could not overrule the existing title held by the Galangs.
Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition filed by the Galangs,
effectively reversing the decision of the CA and affirming the RTC’s dismissal
of the complaint for lack of merit.
2.) RONQUILLO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Del Rosario owns a registered land adjacent to Estero Calubcub which is
already dried up due to the dumping of garbage by the sorrounding
neighborhood and not by any natural causes. Defendant now occupies said
dried up land until Del Rosario, claiming ownership over the same, required
him to vacate on the basis of Article 370 of the Civil Code which provides
that riparian owner owns the dried up river bed abandoned by natural
changes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 370 applies
RULING: No.
The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage
systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows
that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as
forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to
acquisition by private ownership.
3.) BAES V. COURT OF APPEALS
The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage
systems. If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to
or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to
compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected
through artificial means.
FACTS:
In 1962, the Government dug up a canal on a private estate in order to
streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek (in other words, there was a mand-
made change of river course). Said private estate was acquired by petitioner
Baes, and was subdivided in to three lots. It was lot 2958-C which was totally
occupied by the canal so the Government in exchange granted him a lot near
but not contiguous to C. The old river bed was filled up by soil from Lot C.
Petitioner now claims ownership over the old river bed on the basis of Article
461 which says that abandoned river beds belong to the riparian owners
whose land is occupied by the new course of water.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 461 applies
RULING: YES!
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of
his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to
compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected
through artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by
the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government
when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was
therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated.
Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B
through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This
was a fair exchange because the two lots were of the same area and value
and the agreement was freely entered into by the parties.
4.)
5.) Leviste Management System v Legaspi Towers
DOCTRINE:
Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are inapplicable
in cases covered by the Condominium Act.
The land belongs to a condominium corporation wherein the builder, as a
unit owner, is considered a stockholder or ngs to member under Sec. 10 of
the Condominium Act. The builder is already in co-ownership with other unit
owners as members or stockholders of the condominium corporation. The
purchaser of a condominium unit binds himself to a contract with other unit
owners
A builder must gain the consent of other registered owners and follow the by-
rules of the condominium before amending the Master Deed.
FACTS:
Legaspi Towers is a 7-floor condominium building with a deck roof and 2
levels above the deck roof, as stated in the Master Deed, at Paseo De Roxas,
Makati City with a unit on the roof deck and 2 levels above said unit called
Concession 2 and Concession 3 Concession 3 was bought by Leviste
Management System (Petitioner).
Petitioner sought to build another unit called Concession 4 on top of
Concession 3 and was able to secure a buiding permit for its construction.
However, Legaspi Towers 200 Inc. (Respondent) sent a notice to Petitioner
that its construction was illegal but the latter did not heed such Petitioner
filed a writ of mandatory injunction against Respondent.
The RTC affirmed Respondent wherein it found application of Art. 448 of the
Civil Code and Depra v. Dumlao. The “air space above the unit actually
belongs to Respondent.
Respondent sought to demolish Concession 4 at the expense of Petitioner.
Respondent argued that Petitioner should first get the consent of the
registered owners of the condominium project before amendment of the
Master Deed under Sec. 4 of the Condominium Act. Petitioner argued that
there must be a determination of the required values under Depra before
Respondent can take action
RTC: Affirmed Respondent
CA: Affirmed RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Respondent can build Concession 4 on top of Petitioner’s
condominium building
HELD:
No. Petitioner contravened the Master Deed by adding a 3 rd level above the
roof deck and by violating the Condominium Act and Respondent’s by-laws.
RATIO: Instead of procuring the required consent of the registered owners
under Sec. 4 of the Condominium Act or having Concession 4 approved by
the members in a regular or special meeting called for the purpose under
Respondent’s by-laws, Petitioner merely had an internal agreement with the
former president of Respondent. This cannot bind corporations since they
can act only through their Board of Directors.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith does not apply where
there is contractual relation between the parties. The RTC erred in
considering Art. 448 and Art 546 of the Civil Code in this case.
Article 448 The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof. (361a)
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor, but
only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been
reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with
the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of
paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason
thereof (453a)
The land belongs to a condominium corporation wherein the builder, as a
unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member under Sec. 10 of the
Condominium Act. The builder is already in co-ownership with other unit
owners as members or stockholders of the condominium corporation. Thus,
the purchaser of a condominium unit binds himself to a contract with other
unit owners
Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are inapplicable
in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and
the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject property
and by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium
corporation)
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 199353 is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 199389 is GRANTED. The Decision dated May
26, 2011 and Resolution dated November 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR. CV No. 88082 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Leviste Management
System, Inc. Is ORDERED to remove Concession 4 at its own expense No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
6.) Pacific Farms Inc. v. Esguerra, G.R. NO. L-21783
DOCTRINE
Established jurisprudence – compensation should be borne by the person
who has been benefited by the accession.
FACTS
November 29, 1969
Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through
another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another,
shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to
the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to
remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work
constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being
destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the
materials may remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for
damages.
On October 1, 1956 to March 2, 1957 the Carried Lumber Company sold and
delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms Inc. which
the latter used in the construction of the six buildings at its compound in
Bolinao, Pangasinan, of the total procurement price of P15,000.00, the sum
of P4,710.18 has not been paid. Consequently, the Company instituted a civil
case to recover the unpaid balance and the court sustained their claim. The
defendant sheriff levied the buildings constructed. The Pacific Farms, Inc.
filed a suit against the Carried Lumber Company and the sheriff asserting
ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular
Farms by virtue of absolute sale executed on March 21, 1958. Pacific prays
that the judicial sale of the six buildings be declared null and void. The trial
court rendered judgment annulling the levy and the certificate of sale.
However, it denied the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages on
the ground that it was not "prepared to find there was gross negligence or
bad faith on the part of any defendants"
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the application by analogy of the rules of accession would
suffice for a just adjudication.
RULING/S
Yes, it would suffice. Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a principal
and an accessory: the land being considered the principal, and the plantings,
constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good
faith whether personally or through another makes constructions or works
thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of
the said materials with the obligation however of paying for their value. On
the other hand, the owner of the materials is entitled to remove them,
provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has
the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials. Applying article
447 by analogy, the Court consider the buildings as the principal and the
lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the
accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the
obligation to pay for the values of the said materials; the appellant — which
apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were
minded to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the
buildings the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber
and construction materials. A well established jurisprudence is the rule that
compensation should be borne by the person who has been benefited by the
accession.
7.)
Facts:
Background of the Property and Titles
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of the
Pangarap Village property in Caloocan City, consisting of 156 hectares
divided into three parcels registered under Carmel Farms, Inc. with TCT Nos.
(62603) 15634, (62605) 15632, and (64007) 15807.
The specific lot in controversy is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73, which is presently
occupied by the petitioner.
Impact of Presidential Decree No. 293
On September 14, 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD No. 293,
which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared the property open for
disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc.
(MHAI).
A memorandum was inscribed on the title stating that the certificate of title
was “declared invalid and null and void ab initio” and that the property was
open for disposition under Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended.
Petitioner's Possession and Improvements
Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan (a member of MHAI),
occupied Lot No. 32 and constructed houses based on the rights conferred
under PD 293.
In 1995, petitioner took over the lot via an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M.
Juan, thereafter constructing improvements on it.
Judicial Developments and the Tuason Case
On January 29, 1988, the Supreme Court in Tuason v. Register of Deeds,
Caloocan City, declared PD 293 unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its
parts, ordering the cancellation of the memorandum inscribed on the titles
and the restoration of respondent’s ownership.
The Register of Deeds subsequently cancelled the memorandum on
respondent’s title on February 17, 1988, thereby restoring respondent’s title
and ownership of the entire property.
Proceedings on Unlawful Detainer
Respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MeTC on
January 14, 2003 after having sent multiple oral and written demands (the
latter in April 2002) for petitioner to vacate the premises.
The MeTC rendered a Decision on November 9, 2007 ordering petitioner to
vacate the property and pay attorney’s fees and costs, while the RTC
reversed the eviction order on April 30, 2008, citing that the complaint did
not establish unlawful detainer since possession was under color of title
stemming from PD 293.
Court of Appeals Resolution and Further Motions
On September 24, 2008, respondent appealed to the CA, which on May 25,
2010, reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the MeTC’s order, finding
that petitioner had no right to continued possession.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA which was later
denied by resolution on October 15, 2010, leading to the filing of the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner qualifies as a builder in good faith who may be entitled to
reimbursement of his useful expenses under Article 545 of the Civil Code
Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that Petitioner may not be deemed to be a builder in
good faith.
Petitioner also argues that he is a builder in good faith for want of knowledge
of any infirmity in the promulgation of P.D. 293.65 Being a builder in good
faith, he believes that he is entitled to the reimbursement of his useful
expenses and that he has a right to retain possession of the premises,
pending reimbursement of the value of his improvements to be proven
during trial, in accordance with Article 545 of the Civil Code.66
Upon perusal of the records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder
in good faith. A builder in good faith is aone who builds with the belief that
the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to
build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.a67 Since
petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his
predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or about seven
years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of the
binding effect of that ruling. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of
the land, its existence should be a[o]n one hand, x x x matter of mandatory
judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia legis non excusat.a68 He thus loses
whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity, in
accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.69
8.) G.R. No. 157044 October 5, 2005
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, (represented by his heirs, Rodolfo, Jr., Romeo Allan,
Lillian Rhodora, Roy Victor, Roger Lyle and Alexander Nicolai, all surnamed
Rosales) and LILY ROSQUETA-ROSALES, Petitioners vs. MIGUEL CASTELLTORT,
JUDITH CASTELLTORT, and LINA LOPEZ-VILLEGAS, assisted by her Attorney-in-
Fact, Rene Villegas, Respondents.
FACTS
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales
(petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
approximately 315 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 368564 and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRC
Psd-55244 situated in Los Baños, Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners
discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their
knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort). It
turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a
lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas
(Lina) through her son-attorney-infact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a
survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as
the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased. Petitioners filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages. To the complaint, the Castelltorts
claimed in their Answer with Counterclaim that they were builders in good
faith. Lina soon filed a Motion for Intervention. In her Answer to the
complaint, Lina alleged that the Castelltorts acted in good faith in
constructing the house on petitioners’ lot as they in fact consulted her before
commencing any construction thereon, they having relied on the technical
description of the lot sold to them, Lot 16, which was verified by her officially
designated geodetic engineer.
ISSUE Whether or not Miguel Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
RULING: A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land
he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build
thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. Article 527 of the
Civil Code provides that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. The
records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on
petitioners’ lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to
him by Villegas. The confusion in the identification of Lot 16 was eventually
traced to the error committed by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera’s
employees in placing stone monuments on petitioners’ property, instead of
on Lot 16, the lot sold to Castelltort, based on the survey made by the
engineer in 1992. As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in
good faith at least until August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this case
is Article 448 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not
the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant
to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the
case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith
ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true owner.
In the case at bar, Castelltort’s good faith ceased on August 21, 1995 when
petitioners personally apprised him of their title over the questioned lot.
Considering that appellants had ceased as builders in good faith at the time
that appellant Miguel was notified of appellees’ lawful title over the disputed
property, the payment of reasonable rent should accordingly commence at
that time since he can no longer avail of the rights provided under the law
for builders in good faith.
9.)
DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA
When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is terminated,
Article 448 governs in case real property (like a house) encroaches the land
of another. This is provided that good faith exists.
FACTS:
The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at
Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and
Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45 square meters
(which is about the size of a typical Starbux café)
Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two
lots. 30 square meters went to the plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to
the defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the house
of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s adjacent lot, eating 5
sqm of it. The parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate who should
take possession of the encroached 5 sqm.
The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the
Plaintiff cannot be obliged to pay for the portion of defendant’s house that
entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the
price of the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of
co-ownership should govern, and not that of accession.
RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to
demolish the 5sqm part of their house encroaching the 30sqm lot of the
Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family home, hence
they appealed.
CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.
ISSUE:
w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on property that
used to be co-owned, but was subdivided.
HELD:
The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was terminated upon the
partitioning of the lot. Art 448 therefore governs. The house of Defendant
overlapped that of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith. Hence, the
plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options
> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after
indemnifying the Defendants; or
> Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their home
rested. ( or they can rent it)
