Digests On Usufructs
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so hee's gfDigests On Usufructs
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so hee's gfa nddeliveringtoherthecorrespondingcertificateof
stock, claimingthatsaiddividend,althoughpaidout
Usufructs
intheformofstock,isfruitorincomeandtherefore
1. I n the matter of the testateestateofEmilMaurice belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant.
Bachrach, Bachrach vs. Seifert, G.R. No. L-2659,
October 12, 1950 ophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff (legal heirs)
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opposed said petition on the ground that the stock
octrine:
D dividendinquestionwasnotincomebutformedpart
Massachusetts Rule. of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
● It regards cashdividends,howeverlarge,asincome, usufructuary but to the remainderman.
and stock dividends, however made, as capital. It
holds that a stock dividend is not in any truesense I ssue:
anytruesenseanydividendatallsinceitinvolvesno W/N a stock dividend is a fruit or income, which
divisionorseverancefromthecorporateassetsofthe belongs to the usufructuary[YES]
dividend; that it does not distribute property but
simply dilutes the sharesastheyexistedbefore;and uling:
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that it takes nothing from the property of the The Court applied the Pennsylvania rule as it is in
corporation, and nothing to the interests of the accordancewithourstatutorylaws.UnderSection16
shareholders. oftheCorporationLaw,nocorporationmaymakeor
declare any dividend exceptfromthesurplusprofits
Pennsylvania Rule. arising from its business. Any dividend, therefore,
● All earnings of the corporation made prior to the whether cash or stock, represents surplus profits.
deathofthetestatorstockholderbelongtothecorpus Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the
of theestate,andthatallearnings,whendeclaredas usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the
dividendsinwhateverform,madeduringthelifetime natural, industrial, and civil fruits ofthepropertyin
of the usufructuary or life tenant. usufruct. And Articles 474 and 475 provide as
● Itisclearthattestatorintenttheremaindermenshould follows:
haveonlythecorpusoftheestateheleftintrust,and
thatalldividendsshouldgothelifetenants.Itistrue ● A RT.474.Civilfruitsaredeemedtoaccrue
that profits realized are not dividendsuntildeclared day by day, and belong totheusufructuary
by the proper officials of the corporation, but in proportion to the time the usufruct may
distribution of profits, however made, in dividends, last.
and the form of the distribution is immaterial. ● ART.475.Whenausufructiscreatedonthe
right to receive an income or periodical
acts:
F revenue, either in money or fruits, or the
ThedeceasedE.M.Bachrach,wholeftnoforcedheir interest on bonds or securities payable to
except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach,inhis bearer, each matured payment shall be
lastwillandtestamentmadevariouslegaciesincash considered as the proceeds or fruits such
andwilledtheremainderofhisestate.Uponthedeath right.
of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half of all his
estate shallbe“dividedshareandsharealikebyand hen it consists of the enjoyment of the
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between my legal heirs, to the exclusion of my benefits arising from an interest in an
brothers.” industrial or commercial enterprise, the
profits of which arenotdistributedatfixed
heestateofE.M.Bachrachreceivedfromthelatter
T periods, such profits shall have the same
54,000sharesrepresenting50percentstockdividend consideration.
on the said 108,000 shares.
I n either case they shall be distributed as
ary McDonald Bachrach (usufructuary or life
M civil fruits, and shall be applied in
tenantoftheestate)filedapetitioninthelowercourt accordance with the rulesprescribedbythe
toauthorizethePeoplesBankandTrustCompanyas next preceding article.
administrator oftheestateofE.M.Bachrach,toher
thesaid54,000shareofstockdividendbyendorsing
he 108,000 shares of stock are part of the
T d esire for the spouses to build their house on her
property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock property and stay thereat for as long as they like.
dividend are civil fruits of the original investment.
They represent profits, and the delivery of the he MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner and
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certificate of stock covering said dividend is declaredthattherighttousesuchpropertyisdeemed
equivalenttothepaymentofsaidprofits.Saidshares extinguished upon demand by the petitioner. RTC
maybesoldindependentlyoftheoriginalshares,just reversed MTCC, holding that respondents’
as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold possession of the property in question was not by
independently of its mother. mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her
express consent. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
2. M
oralidad vs. Spouses Pernes, G.R. No. 152809 dismissalofunlawfuldetainerforbeingpremature,to
August 3, 2006 the CA, the unlawful detainer suit requires the
Facts: cessation of respondents’ right to possess, and the
At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land issue of whether respondents’ right to possess a
located in Davao Cityandregisteredinthenameof portion of petitioner’s land had alreadyexpiredwas
petitioner Mercedes. In her younger days,petitioner not yet resolved. Hence the instant issue raised by
taught in Davao, QC and Manila. Shefurtheredher petitioner at hand.
studiesinUSAandthereupon,hadtheopportunityto
teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese. Issue/s:
Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health 1) W/N the CA erred in dismissing the
DepartmentofsaidUniversityforthenextseventeen unlawful detainer suit for being premature
(17) years, and during those years, shewouldcome [YES - usufruct ito]
home to the Philippines to spend her two-month 2) W/N the usufruct is deemed extinguished
summer vacation in the house of her niece, [YES]
respondentArlenePernes,adaughterofheryounger
sister, Rosario. In 1986, she received news from uling:
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Arlene that Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City The Court rules for the petitioner. The Court is
was infested by NPA rebels, she immediately sent inclined to agree with the CA that what was
money to Araceli, Arlene’s older sister, with constituted between the parties herein is one of
instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner
Arlene and her family could settle down. being the owner of the property upon whom the
naked title remained and the respondents being
etitioner acquired the lot property initially for the
P two(2)amongotherunnamedusufructuarieswho
purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to were simply referred to as petitioner’s kin. The
Davao City properbutlatershewantedtheproperty Court, however, cannot go along with the CA’s
tobealsoavailabletoanyofherkinswishingtolive holdingthattheactionforunlawfuldetainermustbe
andsettleinDavaoCity.Petitionermadeknownthis dismissed on ground of prematurity.
intention in a document she executed on July 21,
1986. Upon retirement, petitioner came back to the sufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil
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Philippinestostaywiththerespondentsonthehouse Code in the following wise:
they built on the subject property. In the course of
time, their relations turned sour and ugly incidents RT. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the
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interspersed with violent confrontations transpired. propertyofanotherwiththeobligationofpreserving
itsformandsubstance,unlessthetitleconstitutingit
I n1998petitionerfiledwiththeMTCCofDavaoan or the law otherwise provides.
unlawfuldetainersuitagainsttherespondentspouses.
Petitioner alleged that sheistheregisteredownerof sufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply
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the land and that through her counsel, she sent the allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also
respondentspousesaletterdemandingthemtovacate defined as the righttoenjoythepropertyofanother
the premises and to pay rentals, which the temporarily,includingboththejusutendiandthejus
respondents refused to heed. Respondents as a fruendi, with the owner retainingthejusdisponendi
defense, cited the document executed by the or the power to alienate the same.
petitioner wherein the latter expressly signified her
I t is undisputed that petitioner, in adocumentdated e disagree with theCA’sconclusionoflawonthe
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July 21,1986,supra,madeknownherintentionto matter. The term orperiodoftheusufructoriginally
give respondents and her other kins the right to specifiedprovidesonlyoneofthebasesfortheright
use and to enjoythefruitsofherproperty.There ofausufructuarytoholdandretainpossessionofthe
canalsobenoquibblingabouttherespondentsbeing thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or
given the right "to build their own house" on the instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered
property and to stay there "as long as they like." terminated or extinguished.Forsure,theCivilCode
Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
"p roceedsorincomederivedfromtheaforementioned
properties" for the petitioner’s "nearest kins who ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
have less in life in greater percentage and lesser
percentage to those who are better offinstanding." ( 1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a
The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents contrary intention clearly appears;
notonlytherighttousethepropertybutalsogranted
them, among the petitioner’s other kins,therightto ( 2) By expiration of the period for which it was
enjoy the fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory
therefore, with the CA’s ruling that usufruct was condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
constituted between petitioner and respondents.Itis
thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease ( 3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership inthe
contract between the parties. same person;
owever, determinative of the outcome of the
H (4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
ejectmentcaseistheresolutionofthenextissue,i.e.,
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to
have been extinguished or terminated. If the
( 6) By the termination of the right of the person
question is resolved in the affirmative, then the
constituting the usufruct;
respondents’righttopossession,proceedingasitdid
from their right of usufruct, likewiseceased.Inthat (7) By prescription.
case,petitioner’sactionforejectmentintheunlawful
detainer case could proceed and should prosper. he document executed by the petitionerdatedJuly
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21, 1986 constitutes the titlecreating,andsetsforth
I t is undisputed that petitioner expressly authorized the conditions of, theusufruct.Paragraph#3thereof
respondents to occupy portion of her property on states "[ T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the
which their house may be built. Thus – "it is my privilege to stay therein and may avail the use
desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
build their house therein and stay as long as they inimical to the purpose thereof.” What may be
like." From this statement, it seems that petitioner inimicaltothepurposeconstitutingtheusufructmay
had given the respondents the usufructuary rights be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein
over the portion that may be occupiedbythehouse petitioner made it abundantlyclear"thatanybodyof
that the latter would build, the duration of which my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned
beingdependentonhowlongrespondentswouldlike property should maintain an atmosphere of
to occupy theproperty.Whilepetitionerhadalready cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid
demanded from the respondentsthesurrenderofthe bickeringwithoneanother."Thatthemaintenanceof
premises, this Court is of the opinion that the a peaceful and harmonious relations between and
usufructuary rights of respondents had not been amongkinconstitutesanindispensableconditionfor
terminated by the saiddemandconsideringtheclear the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced
statement of petitioner that she is allowing from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner
respondentstooccupyportionofherlandaslongas stated"[ T]hatanyoneofmykinswhocannotconform
the latter want to. Considering thatrespondentsstill with the wishes of theundersignedmayexercisethe
wanttooccupythepremises,petitionerclearlycannot freedomtolookforhisown."Infine,theoccurrence
eject respondents. ofanyofthefollowing:thelossoftheatmosphereof
cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of
harmonious relationship between/among kin
c onstitutes a resolutory condition which, by introducedthereonwithoutdamagingthepetitioner’s
express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the property.
usufruct.
ut of thegenerosityofherheart,thepetitionerhas
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rom the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is
F allowed therespondentspousestouseandenjoythe
indubitable that there were indeed facts and fruitsofherpropertyforquitealongperiodoftime.
circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be They opted, however, to repay a noblegesturewith
deemedterminatedorextinguishedbytheoccurrence unkindness. At the end of the day, therefore, they
of the resolutory conditions provided for inthetitle really cannot begrudge their aunt forputtinganend
creatingtheusufruct,namely,thedocumentadverted to their right of usufruct. The disposition herein
to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986. arrivedisnotonlylegalandcalledforbythelawand
facts of the case. It is also right.
hus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity
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betweenthepetitionerandthePernesfamilyandthe he petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
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violence and humiliation she was made to endure, and Resolution oftheCAareREVERSEDandSET
despite her advanced age and frail condition, are ASIDE. Accordingly, the decision of the MTCC is
enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that all of
having been terminated. respondents’ counterclaims are dismissed, including
their claims for reimbursement of useful and
oreiterate,therelationshipbetweenthepetitioner
T necessary expenses.
and respondents respecting the property in
question is one of owner and usufructuary. 3. F
abie vs. David, G.R. No. L-123, December 12,
1945
I f the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be Facts:
governedbyArts.579and580.Incaselikethis,the Petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the
terms of the contractandthepertinentprovisionsof income of certain houses located at Sto. Cristo, in
law should govern. which the owner is respondent Juan Grey.
y express provision of law, respondents, as
B itigationarosebetweenJosefaFabieasplaintiffand
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usufructuary,donothavetherighttoreimbursement JuanGreyasdefendantandtheowneroftheOngpin
for the improvements they may have introduced on property as intervenors,involvingtheadministration
the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the ofthehousesmentionedinundertheninthclauseof
Civil Code: the will of deceased Rosario Fabie. A suit was
decided by the court upon a stipulation in writing
rt.579.Theusufructuarymaymakeontheproperty
A that,“theusufructuaryshallcollectalltherentsofthe
held in usufruct such useful improvements or both the Sto. Cristo and the Ongpin properties.”
expenses for mere pleasure as hemaydeemproper,
provided hedoesnotalteritsformorsubstance;but J osefa Fabie commenced an action of unlawful
heshallhavenorighttobeindemnifiedtherefor.He detaineragainsttherespondentNgoBooSoo(who
may,however,removesuchimprovements,shouldit says that his correct name is Ngo Soo), alleging in
bepossibletodosowithoutdamagetotheproperty. her amended complaint that the defendant is
(Emphasis supplied.) occupying the premises the Santo Cristo on a
month-to month rental payable in advance not later
rt. 580. The usufructuary may set off the
A than the 5th of each month; that she is the
improvements he may have made on the property administratrixandusufructuaryofsaidpremises;and
against any damage to the same. she prayed for judgment of eviction and for unpaid
rentals.
iven the foregoing perspective, respondents will
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havetobeorderedtovacatethepremiseswithoutany
efendant Ngo Soo contends that he wasandsince
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rightofreimbursement.Iftheruleonreimbursement
1908 had been a tenant ofthepremisesinquestion,
or indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary
whichhewasusingandhadalwaysusedprincipally
might, as an author pointed out, improvetheowner
asastoreandsecondarilyforlivingquarters;thathe
out of his property. The respondents may, however,
remove or destroy theimprovementstheymayhave
asrentingitfromitsownerandadministratorJuan
w a ll the taxes, special assessments, and insurance
Grey. premiums thereon — were by saidjudgmentvested
in the usufructuary.
J uan Grey intervened in the suit, alleging that the
only right recognized in favor of Josefa Fabie as hus, petitioner likewise has the right to to choose
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usufructuary of the income of said premises is to herselfasthetenantthereof,ifshewishesto;and,as
receive the rents therefrom when due; and that as shefulfillsherobligationtopaythetaxesandinsure
usufructuary she has no right nor authority to andconservethepropertyproperly,theownerhasno
administerthesaidpremisesnortoleasethemnorto legitimate cause tocomplain.AsJudgeNableofthe
evicttenants,whichrightandauthorityarevestedin municipal court said in hisdecision,"thepretension
the intervenor as owner of the premises. that the plaintiff, being a mere usufructuary of the
rents,cannotoccupytheproperty,isillogicalifitbe
TC:Theplaintiffusufructuaryistheadministratrix
M taken into accountthatthatcouldnothavebeenthe
of the premises in question, intention of the testatrix."
TC:Dismissedfortheff.themainissueis,“w
R hois 4. G
aboya vs. Cui, G.R. No. L-19614, March 27, 1971
entitledtoadministerthepropertysubjectmatter Facts:
ofthiscaseandwhoshouldbethetenant,andthe ThisisanappealfromtheRTCDecisiondenyingthe
conditions of the lease” which is under the contract of sale executed by the late Don Mariano
jurisdiction of the MTC. CuiinfavorofthreeofhischildrenAntonioMa.Cui,
Mercedes Cui de Ramas and Rosario Cui de
I ssue: Encarnacion.
W/N this is anactionforUDoranactioninvolving
thetitletoortherespectiveinterestsofthepartiesin on Mariano Cui, widower, as owner of some lots
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the property subject of the litigation? [A
CTION sold three commercial lots to three of his children
FOR UD] named Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de
RamasandAntonioMa.Cui,proindivisoforthesum
uling:
R of P64,000. Because of the sale of these lots pro
The question involved in this case is purely indivisoandbecauseofthecancellationofthesaleto
possessory as there is no dispute to thetitletoor oneofthethreeoriginalvendees,DonMarianoand
the respective interests of the parties in the his children Mercedes and Antonio became
property in question. co-owners ofthewholemassinequalportions.In
the deed ofsale,vendorDonMarianoretainedfor
y virtue offinaljudgment,therewasanagreement
B himself the usufruct of the property in the
thattheusufructuaryshallcollectalltherentsofsaid following words: “...do hereby sell, transfer, and
propertyforherselfwiththeobligationonherpartto convey to Messrs. Rosario C. de Encarnacion,
payalltherealestatetaxes,specialassessments,and Mercedes C. de Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, the
insurance premiums,andmakeallnecessaryrepairs; above-mentionedparceloflandinequalparts,...and
andincaseofdefaultonherparttheownershallthe thefurtherconsideration,thatI,shallenjoythefruits
righttodoanyorallofthosethings,inwhichevent andrentsofthesame,aslongasmynaturallifeshall
he shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents last.Grantingandconveyinguntothesaidbuyersthe
untiltheamountspaidbyhimarefullysatisfied,after full rights as owners to enjoy the constructive
which the usufructuary shall again collect therents. possessionofthesame,improve,constructanderect
Such agreement shall be binding during thetermof a building in the lot, ordowhatevertheybelieveto
the usufruct. be proper and wise”
asedontheforegoingjudgmentandupontheninth
B ubsequently,abuildingwaserectedonaportionof
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clauseofthewillofthedeceasedRosarioGreywhere thismassfacingCalderonstreetandwasoccupiedby
petitioner was made as the usufructuary, the Court a Chinese businessman for which he paid Don
declared that she has the right to administer the Mariano P600 a month as rental.
property in question.Alltheactsofadministration
—tocollecttherentsforherself,andtoconservethe ercedes and Antonio then applied for a loan to
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property by makingallnecessaryrepairsandpaying constructa12-doorcommercialbuildingpresumably
o n a portion of the entire parcel corresponding to uling:
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their share. Don Mariano executed an authority to It merely entitles the usufructuary to receive a
mortgage, authorizing histwochildrenco-ownersto reasonablerentalfortheportionofthelandoccupied
mortgage his share. by the building.
he 12-door commercial building was eventually
T he usufructuary rights of the lateDonMariano
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constructedandthebuilder-ownersthereofMercedes Cui,reservedinthedeedofsale,wasovertheland
and Antonio received and continued to receive the alone and did not entitle him to the rents of the
rents thereof amounting to P4,800 a month and building later constructed thereon by defendants
payingtherefromtheinstallmentsdueforpaymenton Mercedes and Antonio Cui at their own expense.
the loan to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Said usufructuary was entitled only to the
reasonable rental value of the land occupied by
J esusandJorge(twootherchildrenofDonMariano) the buildingaforementioned.Suchrentalvaluenot
filed an action to annul he deed ofsaleofthethree having been liquidated until the judgment under
lots in question on thegroundthattheybelongedto appeal was rendered, Antonio and Mercedes Cui
the conjugal partnership of Don Mariano and his werenotindefaultpriorthereto,andthedeedofsale
deceased wife Antonia Perales, but the same was wastherefore,notsubjecttorescission.Asfoundby
denied. the court below, the reasonable rental value of the
land occupied by the defendants' building totalled
osarioEncarnacion(daughterofDonMariano)filed
R P100,088.80uptothetimetheusufructuarydiedand
a petition to declare her father incompetent and to the usufruct terminated.
have a guardian appointed for his property, which
was granted and Reynes was appointed guardian of 5. N
HA vs. CA, G.R. No. 148830, April 13, 2005
his property. Facts:
PresidentMarcosissuedProc.No.481(1968)setting
uardian Victorino Reynes filed a motion in the
G aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City
guardianshipproceedingsseekingauthoritytocollect owned by the NHAasreservedpropertyforthesite
therentalsfromthethreelotsinquestionandasking of National Government Center (NGC).
theCourttoorderAntonioandMercedestodeliverto Subsequently, he issued Proc. No. 1670 (1977),
him as guardian all the rentals they had previously which removed a 7-hectare portion from the
collected. 120-hectareland,givingtheusufructuaryrightstothe
“xxxManilaSeedlingBankFoundation,Inc.,foruse
TC: It was not conjugal property but belonged
R initsoperationandprojects,subjecttoprivaterights
exclusivelytoDonMarianoandsoupheldthesaleof if any there be, and to future survey, under the
two-thirds of said lots to Antonio and Mercedes. administrationoftheFoundation.Thisparcelofland,
which shall embrace 7hectares,shallbedetermined
HIRD CASE NA ITO !!!
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The complaint alleges that the usufructuary right descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and
reserved in favor of DonMarianoCuiextendsto most particularly on the original survey ofthearea,
and includes the rentals of the building datedJuly1910toJune1911,andonthesubdivision
constructedbyAntonioCuiandMercedesCuion survey dated April 19-25, 1968.” Over the years,
the land sold to them by their father; that the MSBF occupied the area but it exceeded the
defendantsretainedthoserentalsforthemselves;that 7-hectare area of the usufruct and occupied 16
the usufructuary rights of the vendor were of the hectaresinstead.BythenthelandoccupiedbyMSBF
essenceofthesale,andtheirviolationentitledhimto was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
rescind (or resolve) the sale. (EDSA)tothewest,AghamRoadtotheeast,Quezon
Avenuetothesouthandacreektothenorth.In1987,
I ssue:W/Nthereservedrightofusufructinfavorof MSBF leasedaportionofitsareatoBGCandother
the late Don Mariano includes the rentals of the stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA,
12-door commercial building [NO] whichoccupies4,590squaremetersofthe16-hectare
area. In November 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino
issuedMO127whichrevokedthereservedstatusof
the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of the
1 20hectaresoftheNHApropertyreservedassitesof
the NGC. It also authorized the NHA to nother point in the case: Article 605 of the Civil
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commercializetheareaandtosellittothepublic.In Code states: Usufruct cannot beconstitutedinfavor
August 1988, acting pursuant to MO 127,theNHA of a town, corporation, or associationformorethan
gave BGC 10 days to vacateitsoccupiedarea.Any fifty years. If ithasbeenconstituted,andbeforethe
structureleftbehindaftertheexpirationofthe10-day expiration of such period the townisabandoned,or
periodwillbedemolishedbyNHA.BGCthenfileda the corporation or association is dissolved, the
complaintforinjunctionon21April1988beforethe usufructshallbeextinguishedbyreasonthereof.Proc.
trial court. On 26 May 1988, BGC amended its No.1670wasissuedin1977,or28yearsago.Hence,
complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.Both underArticle605,theusufructinfavorofMSBFhas
the NHA and MSBF conducted surveys on the 22 years left.MO 127 released approximately 50
subject parcel of land. hectaresoftheNHApropertyasreservedsiteforthe
NGC. However,itdoesnotaffectMSBF’s7-hectare
I ssue: area since under Proc. No. 1670, MSBF’s7-hectare
W/NtheMSBFhastherighttodeterminethesubject area was already excluded from the operation of
7-hectare portion of land[YES] Proc. No. 481, which established the NGC Site.
uling:
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TheSupremeCourtruled intheaffirmative.Art.565
states that, the rights and obligations of the
usufructuary shall be those provided in the title
constituting the usufruct; in default of suchtitle,
or in case it is deficient,theprovisionscontained
in the two following Chapters shall be observed.
I n the present case, Proc. No. 1670 is the title
constitutingtheusufruct.Itcategoricallystatesthat
the 7-hectare area shall be determined by future
survey under the administration of the
Foundation subject to private rights if there be
any.ItauthorizedMSBFtodeterminethelocation
of the 7-hectare area. This authority, coupled with
thefactthatProc.No.1670didnotstatethelocation
ofthe7-hectarearea,leavingnoroomfordoubtthat
Proc.No.1670leftittoMSBFtochoosethelocation
oftheseven-hectareareaunderitsusufruct.However,
the Court cannot countenance MSBF’s act of
exceeding the 7-hectare portion granted to it bythe
proclamation. A usufruct is not simply about rights
andprivileges.Ausufructuaryhasthedutytoprotect
the owner’s interests. Article601oftheCivilCode
states:theusufructuaryshallbeobligedtonotifythe
ownerofanyactofathirdperson,ofwhichhemay
haveknowledge,thatmaybeprejudicialtotherights
ofownership,andheshallbeliableshouldhenotdo
so, for damages, asiftheyhadbeencausedthrough
hisownfault.Thecontroversywouldnothavearisen
had MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use
given to it. Hence,thereisaneedforanewsurvey,
conductedjointlybytheNHAandMSBF,toconsider
existingstructuresofMSBFandasmuchaspossible
include all of the facilities of MSBF within the
7-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.
I ssue:
6. V
da. de Albar vs. Carandang, G.R. No. L-13361, W/Otheusufructincludedthebuildingandtheland?
December 29, 1959 (YES)
Doctrine:
uling:
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acts:
F The Court ruledintheaffirmative,notingthatwhen
Petitioners were the heirs of the late Doña Rosario the deceased constituted the life usufruct on the
FabieyGrey(DoñaRosario),whowastheownerof rentals, she meant to impose the encumbrance on
a lot in the City of Manila with a building and boththebuildingandthelandonwhichitiserected,
improvements erected thereon. The respondent, on forindeed,thebuildingcannotexistwithouttheland.
the other hand, was the goddaughter of Doña The land, being an indispensable part of the rented
Rosario. When the latter died, she left the naked premises, cannot be considered to have no rental
ownership of the property tothepetitionersbywill. valuewhatsoever.Moreover,intheSpanishlanguage,
Meanwhile, the respondent was declared the the term “fincas” has a broad scope; itincludesnot
usufructuary for life. only buildingsbutalsoland.Sinceonlythebuilding
wasdestroyedandtheusufructisconstitutednotonly
owever, during the war, the building was burned,
H onthebuildingbutalsoontheland,thentheusufruct
leaving only the walls and other improvements that is notdeemedextinguishedbythedestructionofthe
were not destroyed by fire. A Chinaman offered to building, for under the law, usufructisextinguished
lease the property for a period of five years with a only by the “total loss” of the thing subject to the
monthly rental of P500;atthesametime,heagreed encumbrance.
toconstructanewbuildingonthelotworthP30,000,
provided that both the naked owner and the urthermore, Art. 517, now Art. 607 of the Civil
F
usufructuary sign the lease agreement. In relation Code provides that "if the usufructisconstitutedon
thereto, the respondent maintains that she has the immovable property of whichabuildingformspart,
exclusive right to lease the property and to receive and the latter should be destroyed in any manner
thefullrentalvaluebyvirtueofherrighttousufruct. whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to
The petitioners, however, maintain that the right of make use of the land and materials. This is a
usufruct was extinguished when the building was temporary measure calculated to maintain the
destroyed. usufruct alive until the very thing that has been
destroyedbereconstructedorreplaced.Thereasonis
evertheless, in order for the leaseagreementtobe
N obvious:sincetheusufructhasnotbeenextinguished
finalized, the parties agreed on a temporary bythedestructionofthebuildingandtheusufructis
compromise whereby the naked owners would for life as in this case, it is but fair that the
receiveP100,or20%ofthemonthlyrentalofP500, usufructuarycontinuetoenjoytheuseofthelandand
while the usufructuary would receive the remaining the materials that they may be constructed on the
80%, or P400, of the monthly rental. land. To hold otherwise would be to affirmthatthe
usufruct has been extinguished.
I n 1952, the petitioner filed an action to settle the
dispute andconflictingviews,prayingthatjudgment
berendereddeclaringthattheusufructinfavorofthe
respondentislimitedtoreceivingthelegalintereston
thevalueoftheland,andthatherrighttoreceiveany
rental under the contract entered into between the
parties has already ceased - since the usufruct is
extinguished by reason of the destruction of the
building.Ontheotherhand,respondentcontendsthat
the provision should be interpreted asconstitutinga
life usufruct both on the buildings and the lands
because the former cannot be separated from the
latter.
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