1.1.

Statute - Meaning, Nature and Classification

What are Statutes?

The term “Statutes” has a specific legal meaning. As per Black’s Law Dictionary, a
“Statute” refers to a formal written rule created by a legislative authority, such as
a country, state, city or county. Statutes often dictate what is allowed or not
allowed or they lay out official policies. This term is typically used to distinguish
laws created by legislative bodies from the judgments made by common law
courts and the rules established by government agencies.
In the Indian Constitution, the term “Statute” is not used; instead, the term “law”
is employed. According to Article 13(3)(a) of the Indian Constitution, the definition
of “law” includes ordinances, orders, by-laws, rules, regulations, notifications,
customs or practices that have the power of law within the territory of India.
A Statute, essentially, represents the intent of the legislative body. It may include
various components, such as a short title, long title, preamble, marginal notes,
section headings, interpretation clauses, provisions, examples, exceptions, saving
clauses, explanations, schedules and punctuation. These elements collectively
make up the content and structure of a statute.
Nature of Statutes
Statutes are formal, written laws enacted by a legislative body, such as a
parliament or congress. They represent the expressed will of the legislature and
are typically used to declare, command, or prohibit something. Statutes can be
classified by their duration, nature of operation, object, and extent of application.
Formal and Written:
Statutes are always formally written and approved by a legislative body,
distinguishing them from unwritten common law.
Expressed Will of the Legislature:
They reflect the deliberate intent of the legislative body to establish rules or
regulations.
Scope:
Statutes can have a broad scope, applying to entire countries, states, or specific
regions, or they can be narrowly focused on a particular issue.
Purpose:
Statutes can serve various purposes, including:
Codifying: Summarizing and organizing existing law.
Enabling: Authorizing or making something lawful that was previously unlawful.
Remedial: Addressing a specific problem or issue.
Penal: Imposing penalties for certain actions.
Interpretation:
The interpretation of statutes is a crucial aspect of legal practice, as courts strive
to discern the legislature's intent when applying the law to specific cases.
What is the Classification of Statutes?
Classification of Statutes can be done based on their duration, nature of
operation, purpose and scope.
Classification of Statutes by Duration
Temporary Statute: A temporary statute is one that specifies a fixed period of
operation and validity within the statute itself. It remains in effect until the
specified time elapses unless repealed earlier. If the legislature wishes to extend
its effect, a new enactment is required. For example, the Finance Act is a
temporary statute, requiring annual reauthorisation.
Permanent Statute: A permanent statute doesn’t have a predefined expiration
date. However, this doesn’t make the statute unchangeable. It can be amended
or repealed by another act.
Classification of Statutes by Method
Mandatory, Imperative or Obligatory Statute: A mandatory statute compels
the performance of certain actions or dictates that specific things must be carried
out in a particular manner or form. Non-compliance typically leads to legal
consequences.
Directory or Permissive Statute: A directory statute merely provides guidance
or permission for actions without compelling their performance. In some cases,
statutes prescribe conditions or forms that are considered essential for the
regulated action and their omission can render the action invalid. In other cases,
these prescriptions are seen as non-binding and failure to follow them might
result in penalties if any are stipulated by the statute.
In the case of H.V. Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, it was determined that
mandatory provisions must be strictly adhered to, while substantial compliance
with directory provisions is generally sufficient to meet legal requirements.
Classification of Statues with Reference to Object
Codifying Statute
A codifying statute is one that aims to comprehensively outline the entire body of
law on a specific subject. It seeks to provide a thorough and authoritative
statement of the key legal rules pertaining to that subject. This includes existing
provisions from various statutes on the subject and may also incorporate common
law principles.
An example is the Bill of Exchange Act of 1882 in England, which codified laws
regarding bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes. Similarly, the Hindu
Succession Act of 1956 in India is a codifying statute that addresses intestate
succession among Hindus.
Consolidating Statute
A consolidating statute consolidates all statutory enactments related to a
particular subject into a single law, making it easier to access and understand. It
brings together existing statutory provisions on the subject, often with minor
modifications.
For example, in England, the Law of Property Act of 1925 consolidated the acts of
1922 and 1924. In India, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 is a consolidating
statute concerning criminal procedures. Such statutes not only compile earlier
laws but also repeal the earlier acts for the sake of clarity.
Declaratory Statute
A declaratory statute is one that clarifies and removes doubts or
misunderstandings about the meaning of terms or expressions within the common
law or statutory law. When courts have interpreted an expression differently from
what the legislature intended, a declaratory statute is passed to set the correct
meaning of that expression. In India, the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 1985,
which added explanation 2 to section 40 of the Income Tax Act of 1961 and the
Finance Act of 1987, which amended the definition of “Owner of house property”
in section 27, are examples of declaratory acts.
It’s important to note that the mere use of the phrase “it is hereby declared” does
not automatically make a statute a declaratory statute. A declaratory statute
typically contains a preamble and uses terms like “declared” and “enacted” to
signal its intent.
Remedial Statute
A remedial statute is a kind of law that offers new help or a new solution. Its main
purpose is to improve how rights are protected and address problems or errors in
the old law. Examples of remedial statutes include the Maternity Benefits Act of
1961 and the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1923. In these laws, you’ll often
find the phrase “for remedy whereof” right before the actual law.
Blackstone, a legal scholar, thought that remedial statutes could either expand or
limit rights. They could expand rights when they made the law more generous or
they could limit rights when they restricted existing legal rights. In a case
called Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi v. Vishwanath, the court decided
that all laws in a welfare state aim to promote general well-being. Some laws are
more responsive to urgent social needs and have a more direct and noticeable
impact on fixing social problems.
Enabling Statute
An enabling statute is a law that allows something that was previously forbidden,
with or without specific rules on how to do it. It widens the scope of what’s
allowed under common law. An enabling statute makes an action lawful, even if it
wouldn’t be otherwise.
In a case called Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants Association v.
State of Bombay, the court explained that an enabling act not only permits
something to happen but also gives the necessary authority to do what’s needed
to achieve the law’s goal. Any conditions set by an enabling statute for the public
good must be followed because they are essential. An example is Section 49-A(1)
and 49-A(2) of the Advocates Act of 1961, as amended by Act 21 of 1964.
Disabling Statute
A disabling statute is one that limits or reduces a right granted by common law.
It’s a law that restricts a common law right.
Penal Statute
A penal statute is a law that punishes certain actions or wrongdoings. This type of
law can be in the form of a detailed criminal code with many sections that define
punishments for different wrongs. For example, the Criminal Procedure Code,
the Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954 and the
Arms Act of 1959 are all examples of penal statutes.
Penalties for breaking these laws can include fines, the loss of property,
imprisonment or even the death penalty. When the law enforces obedience not
through individual lawsuits but by imposing punishments as commanded by the
 law, it’s considered a penal statute. Penalties can only be imposed when the law
explicitly states so and any doubts should benefit the accused.
Taxing Statute
A taxing statute is a law that imposes taxes on income or certain types of
transactions. Examples include income tax, wealth tax, sales tax and gift tax.
These taxes help the government collect money to support public welfare.
However, it’s essential that a statute clearly states that taxes must be paid and
any doubts about this should benefit the person being taxed.
Explanatory Statute
An explanatory statute is a law that explains another law. It’s created to fill in
gaps or clarify confusing parts of a previous law. An explanatory statute aims to
make the meaning of an expression used in an earlier law clearer. For instance, in
Britain, the Royal Mines Act of 1688 was passed to encourage the mining of
certain base metals. The Royal Mines Act of 1963 was enacted to provide a better
explanation of the earlier law.
Amending Statute
An amending statute is a law that adds to or changes the original law to improve
it or better achieve its original purpose. It doesn’t cancel out the old law; it
becomes part of it. Examples include the Direct Taxes Amendments Act of 1974
and the Land Acquisition (Amendments) Act of 1984.
Repealing Statute
A repealing statute is a law that cancels out an earlier law. It can do this explicitly
by saying so in the statute or implicitly through its language. For example, the
Hyderabad District Municipalities Act of 1956 repealed the Hyderabad Municipal
and Town Committees Act of 1951.
Curative or Validating Statute
A curative or validating statute is one passed to fix problems in a previous law or
to make legal proceedings, documents or actions valid, even if they didn’t meet
the legal requirements. These statutes often include phrases like
“notwithstanding any judgment, decree or court order.” They’re meant to make
previously unlawful actions legal or to overturn court decisions.
In a case involving Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra and others v. State of
Orissa and others, the Supreme Court of India explained that while deciding
legal rights is a job for the courts, only the legislature can pass laws to validate
illegal actions or laws. However, when the validity of a validating law is in
question, the court must consider three things:
 Whether the law fixes the problems that made the action or law invalid.
 Whether the legislature had the authority to validate what was declared invalid
before.
 Whether the validation respects the rights guaranteed by the constitution. A
validating law is effective only if the answers to these three questions are “yes.”
 1.2. Interpretation-History, Meaning and Object of Interpretation
Historical interpretation involves deriving meaning from past events and experiences, analyzing historical
narratives, and understanding the significance of events for the present. It's a core aspect of history, shaping our
understanding of the past and influencing how we view the present and future.
Defining Historical Interpretation:
Historical interpretation is the process of understanding the past, including events, actions, and the individuals
involved, and making sense of their meaning and significance. It's not just about recalling facts, but also about
analyzing, explaining, and interpreting the events.
Historical Method:
The process of how historians formulate their interpretations and construct their view of history is called
historical methodology. This involves evaluating sources, analyzing data, and developing arguments.
Historiography:
The study of historical interpretations and how they change over time is known as historiography. This involves
examining how historians have approached and interpreted the past, including their theories, perspectives, and
sources.
Importance of Interpretation:
Interpretation is essential for understanding the significance of historical events, their causes, and their impact
on the present. It helps historians move beyond simple descriptions and create nuanced narratives.
Influence of Perspective:
Interpretations can be influenced by a historian's perspective, theoretical framework, and context. Different
historians may offer different interpretations of the same events, reflecting their individual backgrounds and
beliefs.
Evolving Nature of History:
Interpretations can change over time as new evidence emerges, or as societal values shift. This highlights the
dynamic and evolving nature of historical knowledge.
Facts and Interpretation:
While facts provide the raw data, interpretation helps us understand their significance and impact. Facts are
objective pieces of information, while interpretation involves analyzing and making sense of those facts.
Interpretation meaning
The term has been derived from the Latin term 'interpretari', which means to explain, expound, understand, or
to translate. Interpretation is the process of explaining, expounding and translating any text or anything in
written form. This basically involves an act of discovering the true meaning of the language which has been used
in the statute. Various sources used are only limited to explore the written text and clarify what exactly has been
indicated by the words used in the written text or the statutes.
Interpretation of statutes is the correct understanding of the law. This process is commonly adopted by the
courts for determining the exact intention of the legislature. Because the objective of the court is not only merely
to read the law but is also to apply it in a meaningful manner to suit from case to case. It is also used for
ascertaining the actual connotation of any Act or document with the actual intention of the legislature.
There can be mischief in the statute which is required to be cured, and this can be done by applying various
norms and theories of interpretation which might go against the literal meaning at times. The purpose behind
interpretation is to clarify the meaning of the words used in the statutes which might not be that clear.
According to Salmond, "Interpretation" is the process by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of the
legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.
OBJECT AND OF INTERPRETATION
The object of interpretation is to discover what the Legislature intended. This intention is to be ascertained from
the text of enactment. It is presumed that the Legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expressions and
therefore, unless there is an ambiguity in the words used in the language, the provisions should be read and
understood in their grammatical sense. When the language of a provision is clear, it should not The words used
in the provision should be assigned their plain and ordinary meaning and then the language should be
understood in its literal sense. If the results drawn are absurd, then the courts should look for some other
"Togical" meaning of those words to remove the ambiguity and absurdity. The idea behind this is that the
Legislature is not expected to have used the words capable of bearing more than one meaning, so as to lead to
alternative constructions, but if such a situation arises, then the construction which advances the policy of the
enactment must be upheld.
 In Mahadev Govind Gharge v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka, it
was held that the provisions of a statute are normally construed to achieve the ends of justice, advance the
interest of public and to avoid multiplicity of litigation.
In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen, it was held that the purpose of interpretation is not to
make a provision what the judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be.

1.3. Elementary Principles of Interpretation and Construction of Statutes, Maxims of Statutory Interpretation:
Ejusdem Generis, Noscitur A Sociis, Expressio Unius Est Exclusion Alterius, Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat,
Contemporanea Expositio
Elementary Principles of Interpretation

When the intention of legislature is not clearly expressed, a court needs. to interpret the laws using the rules of
interpretation. There are two types of Rules of interpretation with sub-categories

Primary Rules
1. The Primary Rule: Literal Interpretation

2. The Mischief Rule: Heydon's Rule

3. Rule of Reasonable Construction or Ut Res Magis Valent Quam Pareat

4. Rule of Harmonious Construction

5. Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Other Rules

1. Expressio Units Est Exclusio Alterius

2. Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege

3. Noscitur a Sociis

4. Strict and Liberal Construction

The Primary Rule: Literal Interpretation

In construing Statutes, the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions literally and grammatically giving the words their
ordinary and natural meaning. This rule is also known as the Plain meaning rule. The first and foremost step in the
course of interpretation is to examine the language and the literal meaning of the statute. The words in an enactment
have their own natural effect and the construction of an act depends on its wording. There should be no additions or
substitution of words in the construction of statutes and in its interpretation. The primary rule is to interpret words as
they are. It should be taken into note that the rule can be applied only when the meanings of the words are clear le.
words should be simple so that the language is plain and only one meaning can be derived out of the statute.

To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include "definitions" sections within a statute, which explicitly define the most
important terms used in that statute. But some statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to
define a particular term. The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning
of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself.

Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides in legislative or political issues. They
also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not have extensive access to secondary sources. In probate law the
rule is also favoured because the testator is. typically not around to indicate what interpretation of a will is appropriate.
Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the words used by the testator or their meaning.
It can help to provide for consistency in interpretation.

One criticism of the rule is that it rests on the erroneous assumption that words have a fixed meaning. In fact, words are
imprecise, leading justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However, since little
else is offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning survives.

Case Law:

In Municipal board v. State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand was changed by the Regional
Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30 days of receipt of order of regional. transport authority
according to section 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention
that statute must be read as "30 days from the knowledge of the order". The Supreme Court held that literal
interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as invalid.
The Mischief Rule: Heydon's Case

In Heydon's Case, it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer "that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes
in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and
considered:

1. What was the Common Law before the making of the Act?

2. What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not provide?

3. What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth?

4. What is the true reason of the remedy?

The office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy,
and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to
effectively decide on. Parliament's intent. It can be argued that this undermines Parliament's supremacy and is
undemocratic as it takes law-making decisions away from the legislature.

There are certain advantages and disadvantages of the rule. The Law Commission sees it as a rule that is far more
satisfactory way of interpreting acts as it avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing but for some it is considered to be
out of date as it was established in 16th century when conditions were very different from now.

Case Law:

The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, applied the mischief rule in construction of Article 286 of
the Constitution of India. After referring to the state of law prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to
the chaos and confusion that was brought about In inter-state trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing
powers by the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus, Chief Justice S.R. Das, stated
"It was to cure this. mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of interstate trade or commerce in the
Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the constitution maker adopted Article
286 in the constitution".

A principle to be valued must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it existence. These are
designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it'. Mischief Rule is applicable where
language is capable of more than one meaning. It is the duty of the Court to make such construction of a statue which
Rule of Reasonable Construction or Golden Rule

The words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in many cases, judicial approach finds
that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words, does not meet the ends as a fair and a reasonable
construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words may not necessarily assist a proper
construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur. Often enough interpreting the provision, it becomes
necessary to have regard to the subject matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve.

According to this rule, the words of a statute must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat, so as to give a sensible
meaning to them. A provision of law cannot be so interpreted as to divorce it entirely from common sense, every word
or expression used in an Act should receive a natural and fair meaning.

It is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the plain meaning rule, it gives
the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely
to be the legislature's intention, the judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a word can
have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning, if the word only has one meaning, but
applying this would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning.

Case Law:

In RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd, the Supreme Court stated that if a statute is looked at in the
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute makers provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each
clauses each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act

Rule of Harmonious Construction

When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a statute then the rule of harmonious
construction needs to be adopted. The rule follows a very simple premise that every statute has a purpose and intent as
per law and should be read as a whole. The interpretation consistent of all the provisions of the statute should be
adopted. In the case in which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the court's decision regarding the
provision shall prevail.

When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in apparent conflict with each other, they should be interpreted
such that effect can be given to both and that construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should
not be adopted except in the last resort.

The important aspects of this principle are::

1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they must construe the contradictory
provisions so as to harmonize them.

2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another unless the court, despite all
its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their differences.

3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions, the courts must interpret
them in such as way so that effect is given to both the provisions as much as possible.

4. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless number or a dead lumbar, is
not harmonious construction.

5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it loose.

Case Law:

In Raj Krishna v. Binod, two provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which were in apparent conflict, were
brought forth. Section 33 (2) says that a Government Servant can nominate or second a person in election but section
123(8) says that a Government Servant cannot assist any candidate in election except by casting his vote. The Supreme
Court observed that both these provisions should be harmoniously interpreted and held that a Government Servant was
entitled to nominate or second a candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly. This harmony can only be
achieved if Section 123(8) is interpreted as giving the govt. servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or second a
candidate and forbidding him to assist the candidate in any other manner.
Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Ejusdem Generis (pronounced as "eh-youse-dem generous") is a Latin term which means "of the same kind." The term
'Ejusdem Generis' in other words means words of a similar class. The rule is that where particular words have a common
characteristic (le of a class) any general words that follow should be construed as referring generally to that class; no
wider construction should be afforded.

It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A particular section of the statute shall
not be divorced from the rest of the Act. The Ejusdem Generis rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to
groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear.

Normally, general words should be given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires
otherwise. But when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may be given a
restricted meaning of the same category. The general expression takes its meaning from the preceding particular
expressions because the legislature by using the particular words of a distinct genus. has shown its intention to that
effect.

The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution, because, it implies a departure from the natural
meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning on a supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be
controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be
accomplished. The rule requires that the specific words are all of one genus, in which case, the general words may be
presumed to be restricted to that genus.

Case Law:

The Supreme Court in Maharashtra University of Health and others v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & Others has
examined and explained the meaning of Ejusdem Generis as a rule of interpretation of statutes in our legal system

While examining the doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the expression Ejusdem Generis which means "of the same
kind or nature" is a principle of construction, meaning thereby when general words in a statutory text are flanked by
restricted words, the meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted by implication with the meaning of
restricted words.

The Supreme Court has further held that the Ejusdem Generis principle is a facet of the principle of 'Noscitur a sociis (A
latin term for it is known by the company it keeps, it is the concept that the intended meaning of an ambiguous word
depends on the context in which it is used). The Latin maxim Noscitur a Soclis contemplates that a statutory term is
recognized by its associated words. The Latin word 'sociis' means 'society. Therefore, when general words are
juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their color and their contents are to be
derived from their context. But like all other linguistic canons of construction, the Ejusdem Generis principle applies only
when a contrary intention does not appear.

Expressio Units Est Exclusio Alterius

The maxim is given to gauge the intent of the legislature. If the words of the Statute are plain and its meaning is clear
then there is no scope for applying the rule. The rule means that express mention of one thing Implies the exclusion of
another.

At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is in the statute some
ground for limiting and restraining their meaning by reasonable construction, because many things are put into a statute
ex abundanti cautela, and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically included is for that reason alone excluded
from the protection of the statute. The method of construction according to this maxim must be carefully watched. The
failure to make the "expression" complete may arise from accident. Similarly, the "exclusion is often the result of
inadvertence or accident because it never struck the draftsman that the thing supposed to be excluded requires specific
mention. The maxim ought not to be applied when its application leads to inconsistency or injustice.

Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege

The maxim means that a contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law. Where the words used in a
statute have undergone alteration in meaning in course of time, the words will be construed to bear the same meaning
as they had when the statute was passed on the principle expressed in the maxim. In simple words, old statutes should
be interpreted as they would have been at the date when they were passed and prior usage and interpretation by those
who have an interest or duty in enforcing the Act, and the legal profession of the time, are presumptive evidence of
their meaning when the meaning is doubtful.

But if the statute appears to be capable of only interpretation, the fact that a wrong meaning had been attached to it for
many years, will be Immaterial and the correct meaning will be given by the Courts except when title to property may be
affected or when every day transactions have been entered into on such wrong interpretation.
Noscitur a Sociis

The "Noscitur a Sociis" i.e. "It is known by its associates". In other words, meaning of a word should be known from its
accompanying or associating words. It is not a sound principle in interpretation of statutes, to lay emphasis on one word
disjuncted from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory provision is to be read in collocation with its
companion words. The pristine principle based on the maxim noscitur a socitis" has much relevance in understanding
the import of words in a statutory provision (K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy v. K.P. Ballakuraya, AIR 1999 SC 2143). The rule
states that where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are
understood in their cognate sense. It is only where the Intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words
of narrower significance, is doubtful that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied.

The same words bear the same meaning in the same statute. But this rule will not apply:

1. When the context excluded that principle.

2. If sufficient reason can be assigned, it is proper to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that
which it bears in another part of the Act.
3. Where it would cause injustice or absurdity.
4. Where different circumstances are being dealt with.
5. Where the words are used in a different context. Many do not distinguish between this rule and the ejusdem generis
doctrine. But there is a subtle distinction as pointed out in the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha.

Strict and Liberal Construction

In Wiberforce on Statute Law, it is said that what is meant by 'strict construction' is that "Acts, are not to be regarded as
including anything which is not within their letter as well as their spirit, which is not clearly and intelligibly described in
the very words of the statute, as well as manifestly intended", while by "liberal construction" is meant that "everything
is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be done consistently with any construction of the statute".
Beneficial construction to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy is generally preferred.

A Court invokes the rule which produces a result that satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it. "Although the
literal rule is the one most frequently referred to in express terms, the Courts treat all three (viz., the literal rule, the
golden rule and the mischief rule) as valid and refer to them as occasion demands, but do not assign any reasons for
choosing one rather than another. Sometimes a Court discusses all the three approaches. Sometimes it expressly rejects
the "mischief rule" in favour of the "literal rule". Sometimes it prefers, although never expressly, the "mischief rule" to
the "literal rule".

Meaning of Statutory Interpretation(construction of

statues)
Statutory interpretation refers to the process by which courts interpret and apply
statutes. The term “statutory” refers to laws that have been enacted by a
legislature, while “interpretation” refers to the process of explaining or clarifying
the meaning of these laws. This process is not merely about reading the words in
a statute but involves understanding the intent behind them and determining how
they apply in specific cases.
The courts are tasked with ensuring that the law is not only applied but also
understood in a way that makes sense in the context of the case at hand.
Statutory interpretation, therefore, is an essential judicial function that helps
ensure laws are applied correctly in every circumstance, even when there may be
ambiguity in the text.
Statutory Interpretation in India
In India, statutory interpretation plays a vital role in the administration of justice.
Indian statutes are often complex and deal with a wide range of issues, making
interpretation a challenging task. Courts in India follow the rules of interpretation
outlined above and are guided by principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience.
One of the key features of Indian statutory interpretation is the reliance on judicial
precedent. Indian courts often look to previous decisions and rulings to guide their
interpretation of statutes. This helps to ensure consistency and predictability in
the application of the law.
MAXIMS OF INTERPRETATION
A maxim is a ‘saying that expresses a general truth or rule of conduct’. In legal language a maxim is a saying or
statement usually in Latin – used to denote a rule or principle.
1. Ejusdem generis (of the same kind) rule
This maxim literally translated means “of the same kind” and it holds that where particular words are
followed by general words in a statute. The meaning given to the general words is limited to the same
kind as the particular words. E.g. where a statute provided that “no tradesman, artisan, workman,
labourer or other person whatsoever shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business or work of their
ordinary calling on Sundays… ”. The words “or other person whatsoever” were construed as ejusdem
generis with those which preceded them such that an estate agent was deemed not to be covered by this
section (See Gregory v. Fearn 1953 (1) WLR 974). Another example is where the court held that in a
statute a department of conservation the authority to sell gravel, sand, earth or other material, the term
‘other material’ could only be interpreted to include materials of the same general type and did not
include commercial timber.
The rationale behind this maxim is that it saves the legislature from having to spell out in advance every
contingent to which the maxim would apply
Sacks v. The City of Johannesburg 1931 TPD 443
A traffic by-law provided that ‘no person shall sit or lie down on the street, nor shall any person stand,
congregate, loiter or walk, or otherwise act in such a manner as to obstruct traffic’. The accused was
addressing a crown from a car in a public street during an industrial action. The gathered crowd ended
up obstructing the street. It was held that the particular words all referred to an obstruction by a direct
physical act of the accused, and therefore that the general words “or otherwise act in such a manner as to
obstruct free traffic” did not include an obstruction caused by a crowd gathered to hear the accused.
However, it must be noted that the mere existence of general words upon particular words does not
necessarily invoke he application of the ejusdem generis. According to Van Heerden J in S v. Saidi
1962 (2) SA 128 the rule will only apply where the clear category is followed by words which are not
clear. In that case, the provision in question prohibited the obstruction of free passage along the public
 street by means of any wagon, cart, or other thing whatsoever. The court declined to interpret the general
words as meaning only wheeled vehicles, and decided that it included an obstruction caused by boxes
full of vegetables. This was because according to the court the object of the law giver was clear – mainly
to prevent the obstruction of public streets. The court ruled that the words ‘or other things whatsoever’
were clear and unambiguous in the context in which they were used i.e. they were words of the widest
connotation and were obviously used to include all things except persons.
S v. Vandermever 1977 (2) SA 774
The Respondent had been charged with contravening a provision of a statute in that he had used fuel
in his motor vehicle and then exceeded the speed limit. He admitted that he had used the fuel known
as methanol. Under the regulation in question fuel was defined as including diesel, oil, petrol, or any
other substance capable of being used as a fuel. The trial magistrate had applied the ejusdem generis
maxim to limit the definition of fuel to oil products. On appeal it was ruled that the words ‘any other
substance’ in the definition of fuel referred directly to any other fuel which could be used for the
operation of a motor vehicle.
In decoding whether to apply the maxim one must first consider the scope and object of the enactment to
be considered as well as the mischief which the statute is targeting. Such was the case in R v. Bono
1953 where the court held that the provision which prohibited the collection of money in the public
streets whether for charity purposes or otherwise also included political objects.
The maxim cannot apply where the particular objects/words do not form a genus/class.
S v. Makandigona 1981 (4) SA 439
The Prevention of Corruption Act refers to any receipt, account or other document. It was held to
include the issuing by a driving examiner of a certificate of competence indicating that a candidate
has passed a driving test when in fact she had not. The question for determination was whether a
certificate of competence is a receipt, account or other document. It was held that “It must be
remembered that the ejusdem rule is only one of many rules of construction, it is not to be evoked
automatically when general words follow particular words. It should be applied with caution and not
pushed too far. It should be treated as a mere presumption in the absence of other indications of the
intention of the legislature The starting point must always be to consider the general meaning of the
words in question in their context, not ignoring of course that the context includes the presiding
particular words…”. The judge was satisfied that the certificate of competence is a document to
which Section 3 of the act relates because the common feature is a document covered by the provision
in question, because the common feature shared by a receipt and an account is that both are
associated with money and both relates to the keeping of records generally.
2. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (what is not mentioned is absent) rule
Literally means that whatever is omitted should be understood as being excluded, e.g. if a statute
provides for a specific sanction for non-compliance with its other sanctions being excluded they cannot
be applied. The maxim is based on the rationale that if the legislature had intended to accommodate a
particular remedy or allowance it would have done so expressly, e.g. in the case of Ladysmelting Co. v.
Richardson it was ruled that the express mention of coal mines in the definition of lands excluded the
possibility that the word included mines of other minerals.
R v. Robinson 1975 (4) SA
Biedel AJ ruled that the power to demand information from council or an attorney acting on behalf
of a person did not exclude the power to demand such information from the suspected person himself.
Thus it has been said that this maxim is a faithful servant but a dangerous master.
3. Noscitur a socii (words are chameleon like)
This maxim means that particular words are coloured by their association with other words. A good
example of the application of this maxim is found in the case of R v. Greenland 1962 (1) SA 51 (SR)
where the provision in question prohibited driving “recklessly or negligently”. In that case the court had
the task of trying to interpret the two terms or the two words in such a manner as to give them different
meanings. In the end the court ruled that “only one offense of driving recklessly or negligently is
committed, this being so, it seems to me that this is the case where the maxim noscitur a socii should be
applied in interpreting the word recklessly”.
Another example is the case of Scales v. Pickering where the court was concerned with the meaning of
the word “footways” which appeared in the phrase “the soil and pavements of roads, highways,
footways, commons, sheets and lanes, passages and public places”. The courts observed that construing
the words footways from the company in which it is found, the legislature is assumed to have meant
paved footways in large towns which are too narrow to accommodate wagons and horses.
4. Rendengo Singula Singalis (render each to its own)
This maxim is used to refer each phrase or expression to its appropriate object. The maxim recognizes
that the reader may properly infer a distributing relationship between two juxtaposed series of ideas, e.g.
teachers and students may form guilds and associations (respectively)
5. Contemporonea expositio (focus on the principle of precedent)
This maxim refers to the extent which courts will have regard to their judicial decisions in interpreting a
statute. When interpreting a statute the courts does not approach it afresh each time instead they are
bound by precedent. Under English law the doctrine of stare decisis is rigidly followed however, under
Roman-Dutch law there is room for development and the court may even depart from a previous
decision which it considers to be legally in error. An example is the case of R v. Silas 1959 (4) SA 305
where the court found that due to an oversight there was conflict between the previous Appellate
Division decisions of R v. Banksbird 1952 (4) SA 512 and R v. Mazimbuko 1958 (4) SA. The court
decided to follow the Mazimbuko decision since it believed it to be the legally correct decision.
The modern attitude of the judiciary towards the doctrine of precedent is reflected in the dictum by
Botha J, in the case of National Chem. Search v. Borrowman and Anor, “In the field of precedence
and stare decisis it used to be sad that a decision otherwise binding could be departed from if a later
court considered it to have been clearly wrong. Nowadays the more usual way of expressing the
requirement is that the later court must be convinced that it was wrong. The words used in formulating
the principle are not important. What matters is the degree of error or the degree of conviction but the
test to be applied is incapable of exact definition. If functioning under a virile living system of law, a
judge must not be faint-hearted, and when he is morally convinced that justice requires a departure from
precedence he will not hesitate to do so, but on the other hand, he guard carefully against being
overboard in substituting his own opinion for those of others lest there be too much chopping and
uncertainty in the law. A mere difference of opinion without more ought not to justify departure from
precedence.”
As regards to the doctrine of precedence in Zimbabwe, Section 24 of the Supreme Court Act, now
expressly provides that the Supreme Court shall not be bound by its previous judgements e.g. Magaya
v. Magaya.
In 1981 the then Chief Justice of Zimbabwe Feldstein CJ issued a directive in which he stated that “The
court is conscious that it is important that there being a degree of certainty upon which people cab rely
in the conduct of their affairs. Precedent is an important factor upon which to decide what the law is and
how it is to be applied in particular cases. It also serves as a proper staring point for any developments in
 the law. Nevertheless, particularly in a changing society, it is essential that the court have some
flexibility so as not to restrict unduly its power to develop the law in proper cases to meet changing
conditions and injustice in particular cases. For the future, this court, while treating its past decisions and
those of its predecessors as normally binding, will depart from previous decisions when it appears right
to do so applying the general principles accepted under our law.”
The maxim also refers to the extent to which courts will have regards to long established customs in
interpreting a statute. In R.V Lloyd it was noted that although custom is said to be the best interpreter, it
should not dictate absolutely the construction of the statute, but where a statute may fairly be interpreted
in either of two ways, custom may well be evoked to tip the balance. The situation was clarified by
Innes CJ when he said that custom cannot prevail on a plain and unambiguous meaning of a statute but
where language is open to two constructions, then the fact that it has been uniformly read in one sense
by those entrusted.
6. Statute in pari material (earlier judicial decisions are binding on statutes framed in the same way
as them)
If an Act of Parliament uses the same language which was used in a former Act of Parliament referring
to the same subject and with the same purpose and for the same object, the safe and well known rule of
construction is to assume that the legislature when using well known words upon which there have been
well known decisions uses those words in the sense which the decisions have attached to them. Unless
there is something to rebut that presumption, the new statute is to be construed as the old one.
Wray & Wray v. Minister of the Interior 1973 (3) SA 554
The legislature had repealed Section 3 of a certain statute and replaced it using precisely the same words
of another statute. The court held that the legislature had intended to adopt the Appellate Division’s
construction on those words as given in the cases of Union Government v. Fuckia 1923 AD 466 and
Nara & Sam v. Principal Immigration Officer 1922 AD 673.
Before this rule can be applied the previous judicial interpretation must be certain and well recognized.
7. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex (reason is the spirit of the law)
The reason is the soul of the law and if the reason ceases to exist so does the law itself. The maxim was
applied in Green v. Gerald & Ors 1940 AD 88 where it was applied in relation to the old rule
prohibiting children born out of adulterous relationships from inheriting from their parents. Solomon JA
reasoned that these children were excluded from inheriting from their parents because they were
offspring of a criminal relationship. If therefore adultery is no longer a criminal offense the reason for
excluding them no longer existed.
8. Generalia specialibus non derogant
This means that the specific overrides the general. If there are two apparently conflicting provisions in a statute,
one couched in general terms while the other providing for a specific matter. The latter prevails.