Session 2

I. OBLIGATIONS

A. General Classification of Obligations

Art 1423, 1424 and 1960

Article 1423. Obligations are civil or natural. Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their performance.
Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to
enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has
been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural obligations are set forth in the following articles.

Article 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, the obligor who
voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value of the service he has rendered.

Article 1960. If the borrower pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of this Code
concerning solutio indebiti, or natural obligations, shall be applied, as the case may be. (n [money cannot be
returned unjust enrichment on the part of the lender as the money should be given to the creditor]

Baviera, p 181 to 182

Natural vs Civil Obligations
B. Sources of Obligations (Arts 1156 and 1157)

Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. (n)

Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

Baviera, pp 178 to 179

1. Law
 Refers to a person’s legal duty to do or not do something. E.g. payment of taxes; Civil
Code chapter on support; RPC provisions on what acts or omissions that are, if
committed, punishable by law, etc.

 Performance of Obligations imposed by law in the interest of the public

Arts. 206 to 207, FC (Support)

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Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter
shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being
reimbursed. (2164a)

Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed
by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the
person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the
age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)

Art 2165, CC (Funeral Expenses)

Article 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person, without the knowledge of those relatives who
were obliged to give support to the deceased, said relatives shall reimburse the third person, should the latter claim
reimbursement. (1894a)

Art 2169, CC (Health and Sanitary Regulations)

Article 2169. When the government, upon the failure of any person to comply with health or safety regulations
concerning property, undertakes to do the necessary work, even over his objection, he shall be liable to pay the
expenses.

Arts. 2167-8, 2174 and 2170, CC (Constraint of Life or property on occasion of calamity or
accident)

Article 2167. When through an accident or other cause a person is injured or becomes seriously ill, and he is treated
or helped while he is not in a condition to give consent to a contract, he shall be liable to pay for the services of the
physician or other person aiding him, unless the service has been rendered out of pure generosity.

Article 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or other calamity, property is saved from destruction by another
person without the knowledge of the owner, the latter is bound to pay the former just compensation.

Article 2170. When by accident or other fortuitous event, movables separately pertaining to two or more persons are
commingled or confused, the rules on co-ownership shall be applicable

2. Contracts
Interest (Art. 1956 and Art. 1960)

Article 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. (1755a)

Article 1960. If the borrower pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of this Code
concerning solutio indebiti, or natural obligations, shall be applied, as the case may be. (n)

Lara’s Gifts and Decors Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales G.R. No. 225433, August 28, 2019

Facts:
From January 2007 to December 2007, Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. (petitioner) engaged in transactions with
Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. (respondent), purchasing various industrial and construction materials on a 60-day
credit term, totaling P1,263,104.22. The agreement stipulated a 24% annual interest on overdue accounts. Payment
was made through several post-dated checks, which were subsequently dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Despite repeated demands for payment following the dishonor of both initial and replacement checks, the
petitioner failed to fulfill its monetary obligations, leading the respondent to file a Complaint for Sum of Money
with Prayer for Attachment. The petitioner, admitting the transactions, contested the quality of goods delivered and
cited a fire incident for its inability to meet obligations. The legal journey from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) up

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 to the Supreme Court revolved around the enforceability of the sales invoices, the validity of the 24% interest
stipulation, and the application of relevant articles from the Civil Code in settling the dispute.

1. Whether the sales invoices are admissible and have probative value despite challenges to their genuineness, due
execution, and authenticity.
2. Whether the petitioner is in default of its contractual obligations.
3. The applicability of Articles 1192 and 1283 of the Civil Code in the case.
4. The validity and imposition of the 24% interest rate per annum on overdue accounts.
5. The procedural application and calculation of the interest rate upon final judgment.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court held that:
1. The sales invoices were deemed admitted for not being specifically denied under oath by the petitioner, making
them admissible and imbued with probative value to establish the transactions and the amount due.
2. The petitioner was in default for failing to substantiate its claims of receiving substandard goods, thereby
obligating them to fulfill its monetary obligations as stipulated.
3. Articles 1192 and 1283 were deemed inapplicable since the petitioner could not establish that the agreed
obligations were not met by the respondent.
4. The stipulated 24% interest rate was held valid and binding upon both parties as it was not proved to be
unconscionable; thus, enforceable as part of the contractual agreement.
5. The legal interest rates were clarified and applied per prevailing jurisprudence, modifying the computation and
imposition of interest rates from the RTC and the Court of Appeals’ decisions.

Doctrine:
The case reaffirms the principle that stipulated interest rates in contracts, when not proven unconscionable, are
binding upon the parties. It also highlights the procedural requirement for the specific denial under oath of
actionable documents to contest their authenticity and due execution effectively. Moreover, the decision sets forth
the correct application and computation of legal interest rates for obligations arising from contracts.

Class Notes:
1. Actionable Documents: To effectively contest the genuineness and due execution of actionable documents, the
denial must be made specifically and under oath (Rules of Court, Rule 8, Sections 7 & 8).
2. Stipulated Interest Rates: Stipulated interest rates in contracts are considered valid unless shown to be
unconscionable (Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation).
3. Legal Interest: In the absence of stipulation, the legal interest rate for loans or forbearance of money, goods, or
credits is 6% per annum, computed from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand (Nacar v. Gallery Frames;
BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013).

3. Quasi Contracts (Arts 2142, 2144,2147-8,);

Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the
end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (n)

Negotiorum Gestio

Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another,
without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents,
or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical relation does
not arise in either of these instances:

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 (1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;

(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.

In the first case, the provisions of articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall
govern.

In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable. (1888a)

Article 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:

(1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon;

(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;

(3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner;

(4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)

Article 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save property or business from imminent danger, the
officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events:

(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;

(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the management. (n)

 Negotiorum Gestio (Art 2144)

Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another,
without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents,
or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical relation does
not arise in either of these instances:

(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;

(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.

In the first case, the provisions of articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall
govern.

In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable. (1888a)

Solutio Indebiti (Arts, 22 and 23, CC; Arts 2154 and 2155)

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of
the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

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Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises. (1895)

Article 2155. Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of
law may come within the scope of the preceding article. (n)

 Baviera, pp 178 to 181

4. DELICTS and Civil Liability

Arts 100, 104, 89 and Art. 112, Revised Penal Code

Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.

Article 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of
this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

2. By service of the sentence;

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;

4. By absolute pardon;

5. By prescription of the crime;

6. By prescription of the penalty;

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

Article 112. Extinction of civil liability. - Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code
shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.

Baviera, pp 187 to 188

5. Quasi Delicts (Art 21, Arts 2176, 2177, 2180, Arts 32, 33 and 34, CC and Art 218, FC (Special
Parental Authority);

Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law
prior to its commission.

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Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.(n)

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. [vicarious liability]

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall
be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. [applicable even if no longer a minor]

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

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 (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation
of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of
any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care
shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody. [parents are now only subsidiary liability only]

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Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. (349a)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Baviera, pp 182 to 186

In relation to: Art 365 Revised Penal Code (Reckless Imprudence)

QUASI-OFFENSES

Sole Chapter
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall
be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

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The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails
to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790,
approved June 21, 1957).

1. Singson v. BPI, GR no 24837, June 27, 1968

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; TORTS; CONTRACTUAL RELATION DOES NOT BAR
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES. — The existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent
recovery of damages. Where the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort, the
contractual relation of the parties does not bar the recovery of damages. (Air France
vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, September 28, 1966).
(Singson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-24837, (27 June 1968), 132 Phil
597-600)

Facts:
Julian C. Singson, one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906, was judged alongside his co-defendants Celso
Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay a sum to the Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed the
judgment, which became final and executory against Villa-Abrille & Co. A writ of garnishment was served on the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), where the Singsons had a current account, but only concerning Villa-Abrille
& Co.’s bank credits. Due to an oversight, a BPI clerk mistakenly believed Singson’s own deposits were also to
be garnished, leading to the bank dishonoring Singson’s checks due to the purported garnishment.

On discovering the error, BPI’s president, Santiago Freixas, took steps to correct the mistake, remove the
wrongful garnishment, and apologize to Singson. Unsatisfied, Singson and his wife filed a complaint against BPI
and Freixas, seeking damages for the alleged illegal freezing of their account. The Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissed the complaint; the Singsons then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the relationship between the plaintiffs and the bank, being contractual, precludes the commission of a
tort by one party against another and the consequent recovery of damages for such tort.

2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, and if so, what kind of damages should be awarded.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision. It held that a tort can indeed be committed by one party
against another even in the context of a contractual relationship. The Court recognized that while a contract exists
between the Singsons and BPI, the act that breached the contract could also constitute a tort. Drawing from the
ruling in Air France vs. Carrascoso, the Court underscored that wrongful acts may break a contract and
simultaneously be considered a tort.

The Court, however, noted that the damage was rectified swiftly once the mistake was brought to the bank
president’s attention. As such, it awarded nominal damages to vindicate the Singsons’ rights, recognizing that the
harm done was not substantial enough to warrant a larger sum. Hence, the plaintiffs were awarded P1,000 as
nominal damages and P500 as attorney’s fees, acknowledging the breach of their rights but taking into account
the corrective actions taken by the defendants.

Doctrine:
Even in the presence of a contractual relationship, one party can still commit a tort against another, allowing the
injured party to claim damages for such tort. A wrongful act that breaches a contract may also be considered a

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tort, as per the principle reaffirmed in the ruling of Air France vs. Carrascoso.

Class Notes:
– Existence of Contract Does Not Preclude Tort: Regardless of a contractual relationship, acts that breach said
contract can simultaneously constitute a tort, allowing for the recovery of tort damages.
– Nominal Damages: These are awarded to recognize a violation of a right when the harm caused is not
substantial or material damage is not proven.
– Attorney’s Fees: Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees may be recovered when exemplary
damages are awarded or as appropriate in the circumstances.

2. Barredo v. Garcia, GR no.48006, 73 Phil 607

3. SYLLABUS [right of election]

4. 1. DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT OR "CULPA AQUILIANA"; PRIMARY AND
DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OF EMPLOYERS UNDER ARTICLES 1902-1910 OF
THE CIVIL CODE. — A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the
death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers of the carretela. A criminal action was
filed against the taxi driver and he was convicted and sentenced accordingly. The court in
the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. Thereafter the parents of the deceased brought suit for damages against the
proprietor of the taxi, the employer of the taxi driver, under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Defendant contended that his liability was governed by the Revised Penal Code,
according to which his responsibility was only secondary, but no civil action had been
brought against the taxi driver. Held: That this separate civil action lies, the employer
being primarily and directly responsible in damages under articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code.
5. 2. ID.; ID.; ID. — A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be
safely anchored.
6. 3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra- contractual looms
clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology,
this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to
the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code: for instance, Law
6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el
non fizo a sabiendas el daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
7. 4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code.
According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of
cuasi-delito or culpa extra- contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier
genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation
shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910.
This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.
8. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMES UNDER THE PENAL CODE
AND THE "CULPA AQUILIANA" OR "CUASI-DELITO" UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE. — A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under

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 articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to
enforce. Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are enumerated in the decision.
9. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPINIONS OF JURISTS. — The decision sets out extracts from
opinions of jurists on the separate existence of cuasi- delicts and the employer's primary
and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
10. 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SENTENCES OF THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL OF SPAIN. — The
decision cites sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain upholding the principles above
set forth: that a cuasi-delict or culpa extra- contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and
that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
11. 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. — Decisions of this Court are also cited
holding that, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to
a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for his civil
liability arising from his crime.
12. 9. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUNDATIONS OF DOCTRINES ABOVE SET FORTH; LITERAL
MEANING OF THE LAW. — The Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence; if it should be held that articles 1902-1910, Civil Code, apply
only to negligence not punishable by law, culpa aquiliana would have very little
application in actual life. The literal meaning of the law will not be used to smother a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana.
13. 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF PROOF. — There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910, Civil Code. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
14. 11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPEDITIOUS REMEDY. — The primary and direct
responsibility of employer under article 1903, Civil Code, is more likely to facilitate
remedy for civil wrongs. Such primary and direct responsibility of employers is
calculated to protect society.
15. 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF RELYING SOLELY ON CIVIL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CRIME. — The harm done by such practice is pointed out,
and the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq., of
the Civil Code is restored to its full vigor.

Facts:
In the early morning of May 3, 1936, a head-on collision occurred on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Rizal, Philippines. A taxi owned by Malate Taxicab and operated by Pedro Fontanilla collided with a carretela
guided by Pedro Dimapilis. As a result, the carretela was overturned, resulting in injuries to a 16-year-old
passenger named Faustino Garcia, who died two days later. Fontanilla was convicted in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal for the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence and was sentenced to prison. The court allowed
the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, Faustino’s
parents, later filed an action in the same court against Fausto Barredo, the owner of Malate Taxicab, seeking
damages for their son’s death. The trial court awarded damages, which was later reduced on appeal. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court on the issue of Barredo’s liability.

Procedural Posture:
The case originated in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs Garcia and
Almario, awarding P2,000 in damages, subsequently affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals reducing
the award to P1,000. Barredo, the petitioner, appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that his liability should only
be subsidiary as per the Penal Code, since Fontanilla, his employee, was the primary person criminally liable.

Issues:

11
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Barredo, thereby making him primarily
and directly responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code due to his negligence in the selection and
supervision of his driver.
2. Whether or not Barredo’s liability as an employer for the acts of his employee is governed by the provisions of
Article 1903 of the Civil Code or by the Revised Penal Code, thereby making his liability only subsidiary after the
exhaustion of Fontanilla’s (the driver’s) property.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could bring a separate civil action against Barredo based on
culpa aquiliana under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, making him primarily and directly liable due to his
negligence in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, Barredo was liable to indemnify the
plaintiffs, regardless of whether Fontanilla’s property had been exhausted.

Doctrine:
The doctrine established in this case differentiates the civil liability arising from a crime from the responsibility
for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Thus, the plaintiffs may choose to recover
damages from an employer either through the latter’s subsidiary civil liability under the Penal Code or through a
separate and independent action for culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code without the necessity of proving
insolvency of the employee or exhausting the employee’s property.

Class Notes:
Key elements:
1. The employer’s primary and direct responsibility under Article 1903 of the Civil Code due to negligent acts of
employees.
2. The ability for plaintiffs to seek remedy through an independent civil action for culpa aquiliana regardless of
criminal proceedings or penalties.
3. The distinction between the employer’s subsidiary liability under the Penal Code and their separate
responsibility under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
4. Relevant legal provisions: Civil Code Articles 1902 to 1910 and the Revised Penal Code.

Hierarchy of Diligence
1. Extraordinary diligence
2. Good father of a family
3. Ordinary

16. Calalas v. Sunga, GR no. 122039, 332 SCRA 356, (2000) [contract of carriage – extra
ordinary diligence required]
17. Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an
“extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle.
18. On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear
end, she gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck
driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the
jeepney. This incident cause injury to Sunga.
19. She filed a compliant for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of
carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner
of the truck.
20. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability
holding that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-

12
 delict.
21. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s
decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of
carriage and not on quasi-delict.
22. Hence, this appeal from Calalas.
23. ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of
the accident which negates petitioner’s liability?
24. RULING:
25. No.
26. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage.
27. In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as a
common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
28.
29. Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate
cause applies only to cases of quasi-delict.

30. The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is
no relation between him and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing
relation between petitioner and respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon
happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’ part,
which makes him liable.

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's

contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to
arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater
risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This
is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney
being bumped while it was improperly parked
constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. 3 This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as
to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did
not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. 4
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking
his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
highway. dctai

31. Res ipsa loquitur: Ramos v CA, GR no. 124354, 321 SCRA 584 – can only be used when
there is no other evidence that can be used (e.g. no witnesses
Title: Ramos v. Court of Appeals and Medical Practitioners (G.R. No. 124354) Facts: Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year-
old woman, experienced discomfort due to gallstones and sought medical advice. She was advised to undergo

13
 cholecystectomy (gallbladder removal). Dr. Orlino Hosaka agreed to perform the surgery at De Los Santos
Medical Center (DLSMC) on June 17, 1985, with Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez as the anesthesiologist. Erlinda was
prepared for the operation, but Dr. Hosaka arrived three hours late. During the anesthesia phase, something went
wrong, resulting in Erlinda’s comatose state. The hospital and doctors explained that Erlinda had a bronchospasm.
Erlinda was admitted to intensive care, incurred significant medical bills, and has been in a comatose condition
since. Procedural Posture: Erlinda’s family filed a civil case for damages alleging medical negligence. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the hospital and doctors liable. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s
decision, dismissing the complaint. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court.

Issues: 1. Whether the surgeon, anesthesiologist, and hospital are liable for Erlinda’s comatose condition due to
alleged negligence in the performance of their professional duties.

2. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, inferring negligence on the part of the defendants.
3. The amount of damages due to the petitioners. Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that both the
anesthesiologist and surgeon were negligent in the care and management of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase.
The hospital was also held solidarily liable, failing to prove that it exercised due diligence in overseeing its
employees. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was deemed applicable, as the type of injury Erlinda sustained
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. The Supreme Court modified the CA’s decision, awarding
the petitioners compensatory, moral, temperate, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Doctrine: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows for a presumption of negligence to arise when the injury-
causing event is such as does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence and G.R. No. 124354. December
29, 1999 (

the instrumentality causing the injury was under the control of the defendant.

Class Notes: – In medical negligence cases, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can apply if the injury is such that it
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. – A proper pre-operative evaluation by the anesthesiologist
is paramount to prevent anesthesia-related complications. – An employer-employee relationship can be
established between hospitals and their consultants for liability purposes when the hospital exercises a degree of
control over the consultants. – Compensatory damages cover actual loss proved up to the time of trial, while
temperate damages cover those that can be reasonably expected to arise but are difficult to quantify.

Historical Background: Medical malpractice litigation addresses the accountability of healthcare providers when
substandard care leads to patient injury or death. The concept has evolved with the complexity of medical
procedures and involves legal principles such as duty of care, breach of duty, causation, damages, and defenses
like contributory negligence. The case highlights the Philippine justice system’s approach towards ensuring
redress for victims of medical negligence while safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession.

32. Fortuitous event: Gotesco v Chatto, GR no. 87584, 210 SCRA 18

1.1 FACTS:

In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E.
Chatto went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment
Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of
people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony
collapsed.

As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day.

The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June

14
5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.

Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force
majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect.

The trial court awarded Chatto actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees.

Upon appeal in the CA, petitioner claimed that the lower court erred in finding that 'the ceiling of the balcony
collapsed due to some structural construction or architectural defect,' and not due to an act of god or force
majeure.

In its decision, respondent Court found the appeal to be without merit. It ruled that:

“The lower court did not also err in its finding that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to
construction defects and not to force majeure. It was the burden of defendant-appellant to prove that its theater
did not suffer from any structural defect when it was built and that it has been well maintained when the incident
occured. This is its Special and Affirmative Defense and it is incumbent on defendant-appellant to prove it.
Considering the collapse of the ceiling of its theater's balcony barely four (4) years after its construction, it
behooved defendant-appellant to conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic incident. On this score,
the effort of defendant-appellant borders criminal nonchalance.”

1.2 ISSUE:

WON the collapse of the balcony ceiling considered a force majeure and thus absolves petitioners from any
liability

1.3 RULING:

Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even
founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why
the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed
caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any
explanation does not imply force majeure. In Pons y Compañia vs. La Campañia Maritima, the Court held:

"An examination of the Spanish and American authorities concerning the meaning of force majeure shows that
the jurisprudence of these two countries practically agree upon the meaning of this phrase.

Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law, defines it as --

'Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as
lightning, tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person.'

Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, defines fuerza mayor as follows:

'The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as, for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation,
hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri
neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances.'

Bouvier defines the same as --

'Any accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have

15
been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains, and care reasonably to have been expected.'

Cockburn, chief justice, in a well-considered English case, said that where a captain --

'Uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that
can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural
agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major.'

The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake,
tempests, public enemy, etc."

Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our
mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct
the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an
architect who had not even passed the government's examination. Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot
be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed
by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to
overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was
not shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the
collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence
and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr.Ong, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading questions on
inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the
structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and
certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially
as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.

It is settled that:

"The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
reasonable means."

This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:

"Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is
wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a
presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant."

That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.

Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse
was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court
denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure, for
one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty
of negligence.

33. Assumption of Risk: Art. 2179, CC.

16
Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded. (n)

34. Afialda v. Hisole 85 Phil 67;

35. 1. DAMAGES; LIABILITY OF OWNER OF ANIMAL FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO ITS
CARETAKER. — Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not
liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker.
36. (Afialda v. Hisole, G.R. No. L-2075, (29 November 1949), 85 Phil 67-70)

Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947, without any fault from
Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his death. Afialda’s sister, Margarita
Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, “The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same,
is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability
shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda.

HELD: No. The law uses the term “possessor and user of the animal”. Afialda was the caretaker of the animal
and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of
the carabao and therefore he is the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent
the animal from causing damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the Workmens
Compensation Act as the risk involve was one of occupational hazards.

BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo, GR no. 161151, Mar. 24, 2014

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due to
the supposed negligence of a construction companythen undertaking re–blocking work on a national highway. The
plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened because the construction company did not provide adequate lighting on
the site, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself.
Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino who figured in the accident that
transpired at the site of the re–blocking work at about 6:30 p.m. on October 30, 1997; that Balbino’s Honda
motorcycle sideswiped the road barricadeplaced by the company in the right lane portion of the road, causing him to
lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the
company’s failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the project, especially during night time, was the
proximate cause of the death of Balbino.
In its answer, BJDC denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed warning signs
and lights along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the time of the incident, the lights were
working and switched on; that its project was duly inspected by the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have
satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists.
ISSUE:
Whether or not heirs of Balbino were able to establish by preponderance of evidence the negligence of
BJDC.
HELD:

17
 NO. The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to establish the
allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is
preponderance of evidence.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either
side. Theburden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendantdenies the factual allegations of the complaint in the
manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability.
The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the
burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was
the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.
During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead of the total
omission of illumination. In contrast, the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate illumination. The
Court observes, too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer detailed for more than 17 years at the Pili Police
Station, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties. In his report, it was
mentioned that “upon arrival at the scene of the incident it was noted that road sign/barricade installed on the road
has a light.”

Torts with independent Civil actions, Art. 33 CC:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

a) Defamation: MVRS v. Islamic, GR No. 135306,

396 SCRA 210
**Facts:** The Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., along with individual Muslims, filed a complaint
for damages against MVRS Publications, Inc., and specific individuals responsible for an article in the 1 August
1992 issue of *Bulgar*. The article falsely claimed that Muslims consider pigs sacred and worship them, especially
during Ramadan. This accusation was seen as not only factually incorrect but deeply insulting to Muslims,
attributing to them the exact opposite of their beliefs. MVRS Publications contended that the article did not specify
the complainants, thus they were not entitled to damages, positing that the piece expressed an opinion without intent
to harm. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint, stating the failure to establish identifiable defamation.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, acknowledging the class suit’s validity and the article’s clear
defamatory targeting of the Islamic faith.

**Issues:**
1. Does the article constitute defamation despite not naming specific individuals?
2. Can a class suit be validly instituted in this instance? 3.
Are petitioners liable for damages due to the article’s publication?

**Court’s Decision:** The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision. It
elucidated that defamation implicates the reputation of identifiable individuals, which wasn’t accomplished by the
article’s general reference to Muslims. The principles of defamation, alongside the requirement for specificity, play
against a class suit in this context, as individual reputations were not distinctly attacked.

**Doctrine:** The case reiterates that defamation claims necessitate the identification of specific individuals
harmed by the defamatory statement. General references to a community or group without direct implication to
identified members fall short of constituting actionable libel. **Class Notes:** – Defamation under Philippine law
requires the clear identification of the individuals G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003

defamed. – A class suit for defamation requires that members of the class are directly identifiable from the
defamatory statement. – Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, extends defamation to
electronic means while maintaining principles on identifiability and specificity. **Historical Background:** This
case emerged during a period of growing awareness and sensitivity towards religious defamation, marking the

18
Philippines’ legal stance on the balance between freedom of speech and protection of religious dignity. It
underscores the essential criterion in libel or defamation cases in the country—that the offended party must be
unmistakably identifiable from the statement, which was not satisfied in this instance.

b) Physical injuries : Dulay v. CA, GR 108017 (1995)

c) SYLLABUS
d) 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INDEPENDENT CIVIL
ACTION; RULE. — It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action
before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better
than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,190 SCRA 357 [1990]).
e) 2. ID.;CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; ELEMENTS FOR
EXISTENCE THEREOF. — A cause of action exists if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages. (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA,210 SCRA
33 [1992]);Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar,218 SCRA 118
[1993]).
f) 3. ID.;ID.;ID; DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINTS; CASE AT BAR. — The nature of a cause of action is determined
by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic
v. Estenzo,158 SCRA 282 [1988]).The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made
in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society,112 SCRA 243
[1982]).An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the
plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against
the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint. The general rule is that the allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein.
g) 4. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;PROOF OF ALLEGATIONS; WHEN NECESSARY. — In
determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed
by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA,211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,197 SCRA 663
[1991]).To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial
Board,27 SCRA 50 [1969]).Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to
their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence
of such injury. cdrep
h) 4. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT; CONSTRUED. —

19
 Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed
with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as
the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]),this Court already held
that: "...Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault or negligence,' covers not only acts
'not punishable by law' but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law." The same doctrine was echoed in the case of
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]),wherein the
Court held: "Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.Consequently, a civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually also charged criminally),to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary." [Citing Virata v. Ochoa,81 SCRA 472]
i) 5. ID.; ID.; RULE WHEN AN INJURY IS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE
OF THE EMPLOYEE. — Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,167 SCRA 363 [1988]).The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee
(Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado,176 SCRA 792 [1989]).Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
j) (Dulay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108017, (03 April 1995), 313 Phil 8-25)

Facts:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation occurred between Benigno Torzuela, a security guard, and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay, which resulted in Torzuela fatally shooting Dulay at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang” carnival in Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa. Following this incident, Maria Benita A. Dulay, the widow of the deceased, on behalf of herself and
her minor children, filed a civil action for damages on February 8, 1989, against Torzuela and his alleged
employers, Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc. (“SAFEGUARD”) and Superguard Security Corp.
(“SUPERGUARD”). The complaint was premised on the claim that Torzuela’s act of shooting was due to the
concurring negligence of Torzuela and his employers.

SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the argument that the complaint did not state a valid cause of
action, asserting that Torzuela’s act was beyond their control and scope of duties, and that the liability for such
deliberate action rests on Torzuela under criminal law, not as a quasi-delict. SAFEGUARD sought exclusion as a
defendant, denying that Torzuela was their employee. Conversely, the petitioners argued based on Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code, emphasizing employers’ liability for damages caused by their employees acting within the

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scope of their assigned tasks.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the civil case, aligning with the arguments of SUPERGUARD and
SAFEGUARD. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal, prompting the Dulays to file for reconsideration,
which was denied, leading to the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari.

Issues:
1. Whether acts that are intentional and voluntary, in addition to acts committed with negligence, are covered under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code pertaining to quasi-delicts.
2. Whether an employer’s liability for the acts of their employee, as provided under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, is applicable in this case.
3. Whether the civil complaint against SAFEGUARD and SUPERGUARD sufficiently states a cause of action
permitting it to proceed independently of the criminal action against Torzuela.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, clarifying that Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
indeed covers not only acts committed with negligence but also those which are voluntary and intentional. It
emphasized that an employer’s liability under Article 2180 is direct and immediate, not contingent upon the
negligence of the employee or the outcome of any criminal action against the employee. Moreover, the Court held
that the allegations in the civil complaint were sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants,
thereby allowing the case to proceed to trial on the merits.

Doctrine:
1. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code pertains to obligations arising from both acts of negligence and voluntary,
intentional acts, expanding the concept of quasi-delicts.
2. Article 2180 establishes direct and immediate liability on the part of employers for damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, this liability exists independently of the employee’s own
liability for fault or negligence.

Class Notes:
– Quasi-delicts under Article 2176 include both negligent and intentional actions.
– Employers’ liability under Article 2180 is direct and not subsidiary; it is independent of the employee’s civil
liability under criminal law.
– Filing an independent civil action before the presentation of evidence in criminal proceedings is permissible, and
in some cases, preferable.
– Article 33 of the New Civil Code allows for an independent civil action in cases of physical injuries, which
encompasses consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.
– The existence of a cause of action in a civil complaint is determined by the allegations stating the basis of the
claim, not by the potential defenses or ambiguities.

37. Civil and Criminal Liability: Villegas v. CA, GR no. 82562, Apr 11, 1967 (271 SCRA 148)
38. 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; THE DEATH OF AN ACCUSED
DURING THE PENDENCY OF HIS APPEAL EXTINGUISHES NOT ONLY HIS
CRIMINAL BUT ALSO HIS CIVIL LIABILITY UNLESS THE LATTER CAN BE
PREDICATED ON A SOURCE OF OBLIGATION OTHER THAN THE ACT OR
OMISSION COMPLAINED OF. — The source of Villegas' civil liability in the present
case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed
a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
If the Court ruled in Bayotas that the death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal
extinguishes not only his criminal but also his civil liability unless the latter can be

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 predicated on a source of obligation other than the act or omission complained of, with,
more reason should it apply to the case at bar where the accused died shortly after the
prosecution had rested its case and before he was able to submit his memorandum, and all
this before any decision could even be reached by the trial court.
39. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IN CASES WHERE THE CIVIL LIABILITY SURVIVES AN ACTION
FOR RECOVERY THEREFOR MAY BE PURSUED BUT ONLY BY WAY OF A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION; CASE AT BAR. — The Bayotas ruling, however, makes
the enforcement of a deceased accused's civil liability dependent on two factors, namely,
that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended. Obviously, in the case at
bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the
civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to
the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private offended party in a criminal
case such as this which must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where
the civil action was impliedly instituted with it? The answer is likewise provided in
Bayotas, thus: "'Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended
party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately."' Hence, logically, the court a quo
should have dismissed both actions against Villegas which dismissal will not, however, bar
Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his claim for damages against the
executor or administrator of the former's estate, notwithstanding the fact that he did not
reserve the right to institute a separate civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.
40. (Villegas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 82562 & 82592, (11 April 1997), 337 Phil 597-
605)

This case pertains to the libel suit initiated by Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against Manila Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas following various allegations made by Villegas against Raquiza that purportedly constituted violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in 1968. Despite thorough investigation, Raquiza was cleared by the
Senate Committee on Public Works due to unreliable testimonies and lack of substantial evidence. Following
Villegas’ defeat in the 1971 elections and subsequent migration to the USA, where he remained until his death in
1984, the trial continued in his absence.

After Villegas’ death, the Manila Regional Trial Court moved to dismiss the criminal aspect of the case but resolved
to deal with the civil aspect separately, later ruling in favor of Raquiza and mandating Villegas’ estate to pay
significant damages. Villegas’ heirs contested this ruling, leading to the case’s elevation to the Court of Appeals
which slightly reduced the awarded damages and subsequently to the Supreme Court for further review.

Virtual law firm consultations

### Issues:
1. Can a trial court render judgment on a civil case following the accused’s death and before the filing of a
memorandum on his behalf?
2. Is it valid to render judgment against the deceased accused’s heirs and estate without formal substitution of
parties?
3. Assuming the accused was liable for libel, were the damages awarded by the trial court just and reasonable?

### Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court focused on the implications of Antonio J. Villegas’ death before the final judgment. It
referenced the case of People v. Bayotas, affirming that the death of an accused extinguishes both his criminal
liability and the civil liability that exclusively arises from the offense. However, the civil liability could be pursued
through a separate civil action if rooted in obligations other than the criminal act.

The Court concluded that both the criminal and civil actions against Villegas should have been dismissed per

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Bayotas’ doctrine. This dismissal doesn’t preclude Raquiza from seeking damages through an independent civil
action against Villegas’ estate or legal representatives, providing a way forward despite procedural missteps in
lower court rulings.

### Doctrine:
The pivotal doctrine established revolves around the survival of civil liability after an accused’s death. Stemming
from the case People v. Bayotas, it confirms that death extinguishes both criminal liability and civil liability based
exclusively on the criminal offense. However, a separate civil action based on other sources of obligation can
survive the accused’s death, but it must be pursued independently.

### Class Notes:

– The death of a defendant before final judgment leads to the extinguishment of both the criminal aspect and the
civil aspect based solely on the criminal act (People v. Bayotas).
– A separate civil action for damages can still be pursued against the executor, administrator, or heirs of the
deceased’s estate if it is predicated on sources of obligations other than the offense itself, such as quasi-delict
(Article 33, Civil Code in relation with Article 1157, Civil Code).
– Proper procedural steps, including the substitution of parties in the case of the party’s death, are crucial for the
continuation or initiation of civil proceedings posthumously (Sec. 17, Rule 3; Sec. 1, Rule 87, Rules of Court).

Torts – includes human relations

Respondeat superior – common law, the respondent always responds to the superior
(employer, manager, owner) employer always responds to the damages of the employee [NOT
USED IN THE PH]

Employer’s defence is he exercised the due diligence of a good father of the family

Next meeting: 5 Feb

Coverage: Villegas to Type of civil obligations (d) case of Dagohoy

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