PROBLEM AREAS IN INDIA’S

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
S.D. MUNI

India has to maintain good and friendly relations with all its
always sought
I
and we do have excellent relations with all-except Pakistan.‘
neighbours
Yashwant Sinha, Minister of External Affairs, Government of India, in
London, 30 October 2002.

India is a country wounded by terrorism. Virtually all our neighbours, by choice

or default, by acts of commission or omission, compulsions of geography or

terrain, have been or are involved in receiving, sheltering, overlooking or

2
tolerating terrorist activities from their soil directed against India.2
Kanwal Sibal, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, in Paris,
17 December 2002.

WE DO NOT choose our neighbours; we have to learn to live with them. India has had
an uneasy relationship with its neighbours. Its present dilemma in this respect stands
exposed by the two mutually incompatible statements cited above, issued by two of
the most senior leaders of India’s foreign office within a gap of barely six weeks.
It is true that traditional wisdom inherent in the statements like ’It takes two to
tango’ and ‘You cannot clap with one hand’ is relevant when it comes to neigh-
bourhood relations. To that extent, India alone is not and cannot be held responsible
for the difficult and challenging phase through which its current neighbourhood
policy is passing, or indeed for such phases that India has often experienced during
the past more than five decades of its engagement with the neighbours as a free
country. The neighbours have to shoulder their own share of blame for these phases
of uneasy relationships. Certainly, India’s neighbours have not been able to figure
out how to evolve and pursue a mutually beneficial interaction with their geographically

S.D. Muni is Professor, South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

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and demographically huge, and economically and militarily powerful, neighbour. This
is a neighbour with whom they not only have vast commonalities in almost all the
areas of life, but also so many diverse expectations. In the absence of a coherent and

sustained constructive approach, they have often followed various strategies of pin-
pricks, irritations, harassment, denial of mutual benefits, sabotage and even persisting
confrontation (as in case of Pakistan) to get their way with India. Pakistan is obviously
a category by itself in its attitude toward India, but other
neighbouring states have
also not shied away from a confrontationist approach. There are many reasons for
such neighbourhood approaches towards India: the role of their respective politics,
searcl of identities, psychological complexes emanating from the sense of being
small, economic weakness and governance failures, and so on. The scope of this
article does not permit us to examine these factors in detail..
However, there have also been phases in India’s neighbourhood engagements that
were relatively free from serious tensions, and looked more promising and harmonious.

Until the 1960s, this was largely the case, except for some shadows of the Cold War
divisions in Asia that sucked Pakistan into a web of military alliances and tried to
lure Sri Lanka and Nepal also within that framework. Even after the 1960s, there
were periods of harmony and understanding: during the 1977-79 ’good neighbour-

liness’ rhetoric of the first non-Congress government in India; the early years of
Rajiv Gandhi’s regime (1985-89), when he had a promising rapport with his Pakistani
counterpart Benazir Bhutto, took Sri Lankan President Jayawardane to Bangladesh
to express solidarity during the latter’s flood-calamity (in Uri-Char), and signed an

agreement with Sri Lanka on the complex question of ethnic conflict resolution; and
the phase of the ’Gujral Doctrine’ of 1996-98 when India showed considerable
sensitivity to the concerns and aspirations of its smaller neighbours, in effect admitting
that as the larger and more powerful member of the South Asian community, it
should travel more than half the distance in accommodating the neighbours. The
Indian policy makers came to accept with various degrees of candour that India has
a greater responsibility to work for the evolution of constructive and cooperative

neighbourhood relationships, not only because it is big, but also because it is more
resourceful. Furthermore, India would, perhaps, reap greater advantages in its overall
foreign policy initiatives, if it enjoys a greater support and understanding of its
neighbours and its efforts and attention is not unduly trapped within the South Asian
region. These phases apart, India’s relations with its neighbours are generally char-
acterised by acrimony and tensions. It is, therefore, a necessary exercise, at least intel-
lectually, to identify possible problem areas in India’s neighbourhood policy to see if
it is possible to improve the overall tone and temper of India’s engagements with the
immediate neighbours.
There are five possible problem areas of India’s neighbourhood policy: (a) the
lack of a balanced political perspective; (17) the power differential; (c) India’s economic
clout; (d) extra-regional great powers; and (e) mindset, diplomatic styles and per-
sonalities. Let us look at them one by one in the sections that follow

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II

The most basic problem is the lack of a political perspective that could shape the

long-term interests of India and inform its day-to-day interactions with the neighbours.
Broadly, there are three components of such a perspective. In the first place, does
India have a regional approach to build a community of neighbours, or does it want
to deal with each of the neighbours individually? Nehru had talked of building an
’Eastern federation’ of India and the major Asian countries. In his broader vision of
Asian unity and solidarity, he at times inadvertently displayed a tendency to take the
smaller neighbours for granted. But he realised acutely the strategic significance for
India of ensuring peace and stability in the neighbourhood, and for that matter was
meticulously concerned about every relevant development in the smallest of India’s
neighbours. His agitation with regard to Sri Lanka’s pro-West proclivities during the
early 1950s, and his efforts to trek along difficult Himalayan slopes to cultivate Nepal
and Bhutan were a manifestation of such concerns. But Nehru seldom thought in
terms of assiduously building a community with the smaller immediate neighbours.
If at all, he thought that such a community would be encompassed within the broader
goal of Asian solidarity. Rhetorically, some Indian leaders and Indian policy-makers
have talked of a South Asian community. Recall Ram Manohar Lohia’s idea of a
confederation with Pakistan, perhaps including other neighbours as well. The present
Foreign Minister, Sinha, even went a step ahead and projected the vision of a South
Asian Union. We are not discussing here the feasibility of such ideas on community,
but underlining the importance of having a collective vision.
However, the preferred mode of India’s approach to the neighbours has been
bilateral. Of course, that could be, and indeed is being, justified on the basis of the
very structure of South Asian geopolitics, where India’s neighbours have hardly any-
thing in common with each other except India. The only exception is of Nepal,
Bhutan and Pakistan sharing land borders with China. But China is more of an
extra-regional neighbour of India. Other smaller neighbours have neither common
boundaries nor common cultural and historical roots with each other. Nor are their
economic interests compatible. Therefore, they will have to deal with India one-to-
one. But for India, it would be advantageous to have a regional design in which to

place each of the neighbours according to their individual priorities for India. Thus
the bilateral can be synergised with the regional. One need not see a contradiction
between the two. There are issues that are better dealt with bilaterally and there are
issues that will yield greater advantages if tackled regionally.
In some cases, bilateral goals in relation to the neighbours can be prudently achieved
by India through the multilateral route. Recall the instance of the issue of water
sharing between India on the one hand and Nepal and Bangladesh on the other. In
the interest of greater political bargaining, Nepal and Bangladesh were insisting on a
trilateral approach. In 1985, while meeting in Dhaka to establish the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Rajiv Gandhi moved away from
India’s traditional preference for the bilateral approach and proposed that if Nepal
and Bangladesh could come up with a collective formula, India would join them and

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accept it in the interest of regional and bilateral cooperation. Nepal and Bangladesh
being respectively upper- and lower-riparian countries on the Ganges, found their
real interests were incompatible. They could not evolve any mutually agreed approach,
and eventually settled for bilateral resolution of the river water issue with India in
the form of Mahakali (1996) and Ganga Water Treaty (1998), respectively. Geography
successfully blunted the political approach of Nepal and Bangladesh.
Similarly, in economic matters, the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
(SAPTA) and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) have isolated Pakistan for
its excessive bilateral preoccupation. The thrust of objective assessment of possible
gains has encouraged some of India’s neighbours to join hands with each other in
subregional cooperation like the South Asian Growth Quadrangle of India, Nepal,
Bhutan and Bangladesh, ignoring the protestations of other countries in the region
like Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Within the framework of subregional cooperation it
should be possible for India to promote bilateral projects with the member countries.
Indian policy-makers must realise that undue insistence on bilateralism invokes
avoidable fears and suspicions of Indian dominance in the neighbouring countries
and allows anti-Indian external and domestic forces in these countries to exploit
such fears to their narrow advantages.
India’s neighbours generally feel more comfortable in a regional design that in-
corporates bilateral priorities and concerns. A regional approach is also in accordance
with the ethos of the emerging global order and will be effective to bring about a
regional integration in economic and strategic terms. The neighbours learn from
each other about India’s approach towards each of them. This is an argument for
strengthening, not weakening, SAARC and other subregional initiatives like the South
Asian Growth Quadrangle and the Bangladcsh-IndB-Niyanmar-Sfi Lanka-Thailand
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). There are a large number of former and reigning
Indian policy-makers who are far too keen to bury SAARC unlamented. Indian policy
hardly had a heart in promoting SAARC when the exercise began in 1980. A dead
SAARC at India’s behest will only make India’s neighbourhood policy more difficult
and its international image more unpalatable.
There are two other components of political perspective in India’s neighbourhood
policy. One is ideological and the other relates to seeking and sustaining political
allies within the neighbouring countries. Ideologically, India stands for democracy
and secularism. The thrust on democracy and secularism was rather pronounced in
India’s neighbourhood relations during the Nehru era but the present Foreign Minister,
Sinha, also said recently:

One of the fundamental pillars of our policy, based on our status as the world’s
largest democracy has been the promotion of the democratic way of life. Democ-
racy has proved to be the by far, the best form of governance, especially in multi-
cultural, multi-religious, pluralistic societies.

The rhetorical thrust of this statement notwithstanding, India has dealt with and
evenprotected and promoted any number of non-democratic regimes in the

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neighbourhood. Even during the Nehruvian period, monarchies in the Himalayan

Kingdoms had a special place in India’s policy calculations. One of the factors for
this ideologrical accommodation was concern for stability in the neighbouring countries
that was linked with the security of India and the entire region. There was also the
imperial and bureaucratic legacy of dealing with a single individual in pursuance of
specific interests. Policy makers justified it in the name of pragmatic, non-ideological
approach. They do so even now. While this ideological flexibility is understandable,
and at times even necessary, in relation to some contingencies and to far off countries
and regions, the same cannot be held valid when it comes to dealing with immediate
neighbours in the long run. The United States (US), while promoting and tolerating
all kinds of non-democratic regimes all over the world, has not yet reconciled to the
small, ideologically antagonistic regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba. China, on its part,
has done its best to stall the emergence of liberal, pluralistic regimes in any of its
immediate neighbourhood. India’s experience also shows that with the exception of
Bhutan, sustained relationship with the autocracies in the neighbourhood have not
been smooth and advantageous to India. The cases of Nepal and Sikkim (pre-1974)
in the North and Pakistan and Bangladesh in the West and the East have demonstrated
this amply. A great deal of effort has been made by the feudal and martial constitu-
encies in these countries to make anti-Indianism a source of their political sustenance
and survival. They have even tried to shape the content of nationalism in their re-
spective countries into an anti-Indian mould to serve their sectional interests.
It is true that relations have been tense occasionally with neighbouring democratic
regimes as well, but restoration of harmony has been easier in such cases. The dynam-
ics of democracies that evolves in popular support and peoples’ interests has a natural
propensity and compulsion to seek better and cooperative relations with India. New
Delhi continues to tolerate unfriendly monarchies and hostile military regimes in its
neighbourhood, more so at the cost of eroding and weakening democratic forces. It
is for this reason that India has many times played a proactive role in installing, pro-
moting and protecting democracy in a neighbouring country. There is scope in the
future also for India to play a proactive role in reinforcing, even reinventing, democratic
governance in the neighbourhood. In the neighbourhood, ideology overlaps, if not
coincides with, realistic national interests. Notwithstanding this, there is also scope
for India to engage with adversarial and ideologically anachronistic political for-
mations, like the military in Pakistan, with the objective of understanding and overcom-
ing them as obstacles, when prospects of democracy look dim and distant. Myanmar
may be mentioned as a successful example of such ideologically incompatible engage-
ment. But here again, the democratic alternative, even as a potential reality in distant

future, must not be given up.

Surely, India’s own democratic and secular credentials at home are a very important
precondition for any such proactive role. If India deviates from democracy and
secularism it can no longer credibly inspire others to work for these ideals. The India
policy has witnessed a gradual rise of the ’sectarian state’ in the neighbourhood.
India has done precious little to resist this rise over the past many decades. And now,
India itself is passing through a transition where sectarian forces are getting entrenched

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into its polity. This development is affecting India’s neighbourhood policy adversely,
where neighbourhood tensions are portrayed in sectarian colours to harness political
advantages at home. ’Mian Musharraf’ as an electoral slogan and ’Hindu King’ as an
object of worship for being the ’incarnation of Lord Vishnu’ are manifestations of
the creeping sectarian mindset in India’s policy makers. There is need to learn from
the experiences of the neighbouring countries that the rise of a sectarian state has
torn the society apart, precipitated conflicts and distorted polities.
Within the guiding framework of ideology, India has to seek and sustain political
allies and supporters in the neighbouring countries. This is the third component of a
broader political perspective. Its significance lies in the fact that India is a critical
factor in the domestic politics of each of its neighbours, but the vice versa is not
true. It is unfortunate that allies in the domestic politics of the neighbouring countries
are few and far between; too weak to stand up and be counted even on issues of

mutual advantage between India and a given neighbouring country. Political leaders,
groups and parties in the neighbouring countries are shy of identifying themselves
with India, not only because they would have to pay a political price for doing so, but
also because they are not confident that India would put in its best effort to bail
them out when they need India’s support. Chandrika Kumaratunga in Sri Lanka,
Hasina Wajid in Bangladeshi and the Koirala brothers in Nepal have all experienced
their moments of anxiety and uncertainty in their political expectations from India.
Occasional, ever shifting and opportunistic alliances forged for short-term gains do
not deliver the desired long-term results. The absence of reliable political allies for
India in the neighbouring countries is a serious reflection on the weakness and
ad hocism of Indian diplomacy. Contrast it with the Chinese style of cultivating leaders
and political groups on a sustained basis, not only through financial and political
support, but also through personal relations across parties and leaders. China’s relations
with King Sihanouk of Cambodia may be mentioned as an illustration in this regard.

III

Ideology works better in international relations if backed by hard capabilities and

power projection. Recall the great Indian epic poet Tulsidas who said that’Bbaya bin
preet na hoi gosain’ (’There is no deference without fear’). Looked at carefully, India
had to make serious compromises in its neighbourhood policy ever since distinct
signs of erosion in its power balance with China or Pakistan started manifesting
themselves. King Mahendra of Nepal would not have defied Nehru if India’s conflict
with China had not seemed in the offing. One can also hypothesise that the 1965
Indo-Pak War would not have taken place had there not been the 1962 India-China
conflict. Z.A. Bhutto, then Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, worked to precipitate the
1965 conflict on the premise that India was weak and vulnerable. India’s role in the
emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 did restore some of India’s credibility as a regional
power and yielded a period of reduced tensions in its neighbourhood relations. But
again in recent years, India’s lack of firmness and capability to put down the Pakistani-
sponsored cross-border terrorism has allowed Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence

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(ISI) expand
to its infrastructure in the neighbouring countries like Nepal and
Bangladesh.
However, before we extend the argument further, it must be emphasised that a
country’s national power and capabilities are not simply a function of military hardware
or economic growth. One has to take account of the requisite political will and

regime credibility as well. If a country cannot bring to bear the capabilities it possesses
to carry out a given political decision, having capabilities would by itself have no real

meaning. For instance, notwithstanding the official explanations, the so-called Operation
Parakram was a reflection of a fragile political will and wavering national resolve on
the part of the Indian state. If India were to look all the time to the US and the
’international community’ to restrain Pakistan from cross-border terrorism, why should
any of India’s other neighbours defer to or respect India? In that case, the smaller
neighbours should also be expected to look towards the extra-regional great power
rather than India to meet their respective national challenges.
Some analysts have argued that coalition governments in India have been perceived
in the neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, as a sign of weakness. Such gov-
ernments have been seen as ideal for extracting favours and concessions. This can as
well be argued in the reverse. Only confident and strong governments can make
concessions, weak ones cannot. Rajiv Gandhi made several generous gestures to
improve the neighbourhood atmosphere. That was not seen as a sign of weakness.
The criterion to judge weakness should not be the concessions per se, but rather
what the concessions imply in terms of India’s legitimate national interests. If India’s
interests are not compromised when concessions are made, than there is no issue at
stake.
The strength and weakness of the government in India is also assessed in terms
of the federal structure of governance. To a very large extent, India’s neighbourhood
policy is strongly influenced by these federal imperatives. If a central government is
seen as adjusting and compromising its vital neighbourhood decisions under the

pressure of provincial interests, then that government cannot be perceived by the

neighbours as a strong one. Nor will that particular policy move succeed. India’s Sri
Lankan policy on the ethnic issue has been seen to be oscillating between national
priorities and provincial considerations in Tamil Nadu. In case of Bangladesh also,
India’s failure to demarcate the border and find a viable response to the question of
illegal migration may be seen as the central government’s inability either to carry the
West Bengal government along or to counter its pressures. The federal factor in
India’s neighbourhood policy is becoming critical, deserving to be systematically and
objectively assessed for a careful pursuance of national goals.
Besides the federal imperative, various socio-cultural, economic and professional
vested interests also impinge to dent the critical policy decisions regarding the neigh-
bours. For instance, Rajiv Gandhi’s tough decisions regarding Nepal in 1989 were
objected to by the power elites having matrimonial ties with Nepal, by the religious
priests of Hindu sects, by the senior army officers of the Gorkha battalions, and so
on. Similarly, the tea growers of the Nilgiri hills in Tamil Nadu succeeded in diluting

the Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka in 1998. This is inevitable in a plural and

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democratic polity. However, as and when a well-considered national policy decision

has been taken, its subsequent revision or dilution exposes the lack of political will
on the part of the Indian state and encourages the neighbouring countries to indulge

in cultivating what would seem to them as powerful and sympathetic domestic

constituencies in India.
On the whole, the power differential factor works in a complex and subtle manner
in policy pursuance and projection. Assertion of power differential in a crude manner
by India, even when it succeeds in obtaining desired and immediate results, becomes
counter-productive in the long run.
IV

The economic strength of any country is part of its national power calculus. In
India’s neighbourhood policy, economic resources play a very important role. The
Indian economy is comparatively more resourceful, diversified and strong as compared
to any of its neighbours. Therefore, there are many expectations of the neighbours
for help and support from India in the areas of trade, investments, technology transfers
and developmental assistance. India also has expectations from the neighbours in
the areas of cooperation in harnessing and sharing of natural resources to mutual
advantages, restricting the flow of third country goods into the Indian market, and
transport and transit links.
There are strong elements of the ’marwan psyche’ in the way India pursues its
economic policy towards its neighbours. India has managed to create an impression
that it wants matching and reciprocal advantages from the neighbours for any accom-
modation and generosity shown to them. Accordingly, India appears to be in need
of ’taking’ something from the neighbours while ’giving’ something to them. And
this, the neighbours not only do not relish but also want to exploit as a bargaining
chip. Hence, difficulties with regard to hydropower projects in Nepal and transit and
gas issues in relation to Bangladesh have become persistently difficult and can-
tankerous. Sharing of river waters with them has been equally difficult, as noted
earlier. Indian policy has sought linkages of many such diverse issues in economic
bargaining so as to secure matching responses for itself in comparable areas in return
for the concessions given to the neighbours in a spccific area. A resourceful and
capable India, therefore, has appeared to the smaller neighbours as a petty trader of
economic goods and advantages. India has not been able to earn political goodwill
through its economic diplomacy despite the fact that it is the most important economic
partner of some of its neighbours and has provided huge assistance and support to
them.
The questions of trade, investments and infrastructural development in relation
to the neighbours should have been pursued within the broader framework of regional
economic integration and co-prosperity. The prospects of cooperation through both
BIMSTEC and the South Asian Growth Quadrangle may be significantly enhanced
if India decides to pursue the regional integration approach seriously. By emphasising
the bilateral framework, India has instilled an uncomfortable feeling of dependence

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and vulnerability among her neighbours. There again, India’s policy has been captive
to small but politically powerful provincial states and other vested interest lobbies.
Recall the instance of Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka, where the tea segment
was almost distorted by the Nilgiris tea growers, who produce inferior and expensive

tea. The revision of the Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty in 2002 was also the result of pres-
sures from local vested interests in northern Indian states. The West Bengal garment

and jute manufacturers are inhibiting India’s policy of allowing access to Bangladeshi
products in India. These examples can be multiplied.
Of course, Pakistan is a case apart. In the case of Pakistan, the problem is with the
Pakistani regime which fears political erosion of identity and legitimacy if closer
economic ties with India are forged. It remains to be seen if the new budgetary pro-
visions introduced in 2003-04 regarding economic assistance to the neighbouring
countries under ’India Development Initiative’ (meant for Africa and South Asia),
will be able to innovatively redefine India’s economic approach towards these countries
and reinforce the primacy of national perspective over local and provincial vested
interests therein. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China have made very effective use of their
respective economic cooperation approaches as instruments of regional and neigh-
bourhood security; by developing, expanding and reinforcing mutual stakes. India
can do that profitably as well, because in a globalised world politics, economic engage-

ment is playing a decisive role in political and strategic equations.

There is need for India to integrate the question of labour migration from Bangla-
desh (illegal) and Nepal (under the Treaty of 1950) in its compact economic approach
to the neighbours. Promoting economic growth in the migration-generating regions
of these two neighbouring countries is essential if the outflow of migration from
these areas has to be dealt with on a long-term basis. The approaches of erecting
barbed wire fencing on the border or organising push-back operations have only
generated ill will and tensions without resolving the issue of illegal migration. As
India’s prosperity grows through its sustained development, the economic goods
seekers will always be attracted towards its lucrative and easily accessible labour market.
Neither ’push-back operations’ nor ’sealing of the borders’ would provide viable
answers to this problem.

It is irony, that notwithstanding its primacy and centrality in South Asia, India has
an

always been in competition with the extra-regional great powers for influence and
goodwill in its immediate neighbourhood. China and the US stand out particularly as
difficult factors. During the Cold War and the post-1960 period, neighbours have
used these extra-regional influences to counter-balance India to their advantage. Indian
policy had to adjust with the domineering presence of the US and the United Kingdom
(UK) while responding to the challenges and crises in the neighbourhood. This was
evident during India’s involvement with the anti-Rana revolution in Nepal (1950-51)
and in the debate on Cold War issues with Sri Lanka during the early 1950s. Pakistan’s

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integration with the Western military alliances had become a foregone conclusion by
1954. Subsequently, Indian policy had to confront these Western major powers in
their moves to contain and counter-balance India in the neighbourhood. Even during
crises like the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the role of extra-regional powers impinged
heavily on India’s policy. A similar situation in a different context prevails even in the
post-Cold War and post-September 11 context, where the US has adopted a proactive
role in the subcontinent. China continues to nurse its strategic ties with Pakistan,
Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It may soon have a diplomatic presence in Bhutan.
The proactive US role has created some problem for India’s strategic space in the
neighbouring countries. In Sri Lanka, India was not in the forefront of peace initiative,
perhaps by design. But it has to accept the peace process, the dynamics of which is
governed mostly by the Norwegian facilitator backed staunchly by the US. The US
has claimed that its involvement in the peace process is next only to that of the Sri
Lankan government. Soon after the initiation of the peace process, not only did
senior US policy-makers visit Sri Lanka, including Jaffna, but they also showed interest
in the Trincomalee oil tank farm, the Second World War vintage facility, that had re-
emerged as a sensitive issue during the early phase of the ethnic crisis. India was
forced to move quickly and assert its claims under the Agreement of July 1987 to be
the first to undertake the task of upgrading the facility. The Indian Oil Corporation
is now under contract to develop the oil tank farm in Trincomalee. India has not
viewed with favour the Norwegian underhand supply of broadcasting equipment to
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), nor their soft position on the recog-
nition of the LTTE Navy by the Sri Lankan government. Now the Japanese interest
in getting actively associated with the peace process under the pretext of helping
rehabilitation activity in war-torn Tamil areas has also raised India’s concerns. Foreign
Minister Sinha had to openly say that:

India wants the peace process in Sri Lanka to go on, but talks would have to be
between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. There is no scope for any
third party mediation.’

There are similar signs of unease in India’s response to the peace process in Nepal,
between the King’s government and the Maoists. Both the King and the Maoists are
not taking India fully into confidence as the US and the UK are backing the peace

process, certainly on the side of the King. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Donald Camp, has even pointed to the Maoists agreeing to come to the nego-
tiating table as a success of the US policy in Nepal. The US is also lending willing
ears to the several Nepali complains and resentments against India. The US did not

even take India fully into confidence about the supply of arms and training to the

Royal Nepal Army. India had to delay overflight permission to the cargo plane carrying
US arms to Nepal. However, in response to India’s reservations in this regard, the
US subsequently came up with a statement that they were helping the King’s govern-
ment fight the Maoists insurgency ’in coordination with other countries like the UK,
India and China’. Now there are reports that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

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monitoring centre will be established in Nepal, obviously to keep an eye on the

Chinese and Indian nuclear programmes.
It is possible that India is asserting its interests and position either indirectly through
the US or directly both in Nepal and Sri Lanka. But this is a clear sign of the erosion
in India’s initiative and strategic position in these countries. From the point of view
of these countries, if India has accepted or acquiesced in the proactive US role in its
sensitive neighbourhood, why should they not take advantage of this new situation.
The smaller neighbours are also not unaware of the fact that if India has to depend
upon the US persistently for helping it in disciplining Pakistan, they could do the
same to soften their problems vis-~-vis India with the help of a great power like the

US. This is a reflection of the emerging power realism in the subcontinent. If India
is perceived to be having an adverse strategic balance with the extra-regional great
powers, its credibility and thrust as a major player in the neighbourhood will be
undermined. To put it differently, if India’s autonomy vis-~-vis the extra-regional
great powers is compromised, it cannot pursue an effective and autonomous policy
in the neighbourhood.

VI

On issues and on occasions, Indian policy and diplomacy reflects a colonial mindset
and a domineering personal style which is further inflated to be exploited by the
vested interests, specific political forces, and rulers and regimes in the neighbouring
countries to serve their interests at India’s cost. The question of changing the 1950
Treaty with Nepal or letting Bhutan establish direct diplomatic relations with China
if it so wants, may be taken as instances in point. There is certainly a gradual and
welcome change in India’s approach in this respect. Over the years, Indian diplomacy
has become much more sensitive to psychological and intangible aspects of neigh-
bourhood idiosyncrasies.
There is also widespread ignorance among the Indian masses about the sensitivities
of the citizens of the neighbouring countries, who are often treated as Indians. Indian
policy-makers can hardly do much to educate the Indian masses into treating citizens
of the neighbouring countries with the respect and deference due to any other foreign
nationals. This is not even possible in view of the extensive areas of cultural and
historical identities existing between the two sides. But the policy pays the cost of
such mass-level perceptions. The Madhuri Dixit and Hritik Roshan incidents in case
of Nepal are telling examples. Bhutanese visitors to India strongly resent when affec-
tionately told by many of the well placed, but diplomatically insensitive, Indian hosts
and interlocutors that ‘we treat you as part of us’. When Bangladeshis or Sri Lankans
travel through the adjacent Indian states, they are offended by the casual and shabby
treatment afforded them by the locals. Though it has not been scientifically inves-

tigated, there is a distinct possibility that most of the citizens of the neighbouring
countries coming to India on government-funded programmes for education (even
under scholarship grants), health services, employment, business or other private
purposes, go back hurt, disappointed and resentful of India. As a consequence, they

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in their respective countries easily fall prey to India-bashing forces and vested interests.
The investment made in creating goodwill constituencies becomes counter-productive.
The same is the case with job-seeking immigrants, legal or illegal. The question of
identity is serious at the state level as well as the level of private interactions and en-
gagements. Very few sets of neighbours have such sensitivities as between India and
its neighbours.
There is need for India to be innovative in meeting these collateral pressures on its
neighbourhood policy and diplomacy. One thing that can be done easily is to soften
India’s the rhetorical level, even when India wants to deal tough with its
stance at

neighbours on any given issue. There was something to this effect in the Gujral
Doctrine that, without losing much in concrete terms, raised the comfort level of
the smaller neighbours. The principal issue at stake is winning ‘hearts and minds’ not
only of the decision makers but also the common people in the neighbouring countries
without vitiating or sacrificing India’s vital and long-term interests. India needs to
be generous and accommodative, sensitive and understanding towards the neigh-
bours wherever possible, and tactful, firm and assertive wherever necessary. Indian
policy faces one of most complex challenges not in relation to global issues but in
the neighbourhood.

END NOTES

1. Speechdelivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 30 October 2002.
Downloaded from [Link]
2. Kanwal Sibal, ’Challenges Ahead: India’s Views on Regional Development’. Speech delivered at the
French Institute of International Relations, Paris, on 17 December 2002. Excerpts reproduced in
The Indian Express, 3 January 2003, p. 9.
3. The Indian Express, 14 January 2003.

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