G.R. No.

111091 August 21, 1995

ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Facts:
Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division,
Industrial Technology Development Institute, Department of Science and
Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute which is
an agency of the DOST. He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD
building, while the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the
construction. The structure is jointly funded by the Philippine and
Japanese Governments.

While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either
directly requested and/or demanded for himself the sum of
P200,000.00, claimed as part of the expected profit of the contractor.
Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act for committing said offense in relation to the performance of his official
duties.

Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer

because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely
a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular
project and for a specified period. Hence the Sandiganbayan erred in taking
cognizance of the case. Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to
“include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government…”

Issue:
Can a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government be
considered as public officer?

Held:
Yes. The word “INCLUDES” used in defining a public officer indicates that
the definition is not restrictive. The terms “classified, unclassified or
exemption service” were the old categories of position in the civil service
which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by
PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission by
the Administrative Code of 1987.

A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a

government undertaking falls under the non-career service category of
the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA
3019.
Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative
Code of 1987, non-career service in particular is characterized by
1. entrance other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and
2. tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose employment was made.

Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include
Contractual personnel or those employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency,
to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed
one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his
own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the
hiring agency.

GR no. 213542-43, March 15, 2016

Napoles vs Carpio-Morales

Facts:
The case revolves around the alleged misuse of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) by several individuals, including
Jessica Lucila “Gigi” Reyes, who served as the Chief of Staff for Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, Janet Lim Napoles, and her children, among others. The
alleged conversion of public funds amounted to P172,834,500.00 within the
span of 2004 to 2010, involving prominent government officials.

On September 16, 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed a

complaint for Plunder. On November 18, 2013, the Field Investigation
Office of the Ombudsman also filed a similar complaint for Plunder and
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. These complaints alleged that the
respondents conspired to divert funds through non-government
organizations controlled by Janet Lim Napoles.

Reyes was accused of processing fraudulent releases of PDAF through

various administrative actions and receiving kickbacks. Janet Napoles was
identified as the mastermind, orchestrating and controlling the
NGOs used as conduits. The Napoles siblings were implicated as officials
in the NGOs, engaging in falsifications to facilitate fund diversion.

A Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014, and a Joint Order dated June 4,
2014, by the Ombudsman found probable cause against Reyes, Napoles, and
others for one count of Plunder and multiple counts of violations of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. Reyes, claiming forged documents and hearsay evidence,
sought reconsideration, which was denied. The Napoles siblings argued
that there was no evidence of conspiracy with public officials. Despite
these appeals, the Ombudsman upheld the charges.

Following the Ombudsman’s resolution, 16 Information were filed at the

Sandiganbayan, which, on July 3, 2014, after independently evaluating the
evidence, issued arrest warrants. Reyes and others filed motions for
suspension of proceedings, arguing for judicial determination of probable
cause, which were also denied.

Issue:
Did the Ombudsman err in finding probable cause against Napoles siblings
and De Asis for the crimes of Plunder and violations of section 3(e) of RA
3019?

Held:
NO. As regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings
and De Asis, it must be first highlighted that they are placed in the same
situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged with crime/s
principally performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder and/or
multiple violations of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as
private individuals on account of their alleged conspiracy with public
officers, Senator Enrile and Reyes. It is a fundamental legal axiom that
"[w]hen there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all."206 Thus, the
reasonable likelihood that conspiracy exists between them denotes the
probable existence of the elements of the crimes above-discussed equally as
to them.

"Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interests."207

With respect to the Napoles siblings, it must be clarified that while it

appears from the evidence on record that: (a) they did not serve as officers
or incorporators of the JLN-controlled NGOs designated as "project
partners" in the implementation of Senator Enrile's PDAF projects;208 (b)
their names did not appear in the table of signatories to the MOAs;209 and
(c) they did not acknowledge receipt of the checks issued by the I As in
payment of Senator Enrile's "ghost" PDAF-funded projects, they were
nonetheless involved in various phases of the PDAF scam. Their respective
participations, from which a unity of purpose and design with the acts of
their mother, Janet Napoles, resonates, were uncovered in the sworn
statement210 of whistleblower Luy, as will be shown hereunder.
Based on the foregoing, it may be gathered that the Napoles
siblings:
a. worked at the JLN Corporation, which was apparently shown to be at
the forefront of the PDAF scam, as it was even revealed that it
received no other income outside of the PDAF transactions;
b. do not work as mere regular employees but as high-ranking
officers, being the Vice-President for Administration and Finance and
Vice-President for Operations, respectively of JLN Corporation; and
c. as high-ranking officers of the JLN Corporation, were OSTENSIBLY
privy to and/or participated in the planning and execution of
the company's endeavors, which, as claimed, include illegal
activities concerning the misappropriation of various government
funds, which, as specifically pointed out by Luy, included, among
others, Senator Enrile's PDAF.

To recount, Luy stated that Jo Christine Napoles, as part of the

scheme, checked the "vouchers" he had prepared; that the Napoles siblings
knew of the "codenames" of the legislators in the illicit "vouchers"; and that
they were also included in the actual disbursement of "rebates" to the
legislators, among others. Senator Enrile. More so, although Su�as's
testimony that the Napoles siblings forged documents and signatures
pertaining to the disbursement of the DAR funds which does not directly
prove that they had committed the same with respect to Senator Enrile's
PDAF, such evidence, when juxtaposed with Luy's testimony, gains
relevance in ascertaining the illegal plan, system or scheme to which they
were alleged to be involved.

It also tends to directly prove the fact that they had knowledge of JLN
Corporation's illegal activities. The Court notes that these accounts gain
more credibility not only in view of the whistleblowers' allegations that they
worked closely with the Napoles siblings in JLN Corporation for a
considerable length of time but also that Sula, and particularly Luy as "lead
employee," were among the most trusted workers of Janet Napoles in the
furtherance of the PDAF scam. Also, there appears to be no motive for
any of these whistleblowers, particularly, Luy, to incredulously
implicate the Napoles siblings in this case. With all these factors
together, there is, at least, some substantial basis to conclude, that the
Napoles siblings were, in all reasonable likelihood, involved in the entire
con.

GR no. 109266, December 02, 1993 Santiago vs. Garchitorena vis a

vis
GR no. 105965 August 09, 1999 Uy vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 201830, November 10, 2015
Office of the Ombudsman v. Prudente

Facts:
 August 1991: Board of Directors of San Pablo City Water District
(SPCWD) dismiss division chiefs Evelyn Eje and Racquel Tolentino
upon GM Borja’s administrative complaint.
 Eje and Tolentino appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) which affirms their dismissal; case escalated to the CA.
 December 18, 1995: CA overturns dismissal, awards backwages but
rules the liability is personal to Borja, not SPCWD.
 March 27, 1996: CA decision becomes final.
 July 4, 1996: Eje and Tolentino reinstated; Borja uses SPCWD funds
for their backwages.
 1999: San Pablo City Bar Association files civil case for the
reimbursement of SPCWD by Borja and the Board.
 May 26, 2000: RTC orders Borja to refund SPCWD, noting COA’s
advisory that liability was personal.
 Criminal cases filed against Borja for RA 3019 violations; later
dismissed on Ombudsman recommendation due to COA’s good faith
finding.

Issue:
Did the CA committed any reversible error in dismissing the administrative
complaint against Borja?

Held:
Yes, the Court is convinced that Borja should be held administratively liable
for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 had been dismissed upon the Ombudsman's manifestation that it
lacked basis to prosecute him is of no moment. As correctly pointed out by
the Ombudsman, the dismissal of the criminal case is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance with the rule that a
criminal case is separate from an administrative case and each must be
disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.48
Moreover, in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction could be had,49 while
liability in administrative cases is only hinged on the lesser threshold of
substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.50

Besides, the elements for the commission of graft and corrupt practices
under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, are different from what constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which is an administrative
offense. The following are the essential elements for violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service has
been consistently held to pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity
of the public office, although not necessarily related or connected to the
public officer's function. Thus, while the absence of bad faith may negate
criminal liability for graft and corrupt practices under Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, it does not automatically absolve Borja of administrative liability for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering that the
only question material to the latter is whether the public officer's acts
tarnished the image or integrity of the public office. At this juncture, the
Court deems it fit to emphasize that a public office is a public trust. As such,
public officers must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Furthermore, contrary to the CA's findings, COA Resolution No. 2004-00654

dated September 14, 2004, did not allow the payment of Eje and Tolentino's
back wages from SPCWD's funds. Instead, it prescribed the guidelines on
the matter of allowances and other benefits such as representation and
transportation allowances, emergency and miscellaneous expenses
allowance, Christmas and other bonuses, rice allowance, and other similar
allowances given to officials and employees of water districts in general.

Verily, CO A Resolution No. 2004-006 does not even relate to the payment
of back wages and other allowances and benefits to Eje and Tolentino.
Accordingly, the CA erred in relying on the above-stated resolution in ruling
that the payments to Eje and Tolentino were made in good faith.

GR no, 154482, September 13, 2007

Lindong vs. People

Facts:
Felipe K. Constantino, the mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province, along
with co-accused Norberto N. Lindong, was charged with violating Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for
allegedly entering into an overpriced lease agreement for heavy equipment
with Norlovanian Corporation. Despite resolutions authorizing the mayor to
purchase equipment on a five-year amortization basis, Constantino executed
a lease agreement with a significantly higher total cost. Both parties
proceeded to trial, pleading not guilty.

The prosecution argued the lease/purchase contract was detrimental to the

municipal government, presenting evidence of failed public biddings and a
subsequent unauthorized lease agreement. The defense, on the other hand,
maintained the transaction was a lease/purchase agreement within the
scope of a Sangguniang Bayan resolution and even provided documentation
implying concurrence from municipal officials.

The Sandiganbayan found both Constantino and Lindong guilty, resulting in

separate appeals to the Supreme Court: Constantino seeking a review on
the decision and Lindong challenging orders related to the execution of
judgment against him.

Held:
Constantino’s petition would have been granted and he would have been
absolved of criminal liability had he been still alive today. This is why it is
so.

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.

In order to be liable for violating the law, the following elements must
concur: (1) the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former; (2) he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; (3) the said public officer
commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official
duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (4) such undue injury is
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and (5) the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.32

There are two (2) modes of committing the offense, thus: (1) the public
officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the government; or
(2) the public officer gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.33 An accused
may be charged under either mode34 or under both should both modes
concur.35

Additionally, Section 3(e) poses the standard of manifest partiality, evident

bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence before liability can be had under
the provision. Manifest partiality is characterized by a clear, notorious or
plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other.36
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage.37 Gross inexcusable negligence is
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.38 Mere bad faith or
partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable
under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place
be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both
be gross and inexcusable.39

As discussed previously, the Sandiganbayan held that manifest partiality

could not be rightfully imputed to Constantino.40 The prosecution did not
present proof that he was actuated with malice or fraud sufficient to meet
the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.41 However, the
respondent court found that Constantino’s act of entering into a purportedly
pure lease agreement instead of a lease/purchase agreement was a flagrant
violation of Resolution No. 21. In view of the rigid terms of the subject
contract to which Constantino assented, coupled by his failure to secure the
concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into the agreement,
the Sandiganbayan found that his conduct constituted gross inexcusable
negligence.42 Likewise, the anti-graft court ruled that Constantino’s acts
resulted in undue injury to the Municipality of Malungon.43 Notably, in the
course of trial, the prosecution admitted that it had no proof that
unwarranted benefits and advantage had been given to Norlovanian
Corporation.44

Undoubtedly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of R.A. No.

3019 is quite high which, in this case, was not hurdled by the evidence
presented against Constantino. Verily, the prosecution failed to satisfy the
requisite proof to demonstrate Constantino’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
While Constantino should have exercised more prudence when he
transacted with Norlovanian Corporation, he could not however be held
liable for "gross inexcusable negligence" as contemplated in R.A. No. 3019.
Indeed, in the earlier case of Constantino v. Desierto,45 the Court had
already made an express finding that petitioner Constantino did not violate
the mandate of Resolution No. 21 but instead merely carried out its
directive.

G.R. No. 154482

One of the essential elements for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is
that the respondent is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions, or that he or she is a private individual in conspiracy with
such public officer. In the instant case, the essential acquittal of
Constantino, as presaged in G.R. No. 140656 and presented in the
disquisition, renders an absence in the critical requisite of a public officer
with whom Lindong, the private individual, allegedly conspired to commit
the crime charged.

Hence, we now have before us an incongruous situation where execution of

judgment has been entered against a private person accused with
conspiring with a public officer for violation of the anti-graft law, but at the
same time said public officer would unequivocably be entitled to
exoneration had he not died in the meantime. Yet, it is utterly illogical to
absolve Constantino who entered into the contract on behalf of the
government and send the private person to prison.

The case of Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (1st Division)55 is instructive. Here,

the Court granted the motion for reconsideration filed by former First Lady
Imelda Marcos and acquitted her of the charge of violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the
subject lease agreement not as a public officer, but as a private person.
Thus, the Court found that the first element of the offense, i.e., that the
accused is a public officer, was lacking. However, the acquittal of the
former First Lady was taken in conjunction with the acquittal of the public
officer with whom she was accused.56

It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the
reversal of the former First Lady’s conviction was based on the fact that it
was later held that she signed the subject lease agreement as a private
person, not a public officer. However, this acquittal should also be taken in
conjunction with the fact that the public officer with whom she had
supposedly conspired, her co-accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In
other words, the element that the accused is a public officer, was
totally wanting in the former First Lady’s case because Dans, the
public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in committing
Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019, had already been acquitted.
Obviously, the former First Lady could not be convicted, on her own
as a private person, of the same offense. (Emphasis supplied)
GR no. 165927 April 24, 2009
Giduquio vs. People