HOUSE OF LORDS

Select Committee on the Constitution

8th Report of Session 2010–11

Fixed-term
Parliaments Bill

Report with Evidence

Ordered to be printed 1 December 2010 and published 16 December 2010

Published by the Authority of the House of Lords

London : The Stationery Office Limited

£15.50

HL Paper 69
Select Committee on the Constitution
The Constitution Committee is appointed by the House of Lords in each session with the following
terms of reference:
To examine the constitutional implications of all public bills coming before the House; and to keep
under review the operation of the constitution.

Current Membership

Lord Crickhowell
Baroness Falkner of Margravine
Lord Goldsmith
Lord Hart of Chilton
Lord Irvine of Lairg
Baroness Jay of Paddington (Chairman)
Lord Norton of Louth
Lord Pannick
Lord Powell of Bayswater
Lord Renton of Mount Harry
Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank
Lord Shaw of Northstead

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CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 5
Introduction 1 5
The provisions of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 6 5
The scope of this report 7 6
The history of the fixed-term Parliaments debate 9 6
The development of this Bill 13 7
The Bill and the Government’s aims for constitutional
reform 15 8
Chapter 2: The principal of fixed-term Parliaments 21 10
The nature of fixed-term Parliaments 21 10
Table 1: Continuum of fixed-term experience 10
The case for fixed terms 26 11
The case against fixed terms 34 12
Conclusion 44 15
Chapter 3: The length of the parliamentary term and
election timing 47 16
Five year terms 47 16
Table 2: Length of time between general elections post 1945 16
The case for a five year term 50 17
The case against a five year term 52 17
Conclusion on term length 59 18
Resetting the clock 64 19
Election timing—the devolved institutions 75 21
Sessional arrangements 82 22
Chapter 4: Early parliamentary general elections 88 24
Introduction 88 24
The need for a safety valve 89 24
The need for two distinct mechanisms 96 25
The two-thirds majority vote 99 26
Motions of no confidence 103 27
Definition of a no confidence motion 108 28
The role of the Speaker 115 29
Formation of an alternative government following a
no confidence motion 120 30
Is 14 days the most appropriate length of time for
government formation? 122 31
How can the Commons pass a motion of confidence
in a government which does not yet exist? 126 32
May a government which has lost the confidence of the
Commons reconstitute itself? 128 32
Government manipulation of the no confidence process 131 32
Government resignation 136 33
Abolition of the prerogative in respect of dissolution 139 34
Retaining the prerogative in respect of prorogation 144 35
Judicial review of early dissolution arrangements 150 36
Further drafting issues relating to clause 2 158 38
Chapter 5: The process of scrutiny 160 39
The development of the Government’s policies 164 39
Interrelationship with other reform proposals 168 40
Pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation 173 41
The Parliament Acts 180 42
Chapter 6: Summary of recommendations 183 43
Appendix 1: Select Committee on the Constitution 46
Appendix 2: List of witnesses 47
Appendix 3: Comparison of electoral cycles of selected
legislatures 50

Oral Evidence
Professor Dawn Oliver, Professor of Constitutional Law, University College
London and Professor Anthony Bradley
Oral Evidence, 6 October 2010 1
Further evidence, Malcolm Jack, Clerk of the House of Commons 12
Further evidence, Professor Anthony Bradley 12

Dr Henry Milner, Political science, Umea University, Université de Montréal

and Professor Stephen Padgett, University of Strathclyde
Oral Evidence, 20 October 2010 14

Professor Vernon Bogdanor and Dr Ruth Fox, Director Parliament and

Government Programme, Hansard Society
Written Evidence, Hansard Society 24
Oral Evidence, 27 October 2010 25

Mark Harper MP, Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform

Oral Evidence, 2 November 2010 38
Supplementary evidence, 17 November 2010 51

NOTE: Evidence taken at or in connection with a public hearing is printed

in this volume. Other evidence is published online at
http://www.parliament.uk/hlconstitution and available for inspection at the
Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 5314)

References in footnotes to the Report are as follows:

Q refers to a question in oral evidence;
FTP 1 refers to written evidence as listed in Appendix 2.
 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Introduction
1. The Constitution Committee is appointed “to examine the constitutional
implications of all public Bills coming before the House; and to keep under
review the operation of the constitution.” In carrying out the former
function, we endeavour to identify questions of principle that arise from
proposed legislation and which affect a principal part of the constitution.
2. In this report we consider the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. The Bill would
remove the Prime Minister’s power to call an election at the time of his choosing,
and sets a five year fixed term, subject to the possibility of early dissolution
following a vote by the House of Commons. The Bill is of clear constitutional
importance. We have therefore carried out enhanced scrutiny of the Bill by
conducting a full inquiry into the policy and provisions contained in the Bill.
3. We launched this inquiry on 15 July 2010, shortly before the introduction of
the Bill into the House of Commons, with the intention of producing a
report in time for its second reading in the House of Lords. The Bill received
its second reading in the Commons on 13 September. At the time of
publication of this report, the Bill was awaiting report and remaining stages
in the House of Commons. 1
4. We have heard oral evidence from seven witnesses and received written
submissions from a further 41 witnesses. Our witnesses included the Minister for
Political and Constitutional Reform, Mark Harper MP, academic experts,
campaigners, and international legislatures and academics to all of whom we are
grateful. We have also taken account of the evidence given to us by the Deputy
Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP, and by constitutional experts which
we published in our 5th report, The Government’s Constitutional Reform
Programme.2
5. We have been assisted in this inquiry by the Committee’s Legal Advisers,
Professor Adam Tomkins, University of Glasgow, and Professor Richard
Rawlings, University College London. We are grateful for their assistance.

The provisions of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

6. The Bill as introduced included the following main provisions:
• the next general election to be held on 7 May 2015;
• subsequent general elections to take place on the first Thursday in May at
five year intervals;
• a safety valve provision for an early election to take place in the event of
the Speaker of the House of Commons certifying that a number of MPs

1 References in this report to the Bill or Explanatory Notes are references to the Bill as introduced in the
House of Commons: 2010–11 Bill 64.
2 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011): The Government’s Constitutional Reform Programme (HL
Paper 43).
6 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

equivalent to, or more than, two-thirds of the total number of seats have
voted in favour;
• a second safety valve provision for an early election to take place in the
event of the Speaker certifying (a) that the Commons has passed a motion
of no confidence in the government, and (b) that 14 days have passed
without the House passing any motion expressing confidence in any
government of Her Majesty;
• a provision that Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved.

The scope of this report

7. In this report we examine the key issues of the principle of fixed-term
Parliaments, the length of the fixed term and the provisions enabling early
general elections to be held. We also consider the process by which the Bill
was brought forward.
8. We received little or no evidence on a number of other issues raised by the
Bill’s provisions. We therefore make no further comment on the following:
• the choice of the first Thursday in May as the appropriate day and time of
year for holding general elections; 3
• orders enabling the date of an ordinary general election to be brought
forward or delayed by up to two months; 4
• the length of time between dissolution and the polling date; 5
• the restriction on the designation of public holidays and days of mourning
being used to affect the date of dissolution; 6
• the summoning of a new Parliament. 7

The history of the fixed-term Parliaments debate 8

9. The system by which Parliaments are dissolved and general elections held
has remained largely unchanged for nearly a century. The current five year
maximum term was introduced by the Parliament Act 1911. The Act did not
affect the Crown’s prerogative to dissolve Parliament. This equates to a
prime ministerial power to call an election broadly at a time of his or her
choosing. A former Chairman of this Committee compared this arrangement
to “a race in which the Prime Minister is allowed to approach it with his
running shoes in one hand and his starting pistol in the other”. 9 In other
words, the Prime Minister’s power may give the governing party a significant
advantage over opposition parties, particularly in terms of the organisation of
an election campaign. One way of reducing this advantage, it has been
suggested, is to introduce a system of fixed-term Parliaments.

3 Clause 1(3).
4 Clause 1(5).
5 Clause 3(1).
6 Clause 3(6).
7 Clauses 3(4) and 4(2).
8 For more information see Constitution Unit, Fixed Term Parliaments, August 2010, ch 6 (also included in
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011): Fixed-term Parliaments Bill (HC
Paper 436), Ev 43).
9 Lord Holme of Cheltenham, HL Deb 22 May 1991 col 245.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 7

10. In recent times, there has been little public discussion of fixed-term
Parliaments, though the issue has been on the constitutional reform agenda
for the last twenty years. In 1991 the Institute for Public Policy Research
argued that four year fixed terms should form one element of a written
constitution. 10 The Labour Party’s 1992 manifesto called for fixed-term
Parliaments to be introduced. 11
11. Whilst their 1997 manifesto contained no commitment to fixed-term
Parliaments for Westminster, the newly elected Labour Government did
introduce fixed four year terms for the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland. Private members’ bills providing for fixed parliamentary
terms at Westminster were brought forward in 2001 by Labour MP and
former Chairman of the Public Administration Committee, Tony Wright, 12
and in 2008 by Liberal Democrat MP David Howarth; 13 though neither Bill
progressed beyond a second reading debate. The Liberal Democrat policy in
favour of four year fixed terms was set out in the policy papers Real Democracy
for Britain (2007) 14 and For the People, By the People (2007) 15.
12. In 2007, the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, announced a proposal to
require the Prime Minister to seek the approval of the House of Commons
before asking the Queen for a dissolution. 16 This would have been another
method of addressing the fact that the Prime Minister can choose the
election date. The proposal went no further.

The development of this Bill

13. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats made commitments in their 2010
manifestos to legislate to introduce fixed-term Parliaments, though neither
specified a length of term. The Conservative manifesto made no
commitment to their introduction. The May 2010 election resulted in a hung
Parliament. In the coalition negotiations that followed, fixed-term
Parliaments quickly emerged as one element of the constitutional reform
agenda. The resulting coalition programme for government included the
following commitment:
“We will establish five-year fixed-term Parliaments. We will put a
binding motion before the House of Commons stating that the next
general election will be held on the first Thursday of May 2015.
Following this motion, we will legislate to make provision for fixed-term
Parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution
if 55% or more of the House votes in favour.” 17
14. The Government subsequently announced that the binding motion proposal
had been dropped and the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was introduced to the
House of Commons on 22 July 2010.

10 The Constitution of the United Kingdom, September 1991.

11 It’s time to get Britain working again, Labour Party manifesto 1992.
12 Fixed-term Parliaments, Bill 54 (2001–2002); see also HC Deb 7 May 2002 col 46.
13 Fixed Term Parliaments, Bill 30 (2007–2008).
14 The Liberal Democrats, Real Democracy for Britain: 20 proposals to strengthen British democracy, July
2007.
15 The Liberal Democrats, For the People, By the People, September 2007, para 3.1.8.
16 The Governance of Britain, Cm 7170 (2007), paras 34–36.
17 HM Government, The Coalition: Our programme for government, p 26.
8 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

The Bill and the Government’s aims for constitutional reform

15. The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill is just one part of a package of proposed
reforms intended by the Government to make the political system “far more
transparent and accountable.” 18 In his evidence, the Deputy Prime Minister
told us that: “it is an unambiguous judgment on our part that reducing the
power of the executive, seeking to boost the power of the legislature, making
the legislatures more accountable to people ... collectively introduces the
mechanisms by which people can exercise greater control over politicians.” 19
More recently, the Deputy Prime Minister has argued that “People expect to
be given clear and transparent choices.” 20
16. Throughout this report we consider whether the Government have met these
aims in introducing the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. Although the principle
of fixed terms reduces the power of the executive in one respect, 21 we discuss
in Chapter Four various concerns over the drafting of clause 2 which mean
that the executive’s power to determine when elections should be called
would not be entirely reduced. 22 Moreover, it is arguable that the Bill makes
it less clear when and how that power may be exercised. We stress in Chapter
Three that the Bill would lead to less frequent general elections; this would
make the legislature less accountable, not more. 23 In Chapter Five we
examine the lack of time given by the Government to development of its
policies and the Bill’s detailed provisions. 24
17. The policy behind the Bill shows little sign of being developed with
constitutional principles in mind. A prime example of this is the
Government’s decision to legislate for five year fixed terms, which we discuss
in detail in Chapter Three. 25 There is a legitimate debate to be had about the
length of the Parliamentary term. However, it is important to recognise the
distinction between “the immediate concern of the Government that it
should continue for five years” and “the long-term issue of fixed-term
Parliaments”: 26 the former is possible under the current constitutional
arrangements; the latter constitutes a significant constitutional change.
18. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told us that the
proposed binding motion could have placed the Crown in a difficult position
if any request for early dissolution were subsequently made, and that it was
therefore judged more appropriate to introduce legislation at an early stage. 27
He added that “the House of Commons has effectively now said that in
principle it supports fixed-term Parliaments, and the view is that that has
already constrained the ability of the Prime Minister to seek an early
dissolution if he was so minded.” 28

18 Ibid.
19 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 55.
20 The Deputy Prime Minister, Political Studies Association/Hansard Society Annual Lecture, 16 November
2010.
21 See Chapter Two, paras 26 and 46.
22 See, especially, paras 115–119.
23 See Chapter Three, paras 49 and 62.
24 See, especially, paras 164–167.
25 See Chapter 4.
26 Q 3.
27 Q 117.
28 Ibid..
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 9

19. The speed with which the policy was introduced, with no significant
consultation, no green paper and no detailed assessment of the pros and cons
of a five year term over a four year term, suggests that short-term
considerations were the drivers behind the Bill’s introduction. The Hansard
Society argued that “political expediency appears to have taken priority over
Parliament’s right to properly scrutinise the executive.” 29 Democratic Audit
stressed that “this change is yet another piecemeal alteration, implemented
with insufficient consultation, to the UK constitution”. 30
20. We take the view that the origins and content of this Bill owe more to
short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring
constitutional principles or sustained public demand. We
acknowledge the political imperative behind the coalition
Government’s wish to state in advance its intent to govern for the full
five year term, but this could have been achieved under the current
constitutional conventions.

29 FTP 16.
30 FTP 10.
10 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

CHAPTER 2: THE PRINCIPAL OF FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS

The nature of fixed-term Parliaments

21. Before we examine the arguments for and against fixed-term Parliaments, it
is necessary to define what is meant by that term. There is a spectrum
between rigidly fixed terms, of which Norway is the prime example, and
flexible systems such as in the UK, Australia, 31 New Zealand and Ireland
where the Prime Minister broadly retains the flexibility to call an election at
any point before the expiry of a maximum term.
22. In between, there are semi-fixed arrangements under which a fixed term is
the norm, but where there are safety valve provisions which enable an early
election to be called. Such arrangements operate in Germany, Sweden and
the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Such
arrangements are generally referred to as fixed-term arrangements, though
the terms of these Parliaments are not fixed in length in the pure sense. 32
23. The Constitution Unit have set out a useful representation of this concept: 33
TABLE 1
Continuum of fixed-term experience
Completely Fixed Semi-Fixed Nominally Fixed Completely
Flexible
Norway Germany Canada UK
Sweden France Australia
South Africa Italy New Zealand
Ireland
Completely fixed: No provision for calling an election before the scheduled date.
Semi-fixed: Mechanisms in place to allow for dissolution before the scheduled election date.
Nominally fixed: Safety valves being used in practice to undermine the fixed term.
Completely flexible: Length of term, subject to an overall maximum, decided at the discretion of the
executive.

24. Despite its short title, the Bill does not, strictly speaking, establish a fixed
parliamentary term for the Westminster Parliament, but instead establishes
fixed dates for future general elections (subject to any early dissolution). The
current law, under the Septennial Act 1715, as amended, provides for a
maximum parliamentary term of five years. Each term conventionally
commences a number of days following the general election. Once Parliament
is dissolved there is a period of around four weeks 34 until the next general
election. Consequently, if each Parliament lasted for the maximum five year
term, general elections would sometimes be held at less convenient times of

31 At federal level.
32 Q 83 (Professor Bogdanor).
33 Constitution Unit, op. cit. Fig 5.1. See also Appendix 3 which sets out the election cycles for a number of
Westminster-style international legislatures.
34 The timetable for this is set out in rule 1 in Schedule 1 to the Representation of the People Act 1983.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 11

the year (such as Christmas). In order to establish a convenient election date,

even those Parliaments which have lasted for close to the maximum term have
been dissolved by the Prime Minister a few days or weeks early.35
25. As we shall see in Chapter Four, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, whilst
removing the Prime Minister’s power to choose when to request a dissolution
of Parliament, includes provision for an election to be held before the fixed
date. Accordingly, the Bill establishes a semi-fixed arrangement and
reduces the level of flexibility which exists in the current system.

The case for fixed terms

26. As we have noted, one of the Government’s aims is “reducing the power of
the executive”. 36 The Deputy Prime Minister set out the Government’s case
for the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments on this basis:
“We are seeking to remove from the executive and the Prime Minister
of the day the ability to play politics with the timing of the election. That
is the basic motive of this. Governments have been distorted, paralysed,
hobbled and handicapped over and over again by the capricious manner
in which Prime Ministers have played cat and mouse with the British
people and with the legislature about when elections should be held. ...
That is debilitating to good government; it destroys good government. It
is humiliating to the legislature and the Parliament. It makes a complete
mockery of the relationship between the legislature and the executive.” 37
27. The Bill goes further than is strictly necessary to achieve this stated policy
objective. It would have been possible to remove the Prime Minister’s power
to choose when to seek a dissolution simply by placing the power to
determine the date of the next election in Parliament’s hands through the
two-thirds majority vote. However, we received no evidence setting out the
policy details or implications of such an arrangement.
28. The central argument of proponents of reform, that the current system is
unfair and that fixed-term Parliaments should be introduced as a matter of
democratic principle, is a powerful one. The Government referred us to three
opinion polls which demonstrated public support for the establishment of
fixed terms. 38 A number of witnesses stressed that the Government were
“proposing to give up what has been a very significant element of prime
ministerial power”. 39
29. Whilst this is undoubtedly the central justification for introducing fixed-term
Parliaments, witnesses suggested that the Bill would have a number of
additional beneficial constitutional consequences such as maintaining public
confidence in the democratic process,40 forcing politicians to be more open
about dissolution decisions, 41 stabilising coalition governments 42 and

35 The 1992–1997 Parliament lasted from 27 April 1992 until 8 April 1997 (4 years, 11 months and 11 days);
the general election was held on 1 May 1997, five years and 22 days after the previous general election
which had been held on 9 April 1992. The 2005–2010 Parliament lasted from 11 May 2005 until 12 April
2010 (4 years, 11 months and 1 day); the general election was held on 6 May 2010, five years and one day
after the previous general election. See also Table 2 (Chapter Three).
36 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 55.
37 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 54.
38 FTP 44 (Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform).
39 Ibid. Q 13 (Professor Hazell); FTP 40 (David C Docherty).
40 Q 46 (Professor Milner).
41 FTP 19, para 3 (David Howarth).
12 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

protecting the Crown from becoming embroiled in political controversy over

dissolutions as has happened in other countries. 43
30. Some argued that fixed-term Parliaments could also improve the policy-
making and legislative process. The Deputy Prime Minister told us that the
current system “prevents difficult, long-term decisions being taken, because
everything is refracted through that short-term objective.” 44 Dr Ruth Fox,
Director of the Hansard Society’s Parliament and Government Programme,
argued that the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments should eliminate
both the wash-up 45 and the “tidal wave” nature of the legislative process
whereby the amount of legislation rises and falls at certain points in the
calendar. 46 Officials of parliaments where fixed terms are in operation
stressed that they allowed parliamentary business to be planned more
effectively. 47
31. Introducing fixed terms would create consistency with international
experience. Democratic Audit argued that fixed-term Parliaments of some
kind are a democratic norm. 48 Three quarters of the 41 democracies
analysed in a 2005 study were found to have fixed terms. 49 Their
introduction would also bring Westminster into line with practice in the
devolved legislatures.
32. Several other, less direct, advantages of fixed terms were also suggested.
Henry Milner, Visiting Professor of Political Studies, Umeå University,
Sweden, argued that a fixed electoral cycle presented the opportunity to
engage people in the democratic process more effectively. 50 Mark Ryan,
Senior Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law, Coventry
University, suggested that fixed election dates “would help cement
parliamentary elections in the psyche of the electorate”, which could in turn
encourage higher turnout. 51
33. The Deputy Prime Minister argued that other parties had advocated fixed-term
Parliaments in the past, that the previous Prime Minister had expressed his strong
support for it, that it had been debated for decades, and that it was common
practice in many other democracies: “I think the case has been made”.52

The case against fixed terms

34. A number of our witnesses either opposed fixed-term Parliaments in
principle, or expressed scepticism that their introduction would make any
material difference or advance the Government’s constitutional agenda.

42 Ibid., paragraph 4.
43 Constitution Unit op. cit., para 3.1.5. See further, Ch 4 paras 139–143.
44 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 54.
45 This is where legislation is fast-tracked through its parliamentary stages by consensual agreement between
the political parties at the end of a parliamentary session.
46 Q 111; FTP 16, para 8.
47 FTP 9 (Clerk to the Scottish Parliament); FTP 34, para 19 (Deputy Secretary General, Swedish
Parliament).
48 FTP 10.
49 Constitution Unit, op. cit., para 5, citing Henry Milner, Canada’s Unfixed Election Dates: a ‘Political Season’
to reduce the Democratic Deficit, Institute for Research on Public Policy Matters, December 2005, p 18.
50 Q 47.
51 FTP 32, para 4.
52 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 61.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 13

35. It may be that the advantage accruing to a Prime Minister under the present
system is in practice minimal. Vernon Bogdanor, Research Professor, King’s
College London, argued that on most occasions when a Prime Minister
“went early”, he or she would have won anyway. 53 Alistair Smith, Professor
of Politics, New York University, agreed, suggesting that “electoral fairness,
one of the major justifications for a move to a fixed term system, is greatly
overstated.” 54
36. Some witnesses were sceptical about how much difference the introduction
of fixed-term Parliaments would actually make to the policy-making
process 55 whilst Christian Leuprecht, Associate Professor, Department of
Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada,
suggested that knowledge of when the next election would be could lead a
government to seek to manipulate the economic cycle to their maximum
advantage at the time of the next election. 56
37. Several witnesses reflected on the difficulty of legally entrenching fixed term
legislation in a system where no Parliament can bind another. 57 Some
witnesses suggested that there could be ways of effectively entrenching
legislation. 58 For instance, Raymond Youngs, Senior Lecturer, Law School,
Kingston University, suggested that the legislation should be entrenched by a
provision preventing its repeal or amendment without the consent of the
House of Lords through use of the procedure in the Parliament Acts. 59
Others argued that legislation could be politically entrenched by making it so
intrinsic to the UK’s constitutional settlement that it would be politically
impossible for a government to contemplate repealing the Act. 60
38. The most cogent argument made against fixed-term Parliaments was that, far
from enhancing the democratic process, fixed terms could actually
undermine it since, in certain circumstances, it may be more democratic to
call an early election than it would be to continue to the end of a fixed term.
Thus, it was asserted, whilst removing the Prime Minister’s power to call an
election at a time of his or her choosing may sometimes be a democratic
good, at other times the removal of the flexibility that the current system
provides would be a democratic drawback.
39. Several witnesses made the point that earlier than anticipated elections are
not “axiomatically a bad thing”. 61 There are a number of historical examples
of scenarios in which an early election might be deemed appropriate:
• where there is a change of Prime Minister (for example, the 1955 general
election called after Eden had succeeded Churchill);

53 Q 96.
54 FTP 33. See also FTP 22 (Christian Leuprecht).
55 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 14 (Peter Riddell); FTP 22 (Christian
Leuprecht).
56 FTP 22.
57 FTP 13 (Professor Simon Evans, Professor Cheryl Saunders, John Waugh, University of Melbourne); FTP
19 (David Howarth).
58 FTP 19, summary and para 8, 14–15 (David Howarth).
59 FTP 38, para 13 (Raymond Youngs).
60 FTP 10, para 49 (Democratic Audit); FTP 33 (Professor Smith); Q 126 (Minister for Political and
Constitutional Reform). See, however, FTP 42 (Lord Armstrong of Ilminster).
61 Q 83 (Professor Bogdanor).
14 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

• where there is a change in government formation (for example, the 1931

election called following the formation of the National Government);
• where a Parliament is unviable (for example, the October 1974 election
held only eight months after the previous election had resulted in a hung
Parliament);
• where a government is unable to govern effectively (for example, the 1951
election called just eighteen months after the previous election due to the
Government having a slim majority and following a number of ministerial
resignations);
• where a Prime Minister wishes to seek a mandate for a new policy (for
example, the 1923 election called after the Baldwin Government adopted
the policy of tariff reform).
40. Professor Bogdanor argued that such cases demonstrated the:
“serious disadvantages of a fixed-term Parliament, which prevents
Prime Ministers leading a government in an unviable Parliament from
going to the country, which prevents a newly chosen Prime Minister
between Parliaments from going to the country, which prevents a Prime
Minister who has a new policy for which he may seek a mandate from
going to the country. Most importantly of all, because we could be
moving into that situation with our hung Parliaments, it means that
coalitions can change in the middle of a Parliament without the people
being allowed to pronounce on that.” 62
41. The Constitution Unit has suggested a number of reasons why early
dissolutions have occurred in European countries, including increasing a
government majority or following a constitutional or political crisis or a
major policy change. 63 The case of a government seeking to increase its
majority is clearly the kind of self-interested early dissolution that the
Government have said they are seeking to prevent, but in each of these other
cases an arguable democratic case for an early election could be made. Lord
Armstrong of Ilminster, a former Cabinet Secretary, pointed out that “it is
almost certainly impossible to define in the statute all the possible
circumstances in which a premature dissolution should be permitted.” 64
42. Of these potential scenarios, the case of a change in Prime Minister was the
one most frequently cited by witnesses, not least because the memories of the
2007 speculation 65 over whether or not Gordon Brown would call an election
were still relatively fresh in the collective memory. Under the British
parliamentary system, the Prime Minister remains in office for as long as he
or she retains the confidence of the House of Commons. Accordingly, there
is no constitutional reason why, if he or she can command the confidence of
the Commons, a new Prime Minister should not succeed his or her
predecessor without an election taking place. 66 However, Professor Bogdanor
stressed that the 2007 situation demonstrated some public support for an

62 Q 96.
63 Constitution Unit, op. cit., Fig 7.2.
64 FTP 42.
65 See, for example, BBC reports that the election would not happen:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7031749.stm.
66 Q 11 (Professor Bradley).
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 15

election in such circumstances, 67 and, indeed, the current Prime Minister,

David Cameron, prior to the May 2010 election, argued that this should be
the case. 68
43. Professor Bogdanor agreed that the constitutional practice until now had
been that there was no requirement to call an election after a change in
Prime Minister, but that “it may be that opinion in the country is changing
because people feel that we are moving towards a presidential system.” 69
There is a case for saying that any new Prime Minister should at least have
the opportunity to seek a fresh mandate in a general election.

Conclusion
44. The fundamental question is whether the principle of fixed-term Parliaments
achieves the Government’s stated aim of reducing the power of the executive
whilst making the legislature more accountable to the people. The arguments
are finely balanced. Whilst Professor Bogdanor asserted that “the
disadvantages of fixed-term Parliaments are much greater than the
disadvantages of our current system”, 70 Democratic Audit argued that “the
possible problems associated with fixed-term Parliaments are outweighed by
the potential advantages”. 71
45. There is not a straight choice between fixed and flexible parliamentary terms.
As we have seen, there is a spectrum between a fully fixed and a fully flexible
system and the Bill would establish a semi-fixed arrangement. There is a
trade-off between the potential gain in democratic accountability that would
result from limiting the Prime Minister’s power and the potential loss in
democratic accountability that could result from an overly rigid fixed-term
arrangement. The changes introduced by the Bill need to be considered in
these terms.
46. We recognise that, in promoting this Bill, the Prime Minister is
prepared to relinquish an important prerogative power. This is a
significant aspect of the Government’s stated aim of reducing
executive power. However, the balance of the evidence we heard does
not convince most of us that a strong enough case has yet been made
for overturning an established constitutional practice and moving to
fixed-term Parliaments.

67 Q 105. See, however, Q 120 (Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform). A YouGov poll at the time
indicated that around one third of voters believed that an election should be held that autumn:
http://today.yougov.co.uk/sites/today.yougov.co.uk/files/YG-Archives-pol-ch4news-vi-071005.pdf.
68 See, for example, The Independent, Tories propose six month limit for unelected PMs, 24 April 2010.
69 Q 105.
70 Q 96.
71 FTP 10, para 6.
16 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

CHAPTER 3: THE LENGTH OF THE PARLIAMENTARY TERM

AND ELECTION TIMING

Five year terms

47. Aside from the principle itself, arguably the most significant constitutional
provision in the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill is the length of the term. Clause
1(3) of the Bill provides for fixed terms of five years.
48. This provision reflects the maximum term currently permissible under the
Septennial Act 1715, as amended by the Parliament Act 1911. In
introducing the 1911 Act, the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, told the
House of Commons:
“We propose to shorten the legal duration of Parliament from seven
years to five years, which will probably amount in practice to an actual
legislative working term of four years. That will secure that your House
of Commons for the time being, is always either fresh from the polls
which gave it authority, or—and this is an equally effective check upon
acting in defiance of the popular will—it is looking forward to the polls
at which it will have to render an account of its stewardship.” 72
49. Asquith’s expectation of four year parliamentary terms has been broadly
borne out. There have been 18 post-war general elections, and the average
length of time between general elections since 1945 is three years and ten
months. 73 Had all Parliaments since 1945 lasted the full five year term, four
fewer elections would have been held. Having said that, there have been
three particularly short post-war Parliaments: 1950–51, 1964–66 and 1974.
Parliamentary terms have been more uniform in length since 1979,
principally because Governments since then have, more often than not, been
returned with large overall majorities. Of the seven Parliaments since May
1979, four have lasted for roughly four years and three for roughly five years.
TABLE 2
Length of time between general elections post 1945 74
1945–1950 4.6 yrs 1974–1979 4.6 yrs
1950–1951 1.7 yrs 1979–1983 4.1 yrs
1951–1955 3.6 yrs 1983–1987 4.0 yrs
1955–1959 4.4 yrs 1987–1992 4.8 yrs
1959–1964 5.0 yrs 1992–1997 5.1 yrs
1964–1966 1.5 yrs 1997–2001 4.1 yrs
1966–1970 4.2 yrs 2001–2005 3.9 yrs
1970–1974 3.7 yrs 2005–2010 5.0 yrs
1974–1974 0.6 yrs

72 HC Deb 21 Feb 1911 col 1749.

73 Figure calculated from the general election on 5 July 1945 to the general election on 5 May 2010. There
were 17 Parliaments during this period.
74 Source: HC Research Paper 10/54, Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, 26 August 2010 p 32. That paper also lists
the lengths of the parliamentary terms as well as the time between elections (the latter is longer as it takes
account of periods of dissolution). Only the latter are listed here since this reflects the Bill’s provisions for a
fixed election date.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 17

The case for a five year term

50. The Deputy Prime Minister set out the Government’s case for a five year
term:
“It is ... a length of time ... with which people are familiar ... [and] there
is a pattern of five year Parliaments, at least recently ... Given the
tendency for governments to be somewhat hamstrung and paralysed for
a considerable period before a general election is held ... you are in
practice talking about a government that can get on and do difficult
things ... for about four years ... That provides a degree of stability and
transparency to the political system which outweighs the self-evident fact
that if you did that over a period of time, people would be voting less
frequently ... I think that is a reasonable balance to strike. If one goes to
four years, one is talking about a three-year period in which governments
are not blighted by their own sense of mortality ... That strikes me as a
rather short period. For all of those factors, we have tended to settle on
five years.”75
51. Dr Gary Levy, former Professor of Political Science at the University of
Western Ontario and Ottawa University, submitted the only evidence which
unambiguously backed the Government’s case for a longer term. He
observed that opinion polls suggest that voters “abhor elections”, and that
constant electioneering would mean it would not be possible to keep pace
with China and other developing countries where elections “do not consume
the time, energy, money and political capital of the western style elections
that we hold so dear.” 76 David Howarth, a former MP whose own private
member’s bill had set out a term of four years, saw “no obviously dispositive
method for deciding between the two proposals ... fairness points more to
four years, stability to five.” 77

The case against a five year term

52. The vast majority of witnesses who commented on the question advocated a
shorter, four year term. Many did so in forceful terms 78 raising a number of
specific objections to the Government’s proposals.
53. Several witnesses argued that it was wrong in principle to reduce the
frequency with which elections are held. The Hansard Society stressed the
distinction between five years as an absolute maximum and five years as the
norm; 79 Professor Dawn Oliver, Emeritus Professor of Constitutional Law,
University College London, thought that the cumulative effect of successive
terms would amount to a democratic deficit; 80 and Democratic Audit
expressed alarm that a five year term would present “a reversal of a long
struggle for more accountable government.” 81
54. A five year term does not reflect devolved and international experience.
Appendix 3 shows the variety of experience in terms of the length of a term

75 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 54; see also QQ 63–65. The Government
emphasised their view during the Committee Stage debate in the Commons: HC Deb 16 November 2010
cols 837–841.
76 FTP 23.
77 FTP 19, summary and paras 5–7.
78 Q 7 (Professor Bradley); FTP 10, paras 11–18 (Democratic Audit); Q 50 (Professor Padgett).
79 FTP 16, para 7.
80 Q 7.
81 FTP 10, paras 11–18.
18 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

in international democratic institutions. Four years, whilst not universal, is

clearly the norm. 82 Moreover, where fixed terms have been introduced or
altered in recent years, legislatures have invariably opted for four year
terms. 83
55. Four years has also been the default option in terms of recent debate in the
UK. 84 The devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all
operate according to four year fixed terms. Recent private members’ bills
have proposed four year terms.85 Liberal Democrat policy papers in 2007
were explicitly in favour of four year fixed terms. 86
56. Professor Milner told us that “there seems to be a kind of natural rhythm
around four years in other elections that the citizen might be participating in,
such as municipal elections, Scottish elections and American elections if we
are following them. The four year term is ... culturally established, even in
Britain”. 87 Professor Bradley argued that a four year term would be more
consistent with voters’ expectations. 88
57. As we note in Chapter Five, there has been a lack of public debate on this
issue. Professor Bradley told us that “if one is making the fundamental switch
from the present situation to fixed-term Parliaments, then one needs a full
debate on what the period should be.” 89 When asked whether there should
have been consultation on this point, the Deputy Prime Minister questioned
whether “people are straining at the bit to vote in elections more frequently
... I have never met anyone who says to me, ‘Well, I kind of like voting every
four years.’” 90 This does not reflect the Government’s stated view that the
legislature should be made more accountable to the people. 91
58. Democratic Audit dismissed the Government’s reasoning, alleging that five
years “seems to have been arrived at on a basis of the political calculations of
the two parties involved in the Coalition ... It would be regrettable if short-
term political calculations were ... to have a long-term negative impact upon
political accountability in the UK.” 92

Conclusion on term length

59. Of all the issues arising from the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, the proposal
for a five year fixed term has created the most unease. Despite the
Government’s arguments in favour of a five year term, the consensus
emerging from the evidence is that this is too long, and that a four year term
would be preferable. The Government’s central argument is that a five year
term is necessary in order to allow an administration to govern effectively.
This is an important consideration, yet it must not be viewed in isolation.

82 QQ 50, 52 (Professor Milner). See also Constitution Unit op. cit., Fig 4.1; FTP 10, Table 2 (Democratic
Audit).
83 Including Sweden in 1994 and Canada in 2006. In addition, all Australian states and territories and
Canadian provinces and territories that have introduced fixed terms in recent years now operate four year
terms.
84 Q 87 (Dr Fox).
85 Fixed-term Parliaments, Bill 54 (2001–2002); Fixed Term Parliaments, Bill 30 (2007–2008).
86 The Liberal Democrats, Real Democracy for Britain op. cit.; For the People, By the People op. cit..
87 Q 52.
88 QQ 7–8. See also FTP 31, para 6 (Richard Pond).
89 Q 7.
90 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 66.
91 See para 15.
92 FTP 10,para 17.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 19

The need to deliver effective government must be balanced against the need
to maintain democratic accountability.
60. The evidence we received did not support a term shorter than four or longer
than five years. Neither do we believe that such a term would be appropriate.
The question therefore is whether a four or five year term would provide the
most appropriate balance between effective government and democratic
accountability. The difference between a five year maximum and a five year
norm should not be understated—the cumulative effect on democratic
accountability of successive five year terms would be considerable.
61. The length of previous parliamentary terms in the UK has depended on a
number of factors, including the popularity or success of each particular
government. 93 There has, however, been no fixed-term principle under which
governments would normally last for the full five year term. It is therefore not
possible to judge from the UK experience whether governments required to
last for five years would be any less popular or successful than they would
otherwise have been.
62. Whilst acknowledging the case made by the Deputy Prime Minister
for a five year term, nonetheless the majority of the Committee
consider that a four year term should be adopted for any fixed-term
parliamentary arrangement at Westminster. In the view of the
majority, the shift from a five year maximum to a five year norm
would be inconsistent with the Government’s stated aim of making
the legislature more accountable, inconsistent with existing
constitutional practice and inconsistent with the practice of the
devolved institutions and the clear majority of international
legislatures.
63. Any change in the general election cycle is of the utmost constitutional
significance. The strong views that witnesses have expressed on this question
demonstrate the need to consult on and debate fully and openly the relative
benefits and drawbacks of different term lengths. The Government have
failed to do this. We consider these process issues further in Chapter Five.

Resetting the clock

64. We discuss in Chapter Four the ways in which Parliament may be dissolved
early. One significant issue which has arisen from this is the question of the
length of the ensuing term. There are two basic options: allowing any
subsequent Parliament to last for a new full term (resetting the clock) or
keeping the set election date so that the subsequent Parliament would only
last for a part term.
65. Professor Bradley stressed that if you reset the clock:
“you will not have made a real psychological change to your
constitutional arrangements to the fixed-term system, because in the
minds of major parties there will always be the view that if we do have an
election now, will this give us what at the moment we would like, which
is a four or five year period in office? That goes against what should be
the spirit of a fixed-term system.” 94

93 Q 8 (Professor Bradley); FTP 16, para 7 (Hansard Society); Constitution Unit, op. cit., para 4.1.
94 Q 16 (Professor Oliver). See also Q 99 (Professor Bogdanor).
20 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

66. This issue must be examined in the context of the Bill’s provision of a five
year term. Were an early election to take place, the newly elected government
could have a full five years in which to govern, creating a strong incentive to
bring about an early election. The shorter the maximum term, the weaker
that incentive. Professor Milner and Stephen Padgett, Professor of
Government, University of Strathclyde, agreed that the shorter the term, the
better the argument for resetting the clock. 95
67. Professor Milner also noted that it is possible to agree to reset the clock in
some circumstances, but not in others. He told us that:
“Working on the premise that it would be four years, I would argue that
the principle [of resetting the clock] is not wrong. I could imagine a
compromise that said that if the dissolution was in the first two years of
Parliament, the original date should be maintained, but if it was in the
second two years of Parliament, the election should be four years from
that date.” 96
68. Clause 1(3) of the Bill provides for the clock to be reset. However, ordinary
elections must always be held on the first Thursday in May, therefore this
provision is modified by clause 1(4) which prevents any subsequent
Parliament lasting for more than five years. So, for example, the next
ordinary election should take place on 7 May 2015. If this Parliament were
dissolved early in October 2013, the next Parliament would last until May
2018: a term of four and a half years. This prevents an early election held at a
less convenient time of year (for example, close to Christmas) resulting in all
subsequent elections having to be held at that time of year. It should be
noted that these provisions could result in a subsequent term of just over four
years.
69. The Government justified their decision to reset the clock on the ground that
“the public would think it odd if you were to have an early election and the
public were to make a clear decision about a government—perhaps returning
it with a good majority—and a very short time afterwards, you were to ask
the public to go back and vote all over again.”97
70. The Government also stated, in their response to the report of the Commons
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee on this Bill, 98 that: “The
people expect that when they go to the polls, they are being asked to elect a
government which will last for a full term with a full programme. The
proposals in the Bill will provide certainty as to the length of a Parliament
and minimise the possibility of multiple elections happening in quick
succession.” 99
71. These arguments are not conclusive. Firstly, what the people might expect
under a fixed-term arrangement would be dependent on the provisions of the
relevant legislation. Secondly, any Parliament which lasted only until a set
election date would have a definite length. Indeed, the length of the
parliamentary term might be more certain since it would be less likely that a
Parliament with a shorter time left to run would itself be dissolved early.

95 Q 56.
96 Q 48.
97 Q 161 (Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform).
98 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011) op. cit..
99 Government response to the report of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee on the Fixed-
term Parliaments Bill, Cm 7951, November 2010, para 42.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 21

Thirdly, it can be questioned just how likely multiple elections in quick

succession would be. It is possible to modify arrangements so that a newly
elected government does not have to return to the polls within a short period
of, say, six months or a year. Consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny would
have provided the opportunity for such arrangements to be properly
considered.
72. It is also the case that the clock is not reset in the Scottish Parliament or the
Welsh Assembly. 100 Although the Scottish and Welsh legislatures have been
in existence only since 1999, it is notable that they have produced both
minority and coalition governments and that no early elections have yet been
held.
73. Many of our witnesses were equivocal about this issue. Some argued that
whilst only allowing the remainder of the term would act as a disincentive to
abuse of the early dissolution provisions by an existing government, a
different government elected with a fresh mandate should be allowed a full
term. 101 The Government acknowledged that the arguments were balanced
and that it was, in the end, “a judgment issue”. 102
74. We agree that there is a case to be made for resetting the clock.
Whatever the maximum term, we accept that an elected government
should have a full term in which to develop their policies and take
their legislative programme through Parliament.

Election timing—the devolved institutions

75. Five year terms would create a clash with elections to the devolved
institutions in May 2015 and every 20 years thereafter.103 There was a
widespread view that such a clash was undesirable. 104 Professor Padgett
pointed to the dangers of a clash when he told us that in Germany, “Where
state elections have coincided with the federal election, the federal election’s
issues and campaigns have totally engulfed the regional campaign.” 105
76. Once again, concerns were raised about the process by which the
Government’s proposals were announced, and in particular about the lack of
consultation with the devolved institutions. 106 The Deputy Prime Minister
told us that he had met the leaders of the devolved administrations and the
Presiding Officers in two of the devolved legislatures. He conceded that:
“there is undoubtedly some potential for overlap and some degree of
confusion if one has two elections for legislatures on the same day. We
are consulting people and trying to see whether there are workable or
desirable alternatives ... whether people think that the issue is big
enough that we need to take remedial action.” 107
77. This issue may not be resolvable in the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. The
Government have pointed out that if the Bill provided for a four year term,
an early dissolution which resulted in a clash could lead to a clash occurring

100 It is reset for the Northern Ireland Assembly.

101 Q 21 (Professor Oliver); Q 49 (Professor Padgett); Q 99 (Professor Bogdanor).
102 Q 161 (Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform).
103 On the assumption that the electoral cycle is not disrupted by early general elections.
104 QQ 13–14 (Professor Bradley and Professor Oliver); Q 90 (Dr Fox); FTP 32, para 2 (Mark Ryan).
105 Q 59.
106 QQ 13–14 (Professor Bradley and Professor Oliver); Q 90 (Dr Fox); FTP 32, para 2 (Mark Ryan).
107 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 63; see also Q 64.
22 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

every four years thereafter. 108 Only by providing for fully fixed four year
terms, with the next Parliament due to commence in 2013, could a more
satisfactory permanent cycle of biennial UK and devolved elections be
established. The arguments we set out in the next chapter in favour of early
dissolution arrangements mean that such an arrangement would not be
acceptable. A different solution is therefore required.
78. A number of potential solutions were suggested to us, including allowing the
UK Parliament to continue only until October 2014, 109 moving Westminster
elections to take place just before or after the devolved elections, 110 or giving
the Scottish Parliament the power to set its own election dates. 111
79. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform has announced that he
is consulting the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly about bringing
forward amendments enabling these legislatures to avoid a potential clash by
varying the election date by six months either way if two-thirds of members
vote in favour. In relation to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the
Government are proposing to wait until after the combined elections in May
before deciding how to proceed. 112
80. A potential date clash with elections to the devolved institutions in
May 2015 and every twenty years thereafter could occur if the
Government’s proposals are adopted. Ideally, this should be avoided
in order to protect the integrity and separate identity of Westminster
and devolved elections. We await the outcome of the Government’s
consultations with the devolved institutions, and stress the
importance of ensuring that any proposed solution is broadly
acceptable to all concerned.
81. It is regrettable that the Government did not seek to engage with the
devolved institutions in order to find a satisfactory solution to the
consequences of their proposals before the Bill was introduced.

Sessional arrangements
82. Traditionally, parliamentary sessions have begun and ended in the autumn,
with the exception of years in which there is a spring general election. In
these instances, it is usual for the first session to last approximately eighteen
months until the following autumn, with the final session of a Parliament
lasting around six months. The Government have announced that future
parliamentary sessions will last from spring to spring in order to bring them
into line with elections on a fixed date in May. 113
83. The Government have proposed the shift on the basis that it would form a
common-sense corollary of their legislative proposals. 114 It should be noted,
however, that this change is not a necessary corollary of the Bill’s provisions:

108 HC Deb 16 November 2010 col 844.

109 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 13 (Professor Hazell); see also Constitution
Unit, op. cit., para 4.2.
110 FTP 32, para 13 (Mark Ryan).
111 Q 90 (Dr Fox citing Professor John Curtice). This proposal could equally apply to the Welsh Assembly and

the Northern Ireland Assembly.

112 HC Deb 16 November 2010 cols 841–845.
113 HC Deb 13 September 2010 cols 33–34WS.
114 HC Deb 13 September 2010 cols 614–619. See also Q 135 (Minister for Political and Constitutional

Reform).
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 23

in recent times, the Queen’s speech has been held in the autumn, despite
elections being held in spring or summer.
84. The Government also announced that the current session would last for two
years until spring 2012. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform
told us that:
“given that the first session in a new Parliament is traditionally a longer
one anyway ... we thought that on balance it was better to extend the
current session and then align the State Opening and the new sessions
with the new fixed-term cycle ... I do not see that it changes the balance
between Parliament and the Executive at all.” 115
85. Professor Bradley considered this to be “a rather remarkable situation. We
are in an area of reworking a lot of aspects of the constitution that have been
around for a long while ... to postpone [the State Opening] for a complete
year is quite a major change.” 116 He argued that it would strengthen the
executive at the expense of Parliament, noting that “time and the need to get
agreement by a certain date are a vital part of the power of the House of
Lords.” 117
86. Conversely, the Clerk of the Parliaments stated that:
“the long session may strengthen the power of the House. Use of the
Parliament Act procedure requires the bill concerned to be introduced
in the following session. If that session is not to begin until April or May
2012 then the House has a significant power of delay in relation to a bill
which otherwise would be expected to complete its passage in 2011.” 118
87. The Government’s proposal to extend the current session until spring
2012 may increase the power of the House of Lords to delay legislation
but it also affords the Government more time to get its legislative
programme through both Houses, thus potentially increasing the
power of the executive in relation to Parliament. This appears to be
inconsistent with the Government’s stated aim of reducing the power
of the executive. 119

115 QQ 135–6.
116 Q 4.
117 Q 6.
118 FTP 43, para 9.
119 See above para 15.
24 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

CHAPTER 4: EARLY PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL ELECTIONS

Introduction
88. Clause 2 of the Bill provides for an early parliamentary general election to
take place in two situations. First, where at least two thirds of MPs have
voted in favour of a motion to that effect and, second, following the passing
of a motion of no confidence in the Government. We have received a
significant amount of evidence on both the central issues of policy—whether
and how Parliament may be dissolved early—and on the detailed drafting of
this clause.

The need for a safety valve

89. Despite the short title of the Bill, it is not the case that all future Parliaments
would necessarily last for the full five year period. International comparisons
show that absolute fixed terms are in fact rare. Amongst western
democracies, only the Norwegian Storting cannot be dissolved early in any
circumstance; all other western parliaments with fixed-term arrangements
allow for at least one safety valve to provide for situations where it is regarded
as necessary for an early general election to be held.
90. The Deputy Prime Minister told us that “there are circumstances in which
the desire for a general election, to press the reset button, is so great that
something needs to happen.” 120 Professor Bradley agreed, arguing that the
introduction of fixed terms was “a serious change” which justified the
provision of a safety valve. 121 Robert Blackburn has also argued in favour of
safety valves on the grounds that “the essence of the reform would be to
replace the existing common law discretionary power of dissolution with a
clear legal procedure for when an early dissolution and election should take
place.” 122
91. However, the evidence we received was not unanimous on this point.
Scandinavian experts argued that “The existence of fixed-term parliaments,
de jure in Norway and de facto in Sweden means that governments have to
find other means of resolving political crises than turning to the voters.” 123
David Howarth argued that the only safety valve should be Parliament’s
power to repeal or amend the legislation on the ground that “Where
sufficient political consensus exists that an early election should be called, an
amending bill would go through quickly.” 124 He stressed that a bill “intended
to take advantage of short-run political conditions would inevitably fail to
enjoy broad support” and “find itself making slow progress in the Lords.” 125
92. We noted in Chapter Two that an earlier than anticipated election is not
“axiomatically a bad thing”. 126 The Constitution Unit has compiled a list of
67 cases from across Europe where an early election was called, together with
the reason for the early dissolution. These included:

120 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 58.

121 Ibid. Q 16.
122 The prerogative power of dissolution of Parliament: law, practice, and reform [2009] PL 766, p 788.
123 FTP 36 (Anders Widfelt). See also FTP 28 (Norwegian Parliament).
124 FTP 19, para 12.
125 Ibid., para 9.
126 Q 83 (Professor Bogdanor).
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 25

• to increase a government majority;

• after a constitutional crisis or major constitutional change;
• after losing a vote of no confidence;
• after a major policy change;
• resignation of a Prime Minister—new mandate sought;
• collapse of a coalition or a loss of supply;
• post-war;
• after a political crisis or collapse of a government;
• after a new constitution;
• government split;
• dissolution before a no confidence motion;
• to form a united government. 127
93. Many of these cases, in particular the loss of a vote of no confidence or a
government split, provide a strong argument for allowing an early election.
The Bill does not distinguish between the different situations by specifying
under what circumstances an early election may be held. However, it would
not be possible under the bill’s provisions for a government to unilaterally
dissolve Parliament in order to avoid a no confidence motion. 128 Moreover,
whilst possible, it would not be appropriate for a government to use the Bill’s
provisions to seek an election simply in order to increase its majority. 129
94. We conclude that it is sensible for the Bill to contain some form of
safety valve which would allow for an early election in circumstances
such as the government losing the confidence of the Commons or
where a political or economic crisis has affected the country. Such
circumstances cannot be identified nor listed in advance and so the
safety valve(s) chosen must be sufficiently flexible to deal with the
various situations which might arise.
95. In this context, we note Professor Bradley’s warning that “if it is too easy to
have an early election, you ... would get speculation very early on in the life
of a fixed-term Parliament. ... How one can, as it were, get the safety valve so
that it is there but not too easily used is a question of great subtlety.” 130

The need for two distinct mechanisms

96. We received very little evidence on the question of whether it is appropriate
for the Bill to contain two different mechanisms by which Parliament may be
dissolved early, though Professor Robert Hazell, Director of the Constitution
Unit, University College London, told us that he was “slightly puzzled why
the Government sees the need for a dual threshold”. 131 The Minister for
Political and Constitutional Reform told us that without the two-thirds

127 Constitution Unit, op. cit., Fig 7.2

128 Clause 3(2)
129 See paras 131–135.
130 Q 22.
131 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 13; see also ibid. Q 21.
26 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

majority mechanism “you would force Parliament to have to engineer the

loss of a confidence vote”. 132
97. Democratic Audit also submitted that the two-thirds majority mechanism
was a necessary addition to the possibility of a vote of no confidence since:
“in the event of an irresolvable deadlock, the Commons could vote for an
immediate election without waiting for 14 days to lapse. It seems appropriate
to leave open the possibility for Parliament to dissolve itself in exceptional
circumstances.” 133
98. The purposes of the two mechanisms are different: the two-thirds
mechanism provides for situations where there is cross-party agreement that
an election should be called whereas motions of no confidence are likely to
be passed in situations of great political dispute. We therefore conclude
that it is appropriate for the Bill to contain two different safety
mechanisms as long as each one is workable and fulfils its purpose.

The two-thirds majority vote

99. The coalition agreement stated that the legislation would provide for dissolution
if 55 per cent of the House of Commons voted in favour. 134 This proposal was
subject to significant criticism, both in the media and in Parliament, 135
particularly with regard to the suspicion that the percentage chosen was
designed to enable the coalition Government, but not the opposition parties, to
dissolve Parliament.136 These concerns led to the Government raising the bar to
a two-thirds majority vote when the Bill was introduced.137 This is the same
requirement as exists in the devolved institutions.
100. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told us that:
“the logic was to set a number that was sufficiently high that it was
unlikely that a government could reach it ... it would have to be a cross-
party decision with broad support across the House, which means that it
would not be being done for partisan reasons but because of the general
sense that an early election was in the interests of the country.” 138
We received no evidence arguing in favour of an alternative super-majority.
101. Professor Bradley agreed that this provision was appropriate, arguing that if
the two major parties believed an election to be necessary they should be able
to have one. 139 Professor Bogdanor disagreed, stating that the provision would
enable a government with a landslide majority to secure an election whenever
they liked: “I cannot see why a government with a landslide should have that
extra privilege.” 140 Conversely, Professor Blackburn has stated that the
provision would make it too hard for a Prime Minister to call an election. 141

132 Q 137.
133 FTP 10, paras 35–36.
134 HM Government, The Coalition: Our programme for government, p 26.
135 Press Association, Cameron faces backbench calls over confidence vote, 14 May 2010; HC Deb 25 May 2010

cols 135–154.
136 The Guardian, A giant gerrymander, 19 May 2010 (Lord Falconer of Thoroton); The Telegraph, This 55

per cent majority plan will taint the new politics, 18 May 2010 (David Davis).
137 Second reading debate, HC Deb 13 September 2010 cols 628–629.
138 Q 138.
139 Q 18.
140 Q 96.
141 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011) op. cit. Q 81.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 27

102. It is necessary to re-emphasise here that the Bill would establish a semi-fixed
parliamentary term under which the government could persuade the House
of Commons of the need for an early election. In the light of our
conclusion at paragraph 94 that there needs to be a safety valve
mechanism in order to deal with possibly unforeseeable
circumstances, we consider that the best way to do this is to enable
Parliament to dissolve itself when there is a cross-party majority that
an election should be called. Although it is not possible to determine
the relative majority which might be held by governments in the
future, a requirement of two-thirds of MPs voting in favour of a
dissolution motion would most likely necessitate the agreement of
cross-party MPs. We therefore conclude that this safety valve is
appropriate.

Motions of no confidence
103. Clause 2(2) provides for a two-stage mechanism under which an early
dissolution may follow a vote of no confidence. First, the House of
Commons must have “passed a motion of no confidence” in the government.
Second, 14 days must have passed “without the House passing any motion
expressing confidence in any Government of Her Majesty.” These provisions
have raised a number of issues.
104. When faced with criticism over the initial proposal for a 55 per cent
threshold, 142 the Government responded that it had never been their
intention to remove the traditional right of the Commons to pass a motion of
no confidence by a simple majority. 143 The definition and use of votes of (no)
confidence have been the subject of intense academic and political debate for
many years 144 and the Deputy Prime Minister has claimed that the Bill would
place these votes on a statutory footing:
“no confidence motions have until now been a matter of convention.
Although it has been widely accepted that a no confidence vote would
require a Prime Minister either to resign or to call an early election,
there has been nothing to date to enforce this. So for the first time, the
Bill gives legal effect to a motion of no confidence passed by this
House.” 145
105. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform argued that the Bill
would not alter the existing conventions as to what happens when a
government loses a confidence vote: in such cases the government would
resign and there would either be an election or a new government would be
formed. 146 David Howarth agreed that the loss of a vote of confidence would
not necessarily lead to an election if a new government could be formed. 147
Whilst the Bill clarifies, to this extent, the position of what happens if a vote
of no confidence is carried, it leaves open the question of what constitutes
such a vote in the first place.

142 Discussed above at para 99.

143 Speech given by the Deputy Prime Minister, 19 May 2010; see also HC Deb 25 May 2010 col 147.
144 See HC Library Standard Note, Confidence Motions, SN/PC/2873, 9 July 2010; Philip Norton, Government

defeats in the House of Commons: myth and reality [1978] Public Law 360.
145 HC Deb 13 September 2010 col 629.
146 QQ 130 and 141.
147 FTP 19, para 19.
28 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

106. Clause 2(2) places on the Speaker of the House of Commons the onus of
certifying whether the two stages specified in the Bill have been met. The
Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform argued that this would not
change the nature of the Speaker’s role vis-à-vis the House. 148 However, he
also stressed a number of times that “the Speaker would make it very clear
before ... a vote took place whether it was a vote on which he would issue his
certificate” 149 and that the Speaker would be guided by convention in making
his decisions. 150
107. The evidence we received suggested that the Government’s certainty
regarding clarity of the no confidence provision is misplaced. Firstly, it is not
always clear what would constitute a motion of no confidence. Secondly, it is
arguable that the Speaker’s new role could bring him into conflict with the
government and, possibly, the House.

Definition of a no confidence motion

108. Clause 2(2)(a) applies where “the House [has] passed a motion of no
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”. This is potentially a broad phrase
but, depending on what it is meant to achieve, it may equally not be broad
enough. There are three issues. Firstly, are the Bill’s provisions limited to
motions of no confidence tabled by opposition or backbench MPs, or might
an early election be triggered by the loss of a motion of confidence tabled in
the government’s name? Secondly, do the Bill’s provisions extend to votes on
the Queen’s Speech, on the Budget or on major items of government
policy? 151 Thirdly, if the Bill is intended to extend to instances where the
government lose a motion of confidence or an important vote, does the
provision, as currently drafted, cover this?
109. In relation to the first issue, Dr Fox suggested that “it is hard to see how the
government would bring forward a motion of no confidence in themselves. ...
The wording of the Bill suggests that it would come only from the
opposition.” 152 We note that government backbench MPs may also, in
theory, propose a motion of no confidence in their own party.
110. As discussed at paragraph 96 the Government’s case for having two distinct
mechanisms is at least partly dependent on the argument that without the
two-thirds mechanism, it might be necessary to “engineer the loss of a
confidence vote”. 153 This would appear to suggest that, in order to preserve
the distinction between the two mechanisms, a motion of no confidence
should only be tabled by the opposition or backbench MPs. The wider the
definition of a motion of no confidence, the easier it would be for a
government to manipulate the provisions in order to call an early election.
111. In relation to the second issue, the Government told us that “there is a
convention that certain kinds of votes, like votes on the Queen’s Speech, are
treated as confidence votes.” 154 Although Dr Fox agreed that, under the
current conventions, a vote of no confidence “is one of those things where

148 Q 150.
149 Q 144; see also QQ 147–148.
150 QQ 149, 151–152.
151 Constitution Unit, op. cit., para 7.3; Philip Norton, Government defeats in the House of Commons: myth and

reality [1978] Public Law 360.

152 Q 103.
153 Q 137 (Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform).
154 Q 149 (Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform).
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 29

you know it when you see it” 155 this might not continue to be the case, since
the current conventions would need to be considered in the light of the Bill’s
provisions.
112. The third issue was raised by the Commons Political and Constitutional
Reform Committee:
“It is hard to see ... how a Speaker could certify that the House had
‘passed a motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’, as the
Bill requires, if it had voted down a motion designated as a matter of
confidence by the Government, even a motion ‘That this House has
confidence in her Majesty’s Government’, but not in fact ‘passed’ a
motion at all.” 156
The Government did not refer to this question in their response to the report
on this Bill of the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform
Committee. 157
113. The Deputy Prime Minister told us that:
“we want to try to provide as much clarity as possible about what a no
confidence motion and process looks like, but equally it is for the House
and the Speaker to make his and its own determinations about what they
consider to be a motion of no confidence. In a sense, we have provided
the tramlines in this draft Bill, but at the same time, I clearly want to
retain as much flexibility and autonomy as possible for the House to
decide for itself how it then interprets that.” 158
The Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged that it may be necessary to
strengthen or clarify this provision. 159
114. The Bill as drafted does not explicitly cover all motions of confidence
(including defeats on key confidence issues such as the Queen’s
Speech or the Budget), nor situations where the government lose a
vote. Nor does it distinguish between votes of confidence and no
confidence. The Government should bring forward amendments to
clarify its precise scope.

The role of the Speaker

115. Broadly speaking, we understand the current convention is that it is for the
government to determine what constitutes a vote of confidence (other than a
motion of no confidence proposed by the opposition). Neither the House as
a whole, nor the Speaker, have had a role in this. Clause 2(2) would appear
to change this convention by making the decision to issue a certificate one for
the Speaker. This provision appears to give the Speaker a constitutional role
which he has not previously had. Moreover, although the Speaker would be
likely to follow any direction of the House, it is not clear how any such
direction would be given.
116. There would be no legal duty on the Speaker to clarify in advance whether a
vote were one in respect of which he would issue his certificate. In most

155 Q 103. See also Q 18 (Professor Oliver).

156 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011) op. cit., para 45.
157 Government response to the report of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee on the Fixed-

term Parliaments Bill, op. cit..

158 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 67.
159 Ibid.
30 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

circumstances it may be unlikely that a Speaker asked by the government,

opposition or the House of Commons to set out whether a vote was one of
confidence would refuse to do so. But it is possible that the government
could unexpectedly lose a vote on a major item of policy and that the
Speaker could then designate this as a motion of no confidence
retrospectively. Although a majority government could then pass a vote of
confidence in itself within 14 days, 160 this might inadvertently bring down a
minority government, unless the opposition were willing to pass a motion of
confidence in order to avoid holding an early election.
117. It is also possible to envisage situations in which the Speaker might be put
under pressure to designate an issue as one of confidence. The Minister for
Political and Constitutional Reform accepted that “the Speaker would take
his direction from the House” 161 but he also argued that the government
would be likely to indicate in advance how they wished to treat any
significant issue. 162 Whilst it would be appropriate for the House explicitly to
resolve that a particular motion was, or was not, one of confidence, it may be
less appropriate under this legislation for the government to do so.
118. Whilst greater “transparency and clarity would be helpful for the House”, 163
it is unclear what a Speaker might do were a government with a small
majority (or a minority party governing with a confidence and supply
agreement 164) to start indicating that votes on minor issues should be treated
as votes of confidence in order to ensure that they were passed. Such
behaviour has been demonstrated in the UK in the past. 165 Were a
government to do this, it could put the Speaker in the difficult position of
trying to determine when and whether to accede to the government’s
requests.
119. Greater clarity on the definition of a vote of no confidence, as
recommended by paragraph 114, would reduce the potential for the
Speaker to be drawn into political controversy. The questions of from
whom, if anyone, the Speaker should take direction and of whether
and when the Speaker should state his view on the effect of a
particular vote should be procedural matters for the House of
Commons to determine.

Formation of an alternative government following a no confidence

motion
120. Clause 2(2) of the Bill provides that once a motion of no confidence has
been passed, an early dissolution will happen unless a motion expressing
confidence in any Government of Her Majesty is passed within a period of
14 days. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told us that
this provision clarifies the existing convention:
“The reality at the moment is that if the government does not have a
working majority and loses a vote of confidence, there is no necessity for

160 Q 152; see also FTP 44.

161 Q 151.
162 Q 153.
163 Ibid.
164 An agreement that a minor party or independent member of parliament will support the government in

motions of confidence and appropriation (supply) votes.

165 See Philip Norton, Government defeats in the House of Commons: myth and reality [1978] Public Law 360, pp

373–375.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 31

an election to be called already. It is perfectly possible under our existing

arrangements for a new government to be formed without an election
taking place, so I do not think we are doing anything new. But perhaps it
is the case that, both in Parliament and among the public, expectation
about what would happen in certain cases is not as clear as it ought to
be.” 166
121. The provision does make it clear that an alternative government can be
formed, the period in which that may be done and that if no such
government can be formed there will be an early election. Whilst these are
the major points which the Bill should determine, the provision leaves some
consequential issues unclear or unaddressed.

Is 14 days the most appropriate length of time for government formation?

122. The Government “believe that a period of 14 days strikes the right balance,
allowing enough time for an alternative government to be formed while
ensuring that there is not a prolonged period without an effective
government.” 167 Whilst we note that the Scottish Parliament and Welsh
Assembly 168 may be dissolved early following a period of 28 days after a vote
of no confidence, we have not received any evidence suggesting that a greater
length of time would be more appropriate for the Westminster Parliament.
123. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told us that “I suspect
it would become clear pretty quickly that the government could not put
together an alternative government, or a different government could not be
formed.” 169 This begs the question of whether 14 days is too long. As
Professor Oliver has said, “it is against the public interest for there to be no
effective government of the country.” 170
124. In the most recent cases of the loss of a vote of confidence by the
Government, a decision to call a general election has been taken quickly. 171
Whilst it would be open for the House of Commons, following a successful
vote of no confidence, quickly to pass a two-thirds early dissolution vote, this
may not be easy for the major parties to agree at a time of political crisis. The
Deputy Prime Minister argued that this “limbo” would be avoided by means
of automatic dissolution after 14 days.172 This would, however, result in a
two week period of uncertainty as to whether an election was going to take
place.
125. We recognise that the 14 day period for formation of a new
government may result in a period of uncertainty. However, it is not
possible to determine in advance the many different circumstances
under which a vote of no confidence may be passed. We therefore
conclude that 14 days is an appropriate period to allow for formation
of a new government.

166 Q 130. See also Q 100 (Professor Bogdanor).

167 HC Deb 13 September 2010 col 629.
168 The relevant period for the Northern Ireland Assembly is six weeks.
169 Q 131.
170 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011) op. cit., Ev 28.
171 On the last two occasions (October 1924 and March 1979) the government announced the dissolution of

Parliament on the following day: Constitution Unit, op. cit., para 1.3.2. See further Q 100 (Professor
Bogdanor).
172 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit., Ev 2.
32 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

How can the Commons pass a motion of confidence in a government which does not
yet exist?
126. Dr Twomey, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney,
raised the question of what is meant in clause 2(2)(b) by any motion
expressing confidence in “any Government of Her Majesty”. Is it intended
that Her Majesty would commission a new Prime Minister whose
government would need a vote of confidence to survive? This raises the
question of what would happen if it were not clear whether a prospective new
government could achieve a vote of confidence. Or is it intended that:
“the House may pass a motion indicating its confidence in someone else
to form a government, even though it is not yet formally a ‘Government
of Her Majesty’. Query whether this would oblige Her Majesty to
commission that person as Prime Minister? The Bill ought really be
clearer as to what is intended.” 173
127. The Government should bring forward an amendment to clarify this
provision.

May a government which has lost the confidence of the Commons reconstitute itself?
128. Minority governments will always be subject to the possibility of losing the
confidence of the Commons. Following a vote of no confidence, a minority
administration may decide to form a coalition with another minority party.
Situations may also arise whereby a government which has a very slim
majority loses a vote of confidence due to MPs having difficulties in
attending the House. 174 In either situation, it would be open to the defeated
government to table and seek to win a motion of confidence in itself (or the
new coalition) in order to avoid an early dissolution.
129. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told us that an election
would be held if “the government could not put together an alternative
government, or a different government could not be formed.” 175 In
supplementary written evidence, the Government also confirmed that “It is
not our intention that the Bill should rule out the possibility ... of the House
changing its mind within the 14 day period and deciding nevertheless to
support the current government.” 176
130. In the light of the above statements, we conclude that the Bill is intended
to allow a government which has lost a confidence motion to
reconstitute itself within the 14 day period. However, since this does
not necessarily follow from the wording of clause 2(2)(b), we
recommend that the Government bring forward an amendment to
clarify this provision.

Government manipulation of the no confidence process

131. Many of our witnesses referred to the possibility of a government
manipulating a vote of no confidence in order to seek an early dissolution
(for example, by proposing a confidence motion and then abstaining in order
deliberately to lose it). Under this Bill, a government might be able, were

174 See, for example, Harold Wilson, A personal record: the Labour Government 1964–70 (1971), p 30.
174 See, for example, Harold Wilson, A personal record: the Labour Government 1964–70 (1971), p 30.
175 Q 131.
176 FTP 44.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 33

there a consensus for calling an early election, to persuade the Commons to

dissolve itself under the two-thirds majority procedure. It is therefore
arguable that such manipulation would not be within the spirit of the
legislation.
132. Our witnesses agreed that votes of no confidence should not be engineered
by the government. 177 The Deputy Prime Minister accepted that it was not
possible to exclude this possibility but argued that:
“if a government sought to do that it would be so transparent and so
self-evidently grubby and self-serving that it would not do that
government any good at all. The final court of opinion, of course, is
what the electorate would do, and I think they would be very
unforgiving. ... Can you exclude the theoretical possibility? I think it is
pretty difficult to do that. Can you exclude it in practical political terms?
I think you pretty well nigh can.” 178
133. International experience does not necessarily show that this argument is
borne out in practice. In Canada where, as we note below, 179 the Prime
Minister sought an early dissolution in 2008 through use of the Governor
General’s prerogative powers, the incumbent government was not punished
in the ensuing general election. 180 In Germany where, in 2005, the
Chancellor deliberately lost a confidence vote in order to hold an election
(the only way in which an early dissolution can be brought about in
Germany) the circumstances were “scrutinised very carefully by the
President, a court and public opinion”, 181 but it is not clear from the
evidence whether the early dissolution had any significant effect on the
subsequent election result.
134. Christian Leuprecht concluded that:
“To disabuse a Prime Minister of this temptation, there would have to
be a period of good faith whereby successive administrations would not
indulge themselves in early elections merely to gain a political advantage.
After this period a convention would be established, and the public
would have become accustomed to having elections at regular intervals
on a set date. In other words, any bill that fixes election cycles requires
much broader agreement and political will than one mere majority
vote.” 182
135. We conclude that, if the Bill is passed, it would not be possible to
prevent a government using a vote of no confidence to bring about an
early election. To do so would be seen by many as an abuse of the
Act’s provisions and would undermine the fixed-term principle.

Government resignation
136. Although unlikely, it is possible that a majority government could unilaterally
resign without having lost a vote of confidence. Were this to happen at
present, it would be expected that the Queen would consult other party
leaders to see whether they wished to form a government and, if not, she

177 Q 20 (Professor Oliver), FTP 38, para 12 (Raymond Youngs).

178 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit., Q 68.
179 Para 140.
180 FTP 41 (CES Franks).
181 Q 66 (Professor Padgett).
182 FTP 22.
34 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

would then dissolve Parliament. However, the prerogative power of

dissolution is to be abolished by the Bill 183 so this course of action would no
longer be available.
137. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform responded to our
question on this point, noting that:
“There is nothing in the Bill that prevents a government resigning ... If a
government decided to resign when the Speaker had indicated that he
was not minded to issue ... a certificate [under clause 2(2)(a)], then the
14 day period would not be triggered although ... a period of
government formation would obviously follow. It would just not be
time-limited. Because of the very firm convention that the Queen should
not be left without a functioning government, in practice, the outgoing
government would not resign until the Queen was in a position to
appoint a replacement Prime Minister.”184
138. It may be that the opposition were not in a position to form an alternative
government (whether a single-party government or a coalition). If the
government threatened to resign, Parliament would eventually be forced to
dissolve itself through the two-thirds mechanism. Thus, the government
could bring about an early election without having been said to have
manipulated a vote of no confidence. We believe that any manipulation
of this kind would be an abuse of the Act’s provisions.

Abolition of the prerogative in respect of dissolution

139. Clause 3(2) abolishes the prerogative power of dissolution by stating that
Parliament cannot be dissolved other than under the provisions of clause 1 or
2 of the Bill. Evidence we received on the experience of the Canadian
Parliament throws light on the need for this provision.
140. The Canadian constitution sets the maximum parliamentary term at five
years. However, in May 2007, legislation was passed which set fixed election
dates for October 2009 and every four years thereafter. The legislation
explicitly stated that the prerogative powers of the Governor General were
not affected, including the power to dissolve Parliament at his or her
discretion. This provision was described by Professor Milner as “a loophole
big enough for a locomotive to drive through.” 185 In September 2008, the
Canadian Prime Minister requested an early dissolution under the Governor
General’s prerogative powers. 186 Dissolution was granted and an early
election took place.
141. This experience would appear to suggest that the Queen’s power to dissolve
Parliament should be abolished. However, Dr Twomey has argued strongly
that the power should be retained, describing the stipulation of a five year
term without any possibility of removal of a majority government as “a
courageous act”. 187 She argued that “if there were some kind of public crisis
of confidence in the government (for example, it was found to have engaged
in systemic corruption or other forms of illegality) there would be no chance

183 Clause 3(2); see paras 139–143.

184 FTP 44.
185 Q 63.
186 This was separate from his request for a prorogation later that same year, which we discuss at para 145.
187 FTP 35, para 4.7.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 35

of an election as long as the government controlled majority support in the

lower House and did not want an election.” 188
142. Prerogative powers were used in Australia to dissolve the federal Parliament
in 1975 and in New South Wales to dissolve the Legislative Assembly in
1932. The Clerk of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly stated that:
“The existing conventions would only make that course available where the
government is acting illegally or if the government did not resign or to seek to
dissolve Parliament after it lost the confidence of the lower House.” 189
143. There are other ways to protect against the possibility of a government acting
illegally or abusing its citizens’ human and civil rights. Judicial review is the
primary mechanism for controlling illegal, irrational or procedurally
improper government actions. 190 The House of Lords has a significant role in
revising and delaying legislative proposals. Whilst the prerogative power
of dissolution is an important constitutional longstop, the Canadian
experience would indicate that it is necessary under a fixed-term
arrangement to abolish that power.

Retaining the prerogative in respect of prorogation

144. Prorogation is a prerogative act of the Crown, in practice acting on the
advice of the Prime Minister, which brings to an end a parliamentary session.
It has the effect of putting an end to all business before the House, subject to
certain limited exceptions. 191 The new session of Parliament will then
commence with the Queen’s Speech. In recent times prorogations of the
Westminster Parliament have lasted for short periods. Clause 4(1) of the Bill
expressly preserves Her Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament.
145. We received further evidence from Canada on the controversial use of this
prerogative power. Following his re-election, the Canadian Prime Minister
requested in December 2008 that the Governor General prorogue
Parliament in order to avoid losing a threatened vote of no confidence and
being replaced by a proposed opposition coalition. By the time Parliament
returned, almost two months later, 192 the principal opposition party had
changed its leader and the threat to the government had subsided. 193
146. We put the suggestion that a British government could similarly abuse this
power to the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform. He responded
that:
“That is theoretically possible now. The convention that if the
opposition want to table a motion of no confidence the government
make that time available has worked well in the past. Although it was a
theoretical risk we did not think it was a practical risk. If a government
were so minded, it would not prorogue the House for a significant
period as they need the House’s power to continue in government. ...
Part of the check here is a political one. If the government were abusing

188 Ibid., para 4.6.

189 FTP 3.
190 For the grounds of judicial review, see Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985]

AC 374, 410 (Lord Diplock).

191 See Companion to the Standing Orders, House of Lords 2010 paras 2.12–2.16.
192 Parliament was prorogued on 4 December 2008 and returned on 26 January 2009.
193 Q 78 (Professor Milner); FTP 41 (CES Franks); FTP 24 (Professor Mendes). Prime Minister Harper

sought, and obtained, a second two month prorogation on 30 December 2009.

36 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

procedure to prolong its period in office artificially, there would be a

reckoning when it eventually sought a mandate from the public.” 194
147. Professor Bradley agreed that such a possibility, whilst theoretically possible,
“would be very unsatisfactory and British politics would have sunk to a new
low.” 195 Professor Bogdanor suggested that this be left to the discretion of a
“wise constitutional monarch” who would not prorogue at the request of a
Prime Minister who no longer had the confidence of the House. 196 Whilst the
risk may be low, Dr Fox warned that “you can’t know the views of future
monarchs in a scenario 40 or 50 years down the line.” 197
148. However, Professor Milner stressed that:
“The Canadian case was unique because prorogation saved the
government, which it normally should not. ... [The] circumstances
[were] so unusual that you could not imagine them. I would have to give
you each of the steps in the Canadian case, all of which were unlikely
and all of which fitted together. Frankly, I would not worry about it.” 198
149. We agree that the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very
small. We therefore conclude that Her Majesty’s power to prorogue
Parliament should remain.

Judicial review of early dissolution arrangements

150. The Clerk of the House of Commons has identified a risk that the provisions
of clause 2 could lead to a questioning of parliamentary proceedings in the
courts. For this reason, he would prefer that the detailed provisions were
contained in Standing Orders of the House on the basis that the courts
would be even less likely to intervene. 199 Were the courts indeed to intervene
to prevent Parliament from being dissolved early, “the impact, politically and
constitutionally, would be very great.” 200 It is therefore important to assess
carefully the Clerk’s submissions.
151. Clause 2 of the Bill provides for an early dissolution following one of two
events (a two-thirds vote or a vote of no confidence followed by 14 days
without a relevant vote of confidence). That one of these events has taken
place is to be certified by the Speaker of the House of Commons. A
certificate under clause 2 “is conclusive for all purposes.” 201 The Clerk of the
House argued that this certificate would be justiciable because the Bill would
embody the internal proceedings of the House in statute so that they became
questions ultimately to be determined by the judiciary. 202
152. In his evidence to the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform
Committee, the Clerk outlined some of the issues which he suggested the
courts may call into question. “Not only might the Speaker’s decisions
involve difficult judgments—for example about what constitutes a confidence

194 Q 162.
195 Q 30.
196 Q 108.
197 Q 107.
198 Q 78.
199 FTP 20; see also Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011) op. cit., Ev 26,

paras 28–29.
200 FTP 20.
201 Clause 2(3).
202 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011) op. cit., Ev 25, para 17.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 37

motion, the selection of amendments to such motions and the consequences

of their being carried—but they would be made in a potentially highly
charged political situation”. 203 He also highlighted practical issues concerning
divisions, such as mistakes in counting, members voting in both lobbies in
order to cancel out their votes and conventions which allow sick members
who are on the precincts to be nodded through. 204
153. We agree that it would be inappropriate to create a situation in which
the courts might be called upon to assess the basis on which the
Speaker had issued a certificate. Indeed, on one view, the Clerk of the
House’s arguments provide the very justification for the courts to rule that a
Speaker’s certificate would not be justiciable. Professor Bradley told us that
the judiciary would surely accept that this was “an area for political judgment
which the courts were not qualified to make.” 205
154. Despite the weight of the evidence we received being against the view that a
Speaker’s certificate would be justiciable, few of our witnesses were prepared
to argue that the courts would “announce a sweeping abstentionist rule” 206
preventing judicial intervention whatever the circumstances. 207 Nor have the
Government entirely excluded the possibility that there may be some risk.
The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told us that: “We took
the view that on these very political matters, the risk of the courts straying
into or getting involved with them was very small. ... On that basis, we were
content to proceed.” 208
155. We also raised the question during our oral evidence sessions of whether a
claim brought before the courts, even if dismissed by the judiciary, would
lead to a period of delay which might impact on the subsequent election. The
Clerk of the Parliaments, whilst not offering his view on the question of
justiciability, did note the “risk of litigation to test [the] proposition” that the
courts would not intervene. 209
156. Court cases occurred following early dissolutions in Germany in 2005 and
Canada in 2008. In neither case did the judicial proceedings delay the
subsequent election. 210 Professor Bradley told us that: “the judiciary now in
the public law field are very able and prepared to give a swift answer if
circumstances require it. It would be scaremongering to say that the general
election will be held up for six months or longer while the judges were
deciding this.” 211
157. The risk that the courts may intervene in any early dissolution of
Parliament by questioning the Speaker’s certificate is very small.
Although the political and constitutional consequences of any such

203 Ibid., Ev 24, para 16.

204 Ibid., Q 10.
205 Q 29.
206 FTP 19, para 30.
207 See also Q 24 (Professor Oliver), FTP 16 (Richard Gordon QC). The Supreme Court recently considered

the question of exclusive cognisance in R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52.

208 Q 159.
209 FTP 43, para 12.
210 The German Constitutional Court reached its decision on 25 August 2005, one month after the dissolution

on 21 July and one months before the election on 18 September; the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada
did not reach a decision until August 2010, two years after the election had been held: Conacher v Canada
2010 FCA 311.
211 Q 27.
38 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

intervention would be very significant, we do not consider the risk to

be sufficient to warrant a rejection of clause 2 of the Bill.

Further drafting issues relating to clause 2

158. Clause 2(3) provides that “A certificate under this section is conclusive for all
purposes.” We note that it does not contain the additional words contained
in the equivalent provision in the Parliament Act 1911: “and shall not be
questioned in any court of law.” 212 We questioned the Minister for Political
and Constitutional Reform on the reason for the difference. He responded
that: “[clause 2(3)] simply uses a more modern drafting style, using the more
recent precedent ... There was no particular policy decision.” 213 The wording
in clause 2(3) is the same as that used in the Representation of the People
Act 1983, 214 an Act which is closely related to this Bill. 215 The wording is also
more expansive than that used in relation to a certificate by the Clerk of the
Parliaments in the House of Lords Act 1999 which merely states that the
certificate shall be “conclusive.” 216 On this basis we are content to accept
the Minister’s assurance as to the most appropriate form of words.
159. The Clerk of the House raised one further issue with the drafting of clause 2.
Clause 2(4) imposes a duty on the Speaker, before issuing a certificate, to
“consult the Deputy Speakers (so far as practicable)”. The Clerk of the
House considered that the question of whether consultation was
“practicable” would become a legal question. 217 Whether or not this would
be the case, we agree that the question of whom the Speaker should
consult is a matter of internal House of Commons procedure and
should not be contained within the Bill’s provisions. Clause 2(4)
should therefore be omitted.

212 Section 3.
213 Q 160.
214 See, for example section, 174(3) of that Act.
215 Clause 1(1) of the Bill refers explicitly to the 1983 Act.
216 Section 2(6).
217 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2nd Report (2010–2011) op. cit., Ev 25, para 19.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 39

CHAPTER 5: THE PROCESS OF SCRUTINY

160. We have repeatedly emphasised the importance of proper process with
regard to constitutional reform. 218 Process is critical in terms of upholding,
and being seen to uphold, constitutional values: particularly those of
democratic involvement and transparency in the policy-making process.
Moreover, we believe that a proper process is the foundation upon which
successful policy is built: the lack of a proper process makes an ineffective
outcome more likely.
161. There is strong evidence to suggest that the Government’s proposals have
not been properly thought through. Of three commitments made in the
Coalition’s programme for government in relation to fixed-term Parliaments,
two were quickly dropped. The Government’s original proposal that
dissolution should occur when 55 per cent of MPs voted in favour created
much debate and controversy on the ground that it would have allowed only
the current coalition Government to dissolve Parliament. 219 The proposal
was subsequently changed to a two-thirds majority, as set out in the Bill. 220
162. Dr Fox, Director of the Hansard Society’s Parliament & Government
Programme, summarised the flaws of the process:
“If you chart from the summer the way in which [the Government] have
brought forward various announcements on how things have changed
about this legislation, that reflects the fact that it is ad hoc and ill
thought-out and goes to the point that there ought to have been pre-
legislative scrutiny. There ought to have been a much more extended
timetable given the implications and consequences that would arise.” 221
163. In his evidence to us, the Deputy Prime Minister claimed that “there is an
emphasis in everything that we are proposing on greater accountability in the
manner in which we conduct ourselves and the way in which politics is
conducted, greater legitimacy in the political institutions that seek to
represent people, and breaking up excessive concentrations of power and
secrecy.” 222 We assess in this chapter whether these principles have been
demonstrated in the manner in which the policies contained in the Fixed-
term Parliaments Bill have been brought forward.

The development of the Government’s policies

164. The Government’s original intention was for a binding motion to be put
before the House of Commons stating that the next general election would
be held in May 2015, and that legislation to make a permanent change to
fixed terms would be introduced at a later date. 223 In the event, the binding
motion proposal was dropped, and the Government proceeded straight to
introducing the Bill.

218 See, for example, Constitution Committee, 15th Report (2008–2009): Fast-track Legislation: Constitutional
Implications and Safeguards (HL Paper 116); 17th Report (2008–2009): Parliamentary Standards Bill (HL
Paper 130); 11th Report (2009–2010): Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill (HL Paper 98); 6th
Report (2010–2011): Public Bodies Bill [HL] (HL Paper 51); and 7th Report (2010–11) Parliamentary
Voting Systems and Constituencies Bill (HL Paper 58).
219 See, for example, HC Deb 25 May 2010 cols 135–154.
220 See Chapter Four.
221 Q 95 (Dr Fox).
222 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 53.
223 QQ 116–117, 124–129 (Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform).
40 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

165. The Deputy Prime Minister told the Commons Political and Constitutional
Reform Committee that a binding motion had been proposed “on the
assumption that the legislation would then come much further down the
track ... Initially, we thought we needed the motion to show the political
commitment to a fixed-term Parliament and then, on a more leisurely
timetable, produce the legislation.” 224 The withdrawal of the binding motion
proposal therefore meant that the Bill was brought forward much more
quickly than was originally envisaged.
166. The Deputy Prime Minister justified this change on the grounds that “we
were given the strong advice that this would create a limbo situation with, in
effect, a non-binding, non-statutory commitment to the 2015 date and that it
was better to proceed towards legislation straight off.” 225 Indeed he admitted
to us that there had been flaws in the process:
“We did not entirely appreciate the knock-on effects on different parts of
our constitutional arrangements, which created understandable
nervousness that one is then consigning everybody, not just this
Government and this Prime Minister, but everyone else involved, into a
slightly ambiguous territory, which made people feel uncomfortable.” 226
167. We accept that constitutional reform proposals will rarely, if ever, be
wholly apolitical and may not always proceed by consensus. It is
therefore necessary to ensure that, in relation to such proposals,
constitutional principles should be constantly borne in mind and clear
for all to see.

Interrelationship with other reform proposals

168. The Deputy Prime Minister, in a speech given on 16 November 2010, said
that the Government “have set out a sweeping programme of political
reform, a programme that we can set against a single test: do these measures,
together, help ... [give] people the choice and control they—rightly—now
expect.” 227 As one of the Government’s key political reforms, do fixed-term
Parliaments fit with the other parts of the political reform programme?
169. The other part of that programme to be introduced into Parliament quickly
was the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. As we noted
in our recent report on that Bill, the Government have not determined how
the cycle of five year Parliaments which would be set by this Bill would be
synchronised with the five year boundary reviews to be established under that
Bill, especially if an early election changed the cycle. 228 Nor have the
Government explained why they have chosen to hold a referendum on the
voting system, but not on the key principle of fixed-term Parliaments nor on
the question of the length of the parliamentary term.
170. The Bill could also impact on proposals for reform of the House of Lords. It is
expected that the forthcoming draft Bill on Lords reform will provide for at least
a part-elected House.229 The Government have not yet stated whether they
consider that the election cycle for this House should be timed to coincide with
general elections, nor how the House might be affected by early dissolutions.

224 Evidence taken on15 July 2010; see also Q 65.

225 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit., Q 59.
226 Ibid., Q 62.
227 The Deputy Prime Minister, Political Studies Association/Hansard Society Annual Lecture, 16 November 2010.
228 Constitution Committee, 7th Report (2010–2011): Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill (HL Paper 58).
229 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 82 (Deputy Prime Minister).
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 41

171. The Government have also announced that there will be a third bill on
political and constitutional reform to be introduced in 2011. That bill will
include a new power of recall of MPs and provisions relating to individual
voter registration. 230 The bill may well be consistent with the provisions of
the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, but it is not possible for us to assess how
early dissolutions, for example, might impact on the recall of MPs or on the
timetable which might be introduced relating to voter registration.
172. We are concerned that the constitutional relationship between the
provisions of this Bill and the Government’s other proposals for
constitutional reform have not been adequately thought through.

Pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation

173. In our recent report on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
Bill, we reiterated our view that it is a matter of principle that proposals for
major constitutional reform should be subject to prior consultation and pre-
legislative scrutiny, unless there are good reasons for departing from this
principle. 231
174. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told us that “if you
look at public opinion, as expressed in opinion polls and things, they are
broadly welcoming of the view that we should move to fixed-term
Parliaments.” 232 However, the detailed policies of the Bill were not subjected
to any form of consultation. Indeed, we were told that in 2007 there was
some public support for the contradictory principle that an early election
should be held in the event of a mid-term change in Prime Minister.233
175. Nor was the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill subject to pre-legislative scrutiny.
The Deputy Prime Minister justified this on the ground that “the closer we
looked at it given its constitutional importance we thought it better and more
proper to move to legislation on a quicker timetable.” 234 Yet he conceded
that “the principle should be to time these things in a way that allows for
proper pre-legislative scrutiny.” 235 He also “unambiguously” agreed that such
reform proposals should be brought forward in a more measured way in
future. 236
176. The need for pre-legislative scrutiny on this Bill is demonstrated by the
serious concerns about the content of the Bill which we discuss in this report,
and by the late consideration given to avoiding clashes with elections to the
devolved institutions. 237 Pre-legislative scrutiny would have ensured that
these issues were considered in a thorough and more measured way than is
possible with a Bill already introduced and part-way through its
Parliamentary passage.
177. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform argued that pre-
legislative scrutiny was less appropriate in the first term since, “if the whole
programme was subject to pre-legislative scrutiny ... you would not get on

230 The Deputy Prime Minister, Political Studies Association/Hansard Society Annual Lecture, 16 November
2010.
231 Constitution Committee, 7th Report (2010–2011): Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill (HL

Paper 58), para 12.

232 Q 126; FTP 44.
233 Q 105 (Professor Bogdanor).
234 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 69.
235 Ibid., Q 69.
236 Ibid..
237 See Chapter Three, paras 75–81.
42 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

and do very much.” 238 The Deputy Prime Minister also sought to justify the
Bill’s early introduction on the basis that:
“the principle of fixed-term Parliaments has been argued and made over
a very long period. ... If we were to say that we were going to informally
commit to having a fixed-term Parliament but not introduce it in a belt-
and-braces fashion until later, I would probably be sitting here
answering questions such as, ‘Well, hang on a minute, aren’t you going
to end up breaking the very rules that you are piously declaring lie
behind the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill?’.” 239
178. The Deputy Prime Minister told us that “what matters now is the degree of
scrutiny that it is subject to as the legislation passes through both Houses. On
that we are very clear. We want to make sure that it is subject to the greatest
possible scrutiny, which it rightly deserves.” 240
179. Save where there are justifiable reasons for acting more quickly, the
proper way to introduce a constitutional reform proposal is to publish
a green or white paper or a draft bill, and to take the comments and
concerns raised in the process of consultation and pre-legislative
scrutiny into account in the legislation that follows.

The Parliament Acts

180. Clause 1(5) of the Bill provides that the Prime Minister may by order move
the polling date two months earlier or later than the first Thursday in May.
The Explanatory Notes state that the reason for this is to deal with sudden
crises such as the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001 which caused
the local elections to be postponed. 241 The Notes also state that “parliaments,
under this Bill, may extend a short period beyond five years”. 242 This is a
result of the date of an ordinary dissolution being dependent on the polling
date. The Bill as introduced also repeals the Septennial Act 1715 which
provides for the current five year maximum. 243
181. The procedure contained in the Parliament Act 1911 which enables
Parliament to pass a bill without the consent of the Lords does not apply to
any bill passed by the Commons which contains “any provision to extend the
maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years”. 244
182. The Clerk of the Parliaments stated that:
“It is ... clear that the [Fixed-term Parliaments] Bill does contain
provision to extend the maximum duration of a Parliament beyond five
years, and that it cannot, therefore, be passed under the Parliament Acts
procedure unless, before it leaves the Commons, the [relevant]
provisions ... are amended.” 245
Professors Bradley and Oliver agreed that this was the case, 246 as do we.

238 Q 116.
239 Constitution Committee, 5th report (2010–2011), op. cit. Q 60.
240 Ibid., QQ 59, 62.
241 Para 11.
242 Para 32.
243 The Schedule, para 2.
244 Section 2(1).
245 FTP 43, para 5.
246 Q 36.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 43

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
183. We take the view that the origins and content of this Bill owe more to short-
term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional
principles or sustained public demand. We acknowledge the political
imperative behind the coalition Government’s wish to state in advance its
intent to govern for the full five year term, but this could have been achieved
under the current constitutional conventions. (Para 20)

The principal of fixed-term Parliaments

184. The Bill establishes a semi-fixed arrangement and reduces the level of
flexibility which exists in the current system. (Para 25)
185. We recognise that, in promoting this Bill, the Prime Minister is prepared to
relinquish an important prerogative power. This is a significant aspect of the
Government’s stated aim of reducing executive power. However, the balance
of the evidence we heard does not convince most of us that a strong enough
case has yet been made for overturning an established constitutional practice
and moving to fixed-term Parliaments. (Para 46)

The length of the parliamentary term and election timing

186. Whilst acknowledging the case made by the Deputy Prime Minister for a five
year term, nonetheless the majority of the Committee consider that a four
year term should be adopted for any fixed-term Parliamentary arrangement
at Westminster. In the view of the majority, the shift from a five year
maximum to a five year norm would be inconsistent with the Government’s
stated aim of making the legislature more accountable, inconsistent with
existing constitutional practice and inconsistent with the practice of the
devolved institutions and the clear majority of international legislatures.
(Para 62)
187. We agree that there is a case to be made for resetting the clock. Whatever the
maximum term, we accept that an elected government should have a full
term in which to develop their policies and take their legislative programme
through Parliament. (Para 74)
188. A potential date clash with elections to the devolved institutions in May 2015
and every twenty years thereafter could occur if the Government’s proposals
are adopted. Ideally, this should be avoided in order to protect the integrity
and separate identity of Westminster and devolved elections. We await the
outcome of the Government’s consultations with the devolved institutions,
and stress the importance of ensuring that any proposed solution is broadly
acceptable to all concerned. (Para 80)
189. It is regrettable that the Government did not seek to engage with the
devolved institutions in order to find a satisfactory solution to the
consequences of their proposals before the Bill was introduced. (Para 81)
190. The Government’s proposal to extend the current session until spring 2012
may increase the power of the House of Lords to delay legislation but it also
affords the Government more time to get its legislative programme through
both Houses, thus potentially increasing the power of the executive in
44 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

relation to Parliament. This appears to be inconsistent with the

Government’s stated aim of reducing the power of the executive. (Para 87)

Early parliamentary general elections

191. We conclude that it is sensible for the Bill to contain some form of safety
valve which would allow for an early election in circumstances such as the
government losing the confidence of the Commons or where a political or
economic crisis has affected the country. Such circumstances cannot be
identified nor listed in advance and so the safety valve(s) chosen must be
sufficiently flexible to deal with the various situations which might arise.
(Para 94)
192. We conclude that it is appropriate for the Bill to contain two different safety
mechanisms as long as each one is workable and fulfils its purpose. (Para 98)
193. In the light of our conclusion at paragraph 94 [191] that there needs to be a
safety valve mechanism in order to deal with possibly unforeseeable
circumstances, we consider that the best way to do this is to enable
Parliament to dissolve itself when there is a cross-party majority that an
election should be called. Although it is not possible to determine the relative
majority which might be held by governments in the future, a requirement of
two-thirds of MPs voting in favour of a dissolution motion would most likely
necessitate the agreement of cross-party MPs. We therefore conclude that
this safety valve is appropriate. (Para 102)
194. The Bill as drafted does not explicitly cover all motions of confidence
(including defeats on key confidence issues such as the Queen’s Speech or
the Budget), nor situations where the government lose a vote. Nor does it
distinguish between votes of confidence and no confidence. The Government
should bring forward amendments to clarify its precise scope. (Para 114)
195. Greater clarity on the definition of a vote of no confidence, as recommended
by paragraph 114, would reduce the potential for the Speaker to be drawn
into political controversy. The questions of from whom, if anyone, the
Speaker should take direction and of whether and when the Speaker should
state his view on the effect of a particular vote should be procedural matters
for the House of Commons to determine. (Para 119)
196. We recognise that the 14 day period for formation of a new government may
result in a period of uncertainty. However, it is not possible to determine in
advance the many different circumstances under which a vote of no
confidence may be passed. We therefore conclude that 14 days is an
appropriate period to allow for formation of a new government. (Para 125)
197. The Government should bring forward an amendment to clarify whether
clause 2(2)(b) is intended to apply to a government which has already been
formally constituted by Her Majesty or whether it may apply to a
government not yet so constituted. (Para 127)
198. We conclude that the Bill is intended to allow a government which has lost a
confidence motion to reconstitute itself within the 14 day period. However,
since this does not necessarily follow from the wording of clause 2(2)(b), we
recommend that the Government bring forward an amendment to clarify this
provision. (Para 130)
199. We conclude that, if the Bill is passed, it would not be possible to prevent a
government using a vote of no confidence to bring about an early election.
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 45

To do so would be seen by many as an abuse of the Act’s provisions and

would undermine the fixed-term principle. (Para 135)
200. We believe that if a government were to resign in order to force a
parliamentary vote for an early dissolution under clause 2(1), such
manipulation would be an abuse of the Act’s provisions. (Para 138)
201. Whilst the prerogative power of dissolution is an important constitutional
longstop, the Canadian experience would indicate that it is necessary under a
fixed-term arrangement to abolish that power. (Para 143)
202. We agree that the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very small. We
therefore conclude that Her Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament should
remain. (Para 149)
203. We agree that it would be inappropriate to create a situation in which the
courts might be called upon to assess the basis on which the Speaker had
issued a certificate. (Para 153)
204. The risk that the courts may intervene in any early dissolution of Parliament
by questioning the Speaker’s certificate is very small. Although the political
and constitutional consequences of any such intervention would be very
significant, we do not consider the risk to be sufficient to warrant a rejection
of clause 2 of the Bill. (Para 157)
205. We are content to accept the Minister’s assurance as to the most appropriate
form of words for clause 2(3). (Para 158)
206. We agree that the question of whom the Speaker should consult is a matter
of internal House of Commons procedure and should not be contained
within the Bill’s provisions. Clause 2(4) should therefore be omitted.
(Para 159)

The process of scrutiny

207. We accept that constitutional reform proposals will rarely, if ever, be wholly
apolitical and may not always proceed by consensus. It is therefore necessary
to ensure that, in relation to such proposals, constitutional principles should
be constantly borne in mind and clear for all to see. (Para 167)
208. We are concerned that the constitutional relationship between the provisions
of this Bill and the Government’s other proposals for constitutional reform
have not been adequately thought through. (Para 172)
209. Save where there are justifiable reasons for acting more quickly, the proper
way to introduce a constitutional reform proposal is to publish a green or
white paper or a draft bill, and to take the comments and concerns raised in
the process of consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny into account in the
legislation that follows. (Para 179)
210. We agree that, as introduced in the House of Commons, the Bill could not
be passed under the Parliament Acts procedure. (Para 182)
46 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

APPENDIX 1: SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

The Members of the Committee that conducted this inquiry were:
Lord Crickhowell
Baroness Falkner of Margravine
Lord Goldsmith
Lord Hart of Chilton
Lord Irvine of Lairg
Baroness Jay of Paddington (Chairman)
Lord Norton of Louth
Lord Pannick
Lord Powell of Bayswater
Lord Renton of Mount Harry
Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank
Lord Shaw of Northstead

Declaration of Interests
No relevant interests have been declared.
A full list of Members’ interests can be found in the Register of Lords’ Interests:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldreg/reg01.htm
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 47

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Oral Evidence
6 October 2010
Professor Dawn Oliver and Professor Anthony Bradley
Written Evidence, Malcolm Jack, Clerk of the House of Commons (FTP 20)
Written Evidence, Professor Anthony Bradley (FTP 39)
20 October 2010
Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett
27 October 2010
Professor Vernon Bogdanor and Dr Ruth Fox
Written Evidence, Hansard Society (FTP 16)
2 November 2010
Mark Harper MP
Written Evidence, (FTP 44)

Written Evidence
Evidence marked * is associated with oral evidence and is printed. Other evidence
is published online at www.parliament.uk/hlconstitution and available for
inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 5314).

Numerical Order
Arter, David (FTP 1)
Clerk of Australian Senate (Rosemary Laing) (FTP 2)
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, New South Wales (Russell Grove) (FTP 3)
Clerk of the New South Wales Legislative Council (Lynn Lovelock) (FTP 4)
Clerk of New Zealand Parliament (FTP 5)
Clerk to the Northern Ireland Assembly (Trevor Reaney) (FTP 6)
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory (FTP 7)
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan (Gregory A. Putz) (FTP 8)
Clerk to the Scottish Parliament (P E Grice) (FTP 9)
Democratic Audit (FTP 10)
Dodek, Professor Adam (FTP 11)
Electoral Commission (FTP 12)
Evans, Professor Simon; Saunders, Professor Cheryl and Waugh, Professor John
(FTP 13)
German Bundestag (FTP 14)
Gordon QC, Richard (FTP 15)
* Hansard Society (FTP 16)
Heard, Professor Andrew (FTP 17)
Hepner, Timothy Kingston (FTP 18)
48 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL

Howarth, David (FTP 19)

* Jack, Malcolm, Clerk of the House of Commons (FTP 20)
Kildea, Paul; Lynch, Andrew; Williams, Professor George (FTP 21)
Leuprecht, Professor Christian (FTP 22)
Levy, Dr Gary (FTP 23)
Mendes, Professor Errol Patrick (FTP 24)
Milliken MP, Peter (FTP 25)
National Assembly for Wales (FTP 26)
Newell, Professor James L (FTP 27)
Norwegian Parliament (FTP 28)
Oliver, Professor Dawn (UCL) (FTP 29)
Palmer, Anne (FTP 30)
Pond, Richard J (FTP 31)
Ryan, Mark (FTP 32)
Smith, Alastair (FTP 33)
Swedish Parliament (Ulf Christoffersson, Deputy Secretary General) (FTP 34)
Twomey, Dr Anne (FTP 35)
Widfeldt, Anders (FTP 36)
Wiseman, Professor Nelson (FTP 37)
Youngs, Raymond (FTP 38)
* Bradley, Professor Anthony (FTP 39)
Docherty, David C (FTP 40)
Franks, CES (FTP 41)
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (FTP 42)
Clerk of the Parliaments (FTP 43)
* Harper MP, Mark (FTP 44)

Alphabetical order
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (FTP 42)
Arter, David (FTP 1)
* Bradley, Professor Anthony (FTP 39)
Clerk of Australian Senate (Rosemary Laing) (FTP 2)
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, New South Wales (Russell Grove) (FTP 3)
Clerk of the New South Wales Legislative Council (Lynn Lovelock) (FTP 4)
Clerk of New Zealand Parliament (FTP 5)
Clerk to the Northern Ireland Assembly (Trevor Reaney) (FTP 6)
Clerk of the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory (FTP 7)
 FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL 49

Clerk of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan (Gregory A. Putz) (FTP 8)

Clerk to the Scottish Parliament (P E Grice) (FTP 9)
Clerk of the Parliaments (FTP 43)
Democratic Audit (FTP 10)
Docherty, David C (FTP 40)
Dodek, Professor Adam (FTP 11)
Electoral Commission (FTP 12)
Evans, Professor Simon; Saunders, Professor Cheryl and Waugh, Professor John
(FTP 13)
Franks, CES (FTP 41)
German Bundestag (FTP 14)
Gordon QC, Richard (FTP 15)
* Hansard Society (FTP 16)
* Harper MP, Mark (FTP 44)
Heard, Professor Andrew (FTP 17)
Hepner, Timothy Kingston (FTP 18)
Howarth, David (FTP 19)
* Jack, Malcolm (Clerk House of Commons) (FTP 20)
Kildea, Paul; Lynch, Andrew; Williams, Professor George (FTP 21)
Leuprecht, Professor Christian (FTP 22)
Levy, Dr Gary (FTP 23)
Mendes, Professor Errol Patrick (FTP 24)
Milliken MP, Peter (FTP 25)
National Assembly for Wales (FTP 26)
Newell, Professor James L (FTP 27)
Norwegian Parliament (FTP 28)
Oliver, Professor Dawn (UCL) (FTP 29)
Palmer, Anne (FTP 30)
Pond, Richard J (FTP 31)
Ryan, Mark (FTP 32)
Smith, Alastair (FTP 33)
Swedish Parliament (Ulf Christoffersson, Deputy Secretary General) (FTP 34)
Twomey, Dr Anne (FTP 35)
Widfeldt, Anders (FTP 36)
Wiseman, Professor Nelson (FTP 37)
Youngs, Raymond (FTP 38)
APPENDIX 3: COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL CYCLES OF SELECTED LEGISLATURES 247
Country Maximum Average duration Fixed-term arrangements
length of between elections
term since 1945 248
UK: House of 5 years 3.8 years Flexible
Commons
UK: Scotland 4 years 4 years Semi-fixed
Provisions for an early dissolution in the event that two-thirds of members
vote in favour of dissolution, or if the legislature fails to nominate a First
Minister within 28 days.
UK: Wales 4 years 4 years Semi-fixed
Provisions for an early dissolution in the event that two-thirds of members
vote in favour of dissolution, or if the legislature fails to nominate a First
Minister within 28 days.
UK: Northern 4 years N/A 249 Semi-fixed
Ireland Provision for an early dissolution in the event that two-thirds of members
vote in favour of dissolution. The Secretary of State may by order propose
a date for an election in the event that the Assembly does not fill the posts
of First and Deputy First Minister within seven days.
Australia: House 3 years 2.6 years Flexible
of Representatives

247 Presidential (such as the USA) or semi-presidential (e.g. France) systems have not been included because of the difficulties of direct comparisons with the UK’s parliamentary
system. Instead, “Westminster-style” legislatures as well as a number of European case studies on which the Committee has heard evidence have been included.
248 Or since the establishment of the legislature if more recent than 1945. Figures include the last completed term, e.g. 2005–2010 in the UK.
249 The Northern Ireland Assembly has yet to sit for a full term because of repeated suspension of the devolved institutions in the light of setbacks in the peace process.
Australia: States 4 years except Variable Semi-fixed in five states or territories.
and Territories Queensland (3
years) In New South Wales, for instance, early dissolution can occur if: a) a
motion of no confidence in the government has been passed; b) the
Legislative Assembly has rejected or failed to pass an Appropriation Bill
for the ordinary annual services of government; c) the election date needs
to be moved forward because of a clash with a federal election, holiday
period or some similar inconvenience; or d) where the Governor could
otherwise do so in accordance with established constitutional
conventions.
Flexible in three states or territories
Canada: House 4 years 3.2 years Nominally fixed
of Commons
In 2006 legislation was passed fixing parliamentary terms at four years,
though the Governor General’s prerogative power to dissolve was retained.
This power was used to bring about an early dissolution in 2008.
Canada: 4 years in eight Variable Nominally fixed in eight provinces and territories on the same model as
Provinces and provinces and operates at federal level.
Territories territories.
The fixed electoral cycle has thus far been adhered to.
5 years in the
other five Flexible in the remaining five provinces and legislatures.

Denmark 4 years 2.6 years Flexible

Germany 4 years 3.8 years Semi-fixed
Dissolution can take place by order of the Federal President in the event
of the Government losing a vote of no confidence, or in the event of an
unsuccessful election of the Federal Chancellor.
Ireland 5 years 3.5 years Flexible
Italy 5 years 3.9 years Nominally fixed.
The Italian legislature has been dissolved early eight times in the last 40
years. This is done by the President, upon consultation with the Speakers
of both houses, but without formal involvement of the Prime Minister.
New Zealand 3 years 3 years Flexible
Only one post-war Parliament has been dissolved substantially early.
Norway 4 years 4 years Fixed
South Africa 5 years 4.1 years Semi-fixed
The National Assembly can be dissolved early in the event that three
years have passed since the last election and where a majority of the
Assembly vote for dissolution, or where there is a vacancy in the office of
President and the Assembly fails to elect a new President within 30 days.
Sweden 4 years 3.3 years Semi-fixed
The Riksdag is elected for four year fixed terms (increased from three
years in 1994), but with the provision of an early dissolution by Prime
Ministerial decree, or where the Speaker’s proposal for a new Prime
Minister is rejected four times. There have been no premature
dissolutions since Sweden adopted a unicameral legislature in 1970.
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Minutes of Evidence
TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION
WEDNESDAY 6 OCTOBER 2010

Present Baroness Jay of Paddington Lord Irvine of Lairg

(Chairman) Lord Norton of Louth
Lord Crickhowell Lord Pannick
Baroness Falkner of Margravine Lord Renton of Mount Harry
Lord Goldsmith Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank
Lord Hart of Chilton

Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Professor Dawn Oliver, [Emeritus Professor of Constitutional Law, University College, London],
and Professor Anthony Bradley.

Q1 The Chairman: Professor Oliver, Professor perhaps publish a Green Paper or some preliminary
Bradley, thank you both very much for coming. This work of that kind?
is our first evidence session specifically on the Fixed- Dawn Oliver: I think ideally there should have been
term Parliaments Bill, on which I know you both more time for consultation and so on, but on the
gave written evidence to the Commons Committee. other hand I understand the urgency brought about
The Commons Committee had a fairly short time in by the fact that there is a coalition Government which
which to conduct its inquiry and as you know it needs some security for its first term. So I suppose my
published a report but has not been able to cover answer is yes, more consultation would have been a
everything. We hope we are going to cover some of good idea but I still think that there would need to be
the things that they mentioned in the report but also quite a quick process before an actual Bill had got to
delve a bit more deeply now that we have seen the the House rather than a draft Bill.
Second Reading, and of course the Commons have
now moved on to Committee stage. It is very kind of
you both to come. It would be helpful to mention at Q3 The Chairman: Are there specific areas that you
this point that of course this is being sound recorded. feel should have been teased out?
It will be very helpful for the record if you could both Dawn Oliver: I find the arguments around votes of
identify yourselves and you may wish to make a short confidence triggering an early election and that sort
opening statement. Professor Oliver, shall I begin of thing very complex and I cannot quite see through
with you? the fog myself, so those are matters which need to be
Dawn Oliver: Thank you very much. I am Dawn teased out by someone. I do not know that I am the
Oliver, Emeritus Professor of Constitutional Law at right person.
University College, London. I sent in some evidence The Chairman: I am reassured to hear you say that,
to you and I do not feel that I need to expand on that. because having spent some time trying to see through
Anthony Bradley: I am Anthony Bradley, former the fog, I thought perhaps that simply being a lay
Professor of Constitutional Law at Edinburgh person made it difficult, so I am rather relieved to hear
University, now a visiting fellow at the Institute of that you found that so as well. Professor Bradley, did
European and Comparative Law at the University of you have any view on that?
Oxford. Like Professor Oliver, I sent in written Anthony Bradley: As I stated to the House of
evidence to the House of Commons Committee. Commons Committee, undoubtedly this has been
rushed. My response is to distinguish the immediate
concern of the Government that it should continue
Q2 The Chairman: Which we have read, thank you for five years, which seems to me a perfectly
very much. May I just plunge straight in with the respectable position to adopt given the circumstances
question, which I think has come up several times, of the last general election, from the long-term issue
about whether, given that the coalition Government of fixed-term Parliaments. Whether one needs a Bill
has already announced that this will be a five-year to deal with the position of this Parliament and the
Parliament, there was a need to rush this legislation, life of the present coalition, I do not know, but if that
as is being perceived by many people in both Houses, is what the Government wishes, then let it go
or whether it would have been much more through. But those arguments should not be
satisfactory to conduct pre-legislative scrutiny or confused with the rather different and very strong
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6 October 2010 Professor Dawn Oliver and Professor Anthony Bradley

arguments for change in our constitution of a review of the legislative programme promptly is to
fundamental kind to fixed-term Parliaments. weaken the position of Parliament, isn’t it?
The Chairman: There has of course been what one Anthony Bradley: It is possible that Bills can be
might describe as a subsidiary announcement since carried over. This is an exceptional course. In an ideal
the Second Reading and your earlier evidence, which world, longer time for scrutiny of legislation should
is about moving the Queen’s Speech, which is lead to better legislation, but I have never been
obviously relevant to that. Lord Norton, did you persuaded that a Government needs to get through
want to come in on that? into law all the items in its legislative programme.
The ending of a session has a value in cutting down
that programme to a size that is acceptable. The
Q4 Lord Norton of Louth: This is really just a
Government can then start afresh with a continuing
consequence of what has been suggested. The
but new programme for the coming year.
Government now proposes that the session should
run from May to May. We will probably come back Dawn Oliver: I agree there is a lot to be said for not
to cover that aspect, but one specific proposal ending up with a whole lot of stale bills that have been
announced by the Leader of the House of Commons hanging around uncompleted for two years and that
was that the present session should run until May it is a good idea. That seems to me to be the argument
2012. Do you have a view on that? in favour of dividing Parliament into sessions and
Anthony Bradley: To me that is a rather remarkable normally trying to get through the business quite
situation. We are in an area of reworking a lot of rapidly.
aspects of the constitution that have been around for
a long while. I happened to notice last night that Ivor Q6 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: On this point,
Jennings said in one of his writings on Parliament as I understand it, your concern relates to the fact
that he thought the State Opening of Parliament each that giving us more time will make us lazier, in effect,
year by the Sovereign was a very good example of the and we will take longer to get Bills through and they
British constitution in action. If that is right, to will lie around, as you put it. Could not the other
postpone it for a complete year is quite a major argument apply that when you have a brand-new
change. Maybe the Jennings view is even greater now Government, unusually a coalition, and the
that we have televising of the State Opening of programme therefore is not representative of any of
Parliament. It is a significant change and it is to meet the manifestoes, so the Queen’s Speech is cobbled
the immediate awkwardness of the election in May together rather than being a more coherent one that
because it is always a long session running along until would have been anticipated some time ago, and
November in the year following. when you have, for example, bills that carry over
Dawn Oliver: I agree that it sounds too long to wait because they have sunset clauses and things—at the
until 2012 for the next session to start. moment we are dealing with the Terrorist Asset-
Anthony Bradley: To that one could add that in some Freezing etc. Bill, which we should not be because it
Parliaments they do not have annual sessions at all, was not part of the Queen’s Speech—in those cases it
so the Parliament that is elected at a general election makes sense not to stick to an 18-month timetable
has four years or so, whatever the period is, to run and to give yourself the additional time, because you
through all its legislative programme. I think it is are bedding down to a new situation?
quite clear to anyone who has been concerned with Dawn Oliver: I am rather answering off the cuff
the legislative process—everyone around this table
because I have not thought this through much, but I
will have had a greater connection with it than I
think the possibility of carryover is a solution to that,
have—that the annual session and the need to bring
and in principle a copable amount of legislation
things to a climax and get a resolution on a Bill is a
should be introduced in each session and got through
fundamental part of the way that Parliament hitherto
sensibly rather than an excessive number of Bills that
has conducted its legislative duties.
cannot reasonably be dealt with without having a
very long session.
Q5 Lord Crickhowell: On that very point, the Anthony Bradley: I had not meant to suggest that
Deputy Prime Minister and others keep saying that extending the session would let people be lazy, but it
one of the reasons for the Bill that we have before us removes the particular political impetus and the
is to strengthen the position of Parliament. We may political need to reach a conclusion. This is very
come later to the question of whether strengthening important to the House of Lords as a revising
the position of Parliament or strengthening the Chamber. A former member of this Committee, Lord
position of the electorate should be the priority, but Elton, reminded me very strongly when I was
surely the proposition that has just been put can only advising the Committee that time and the need to get
weaken the role of Parliament, not strengthen it. To agreement by a certain date are a vital part of the
lengthen the session so that you cannot have a proper power of the House of Lords.
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The Chairman: Absolutely. There is of course the way that the Thatcher Government or the Blair
broader question in this Bill about the length of a Government were re-elected in their first four-year
Parliament as such. The Bill proposes a five-year periods, it seemed to work. If one voted in May 1983,
term. Lady Falkner, I think you had a question you by 1987 the commentators were saying that there may
wanted to put on that. be an election, and why not in May 1987? That seems
to me to be a cycle that the electorate would like.
Q7 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: The Deputy
Prime Minister has justified his proposal for a five- Q9 The Chairman: Am I right that internationally
year term on the grounds that it goes with the grain of where there are fixed-term Parliaments that is the
the founding texts of the unwritten constitution and usual experience, that three or four years is common?
follows the precedent set by the immediate past Anthony Bradley: I think both Professor Blackburn’s
Government. How would you respond to proposals paper and Professor Hazell’s evidence to the
for five-year terms? Do you consider them Commons Committee show that four years is the
appropriate? norm. There are exceptions, as in France and as he
Anthony Bradley: I said very clearly in my evidence to Professor Hazell in the statistical tables.
the Commons that I think it would be wrong. I do not The Chairman: Lord Goldsmith, I am sorry, I
usually go quite as strongly as that, but if one is interrupted you.
making the fundamental switch from the present Lord Goldsmith: No, that is very helpful, thank you.
situation to fixed-term Parliaments, then one needs a
full debate on what the period should be. I am afraid
I am not persuaded by the particular point that you Q10 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: I know this may
quoted from the Deputy Prime Minister. The five- stray a little towards Clause 2, but there was a
year maximum has come into being for quite reference to better politics. It is certainly relevant
different reasons. I do not have an academic basis for whether it is four years or five or whatever the case
what I am saying; I am speaking now as a voter. I may be. There may have been a discussion in the
want to be able to vote more frequently than every Second Reading in the Commons, or I may be wrong,
five years for a fixed-term Parliament. If one looks at but it raises a question that wraps around this of
the history of political practice since 1945, politics whether, as we are moving or have moved to a much
has gone better when elections have been held every more presidential Government, a new Government
four years. happens not simply after a general election but on the
Dawn Oliver: I agree. The other point is that one five- appointment of a new Prime Minister. We could find
year term for one Government might look quite a situation where we had a five-year or four-year
acceptable, but if you have only five-year elections Parliament, or whatever it might be, and one year
and the same party is elected to Government then after the election, one Prime Minister goes and
you have 10 years or even 15 years and it strikes me another takes his place. It is arguable that the matters
that the British public get bored with Governments that the new Prime Minister sets out in his own
after a while and Governments get tired. I am not programme and agenda could be very different, so we
making a partisan point. The thought that it might be have not had a general election covering that. Might
impossible for a change of Government to take place we not possibly consider deciding that elections
for 15 years once elected is unappealing. Four, eight should occur once a new Prime Minister has been
and 12-year terms seem to me to be more acceptable. chosen? If you go back, it happened with Eden, I
think, or certainly when Macmillan succeeded Eden,
Q8 Lord Goldsmith: I want to ask Professor Bradley and if you go back, with Callaghan after Wilson,
to elaborate a little bit on what he has just said about much later. It all feeds into the question, why do we
history showing that four-year terms have been better not have an election once a new Prime Minister has
for politics. I wonder what historical precedent you been chosen?
had in mind there. Dawn Oliver: We don’t because we don’t. It is just not
Anthony Bradley: Professor Blackburn of King’s required and it has not seemed appropriate to
College, who gave oral evidence to the Commons parliamentarians for there to be one. I am not really
Committee in July, has studied fixed-term keen on there being too frequent elections. One does
Parliaments for a long while and his view is that it occasionally have a change of Prime Minister in the
should be four years. He makes the point that in middle of the Parliament, as happened in the last
recent history Governments seem to get into trouble Parliament. I do not think that that fact should in
in the fifth year and this is an unsatisfactory period itself trigger an election. Once MPs are elected it is
for politics. Maybe the answer to that is that if their job to do their best to see that Government is
everyone knows that we are in the final year of a conducted in a responsible and responsive way and
Parliament then it is going to be difficult whether it is not run to the electorate too often. That is my gut
the fourth year or the fifth year, but if one looks at the feeling
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6 October 2010 Professor Dawn Oliver and Professor Anthony Bradley

Q11 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: Why not? I have know that the consequence would be a general
not heard, forgive me, the argument against. Once election.
you have changed Prime Minister, why do we not Dawn Oliver: It seems rather odd to me to think of
have an election? having an election after you have got a new Prime
Anthony Bradley: I have in my notes the heading Minister. The normal point of a general election is to
“Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism”. True get a new Prime Minister, or to have the opportunity
presidentialism, as in the United States, has a to get one, so I am rather surprised by this.
separate election for President and a separation of The Chairman: I am not sure that we are going to
powers and the elections continue on separate advance this, because it is clearly dependent on
channels. The essence of parliamentarism is that the people’s personal experience and their perception, as
Prime Minister is in office so long as he or she has the you said Professor Oliver, as either a voter or an
confidence of the House of Commons. The converse expert, which may be slightly different. There is the
of that is that if the Prime Minister dies, there is no question, whether we go for four or five years, and
reason why his or her successor should not, if they particularly if we go for five years, of this potential
can command the confidence of the House of conflict with elections be held in the devolved
Commons, follow without an election. Given Assemblies and the Scottish Parliament.
majority parties, if it is the new leader of the party I
can see no reason why a general election is needed. If
the Labour Party chose Mr Gordon Brown or the Q13 Lord Hart of Chilton: After the five-year term
Conservative Party chooses a new leader for any was announced it became apparent that that would
reason, to me that does not justify a general election clash with elections to the devolved institutions in
and one would not expect a new Prime Minister 2015, and thereafter every 20 years. Some see that as
elected by the same party to have a totally different a big problem. I would like to know what your views
programme. are. If you think there are problems, do you
The Chairman: In a sense this was tested by John categorise them as merely practical problems or do
Major’s resignation as Prime Minister during his they involve constitutional problems?
administration, when there was no issue that he was Dawn Oliver: It does not seem to me to raise
calling for a dissolution; he was just calling for a constitutional issues and I do not know what the
change of Prime Minister. practical problems would be. I have not looked into
Lord Renton of Mount Harry: Could I just say, that.
against the background of 23 years in the House of Anthony Bradley: It is difficult sitting in London to be
Commons, I would go for five years. I do not think, certain what the views would be in Scotland, Wales or
like many of my colleagues, that that is a bad thing. I Northern Ireland. If there were devolution to an
think it would be stable and it is an acceptable time and English Parliament, that possibly suggests that you
so forth. What is perhaps much more valid is what would not want elections at one and the same time,
Lord Rodgers has just taken us into, which is the but that is not the case. I agree with Professor Oliver
position of Prime Minister. I remember well that that this is not a serious constitutional problem, but
when Margaret Thatcher went—I was Chief Whip at it is a very practical problem with political
the time—it was not irritation with the Tory Party in significance in Scotland and Wales in a way that
Parliament, it was irritation with Margaret Thatcher. cannot easily be assessed in England.
She was then succeeded by John Major and then the
Tories rather surprisingly won the next election. I
Q14 Lord Crickhowell: As a former Secretary of
think therefore that the relevance in this of the Prime
State for Wales, I think there is no doubt that a
Minister is tremendously important. Within that, I am
simultaneous election taking place nationally could
not settling that issue, but I would not have a problem
have a profound impact on an election taking place
with five years.
for the Assembly. I think you might get a different
Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: This is a very
result as a consequence. Whether that is a good or
parliamentary view, if I may say so. We are all talking
bad thing I would not know, but I think it could have
to each other, because we like Parliament, but what
an impact in that way. Therefore, it is a factor that
about the public? You are excluding the opportunity
needs to be considered. I think it is felt in the Welsh
for the public to take a view on whether they like
Assembly, certainly, and I believe in Scotland, that it
Brown or Blair. Surely that is the essence of the
would probably be a bad thing for that to happen
relationship of Parliament to the public?
because they would like to be judged on their
performance as an Assembly and not have their
Q12 Lord Pannick: Maybe it would be most record caught up in the, perhaps at that moment,
unfortunate if the rules deterred a parliamentary poor performance of the Government or other
party from changing their leader because they would factors.
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6 October 2010 Professor Dawn Oliver and Professor Anthony Bradley

Anthony Bradley: I would wish to keep a very open ear persuaded by that argument. It would not be nearly
to that kind of proposition, remembering that there so easy, save in the event of a world war or something,
was a difficulty in Scotland not so long ago with for a bill of that kind to go through the House of
simultaneous elections for local government and the Lords, which would definitely have a view to
Scottish Parliament with different voting systems. We consider. It would not necessarily go through as
are now talking about a somewhat similar case in rapidly and it might be a bit like entering a marriage
which there would be a general election on the first- but saying that you can always get a divorce at 24
past-the-post system for Westminster and an election hours’ notice. If one is moving to fixed-term
on a separate basis, with I think two votes, in Parliaments, that should be for real. It is a serious
Scotland and Wales, leaving aside Northern Ireland. change and in my view it does justify a safety valve to
I think there will be difficulties not just of a practical enable an early election. That is necessary, but I agree
kind from the organisational side, but I think for the with Professor Oliver that if the clock starts to tick
voters too in expressing their views. again and the four-year or five-year term begins to
run, then you will not have made a real psychological
Q15 The Chairman: I think there were indications in change in your constitutional arrangements to the
the Second Reading debate in the Commons that the fixed-term system, because in the minds of major
Deputy Prime Minister thought this was worth parties there will always be the view that if we do have
looking at again. I take the point that you have both an election now, will this give us what at the moment
made that this is not a constitutional issue, but it we would like, which is a four or five-year period in
seems to be regarded as a sufficiently difficult office? That goes against what should be the spirit of
administrative and political issue. I think the a fixed-term system.
suggestion was to try and get the elections to the
Assembly and the Parliament moved, which I Q17 Lord Norton of Louth: Just to follow up, if one
thought would cause some political difficulty. Does takes the premise of a fixed-term Parliament, say for
anybody want to make any further comment? Can we five years, and if there is an election within that it is
then move on to the central point that we have for a remaining term, your point, Professor Bradley,
touched on, but which you were saying at the is that there should be some extraordinary triggering
beginning, Professor Oliver, was clouded in some mechanism. Am I right, Professor Oliver, that you are
difficulty, which is the whole question of the safety not suggesting that?
valve for an early general election, however long the
Dawn Oliver: I am not in favour of the two-thirds
fixed term is agreed?
majority point. The other safety valve, if you like, is if
the Government loses a vote of confidence and one is
Q16 Lord Norton of Louth: The first element of the left with the problem of perhaps not having a
safety valve is the two-thirds requirement for functioning Government. That needs to be dealt with.
triggering a dissolution. How appropriate do you That is the point that I assume we are coming on to in a
regard that? moment. I am not in favour of the two-thirds majority
Dawn Oliver: I do not see the need for it. The requirement.
implication is that if there is pretty broad consensus
in the House of Commons that there should be an
early election, then there should be one. I do not see Q18 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: I think that the
why that of itself should trigger an election. If the detail of Clause 2(1) and (2) is very difficult and that
Government still has support and things are comes over particularly in what Professor Bradley
meandering along, I do not see the point of an early has been saying. You can envisage a situation in
dissolution. My own sense, jumping ahead a little, is which it was not two-thirds of the total number of
that abuses of early elections could be avoided if the MPs who voted in favour, but it was two-thirds minus
newly elected Parliament only served for the rest of one. That could very easily become very agonising.
what would have been the term of the dissolved The advantage of the present situation, and one
Parliament. The main thing to do is to avoid giving remembers it from the late 1970s, is that “no
the incumbent or groups within Parliament partisan confidence” are the words used in the motion and if
advantages in triggering an election. That would be there is a majority of only one, the “no confidence”
an abuse of power, so we need to find ways of wins. The advantage of that in a way is the clarity and
preventing that. certainty. If you are going to add in other words such
Anthony Bradley: I have been able to read the written as questions of supply or Queen’s Speech and you did
evidence that Mr Howarth has put in to this not quite get two-thirds, this is in danger of becoming
Committee, and he says very strongly that you do not a very hostile and a very bad event in Westminster.
need a safety valve because you could always have a What is the alternative?
rapid bill go through to make the election happen and Dawn Oliver: The two-thirds majority requirement
amend the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I am not would be a bad event?
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Lord Renton of Mount Harry: And then looking on to Q20 Lord Crickhowell: We have got firmly into the
the second safety valve of the Speaker certifying that complexities of Clause 2(2). I am going to come back
the House of Commons had passed a motion of no on the 14-day question, but as we are on the
confidence. You would not have thought that was Speaker’s certificate and so on, there has never been
necessary. It is either the right number of Ayes or it any real difficulty in the past, as far as I know, of
is not. Parliament knowing that it has got a vote of
Dawn Oliver: Yes, I can accept that. It ought to be confidence and what it was voting about. The more
obvious whether a no confidence vote has been you define what a vote of confidence is, the more
passed or not passed. I do not see the need for the likely it is that someone will challenge it. The very fact
Speaker’s certificate. that you have to have a Speaker’s certificate puts the
Anthony Bradley: If I can add the view that if the Speaker in a position that could be open to criticism.
majority required is as much as two-thirds—I have Do you have a view? Do we need to have a precise
not done the arithmetic and gone back to see—it definition of what a vote of confidence is and a
would really require both major parties to agree. If Speaker’s certificate? Cannot we continue, as
the two major parties in Parliament believe that a Parliament has done as far as I know—I have lived
general election is needed then why should they not through several such situations in Parliament—with
have it? They will not be making that decision an understanding by Parliament that it knows
without regard to the state of affairs and public perfectly well when it is on a vote of confidence?
opinion in general and there will be this disincentive Maastricht is a very good example of one and the
if they are only going to have the rest of the period vote of confidence that resulted, among other things,
that is provided for in the legislation. On the question in me becoming a Cabinet Minister on Jim
of motions of confidence, I have not developed an Callaghan’s resignation is a clear case. We knew
analysis in detail on this, but if we simply look at exactly what was happening.
Clause 2, if the Speaker certifies that on a certain day Anthony Bradley: If I may say so, that question goes
the House of Commons passed a motion of no to the heart of the methodological problem in this
confidence, what if the Government had wanted a Bill. For several centuries one has had the British
motion of confidence and it is defeated? Does that constitution unwritten and uncodified, based on
come within the clause? That is a very simple example constitutional convention and an understanding of
and one can think of many other examples of the what happens. If one is trying to replace that totally,
difficulty of deciding in certain circumstances when you have to be more specific than is the case here.
confidence exists or not. Whether that is desirable or not is another matter.
There was the example of Canada, which I imagine
the Committee knows about, where they switched to
fixed-term elections but for constitutional reasons
Q19 Lord Pannick: On the point you were making, could not alter the power of the Governor-General to
Professor Bradley, can I see if I have understood you order a dissolution and very soon after introducing
correctly? Are you saying in relation to both the the fixed-term system the Prime Minister advised the
safety valves, that is the no confidence motion and Governor-General to have a dissolution. What
the two-thirds majority, that if there is an early would be worrying is to have doubt of this kind. If
election, the new Parliament should last only for the one looks at some of the writers on motions and
residue of the four or five years? Are you issues of confidence, such as Sir William Anson and
distinguishing between the two safety valves? Ivor Jennings and others, it is not always clear
Anthony Bradley: I have not fully thought this out, I whether in the past it has been an issue of confidence.
am afraid. I was not distinguishing between the two Governments have sometimes said, “This is an
at that point. important Bill and this is therefore an issue of
Lord Pannick: Maybe you could let us have the confidence”. That has often been an exaggeration. A
answer in writing. Government would be unlikely to say that today, but
Anthony Bradley: It depends on how deep one’s it could. It may be that within the walls of
conviction is that the fixed-term system is better than Westminster everyone knows that the Government
what we have at the moment and whether one should has had it and no longer has the confidence of the
make a permanent change to that, which takes root. majority, but I am not sure that that is going to be a
If it were to help out a particular set of circumstances sufficient answer in the changed circumstances
and it was a way of possibly enabling the House of brought about by the Bill.
Commons to exercise a bit more authority vis-a-vis Dawn Oliver: The political implications of a vote of
the Government, maybe it does not matter whether no confidence under this Bill would be different from
after an election they take over the full period or not. the political implications under the present system,
I was not distinguishing between the two when I because under the present system it normally means
answered the question. there is going to have to be an election and there will
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be an election. The implication if this Bill is passed in with an overwhelming majority, it serves 10 or 11
its present form is that a vote of no confidence would months in office and has to have a new election.
not be passed unless the homework had been done by Anthony Bradley: I would not wish to overemphasise
the Opposition or by somebody in advance, knowing the need to go to a full-blooded fixed-term system on
perfectly well that if they do bring down the the American lines or whatever, but if it is too easy to
Government on a vote of no confidence they are have an early election, you will have the political
going to be put on the spot about whether they can commentators very soon saying, “Yes, we are here for
form a new Administration within 14 days, or five years, but is Mr Cameron thinking maybe that
however long it is. I would not like the vote of no the coalition is not”. You would get speculation very
confidence to be engineered by the Government. early on in the life of a fixed-term Parliament. If the
That is something we need to talk about, because it term were four years, one would not have achieved
might suit a Government to have an election. One very much because you would have reduced a five-
would also have to think about the implications for year maximum to a four-year maximum. How one
the Opposition or the possible new Government that can, as it were, get the safety valve so that it is there
might be formed during this period after the but not too easily used is a question of great subtlety.
Government has come down. I am not sure that I have given enough thought to it.
The Chairman: No, but what you have illustrated
Q21 Lord Goldsmith: I wanted to go back to the very clearly, if I may say so, is the complexities of this
point that both of you have made about the rump of part of the Bill, which Professor Oliver referred to at
the fixed-term, or whatever it may be. I am having the beginning, and whether it is appropriately
some difficulty understanding the benefit of that. If drafted.
one assumes that a consequence of the early election,
whatever the cause of that would be, is that another Q23 Lord Crickhowell: I suppose in asking my
party then gets into power, having succeeded in question I am challenging the whole desirability of a
pulling down the Government and then winning the fixed-term Parliament, because I am going to press a
election, why would one want to subject it to another little on this 14 days in which you can form a new
election relatively shortly thereafter, which it might Government and sail on. Perhaps I am influenced by
have to start campaigning on straight away? What if the fact that, with Lord Renton and others, I sat in
the circumstances were that the Government was not the House of Commons on that very dramatic
dealing with a really serious problem and we needed evening when the Callaghan Government went down
time to handle it and needed a full term? I do not see by a single vote and he got up immediately and said
the benefit. that he would go to the country as soon as it was
Dawn Oliver: I see your point and I think if there were possible to wind up the necessary proceedings. The
safeguards preventing an early election being country then has a chance to have a view about the
triggered by the Government, which wanted an extra new Government. With this arrangement for 14 days,
term, in other words if the motion of no confidence I can envisage a scene in which there was only a one-
can only be introduced on the instigation of vote defeat. We no longer have smoke-filled rooms,
Opposition Members, for example, then I would not but their nice clean equivalent. There would have
have a problem with the new Parliament running for been a sitting down with the minority parties,
the full four or five-year term. From my point of view, including the Irish, the Scots and the Welsh. I can see
the benefit in some circumstances of giving the new the possibility of some kind of alternative
Parliament only the residue of the first term is to Government being cobbled together and instead of
provide disincentives for the Government to the normal wash-up with the proceedings completed
manufacture a trigger for an early election. I might be as quickly as possible and then giving the British
in a fog; I suspect I am. electorate a chance, you carry on with a minority, and
The Chairman: Did you want to pursue that? probably pretty feeble, Government in those
Lord Goldsmith: There is not time. circumstances, not a very strong Government by the
nature of things. Why is all that supposed to be a
Q22 Lord Norton of Louth: I have a question on the benefit? Perhaps I am influenced because I
same point. I understand the point about the immediately found myself as a Minister as a result of
disincentive, but I was thinking that at the end of the the vote of confidence and we won the election. But
fourth Session in a Parliament where the two parties it was the electorate who decided, not a cobbling
are evenly balanced, the Government is in office together of the minority parties deciding, possibly for
courtesy of a minor party, the minor party withdraws a number of years, the fate of the Government.
its support, there is a motion of no confidence which Anthony Bradley: Those are very cogent arguments,
is passed, the minor party does not support the but let me try and respond. If, say, a Government is
Opposition, a Government cannot be formed within elected with a majority for its party but there is a big
14 days and there is an election. The party is elected issue on which that party is divided, the governing
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party may break up for that reason, but a third party particular question. Whether an issue is justiciable
may be able to agree that issue of great importance does not depend on whether the source of the power
and form a coalition Government in place of is statutory or common law or Royal Prerogative; it
whatever the former Government was. Possibly this depends on the nature of the power that is being
is not very far from the 1931 scenario, which is not a exercised. That was the case of Council of Civil
particularly happy one I think. That is a suggestion. Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service . Given
I am not persuaded that this 14-day rule would that this is to do with the exclusive cognisance of
always be a disaster, but it is difficult, as you have Parliament over its own matters, that is with a non-
said, to see that it is necessarily an improvement on justiciable category of decisions and functions, I
what we have. think it is extremely unlikely that the court would
Dawn Oliver: I do not think I have much to say. I entertain a challenge. In a common law system, you
think it is very complicated and it involves an cannot be dead sure what the courts are going to say,
understanding of the political psychology, if you like, but I think it would be contrary to the well-
of parliamentarians, and I do not think I understand established principles of parliamentary privilege and
that. The insiders are much better at speculating exclusive cognisance and concepts of justiciability for
about how the different blocs of MPs would function the courts to want to have anything to do with this.
and what they would do given a certain scenario. I That is just my feeling.
find it very difficult to imagine. Anthony Bradley: I have had very little opportunity to
The Chairman: Lord Crickhowell or Lord Renton, read Mark Harper’s paper, but I found myself
did you want to come back on that? reacting positively to that and reacting rather
Lord Crickhowell: No, I am left with a sort of anxiety unfavourably to what Malcolm Jack had been
that we do not actually create a better situation and saying. His argument, it is probably oversimplifying
we possibly create a worse one. to say, is that if you put it into statute therefore it is
Lord Renton of Mount Harry: Professor Bradley judicially reviewable. That to me is a very poor
referred to 1931, but one has to remember February/ argument. First of all it omits the leading case of
March 1974, which was three days of negotiation and Bradlaugh v Gossett, when Charles Bradlaugh tried to
Ted Heath finally decided that he could not form a rely on a statute to claim that he had a right to take
Government and therefore there was a minority the oath or whatever it was in the House of
Labour Government. These things happen and I Commons. Mr Justice Stephen, in a fine judgment
think that Lord Crickhowell has a good point in that has been approved recently in a different context
saying that we do not want them to go on for 14 days. by the Court of Appeal, said, “The House of
The Chairman: This brings us to the basic issue, which Commons is not subject to the control of Her
has been debated in the Commons and has been the Majesty’s Courts in its administration of that part of
subject of a letter from the Minister of State, Mark statute law which has relation to its own internal
Harper, on the basis of the debate and the concerns proceedings. The House of Commons has exclusive
that were raised by the Clerk of the Commons about power of interpreting the statutes so far as the
the necessity for statute in this area and the potential regulation of its own proceedings within its own walls
for judicial review if there is statute. Many Members is concerned.” It quotes Blackstone and others to the
want to raise this. I know that Lord Norton and Lord same effect. It is, of course, a rather elderly case, 125
Pannick have both mentioned this before. years or so ago, and it would be very interesting as an
advocate to take part in a discussion on whether the
Q24 Lord Pannick: Can I kick off on this? As you situation has changed, but there is no doubt that the
know, Clause 2 provides that each of the safety valves recent extension of judicial review into the area of the
depends on a certificate from the Speaker. Clause 2(3) prerogative has excluded certain matters as being
tells us that, “A certificate under this section is non-justiciable. Lord Roskill did this in the GCHQ
conclusive for all purposes”. The Clerk to the House case and he included the dissolution of Parliament
of Commons has expressed concern that there is at among the areas that are inherently not suitable for
least a real risk that the courts may be involved. You decision by the court. There has been quite a lot of the
may have a view on the practical reality of that, but I same kind. The advance of judicial review into many
am particularly interested in your views, as very areas of executive action means that issues of
distinguished constitutional lawyers, on whether the justiciability do not often arise in the administrative
courts would have jurisdiction over a certificate court today, but if one is getting to a review of
issued by the Speaker in the light of parliamentary parliamentary proceedings or a review of what the
privilege. Speaker may have decided under legislation such as
Dawn Oliver: I think frankly you can never be entirely this, I think one would have a huge discussion about
sure what the courts will say when faced with very justiciability and I think there are very strong
eloquent advocates with good arguments both ways, arguments that even if the Speaker’s certificate were
but the question really is the justiciability of the subject in a primary way to the jurisdiction of the
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courts, in a secondary sense the court would be very The Chairman: Does anybody else want to make a
loath to apply intensive judicial review to the point about that?
Speaker’s certificate.
Q28 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: Just a brief
Q25 Lord Pannick: That is very helpful. You would one. On the US election in 2000, the Supreme Court
accept, would you, that Bradlaugh v Gossett is made a very speedy judgement. Everyone has
plainly the relevant case and there are much more forgotten that was fairly recent and the world did
recent cases that apply it? There is no authority that not cave in.
you can think of, is this right, that would suggest Anthony Bradley: Indeed. Well, not everyone agrees
that Bradlaugh v Gossett is not still the governing with the outcome of the case.
law? Baroness Falkner of Margravine: The decision itself
Anthony Bradley: Indeed, and one has Pickin and the is what I was talking about, not the outcome.
British Railways Board in the 1970s that would Anthony Bradley: Could I say, I do not want to be
confirm that. The point is that “some issues are too dismissive of the Clerk of the House of
inherently unsuited to adjudication”, which I have Commons, because I have much respect for his role
taken from the current edition of De Smith’s Judicial in very many ways, but I think in this respect he is
Review1. That text says firmly that decisions pursuing a line which is simplistic, to put it at its
regarding the internal procedures of Parliament are best, and the realities would be very different. It is
outside the jurisdiction of the courts2. These are not the case that aspects of self-regulation have been
eccentric views. taken away from the House of Commons, as with
this House. The House of Commons no longer
decides election petitions and it no longer deals with
Q26 Lord Pannick: It would be very surprising expenses and allowances. There could be other
indeed were the courts to exercise jurisdiction in inroads. The Speaker’s certificate to me would be
this area. an internal proceeding of Parliament, even if it is
Anthony Bradley: Yes, I suppose just putting the provided for in a statute.
other argument for a moment, there may be
arguments of a broader or different kind that could
Q29 The Chairman: One of the other cases from
not be raised in Bradlaugh v Gossett which would
another jurisdiction, as it were, which has been
have to be addressed, but to say that the court
drawn to our attention—it would be interesting to
would go into this as if it were reviewing a planning
have your comment on this—is the Northern
decision by a local authority or whatever is a very
Ireland case of Robinson v the Secretary of State for
poor argument.
Northern Ireland, which we have a note about from
one of our legal advisers. This has been considered.
Q27 The Chairman: This is not so much a legal I do not know whether you have a comment on the
point as going back to the politics of this sort of relevance or otherwise of that.
situation, but it has been raised that although Anthony Bradley: I had a chance to look at this last
obviously what you have said is immensely night, but I am afraid I have not given longer
authoritative in terms of the ultimate decision of the thought than that. There was disagreement within
courts, the delay of the process which might be the House; it was a 3-2 decision. Lord Bingham,
involved in terms of an appeal being made for whose judgments I respect enormously, said that the
judicial review within this strange 14-day context, et Act they were interpreting was in effect a
cetera, might have political relevance. constitution, and while it was for the courts to
Anthony Bradley: The court has a discretion in interpret those provisions, “they should, consistently
granting interim relief as well as giving remedy. I with the language used, be interpreted generously
notice that in the Canadian case, the Conacher v and purposively, bearing in mind the values which
Prime Minister of Canada, the substantive decision the constitutional provisions were intended to
was made a whole year after the holding of the embody”3. He pointed out in the same judgment
general election. The Federal Court had already that “matters of potentially great importance are left
decided not to postpone the general election for that to the judgement either of political leaders, whether
reason. To that one could add that the judiciary now and when to seek a dissolution for instance, or even
in the public law field are very able and prepared to if to a diminished extent of the Crown, whether to
give a swift answer if circumstances require it. It grant a dissolution”. Where constitutions retain
would be scaremongering to say that the general scope for the exercise of political judgement, they
election will be held up for six months or longer “permit a flexible response to differing and
while the judges were deciding this. unpredictable events in a way which the application
1 Page 121 3 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002]
2 Page 119 UKHL 32, Para 11.
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of strict rules would preclude”4. If those are the system, but if one wishes to make a change, such a
principles with which the judiciary would approach change is needed beyond Standing Orders, which
an issue of this kind, it would surely be to accept can easily be set aside, as I understand it, by a vote.
that this was an area for political judgement which I rather share Mark Harper’s criticism of that.
the courts were not qualified to make. The minority
judges took a much more precise view and said that
Q32 Lord Norton of Louth: Surely the argument is
the power could not be found in the Act and
therefore could not be exercised. that a bill can be set aside. If you pass an act, you
The Chairman: That is helpful. A slightly lateral can repeal it by a vote. The difference is that it
point in this whole area, but one which I think Lord would give the House of Lords a stronger role.
Dawn Oliver: I agree. I think there needs to be a
Pannick wants to raise, is about the whole issue of
statutory provision. I do not think that Standing
prorogation powers and the prerogative.
Orders alone will do.
Q30 Lord Pannick: Clause 4(1) says, “This Act does
not affect Her Majesty’s power to prorogue Q33 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: To support
Parliament”. I would be very interested in both of that, your earlier argument was that in any event
your views on whether there is any danger that the they would be justiciable.
existence of that power might be abused by the Dawn Oliver: No, they would not be justiciable. You
Government advising Her Majesty in order to mean Standing Orders? My position, and I think
undermine the substance of the Bill. You have Professor Bradley’s position, is that they would not
already mentioned the Canadian example. be justiciable. That is to say the courts would not
Dawn Oliver: I am afraid I have not had time to entertain any complaints about whether the
think about this much, so I cannot help. Standing Orders had or had not been properly
Anthony Bradley: I would go back to the point about observed. They would not be justiciable. This would
a sea change in this area of the British system of be something that the court would consider it
Government, from conventions that everybody inappropriate to adjudicate on.
understands and are well known, to a new world. Anthony Bradley: I found very helpful a recent article
Prorogation could be used abusively to prevent a by a young lawyer called Daly in the 2010 edition
motion of no confidence, but is it likely? There is a of the journal Public Law. He distinguishes between
very strong convention that the two Houses should primary justiciability and second justiciability.
sit so many weeks of the year. A prorogation for two Primary justiciability is where the court simply says,
months with that obvious motive would do no good “This is nothing to do with us” and it is thrown out.
to the Government or the Prime Minister that Secondary justiciability is where the court will look
advised it. If you are thinking of a world in which at it, but when it comes to what is being alleged and
anything can happen, however unthinkable, then the grounds, the answer is the same. It seems to me
prorogation could theoretically be used to avoid a that if the Speaker has consulted Deputy Speakers
no confidence debate, as possibly in Canada, but it and has issued a certificate that intends sincerely to
would be very unsatisfactory and British politics give effect to the situation, in no way is a court going
would have sunk to a new low. to reject this, even if they have said that they would
The Chairman: I fear, however, that we cannot be prepared to look and see what the arguments
necessarily legislate against that. were. When a court has an unusual case before it,
it sometimes finds it more convenient to deal with,
Q31 Lord Norton of Louth: Coming back the Clerk as it were, the merits, assuming there is jurisdiction,
of the House of Commons’ proposals, he raised the rather than simply throwing it out on jurisdiction
possibility of judicial review. Even if we accept your without looking at the merits at all. I do think it is
point in terms of what will be likely to happen, possible that one would have a case on justicability
would you have a problem with his proposal that it and raising this and there might need to be a judicial
could be simply incorporated in the Standing Orders decision on it, but I do not feel that this is a fear
of the House of Commons? that should hold up a change of this kind if it is
Anthony Bradley: I felt that if the present otherwise desirable.
Government believes that fixed-term Parliaments
are an improvement and that we should, as it were, Q34 Lord Pannick: Do you think the fear and the
convert to them, Standing Orders is not an adequate risks of delay are sufficiently strong that it would be
way of meeting that policy decision. I understand desirable to say on the face of the Bill that such a
the significance that Standing Orders have played in certificate shall not be open to challenge or review
the past, and Speaker’s decisions and so on. This is in the courts by reason of parliamentary privilege?
absolutely at the heart of the British parliamentary Can you think of other examples of where
4 Ibid, para 12. Parliament has said that?
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Anthony Bradley: I believe the Parliament Act 1911 Q37 Lord Hart of Chilton: If that veto were to
equivalent provision goes somewhat further. happen, the Bill could not be Parliament Acted?
Certainly there have been decisions on legislation Anthony Bradley: It is possibly worth mentioning
like the Anisminic case, where a decision “shall not that the Parliament Act is drafted in terms of
be questioned” in any other proceedings. And there sessions, and if one is having unusually long sessions
was the ill-fated proposal to exclude judicial review or altering the customary framework, the operation
altogether on immigration decisions, not so long of the Parliament Act will be somewhat different.
ago, which provoked a constitutional argument. The
legal profession and the judiciary and this House Q38 The Chairman: Only, presumably, after this
were all very concerned with this attack on judicial session, if you see what I mean. After that it will
review. If that were added in the terms that Lord revert to a year, it will just be a different year.
Pannick has said, it would be difficult on Anthony Bradley: Yes
constitutional grounds to say that that is improper, The Chairman: Has any other member of the
but it surely would influence the judges. Committee got a point that they would like to raise
Dawn Oliver: I note that Clause 2(3) at the moment or a question that they feel has not been covered in
provides, “A certificate under this section is the way that they had hoped?
conclusive for all purposes”. I suppose that could be
expanded to refer to Parliament’s exclusive Q39 Lord Crickhowell: I have a point under
cognisance of its own procedures. Question 14, about the timing of the sitting of
Parliament after an election and whether it should
be in the hands of the Electoral Commission. It is
Q35 Lord Pannick: The concern about the existing quite an important point. If the sitting of Parliament
provision, as Professor Bradley says, is that it might is for any reason delayed, it is quite a handicap to
be said, as in Anisminic, that it does not mean an an incoming Government in completing important
invalid certificate. A valid certificate is legislation before the House rises for the summer
challengeable. recess. The actual timing of the sitting of Parliament
Anthony Bradley: There are certainly other statutory does have significance and I wondered if there was
instances of recent times when you get the word a view about how it should be decided.
“purporting” included, which help to give extra Dawn Oliver: I do not have a view on that, I am
effect and inclusiveness. My view is that one could afraid.
strengthen this particular part of the Bill without Anthony Bradley: I agree that the point is an
running into a whole set of constitutional arguments important practical one. I think the time has been
about destroying judicial review. lengthened after the most recent general election,
The Chairman: That is very helpful. We are coming when there was a longer period before the House of
almost to the end of our time with you. I know that Commons began to sit again.
Lord Hart wanted to raise a question about the Lord Crickhowell: And it created a great pressure
Parliament Acts. during that first session ending in July.
Anthony Bradley: I would not necessarily have been
in favour of that extension of time, but I certainly
Q36 Lord Hart of Chilton: It is a very short do not have a view on that point.
question. The Parliament Acts, which circumscribe
the powers of the House of Lords, expressly exclude
Q40 Lord Goldsmith: Could I just ask one question,
that circumscription for any bill that extends the life
if it is not unfair? Professor Bradley, you have very
of a Parliament for beyond five years. The clearly explained your view that you would
Government has acknowledged that Parliaments distinguish between this Government’s desire to
under this Bill may extend a short period beyond have a five-year term, which you can deal with in
five years. If that is so, do you consider that the one particular way, and the question of fixed-term
House of Lords will have a right of veto? Parliaments for the future. You have distinguished
Dawn Oliver: My gut feeling is yes. between those two and think we should spend more
Anthony Bradley: It is a difficult one to answer time considering the second question. I wonder, if it
rapidly, but it should be yes. The House of Lords’ is not unfair, whether Professor Oliver has a view
consent would be needed if there is any possibility on that as well. You are already teasing out the Bill
of going beyond five years. It is difficult to think of into two parts and I wonder whether Professor
a satisfactory alternative argument to that. It raises Oliver shares that view or sees it really still as a
another question of whether the House of Lords single question, not two.
should be involved in decisions about the length of Dawn Oliver: I do see it as a single question.
a Parliament if there is a fixed-term system, but that Professor Bradley and I have not discussed that and
is not what your question was about. I have not thought it through, but my approach has
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been that you cannot really separate those two Dawn Oliver: Yes, but you never know what is going
issues; this has to be dealt with in one bill. to happen between now and then, do you?

Q41 Lord Goldsmith: For the future as well as for Q43 The Chairman: Professor Bradley, did you
this Parliament? want to come back on that?
Dawn Oliver: Yes. I do not understand how one Anthony Bradley: I think not. I realised when I wrote
could have some one-off arrangement for this my view to the House of Commons Committee that
Parliament and then an entirely separate bill along I was probably being unrealistic in political terms,
these lines dealing with future Parliaments. But I am but I repeat my view that there is a different
probably in a fog. dimension between deciding what this Government
wishes to do after the general election we have just
Q42 The Chairman: But if we did distinguish had and the changes in the system of Government
between those short-term and long-term objectives that should be made for the long term.
as Professor Bradley is suggesting, you could The Chairman: Thank you, that is very clear. Is there
achieve what you wanted to do for the purposes of any other member of the Committee who wants to
the present Government by doing precisely what raise any further points? Well, I am most grateful
they have done, which is to say that the next general to you both. It has been extremely interesting and
election will be on May the whatever 2015. most helpful.

Further evidence from Professor Anthony Bradley, in response to the written evidence submitted by the
Clerk of the House of Commons, Malcolm Jack (FTP 39)
Paragraph numbers relate to the relevant paragraph’s in the Clerk’s written evidence.
(Para 3) I do not wish to add anything of substance to what the Clerk says in discussing the “risk” under the
Bill of parliamentary proceedings being questioned in the courts, since the nature of our disagreement over
that risk is clear. There is, in my view, nothing in the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill that could be said expressly
or impliedly to restrict the scope of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.
(Para 4) In commenting on the case of Bradlaugh v Gossett, the Clerk refers to section 3 of the Parliamentary
Oaths Act 1866, and its requirement that the oath should be taken under directions laid down by the Standing
Orders of each House. While this may provide a precedent for what the Clerk proposes should now be done
by Standing Orders, I observe that neither Stephen J (save for a passing reference at page 282 of his judgment)
nor the other judges in Bradlaugh v Gossett mention this provision. They deal with the matter on the basis, as
argued by Bradlaugh, that the order given to the Serjeant at Arms was contrary to the Act itself.
(Para 4) While there have indeed in recent years been several interventions by the Speaker of the House of
Commons to protect parliamentary privilege in the courts, it has not always been obvious that there was a
need for such an intervention, and I am doubtful whether those interventions have achieved a great deal. So
far as the European Court of Human Rights is concerned, in the case of A v United Kingdom in 2002, the Court
by a majority of 6-1 upheld the absolute immunity of MPs from being sued in defamation for what they say
in debate in the House, and the United Kingdom’s successful defence of this position was supported by eight
other European governments.
October 2010

Further evidence from Malcolm Jack, Clerk of the House of Commons (FTP 20)
I have read, with interest, the evidence taken by your Committee last week (6 October 2010) on the Fixed-term
Parliaments Bill. I would be grateful if the Committee permitted me to make a few, brief comments on the
specific matter of Clause 2 and its effects on parliamentary privilege (in which my opinion was cited) in order
to clarify the issue as I see it.
I should preface my remarks by saying, as your Committee will be aware, that in submitting evidence to the
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of this House, I made it clear that I was not challenging the
principle of the Bill or in any way commenting on the merits of a fixed-term Parliament which are issues for
Parliament itself to consider.
What I am saying, in essence, is that I identify a risk that the provisions of Clause 2 of the Bill could lead to
a questioning of parliamentary proceedings in the courts. That risk was, in fact, acknowledged by both your
witnesses albeit that their view is that the risk is not a great one. Dawn Oliver admitted that one could not be
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fixed-term parliaments: evidence 13

certain of what the courts would say in the face of “good arguments both ways”.1 Anthony Bradley talked
of “a huge discussion about justiciability” arising in such a case but his view was that the matter was unlikely
to go beyond a “primary” stage of jurisdiction in the courts.2 An important aspect of risk not mentioned in
that discussion was that of impact. There may be little risk of an accident if one drives up the motorway on
the wrong side at four in the morning but the impact, if there were an accident, is likely to be very serious. The
risk of a dispute about a vote to dissolve Parliament, argued out in the courts, might be small but were it to
happen its impact, politically and constitutionally, would be very great. Taking stock of the evidence you have
received does not, therefore, lead me to revise my view that incorporating the provisions of Clause 2 in the
Standing Orders of the House remains the safest course of action.
I would also like to comment on the reference made to the case of Bradlaugh v. Gosset (1884). While I
acknowledge the importance of Judge Stephen’s judgment in that case, I do not think it would be difficult to
show that the circumstances which it dealt with, well over 100 years ago, were very different from the
circumstances that would arise in a modern dispute about the workings of Clause 2 of the Bill, for example in
the area of human rights. There is also an important point of context to the case not mentioned in the evidence
to you: the Parliamentary Oaths Act (1866), under section 3, while stipulating that that the oath must be taken
in the Chamber of each House nevertheless specifically provides for regulation of the process according to
directions laid down by way of Standing Orders of each House. Such a manner of dealing with the provisions
of Clause 2, rather than setting out detailed procedure on the face of the Bill, is a precedent for what I am
suggesting.
I should add a few further points of clarification which make me, unfortunately, more sceptical than Anthony
Bradley about the self-restraint of the courts and have persuaded me of the desirability of a Parliamentary
Privileges Act. The first is the not infrequent need in recent years for interventions by the Speaker of the House
of Commons to protect parliamentary privilege in the courts. The second is in the attitude of the European
Court of Human Rights, which has heard cases that British courts would not consider on the grounds that
they fell within the area of parliamentary jurisdiction.3 Furthermore, in the case I have just cited, two of the
judges expressed reservations about the lack of remedies against the exercise of parliamentary privilege in the
UK system.4
The last point I would like to put to the Committee is this: given that a draft Parliamentary Privileges Bill has
now been announced, why deal in advance and separately with a matter affecting the proceedings of the House
of Commons in legislation?
11 October 2010

1 Q 24.
2 Ibid.
3 See A v United Kingdom (2002) (35373/97).
4 Ibid.
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14 fixed-term parliaments: evidence

WEDNESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2010

Present Baroness Jay of Paddington Lord Norton of Louth

(Chairman) Lord Powell of Bayswater
Lord Crickhowell Lord Renton of Mount Harry
Baroness Falkner of Margravine Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank
Lord Goldsmith Lord Shaw of Northstead

Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Dr Henry Milner, [Political science, Umea University, Université de Montréal], and
Professor Stephen Padgett, [University of Strathclyde].

Q44 The Chairman: Good morning to both of you written around 10 books on German politics and
and thank you very much for coming to the policy. I am not a constitutional expert; I would say
Constitution Committee. The procedure is that we that I am an expert in German politics. I do not have
are recording this for the transcript and the purposes a prepared statement, but I am happy to respond to
of the archive et cetera, so everything is on record. We your Lordships’ particular concerns. I am interested
will first invite you simply to identify yourselves and in and have done some work on policy transfer and
give a brief statement of both your positions. We are institutional transfer, and learning lessons from
very interested in the overseas experience of fixed- abroad. It is very positive that the institutions of one
term Parliaments because until now all our evidence country should learn from those of another. I add one
has been concerned with the details of the Bill that is caveat that emerges from the study of policy transfer
now before the House of Commons but will come to and institutional transfer: countries have very
the House of Lords fairly soon. We are the revising different cultures and legal systems, so the type of
Chamber and it is always extraordinarily valuable to institution or institutional device that works well in
us to have overseas experience to compare and one country does not necessarily work well in
contrast with our own domestic arrangements. another. Looking abroad is positive but I suggest a
Would you like to start, Professor Milner? note of caution.
Henry Milner: Thank you very much for inviting me
here. It is a great pleasure to have a chance to be in
this building and to discuss this important subject Q45 The Chairman: That leads in very easily to the
with you. I am not a constitutional expert per se. My first very general question that I would like to put to
work has been on political participation, but at a both of you, which is do you think that the experience
certain point I realised that political institutions have of fixed-term Parliaments that you know about,
much to do with political participation. I have specifically in the countries that you have studied, is
written several articles and I have written two books relevant to this country? Do you think you learn
on the subject, drawing a link between certain aspects something about the fixed-term Parliament process
of institutions, electoral systems and so on, and that is valuable or not so valuable overall? Are fixed-
political participation. If I have a chance I want to term Parliaments a good thing, to put it at its
make some arguments in relation to fixed voting simplest?
dates. A link can be drawn between fixed voting dates Stephen Padgett: I think the German case is certainly
and possibly higher levels of political participation in relevant to your Lordships’ considerations, but the
a given context. I have written about Canada in design of the fixed-term Parliament in Germany was
several articles, as was mentioned, but I am also a made in 1948–49, against a particular set of historical
specialist in Scandinavia. Some Scandinavian circumstances and the constitution-makers were
experience is relevant here as well. Thank you again motivated by those circumstances. Governments
for having me. in the Weimar Republic, as I am sure your
The Chairman: Thank you very much. We are Lordships know, were highly vulnerable to negative
particularly fortunate that, although you are parliamentary majorities. In large part, the
Canadian and your background is in Canada, you are constitutional arrangements that Germany adopted
working in Sweden at the moment, so we have, as it were designed to protect Governments from such
were, the double approach. circumstances. I think the considerations that have
Stephen Padgett: I am a professor of politics in the motivated the proposals for a fixed-term Parliament
School of Government and Public Policy at the in this country are rather different, so the particular
University of Strathclyde. I have worked in German processes that Germany has may not be ideally suited
and European politics for more than 20 years. I have to the political circumstances. However, I think the
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fixed-term parliaments: evidence 15

20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

processes and how they have worked in practice are we get to the length of term being five years, that is
relevant to the considerations of this House. another matter, but if it were a four-year term, as it
is almost everywhere, including Germany, that would
Q46 The Chairman: Dr Milner, drawing on your not be very worrisome. The second argument—I will
experience, do you believe that there are some be very quick—is quite specific, but it concerns an
absolute advantages to a fixed-term Parliament? area I have been working in. Think of civic education,
Henry Milner: I hate to use the term “absolute very widely defined, as a way to get young people
advantages”, but on the whole, under current interested in elections, and of helping teachers in
circumstances, there are two things that I would draw schools, and making it easier for them to do their job.
your attention to, neither of which are specific to the If you know the date of an election in advance, it is
questions being raised here, namely how you do that much easier to organise a whole series of activities
and how you deal with particular technical aspects. I around that election. In my last book I look at
know that there is a lot to talk about these matters Norway, which is a very good example of this through
but I am just talking about the general idea at this the student vote process that happens in the schools
point. My starting position is that if we agree that the and what goes on in civic education classes at the time
general idea of fixed election dates is good, we can of elections. None of these things would be easy to
find technical ways of doing it in the best possible do, or even possible, if the date of the election was not
way. It is good for two general reasons. One is that, known in advance by everybody in Norway. It is a
given the rising cynicism towards politics, which we small point, but it could make a difference.
have all encountered and which is pretty universal,
the very idea that an election should be the property Q48 Lord Norton of Louth: Coming to the detail,
of a politician, to call when he or she sees fit, rather because you are looking at the principle of whether
than something that belongs to people and the laws we should have a fixed-term Parliament, if one does
of the nation so that the nation knows, “This is when there is the issue of whether it should last for five
our election takes place. This is when we choose our years, four years or whatever. The other element that
government”, seems to me rather difficult to argue in we are looking at is, if there is a premature dissolution
principle, especially today. One may call upon the
of Parliament, whether the remainder of the term
constitutional tradition but people today think
should be served out by whoever is then elected, or
rather in the way that I have articulated. When you
whether, after the premature dissolution, the clock is
have a sense that politicians are calling elections for
reset and the government then serves for the set
their own reasons, rather than as a genuine
period thereafter. Drawing on your experience, which
democratic exercise, whether that is true or not, it
of those do you think is the desirable option?
feeds into this kind of cynicism. We see that in lower
Henry Milner: I will start on that. I guess one of the
turnout and the expressions of alienation. It is a
reasons I was invited here is that I wrote a paper
minor point but the kind of point that makes a
several years ago, looking at the experience of
difference. On balance, countries that have fixed
different countries. I do not think it makes all that
election dates are less likely to have this kind of
much difference. The case of Norway is the most
cynicism.
extreme. Essentially, you cannot even have a
premature election. More typical, the choice is
Q47 The Chairman: We have seen some evidence, between keeping the original next election date as it
particularly from Australia, where the countervailing is, as in Finland, or as in the proposal here, for it to
mood is that if you have a fixed-term arrangement it be five years later. Working on the premise that it
prevents the populace, who may be angry with the would be four years, I would argue that the principle
government, having any chance of getting rid of them here is not wrong. I could imagine a compromise that
before a particular time. said that if the dissolution was in the first two years
Henry Milner: In Canada, we now have a situation of Parliament, the original date should be
where we would probably have elections more maintained, but if it was in the second two years of
frequently except that the population really does not Parliament, the election should be four years from
like the idea. Because the politicians have partisan that date. That would be a technical compromise but
disagreements among themselves, we have a minority it is not one about which I have a strong opinion
government, without a coalition such as you have. either way.
Every day there seems to be another moment of some
disagreement that might result in an election. The
population’s attitude is quite the opposite. It is that, Q49 The Chairman: Professor Padgett, do you have
“You are there for a certain period of time: get anything to add? I know the point about a four or
along”. It is one of the reasons why we are not having five-year term is something that we want to raise, but
elections, despite the fact that there is all this to do so. do you have a point on that about coming to a
So, on balance, I do not see this as a problem. When conclusion or moving back to the original timetable?
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20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

Stephen Padgett: I think there is an argument for provinces in Canada that have adopted fixed terms
sticking with the original timetable and simply and, as you know, the Scottish Parliament, and so on.
running to the end of the Parliament’s term where a
government has called a dissolution and that has
resulted in the return of that government, because Q52 Lord Powell of Bayswater: We tend to be a bit
that arrangement would act as a disincentive for different from others. What would you say was the
governments to behave opportunistically and disadvantage of four-year terms?
dissolve Parliament to reap the benefits of favourable Henry Milner: I am trying to place myself in the
polling circumstances. If, on the other hand, the position of an informed citizen. It seems to me that it
dissolution results, one way or the other, in the would be difficult to justify a five-year term to an
formation of a new government, it would seem informed citizen when there seems to be a kind of
anomalous to deny that new Government its full natural rhythm around four years in other elections
term. It would rather depend on the circumstances. that the citizen might be participating in, such as
municipal elections, Scottish elections and American
elections if they are following them. The four-year
Q50 Lord Powell of Bayswater: I seem to remember term is now, I think, culturally established, even in
that it was Britain that drafted the German Britain, where it has been a little different. You have
constitution, so perhaps some would say that it is had some five-year governments and some four-year
another example of our knowing how to run other governments, though I think slightly more four-year
countries better than our own. Coming to the issue of ones. In Canada we have almost never had five-year
five years versus four years, we would be interested to terms, even before fixed terms. That is just people’s
know both of your views on which is more expectation. It is incumbent on those who want five
appropriate for the UK. One can see advantages years rather than four to make the argument. That is
either way. Five years is familiar and enshrined in how I would put it.
practice. It gives the government plenty of time to get
its legislation through. On the other hand, people
vote less frequently and, speaking as a former civil Q53 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: As I recall, the
servant, the last year of the five is wasted by European Parliament has five-year terms. That has a
politicians getting ready for elections. What would much bigger electorate than any of the individual
your view be? countries. What would your comment about that be?
Stephen Padgett: First of all, it is not quite correct to Is that not a perfectly workable model?
say that Britain drafted Germany’s constitution; Henry Milner: Unfortunately, as I don’t have to tell
Britain and the Allies oversaw the drafting but it was you, the European Parliament is—what do we call it
Germans who drafted it, with German historical in political science?—a second-level Parliament. It is
memories. In relation to the term of a fixed-term not one that people identify with primarily. You can
Parliament, I feel very strongly that five years is too see that in turnout numbers. Frankly, I would not
long and there would be a serious danger that a start from the European Parliament. I think it is a real
government would come to the end of its useful life problem to have a Parliament where the turnout is
before the end of a five-year term. If there were no always less than 50%. It is very difficult for that
safety valves or if they were tightly constrained, that institution to claim legitimacy. I am not saying that it
could lead to a period of hamstrung government would make much of a difference if its terms lasted
towards the end of its term. Alternatively, if there four years rather than five, but an illegitimate
were safety valves, it could lead to frequent institution is not a good example for others.
premature dissolutions, which would not be a
positive thing and would really defeat the object of
the fixed-term Parliament. Q54 The Chairman: Professor Padgett, do you have
Henry Milner: Very few countries comparable to a comment on that?
Britain have five-year terms. Very few democratic Stephen Padgett: I think the critical difference
countries, period, have terms that long for their between the European Parliament and any national
legislature. Parliament is the absence of that direct link between
the Parliament and the Government. The five-year
Parliament does not imply a five-year term of
Q51 The Chairman: Do any of the fixed-term government.
Parliament countries have five-year terms for central
government?
Henry Milner: France does, but France is a semi- Q55 Lord Goldsmith: I wanted to ask exactly that
presidential system. Italy does. After that you reach question, but you have answered it. I will go back to
Luxembourg and Malta. Pretty much all the the experience in France and Italy. Do you know how
European countries with fixed terms, which is the often Italy has succeeded in getting to a five-year
large majority, have four-year terms, as do the term?
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20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

Henry Milner: Actually, somewhat more often than governments. In Sweden, all elections take place on
we think. Denmark has had more frequent elections the same date every four years. That is when all three
than Italy, but Italy has had much more frequent levels are elected. In the case of Norway—this is more
changes of government. That is the major difference. common—there is a mid-term election halfway
Lord Goldsmith: And France? through the term, which is when the local and
Henry Milner: In France, the President can dissolve regional levels are chosen. My preference is for the
Parliament pretty much as he wishes. I am not an Norwegian system. The advantage of the Swedish
expert on France per se, but my impression is that it system is that you get higher turnout in the local and
has happened reasonably frequently. Again, that is regional elections, because once people show up to
not a model applicable to the British constitution. vote in national elections, they will also vote in local
and regional elections. However, they do not pay
Q56 Lord Norton of Louth: I wanted to link the much attention to them. Local issues disappear from
answers to both questions. It strikes me that there is political discussion. Secondly, four years without
a possible relationship between the length of the term elections is a long time for the kind of things that I am
and whether, if there is a premature dissolution, the talking about, such as getting people interested and
Government should fulfil the rest of the term or the involved, and use in civic education. So my general
clock should start ticking again. Presumably, the tendency is to try to find a way in which elections take
longer the term, the stronger the argument for place every two years, with national elections taking
fulfilling the remainder of the term. If the fixed term place on a given date and other-level elections taking
is shorter, arguably the clock should be reset. Would place two years later. I am not saying that applies in
you agree with that? this case, because you have specific rules regarding
Henry Milner: Yes. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but, if
Stephen Padgett: I think I would, too. possible, moving towards that system is the most
The Chairman: One of the other issues that has been effective compromise.
raised in debates about our proposals is the question
of how you combine an election at the national level
with one at the devolved level, as in Canada and Q58 Lord Crickhowell: On the confusion issue, if
Germany. I know Lord Crickhowell wanted to raise you are being asked to vote on an AV system, while
this point. on the same day you are voting to elect people to the
Welsh Assembly on an entirely different system, is
this likely to cause confusion, or do you think not?
Q57 Lord Crickhowell: Sticking with political
Henry Milner: There really are not many examples of
participation, what is the experience in Canada,
that that I can think of, so I cannot give you a very
Germany and other countries in respect of federal
informed answer. My guess is that it would probably
elections being held at the same time as provincial or
be something of a problem, so it would be worth
local elections? Do dual elections increase turnout or
avoiding if possible, but people do learn and adjust.
not? What is the experience if the electoral system is
I would not throw the whole thing out because at one
different at one level from the other? For example, in
Wales, if we had the proposed system it would be point you end up with people voting in two different
different from that of the Assembly election on the kinds of system.
same day. Does that cause confusion and spoilt ballot Stephen Padgett: The German case does give some
papers? There are two issues, really. I was hoping to examples of this, but relatively few. Three state
start with Dr Milner because you said you were the elections took place on the same day as federal
great participation expert. Are we likely to get more elections in 1994. There was also one in 2002. The
or less turnout by combining the elections at each 1994 case was quite interesting because it was a
level? period when participation in the eastern part of
Henry Milner: Neither Canada nor Germany are Germany was very low. The turnout in the state
especially relevant in this case because the provinces election in the two eastern states was 10 to 15% higher
set their own dates for elections and now several of than in Land elections that had taken place in eastern
them have become fixed, so we cannot take that into Germany previously that year. There is clear evidence
consideration. There is no case of a fixed date of a there of increased turnout. Generally, the German
provincial and federal election coinciding exactly. We state electoral systems are rather similar to the federal
have not reached that point. At some point I will talk electoral system with the one exception of Saarland,
about the experience, or failed experience, of the which coincided in 1994. As far as I recall, there was
fixed election date law in the federal Parliament of no widespread confusion over different electoral
Canada. We do not really have any experience of that systems, though it has to be said that the federal
in Canada. I think it is pretty much the same in system is well known and the Saarland system is
Germany. To compare Sweden and Norway, neither rather simple, with just one ballot being cast, so it is
is a federal country but they have regional and local understandable that there was little confusion. I
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20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

think the UK provides the example of confusion in legitimacy reaches a point where fewer than half the
the Scottish elections. people are voting regularly, to the extent that the
legitimacy of the entire system is called into question,
Q59 Lord Crickhowell: It is very easy for an elector just getting more people to vote is something
to distinguish between purely local government valuable. I do not like it as a general solution to the
issues and central government issues. It may be more existing situation because it papers it over. It does not
difficult to distinguish between Scottish Government get us more active and interested citizens; it just gets
and Welsh Assembly issues and central government us more people who vote because they have to. We
issues. Therefore, I think there is a real fear among have to look at how we get more active and interested
Assembly Members, for example, that their election citizens who will vote not because they have to, but
may be decided by the popularity or otherwise of the because they are interested and attentive to what is
UK Government, rather than by their own going on. That is what my book is about. In a sense,
performance. compulsory voting is a band-aid solution.
Stephen Padgett: The German case would certainly Stephen Padgett: I defer to Dr Milner on that. I have
suggest that that is the case. Where state elections no expert experience.
have coincided with the federal election, the federal The Chairman: Going back to the question of the
election’s issues and campaigns have totally engulfed fixed term, the whole issue of early dissolution is
the regional campaign. obviously relevant.

Q60 The Chairman: Is there a determination by Q62 Lord Shaw of Northstead: I wonder if you could
people within the German system to try to avoid this briefly describe the processes under which the
potential conflict, or is it something that is not Canadian and German federal Parliaments may be
discussed? It is already being discussed here, as you dissolved before the fixed term has expired. In
say, particularly in relation to the Scottish example particular on that point, to what extent do the
from 2007. Governor-General in Canada or the federal President
Stephen Padgett: I do not think it has been a major in Germany retain a discretion to dissolve Parliament
issue either way. It has occurred almost randomly early? And one more question, if I may: where there
through the terms of Land Parliaments, which are is more than one process for dissolving Parliament
fixed, drifting towards the federal elections because early, is one regarded as more constitutionally
of premature dissolutions or whatever else. If a Land appropriate? Is either process regarded as more
election was going to be timed very close to a federal straightforward from the point of view of the PM, the
election, it would probably take place on the same Chancellor or the Parliament?
day for, I would guess, administrative convenience. Stephen Padgett: In the German case there is, strictly
Politically it is not a major issue in Germany. speaking, only one process by which Parliament can
be dissolved prematurely, and that is triggered by the
Q61 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: I apologise for failure of Parliament to support a confidence motion
arriving late. I am not certain how relevant my that is put to it by the Chancellor. Constitutionally,
question is. If it has already been answered, forgive such motions can only be put by the Chancellor. The
me. What is your view about compulsory voting, House does not have the prerogative to raise a
particularly for parliamentary elections? I remember motion of confidence. So there is no provision for
that when I went to Australia there was compulsory Parliament to trigger a premature dissolution in the
voting. You were fined if you did not vote. I was German case. Following the failure of a confidence
always interested in how little Australians resented motion, the Chancellor may, but is not obliged to,
this. If anything, they were rather for compulsory dissolve Parliament. If he proposes that Parliament
voting. What are your views? be dissolved, the President acts on that proposal and
Henry Milner: I looked at this issue in my last book has the discretion to dissolve Parliament or not. So
and I tried to find evidence for compulsory voting, yes, the federal President has that discretion. The
beyond getting more people to vote than otherwise federal constitutional court has no constitutional
would. We know that it has that effect in Australia, prerogative to give a judgment on the dissolution
Belgium and so on. The question is, does it make unless it is petitioned to do so. That has occurred
those people who vote because of compulsory voting twice. In theory, at least, a dissolution under Article
more likely to seek more information, so that they 68 of the German constitution requires the
vote in an informed manner? There is some evidence concurrent consent of the Chancellor, the Parliament
from simulations and experiments that we have tried. to deny the Chancellor the vote of confidence, the
We have not really found that to be the case. It seems President and, if it is so petitioned, the federal
to be that you get more voters but not necessarily constitutional court. There are several checks and
more informed voters. So I tend to be sceptical. I do balances there. While Parliament does not have the
not oppose it under all circumstances. If democratic constitutional right to dissolve itself, it has the right
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20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

to move a constructive vote of no confidence. I more and it does not affect anyone’s thinking. Every
should add that it is obliged, simultaneously in journalist talks about whether there will be an
proposing the vote of no confidence, to elect a new election in the fall or in the spring, but nobody says
Chancellor. that this would violate the law, which is still there—
nobody bothered to repeal it—about fixed election
dates. The Prime Minister has the ability to use this
Q63 The Chairman: Is the constructive vote of no simply to go back to the old system and ignore the
confidence defined in the constitution? idea of fixed election dates. If we—and you—are
Stephen Padgett: It is, yes, quite explicitly. In that serious about this, that should not happen. As far as
event, though, Parliament is not dissolved. The new I can see, that is not the case here. Once this law is
government simply continues to the end of the passed, the Prime Minister could not go to the Queen
parliamentary term. Having said that, the only time and simply ask for the dissolution.
that the constructive vote of no confidence has been
successfully deployed, by Chancellor Kohl in 1982, it
was followed the next year by a dissolution on the Q64 The Chairman: Is that because of the distinction
initiative of the Chancellor, who contrived to lose a between retaining the prerogative, as in your case,
confidence vote that his party had put to trigger new and not in what is being proposed here?
elections. Henry Milner: I think so. I am not a constitutional
Henry Milner: The Canadian situation is very lawyer but I would assume that, with the law as it is
different. As far as the federal Parliament is written, if it went to court the court would say that
concerned, a law on fixed elections has only been in the Prime Minister could not, under the law, simply
effect for, I think, four years. It is written in such a go to the Queen and ask for a dissolution, especially
way and has been interpreted—correctly, I think, by since it has an alternative mechanism—the two-
the federal court—to create almost a dead letter, so thirds vote. With an alternative mechanism, it seems
that the actual law is almost without effect. This is to me that any court would say that since you could
even more the case because of the events that took not use the mechanism provided by the law, it simply
place. Let me give you a brief summary of those. The is not legal to try to get around it. There are lawyers
Canadian law is very short. Clause 1 in three ways here who are probably better positioned to answer
reaffirms the position of the Governor-General. than I am that that is the case. But I assume it is the
Nothing in this law shall in any way affect the power case and it would be a definite improvement on the
of the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament at Canadian situation.
his or her discretion. The second clause, the last part
of which states that elections will take place on the Q65 Lord Goldsmith: I wanted to clarify one thing.
third Monday in October every fourth year, begins The Governor-General’s view and, as I understand it,
with “subject to Clause 1”. In case we were unclear, the court’s view of the power is that there is a general
it reminds us. The intent, I think, of the government discretion. Or it is similar to a situation where a head
lawyers when they wrote that was to give the of state would rely on the advice from his or her
government a loophole big enough for a locomotive Ministers? So if the Prime Minister says, “I want a
to drive through. That is exactly what happened. The dissolution”, would the Governor-General say,
minority government were at a point where they “That’s the answer. That’s what I have to do”?
thought they had a chance of winning a majority. Taking into account other considerations, what has
Parliament had not been getting along very well; it happened?
was quite ineffective. The Prime Minister went to see Henry Milner: That is a good question. We have only
the Governor-General. The Governor-General, one case. Before this law was passed, the precedent
interpreting the clause, I think, correctly, essentially was very clear. Even if, three months after an election,
brought us back to the previous position, which was the Prime Minister went to the Governor-General
that the Governor-General would follow the Prime and said, “I want a new election”, the Governor-
Minister’s recommendations for dissolution. So that General, would not say, “Why don’t you give the
is what happened. This was later, as I said, tested in Opposition leader a chance? It has only been three
the Federal Court, which said that courts can act and months”. For the Governor-General, the precedent
its jurisdiction could apply in this case, because it is a was clearly established. This would be the Prime
federal law, but the government acted in accordance Minister’s call and he would have to answer to the
with the law. We had another election. To the people for it. It would not be for the Governor-
disappointment of the government, we ended up with General to intervene. The new law changed that. As
another minority. The additional problem is that far as I can tell—I was not privy to the discussion
practically nobody in Canada realises that we still between the Prime Minister and the Governor-
have this law on the books. Even I have not thought General—in this case the Governor-General’s
of the date of our next election because it is a advisers would have said, “On what basis could you
meaningless concept. No one is aware of this any refuse the Prime Minister, since the way that the law
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20 fixed-term parliaments: evidence

20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

is written allows you to do everything that you could of economic reform. Arguably there was a political
have done before and act in exactly the way you crisis, but the government had a workable majority.
would have acted before the law was passed?”. If a
Governor-General, in her wisdom, had said, “No, we Q68 Lord Shaw of Northstead: Do you believe that
have fixed election dates and I refuse to dissolve the courts should intervene? This is a political matter.
Parliament”, that would have been an interesting Stephen Padgett: The end of this—sorry—rather
development but no one in Canada anticipated it. prolonged response will, I hope, answer that
question. The court sought to define how a political
Q66 Lord Shaw of Northstead: Going back to the crisis should be defined. It concluded that a political
German case, when Chancellor Kohl deliberately crisis could not be determined by a court and that the
decided to lose a vote of confidence, did that result definition of a political crisis should be within the
later in an alteration to the law or some further broad administrative competence of the Chancellor.
change? That judgment is broadly interpreted as meaning that
Stephen Padgett: No. I should add that in all three a future court would be unable, following that
cases when a premature dissolution has occurred in precedent, to subject that question to judicial
Germany, it has occurred through the deliberate interpretation.
contrivance of the Chancellor. That is an issue. The Chairman: This is very much a point in the
Unlike in Canada, the expectation is that a internal conversations that we have been having in
Parliament will run for its full term. Exceptions are the Houses of Parliament, with evidence from the
treated as such and are scrutinised very carefully by Clerk of the House of Commons, about the potential
the President, a court and public opinion. The court judicial role in fixed-term Parliament legislation. Of
was called upon to rule on the Kohl case in 1983. The course, it also impacts on the nature of the vote of
usual way in which the court is called upon is by confidence.
Members of Parliament petitioning the
constitutional court that the early dissolution is a Q69 Lord Norton of Louth: The Fixed-term
breach of their constitutional right to a four-year Parliaments Bill provides the triggering
term. The court has regarded that as justiciable and mechanism—a vote of confidence—for dissolution.
given a judgment on it. What the court tried to do in Then there are the safety-valve provisions. One of the
1983 was tighten the circumstances in which a things that is being discussed here is the definition of
Chancellor could contrive his own defeat, and a vote of confidence. As I understand the German
therefore dissolution, by saying that, in addition to case, that is not really an issue because there is an
the formal procedural requirements of the explicit vote of confidence, which the government
constitution—that is, failing the vote of confidence— can move. I think I am right in saying that if it is lost
the Chancellor should be able to meet a further by a simple majority, that is fine. Then you have the
material requirement. That material requirement was constructive vote of no confidence, which you say is
that the Chancellor should be able to demonstrate defined in the constitution, so there is no issue about
that continuous government is no longer possible. what constitutes a vote of confidence. I wonder,
The court expanded on that by saying that the Professor Milner, whether there is an issue, in your
material condition would be a political crisis. experience, of what defines a vote of confidence.
Does it have to be an explicit vote? With us, you can
Q67 Lord Shaw of Northstead: Who would decide? have the passing of a vote of no confidence but, as in
Stephen Padgett: Despite that judgment, the court the German case, you can have a vote of confidence
upheld Kohl’s dissolution and there was no political moved by the Government, which is then lost. There
crisis in that instance. Kohl moved the dissolution is that issue of what constitutes a vote of no
because he had come to power the previous year confidence. In our case, of course, it can go wider
through the constructive vote of no confidence—that because the Government can say that it is a matter of
is, a vote in Parliament—and therefore lacked a confidence and that if they lose the vote they will
popular mandate. So he was asking for a popular resign.
mandate, but there was no sense of political crisis. In Henry Milner: I am not sure that the Canadian
2005, which was the most recent premature experience is all that helpful. I am not enough of a
dissolution, by Chancellor Schröder, the court gave constitutional expert to give you the final word.
some consideration to exactly that question: what Governments fall on, for example, budgets and so on;
constituted a political crisis and how should it be there are certain conventions. Sometimes, if a bill is
adjudicated? The circumstances were that arguably defeated and the opposition says that the government
there was a political crisis because the Government should resign because this is a matter of confidence,
was deeply unpopular, had lost a series of state the government has been known to, and can, ask for
elections and Schröder had lost the confidence of a vote of confidence. It can then stay in office if it gets
large sections of his own party through a programme it. I am not sure that that is a significant issue. I did
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20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

not see this in the Bill—maybe I missed it—but if a point about the cynicism of the electorate. If a
vote of no confidence takes place, does it need the government that has been staggering on loses a vote
majority of those voting or a majority of Members? of confidence—I have cited the example of the
The Chairman: A majority of Members. Callaghan Government which lost such a vote by one
Lord Norton of Louth: There is a difference between vote, with some of us becoming Ministers as a
a vote of confidence and a dissolution. consequence—under the arrangements proposed
The Chairman: I am sorry. I am slipping between here, there are 14 days in which someone can try to
the two. cobble together an alternative government. You can
Henry Milner: So there is a separate dissolution vote? imagine that on the occasion of the Callaghan vote, it
I checked and most places with fixed election dates do would have been possible, perhaps with offers to the
that. The two-week period seems to me to make good Irish, the Scots or the Welsh, to have cobbled
sense as well, as does having an explicit dissolution together a weak government which would then,
vote so that everyone knows exactly what the rules under this provision, have gone on to the end of the
are, and so on. This seems to me a reasonable way of fixed term. It seems to me that if we are seeking to
operating. In Canada we do not have that. Nothing remove cynicism, the electorate might well feel that,
in the law attempted to be explicit. There is the the government having fallen in those circumstances
question of whether, rather than having to get two- and a new government been cobbled together in this
thirds, a government that wanted to dissolve way, they ought to have a say in choosing the new
Parliament would trigger a vote of non-confidence in government. I find it hard to see that a fixed-term
itself, followed by a vote of dissolution. I assume that Parliament in such a situation removes the cynicism
would be possible, under the way the law is written. of the electorate. Callaghan said: “I’m going to wind
Having thought about that, I guess that perhaps that things up as quickly as I possibly can and we will have
should be possible. It would be an extreme case. The an immediate election”. We all knew exactly where
government would have to go to the people and say we were. In this situation, that might not have
that it was such an extreme case that it absolutely happened. Would that not have rather upset the view
could not continue to govern and the opposition of the electorate that they were being treated
would not give it the two-thirds of votes needed to seriously?
dissolve. The government would have to make its Henry Milner: I guess this idea was put in because you
case before the people and justify voting non- could imagine a defeat that was not as clear-cut, and
confidence in itself. I know the German case is a bit it was not so clear exactly where everyone stood and
uncertain but perhaps it is not such a bad safety valve whether it indicated a real desire for a new
if it is understood in that way. Nothing in the government and a whole new election. When you
Canadian experience helps to clarify that. think of all the possibilities that could trigger such a
The Chairman: Thank you. Lord Crickhowell has a vote, on balance it is probably a good idea. I think
question about support from opposition parties. people understand that. Perhaps it is not the case in
Britain, but the attitude in Canada, close to
Q70 Lord Crickhowell: I thought I was going to be universally, is: “We elect you to run the country. Yes,
asking about how frequently the Canadian and you have political differences. You are liberals,
German federal Parliaments have been dissolved conservatives, NDP, Bloc or whatever, but you are
early over the last 50 years. How frequently has it there to run the country. We made a choice—now try
happened? to do it. Don’t lose sight of that and just care about
Henry Milner: In Canada, when we have had majority your own particular partisan goals and so on”. I am
governments they have almost always lasted four talking about perception, not objective reality, but
years and sometimes five. Only two have not. Only this is a very strong perception. It is very important to
minority administrations have never lasted the full demonstrate to the people that this conforms, as
term. Even under this so-called fixed-term election much as possible under reasonable circumstances, to
law that we have now, they were not able to last the what they want. Institutions should encourage that.
full term. That is our experience. If we had a better I would guess that, on balance, the two-week period
law, there would be a much better chance. I am would more often than not have that effect. I agree
hoping that you will produce a better law and that there probably will be cases where people will ask
perhaps inspire us to amend our law in such a way what they are doing and say that they are wasting
that it will be more effective. time, but it is just two weeks. I do not think it is that
serious a problem.
Q71 Lord Crickhowell: We have already heard why
in each case the action was taken. I will not follow Q72 The Chairman: We have a problem when it
that up a second time. I come back to a question I takes five days to form the Government, as it did in
have asked in previous sessions and pick up on your May, so we are possibly in a different position.
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20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

Stephen Padgett: My understanding is that the was timed for the end of September, so by the time the
purpose of the 14-day period following a dissolution, court made its judgment the election campaign was in
which Germany also has, is not to allow the full swing. It was almost inconceivable that the court
incumbent government to make adjustments to itself would have said: “No, stop. This is
or reconstitute itself, but to give the opposition the unconstitutional”.
opportunity to put together a government as an
alternative to calling new elections. As such, it serves Q76 Lord Goldsmith: That leads me, in a sense, to
as a disincentive to a government to contrive a no my final question. From the point of view of the
confidence motion to get a dissolution and fresh electorate and the public, what role does the court
elections because it might be pre-empted by the play in this process? Is it really an irrelevance, or is it
opposition. It probably serves a useful purpose in a Gore v Bush matter and at the top of the agenda for
that regard but it has never been put into operation in winning an election?
Germany. Stephen Padgett: It is quite difficult in the German
The Chairman: Lord Goldsmith, do you want to raise case, because generally German citizens hold the
an additional point about judicial intervention? constitutional court in high regard. It is one of the
most respected of the political institutions. Certainly,
Q73 Lord Goldsmith: Yes, we have said quite a lot in 2005 they regarded the court’s judgment and the
about this already. As I understand it, the German whole process of dissolution and the premature
constitutional court felt able to adjudicate on the election as political theatre. I think the public
question, particularly of Chancellor Kohl’s welcomed the election because the Government was
contrivance, but then devised a way of dealing with it deeply unpopular and arguably no longer effective.
that meant it did not interfere at all. So far as Canada The way in which the election was brought about was
is concerned, I presume it was the Supreme Court – regarded as theatre.
Henry Milner: It was the Federal Court.
Lord Goldsmith: It never went to the Supreme Court? Q77 Lord Goldsmith: What about Canada, which is
Henry Milner: I do not think it did. I do not think the closer to Washington?
group that brought the case decided there was any Henry Milner: My sense is that we have a law that
value in going to the Supreme Court. almost invited this kind of situation. If we had
drafted the law more carefully, there would not have
Q74 Lord Goldsmith: But so far as justiciability was been this situation. That is the solution to this, in a
concerned, there was no issue because it was a sense. If you draft a law where Clause 2 says
question of what the statute meant. The court could something but clause 1 makes Clause 2 essentially
look at that but, as it happens, the court’s decision ineffective, somewhere along the line some group will
was that it was not a decision for it but for the say that the Government has violated Clause 2. If you
Governor-General. Is that right? push hard enough, somebody will have to say that
Henry Milner: Yes, but unlike in Germany, if a similar Clause 1 applies. Good law-writing, where the intent
situation happened again it could go to the court, is clear, reduces or potentially removes the need for
which would probably say the same thing. However, the courts to intervene.
the court did not rule in such a way as to say that it Lord Goldsmith: As a general proposition, many
should never have come to the court. British Governments would wish that had been true.
Thank you very much.
Q75 Lord Goldsmith: We have a different situation, The Chairman: Thank you. You have both been
because of our Bill of Rights, which creates a clear extremely generous with your time. We are coming to
distinction between what courts do and what the a conclusion but Lord Norton wanted to raise
legislature does. That is a matter of great sensitivity. another point about the prerogative.
It does not sound as though that sort of principle
applies in either Germany or Canada, although the Q78 Lord Norton of Louth: Yes, this is probably
German constitutional court recognises that it directed to Dr Milner in the light of his experience.
should be careful not to tread in political matters. The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill states that the
Stephen Padgett: It falls clearly within the court’s monarch’s power to prorogue Parliament is not
jurisdiction constitutionally, but the court is trying to affected. In the Canadian case we have seen the
square the circle. It has tried to retain some power to prorogue used to prevent a vote taking place
constraints on the way that Chancellors use these on a motion of confidence. Should we be worried
devices by establishing general principles, but has about that retention and, if so, is there anything we
ultimately felt unable to deny a Chancellor a right to can do about it?
terminate his or her government. It is a question of Henry Milner: The Canadian case was unique because
timing as well. In the Schröder case, it was August prorogation saved the government, which it normally
when the court made its judgment and the election should not. If the government cannot survive before
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20 October 2010 Dr Henry Milner and Professor Stephen Padgett

prorogation, it should not be able to survive could end up with another election. If we had real
afterwards. It happened because the outgoing fixed elections, it would make it a bit tighter but the
opposition leader was already on his way out when existing system seems to have worked fairly well.
this very quick opposition coalition was put together. Where we have had that case, you would get a second
It allowed him, even though he was about to be election relatively early in the term but everybody
replaced, potentially to save his career but it had to expects it. I think we are probably even less likely now
happen right away. After prorogation, the process in to get the kind of scenario that you picture than we
his own party was going to continue and the new were in the past. I think almost every election will
leader, since everyone knew who it would be, was produce some logical configuration of a government.
someone who was far less ready to take the risk of It might not be obvious that the existing government
bringing down a government that had just been will be there. However, the scenario is hard to
elected, even if it as a minority government. Everyone imagine under our circumstances.
knew that prorogation actually saved the
government. That is why in this particular Q81 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: Coming back
circumstance there was a connection between the to Germany, I notice that you did not mention
two. These circumstances are so unusual that you anything to do with the Bundesrat. What role do you
could not imagine them. I would have to give you imagine the House of Lords would have in a fixed-
each of the steps in the Canadian case, all of which term parliamentary system if there was an early
were unlikely and all of which fitted together. dissolution?
Frankly, I would not worry about it. Leave the power Stephen Padgett: As you say, I have not mentioned the
of prorogation as it is and do not mention it in the Bundesrat. That is because the upper Chamber has
law. I think it will be all right. no constitutional role in matters of dissolution or a
constructive vote of no confidence, and has not been
Q79 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: What involved in either. There is no precedent in the
mechanisms do you have in place when there has German case. It is quite difficult to imagine this
been a general election that results in an unclear House playing the role of arbiter because of its
verdict and a new government cannot be formed? composition and the party political nature of that
Could you explain briefly for either country? composition. Whatever arbiter is chosen for issues
Stephen Padgett: 2005 was a case in point in Germany. that arise in dissolution, it has to be demonstrably
The provisions for a case where the Bundestag cannot insulated from politics, as is the federal President in
elect a Chancellor allow for a person who has the Germany.
highest number of votes in a Bundestag vote to be Henry Milner: I tend to agree. The Canadian Senate
elected Chancellor—in other words, a Chancellor is an entirely appointed body, so it could not easily be
without a majority. There is a provision for forming imagined playing a role in such a circumstance. My
a minority government but it has never been used. In guess is that what Professor Padgett said applies to
practice, the incumbent Chancellor remains in office this House but there are, I guess, changes anticipated
until a new government is formed. There is provision in terms of elections and so on.
for that in the constitution. The parties simply The Chairman: Thank you both very much indeed.
negotiate with each other to try to come to terms. In You have been enormously helpful and it is very
2005 it proved impossible for either of the main valuable for us to have a broader perspective,
parties to form a coalition in the usual way with particularly from both sides of the Atlantic. Does any
smaller parties. The last resort is that the main parties member of the Committee feel that something they
form a grand coalition. wanted to raise with either Dr Milner or Professor
Padgett has not been covered? Do either of you have
Q80 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: Was that anything that you feel we have ignored or that you
open-ended in duration? particularly wanted to say?
Stephen Padgett: There is no constitutional cut-off Stephen Padgett: No, I think the discussion has been
that makes provision for something happening after very comprehensive and I thank you all for an
a period of incomplete negotiation. interesting discussion.
Henry Milner: In Canada, again, this is the tradition, The Chairman: Thank you very much for giving us so
but it has not been a problem. As in Germany, if there much of your time.
is no obvious successor government, the existing Henry Milner: I congratulate you on putting this kind
government stays in office until some kind of of effort into these questions. Very often, if we get
alternative is formed. If there is no alternative, the things right at the beginning, it has a long and useful
existing government, which would be a minority effect. This is the way to go about doing it.
government, will rule for as long as it can and we The Chairman: Thank you very much for coming.
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24 fixed-term parliaments: evidence

WEDNESDAY 27 OCTOBER 2010

Present Baroness Jay of Paddington Lord Irvine of Lairg

(Chairman) Lord Norton of Louth
Lord Crickhowell Lord Pannick
Baroness Falkner of Margravine Lord Renton of Mount Harry
Lord Goldsmith Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank
Lord Hart of Chilton Lord Shaw of Northstead

Memorandum by the Hansard Society (FTP 16)

1. “Time is the oxygen of Parliament”. So said the now Leader of the House Sir George Young MP in a speech
to the Hansard Society in March 2010, setting out his party’s agenda for parliamentary and legislative reform
and the need for improvements to enable MPs to “undertake scrutiny in a measured and considered manner”.
2. Good scrutiny is an essential prerequisite of good law-making and good governance. However, with the
Fixed Term Parliaments Bill political expediency appears to have taken priority over Parliament’s right to
properly scrutinise the executive. Tackling important constitutional issues in such a rushed manner is not a
recipe for good government and high quality legislation.
3. There has been no prior consultation process—green and white papers—to examine the policy implications
prior to presentation of the bill and there has been no pre-legislative consideration of the bill in draft form.
Given the key issues of constitutional concern the legislation would benefit from greater time and scrutiny. We
recognise that there are serious time pressures with regard to implementation of the government’s proposals
for a referendum and the equalisation of constituencies. However, no such time pressures exist with regard to
the Fixed Term Parliaments Bill and this legislation should therefore have been subject to pre-legislative
scrutiny.
4. This lack of consultation is important and has potentially damaging longer term consequences because the
Fixed Term Parliaments Bill has implications that link to the outcome of the proposals to reform the
constituency boundary review process, to reform the House of Lords and the review of parliamentary
privilege. Consultation and a less accelerated timetable for implementation would have provided for more
coherent consideration of the related constitutional issues and questions that these policy changes throw up.
5. The Hansard Society’s Audit of Political Engagement demonstrates that public interest in and
understanding of the concept of a Fixed Term Parliament and its implications is limited. When asked how well,
if at all, they felt they understood how the date of a general election is chosen, 60% of the public reported either
only a limited level or no understanding at all of the issue, 39% of the public reported being “satisfied” with
the concept of letting the government decide the date for a general election, 23% were “dissatisfied” with the
arrangement, and 38% either had no preference either way or had no view at all on the matter.1
6. However, as a matter of principle, the proposed reduction in the prerogative power and the constraining
of a Prime Minister’s freedom of action with regard to the calling of a general election is to be welcomed.
7. Nonetheless, we have concerns about the Bill as follows:
(a) The fixed parliamentary term should be for four not five years.
(i) Setting the term at five years will turn what has hitherto been the absolute maximum length of
a parliament into the norm. Parliaments which have lasted into a fifth year have tended to be
ones where the Government has, in reality, run out of steam but is waiting on the turn of events in
the hope that something will turn around their flagging poll ratings and likely electoral fortunes.
(ii) Fixing the term at five years rather than four will create a periodic timetabling problem with
regard to elections to the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern
Ireland Assembly. This could be avoided with a different term length. Alternatively, a polling
date later in the year than May might be chosen; however, this is a less attractive option than
having just one national election in any given year.
(b) Members of the governing party might at some future time subvert the spirit of the bill’s intention by
laying down a motion of confidence in themselves in order to trigger an early dissolution. This might
1 Hansard Society (2008), Audit of Political Engagement 5, pp 53–54.
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fixed-term parliaments: evidence 25

be prevented by a restraining measure, such as, for example, providing that such a motion can only
apply to members of an opposition party.
(c) In the event of a no confidence motion being passed there will be a 14 day period when an alternative
government might be formed before a general election is otherwise called. The legislation in effect will
create a new “caretaker” period when the incumbent government that has lost the confidence of the
House nonetheless remains in office until an alternative government can be formed or an election has
to be called. In this 14 day period the same constitutional conventions, particularly in respect of
“purdah”, that apply following the calling of an election or following an uncertain election result,
should apply. This need not be enshrined in the legislation but will necessitate changes to the Cabinet
Manual. At present this falls under the purview of the Cabinet Secretary but should be a matter for
which a minister at the Cabinet Office is held accountable.
8. The introduction of a fixed term should allow for better planning of the legislative timetable and improved
electoral administration.
(a) If a fixed term is introduced then the onus should be on the Government to ensure better management
of the legislative timetable thus avoiding the need for the “wash-up” at the end of each session.
Changes to the parliamentary sessions to better align them with the fixed term should facilitate this
but assurances should be sought from the Government about the management of business in the final
session in order to avoid the problems of the “wash-up”.2
(b) The bill as currently drafted misses an important opportunity to address some of the concerns about
the administration and management of elections, particularly with regard to the statutory timetable,
as set out most recently by the Electoral Commission in its report on the administration of the 2010
general election.
1 October 2010

Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Professor Vernon Bogdanor [Research Professor, King’s College London], and Dr Ruth Fox,
[Director Parliament and Government Programme, Hansard Society].

Q82 The Chairman: Good morning, and thank you what you see as the potential advantages and
both very much for coming. As I said when we met disadvantages of having a fixed-term Parliament. I
outside, we have approximately one hour for this was rather interested in Professor Bogdanor’s
session, in which we obviously need to get through a remarks in paragraph 22 of his paper, where he says,
great deal of material. Thank you both for your “it is not clear to me that it would make a beneficial
background papers, which are very helpful indeed. difference.”
As you will be aware—you are both old hands at this Vernon Bogdanor: Let me begin by saying how glad I
process—this session is being recorded so everything am that the Committee is considering this very
will be on the record and we will conduct the business important constitutional issue. As is well known, the
from the start as a recorded session. I know that we proposal for fixed-term Parliaments was in the
have an understanding about the publication of the Liberal Democrats election manifesto—and, I think,
paper submitted by Professor Bogdanor—I was in the Labour Party manifesto—and its next
about to say Lord Bogdanor, so excuse me for that— manifestation was in the coalition agreement, where
but we understand that point. Given that you have the proposal was not given a constitutional status but
both kindly already provided written remarks, I do implied that the coalition would not dissolve itself
not know whether either of you want to make without the support of both parties. In my view this
opening statements. Perhaps for the record you could proposal raised no constitutional issues. But the
introduce yourselves. Fixed-term Parliaments Bill seeks to introduce an
Vernon Bogdanor: I am Vernon Bogdanor. I am a important change in the constitution. I think it fair to
research professor at King’s College London.
say that one reason why the fixed-term Parliaments
Ruth Fox: I am Dr Ruth Fox. I am Director of the
proposal was included in the election manifestos of
Parliament and Government Programme at the
two parties was as a reaction to the expenses problem.
Hansard Society.
A number of constitutional proposals were produced
in response to that issue, some of which were perhaps
Q83 The Chairman: Thank you. I will kick off by ill thought out. My first reaction was that such a
asking you both—from your written submissions, I proposal is a somewhat perverse response to the
think that you have slightly different views on this— expenses scandal, because the main popular concern
2 For an analysis of reform of the parliamentary “wash-up” see R Fox and M Korris, “Reform of the wash-up: managing the legislative
tidal wave at the end of a Parliament”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol 63, No 3, 2010, pp 558–569.
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about expenses was that there ought to be more generally fixed for a four or five-year period means
popular control over Members of Parliament, who that having an earlier election is necessarily a bad
had become perhaps too insulated from public thing. I do not think that having an earlier general
opinion. Proposals such as the recall of MPs were election needs to be seen as axiomatically a bad thing.
designed to deal with that. However, the fixed-term My problem with the Bill—and with the approach
Parliaments proposal would achieve the opposite that has been taken to a large extent—is that, in some
effect, because it would tend to insulate Members of ways, the proposal is a missed opportunity because it
Parliament from popular pressures. That seems to me focuses the mind very much on the end of the term
a point worth noting. Another point worth noting is and on ways to bring about an early dissolution if
whether the constitution should be changed in this such a thing is required. However, a term has both a
rather hurried way without very much discussion. As beginning and an end. If the Bill had been handled
I say in my written submission, the only Western differently with a different timescale to allow for
European country with a parliamentary system that greater consideration, an awful lot more could have
has a pure fixed-term Parliament is Norway. Any been done to address some of the planning and
change to that system in Norway requires that one timetabling issues that having a fixed term would
first produce a proposal and then, following a general enable us to fix. Having that planning capacity would
election, secure a two-thirds majority on it. That is, of enable us to address some of the issues that arise at
course, very different from our own procedures. It the beginning of the term. The current Bill does not
may be that we need a change in our constitutional do that.
rules or a change in our constitution in general if, as The Chairman: Thank you. Lord Rodgers wants to
is possible, we are moving away from a period of pursue the question about the process of introducing
having a single-party majority government, which the proposal.
has been the norm since the war but was not the norm
between the wars, when we had minority
Q84 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: If I may, I would
governments and coalitions. It is possible that we
like to look back at the history of the issue and at
may be moving towards a multi-party system. If that previous practice. In paragraph 3 of his written
is the case, we will have regular hung Parliaments and submission, Professor Bogdanor suggests why the
it may be that we should develop new constitutional coalition might have dreamt up—although he does
rules. However, I am not clear that the current not use that phrase—the idea of introducing fixed-
proposal is the way to do that. I cannot see that the term Parliaments. Will he say a word or two about the
proposals that have been produced, which are fairly history of that? When the proposal suddenly popped
ambiguous in some ways, will necessarily provide up, I assumed that it had been discussed frequently in
much in the way of improvement. the past, but I cannot remember that. I have never
The Chairman: We will certainly come back to the read manifestos, but I do not think that it has
process of achieving constitutional change. However, featured in many manifestos in the past. Some history
I want to ask Dr Fox first for her overview on fixed- on that would be helpful. In the same context—
term Parliaments, however those might have been again, this is not mentioned in the written
introduced. submission, so I may be putting words in his mouth—
Ruth Fox: Building on Vernon Bogdanor’s point the coalition argues that we should move from the
about the fixed-term Parliaments proposal being a Executive to Parliament and from Parliament to
response to the broader political crisis post the people. The written submission points out that there
expenses issue, I would endorse that and point out have been 18 Parliaments since 1945. If we had had
that many of the constitutional, political and fixed-term Parliaments of five years, we would only
parliamentary reforms that have been proposed have have had 14. How would that be reconciled? I have a
had very little to do with resolving the expenses crisis. further specific two questions, if I am allowed, the
The link between the two issues has been somewhat first of which is on the consequences of having fixed-
tenuous. Certainly, looking at priorities of the public term Parliaments. Given the reference in Professor
for political and constitutional reform—as I Bogdanor’s paper to “hypothetical circumstances”, I
highlight in my written submission to the wonder if we had had a fixed-term Parliament in 1950
Committee—I think that our annual Audit of or 1951—it is very difficult to tell, of course, but the
Political Engagement study suggests that there is little submission reflects on this—what would have
public interest in addressing fixed-term Parliaments happened at that time. As the paper says, the early
as a priority. On the general principle of fixed-term dissolution in 1951 was a very unusual case in that
Parliaments, I think that there is something to be said Attlee resigned and gave up. If a Prime Minister gave
for introducing a restraint on the prerogative power up in that way, could an early general election
and on the ability of a partisan Prime Minister to fix happen? My second question, if I may, is on the
the date of the election. However, I am not sure that reference that the written submission makes to Prime
moving to a system in which Parliaments are Ministers seeking a “personal mandate”. Why do we
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not have a fixed—that is, obliged—personal mandate majority of the public but nearly a majority—when
and always have an election whenever a Prime Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair as Prime
Minister changes? As the submission points out, Minister in 2007. I do not think that the issue arose
there may be a change not only of individuals but of when John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher in
policies, which may undergo very significant 1990 or when James Callaghan replaced Harold
changes. Why do we not have a new Parliament when Wilson in 1976. Perhaps the issue arose in 2007
we change Prime Minister? because our politics has become more presidential
Vernon Bogdanor: There were a number of questions than it was. People seem to think that the colour of a
there, which I will do my best to answer. On the government depends much more on the Prime
history of the proposals for fixed-term Parliaments, I Minister than was the case formerly. It is interesting
understand that the Liberal Democrats have long to note that shortly before the election, David
taken the view that there should be fixed-term Cameron put forward a proposal similar to what
Parliaments, which they see as a corollary of Lord Rodgers has suggested when he said that a new
proportional representation something that they Prime Minister ought to be required to go to the
have favoured for a long time. Of course, the issue country within six months of taking office. Of course,
came up after the general election because the Liberal there is no provision in the Bill for that suggestion,
Democrats were naturally worried that, if they but I think that it is well worth considering. Another
entered into a coalition with the Conservatives, a issue, of course, was that some people thought that
Conservative Prime Minister might dissolve the the Labour Party might do better under a different
coalition at an unwelcome time for the Liberal Prime Minister than Gordon Brown between 2007
Democrats in the hope that the Conservatives could and 2010, but they were deterred from securing that
then win an absolute majority. Therefore, part of the change because it was argued that, if there is to be a
coalition agreement was that Parliament could be second non-elected Prime Minister within the same
dissolved only if 55 per cent of the MPs agreed, which Parliament, one really ought to go to the country to
in practice would require the agreement of both the get approval for it. That has never happened in the
Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs, because if 20th century, apart from during the odd conditions of
the Liberal Democrats switched to a different wartime in 1940, when there was a second change of
coalition, the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Prime Minister in the same Parliament. However, if
Party would not be able to achieve the necessary 55 we are moving into a hung Parliament situation, it is
per cent. In effect, the coalition agreement gave the much more likely that we will get a change of Prime
Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives the choice Minister within the same Parliament. As I said, a
of when to dissolve Parliament and included an deterrent to changing the leader of the Labour Party
assurance to the Liberal Democrats that the coalition was the idea that the Government would have to go
could not be dissolved against their wishes. However, to the country immediately, perhaps at a time when
after various criticisms, that became transmuted into the Labour Party was not very popular. I think that
the form in which it now appears in the Bill. That is the proposal that a new Prime Minister should seek a
the history of it. On the issue of the 1950–51 mandate deserves further consideration.
Parliament, which raises a very fundamental
question, I think that Attlee took the view that the Q85 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: I have a further
Parliament was not viable. He had an overall brief question on the pre-history of the proposal. In
majority of five, and his position had been weakened effect, until the past six months, has there been no
by the resignation of two Cabinet Ministers, Aneurin serious constitutional discussion on fixed-term
Bevan and Harold Wilson, who disagreed with the Parliaments over the past, say, 50 years or more?
spring 1951 budget. He dissolved the Parliament in Vernon Bogdanor: That is right. Primarily, the
the hope, obviously, that he would get a working proposal has been made by the Liberal Democrats,
majority, but he was doubtless aware that he might be which has been the minority party, and the idea has
defeated. With a fixed-term Parliament, it is not clear been associated with proportional representation,
that he could have done that. Therefore, a lame-duck which has not really been at the forefront of the
Parliament and government would have had to have political agenda.
hobbled on. That is the danger of provisions that Ruth Fox: I slightly disagree with that. The Liberal
would make it more difficult to dissolve Parliament. Democrats have been at the forefront in promoting
I believe that this is a fundamental point: the more the proposal, but my understanding is—I do not have
difficult it is to dissolve Parliament, the more likely it the dates to hand—that the proposal has been in the
is that there will be a lame-duck government, which, Labour Party manifesto previously. I do not think
even if it can survive in Parliament, cannot govern that the proposal appeared in the 1997 manifesto, but
very effectively. I think that was the problem in 1951. it has appeared previously. I think that I am also right
On the question of having a personal mandate, I in saying that the idea was an aspect of major study of
think that issue arose among the public—not quite a the Plant commission in the late 1980s or early 1990s.
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Therefore, fixed-term Parliaments has been a running start worrying about the election at the end of the
issue in Labour Party discussions, although it did not third year and already start to think at that time
make it into Labour’s constitutional programme about which bills should be introduced in the third
when the party was in government. I understand that year and which should be kept until the fourth year
the Labour Party is supportive of the idea in that might be attractive to the electorate and do the
principle. The Conservative Party has previously party some good at the last moment. For that reason
resisted the proposal, although, as Vernon Bogdanor as much as any, I would go—probably contrary to
has alluded to, David Cameron expressed an interest many of my colleagues around the table—with a
in the constitutional position of the Prime Minister in fixed five years. In the third of its five years, a
the context of the politics of the previous Parliament. Government will feel absolutely safe and will
introduce bills that it knows will be difficult and
Q86 Baroness Falkner of Margravine: In addition to unpopular and it need not start worrying about the
what Dr Fox has said, there have also been private election and about introducing popular bills and so
members’ bills on the subject in Parliament. For forth for another year. I think that that is a very valid
example, Dr Tony Wright was not a Liberal argument for having a fixed five-year Parliament.
Democrat. He was a senior constitutional expert. I Your comments, please.
seek a bit of clarification. As I understand the Liberal Ruth Fox: On the length of the term, my preference is
Democrats’ policy, the fixed-term Parliaments for four years. Since 1945, there have been a number
proposal was not tied into proportional of Parliaments of four years and of five years, as well
representation as closely as has been suggested by as a number that have been for four and a half years. I
Professor Bogdanor. As I saw it, there was a do not get too hung up on the issue. I take that point,
constitutional bundle, of which fixed-term which arises from experience in government, but I
Parliaments was one aspect. On that basis, there has suspect that the perception from outside would
been an unbundling and a take-what-you-like or probably be somewhat different. I also think that the
take-what-is-feasible approach has been taken. Of issue probably matters less than it would have done
course, there is also movement towards a different 20 years ago because, to all intents and purposes, we
electoral system. live in the age of the permanent campaign. Election
Vernon Bogdanor: Of course I accept that point, but campaigns do not kick off just a month before the
the notion of a fixed-term Parliament takes on a very election date in the way that might have been the case
different character in the context of proportional 20, 30 or 40 years ago. The nature of campaigning has
representation. That is why I think that analogies changed and the nature of how parties approach
from Norway and Germany are not terribly relevant. those things has changed, so I think that the issue is
With proportional representation, a dissolution possibly less important. I think that there has been a
offers much less advantage because it is very unlikely consensus around terms of four years. For example,
that a party will win an overall majority. Overall the history—I refer to previous private members’
majorities are not very likely with proportional bills, the Plant commission and so on—suggests a
representation—for example, there has never been a general consensus around four-year terms. In
party with an overall majority in the Scottish addition, other parliamentary systems around the
Parliament—so the advantage to be gained from an world tend to have a term of four years rather than
early dissolution is much less. With a majoritarian five. To my mind, the deciding factor, in the event of
system, such as our current first-past-the-post system a split in political opinion over whether the term
or even possibly the alternative vote system, there should be of four years or five, is the danger that
may be much greater advantage to be gained from a people might perceive five years as being in the
dissolution. I think that the idea takes on a different partisan interests of the current Government,
colouring with proportional representation. because of what the Government want to achieve in
The Chairman: That brings us to the question of the getting through their economic measures and
length of time of the fixed-term Parliament. establishing stability and so on. There is a risk that, if
there is no political consensus on the issue, the length
Q87 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: Dr Fox’s of the term could become a driving point for future
evidence on behalf of the Hansard Society makes the reform of the legislation and would actually create
following point very strongly: “Parliaments which the opportunity for Members to revisit the issue quite
have lasted into a fifth year have tended to be ones quickly. My preference would be that such
where the Government has, in reality, run out of constitutional matters should be introduced on a
steam but is waiting on the turn of events”. Speaking consensual basis, so that we do not create those
as someone who, in the House of Commons over strategic driving points to which Members can keep
many years, saw both four-year and five-year coming back to the issue for further revision. I am not
Parliaments, I confess that I take a totally different too hung up on the length of the term—there are pros
view. With a four-year Parliament, the Government and cons either way—as it comes down to a matter of
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preference. However, for those reasons, I would go together an alternative. One pictures deals being
for four years. done with the Irish or the Welsh or the Scots, in
The Chairman: Professor Bogdanor, do you want to various combinations, to allow a weaker
add anything? government—of the kind to which Professor
Vernon Bogdanor: No, I share Dr Fox’s view. Bogdanor refers in Attlee’s situation—to soldier on
without allowing the people to have their say. To me,
the simple issue with the Bill is that it could weaken,
Q88 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: I want to ask rather than strengthen, the role of the people.
about one other point first. Does the availability of Vernon Bogdanor: Yes, I very much agree with those
information on the internet make a difference? With comments. In the event of a hung Parliament, there
the internet, it is very much easier for the ordinary can be a conflict between two principles: the principle
citizen to find out what is happening. I am not of parliamentary government whereby the
necessarily saying that that makes a five-year government is accountable to Parliament and the
Parliament more likely than a four-year Parliament. principle of democracy whereby a government is
I am interested in your view about how the internet accountable to the people. Normally, in the single-
will affect, for example, what constituents think party majority governments that we have had since
about their MP. the war, those principles coincide. Where there is a
Ruth Fox: The question probably ought to be put to conflict—my perspective is very similar to Lord
my colleague who is head of the digital democracy Crickhowell’s—I think that accountability to the
programme at the Hansard Society—he would be people should be the prime factor. We ought to be
able to advise better than I can—but I would not careful before doing anything that weakens the
overstate the influence of the internet on politics, ability of a government to govern effectively.
elections and so on. Parliament’s website is very
good, but who it reaches is perhaps an issue. The
Q90 Lord Crickhowell: Thank you. That strengthens
reality is that that most people still get their political the view that I have been forming throughout. Let me
news via the TV, newspapers and so on. In a sense, come to my specific question. A five-year term will
one problem that we will come up against in result in a clash with the elections of the devolved
responding to the attitudes of the public is that the Administrations in 2015 and every 20 years
media and communications mechanisms are driving thereafter. That is an interesting clash in respect of
a very personalised and therefore presidential style or involving the people. Certainly, the view of the
approach to politics, which requires a robust chief devolved Administrations is that discussion of their
executive leader figure at the head. That might come performance, their record and their policies will be
increasingly in collision with the realities of overwhelmed by the arguments about the national
parliamentary politics in an age of hung Parliaments. situation. Is it desirable to separate those out to deal
Culturally and politically, there is the potential for with that linkage?
clash there. I do not think that the internet and other Ruth Fox: Ideally, yes. The danger is that we could
media mechanisms necessarily provide ways in which end up in a situation in which—although to put the
that can be resolved. matter in perspective, this would happen only every
The Chairman: Coming back to the present Bill and 20 years—a number of different elections take place
the proposal for five-year terms, we have received on different dates within the same year. Although I
evidence about issues such as the clash of dates. I am all in favour of accountability to the public, I am
think that Lord Crickhowell wants to ask about that. not sure that the public would be terribly in favour of
having to go to the polls for a general election, for a
Scottish Parliament election and for Scottish local
Q89 Lord Crickhowell: Before I ask my two elections. Clearly, some political and administrative
questions on that issue, I must say that the most difficulties could arise. The electoral returning
important issue from all the evidence that I have officers have already made clear that, from their
heard so far is the point that is raised in the final perspective, running two elections on the same day
paragraph of Professor Bogdanor’s paper, which with different timetables and different constituencies
asks whether the proposal will make Government would cause some problems. Another issue is how the
more answerable to the people. Professor Bogdanor Scottish Parliament and the Scottish people perceive
cites the example of the Attlee Government; in the respect that this place has, and that the
previous witness sessions, I have cited the event that Government has, for the devolved settlement. I have
made me a Minister in 1979, following the defeat, by difficulties with some solutions that have been
one vote, of the Callaghan Administration. suggested. For example, it has been suggested that
Callaghan immediately said, “I am going to have an the general election date could be moved to October,
election”. Under the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, we but I am not convinced that that is a great idea. I
will have 14 days for someone to try to cobble cannot claim any credit for this, but I know—from
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chairing a fringe meeting at the Scottish National Q93 Vernon Bogdanor: The premise behind the
Party conference in Perth a couple of weeks ago— question, if I may say so, is that the Bill is the Fixed-
that Professor John Curtice has suggested that the term Parliaments Bill, but the title is really a
issue of respect for the Scottish Parliament elections, misnomer. If in a particular Parliament—I admit that
which has come up in the context both of this Bill and this is unlikely—there is a two-thirds vote in favour
of the Parliamentary Voting System and of dissolution or a vote of no confidence, the cycle
Constituencies Bill, could be dealt with by allowing would be upset unless the Swedish system is adopted,
the Scottish Parliament to agree to the general as in Scotland, whereby such an election is deemed an
election date that the Bill proposes if, in return, the extraordinary general election so that the cycle is still
Scottish Parliament could hold the Scottish maintained. There is some ambiguity about whether
Parliament elections on a date of its choosing. At the that is what should be achieved. The title “Fixed-term
moment, under the Scotland Act 1998, the date of Parliaments Bill” is a misnomer—I do not know what
Scottish Parliament elections is determined by would be a good title—for that would mean that, as
Westminster. A small amendment could be made to in Norway, the Parliament simply could not be
the Bill to insert a new clause amending the Scotland dissolved at any time. As I said, Norway is the only
Act to enable the Scottish Parliament to determine country in Western Europe that has that.
the date of its elections. Professor John Curtice made
a fairly compelling case that the Scottish Parliament Q94 The Chairman: An additional question is
elections could be moved to October because of the whether the Bill is a normal piece of legislation that
nature of that Parliament’s arrangements. Given that does not bind a future Parliament.
the Scottish Parliament elections in May can be Vernon Bogdanor: Indeed. My understanding is that
followed by a period of up to 28 days for the the legislation could be repealed by a simple majority.
formation of a government, and given that the school I do not know whether the constitutionalists would
holidays—and, therefore, the recess dates—are agree with that. Otherwise, one could presumably
earlier, there is currently a very constrained period repeal the legislation in two stages by first repealing
before the summer recess. the requirement for the two-thirds majority for
Lord Renton of Mount Harry: It is snowing in dissolution and then dissolving by simple majority. I
Scotland by October. cannot believe that in practice the legislation would
Ruth Fox: Well, there seemed to be some enthusiasm necessarily bind another Parliament.
for the proposal. However, that would require an
amendment to the Scotland Act. There are pros and
Q95 Lord Crickhowell: The present Government
cons either way. At some point, there will be a clash
have extended the current session until Easter 2012.
of elections unless the dates are separated out.
Do you have any comment on the constitutional
implications of that?
Q91 Lord Crickhowell: Professor Bogdanor, do you Ruth Fox: On the sessional arrangements, I am quite
have a view? relaxed about that. Scrutiny is needed when there is a
Vernon Bogdanor: I agree very much with what Dr tidal wave of legislation as a result of the pressure of
Fox has said. I do not feel as strongly as she does that cut-off. As we do not have a culture of sessional
we should not have general elections in October, if carryover—although carryover is available to the
that is what the politicians opt for. When general Government, it has not happened on the scale
elections have coincided with local government anticipated—there is a sense that legislation is
elections, some people in local government have rammed through because of the sessional cut-off.
welcomed that because it means that turnout for the Enabling better planning and longer-term thinking
local government elections is higher than it would be would be one advantage of having fixed-term
otherwise. Parliaments, so I have no problem with facilitating
that. Clearly, moving to a five-year timeframe would
require some regularisation of the sessional pattern.
Q92 Lord Crickhowell: That takes us very neatly to Clearly, the first Queen’s Speech is important, but
my next question. The proposal is that the general there is an argument to be had about whether
election should have a fixed date of the first Thursday successive Queen’s Speeches are an effective tool for
in May, which we would all need to get used to. Is that scrutinising the Government’s legislative
a good idea? I have not worked this out, but would programme, given that the Government will bring
an election in May followed by a summer recess have forward legislation that was not in the Queen’s
some practical implications for Government, given Speech. In addition, we know from our research that
that MPs need to go into a long period of recess Government will often treat the Queen’s Speech
before they come back? What are the pros and cons simply as a communications tool to establish a
of having a fixed election date of the first Thursday narrative about the Government, with the actual
in May? legislation in the speech being to some extent
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secondary. Certainly, in research that we did last year, there ought to have been pre-legislative scrutiny.
in which Lord Norton was involved, we heard tales There ought to have been a much more extended
from special advisers that a Government department timetable given the implications and consequences
that did not have legislation in the Queen’s Speech that would arise. Parliament Act implications would
was called up and told, “Where is your bill? You must obviously have to come into that.
have a bill in the Queen’s Speech”. It then had to The Chairman: We have briefly touched on the safety
create a bill. In terms of good planning, of good valve mechanism of early dissolution, but do you
approaches to legislation and of improving the want to pursue that, Lord Pannick?
quality of law, I think that there are some advantages
to what the Government have suggested. I would be
Q96 Lord Pannick: Can I follow up on Professor
quite radical and ask why we need to have a sessional
Bogdanor’s point that the title of the Bill is a
approach. Why do we not take the approach of, say,
misnomer? Can I ask you both about the purpose of
Scotland, where the session runs through?
the two-thirds provision for early elections? Plainly, if
Vernon Bogdanor: If I may, let me say that the
the opposition wish to secure an early election, they
constitution and procedures of Parliament do not
will use a 50 per cent !1 mechanism, which is easy to
belong to any particular political party or
achieve. If we believe in fixed-term Parliaments, and
government, and it is not clear that they should be
I appreciate that we may not for all the reasons that
altered in this way. There is a great contrast between
Professor Bogdanor has eloquently given, is it really
the constitutional reforms after 1997, which were by
right that the government should be able to secure an
no means the product of consensus in the sense that
early election when they retain the confidence of
all parties agreed with them, but had nevertheless
Parliament?
been the product of a long period of debate and
Vernon Bogdanor: The two-thirds provision allows a
discussion. Partly that was because the Labour Party
government with a landslide majority, such as the
had been so long in opposition, but even after 1997
National Government of 1931, to secure an election
there was a period of gestation before the proposals
whenever they like. I cannot see why a government
reached the statute book. The one case in which that with a landslide should have that extra privilege. It
did not happen was the Constitutional Reform Bill of seems very peculiar that a normal government, if you
2005, but there were nevertheless many amendments call it that, cannot dissolve when it likes, but the
made to the original provisions precisely because they National Government of 1931 could dissolve when
were criticised as being knee-jerk proposals. In my they wished. The argument against a government
judgment—I hope that I am not making a party- dissolving when they wished to do so is that they can
political point here—the procedure of constitutional somehow manipulate the economy or choose a
reform after 1997 was better thought through than favourable moment when they are doing well in the
some of the things that we are seeing today. opinion polls to go to the country early. As I said in
The Chairman: Could I just go back to Dr Fox’s point my evidence, that has arguably occurred on six
about the extension of the session? Some of the occasions since the war. On one, in 1970, the
implications in terms of the House of Lords are the Government miscalculated and lost the election. On
ability to use the Parliament Act. the other five occasions it is difficult to argue that,
Ruth Fox: I accept that. That would need to be even if the Government had gone on to the end of
resolved. It goes to Vernon’s point about the fact that their term, they would have been defeated, though
these matters do not belong to one political party and obviously that is a matter of speculative judgment. In
the need for greater consideration. In a critique of the my view, that disadvantage to dissolving early is
Government from an administrative point of view, in outweighed by the serious disadvantages of a fixed-
a position of improving the quality of law, there are term Parliament, prevents Prime Ministers leading a
some advantages to the longer session. But I take the government in an unviable Parliament from going to
point that, in terms of how these things are developed the country, and prevents a newly chosen Prime
and thought-out, there needs to be a more consensual Minister between Parliaments from going to the
approach. The fact that the Government announced country, which prevents a Prime Minister who has a
the changes in the sessional arrangements much later new policy for which he may seek a mandate from
than when they announced the Bill suggested an ad going to the country. Most importantly of all,
hoc and ill thought-out approach to the because we could be moving into an era of hung
consequences of what they had brought forward Parliaments, it means that coalitions can change in
initially. They had not thought it through at the the middle of a Parliament without the people being
beginning and set it all out. If you chart from the allowed to pronounce on it. Some criticise the present
summer the way in which they have brought forward coalition because it was not endorsed by the voters in
various announcements on how things have changed the election. The voters had no chance to endorse it.
about this legislation, that reflects the fact that it is ad The voters might be even more annoyed if at some
hoc and ill thought-out and goes to the point that time the Liberal Democrats decide to join with the
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Labour Party to form a different coalition which, rump of what is left or should we reset the clock and
again, the voters under these proposals would have have another five-year term, or whatever the fixed
no chance of endorsing. In my judgment, the balance term is?
of argument is against fixed-term Parliaments. The Vernon Bogdanor: That depends on what you think
disadvantage of our current system is that it allows the advantages of fixed-term Parliaments are and
Prime Ministers to choose a moment for dissolution, your own judgment of the balance of advantage. If
but the benefits that it gives the Prime Minister are you are sympathetic to fixed-term Parliaments, you
exaggerated and the disadvantages of fixed-term will say that the clock should not be reset. If, like me,
Parliaments are much greater than the disadvantages you are not very sympathetic, you would say that the
of our current system. I hope that meets the point that clock should be reset.
you were seeking to clarify.
The Chairman: We then move on from the dissolution Q100 Lord Goldsmith: I want to press a little on the
point to the vote of confidence point. 14 days. Professor Bogdanor, you have said
something about this already. There are two extreme
Q97 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: This is a totally situations about what happens during the 14 days.
fascinating conversation. You just said that you One is that the government of the day manage to do
actually prefer not to have fixed-term Parliaments, a bit more in terms of offers of jobs, promises or deals
but something else. Having been in the Commons for on policies and therefore get back to a position where
quite a long time, one realises that it all depends on broadly the same government can come back in and
the Prime Minister and the team around him, because get a no confidence vote reversed, as it were. That
the strength of feeling at that point is so great. We would work under the Act, so we would not have a
come to Clause 2 and the second safety valve. What dissolution. The other extreme is that that can’t be
you think about that? Is there a danger of it being done, and you have an entirely different grouping—
manipulated by governments seeking to bring about Liberal Democrats and Labour or whatever it may
an early election, as occurred in Germany in 2005, for be—producing an entirely different coalition that the
instance? How can that be prevented? I doubt that it people have not voted for. How does that fit within
can be prevented. the concept that this is all designed partly to give
Vernon Bogdanor: I doubt that it can be prevented. more power back to the people?
Governments have dissolved early in that way in Vernon Bogdanor: I don’t think that it does fit with
Germany on three occasions. In 2005, the that idea. I share Lord Crickhowell’s earlier
Government miscalculated because they called an reservations about the 14-day clause. My
early election and lost. On the other two occasions, it understanding is that if the government are defeated
worked and the Government won the election. on a vote of confidence they can only be a caretaker
government until they have parliamentary
Q98 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: You were quite confidence again, if they secure it, and therefore
right in saying that the Labour Government could not undertake controversial measures. Of
miscalculated in 1970. They certainly expected to win course, it means that for 14 days you do not have an
and didn’t. effective government while parliamentary
Vernon Bogdanor: It is difficult to prevent manoeuvring is going on to see if some alternative
manipulation, but you can make it less advantageous combination is possible. I much prefer the situation,
by adopting what you might call the Swedish or as in 1979, when James Callaghan was defeated on a
Scottish model, by which any election that comes vote of confidence. He immediately said, “We will
about between terms is an extraordinary general take our case to the country and let the country
election and does not affect the timetable. In Sweden, decide”. Under the current situation, it is possible for
you have four-year elections. If there is an election an alternative government to be found in those
between then it does not affect the cycle, and that is circumstances. That happened in 1924, when the first
the case in Scotland also. As I said earlier, the MacDonald minority Labour Government were
advantage of calling an early election is much less in a defeated. The King’s private secretary enquired of the
proportional system than in the system that we have. other parliamentary leaders whether they were
The Chairman: Lord Hart, I think you were prepared to form a government and only when he was
concerned about early dissolution. told that they weren’t was a dissolution granted. If
one of them had been, that alternative would have
Q99 Lord Hart of Chilton: Let us assume that we been perfectly possible under our present
have a fixed-term Parliament and there is a constitution.
dissolution. There will either be a dissolution on a
vote of no confidence or on the two-thirds vote. This Q101 Lord Goldsmith: Thank you. Can I just pursue
question, which you touched on earlier, relates to the question of what happens in those 14 days? Dr
what the subsequent term should be. Should it be the Fox, you say that during that period the same
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constitutional convention should apply as in the run- Ruth Fox: That is the difficulty. How do you define a
up to an election. What would you see happening confidence motion in the sense that there is no formal
during that 14 days in terms of government managing definition of it? It depends on political context. It is
to operate? one of those things where you know it when you see
Vernon Bogdanor: My understanding of our system is it. The wording of the Bill very clearly defines it as no
that if a government has lost the confidence of confidence. Therefore, it is hard to see how the
Parliament, they can only undertake non- government would bring forward a motion of no
controversial matters. Anything that has any confidence in themselves. I do not know enough
controversial flavour must be agreed with the procedurally about whether this would be possible,
opposition. but a government back-bencher could bring forward
The Chairman: A purdah requirement. a motion of no confidence in their own government,
Vernon Bogdanor: Precisely. but that would seem perverse. The wording of the Bill
Ruth Fox: I agree that that is the constitutional suggests that it would come only from the opposition.
convention, but this is where we may rub up against The danger of the situation is that if the Queen’s
some potential difficulties vis-à-vis the constitutional Speech, the Budget or the second reading of a
status of the Cabinet Manual. Chapter 6 of the manifesto bill were perceived to be an issue of
Cabinet Manual, which was published in draft form confidence, and then a no confidence vote came
before the election, makes clear that convention, but forward. It would not necessarily come from the
there is no reference to that in terms of what would opposition because it might be in their political
happen in the event of an early dissolution or this 14- interest to maintain the perception of a lame duck
day scenario. In my view, if that is going to be the government for an extended period.
operational document in government and Whitehall,
the Cabinet Manual will have to be amended very Q104 The Chairman: Professor Bogdanor, do you
clearly to that effect. In practice, yes, the caretaker want to comment on the constructive no confidence
convention should apply. What would that mean? arrangements in Germany?
The government could not sign large financial Vernon Bogdanor: Yes. It seems to me not very helpful
contracts or make major public appointments. In the and has been used on two occasions in Germany for
five-day period after the general election in May, purposes quite different from those imagined by the
Alistair Darling went to the ECOFIN meeting about founding fathers of the German constitution. The
the Greek economic situation and Lord Adonis constructive vote of no confidence provides that you
consulted the Opposition about air traffic control cannot simply have a no confidence vote in the
problems. There would have to be inter-party government, but must propose an alternative Prime
consultation about any decisions that Ministers felt Minister. The purpose of that was to meet the
they had to take in order to manage what was deemed situation that occurred at the end of the Weimar
to be essential business. All non-essential business Republic, particularly after 1930, when governments
would effectively be put on hold. It needs to be were removed by an unholy opposition combination
clarified in the Cabinet Manual. of Nazis and Communists, who themselves would
not get together to form a government. The notion is
Q102 Lord Pannick: Do you think that the Bill needs somewhat confused, because you either have a two-
to define more precisely what is a vote of no party or bipolar situation in a Parliament, in which
confidence? For example, does it cover defeat on the case the alternative government is obvious; or you
Queen’s Speech, defeat on a matter that the have a multi-party system in which there is no
government have designated a question of confidence obvious alternative government. In a multi-party
or do you understand it only to apply to an express system, the effect of the constructive vote of no
motion of no confidence? confidence is to allow a weak government to hobble
Vernon Bogdanor: I suppose it is always possible for a on when it hasn’t got the support of Parliament. In
government, when defeated on a major issue—the that situation, I prefer a dissolution of Parliament to
Budget, for example—to demand a vote of let the people decide what the alternative government
confidence from Parliament. That is what John should be. I don’t think that the idea of a constructive
Major did in 1993, when defeated, I think, on the vote of no confidence has as much value in Germany
social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. He then as the founding fathers would have hoped, and I
demanded a vote of no confidence, which he secured. don’t think it would have much value here either.
That would always clarify the position.
The Chairman: A vote of confidence. Q105 Lord Shaw of Northstead: In the Professor’s
Vernon Bogdanor: Yes, a vote of confidence. report, at paragraph 27, he says that the Fixed-term
Parliaments Bill, “indicates a conflict between two
Q103 Lord Pannick: Does it cover a motion of fundamental principles, the principle of
confidence? It says here, a motion of no confidence. parliamentary government and the principle of
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democratic government. The former principle Ruth Fox: I don’t think you need worry about it in the
provides that parliament shall choose the context of the current Monarch, but you can’t know
government, the second that the people should the views of future Monarchs in a scenario 40 or 50
choose the government”. I take issue on the subject of years down the line. It is something that could be
the election of the Prime Minister. I can see the point addressed. The fear is that you have a no confidence
of going to the country if it is a realignment of a multi- motion and then you have these 14 days. I have issues
party government, but that is very different from a about where the 14 days came from. I haven’t seen
change of leader. Surely it is right that the people elect anything from the Government that explains exactly
Members of Parliament to govern and the party there how they came up with 14 days, but there we are. In
chooses its own leader. That should be paramount. the 14-day period, you have the opportunity for a
You should not have to go to the country every time government to try to be formed and then there would
you want to change a leader. Is that not a clear have to be another confidence motion in that
distinction and should it not be drawn in the Bill government. It seems to me that you could put in the
itself? Bill a restraining power to the effect that if a no
Vernon Bogdanor: Your question reflects the confidence motion has been approved, in that 14-day
constitutional practice until now. That is of course scenario that prerogative power could not be applied.
correct. But as I said earlier, there was some feeling in You could not use it, so the Monarch would not have
the country—opinion polls suggested that it was not the discretionary power to take up the request from
the Prime Minister to prorogue. It would not be on
a majority feeling—that Gordon Brown ought to go
the table.
to the country in 2007, having become leader. That
was not felt on previous occasions when, for example,
John Major succeeded Margaret Thatcher or James Q108 Lord Norton of Louth: The problem would not
Callaghan succeeded Harold Wilson. It may be that necessarily be who the Monarch was, but who the
opinion in the country is changing because people Prime Minister was.
feel that we are moving towards a presidential system Ruth Fox: Indeed. A combination of both,
and that we are voting not for a Labour, Liberal potentially.
Democrat or Conservative government but for Vernon Bogdanor: In the circumstances outlined by
David Cameron, Nick Clegg or Ed Miliband for Lord Norton, a wise constitutional Monarch would
Prime Minister. This is a difficult matter to resolve, wait, if asked for prorogation. A wise constitutional
because the mood may be changing. On the broader monarch would say, “My Prime Minister has the
point, at every general election since the war except authority to advise me or to ask for a prorogation as
this one and February 1974, the people have voted long as he has the support of Parliament, but not
for a government and Prime Minister. In 2005, they otherwise”.
voted for a Labour government led by Tony Blair The Chairman: Does that answer the point that you
rather than a Conservative government led by wanted to make Lord Norton? Was there an
Michael Howard. It is difficult to say the same about additional question on the House of Lords?
the election of 2010. Were you to have a change of
coalition partners it may be even more difficult to say
Q109 Lord Norton of Louth: Separate from that, do
that. There is a difference between a general election
you envisage a role for the House of Lords in any
that does not yield a majority for a single party and a
parliamentary fixed term or, for that matter, any
general election that does yield such a majority.
early dissolution arrangements?
Vernon Bogdanor: The Wakeham Royal Commission,
Q106 Lord Shaw of Northstead: But that is not clear if I remember rightly, was against any such role for
in the Bill. the House of Lords. I’m not sure that it was correct
Vernon Bogdanor: No, indeed. about that. The House of Lords already has a
The Chairman: Lord Norton, would you like to ask constitutional role in preventing the Commons from
about the constitutional Monarchy and the question extending its own life. The Parliament Acts do not
of the prerogative? apply in relation to such a provision. There might
well be one or two other fundamental constitutional
provisions that you should not allow a majority in the
Q107 Lord Norton of Louth: This is really on the House of Commons to override. That obviously
power of prorogation, because there is nothing in the raises large questions because the matters in this Bill
Bill. There was the incident in Canada, where might not be the only ones. It seems to be a matter for
prorogation was used to prevent a vote of no further consideration whether we need stronger
confidence occurring. We have been told that that constitutional protection than we have on matters
was a one-off and we should not worry about it, but other than extending the life of the House of
should we worry about it? Commons.
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Lord Norton of Louth: Presumably, the only role the Ruth Fox: I agree. It goes to the heart of the problem
House would have if this were passed would be an with the legislation, the way that it is being pushed
attempt by a future government to amend the through and the timetabling. An awful lot more time
legislation. Obviously, the Lords would have a role in and detailed consideration could have been given to it.
the normal legislative process, but that would be it. I said at the beginning that I think there is a missed
The Chairman: In the substantive questions that the opportunity in this Bill in thinking through the nature
Committee indicated that it wanted to talk to you both of the term. So much of the focus of the Bill is on the
about, we have probably covered most of the ground. end of the term—the date of the end of the term and the
Do other members of the Committee have points that emergency valve for dissolution. One of the core
they feel have not been addressed? advantages of having a term is that you can plan and
have a longer-term approach. You also need to think
about issues right from the beginning of the term. One
Q110 Lord Norton of Louth: I just want to pick up on issue we have not mentioned is that the dissolution
a point that Professor Bogdanor made in his power is a prerogative power, but the Bill does not
submission, because it raised an interesting spectre. In address the summoning power for the date of the first
paragraph 5, you say at the end: “It is, however, not meeting of the Parliament. You then have issues from
clear whether the two-thirds provision can bind a that point of how you plan a legislative programme
future parliament such that if a majority smaller than through the various years of that five-year term. It
two-thirds in a future parliament were to vote for would, in my view, remove the need for wash-up at the
dissolution and the Prime Minister then asked for one, end of a Parliament. Obviously, in the event of an early
the Queen would be entitled to refuse it”. That is an dissolution it wouldn’t and things would be pretty
issue for constitutional lawyers but it strikes me as much as now, looking at the 1979 scenario for
quite a profound issue because you can see what would example, but in my view it would remove the need for
happen in those circumstances if someone sought to wash-up. I take your point about there being pressure
challenge that. Would you like to expand on that? to get bills into the Queen’s Speech from Departments
Vernon Bogdanor: Constitutional lawyers have argued and Ministers. It depends. In Robin Cook’s memoirs,
for many years on whether Parliament can bind itself, he talks about when he became Leader of the House;
without reaching any conclusion. I am far too careful. he looked in the legislative cupboard and it was bare.
It would be like a bull in a china shop to tread in an area They very quickly had to come up with legislation. It
which constitutional lawyers have debated in such a depends from government to government and on the
sophisticated manner for so many years without political context. The reality is there is too much
reaching a conclusion. One has to call it a grey area of legislation. It is a tidal wave approach. I think it is
our constitution—whether Parliament can bind itself unavoidable, whatever parliamentary arrangements
by a special majority. It has not happened before. you have, that at the beginning of the term you are
going to have a lighter legislative workload because
parliamentary counsel have to have time to draft
Q111 Lord Crickhowell: I want to go back to the legislation properly. The beginning of the term is going
extension of the session, and something that Dr Fox to be quite light, but inevitably the middle and the end
said about departments being asked to produce bills of the session or Parliament are going to be heavier. It
because they hadn’t. I sat for quite a long time under seems to me that if you have some sense of when the
Willie Whitelaw on the Legislation Committee. It was end date is, business managers through the usual
very important, particularly as many of us feel that channels should be required to work backwards from
there is too much legislation. But the pressure there that in planning the legislative programme, either
was quite the reverse. It was extremely difficult to across the term or across the sessions. It should be
possible to avoid some of the problems of the tidal
come forward with a bill because there were a limited
wave, banging up against the deadlines and the fact
number of bills that you could get into a session. That
that whole sections of bills go through with very
was rather an important factor. There was another
limited scrutiny. If the public were aware of some of the
feature, too. Am I not right in thinking that by
bills that go through and the amounts of money that
extending the session, the pressure that this House are voted on with limited—or sometimes even no—
particularly has towards the end of a session to get scrutiny, they would be appalled.
legislation altered is removed for quite a lot of bills? Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: Are we moving towards
Governments have to stop and think towards the end an end?
of a session. Amendments get carried by this House The Chairman: We are, but both you and Lord Renton
that probably would not otherwise get carried. It wanted to make comments.
seems to me that there are some quite significant
consequences from this change and I am not at all sure Q112 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: If I could speak
that they have been thought through adequately. Any about the wash-up, as an ex-Chief Whip, you have to
further comment? think of realism rather than totally of idealism. The
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whole point of the wash-up is to do deals with the other at the expense of the Conservatives. So in that sort of
side that enable you to get through bills that would not situation, a hung Parliament would be more likely.
otherwise get through. It is a remarkable occasion, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: I was really asking for
because suddenly the Whips who were arguing with your judgment on the merits of a fixed-term
each other are working together to make certain that Parliament against those two prospects.
bills get through. I don’t think you can avoid that Vernon Bogdanor: If you are moving into an era of
element in the running of the House of Commons. It hung Parliaments, the issue of fixed-term Parliaments
will always be there, because bills will take longer than arises for this reason. On the continent, which does not
expected. There are events happening that demand have the alternative vote, but proportional
debate which had not been thought about and representation, the aim is to persuade or even force the
therefore timetables get, not lost, but very, very political parties to work together in the way that Lord
squeezed. It is out of that that the wash-up happens. In Renton was describing sometimes occurred in the
a way, it is a very good example of parties who are wash-up period. That is the purpose of the fixed-term
opposing each other working together to get Parliament, to alter the culture of Britain from its
legislation through at the last time. I am not saying it is current, fairly adversarial culture, if I can put it like
all properly argued through. The general view is that that, to a more consensual culture. Countries such as
when an MP turns up and says to the Whip, “What’s Germany and Norway operate in practice in terms of
this all about?” the Whip says, “Don’t bother about grand coalitions. Even if they don’t have formal grand
that; just get into the Yes Lobby.” That’s life, and I coalitions, you often have the consent of the
suspect it will go on. It is another element. opposition for legislation, which obviously is rarely
Ruth Fox: I accept that there may be instances where the case here. Your question about the alternative vote
some of it may go on because of events arising. You raises a very important general point that, if we are
might need legislation that you had not anticipated moving into a period of hung Parliaments, there is a
earlier in the Parliament, or whatever, but we should large issue that perhaps this Committee might
look at the wash-up at the end of the last Parliament, consider of how our constitution might need to
in March/April. I submitted with our written evidence change. I repeat that I think this Bill is not very well
an article that I and colleague, Matt Korris, had thought out. In my judgment, this session has revealed
written for Parliamentary Affairs on a quick analysis two very important ambiguities in it. One was pointed
of the wash-up. I took a fairly pragmatic view on the out by Lord Norton, on whether Parliament can bind
pros and cons of it, but I don’t think in a fixed term you itself. The second, pointed out by Lord Hart, was
should ever end up in that situation, as the last whether the intention is to have an extraordinary
Parliament did, with bills such as the Constitutional general election if you dissolve early, as in Scotland or
Reform and Governance Bill and the Digital Sweden, or not. It seems to me that these issues are not
Economy Bill. There may be instances on the margins yet clarified in the Bill, and perhaps not in the
where, at the end of the fixed term, there is some Government’s mind either. I think they need to be
pressure and it is not as ideal a situation as you would clarified.
like, but a fixed-term should eradicate those examples Ruth Fox: I don’t think I would add anything to that
where the government was really stretching the other than to go back to my earlier comments that
bounds of acceptability, if I can put it politely. there is a looming difficulty in terms of the relationship
Lord Norton of Louth: I should have declared an between politicians and the public, and understanding
interest at the beginning as Director of Studies for the and knowledge of how our political system operates,
Hansard Society. which is seen partly in the issue about voting on the
The Chairman: Thank you for doing so. Thank you identity of the Prime Minister. In the context of where
both very much. You have been very generous with we are, whether it is under first past the post or AV, as
your time and this has been a very valuable session. Vernon has indicated, we are moving into a scenario
Lord Rodgers would like to make one final point. where hung Parliaments are more likely. We are going
to have a clash between the perception that we ought
Q113 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: We have to have a more presidential system, and therefore our
discussed this very fully. I have already asked about a constitutional and political arrangements should
summary of the balance of merit for a fixed-term reflect that, alongside a culture of hung Parliaments,
Parliament. Could I ask both of you, what is the which does not facilitate that. It seems to me that there
difference, if any, between a first-past-the-post is a potential major political problem looming on
Parliament, which we have now, and AV, if we find that public understanding and engagement around those
we have AV or some other form of PR? issues. I simply make a plea that one area that needs to
Vernon Bogdanor: The alternative vote makes a hung be addressed, and has not been addressed sufficiently
Parliament slightly more likely. At the last election, yet, is public understanding and education about
according to various calculations, it would have given these issues—political literacy and so on, which the
the Liberal Democrats about 20 more seats, primarily Hansard Society is very much an exponent of.
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The Chairman: Thank you both again. You have been least, as I understand it from what you have both said,
enormously helpful and this has been a very valuable about the title of the Bill, which is a fairly basic point.
session. I am really grateful to you and thank you, too, I am very grateful indeed for your time and for the
for highlighting the ambiguities, as Professor written evidence that you have sent to us. Thank you
Bogdanor has just expressed them, within the Bill, not very much indeed for coming.
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38 fixed-term parliaments: evidence

WEDNESDAY 3 NOVEMBER 2010

Present Lord Norton of Louth (Chairman) Baroness Jay of Paddington

Lord Crickhowell Lord Powell of Bayswater
Lord Goldsmith Lord Renton of Mount Harry
Lord Hart of Chilton Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank
Lord Irvine of Lairg Lord Shaw of Northstead

Examination of Witness
Witness: Mark Harper MP, [Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform].

Q114 The Chairman: Mr Harper, good morning, Mark Harper: Two things drove us on this. The first
and thank you very much for being with us. As you is a general one about things that governments do
will appreciate, I am not Baroness Jay. She has to get early in their first term of office. If the whole
away early, so I will be presiding over the proceedings programme was subject to pre-legislative scrutiny—a
this morning. Before we get under way, you will question that obviously has been raised about the
appreciate that we are not being televised, but we are other Bill that will shortly be brought before the
being sound-broadcast. For the record, could I ask House of Lords—frankly, you would not get on and
you to identify yourself? do very much. With this Bill particularly, there was
Mark Harper: I am Mark Harper, Minister for another question. Given that the Prime Minister had
Political and Constitutional Reform. said that he did not intend to use the power he has to
ask Her Majesty for an early dissolution at any point
in the Parliament, and we said in the coalition
Q115 The Chairman: Thank you very much. Is there
agreement that we would look to put a motion before
anything you want to say by way of opening or are
you happy for us to proceed with questions? Parliament to that effect, and having looked at the
Mark Harper: Very briefly, this is a short Bill, but one practicalities, it was felt that it would be better to put
with broad effect. It is right that the Government, the it beyond doubt and not lay open opportunities
Prime Minister, give away the power to call an during the Parliament to cause the Palace any
election early. Two provisions in the Bill allow for an difficulties. This will make things clear. We are not
election to be held earlier than the five-year cycle, and rushing this Bill through. It was published on 22 July
looking at the evidence and the questions that have and, while it has had its second reading in the
been put, I am sure that that is what we will focus on. Commons, it has not had its committee stage. We are
The Government think that this is right and broadly taking this Bill at a far slower pace than the
there is cross-party support for the principle of fixed- Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
term Parliaments, although there is some debate Bill, so we have some time. The Political and
about the length. Most of the evidence with, I think, Constitutional Reform Committee in the Commons
one exception, shows broad support, although has had a chance to take evidence and comment on
obviously there will be debate about the details. So, the Bill, and clearly this committee has carried out a
this is broadly supported, and we look forward to the considerably thorough investigation as well.
debate both in the Commons and in your Lordships’
House in due course. Q117 Baroness Jay of Paddington: You raise the
The Chairman: Thank you very much. It is a short Bill other Bill. I think the point is the one that has been
that gives rise to several constitutional questions. broadly put to us, which is that constitutional
Baroness Jay will put the first question. changes of this kind need to be handled in a slightly
different way from instant government, as it were, by
Q116 Baroness Jay of Paddington: We have had Parliament at the beginning of a term. You have
quite a few representations, not least from our raised a point about the Palace, but there is a question
colleagues in the other place, about the way in which of why it was necessary to go ahead so quickly with
the Bill has been produced. We have been asked fixed-term Parliaments, particularly with the
whether there should have been some more formal provision of terms of five years.
pre-legislative scrutiny and whether the public should Mark Harper: Having said in the coalition agreement
have been consulted more. As I say, we have had a what the Government planned on doing, with a
certain amount of evidence showing that people feel motion and then a bill, we looked into what kind of
that a constitutional measure of this kind, which is motion we could have that would be binding. If the
substantial even though it is a short Bill, should have House had passed a motion that was not binding, it
been subject to proper pre-legislative scrutiny. would have left open the theoretical possibility that
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the Prime Minister could call an election. Potentially, those constitutional arrangements. The other point,
that could have put the Palace in a difficult position. which I know the Deputy Prime Minister put to you,
The Government felt it was better to put matters is that if you have a five-year Parliament, you have
beyond doubt by publishing the Bill and giving it a four years during which you can crack on with
second reading. The House of Commons has serious work, and as you get to the end, Members’
effectively now said that in principle it supports fixed- thoughts turn inevitably towards being re-elected.
term Parliaments, and the view is that that has With a four-year fixed term, you would have three
already constrained the ability of the Prime Minister years in which to crack on with serious work, and
to seek an early dissolution if he was so minded. The then Members’ thoughts would turn to an election.
Government felt that on balance that was the best On balance—of course it is an issue of judgment—we
way to proceed, but we have not sought to rush thought that five years is the right term. It is the
further scrutiny of the Bill. We have allowed time for period that we have as a maximum term for a
both Houses to scrutinise it properly. Parliament, and of course the last Parliament ran for
five years, although that was damaged, I think, by the
fact that the last two years of it were full of
Q118 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: Were you speculation about whether we would or would not
personally familiar with the issue before you became have an early election.
a Minister? Had you discussed it over many years
either personally or within your party? Q120 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: In your own
Mark Harper: I had not. I am broadly familiar with constituency, is this matter discussed at all? I come
the issue, but not with constitutional matters prior to back to the question of whether people have really
being a Member of Parliament. I did take a fair thought about it.
degree of interest in constitutional matters when I Mark Harper: I have to say that on the doorstep there
was a backbench Member in opposition because I am was not a great clamour for this Bill to be brought
a great lover of Parliament. I am pleased to have this forward, but there was concern and discussion about
job, whose role is to look at how we can reform when the previous Prime Minister took office. There
Parliament for the future. I very much support the was a lot of speculation about whether we would or
measures in this Bill, which effectively move powers would not have an election, and members of the
from the Executive and put them in the hands of the public did not think that that whole debate and the
House of Commons. uncertainty was very healthy. Certainly from
conversations I have had with people in my own
constituency, having a fixed term so we know when
Q119 Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank: Yesterday, one the election will be, and getting rid of the ability of
of our colleagues in the House of Lords referred in the Prime Ministers to choose the date for political
context of the big society to the fact that it was reasons, has been broadly welcomed. However, given
important to put more power in the people’s hands. the other issues facing the country at the moment, it
But if we were to have five-year Parliaments, we is fair to say that this is not at the top of people’s list
would have fewer elections than we had in the past. of immediate priorities.
As you well know, there were 18 between 1945 and The Chairman: Lord Powell, did you want to follow
today, but with five-year Parliaments there would up on that?
have been only 14. Are you concerned about that?
How do you reconcile the two ideas? With your
Q121 Lord Powell of Bayswater: No, Lord Rodgers
experience of Parliament, are you not slightly has shot at my fox, even if he has not quite
suspicious when all parties vote the same way on a demolished it. The majority of our evidence has been
second reading? It is easy to see that it is a in favour of four-year Parliaments. It has been
comfortable approach for Members of Parliament pointed out that the great majority of fixed-term
and future governments, but Parliament will not be Parliaments are for four years. Did you take that into
better off. account and decide that, none the less, it would be
Mark Harper: We thought carefully about this. If you better to have five-year terms? Was that not also
look at the history and take out the very short partly for political reasons? Was it convenient for the
Parliaments, the average is over four years. What coalition Government to have a nice long stretch
must be factored in is that many previous elections ahead of them without an election?
were called before the end of a five-year Parliament at Mark Harper: If we had been starting with a clean
a time when the incumbent Prime Minister thought sheet of paper, we might have reached a different
he was best positioned to win an election. There is an conclusion, but we started from our existing position
argument about whether that was in the interests of where the length of a Parliament is up to five years.
the country. Effectively, this is looking back and As I have said, when they are shorter than that, it is
asking what would have happened if we had not had usually because the Prime Minister judged not that a
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shorter Parliament was good for the country, but that Mark Harper: Yes, it can. The view that we have
an election at that point was good for the governing taken—and the evidence that you have taken sets this
party. On balance, we thought that starting from a out—is that it changes the nature of the political
five-year term was right for the UK Parliament. debate. If you have legislated and there is broad
support for what the Government have done, it is of
Q122 Lord Powell of Bayswater: And you are not course theoretically possible for Parliament to repeal
moved by the argument that four-year Parliaments that Act but it becomes very difficult if the settled
allow people to vote rather more often, given that view of both parliamentarians and the public—and
your intention is to increase public participation? of academics and those who take a great interest—is:
Mark Harper: I think there are countervailing that is the constitutional settlement.
pressures as well. There is an awful lot of debate, Lord Goldsmith: You mentioned the public again, but
particularly given some of the tough decisions we you haven’t asked the public.
have taken on the economy, about whether people Mark Harper: No, we haven’t formally asked the
want governments to be able to take difficult public in a consultation or something like it but the
decisions for the long term. There is clearly a balance sense is that if you look at public opinion, as
between giving governments time to take difficult expressed in opinion polls and things, they are
decisions and see them through, and giving voters the broadly welcoming of the view that we should move
opportunity to give their verdict on the government. to fixed-term Parliaments. I do not think the public
It is not an exact science, but a matter of balance. We were ever very keen on the idea that Prime Ministers
think that we have struck the right balance, albeit could dissolve Parliament at their political
that I recognise that your evidence came up with a convenience.
different view.
Q127 Lord Goldsmith: I don’t want to pursue this,
Q123 Lord Goldsmith: On that last point, you have but I just want to be clear. The concern about the
not actually asked the public, have you? Palace—and the sensitive report they were talking
Mark Harper: No, we haven’t. about—is simply that the Palace might be in a
difficult position if Mr Cameron said that he wasn’t
Q124 Lord Goldsmith: Can I go back for a moment going to have an election and then said that he
to Lady Jay’s question about something other than a wanted to call one. Is that it?
Bill? You said that there were practicalities. Perhaps Mark Harper: That is part of it, yes. That wasn’t the
I may get some clarification on this. You have only reason for the decision but it was something we
identified the practicality of not wanting to put the took into account.
Palace in a difficult position. Was there any other
reason?
Mark Harper: We had said in the coalition agreement Q128 Lord Goldsmith: Forgive me, but what is the
that we were going to have two stages. We would other reason? I just want to understand.
bring a motion before Parliament and then we would Mark Harper: Well, as I said, in the coalition
legislate. So the question before us at this early stage agreement, we had said that the process was set out
of the Parliament is whether that two-stage process to be a motion followed by an act of Parliament.
still makes sense. We think it does not and that it There isn’t actually a very satisfactory parliamentary
would be better to legislate, setting the principle out device for a binding motion. We felt that the best
in statute. binding method was to have an act of Parliament—
passed by both Houses, of course, not just the House
of Commons.
Q125 Lord Goldsmith: Was there any reason you
identified other than the concerns about the Palace?
I still do not understand what these practicalities are. Q129 Lord Goldsmith: But so far as the concerns
Mark Harper: We talked in the coalition agreement about the Palace are concerned, have I correctly
about a binding motion being put before the House identified the concern?
of Commons, but there isn’t really an appropriate Mark Harper: Yes, you have.
type of motion which would have that effect. Having The Chairman: I think you are saying that, in terms of
considered the options, it seemed that legislating a binding motion, it was discovered that nobody
early would be the best solution in order to put into could be bound by the motion.
effect what the Government said they wanted to do in Mark Harper: Correct, yes, and the other thing is that
the coalition agreement. the motion would only be a House of Commons
motion, and by having an act of Parliament you have
Q126 Lord Goldsmith: An Act of Parliament can be better control by having both Houses having passed
repealed as well, can’t it? it.
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Q130 Lord Crickhowell: You have been basing your the current position both to Members of both Houses
case for a fixed-term Parliament, whether for four or and to the public, where perhaps some of them are
five years, on the disadvantage that in the past the not as clear as they could be.
Prime Minister has been able to choose the date of the
election. I expect that you have read Vernon
Bogdanor’s pretty compelling piece of evidence from Q131 Lord Crickhowell: Some of us feel that the
when we saw him a week ago, in which he argued that 1979 example is a particularly good one. I declare an
the, “disadvantage to dissolving early is outweighed interest, in that I became a Minister because of it. But
by the serious disadvantages of a fixed-term there was no doubt. The Prime Minister of the day
Parliament, which prevents Prime Ministers leading immediately said that he would go to the country and
a government in an unviable Parliament from going the country had the choice. Although there may be
to the country”—he had cited the Attlee example circumstances—we will come to examine them—in
earlier in his evidence—“which prevents a newly which this may happen, the fact is that this Bill will
chosen Prime Minister between Parliaments from make it much more difficult. We could have had a
going to the country, which prevents a Prime Minister situation in the way this Bill is drafted in which, over
who has a new policy for which he may seek a 14 days, every sort of effort was made to encourage
mandate from going to the country. Most the Scots, the Welsh, the Irish, or someone else to
importantly of all, because we could be moving into form a new coalition. It might have dragged on with
that situation with our hung Parliaments, it means a weak government for a time with the people having
that coalitions can change in the middle of a no say. It is not self-evident to me that we are in a
Parliament without the people being allowed to better position as a result of this Bill.
pronounce on that.” He concluded: “the balance of Mark Harper: I think the reality would be that if you
argument is against fixed-term Parliaments”. He were in that position, a great deal of effort would
argued that what you are actually doing is taking have taken place prior to any key vote taking place to
power away from the people when you are arguing get the smaller parties that you are talking about on
that you are trying to give it to them. side anyway to avoid the loss of a vote of confidence.
Mark Harper: Yes, I did read Vernon Bogdanor’s A lot of that work would have taken place
argument. It may interest the Committee to know beforehand. If the government lost a vote of
that, in the same way as he taught the Prime Minister, confidence, you would have your 14-day period. I
he also taught me politics at Oxford. It is fair to say suspect it would become clear pretty quickly that the
that he and I did not always see eye to eye in tutorials government could not put together an alternative
either, about Europe or electoral reform, so the fact government, or a different government could not be
that he and I are disagreeing on this subject isn’t new; formed. Indeed, there would then be a general
perhaps he won’t be surprised. What he outlines is election, but I do not think that that should
not, I think, a change in reality from the current necessarily be automatic. If a government can be
position. Certainly, in some of the debate that we had formed with a majority to get a vote of confidence in
on this Bill at second reading in the Commons, the House of Commons, particularly if it takes place
people’s views about what happens when a early in a Parliament, we are not necessarily
government does not have a majority in the House of depriving the public of something by not having a
Commons or loses a vote of confidence is very much general election as a matter of course. That isn’t what
shaped by recent events, because it has not happened would happen in the current situation anyway. I don’t
very often. They immediately think of the 1979 think we are changing huge amounts by the way we
example and the loss of a vote of confidence have laid down the procedures in the Bill.
automatically triggering an election. There are older
examples when that was not the case. The reality at
the moment is that if the government does not have a Q132 Lord Crickhowell: We will come to that on
working majority and loses a vote of confidence, later questions. The fixed term will result in a clash
there is no necessity for an election to be called with elections to the devolved institutions in 2015 and
already. It is perfectly possible under our existing every 20 years thereafter. What do you propose to do
arrangements for a new government to be formed to alleviate that situation? It has been suggested, for
without an election taking place, so I do not think we example, that the Scottish Parliament, and possibly
are doing anything new. But perhaps it is the case the Welsh if the situation changes there, might be
that, both in Parliament and among the public, allowed to decide on the date of their own elections.
expectation about what would happen in certain You could avoid a clash by implementing automatic
cases is not as clear as it ought to be. The debate on four-year fixed election dates. What are you
this Bill, the evidence you have taken and the proposing to do about what is considered by the
evidence that the committee in the Commons has devolved administrations as a drawback in the
taken is actually a good opportunity for explaining present proposals?
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Mark Harper: The first thing to say is that our Bill, if Mark Harper: As I have said, we have not yet set the
anything, highlights the potential problem but does parliamentary timetable for the Bill. Unlike the
not actually cause it. It is perfectly possible without Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
our Bill. If this Parliament ran its full term you would Bill, where clearly the timetables link to the choice of
have had the clash anyway. Indeed, what would likely date for the referendum next year, this Bill is being
have happened is you would have got to 2014 and taken on a much more considered timetable. We are
once you got past May or June 2014 without an not in any sense trying to rush it, and we would rather
election, immediately speculation would start about get it right before it exits the Commons and gets to
the likely date. We would have had exactly this your Lordships.
debate, but it would have been taking place at a point Baroness Jay of Paddington: If I may say so, you have
when, frankly, we could not have done anything rather illustrated the point that I was trying to make
about it. In a sense, we have crystallised the issue so in my earlier question about how it would have been
that everyone is aware of it. We have made it very helpful to have prospective rather than retrospective
clear. We think that the coincidence of dates next year consultation.
with elections and the referendum is one situation Mark Harper: One of the issues—and we did get this
which we do not think is problematic. But we accept a little bit in the Commons—is that there is a balance
that there is a bigger question when elections clash— here. There is also the issue about the Government
the UK general election and the general elections in announcing their policies and positions to
the devolved nations—partly for practicalities and Parliament before they go out and talk quite widely.
partly for the arguments taking place about who If you are going to talk to each of the parties in the
should govern at the various different levels. We are devolved Parliament Assemblies, in effect you are
considering within Government what the putting your proposals in public. There is of course
appropriate solutions might be. We then intend to an argument about announcing the Government’s
have a proper consultation process with all the proposals to Parliament first. That was the balance
parties in each of the devolved administrations to that we struck. The territorial Secretaries of State
come up with an agreed way forward. We hope that then engaged in negotiations with each of the parties
that will be implemented in the Bill before it leaves the in the devolved nations and their First Ministers
House of Commons and gets to your Lordships’ about how we might solve the obvious clash.
House.
Lord Crickhowell: I welcome the fact that we are Q135 The Chairman: As a consequence of the
going to have consultation. It is what we are proposal to have fixed term Parliaments with
pressing for. elections in May, Sir George Young has announced
the move to a May-to-May parliamentary session, so
we have the unusual position that the current session
Q133 The Chairman: So the proposed length of the
will be a long one. Some have argued that having a
consultation will be the normal consultation period.
two-year session rather than finishing it next May
Is that the intention?
strengthens the Executive rather than Parliament.
Mark Harper: We want to do two things. We want to
What is your response to that?
make sure that we get the chance to make the changes
Mark Harper: First, the reason for doing that is that,
in the Bill while it is still in the House of Commons,
if we are to have a fixed-term Parliament and we
but we will have full consultation with the parties in
know that the election is to be in May 2015, we want
each of the devolved administrations to see the level
to avoid having a very short final session, where
that there is a consensus. We are just thinking in
frankly you would not get a lot done. Given that the
Government at the moment about what might work
first session in a new Parliament is traditionally a
across the three devolved nations. But we recognise longer one anyway and so we would have run
that it is an issue and we have said that clearly in through to next autumn, we thought that on balance
debates in the House of Commons. We very much it was better to extend the current session and then
hope that we can get to an agreed solution. align the State Opening and the new sessions with the
The Chairman: So that could produce amendments to new fixed-term cycle. That was the judgment that we
the Bill before it had concluded its process? took, and I do not see that it changes the balance
Mark Harper: Yes. between Parliament and the Executive at all.

Q134 Baroness Jay of Paddington: I want to ask Q136 The Chairman: The issue is obviously specific
about the timing. I am sorry to come back on this, but to this session. I take the point about subsequent
if you are going to do the consultation before you sessions.
bring the Bill here based on your conclusions in the Mark Harper: I think that you could argue that, pre
other place, does that suggest that the Bill may well carryover, there may well have been an issue but, as
be delayed in being introduced in this House? the Government have the power to carry Bills over
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from sessions, I do not think that the longer session That is why we chose that number. The obvious
has changed the position in any significant way. example that we had to go on is what Parliament
decided to legislate for in terms of the devolved
Q137 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: We now move assemblies. We tested that against the experience of
on to Clause 2, “Early parliamentary general governments in the past and it seemed to be the right
elections”. Before we do so, perhaps I may say that, balance to hit our objective.
after many years in the House of Commons, I The Chairman: That is the practice in legislatures
personally think that you are right to go, if possible, elsewhere. Where they have a threshold, the
for five-year rather than four-year terms. Clause requirement is normally for a two-thirds majority.
2(1)—this goes against support for the fixed five-year
term that you have been talking about and agreeing Q139 Lord Goldsmith: You have referred to
with rather strongly—sets out a safety-valve examples in other countries where governments have
mechanism, whereby an early general election will succeeded in engineering votes of no confidence. This
take place if two-thirds or more of the total number Bill does not prevent the same thing from happening
of MPs vote in favour of an early dissolution of here, does it?
Parliament. In a strange way, this goes quite strangely Mark Harper: No, it does not in technical terms, but
with what you have been saying. What is the purpose it changes the view that the public would take of such
of that mechanism and in what circumstances do you behaviour by the government. The position to date,
envisage it being used? or the expectation, has been that it is perfectly
Mark Harper: There are two things. First, it clearly reasonable for the Prime Minister to seek an early
gives the power to Parliament. Setting the number at election. Once the Bill, which has been approved by
two-thirds is of course a change from what is in the the House on second reading, becomes law, the
coalition agreement and there was a fair bit of debate expectation will be that we have a fixed-term
about that at the beginning of this session of Parliament. It would then still be technically possible
Parliament. The purpose of setting the level at two- for a government to engineer the loss of the vote of
thirds is so that the government—either a single- confidence, but I think that the public would take a
party government or in this case two parties—do not dim view of that and would make a judgment in the
have the power to call an election, so it would have to subsequent general election about whether they
be a cross-party decision. I do not particularly want thought that that was the right way for a government
to speculate on hypothetical examples, but there may to conduct themselves. Ultimately, the choice would
well be circumstances where there is a general view be with the public.
that an election is necessary and that is shared across
parties. Without such a mechanism, you would force Q140 Lord Goldsmith: Let us be clear about that.
the Parliament to have to engineer the loss of a There is no other mechanism that you are considering
confidence vote, as has happened elsewhere. Clause putting in the Bill that would prevent a government
2(1) will give the Commons the mechanism that we from engineering a vote of no confidence other than
gave to the devolved administrations for eventualities the belief, or possibility, that the public would take a
that may exist but that we cannot predict. However, dim view of it. Is that the case?
the power very much belongs to the House and not to Mark Harper: Yes, that is right. The backstop against
the government. It may be a power that is never used, a government behaving in that way is that it would be
but I think that it is right that it is there. transparently obvious that that is what they had done
and the public could take a view on that when asked
Q138 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: It sounds as for its opinion in the subsequent general election.
though you are saying “Let’s call it two-thirds Lord Goldsmith: I suppose the government might be
because that is a reasonable number”. There is not absolutely transparent about it and say, “This is the
much more thinking behind that two-thirds other only way we can bring the country back into a position
than, “We must have a target so this should be it”. where we can govern it properly because for this or
Mark Harper: I think the logic was to set a number that reason we are not succeeding at the moment. We
that was sufficiently high that it was unlikely that a therefore want to go to you to ask you to reconstitute
government could reach it. If you look at the Parliament”.
experience post-war, no government could have Mark Harper: If the government chose to do that,
reached that target. The message that it sends out is ultimately the public would be the ones who made the
that the government do not have the ability to get an choice about whether the government were behaving
early general election; it would have to be a cross- appropriately. That is the right place for it to be. It is
party decision with broad support across the House, technically possible—we have been very open about
which means that it would not be being done for that—but my view is that the public would take a
partisan reasons but because of the general sense that very dim view of that and the government would be
an early election was in the interests of the country. punished accordingly. I think that that is the best
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control mechanism rather than coming up with some vote, but the way it is drafted raises the question of
technical device. whether it would have to be explicitly a vote of no
confidence, as opposed to the government bringing
Q141 Lord Goldsmith: I want to ask just one other forward a vote of confidence in themselves and losing
point, although I will come back to another issue it, or a major measure being brought forward by the
later. When you talked about the 14 days, you said government and their announcing, “Confidence
that you did not think that we were moving much attaches to this. If we lose, we cannot sensibly
from the present position. However, the 14 days continue”. Is the intention that the Bill as drafted
would allow a completely different composition of would encompass those circumstances, or is it meant
government. For example, we could end up with to be specific—that it must be, say, the opposition
Labour and Liberal Democrats. That could not moving a vote of no confidence in the government?
happen under the present system, could it? Mark Harper: No, I think the intention is that the Bill
Mark Harper: That depends on the way people would encompass those examples, not changing the
conduct themselves, but I think that it could. It current position. Ultimately, the Speaker is the
depends on a range of factors, including the balance person who has to certify that a confidence vote has
of power of the parties in Parliament, where we are in been lost or passed. Our view is that the Speaker
the parliamentary term and the position of the would make it very clear before such a vote took
Palace. If we were early in a Parliament and there was place whether it was a vote on which he would issue
a viable alternative government and—prior to having his certificate. If you think through the examples, I do
published this Bill—a Prime Minister had sought a not think that there would be any doubt in the minds
dissolution, it is perfectly possible that a dissolution of Members of Parliament voting that they were
would not have been granted and that an alternative voting on something which would be treated as a
person would have been sent for to form a confidence vote.
government.

Q142 Lord Goldsmith: Is there a recent example of Q145 The Chairman: My concern would be that, if
that? you look at past examples, the government said that
Mark Harper: There is not a recent example of that, confidence attached to it, but the problem for the
because there have not been very many examples over Speaker would be the lack of guidance if just the
the past century when governments have been in that words of the Bill, or the Act, were before him. If they
position. As I said, the narrative tends to be driven by
referred to a vote of no confidence, it would be up to
the most recent example—where we were at the tail-
the Speaker to interpret that, and he may decide that
end of a Parliament, and therefore, when the Prime
it is not an explicit vote of no confidence.
Minister decided to seek an election, the dissolution
Mark Harper: I think the important thing is the
was granted, but there was an earlier example in the
Speaker making that clear before the debate and the
1920s when a Government went and a minority
vote, and then everyone would be clear about what
Government with a different Prime Minister and a
was going to happen as a result of it. If you think
different party were formed. You are right, there have
through examples in the past, I do not think that
not been very many examples; that is perfectly true.
anyone has been in any doubt about the significance
of what they were going to do. In practice, I do not
Q143 Lord Goldsmith: I am a little bit surprised by think that that would be a serious problem.
the suggestion that this is not actually a very
significant change. Do you think that it is not a
significant change to the present position?
Mark Harper: No. I think the fact is that there have Q146 The Chairman: I wonder whether it might
not been many examples in recent history where we make more sense to do it the other way round, so that
have not had governments with majorities able to the Bill is amended so that we get clarity, so that it
govern alone. If that isn’t the case, the existing does not leave it to the Speaker. There is always the
constitutional position, or the way we behaved, prospect of a challenge to the Speaker’s certificate.
would have been different even if we had not brought Mark Harper: The reason we decided to use the device
the Bill forward, of the Speaker’s certificate was exactly to deal with
the issue that the Clerk of the House of Commons has
Q144 The Chairman: Your reference to the 1920s raised with you about the potential to challenge in
leads us on neatly to votes of confidence, because in court. We decided to use the device of a Speaker’s
the past, a government could lose the confidence of certificate without specifying in legislation any more
the House without an explicit vote of no confidence detail of the procedures of the House for that very
being carried against the government. The Bill now reason—to use a tried and trusted formulation. That
seeks to put in statute the concept of a no-confidence was why we decided to do it the way that we have.
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Q147 The Chairman: But it would presumably put vote is. It would just mean that the Speaker would be
pressure on the Speaker if, let us say, he did not make making those conventions more explicit. I do not
an announcement in advance. think that it changes the nature of his role vis-à-vis
Mark Harper: I think the Speaker would want to the House.
make sure that the House was clear about the nature
of the debate and the vote attached to it. I am not sure Q151 Lord Shaw of Northstead: But, surely, if, at the
that it would put pressure on him; I think there would beginning of the debate, the Speaker announces, “I
be an expectation that he would set out clearly the am going to regard this debate and its result as a vote
nature of the debate and vote that was to take place, of confidence”, if the House then has its debate and
the consequences of the vote and what he would do specifically says that it does not want this to be
as a result, so that people were clear about it. I think regarded as a vote of confidence, who is in the lead?
that there would be an expectation that that is what Mark Harper: If the House decided formally to
would happen. amend the motion that was being put to the House to
explicitly say that it was not a vote of confidence,
Q148 The Chairman: Yes. Seeking clarification, the clearly the Speaker would take his direction from the
Speaker would have a role in making clear House. But that isn’t what traditionally happens with
beforehand his interpretation of the situation. those votes. They do not explicitly say one way or the
Mark Harper: Yes, and I think if his interpretation other, but convention suggests that certain kinds of
was made clear beforehand, people wouldn’t be left votes are votes of confidence. That is the way they
in any doubt about the consequences of their vote have been treated.
and what would happen as a consequence.
Q152 The Chairman: You have touched on a grey
Q149 Lord Shaw of Northstead: Arising out of that, area, because sometimes the government would
there is an argument that a defeat on a motion of no regard it as a vote of confidence and at other times
confidence should automatically be followed by a they would then follow that defeat by introducing a
general election. That, I think, has been put on one vote of confidence to get the confidence of the House.
side. But, arising out of the questions that follow I am thinking of a situation where there is a vote on
now, it seems to me that the Speaker can only speak a central issue of government policy that is key to the
as a result of decisions taken in the House. By him government’s programme, which is unexpectedly
deciding, without the agreement of the House defeated. I think that yours is premised on an issue
necessarily, that this is a vote of confidence, it seems where the government might be in trouble, but the
to me that that takes away some of the power of the Speaker makes it clear that it is a vote of confidence.
House. The House should itself decide that this is a It might be one where, in the light of the debate, some
vote of confidence, not the Speaker. Members vote against and it’s an unexpected defeat
Mark Harper: On explicit confidence votes, I don’t of the government on a major bill. If there is a defeat,
think there’s much doubt. The votes in more doubt the Speaker would have to determine after the event
are those that have been treated as confidence votes whether it is a vote of confidence or not.
by the government. I don’t think it’s asking the Mark Harper: Yes, but I think the Speaker, as is usual
Speaker to make decisions beyond those he should in these cases, would be guided by convention. I am
make if there is an expectation. If there is a not going to start suggesting and giving hypothetical
convention that certain kinds of votes, like votes on examples about the way the Speaker should conduct
the Address, are treated as confidence votes and are himself, but I think he would be guided by
treated as those by the government, for the Speaker convention in those cases. What would typically
to make that explicit, effectively, it is a convention happen in cases where there was an unexpected defeat
that exists and he is simply going to be setting out the on a major area of government policy is the
consequences of that convention. He is not really government would respond accordingly. As Lord
creating any new rules. He is just making it more Norton suggested, they would put forward an explicit
explicit about the effect of existing conventions that motion to demonstrate that the Government still
are already in place. have the confidence of the House. I do not think that
we would be leaping forward into new realms. We
Q150 Lord Shaw of Northstead: I think this is an would use some of the existing conventions and
important principle. Who is to decide whether or not processes to make it clear.
it is a vote of confidence—the House or the Speaker?
Mark Harper: On votes, for example, that convention Q153 The Chairman: So in a way it would be up to
suggests are confidence votes, like votes on the the government to make representations to the
Address, it is convention that dictates that. Those are Speaker that they didn’t regard that as a vote of
rules that have grown up. They are not hard and fast confidence and they would wish to seek an explicit
tied to the vote in the same way an explicit confidence vote of confidence from the House.
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Mark Harper: I think that one of the things that the Clerk’s arguments are more compelling than
would happen with this procedure is that there would those of the government or vice versa, and we will see
be more clarity from the government beforehand what view the House takes.
about the nature of the way that they were
conducting themselves, and I think that some Q156 The Chairman: One thought occurs, coming
transparency and clarity would be helpful for the back to the point about confidence and who
House and the country. determines it. If the government lost an important
vote, even though it had not been certified as a vote of
Q154 The Chairman: So the government would confidence but was clearly a critical vote—and there
indicate in advance how they wished to treat any were circumstances in the 1920s in which the
significant issue. government, in a sense, retrospectively decided that it
Mark Harper: Yes. was a confidence vote and that they would go—but
they none the less said, “Well, we can’t carry on
Q155 Baroness Jay of Paddington: But if, as you say, because we lost this important vote”, and they
the Speaker relied on convention if the hypothetical resigned without losing a vote of confidence, would
situation that you alluded to arose—and you have that trigger the 14-day provision?
also alluded to the fact that we have received the Mark Harper: If the government resigned and we
opinion of the Clerk that this could go to the court— were without a government, you would then have to
then there would be a potential difficulty in that the have a process of government formation. I believe
Speaker could be in an even more difficult situation. that we think that would be the case.
There would be a tension with the political
imperative, with the government, as Lord Norton Q157 The Chairman: In circumstances where they
suggested, driving in one direction, and the had lost a vote of confidence and the 14-day
convention would presumably depend on the advice provision then kicked in under the Bill, would it be
being received by the Speaker from the clerks. If the possible for that government to try to reconstitute
clerks’ position was the one that has been suggested themselves, perhaps in a slightly different way?
to us by the current Clerk, there would be Presumably they could carry on as the government, if
considerable difficulty. a government were formed, with the same people.
Mark Harper: Perhaps I may deal first with the Mark Harper: Rather than giving you a rushed
concern that the Clerk outlined, which we discussed answer, let me think about it and I will come back to
with him prior to introducing the Bill, and then you, either later in this evidence session or in writing,
briefly explain why, having had that discussion with if that is all right.
him prior to introducing the Bill, we still decided to The Chairman: Okay, we will move on to the
proceed. His argument goes to the safety of the consequences.
certification process—whether it is still robust and
whether the courts would wish to challenge it. He was
concerned that they might. Our view was that that is Q158 Lord Goldsmith: But would you please also
a tried and tested process which has held up in the consider, in the example that Lord Norton put to
past. We also felt that in the circumstances we are you, that you said that there would have to be a
talking about, courts would not wish to trespass in process of formation of government? If not now,
those areas; they would hold to the traditions and perhaps you could help us with which provision in the
powers in the Bill of Rights and stick to doing that. Bill would enable that to happen because the Bill
We had that conversation with the Clerk in advance. seems to say that you cannot have dissolution
The reason that we wanted to put the certification without one of the events taking place which has been
procedure in the Bill rather than in Standing Orders identified. Could you help on that as well?
of the House was that you simply can’t achieve the Mark Harper: Yes.
policy effect—as we talked about in answer to earlier
questions from Lord Renton concerning the two- Q159 Lord Goldsmith: On the consequences, you
thirds majority—by relying on Standing Orders in the have picked up already on what the Clerk has said
House, because Standing Orders can be amended by and the disagreement. First, on the point that the
a simple majority. It was really a debate about the fact Clerk raised about the risk that the courts might
that, if you want to achieve that policy effect, you intervene, is it the Government’s view that that is not
have to legislate for it rather than use internal possible at all or that the risk is slight?
procedures. There is a disagreement with the Clerk Mark Harper: Looking at the precedents, there is
about our view. We tested it a little bit at scond always a theoretical risk, but we do not think it is
reading and I anticipate that we will have a pretty full realistic to think that the courts would intervene in
debate on it in Committee in the House. Ultimately, these particular cases. The precedents and the other
the House will take a view on whether it thinks that examples in law where you use the device of the
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Speaker’s certificate suggest that our judgment on over again. I recognise the point you make: you could
that is correct and would be supported by the courts. argue that it would be an incentive for a government
Lord Goldsmith: We have seen material, such as an to have an early election and give itself another full
opinion from Richard Gordon QC, who is pretty term, but with the provisions in the Bill that make it
expert in the field of judicial review and who very difficult for a government to do that, on balance
considers that in modern terms there is at least a risk we have taken the view that resetting the clock is the
that the courts might be prepared to intervene. right one. It is arguable and it is a balance, but we felt
Mark Harper: The response that we made to the that the balance was better in saying that if a
Clerk’s memorandum, which we placed in the government has been returned with a majority, it
Library of the House, was on the argument about the should get the full term and you should effectively
risk. We took the view that on these very political reset the clock.
matters, the risk of the courts straying into or getting
involved with them was very small. I am not sure
whether the Clerk disagreed and thought that the risk Q162 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: On other issues,
was high, but he felt it his duty to flag up the risk. The Clause 4(1) states that the Monarch’s power to
Government’s view, which we have set out, is that prorogue Parliament is not affected. One slightly
looking at how this has worked in the past—using the wonders why this clause has been included at all.
device of the Speaker’s certificate and the way that What is the basis for not legislating on the
the courts have behaved, even in the relatively recent prerogative part of the power to prorogue? One says
past—we thought it a very small risk and, on that that against the background that an incumbent
basis, we were content to proceed. government in Canada, in order to avoid facing a
vote of no confidence, thought of proroguing their
Parliament.
Q160 Lord Goldsmith: Content, as it were, to take Mark Harper: I think that the reason was that the
that risk. You have said more than once that you changes made to the Royal Prerogative in this Bill are
therefore went for the route of the tried and tested the minimum changes necessary to achieve the policy
formula, but I do not believe that the language which effect; they do not change the prerogative more
is used in the Bill is the same as that, for example, in widely. In effect, we have kept the prorogation
the Parliament Act, which specifically says that the powers as they are now. The risk that you
certificate shall not be questioned in any court. Is highlighted, which was also brought up in the debate,
there a reason why the language is not the same?
is what happened in Canada. That is theoretically
Mark Harper: It simply uses a more modern drafting
possible now. The convention that if the opposition
style, using the more recent precedent where the same
want to table a motion of no confidence the
language was used in the House of Lords Act, which
government make that time available has worked
this Committee’s Chairman steered through the
well in the past. Although it was a theoretical risk we
House of Lords and which uses that formulation
did not think it was a practical risk. If a government
rather than the other one. There was no particular
were so minded, it could not prorogue the House for
policy decision. It is simply that we have used a more
a significant period as they need the House’s power to
up-to-date form of language from that which was in
continue in government. Although that was a
the Parliament Acts. We think it has the same
theoretical risk, we did not think it a practical one
policy effect.
Lord Renton of Mount Harry: In general terms, it
would not go down at all well if the government tried
Q161 Lord Hart of Chilton: Let’s assume that there’s to do this.
a fixed-term Parliament and that it is dissolved by one Mark Harper: No. Part of the check here is a political
of the two ways of doing that. Why should the clock one. If the government were abusing procedure to
be reset for a full and new five-year term rather than prolong its period in office artificially, there would be
the rump of the term being served by that new a reckoning when it eventually sought a mandate
Parliament? The latter would act as a disincentive for from the public. As I said, there is a theoretical risk
any contrived end of the government. but we did not think it a realistic or practical one.
Mark Harper: We thought about this. There is no rule
here; it was a judgment issue. We thought about the
two options and both have their merits. We came Q163 Lord Shaw of Northstead: The Parliamentary
down on balance for the view that you would reset the Voting Systems and Constituencies Bill provides for
clock, for this reason: we felt that the public would reviews of constituency boundaries every five years.
think it odd if you were to have an early election and How do the Government propose to ensure that the
the public were to make a clear decision about a reviews are aligned with elections under the Fixed-
government—perhaps returning it with a good term Parliaments Bill? Do the Government envisage
majority—and then, a very short time afterwards, amending the review period if the two cycles move
you were to ask the public to go back and vote all out of synch in the future?
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Mark Harper: We thought about this carefully when Boundary Commission, so that the changes took
we were considering both Bills. We took the view that effect for the election after next, which would give
the present position is that boundary reviews under Members themselves more time to prepare for
the current cycle are not synchronised with changes?
parliamentary terms. Sometimes boundary reviews Mark Harper: We think the process for boundary
have taken place very near to a general election and reviews should be quicker, but also that it should
sometimes they have been much earlier in the happen more frequently, so that boundaries are kept
Parliament. We did not think that it was absolutely more in line with shifts in electors than has previously
necessary to synchronise them. You will know that been the case. Clearly, the first review will be a
the Parliamentary Voting Systems and significant one; partly because it is a reducing review,
Constituencies Bill sets out that we want boundary reducing the size of the House of Commons; but also,
reviews once every five years—broadly once per by making parity the primary determinant, we will be
Parliament—but I do not think that it is that dealing with the areas of the country which are
important that they are absolutely synchronised. We currently overrepresented. Subsequent to that, the
will see how it works. We thought about it and did not trade-off for Members of the House of Commons is
think it necessary to synchronise the reviews in the that boundary reviews will be more frequent but less
two Bills. disruptive, because we will be keeping boundaries
Lord Shaw of Northstead: So it is open to discussion. more aligned with population moves, so the shifts
We will see how it works. will be smaller but more frequent.
Mark Harper: Yes. It is not currently the case that
they are aligned, so we did not think it important to Q166 The Chairman: So there will be fewer
align them or make provision in this Bill or in the disappearances of constituencies once the big change
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill has taken place?
to tie the two together. Mark Harper: Yes, once the big change has happened,
we will keep them aligned, so we will have more
Q164 The Chairman: Since it has been mentioned, frequent, smaller changes, rather than saving them all
we shall just raise one or two questions about the up for a really significant change on a less frequent
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies basis.
Bill. It has now cleared the Commons so we await it
here. You are reviewing the boundaries in a very Q167 Lord Crickhowell: I understand that
quick period of time. What is the justification for argument, but on this occasion some of the changes
moving so quickly? are going to be very substantial indeed. I mean,
Mark Harper: First, we are reviewing the boundaries Wales, for perfectly understandable reasons, is facing
in a very quick period only compared to our present a very large reduction of about 25 per cent in the
practice. It is not particularly quick internationally. number of seats—creating, incidentally, some
The key reason is that the boundaries on which this extremely difficult alignments for the Boundary
year’s general election was fought were based on Commission to undertake if it is to keep the kind of
electoral registration data dating from 2000, so they connections which are thought to be desirable with
are a full decade out of date. The Government’s view social and historic boundaries. Candidates are going
is that that is just too slow and we wanted to speed up to find themselves with totally different
the process. If the Bill gets Royal Assent, the constituencies and an extraordinarily short time to
boundary commissions will have to report by set up associations and organisations to fight
October 2013. They are confident that they can do a elections. The Welsh Committee has already
boundary review consistent with all the normal commented on this. Isn’t it a terribly tight timetable
provisions in that period. That is why we have made for such a radical transformation of constituencies?
changes to remove local inquiries but increase the Mark Harper: You have picked up two issues there.
amount of time available for people to submit written The first one you alluded to was the significant
representations from one month to three months. We change in the number of Members of Parliament who
think that that strikes the right balance and enables a will represent Welsh constituencies. Yes, it is a
review to take place more quickly, and for subsequent significant change, but it is because Wales is currently
reviews to happen once per Parliament, which will the most overrepresented part of the United
keep boundaries much more up to date and in line Kingdom. We have had a significant amount of
with where electors actually live. debate in the House of Commons about this—and a
significant amount of debate about Wales, among all
Q165 The Chairman: So your argument would be the constituent parts of the UK, both because the
that the current disparity in size would justify moving Labour Front-Bench spokesman is a Welsh Member
quickly in time for the next election rather than, say, of Parliament and because the Welsh Members of
making provision now but giving more time for the Parliament have taken a considerable interest in the
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debate. The fact is that it is about treating all parts of transferable voting system. We didn’t just take the
the United Kingdom fairly, and it is just not two and come up with an answer. We looked at our
justifiable that there are significant number of seats in own proposal—600 is not a magic number. There was
Wales where Members of Parliament represent only a balance between the size of a constituency that
50,000 constituents. That is an enormous disparity would allow Members of Parliament to carry out the
with the rest of the country. It is simply not justifiable. work they do. With a very much smaller House,
In fact, in the debate, we have not heard any good constituencies would be significantly larger than
reasons, apart from sticking with the status quo, why traditionally we have been used to, and that would
that should be the case. change the nature of the role. The size of House we
Lord Crickhowell: As a former Welsh Member, I am have settled on comes out broadly in line with the
not going to press that case, so you need not argue numbers on the last electoral register, at an average
with that. size of 76,000. It means that a third of the House
Mark Harper: That is the view that we have taken. already represent constituencies of that size. On
Clearly it is controversial, but I think it is treating all balance, we felt that that was about the right number.
parts of the United Kingdom fairly. On your point It would not qualitatively change the nature of the
that it is a significant change and about the timetable, representative role that Members of Parliament carry
the reason why we set the timetable for the Boundary out. I am not going to pretend that there is a magic
Commission to report in October 2013 is that that science to this. It is a judgment. We felt that a
will enable them to report by that date, for the Order reduction was necessary and, at just over 7 per cent,
in Council to be moved, the House to approve the this is a fairly modest one. There was no scientific
boundaries so that they are final and to give the process to it because it was a matter of judging the
parties time to select candidates and get them in place balance between two competing forces. We think that
in the early part of 2014, with a year or so to go before we have the balance about right.
an election in 2015. That is a challenging timetable,
but we think it is deliverable, which is why we have set
the timetable that we have. I don’t think there is any Q169 The Chairman: How do you respond to the
way of avoiding the fact that we are doing a reducing concern that, by abolishing the local inquiries, the
review, reducing the size of the Commons, and number of applications for judicial review of
dealing with some of the significant disparities, Boundary Commission recommendations might
making seats of more equal size across the country, is increase?
going to lead to a significant amount of change in Mark Harper: The view we have taken is that we want
those constituencies. I don’t think there is any way local people to be able to express their views to the
you can avoid that significant change or make it Boundary Commission and to give the commission
easier by spreading it over a longer period of time. I evidence to consider. We think that a lengthened
think you have to accept that there is going to be a process of written representations makes it perfectly
significant amount of change and get on and do it. I possible for that to happen. Quite a lot of the
am sure that Members will rise to the challenge. academic evidence on local inquiries makes the point
The Chairman: You mentioned that the change in the that they are largely exercises in political parties
boundaries also ties up with reducing the size of the putting forward their points of view. While there are
House. Lord Hart has a question on that. exceptions, they are not generally vehicles for
ordinary electors to be able to put forward their view.
We feel that a longer period for written
Q168 Lord Hart of Chilton: What was the evidence representations is a different process, but it is
base for choosing 600? Both parties to the coalition perfectly satisfactory for ensuring that the boundary
had different numbers in mind. Was this just a horse commissioners have had people’s views made
trade or was it rather a sophisticated process? There available to them. It is a process that is used
does not appear in any of the debates to be evidence elsewhere. Although the timetable for the review
for why 600 was chosen. Would it not have been sounds challenging in our context, if you look at what
better to have carried out a process of looking at happens in other countries such as Australia, which
MPs’ functions, which would be a rather more by comparison is much pacier, we are still going at a
focused view of what the House of Commons should fairly leisurely pace. The boundary commissioners
be up to, rather than going for 600 on no evidence? are content, based on the provisions in the Bill and
Mark Harper: The view was this. The Conservative the resources they will have, that they can deliver
Party had a proposal based on the existing electoral what we have asked them to within the timetable.
system to reduce to 585. That was not a scientifically
calculated number because it represented a 10 per
cent reduction in the size of the House. The Liberal Q170 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: If I understood
Democrats had in mind a much sharper reduction to you right, on the question of the number of MPs, you
500, but that was based on a change to the single said that the Liberals were thinking of 500 MPs
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because of the single transferable vote. What that meant for the conduct of the referendum. We will
difference would that make? have to see how the debate in the House of Lords
Mark Harper: Lord Hart’s question was about proceeds.
whether we had had a horse-trading exercise and I
said that we had not, because although both parties Q173 The Chairman: When you say significant
in the coalition had set out proposals to reduce the changes, do you have any examples of what would be
size of the House, the Liberals’ proposals were not significant as opposed to not so significant?
just on the current arrangements but were about Mark Harper: Those are matters of judgment. The
changing the system completely and moving to Electoral Commission has been working closely with
larger, multi-Member constituencies with the single our officials and will no doubt take a close interest in
transferable vote. The two systems could not be what goes on in this House. I know it will provide
traded off against each other because they were briefing for Members of the House of Lords as the
qualitatively different. debate proceeds at each of its stages. We will see what
happens.
Q171 Lord Renton of Mount Harry: I was really
wondering why the single transferrable vote should Q174 Lord Crickhowell: I have a different question.
mean fewer constituencies. What you are saying is I am in favour of reducing the number of MPs, but if
that the Liberals had two things to say. It wasn’t you don’t reduce the number of Ministers and PPSs,
really that one meant the other. you are actually strengthening the Executive. Clearly,
Mark Harper: Not at all, no. I was making the point at some point you will have to face this. There will be
that both coalition parties thought that the number great pressure on you to do so. Are you going to face
of Members of Parliament should be reduced. I raised up to it while we are dealing with the legislation?
the issue of the single transferable vote just to say that What is the Government’s position?
this was not about there being two numbers that, with Mark Harper: I think your point is very well made. In
other things being equal, we traded off against each one sense, the Government have a difficult argument.
other. It was not that kind of discussion. That was the We accept that there is a problem that needs to be
point I was trying to make. I clearly didn’t make it dealt with, but we do not think that this Bill is the
very well. right vehicle to do it in. I know that that provokes
some cynicism. “Well, he would say that and they’re
Q172 The Chairman: The other provision of the Bill not going to deal with it”. I would say two things.
provides for a referendum. How confident are you First, I think that the Government have
that there will be time, given that the Bill has yet to demonstrated, both by the previous discussion we
complete its parliamentary passage? have had where the Prime Minister has given up a
Mark Harper: It is not giving away a secret to say that significant power and by the steps we have taken in
the timetable is challenging. The Electoral the Commons to pass power to the House—setting
Commission—obviously, it has an important role to up the Backbench Business Committee, the election
play, because its chairman will be the chief counting of Select Committee chairmen and carrying out a lot
officer—has set out in evidence to the Commons of the Wright committee recommendations—that we
Constitutional Reform Committee that it wants the want to strengthen Parliament. The reason for
key important sense of the rules to be settled six looking a little wider is that the debate we had in the
months before the election. Obviously, that is before Commons and the clause we voted on affected only
your Lordships get to consider the Bill, but I do not the number of Ministers. If you only look at it
think that that fetters your ability to amend the Bill. narrowly, it did not look at prime ministerial
All the key provisions around the date and the patronage as a whole. It would not, for example, have
question have been debated and voted on by the affected the number of PPSs. It would not have
Commons. The Electoral Commission has been looked at the balance in ministerial ranks between
working closely with our officials and will clearly those Ministers who are Members of the House of
take a very close interest in the parliamentary Commons and those who are Members of the House
passage. If there are areas where the House of Lords, of Lords. So it would not have looked at that balance.
doing its usual excellent job of scrutiny and revision, There is also an argument on which, interestingly, I
thinks that there are things that would make the had a debate with Chris Mullin, who wrote in the first
conduct of the referendum smoother or work better volume of his memoirs about how he felt as a junior
or in other ways could be improved, I am sure that the Minister work was created in order to keep him busy.
Electoral Commission will follow that as we go But he acknowledged that there are some
along. I do not think that that would be insuperable. parliamentary innovations which the last
The point that it made was that, if your Lordships Government made which have been very valuable—
made significant changes, it would have to consider for example, the Westminster Hall debates we have
those and come back and express a view about what had, which have generally been a success. But they
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impose a burden on the Government in terms of and want to solve it but did not think that just solving
Ministers to respond to them and you have to take it in that narrow way, by looking at the number of
ministerial accountability into account. The Ministers in the Commons, was the right way to deal
Government’s position is that we want to deal with with it. There may well be a partly legislative and
this issue, but you have to look at the size of partly non-legislative solution. That is the long
government and the balance between the two answer.
Houses. There is an argument that you do not just
deal with Ministers, but you look at all the other Q176 Lord Goldsmith: May I make a request rather
positions. All you do if you deal only with Ministers than asking a question? Earlier, when members of the
and do not look at PPSs and other roles that might Committee were asking you about consultation, you
be created that are considered to be on the payroll is referred to opinion polls. I, for one, would find it very
squeeze one part of the balloon and patronage will helpful—it may be that others would not—to see
just appear elsewhere, perhaps in a less accountable what opinion poll or polls you had in mind, so that
form. The Government want to deal with it and we can understand to what extent this has been the
recognise the issue. We will bring forward proposals subject of public debate. Would you be able to
during the Parliament, but we do not think that provide us with the opinion poll?
dealing with it in this Bill is the right vehicle. Mark Harper: On which aspect—the fixed-term
Parliaments?
Q175 The Chairman: The statute at the moment only
deals with Ministers, so I am not sure how you can Lord Goldsmith: On fixed-term Parliaments, I am not
deal by statute with people such as Parliamentary sure what it is that you say is to be found in the
Private Secretaries. You can devise any old status for opinion polls. That is part of the reason I would like
a Member and say that it somehow binds you to to see what it is.
government. Mark Harper: OK, fine.
Mark Harper: That is one of the things we want to
consider. If the concern of the House is about The Chairman: The only other point I would make on
patronage—and that is the concern, rather than the discussion we were just having, from a suggestion
Ministers—but if there is a pressure, which may be that was made to me, is that rather than referring to
for perfectly valid reasons, for people to carry out the payroll vote—because you have already indicated
government business and you artificially constrain it that quite a lot of the so-called payroll vote is not
in one area, all you do is to force something else to paid—it should be simply referred to as the
happen. During the period of the previous jobsworth vote, which I think is more encompassing.
Government, we saw roles being created such as Anyway, Minister, we are very grateful for the time
regional Ministers, assistants to regional Ministers that you have spent with us and for the ground you
and special envoys, all of whom were considered to be have covered. That has been extraordinarily helpful
on the payroll—or they did not have any pay. There to us and, from what you were saying earlier, we will
is an argument that, during this Parliament, we could be hearing from you on one or two other points that
have a debate about the size of the Government and we have raised with you as well. We are very grateful
the role of Ministers, looking at it in the round rather indeed for your being with us today. It has been
than focusing on one particular narrow aspect of it. extremely helpful for our purposes. Thank you very
There will be legislative opportunities during the much.
Parliament. The Government don’t have a closed Mark Harper: A pleasure, and thank you very much
mind on this. They recognise that there is a problem for the invitation.

Supplementary letter from Mark Harper MP, Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform (FTP 44)
At the evidence session on 3 November I undertook to respond in writing to points raised by Lord Norton
and Lord Goldsmith.

Lord Norton asked about clause 2(2) of the Bill.

Clause 2 of the Bill sets out the circumstances in which an early parliamentary general election can be held.
Those circumstances are:

— where two-thirds of all MPs vote for an early election (subsection (1)); or

— where a vote of no-confidence in the Government has been passed and a Government has not been
able to secure the confidence of the House of Commons after 14 days (subsection (2)).
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52 fixed-term parliaments: evidence

The purpose of clause 2(2) is to prevent the possibility of a Government having to continue in office where it
cannot command the confidence of the House of Commons, but where the House refuses to dissolve
Parliament.
Lord Norton asked whether a Government could resign following a vote which had not been formally declared
to be a vote of no confidence, and whether if they did so, this would trigger the 14 day period. Following this
point, Lord Goldsmith noted that in a situation where no certified motion of no confidence were passed but
a Government still chose to resign, a process of Government formation would still have to take place, and
wondered which provision in the Bill would enable that to happen. Under the provisions of this Bill, it is not
for the Government to decide that a motion is a motion of confidence for the purposes of clause 2(2). The
issuing of a certificate is a matter for the Speaker. There is nothing in the Bill that prevents a government
resigning; the Bill is about the length of a Parliament. If a government decided to resign when the Speaker had
indicated that he was not minded to issue such a certificate, then the 14 day period would not be triggered
although, as I said to the Committee, a period of government formation would obviously follow. It would just
not be time-limited. Because of the very firm convention that the Queen should not be left without a
functioning government, in practice, the outgoing government would not formally resign until the Queen was
in a position to appoint a replacement Prime Minister.
Lord Norton also enquired whether this clause would allow an incumbent Government to re-group and
remain in office following a certified vote of no confidence.
Subsection 2(2) of the Bill does not rule out the possibility of an incumbent government which has lost a no-
confidence vote and thus started the 14 day period from subsequently securing the confidence of the House
within that period and so continuing to govern.
It is not our intention that the Bill should rule out the possibility, however unlikely, of the House changing its
mind within the 14 day period and deciding nevertheless to support the current Government. Therefore it will
be for the House of Commons to decide whether to endorse an incumbent Government following a vote of
no-confidence.
I also undertook to write in response to Lord Goldsmith’s query about opinion polls which showed public
support for establishing fixed terms.
A survey conducted by Populus for The Times (published 30 May 2009) found that 74% of those surveyed
supported the establishment of fixed terms.
A poll conducted by ICM research for The Sunday Telegraph (published 26 May 2010) found that 63% or those
surveyed supported the establishment of fixed-terms.
A survey by the Scottish Youth Parliament (conducted in August 2010) found that 76.4% of young people
surveyed were in favour of establishing a fixed term for the UK Parliament.
17 November 2010

PEFC/16-33-622

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