Power Substation / Premium Content / Protection / Testing and

Commissioning

Practical guidelines for

protection system
engineering
By Edvard Csanyi Apr, 1st 2024

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Substation Control and Protection

Relay protection and the whole bunch of protection
system engineering around the substation are quite
interesting from the point of view of creativity. The
Control and Protection System technology in a
substation is very important because it watches
over, protects, and manages the flow of electricity.
Because substations are getting more complicated,
more power is being sent, and fault currents are
getting higher, which means that control and safety
equipment has to work better.

Practical guidelines for protection system engineering (photo

credit: Warna RS Sdn. Bhd.)

The main goals are to have the lowest possible life

cycle costs and the most reliable service available.
To get total reliability, it’s also important that the
system is flexible and easy to manage.

To get low life cycle costs, it’s important to pick the

right main equipment, whether to use AIS, GIS, or
hybrid switchgear, the switching arrangement, the
transformer size, and other things. Then decisions
are made about the control and protection
equipment, such as whether to use traditional or
computerized control equipment, single or
redundant protection systems, the design and
voltage of the battery system, the type of battery to
use, and so on.

When making decisions, it’s important

to think about how things will likely go
in the future. Any changes made later
will always cost a lot more than a choice
made at the start that took future needs
into account.

Some general rules for Engineering of Protection

System are given in this scientific article. These
could be improved by the utility if it thought it was
important based on its own needs and ways of
doing things. SCADA systems control and watch,
send signals, and record events most of the time
these days. This article doesn’t talk about how to
design a SCADA system.

Table of Contents:

1. Engineering Of Protection System:

1. Redundancy (Two Groups of Protection
Systems)
2. Instrument Transformer Circuits
3. Physical Location of Relay Protection
Panels
4. Exchange of Information Between Two
Subsystems:
1. Start and Block of Auto-Reclose
2. Start of Breaker Failure Protection
5. Arrangement of Trip Circuits
6. Trip Unit
7. Direct Trip of Remote End Breaker
8. Trip Circuit Supervision
9. Cabling
10. Capacitive Discharges
11. Alarming and Testing
12. Design Of Fault Clearing System
2. DC Distribution (Auxiliary Power System):
1. DC Distribution to Different Equipment
2. DC Supervision
3. Design Of Control and Protection Panel:
1. Terminals Inside a Panel
4. Fault Signaling
5. Interlocking
6. Documentation
7. BONUS! Download Guide for the Operation
and Maintenance of Power Plant Equipment
(PDF)

1. Engineering Of Protection
System
1.1 Redundancy (Two Groups of
Protection Systems)
In cases when there are two sets of direct current
(DC) sources, the relays are electrically and
physically split into two groups in order to achieve
redundancy and facilitate the removal of a
protection for maintenance purposes while the
protected equipment is in operation. The
process of grouping is implemented to the
maximum extent feasible, ensuring that each group
is capable of autonomously performing protective
functions with almost equal redundancy.

The establishment of interconnection between

these two groups is generally not recommended.
Nevertheless, if it is absolutely essential, the level
of linkage should be limited to the absolute
minimum.

A common technique employed in redundant

systems is:

1. The utilization of redundant batteries is

recommended.
2. Two sets of safeguards are employed, each
with the ability to fully execute the protective
function.
3. The objective is to achieve maximum physical
segregation between the two groups.
4. The instrument transformers employ distinct
cores for the two protection groups.
5. Due to budgetary considerations, the circuit
breakers are not duplicated. The utilization of
duplicated trip coils is observed.
6. Cables should be arranged in distinct cable
ducts or layers to the greatest extent feasible.

The absence of duplicate circuit breakers

results in the failure of a breaker to
function, hence preventing the
resolution of the fault. To rectify the
deficiencies, it is necessary for the
adjacent circuit breakers to be operated
instead. In situations where the failure of
“remote” protection relays to detect faults
necessitates local backup, the inclusion
of a breaker failure relay becomes
imperative.

The breaker failure relay quantifies the residual

fault current that remains flowing through the
breaker following the anticipated tripping event,
and subsequently triggers the tripping of all
neighboring circuit breakers.

Figure 1 – Redundant power supplies within the

central and bay units of the decentralized busbar
protection

Figure 1 – Redundant power supplies within the central and

bay units of the decentralized busbar protection

Figure 2 – Busbar protection power supply

using two batteries and an auxiliary relay to
commute between batteries

Figure 2 – Busbar protection power supply using two batteries

and an auxiliary relay to commute between batteries

Go back to Content Table ↑

1.2 Instrument Transformer Circuits

In most cases, instrument transformers are not
duplicated, but rather equipped with different
cores to accommodate the two sub-systems.
Various cores are interconnected with redundant
protective methods. It is advisable to refrain from
using a single current transformer core to supply
power to both sub-systems. It is necessary to
supply each Busbar protection with power from a
separate CT core.

To mitigate the potential for open circuits at the

terminating point or within the terminal itself, it is
advisable to refrain from utilizing any current loop
that supplies many panels. This precaution is
particularly crucial when the loop is equipped with
a disconnectable connection. Typically, both
subsystems are linked to the identical CT junction
box.

Therefore, it is typically not feasible to

achieve physical isolation within
distinct CT junction boxes.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to transmit
distinct cores of the CT using separate
wires.

It is customary to have distinct secondary windings

for the two sub-systems in voltage transformer
circuits. In certain instances where two windings
are unavailable, such as at lower voltage levels, it
is advisable to employ distinct fuse groups within
the marshalling box to divide the circuits. The high
availability of voltage transformers renders this
option generally acceptable.

Figure 3 – Dedicated current transformer wiring

panel in air insulated substation

Figure 3 – Dedicated current transformer wiring panel in air

insulated substation

Go back to Content Table ↑

1.3 Physical Location of Panels

The physical placement of the protection relays
and auxiliary relays in the panels is crucial when
utilizing sub-divided systems. It is recommended to
employ distinct panels for the protection equipment
of group A and group B. The rationale behind
implementing physical split-up is to mitigate any
issues that may arise from a singular incident,
such as a cable fire or mechanical damage in a
panel, affecting both sets of protective measures.

Additionally, it facilitates the ability to work on one

group while the other group is engaged in service.

Nevertheless, in certain instances where the sub-

systems occupy little space, it is deemed
permissible to house the equipment for both sub-
systems within a single panel. There is a little
likelihood of cable fire or any other mechanical
damage that may impact the two systems within
the same panel. The issue of circuit mix-up
resulting from errors during the processes of
erection, commissioning, or maintenance
necessitates careful consideration and the
implementation of preventive measures.

Based on what has already been said, it

may be concluded that a crucial aspect
of panel design involves the explicit
indication of the object to which it
pertains. When employing sub-divided
systems, it is imperative to explicitly
specify the sub-system to which it
belongs. This encompasses the
implementation of distinct equipment
segregation and explicit labeling of
various portions, as well as the
segregation of components between sub-
systems or objects. The process of
separation within the panel involves the
physical segregation of terminal groups
to accommodate the various protected
devices within the panel.

Any equipment employed in the protective system,

as well as additional supplementary relays linked to
the identical battery system or fuse groups, must
be consolidated and unambiguously designated.
The equipment responsible for closing, interlocking,
and other related functions is situated within the
protection panel.

Figure 4 – Relay protection panel

Figure 4 – Relay protection panel

Go back to Content Table ↑

1.4 Exchange of Information Between

Two Subsystems
One of the primary principles employed in the
utilization of sub-divided systems is to prevent
signal exchange between the two systems. To
the greatest extent feasible, sub-systems should
function entirely autonomously from one another.
This provides the utmost level of security during
maintenance and other related activities,
encompassing both human and equipment failures.

Nevertheless, in the majority of instances, certain

signals are necessary to be transmitted to another
sub-system. The signals that are most frequently
encountered are:

1.4.1 Start and Block of Auto-Recloser

The duplication of auto-recloser is typically avoided
due to speed limitations associated with two
units, as well as the absence of significant
consequences resulting from a failure to
autoreclose.

The sub-systems involved in the initiation and

termination of the autoreclose function engage in
the exchange of various signals.

Further Study – Auto-reclose schemes for re-

energising the line after a fault trip

Auto-reclose schemes for re-

energising the line after a fault
trip
Faults on overhead lines fall into one of three
categories: transient, semi-permanent and permanent.
80-90% of faults on any overhead line network are
transient in nature. The remaining 10%-20% of …
Continue reading

EEP - Electrical Engineering Portal 2

1.4.2 Start of Breaker Failure Protection

The Breaker failure relay/function (BFR) isn’t
duplicated in redundant systems, just like the Auto-
recloser function. However, the rationale behind
this is entirely different. The Breaker failure
function necessitates stringent security measures
to prevent unnecessary trippings and
duplication, resulting in enhanced dependability
but a deterioration in security.

Given the statistically low risk of breaker failure,

prioritizing security is of greater significance.

The provision of the BFR function is limited to a

single system, often within the Group A protection
system. It is now usual practice to provide DC
changeover to the BFR relay when using a
single BFR, as this enhances reliability and
availability. When the breaker failure function is
repeated, such as when duplicate busbar
protection is employed, it is important to
acknowledge the associated security issues.

The transmission of data between the

systems must be managed with
meticulous attention to avoid issues,
such as when maintenance is performed
on one of the systems. Interface relays
should be positioned either internally or
externally, ideally in a distinct and clearly
marked section within one of the panels
only.

In order to facilitate the identification and

disconnection of the appropriate terminals during
the separation of sub-systems, it is imperative that
the terminals are prominently displayed within the
panel.

Figure 5 – Functional diagram of a Breaker

Failure Relay

Figure 5 – Functional diagram of a Breaker Failure Relay

Go back to Content Table ↑

1.5 Arrangement of Trip Circuits

The trip circuits are a significant component of the
protective system. The occurrence of a trip circuit
failure will inevitably result in the failure to
activate the circuit breaker. As previously stated,
the breaker is not duplicated due to cost
considerations. The only practical way to enhance
reliability is by incorporating two trip coils on the
breaker.

This approach aims to mitigate operational failure

issues related to DC supply, wiring, and trip coils in
CBs. However, it does not provide any benefits in
terms of mechanical issues within the CB operating
mechanism.

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MORE INFORMATION

Edvard Csanyi
Electrical engineer,
programmer and founder of
EEP. Highly specialized for
design of LV/MV
switchgears and LV high
power busbar trunking (<6300A) in power
substations, commercial buildings and industry
facilities. Professional in AutoCAD programming.

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