G.R. No.

159270
August 22, 2005

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,

FACTS:

Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO)

transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the

Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges

along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it

requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to

enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) via Dau-Sta.

Ines from Mabalacat, and via Angeles from Magalang, and exit at San

Fernando going to its milling factory.

On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a

memorandum of Agreement (MOA), where the latter was allowed to enter

and pass through the NLEX.

On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for

damages against PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila, Branch 16.

They alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and

maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks

with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; that

PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed

to put up emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of

PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries

sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaiz’s car.

In its answer, PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the

North Luzon Expressway, to keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the

mishap was due to the “unreasonable speed” at which Arnaiz’s car was

running, causing it to turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of

flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of the mishap was

PASUDECO’s gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and its failure to

clear and mop up the area completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty

of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed.

On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of

Latagan, dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of

evidence. The case as against the PNCC was, likewise, dismissed.

The petitioner argues that the respondents should bear the

consequences of their own fault or negligence, and that the proximate and

immediate cause of the mishap in question was respondent Arnaiz’s reckless

imprudence or gross negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PNCC is jointly liable with PASUDECO.

RULING:

Yes. The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right,

privilege, and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities

covering the expressways, collectively known as the NLEX. Concomitant

thereto is its right to collect toll fees for the use of the said expressways and

its obligation to keep it safe for motorists.

plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for

whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect

between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred

by the plaintiff. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault

or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this

Chapter.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the

alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an

ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,

then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard

supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet

paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case

is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the

situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,

blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence

and determines liability by that.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act

whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is

this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence

is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence

of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to

refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its

Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition

born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to

exist.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the

requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted

cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened

sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the

juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have

foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists

passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning.

The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between

PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was not a party thereto. We

agree with the following ruling of the CA: Both defendants, appellant

PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of

the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance

of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of

a private agreement, to other parties.

PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles

of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks

left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of

care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should

have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered

sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway. The records show, and as

admitted by the parties, that Arnaiz’s car ran over scattered sugarcanes

spilled from a hauler truck.

It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the

NLEX who are not privies to the MOA.

PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper

harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning

devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and

proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are

jointly and severally liable.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is

solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the

concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,

although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and

proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to

determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of

them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence

resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors

and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the

Civil Code.

Thus, with PASUDECO’s and the petitioner’s successive negligent

acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting

damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.

Anent respondent Arnaiz’s negligence in driving his car, both the trial

court and the CA agreed that it was only contributory and considered the

same in mitigating the award of damages in his favor as provided under

Article 2179 of the New Civil Code.

Members: - Buhayang, Shayne Karylle - Sagut, Esel Zarina