_,.'"'.

A
also looks
·
at the mind in another pra
· t d t
~ - ----sses onen e oward problem s 0 1vmg.
'
.
CHAPTER 10:

gmatJc way
• ·
That 18
S
YMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

· involves
· ,, th e mind
351
"
I I
I

...ht. p.ru- . The real w Id · ·

tbO"»;ct it is the function of the mind to try to s I h or 1s nfe with prob-
lCJllS, te rnore effectiv ely in the world. o ve t ose problems and permit people
toOpet' .. , .

~Y -" of Mead's
t.{u1,11 •
thinking in general,
f
• 1
and especial ly on the m ·md , mvo . .
ves his ideas on
tbe~Y ~portan t co~cept ~. the self, basically the ability to take oneself as an ob-
. t·, the self . t
the pecµhar ab1hty to be both subj. ect and obJ·ect • A s 1s
JCC • 1s rue of all
"'cad's maJor concept •
s, the self presupp oses a social process·• commun·1ca1mn - among
!YI
bulllaJJS. Lower ammals do not have selves, nor do human infants at birth. The self
arlseS .-Ith ~evelo~ me~t and throu~~ so:ial activity and social relationships. To Mead,
it is ~Sibl e to rmagme a self ansmg m the absence of social experiences. However
once a'Self has develop ed, it is possible for it to continue to exist without social con~
tact. 'lb.us, Robinso n Crusoe develop ed a self while he was in civilization, and he con-
tinued to have it when he was living alone on what he thought for a while was a
deserllld island. In other words, he continued to have the ability to take himself as an
objd Once a self is develop ed, people usually, but not always, manifest it. For ex-
ampl6. the self is not involve d in habitual actions or in immediate physiological expe-
. rienc-.-c>f pleasure or pain.
'Illtelf is dialectic ally related to the mind. That is, on the one hand, Mead argues
that 9 t>ody is not a self and become s a self only when a mind has developed. On the
otherllnd, the self, and its reflexiv eness, is essential to the development of the mind .
Of .._, it is impossi ble to separate mind and self, because the self is a mental
p ~ Howeve r, even though we may think of it as a mental process, the self is a so-
cialflllcess. In his discussi on of the self, as we have seen in regard to all other mental
~h~a , M~ad resists th~ idea of lodging it ~n consciousness and in~tead embe~s it
msolll- experien ce and social processe s. In this way, Mead seeks to give a behav1or-
isticw.se of the self: "But it is where one does respond to that which he addresses to
anotlfrand where that respons e of his own become s a part of his conduct, where he
1 not Oily hears himself but respond s to himself, talks and replies to himself as trul y as
s tbe .... person replies to him, that we have behavio r in which the indivi~u a~s become
s ~ to themsel ves" (1934/1 962:139 ; italics_ addedr ~h_e sel~, the~, IS Simply an -
e 0~ of the overall social process of which the md1v1dualfl is a· part. ..
-.ta..:._ · ·• 0 r the •·1b1lttv
1t ·~ neral mechan ism for the develop ment of the self st res they 1 e x ivt Y, _ ·
to ~ - d act As a resu lt .
f"lllll'Urselves unconsc iously into others' places an to ac · a ti , 1 As · Meati s,l\s.... ,.
1- are able to examine themsel ves as others would examme , en · ~ ·
. 'e •)f individua l
e · b k O f the ex pencm: , tlict·ncr nf the
turmng-·, ac ' . ti , •' XJ)L' fi
I- Y means of reflexiv eness-th
. .e th broug 11t 111 1o . i t:,.
us
,
hril to take the
hltnself-t hat the whole social process ts r , •
1 · h •n ·,blc t 11e 11wi, 1t fl1' adjust ham
d w \IC ~ '
.
-
j,
uals involved in it·' it is by such means,
.111 d" . l I . ·1bk Cl)l\Sl h i .
, . • iisl)'
.
oftbe other toward himself, that the ,v,otia ,_i-.: . , j~,c n social act in ter ms
g 111
that process, and to modify the resultant process .my g
JI -1justme nt to it. ( l\fra d. I4 J..i.: I% 2: u 4 )
1111 .:

352 PART lWO: MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY: THE MAJOR SCHOOLS

• their conversations with others. That .

The self also allows people to take part m • ble to monitor what is bein 1~' 01\c
is aware of what one is saying and as a resu1t 18 a g said and
to determine what is going _to ~e.said next. t be able to get "outside themselves" s
In order to have selves, md1v1duals mus can become objects to themselves. o that
they can evaluate themselves, so th at. th ey experiential field as they put l'o do
· b · 11 t th selves m the same every
this, people as1ca ~ pu . em ant art of that experiential situation, and people lllu •
1
one else. Every~ne 1s an mJ>?rt P be able to act rationally in a given situar st
take themselves mto account if they ar~ to h Ives impersonally, objective} ion.
Having done this, they seek to examine t emse . Y, and
without emotion. · . directly. They can do so on! • .
t experience themse1ves YU1d1.
However, peop1e canno .. th and viewing themselves fro
rectly by putting themselves in the p~s1t10n of_o ers 's self can be that of a p rt~ that
. Th d int from which one views one a icular
standpomt. e Slan po . h le As Mead puts it most generally "It ·
individual or that of the social group as a w O • ' , 1s
only by taking the roles of others that we have been able to come back to ourselves"
(1959:184-185) .

. Child Deve~ Me.:i is very interested in the gene~is of the sel_f. .He sees ilie
conversation of gestures as the background for the ~elf, but it does not m:olve a self,
since in such a conversation the people are not taking themselves as obJects. Mead
traces the genesis of the self through two stages ~n-child~ood ~evelopment. .
Play Stage The first stage is the play stage; it is dunng this stage that children learn
to take the attitude of particular others to themselves. While lower animals also play,
only human beings "play at being someone else" (Aboulafia, 1986:9). Mead gives the.
example of a child playing (American) ."Indian": '~This means that the child has acer- :
tain set of stimuli which call out in itself the responses they would call out in others, and
which answer to an Indian" (Mc,ad, 1934/1962:150). As a result of such play, the child
learns to become both subjtct and object and begins to become able to build a self..
However, it is a limited self because the child can take only the role of distinct and sep·
arate others. Children may play at being "mommy" and "daddy" and in the process de·
velop the ability to evaluate themselves as their parents, and other specific individuals,
do. However, they lack a more general and organized sense of themselves.
Game Stage lt is the next stage, the game stage, that is required if the person is to
develop a self in the full sense of the term. Whereas in the play stage the child takes 1.he
role of discrete others, in the game stage the child must take the role of everyone else1~·
volved in the game. Furthermore, these different roles must have a definite relationship
to one another. In illustrating the game stage, Mead gives his famous example of a base· ·
ball (or, as he calls it, "ball nine") game: . . . . . , .
8
· But in game where a number of individuals are involved then the child taking one role '
tb d
. mus e rea y to take !h.e ro!e of everyone else. If he gets ,in a ball nine he must haveone
the ·;
responses of each position mvolved in his own position . He must know what every .
eIse IS
· gomg
· to dO m · order to carry out his own play. He · has to take all of ese r0Jes,
th rne ··
They do not all have lo be present in C:ODICiousness at the same time, but at sothe .
.;:-1s ~ ~ lo have three or four individuals present in bis own attitude, such;,~
ne who IS gomg to throw the ball, the one who is going to catch it, and so on.
 CHAPTER 10:
SYMeouc INTERACT IONISM
353
ree p
lllust be, in some deg , resent · h' .
so or , •~ is own make-u
. t of. responses of such others
ganized that the attitu~·e ~~ th e game, then, there
18 aii to attitudes of the other. one calls out th e .ap-
. , .
. ..
(Mead, 1934/1962: ISI)
· ·.· , ,, stage, child ren are not organiz ed wholes becau th • .
It .
. Mead' s vie . . se ey play at a se nes
.. di' ,,., As a resu , m
,.....;e w they 1ack defm ue . wev .
of dis-
. . . personalities. Ho er, in the
e1r- .;ja M~ ' such orgamzation begins and a def'tntte personal it
...flle 11 9~ . bl
on in org anized rou Ystarts to emerge. Chil-
e to fun cti
,-- 1,egib. to bec om e a
cific group. g ps a , most
nd important, to de-
~~ t the y wi ll_ do wi t~i n a spe
..
. ~..
of M d'
Odj,
··~ Other . The game stage yieldsd one oth . hea s_ ( e of:87
1959 ) best-known
oth er. Th e gen era lize
that ~~, .-the gene ral ize d er ts t e attitud . the ent·ue com-
uJar ~~ eball game the attitude of th . The abil-
.-,nity qal; in the exafmphle of the bas . . ' s
e entire team
If· "O •
I 1 essent ial to the
It is 111 -
.,., 10 • the d ro e o t e genera· 1zed oth. er 1s e · n1Y m so thfar as he
'es'' ,., ~. · f h soc ial group to wh ich he belongs toward e orga-
e org am zed
takes die IL11"" . es o t
· I · · of such activities in which tha
t group is
ti ve soc 1a act1v1 ty or set
aiz,ed, ~ r a It is also crucial
es he lop a com ple te self" (Mead, 1934/1962:155).
the
ie)f
'
da t .
~ :db de
be able to ev
other jd not merely
ve

fro m
alu
the
ate
vie
the
wp
ms elv
oin t
es
of
fro
dis
m
cre
the point of view of the generalized
te others. Taking the role of the
gen-
abstract
ead n tha t of dis cre te oth ers, allows for the possibility of
~ #>ther, rat he r tha es the full
19 59 :19 0). Here is the way Mead describ
!arn
· 'ti&d ob jec tiv ity (M ead ,
~ nt of the self:
es of others
lay,
che s its ful l dev elo pm ent by organizing these individual attitud
rea reflection
the and by thus becoming an individual
organized social or group attitudes, oth ers are in-
:er-
sys tem atic pat ter n of soc ial or group behavior in which it and
ral individual's experience in terms of
and ich ent ers as a wh ole into the
pattern wh vous sys-
h the mechanism of the central ner
hild • group attitudes which, throug
the individual attitudes of others. 962: 158)
;elf. es toward himself, just as he takes (Mead, 1934/1
;ep- -1. . ,

d by
de- st be a memb er of a community_and be directe
.als, laA,W o&ds, to have a self, one mu While play requires only pieces of selves, the
the common to the community.
. If b t ·t is also
s to • a co he ren t self. lized other essential to the se ' u I . •.
in th
• tak le of the gen era p req uires that md1 -
.. • A
the 18, g e ro
of org anized gro up act1v1 ttes. grou 1· d other. The
dn- ~ de ve lop me nt
. h th ttitudes of'tythe genera ize
. .~ a to give priority to the so-
,hip .their activities in accord wit 1har ~opens1 'nfluences the behavior of
fam
ase- other also represents Mead's
ed oth er that t e group I
)t ~ through the generaliz
. w. At the individual lev
. t of vie . el,
:. ,-. \.· , .,,. tic pom .
role . .
fro m a pragm a . ber of the larger. society
·
looks at the sel f efficient mem ected of them m a given
! the
s the individu al to be ~ mo r; do what is exp
,one 0

)]eS, ie self, people are more hkely

. ts out that he means
ome ;· , " •
. clear as Aboulafia (1986:198) pom '

,......
...._________~,.,_
I
·' . , , " 't s
; the ,. , 1 1 family).
uses the term "games, 1 the
bese responses (for examp e,
354 PART TWO· ORY: THE MAJOR SCHOOLS
· MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL THE

. ns, they are more lik

situation s ·
. · mce people often try to live up to gro up exp ectatio
ien cie s tha t com e fro m failin g to do what the group ex cly
to avoid the ineffic nation in society as a whole . Be~
:~-
th sel f allo ws for gre ate r coo rdi
~ur_ _ermore, the can oper SC
ls _can be cou nte d on to do wh at is expected of them, the group ate
rnd1vidua
more effective ly.
d _us _to believe
rall discuss!on of the self, mi~ht _lea
The pr~ceding, as well as the ove mi sts ~nd that there is htt!e md1vidu ality
,
ors are litt le mo re tha n con for
t?at Mead s act d other. But
ryo ne is bus y con for mi ng to the expectations of the generahze
smce eve mon struc-
cle ar tha t eac h sel f is dif fer ent from all others. Selves share a com
Mead is lation. In addition, it is clear that
eiv es uni que bio gra phi cal art icu
ture, but each self rec er but that there are many generalized
oth-
ply one gra nd gen era lize d oth
there is not sim in society. People, therefore, have
multi-
, bec aus e the re are ma ny gro ups
ers in society que set of
era lize d oth ers and , as a res ult, multiple selves. Each person's uni
ple gen
her dif fer ent fro m eve ryo ne els e. Furthermore, people need not aC-:
selves makes him or thin gs and seek to make them better.
We
nit y as it is; the y can ref orm
cept the commu is forced
cha nge the com mu nity bec aus e of our capacity to think. But Mead
are able to s: "The onl y way
this issu e of ind ivid ual cre ativ ity in familiar, behavioristic term
to put
aga ins t the dis app rov al of the ent ire community is by setting up a
in which we can react se ~mt-votes the one we find ... he may
mu nity wh ich in a cer tain sen
higher sort of com voices of
him sel f ove r aga ins t it. Bu t to do that he has to comprehend the
stand out by ich is more
and of the fut ure . Th at is the onl y way the self can get a voice wh
the past rds , to stand up
voi ce of the com mu nit y" (19 34/1962:167-168). In other wo
than the
er, the ind ivid ual mu st con stru ct a still larger generaliz ed other,
to the generalized oth fro m the past and the future , and then
.
y fro m the pre sen t but als o
composed not onl ·
·
respond to it. "I" and the
ide nti fie s two asp ect s, or pha ses , of the ·self, which he labels the
Mead "The self is ·
dis tin ctio n, see Athens, 1995). As Mead puts it,
"me" (fo r a cri tiq ue of this ble phases" i
y a soc ial pro ces s goi ng on with these two distinguisha
essent iail t the "I" and "me" are processes ·
im por tan t to bea r in mi nd tha
(1934/1962:178). It is "th ings."
'
ces s of the sel f; the y are not
within the larger pro

e "I" is the im me dia te res pon se of an individual to oth ers. It is

"I" and "Me" Th asp ect of the self. People do not know001iJ1
red icta ble , and cre ativ e
the incalculable, unp wh at that response will be he does
1;
"B ut
advance what the act ion of the
.
"I"
Per
wil
hap
l
s
be:
he wiU ma ke a brilliant play or an error. The re· f
know and nobody els e kno ws f
te experience is uncert ain " (l\fead,
sponse to that situatio n
are
as
nev
it app
er
ear
tot
s
ally
in
aw
his
are
im
of
me dia
the ''I, " and through it we surpris e ou~·
l
1934/19~2:175). ':"e er the act has been carrie d out. ThU ~ -.
s. We kno w the "I" on ly aft 1
selves with our action at stress on the "I" for fou~ ~~; ;
Me ad lay s gre
we kn o~ th~ ' _I'' only in our me mo rie s.
1 st , It ~~ key source of_ novelty in the social pro
cess. Second, Mead bd_ie tl'~
sons: ~ ~ ! por tan t val ues are located. Third, the "I" con s111ude·
that It I~ m the I tha t our mo st im to .·10
all see k,- the rea liza tio n of the self. It is the "I" that permit s us · tor'
something that we " ~m · ally, Mead sees an evolutionary process in 111 ~ s~1ci·
velop a "d ef'm!'t e p~rs~~aI·tty.. ·
.
1ttv ~ soc 1eh es are do mi nat ed more by "m e" whiJe in modein ·
w~tch peo~Je m pnm
of "I.''
et1es there 1s a greater component
 CHAPTER 10:
SYMBOLIC INTERAc
TIONISM
355
The "I" gives Mead's theoretical .
.h . M , system some h
ity. Wit out It, ead s actors would b muc -needed dyn• .
. . . e totally d0 · am1srn a d
trots. Wath at, Mead as able to deal with th mmated by external . n creativ-
figures in history (for example Einste. ) ~ changes brought about not :n~ internal con- i
It is the "I" that makes these changes pm ~btlalso by individuals on a dan Ytby the great
oss1 e s· Y- o-day b ·
and "me," the great historical figures are . mce every personality is a . as1s.
. seen as havin 1 rn1x of "I"
most others have. But m day-to-day situat· g a arger proportion of "I"
· h • tons, anyone's "I" than
to change m t e social situation. Unique . may assert itself and 1 d
. . ness 1s also br h . ea
through the b10graph1cal articulation of each . d' 'd oug t mto Mead's syst
. . m 1v1 ual 's "I" d " ,, em
cific ex1genc1es of each person's life give him h . an . me. That is, the spe-
The "I" reacts against the "me ,, wh' h . ohr :r a un~que mix of "I" and "me."
, ic is t e orgamzed t Of .
which one himself assumes" (Mead, 193411962. ) se attitudes of others
· f h 1· ·175 · 1n other words the " " ·
d
a option o t e genera 1zed other. In contrast to the "I ,, . , _me is the
"me"· the "me" involves consc· . .. ' people are conscious of the
' mus respons1b1hty. As Mead sa s "Th ' ' .
ventional, habitual individual" (1934/1962 .197) Co l: • t Y 'd ~ me is a con-
. • n1orm1s s are ommated by "me ,,
although everyone-whatever his or her degree of conform 't -b d '
b t . l" ,, I . h i y as, an must have
su stan 1a. me. . t 1st rough the "me" that society domi·nates th · d' ·ct
. e m iv1 ua1. Indeed,'
Mead defmes the idea of social control as the dominance of the expression of the " "
over the expression of the "I." Later in Mind, Self and Society, Mead elaborates 0 ::is
ideas on social control:
Social control, as operating in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and
extensively over individual behavior or conduct, serving to integrate the individual and
his actions with reference to the organized social process of experience and behavior in
which he is implicated .... Social control over individual behavior or conduct operates
by virtue of the social origin and basis of such [self-] criticism. That is to say, self-
criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled socially. Hence social
he laoeli ili1 t control, so far from tending to crush out the human individual or to obliterate his self-
Meaa rulii('ii conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually constitutive of and inextricably
associated with that individuality.
dislin~uii~i\11, (Mead, 1934/1962:255)
, anu~ "n/~1r
,~~
Mead also looks at the "I" and "me" in pragmatic terms. The "me" allows the ind ~-
. d h"l h "I" kes the change of soc1-
vidual to live comfortably in the social worl , w 1 e t .e ma. d ·t t 8 steady
f 1·t tO allow 1t to funct10n, an
1 ge s
h
ety possible. Society gets enoug con Y °~ . Th "I" and the "me" are
infusion of new developments to prevent It from st a~na! 1~dg. e d society to function
. d 11 w both mdivt ua 1s an
thus part of the whole social process an a 0

more effectively.

Society ' .
. : . h ongoing social
· · ty to mean t e · th
d the term socie , in shaping e
At the most general level, Mea uses h lf Given its importancet level soci-
· d and t e se • A not 1er '
process that precedes both the mm . ortance to Mead. t a by the individ-
mind and self, society is clearly of centra1fimpponses that are taken ov~r ty around with
· d set o res . y soc1e .
ety to Mead represents the organize . . sense individuals carr selves. Mead a1so
ual in the form of the "me." Thus, ': th;;_criticism, to control them
them, giving them the ability th roug se
 356
PARTTWo:
MODERN soc,oL )
OGICAL THEORY: THE MAJOR SCHOOLS 1"
i
deals· w 1·th th e evoJ 1· ti·
. u ion of · t
\
society, in spite of .1 s~ciety. But Mead has relatively little to say expr .
tio~s lie in his tho~,.~ centrah~y in his theoretical system. Hi~ most importa~~•~ly~~11Jt;·
societal (macr ) g ts on ~Ind and self. Even John Baldwm, who sees a rn C<'. ntr1~uJ:
nents of M d~ component tn Mead's thinking, is forced to admit: "The macroUc.:hC< ll'lr11t:',..
· ea s theo f 1
At a more .. re ica_ system are not as well developed as the micro'' (l 986~l'l1!)(1,;~
1
. . specific societal level Mead does have a number of things· to say ·, 23! ·,t
Soc).,a1 inst t ·
l u_tzons. Mead broadly defines an institution as the "common res <thciur;
th e communi ty" or " the 1·1fe habits of the commumt . y" (1934/19 62:261, 26 .,Ponse •.
M, 4 , · in ~
h e~d, .1~36 :376). More specificalJy, he says that "the whole community ac~~li~e alSiil,
t e individual under certain circumstances in an identical way ... there is an idow_ard :;
response on the part of the whole community under these conditions . We cal) t~;hca\ ·
f?rmation of the institution" (Mead, 1934/1962:167). We carry this organized set ~/~te
htudes around with us, and they serve to control our actions, largely through the "ni ~
Education is the process by which the common habits of the community (the in e._
t~tion) are "internalized" in the actor. This is an essential process, since, in Mea~'.-;
view, people neither have selves nor are genuine members of the community until the;·
can respond to themselves as the larger community does. To do so, people must have
internaliz ed the common attitudes of the community. . •
But again Mead is careful to point out that institutions need not destroy individualiry
or stifle creativity. Mead recognizes that there are "oppressive, stereotyped , and ultra-
conservat ive social institutio ns-like the church-w hich by their more or less rigid
and inflexible unprogressiveness crush or blot out individuality" (1934/1962 :262).
However, he is quick to add: "There is no necessary or inevitable reason why social
institutions should be oppressive or rigidly conservative, or why they should not rather ,
be, as many are~ flexible and progressive, fostering individuality rather than discourag-
ing it" (Mead, 1934/1962:262). To Mead, institutions should define what people ought
· to do only in a very broad and general sense and should allow plenty of room for indi-
viduality and creativity. Mead here demonstrates a very modern conception of social
institutions as both constraining individuals and enabling them to be creative individu·
als (see Giddens, 1984).
What Mead lacks in his analysis of society in general, and institutions in particular,1 ,
is a true macro sense of them in the way that theorists like Marx, Weber, and Durkheim ·
dealt with this level of analysis. This is true in spite of the fact that Mead does bav~ a
notion of emergence in the sense that the whole is seen as more than the sum of_its
parts. More specifically, "Emergen ce involves a reorganization, but the reorganizat!On
brings in something that was not there before. The first time oxygen and hydrogen
come together, water appears. Now water is a combinat ion of hydrogen and ~~~~: ·
0

but water was not there before in the separate elements" (Mead, 1934/196Z. ,
· sne,5
However, Mead is much more prone to apply the idea of emergenc e to consciou frofll
than to apply it to the larger society. That is, mind and self are seen as emergent

. .. . . ,. , . .. . . . be defineS
· "Ibere are at least two places where Mead offers a more macro sense of society. At one poin_t1 in an
social institutions as "organized forms of group or social activity" (Mead, 1934/1962:261 )..Earl ~r,,y and as
argument reminiscent of Comte, he offers a view of the family as the fundamental unit within socie
the base of such larger units as the clan and state. .
 INTERACTIONISM
; I
CHAPTER 10: SYMBOLIC 357

eo ver, Mea d is incl ined to use the term emergence me eJ t0

ess. Mor . 1
· . new or novel (D M1- r Y
. ~ a l prOC . f somethi ng 11 ·41)
er' 1973 . .
~ · ~i·ng into existence o
~i.e the C()u• .
• ·
JJ-1
tJJeBO . . .
. '

A c r i ~'eAs1c PR1Nc1PLEs
80
uC , N T e R
· · f h b as ·
1c pr in ci pl es of sy rn bo · teract1.0n
'c m
Ji
sYIA Of this chapter 1s· our d1scuss.1on o t e ge ne ral terms, this is not easy to
tf'l.e beart arac tenz e th e th eo ry in
J•• Although we try to .chh "d l1'b erately constructed vagueness" and a "resis-
tbeoir)'r• as Paul Rock says, 1t .as a e
79 ·1 8- 19 ) T h er e ar e s1.gn1'f'1cant di·fferences within sym-
10
do,ce to system~t1s • n"(19 . .
• at1o . .
m e of w hi ch are di sc us se d as we proceed.
~ - interaction1sm, so a; M an is an d M el tzer, 1978; A. Rose,
~:rne
bo symbolic interactioatnieststh(B lum er
e basic prin
, 19 69
ci ples of th e th eo ry . T he se princi ples
) ha ve tried ~o enumer
1962
include the following: e ca pacity for th ought.
als, ar e en do w ed w ith th
.,Jiuman beh'lgs, unlike lower anim
ci al interaction.
ll e capacity for th ou gh t is sh ap ed by so
e sym bo ls that aUow them to
~ arn th e m ea ni ng s, an d th
social interaction people le
eir distinctively hu m an capacity for thought. an ac tion an d
ex~ise th rry on di st in ctiv el y hu m
allow people to ca
_4>teanings and ~ymbols
ii¥raction. m ea ni ng s an d sy m bo ls th at they use in ac-
y or alter the
5 People are able to modif r in te rp re tc ;1tion of the situation.
e ba si s o f th ei
tion and interaction on th od if ic at io ns an d al te ratio ns because, in part, of
these m
6 People are able to make hi ch al lo w s th em to ex am in e possible courses
themselves, w
their ability to mteract with d di sa dv an tage s, an d th en choose one.
e advantages an
of action, assess their relativ te ra ctio n m ak e up gr ou ps and societies.
of action and in
7 .!Jie intertwined patterns