1. NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BASED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY / TAN - ANDAL v.

ANDAL

Question: Whether the evidence is sufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological
capacity if there is no expert testimony or even if there is an expert testimony of a psychologist but the
psychologist did not interfere the respondent spouse.

DOCTRINES:

1. This Court commiserates with the parties who find themselves in an unsatisfactory marriage, but the
Court emphasises that a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is limited to cases where there is a downright incapacity or
inability to assume and fulfil the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Expert opinion may be persuasive but, ultimately, the totality
of evidence must show that an adverse integral element in the personality structure of the respondent
effectively incapacitates him from accepting, and thereby complying with his essential marital obligations,
and such incapacity must be proven to exist prior to, or at the time of celebration, of the marriage of the
parties. Absent any such clear and convincing evidence, the petition must be denied. (Santos-Macabata v.
Macabata, J.Hernando)

2. The expert testimony is not always mandatory as long as the totality of evidence is sufficient to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity. The totality of evidence must still be sufficient to prove that the
incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage. (Pugoy - Solidum v. Republic,
J.Hernando)

3. Similarly, juridical antecedence of psychological incapacity may be proven by ordinary witnesses who
can describe the incapacitated spouse's past experiences or environment while growing up which may
have triggered one's particular behaviour. At any rate, the gravity of psychological incapacity must be
shown to have been caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. Thus, "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are still not accepted grounds that would
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. (Carullo v. Padua, J.
Hernando)

The Court affirmed the validity of marriage between Hannamer and Grant. To render a marriage void ab
initio under Art. 36 of the Family Code, psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

1. Gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious that such party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in the marriage

2. Juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage.
3. Incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.

The expert testimony is not always mandatory as long as the totality of evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity.

The petitioner bears the burden in showing gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurabilty.

The following parameters as provided under the case of Tan-Andal was used in this case:

1. The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage;

2. Cause by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed prior to their marriage;

3. Cause by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and

4. Proven by clear and convincing evidence

2. HUMAN RELATIONS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, EXTRAJUDICIAL POSSESSION OR SEIZURE OF LESSESEES

PROPERTIES

Question: Lessor retained or withheld the personal properties of the lessee's who failed to pay the rentals
despite this retention, the lessor still claimed payment of the arrears. Was the act of the lessor legal and
justified? - ABUSE OF RIGHT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT balance it with the right of parties to stipulate the
terms and conditions of their contract.

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,

a) act with justice,

b) give everyone his due, and

c) observe honesty and good faith.

The principle of abuse of rights sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article
19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality.

Albetz Investment Inc v. CA

We find that the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations are applicable, specifically Article 19.
Certainly, the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent with
justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving
the occupants of the house no time at all to remove their belongings therefrom. No damage worth
mentioning would have been sustained by Albetz Investments, Inc. if their men, led by the Sheriff, had
been instructed to allow said occupants to remove their personal properties, considering that this would
not have taken a considerable length of time.

MERALCO v. CA

Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its
regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner
MERALCO is engaged.

A prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the service. Failure to give such
prior notice amounts to a tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional
mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that willful injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. In the Manila Gas Corporation case, the Court held that respondents’ default
in the payment of his bills “cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages. At
most, this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages
to which respondent is entitled

ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Felipe v. Leuterio, et. Al

Whether the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical
competition. No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was merely the
privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until
they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges. The flaw
in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of
judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same
thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. Granting
that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This
is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action
should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not
against the other judges. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an
oratorical contest

ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry, is it actionable? "Mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable
wrong.
What kind of damage can be recovered? Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21.

WASSMER V. VELEZ

There is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our
ruling in Hermosisima v. CA, 109 Phil., 629, as reiterated in Estopa v. Piansay (109 Phil, 640), is that "mere
breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so. It must not be
overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity,
is not limitless as per Article 21 of said Code.

The record reveals that plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued. Their wedding was already set. And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding-My mother opposes it . . ." Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated,
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation, and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

GASHEM SHOOKT BAKSH v. CA

Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21
not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
HERMOSISIMA v. CA

Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The Court ruled
in De Jesus v. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that"the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced upon the faith of such promise". The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends
itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has
led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Solutio Indebiti and Accion en rem verso

ARTICLE 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.

Requisites for an Accion in rem verso

a) Defendant has been enriched;

b) Plaintiff suffered a loss;

c) Enrichment of defendant is without just or legal ground; and

d) Plaintiff has NO other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict.

DOCTRINES:

The rules on return of disallowed amounts are based on the civil law principles of unjust enrichment and
solutio indebiti, and which apply regardless of the good faith of the recipients. However, there may be
certain situations which may constitute bona fide exceptions to the application of solutio indebiti, one of
which is that the disallowed benefits were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered (or to be
rendered), negating the application of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti. Other exceptions are that
there will be undue prejudice, or social justice considerations. (LAMAUAN v. CA, J. Hernando)

These rules on return are based on the civil law principles of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti, and
which apply regardless of the good faith of the recipients. However, there may be certain situations which
may constitute bona fide exceptions to the application of solutio indebiti, one of which is that the
disallowed benefits were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered (or to be rendered),
negating the application of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti. Other exceptions are that there will be
undue prejudice, or social justice considerations.

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith. The parties are allowed by law to enter into stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions they may deem convenient which bind the parties as long as they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. (PNTC Colleges v. TIME REALTY, INC. , J.
HERNANDO)
3. DECLARATION OF HEIRS NOT NECESSARY FOR ORDINARY ACTION TO RECOVER PROPERTY

Question: Properties of a deceased which were fraudulently acquired by another. The heir of the deceased
filed an action to recover the property but the Defendant, present possessor, question the personality of
the heir because there was no prior declaration of heirs of the case filed for the purpose.

Remember : Treyes v. Larlar reiterated in the case of Ende v. Roman Catholic

Treyess v Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020, En Banc

• The rules laid down in previous jurisprudence which requires a prior determination of heirship in a
separate special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.

• The rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or
for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action
to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the
enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior
and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation
to the cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and
recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding only between and among the parties.

The rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The operation of
Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's death -the transmission by succession occurs at
the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have acquired ownership of
his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or
partition, or distribution." Dr. Nixon L. Treyes v. Antonio L. Larlar, et al., G.R. No. 232579, September 8,
2020

4. RIGHT OF ILLEGITIMATE OR NON-MARITAL CHILDREN TO INHERIT FROM THEIR ILLEGITIMATE GRAND

PARENTS (AMADEA AQUINO V. AQUINO) (Q: A child was born out of wedlock the father died before she
was born so her parents did not get the chance to marry. She was accepted by the family of her father ,
when the father of her father died she sought a share in her grandfather’s estate. Her uncles and aunts
denied her claim because she was an illegitimate. ARTICLE 992 will not apply it is Article 982 of the CIVIL
CODE)

In a landmark case, the Court reexamined the so-called iron curtain rule that interpreted Article 992 of the
Civil Code as barring nonmarital children from inheriting from their grandparents and other direct
ascendants, as they are covered by the term “relatives.” The Court ruled that grandparents and other
direct ascendants are outside the scope of “relatives” under Article 992. Both marital and nonmarital
children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other
ascendants. Thus, a nonmarital child’s right of representation should be governed by Article 982 of the
Civil Code, which does not differentiate based on the birth status of grandchildren and other direct
descendants.

IRON-CURTAIN RULE & THE SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS OF NON-MARITAL CHILD (AQUINO V. AQUINO, G.R.
NO. 208912 and 209018, DECEMBER 7, 2021, En Banc)

• Iron-curtain rule - Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. • The Iron Curtain Rule, embodied in Article 992 of the Civil Code,
creates an absolute bar that operates bilaterally. It prohibits an illegitimate child to succeed intestate from
the legitimate descendants, and collateral relative of his legitimate parent, and vice versa. • In Aquino, the
SC adopted a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of their
births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants—such as their grandparent—by their right of
representation.

• Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their
grandparent's estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply. Article 982 provides: ARTICLE 982. The
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should
have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions.

• The language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the
"grandchildren and other descendants" granted the right of representation.

• Applying Article 982 in situations where the grandchild's right to inherit from their grandparent is in issue
is more in accord with our State policy of protecting children's best interests and our responsibility of
complying with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

• The ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent's share
in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by
themself.

• No ruling yet on the extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be
the subject of a proper case and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed
future legislation

5. The New Adoption Law ( Q: About changes in Adoption in the Philippines from who can adopt, who
may be adopted and required documents. Compare R8552 and RA 11642 to see the difference: Adoption
is now administrative and no need to undergo thru Courts)

Any alien possessing the same qualifications for Filipino nationals may adopt under the Domestic Adoption
Act. Provided, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the
filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered. (Sps.
Park v. Liwanag, J.Hernando)

The Domestic Adoption Act enumerates persons who are qualified to adopt.

Section 4 (1) of the said act provides that:

“Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legalrights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; who is emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older then the adoptee, and who is in a position
to support and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family.”

Further, Section 4 (2) of the same Act provides that:

Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino nationals: provided, that he has
been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by
his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt
in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child.

Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that the latter has abandoned them?

Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the
parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith.

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?

The name of an individual has two parts:

(1) the given or proper name and

(2) the surname or family name.

The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs
and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

6. CO-OWNERSHIP/ RATIFICATION BY A CO-OWNER OF A SALE BY ANOTHER CO-OWNER OF A

DETERMINATE PORTION OF THE CO-OWNED PROPERTY. (THERE ARE TWO CO-OWNERS OF A PROPERTY
WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN PARTITIONED BUT ONE OF THEM SOLD ½ PORTION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER CO-OWNER. THE BUYER THEN OCCUPIED SAID PORTION MEAN
WHILE THE OTHER CO-OWNER WAS AWARE OF THE SALE AND DID NOT OBJECT TO THE BUYER TAKING
POSSESSION OF THE OTHER HALF OF THE PROPERTY. IS THE SALE VALID? TN: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VOID
CONTRACTS AND INEFFECTIVE CONTRACTS. CAPABLE OF RATIFICATION
A co-owner has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the
consent of the other co-owners. But such alienation is limited only to the portion which may be allotted
to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership under the principle of nemo dat quod
non habet (No one can give what he does not have have) (REYES V. GARCIA, J.HERNANDO)

Nonetheless, a co-owner may alienate an inchoate portion of the subject property which belongs to him
or her. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides for the rights of the co-owners over a co-owned property.

Thus, Isidoro, as one of the heirs of Julian and Marcela, has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share in
the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-heirs. However, as a mere part owner,
he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. Nemo dat quod non habet.

No one can give what he does not have. Hence, as correctly ruled by the courts a quo, Isidoro’s sale of the
remaining half of the subject property will only affect his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale.

The spouses Garcia will not only get Isidoro’s undivided share in the subject property. However, Reynaldo
Reyes’ recourse should have been a division of the common property. To demand a partition or division of
the common property is in accord with Article 494 of the Civil Code, that is, no co-owner shall be obliged
to remain in the co-ownership and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his or her share is concerned.

The spouses Garcia, as co-owner of the 231.5 sqm subject property by virtue of the deed of sale dated
August 16, 19893 1 executed by Isidoro in their favor, cannot claim a specific portion of the subject
property prior to its partition. With the subsistence of co-ownership, the spouses Garcia only owns Isidoro'
s undivided aliquot share of the subject property. The spouses Garcia and all the co-owners cannot
adjudicate to himself or herself title to any definite portion of the subject property until its actual partition
by agreement or judicial decree.

Where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy
a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to be ignored, the
possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees. Such undisturbed possession had the effect
of a partial partition of the co-owned property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which
he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted
possession thereof for a total of 49 years up to the present (Sps. Del Campo v. CA)

7. AMENDMENTS TO PD 1529 (Q: An application for original registration of land. You will be asked about
the period required for open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an
owner. Should it be counted from June 12, 1945 or the question could be what is the proof that the land
is alienable and disposable and agricultural land. Should it be the original classification of he land
certified by the DENR main office? READ RA 11573

In a decided case, the Supreme Court has ruled that the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 11573 on
the nature of proof sufficient to establish the status of land as alienable and disposable has effectively
superseded the requirements in T.A.N. Properties and Hanover. Hence, at present, the presentation of the
approved survey plan bearing a certification signed by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer stating
that the land subject of the application for registration forms part of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain shall be sufficient proof of its classification as such, provided that
the certification bears references to:

(i) the relevant issuance; and

(ii) (ii) the LC Map number covering the subject land. ((Republic v.Pasig Rizal Co., Inc. 2022 En Banc)

Pending its resolution of Republic of the Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co. Inc., the Supreme Court noted that
the applicable Property Registration Decree was amended such that persons or their predecessors-in-
interest may file an application for the registration of title to alienable and disposable land when they had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof for at least 20 years immediately
preceding the filing of such application.

8. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LANDS (Q: FORMER SWEETHEARTS A PINOY AND AN AFAM. THE AFAM
GAVE THE PINOY MONEY TO BUY LAND IN THE PHILIPPINES TO REGISTER IT IN THE NAME OF THE PINOY
BUT TO EXECUTE A MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT WITH THE AFAM GIVING THE AFAM PERPETUAL RIGHT
TO LEASE THE PROPERTY. THE OTHER POSSIBLE FACTUAL SITUATION IS THAT THE AFAM PURCHASED
LAND IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT BEFORE IT COULD BE QUESTIONED IMMEDIATELY SOLD THE LAND TO THE
PINOY. IN EITHER CASE, IS THE PURCHASE OF LAND BY THE AFAM VALID?)

CONCEPCION CHUA GAW V. SUY BEN CHUA AND FELISA CHUA (HERNANDO)

DOCTRINE: There is no implied trust if the enforcement of the trust would be against law or public policy.

SC: There was no implied trust. Implied trust is notan exception to the Constitutional ban against
ownership of Philippine lands by a non-Filipino. Concepcion's evidence do not prove the existence of an
implied trust.

Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides that there is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary

Here, Lu Pieng practically held and exercised full ownership over the subject properties. To give rise to a
purchase money resulting trust, it is essential that there be

1. an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration;

and

2. such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust, which was not
present in this case.

Further, in view of the Constitutional prohibition, the implied trust was ineffective, and Chua Chin acquired
no right of ownership whatsoever over the subject properties because non-Filipinos cannot acquire or
hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession.

Due to the Constitutional proscription against foreign ownership of lands and the evidentiary
requirements in establishing legal claims, Concepcion's claim of implied trust over the subject lots. Hence,
there is no implied trust if the enforcement of the trust would be against law or public policy
9. VALID AND CONSUMMATED SALE (Q: A SALE OF REAL PROPERTY ON INSTALLMENT BUT THE SELLER
DIED BEFORE HE COULD EXECUTE A DEED OF SALE. THE PROPERTY WAS ALREADY DELIVERED TO THE
BUYER BUT THE BUYER HAS NOT YET FULLY PAID THE PRICE BUT THE BUYER IS WILLING TO MAKE
PAYMENT TO THE HEIRS. IS THERE A VALID AND CONSUMMATED SALE? ABSOLUTE SALE V. CONTRACT
TO SELL

Absolute Sale:

In an absolute sale, ownership and title to the property are immediately transferred to the buyer upon the
meeting of the minds and the payment of the purchase price, even if full payment has not yet been made.
The transfer of ownership is complete, and the seller has no further interest in the property.

If the seller dies after an absolute sale has taken place (i.e., the sale was consummated), the property
rights would have already transferred to the buyer, and the buyer becomes the rightful owner. The buyer's
obligation to complete payment may still exist, but it becomes a debt owed to the seller's estate or heirs.

Contract to Sell:

In a contract to sell, the seller promises to sell the property to the buyer, subject to certain conditions,
typically including the full payment of the purchase price. Ownership and title do not transfer until the
conditions are met.

If the seller dies before the contract is fully performed (i.e., before the full payment is made), the buyer's
rights may not be as strong. The property may be considered part of the seller's estate, and the buyer may
need to negotiate with the seller's heirs or estate to complete the purchase.

10. MACEDA LAW : Q: A BUYER PURCHASE A REAL PROPERTY THROUGH A CONTRACT OF SALE WHERE
THE PRICE IS PAYABLE ON INSTALLMENT. THE BUYER DEFAULT IN LESS THAN 2 YEARS AFTER PURCHASE.
THE SELLER GAVE THE BUYER A GRACE PERIOD TO PAY BUT THE BUYER FAILED TO PAY SO THE SELLER
SENT A LETTER TO THE BUYER STATING THAT THE CONTRACT SHALL BE CANCELLED AFTER 30 DAYS. IS
THE PRIVATE LETTER OF CANCELLATION SUFFICIENT? TN : THE IMPORTANCE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC.
NOTARIZED THE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION AND RESCISSION.

Essential elements of a contract of sale :

(1) consent, (2) object, and (3) price in money or its equivalent.

RA No. 6552 (Maceda Law) Sec. 4 (2) :

If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel
the contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for
rescission of the contract by a notarial act. The notarial rescission contemplated in the law "is a unilateral
cancellation by a seller of a perfected contract thereunder acknowledged by a notary public and
accompanied by competent evidence of identity (INTEGRATED CREDIT AND CORPORATE SERVICES V.
CABREZA, HERNANDO)

11. REVOCATION OF AUTHORITY OF AN AGENT (Q: A DAUGTHER AUTHORIZED HER MOTHER TO

REPRESENT HER IN A CASE. DURING THE TRIAL THE MOTHER MADE SEVERAL AGREEMENT WITH OTHER
PARTIES. THE DAUTHER WAS NOT HAPPY SHE SENT A LETTER TO THE COURT REVOKING THE LETTER THAT
SHE GAVE TO HER MOTHER. THE MOTHER WAS NOT SERVED BY THE LETTER OF REVOCATION. TN:
ELEMENTS OF AGENCY AND REQUIREMENTS FOR REVOCATION OF AN AGENTS AUTHORITY.)

DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY The principal is liable only as to third persons who have been led
reasonably to believe by the conduct of the principal that such actual authority exists, although none has
been given.

Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form.

SILVA V. LO G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021 J. Hernando Law and jurisprudence recognize actual authority
and apparent authority. Apparent authority is based on the principle of estoppel. The Civil Code provides:
Article 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. x x x Article 1869.
Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his
failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority

Conchita failed to give her mother notice of the revocation and belatedly repudiated her assent to the
2006 Kasunduan which was signed by her mother on her behalf despite her full and complete knowledge
that Civil Case No. Q-89- 3137 was ongoing and that the partition of her father's estate's properties was
underway. Conchita could not feign ignorance of the action for partition and what it sought, and the
consequence of failing to inform her mother that she had revoked the SPA which she had previously given
her.

The various Orders of the RTC partitioning different properties of the estate clearly show that Concepcion
or Atty. Tuason repeatedly and consistently drew the lot on Conchita's behalf in the numerous raffles
conducted by the trial court to determine which portion of the property to be divided will go to which heir.
The second paragraph of Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that "a contract entered into in the name
of another by one who has no authority x x x shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed x x x.“ In this case, Conchita has impliedly
ratified hermother's assent to the partition on her behalf byfailing to assail the RTC's April 13, 2007
Orderand the conduct of the raffle for distribution ofthe property even after she had obtained acopy of
the Order and the Minutes of Raffle

MODES OF EXTINGUISHMENT

1. By agreement to extinguish
2. By its revocation
3. By the withdrawal of the agent;
4. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent.
5. By the dissolution of the firm or corporation which entrusted or accepted the agency;
6. By the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the agency.
7. By the expiration of the period for which the agency was constituted.

Note: the list is not exclusive: may also be extinguished by the modes of extinguishment of obligations
in general whenever they are applicable, like loss of the thing and novation.
KINDS OF REVOCATION

Revocation may either be: a. express or b. implied

A contract of agency is impliedly revoked when the principal:

1. Appoints a new agent for the same business or transaction.

2. Directly manages the business entrusted to the agent

3. After granting the general power of attorney to an agent, which results in the revocation of the
former as regards the special matter involved in the latter

NECESSITY OF NOTICE OF REVOCATION

1. As to the agent – express notice is not always necessary; sufficient notice if the party to be notified
actually knows, or has reason to know, a fact indicating that his authority has been
terminated/suspended; revocation without notice to the agent will not render invalid an act done in
pursuance of the authority.

2. As to 3rd persons – express notice is necessary. a. As to former customers – actual notice must be
given to them because they always assume the continuance of the agency relationship b. As to other
persons- notice by publication is enough.

12. LOAN WITH INTEREST BUT THE AGREEMENT ON INTEREST IS NOT IN WRITING (Q: THE PARTIES IN
THE CONTRACT OF LOAN AGREED ORALLY THAT THE LOAN WILL EARN INTEREST WITH 5% PER
MONTH. WHEN THE LOAN WAS DUE, THE BORROWER FAILED TO PAY. THE LENDERS SUED THE
BORROWERS FOR THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT AND THE INTEREST VALID AND DUE? TN: ART. 1956 OF
THE CIVIL CODE AND THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT EVEN THE PARTIES HAD AGREED TO
THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST, THE INTEREST SHALL NOT BE VALID IF NOT WRITTEN IN THE CONTRACT.)

Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. The
contract is the law between the parties. Thus, it should be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intent

Article 1956 of the Civil Code states that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated
in writing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is allowed
only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the
payment of interest was reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the
payment of monetary interest.

Q: IS NPC LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST? (DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HEIRS OF DANICO,
J. HERNANDO)

As to respondent NPC's liability to pay interest, Article 1956 of the Civil Code states that no interest
shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing
provision, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the
payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing. The
concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary interest. Thus, We have
held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law. In the
case at bar, it is clearly apparent that the two deeds of sale do not contain any stipulation as to the
payment of monetary interest. Contrary to the contention of petitioner DBP, the stipulation as to
interest in the original agricultural loan dated April 22, 1977 and the Deed of Conditional Sale dated
October 10, 1985 are not applicable to NPC as the latter is not privy to the said contracts.

13. INTEREST AS DAMAGES IN BREACH OF OBLIGATION (Q: AN OBLIGOR WHO IS GUILTY OF DELAY IN
THE PAYMENT OF OBLIGATION. ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A DEMAND, WHETHER JUDICIAL OR
EXTRAJUDICIAL, WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF DELAY? WHAT IS THE RATE? TN: ART. 1170 AND 2209
OF CIVIL CODE IN RELATION TO BSP CIRCULAR NO. 799 SERIES OF 2013)

The rates of interest stated in the guidelines on the imposition of interests, as laid down in the
landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals have already been modified in Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, which reduced the rate
of legal interest from twelve percent (12%) per annum to six percent (6%) per annum.

When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.

The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%)
per annum. (SECTION 1, BSP CIRCULAR NO. 7990

BREACH OF OBLIGATION - Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of FRAUD,
NEGLIGENCE, or DELAY, and those who in any manner CONTRAVENE THE TENOR thereof, are LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES without need for a contractual stipulation or prior agreement.

14. COMPROMISE / EFFECT/ WAYS TO REPUDIATE CHANGE OF MIND (Q: A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
BY THE PARTIES IN WHICH THEY EXCHANGE PROPERTIES, ONE PARTY WAS TO GIVE LOT A WHILE THE
LATTER WAS TO GIVE LOT C. THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WAS APPROVED BY THE COURT AND THE
JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL. LATER THE PARTY WHO GAVE LOT A REALIZED THAT THERE WAS A
MISTAKE BECAUSE SHE INTENDED TO GIVE LOT B, NOT LOT A. TN : EFFECT OF COMPROMISE OF THE
PARTIES, MORE IMPORTANTLY IF APPROVED BY THE COURT AND THERE IS A FINAL JUDGMENT)

In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. “[A] judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits” of the case. It has the effect of res judicata. These
principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.
Thus, Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there
shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

In Spouses Romero v. Tan, this court said:

It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately executory
and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
falsity of documents that vitiated the compromise agreement].

15. TORRENS TITLE AS A SOURCE OF RIGHT TO POSSESSION (Q: A BUYER WHO BOUGHT A LAND AND
OBTAINED A NEW TITLE THERETO. THE LAND, HOWEVER, WAS OCCUPIED BY SOME INDIVIDUALS
WHO WERE MERELY TOLERATED BY THE FORMER. THE BUYER SENT A DEMAND LETTER TO VACATE
THE PROPERTY. WHEN THEY REFUSED, THE BUYER FILED AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
WILL THE ACTION PROSPER? TN: POSSESSION IS AN INCIDENT OF OWNERSHIP.

QUIJANO V. AMANTE

Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the possession
is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper
remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without any allegation in
the complaint that the entry of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation, threats,
strategy or stealth. Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed
property, the CA properly ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining
who between them had the better right to possess the disputed property.

Even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned and
is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership.

Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only
a co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would be allotted to him
upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed
property in the respondent but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso share to him,
consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.

As Eliseo's successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right under Article
497 to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without
his consent. Yet, despite knowledge of Eliseo's co-ownership with his co-heirs, and of their oral
agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his right under
Article 497. Having been silent despite his ample opportunity to participate in or to object to the
partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately agreed upon by the
Quijanos.

There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the property thereby
covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the Court cannot ignore that the statements in
the petitioner's complaint about the respondent's possession of the disputed property being by
the mere tolerance of Eliseo could be the basis for unlawful detainer.
16. ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE (AN ADVERSE CLAIMANT OF A PROPERTY FILED AN ACTION FOR
QUIETING OF TITLE AGAINST THE REGISTERED OWNER ALLEGING THAT THE REGISTERED OWNER IS
NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY AND THAT HE ACQUIRED THE CERTIFICATE THRU FRAUD. TN :
REQUISITES OF QUIETING OF TITLE )

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property.

Its purpose is to secure an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to
that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim. (Heirs of Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud, G.R. No.
187633, April 4, 2016)

Article 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract,
instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by
extinctive prescription.

Requisite:

a. The plaintiff has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and

b. The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

• A “cloud on title” is an outstandinginstrument, record, claim, encumbrance orproceeding which is

actually invalid orinoperative, but which may neverthelessimpair or affect injuriously the title to
thatproperty.

The matter complained of must haveprimafacie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.The cloud on
title is a semblance of titlewhich appears in some legal form but whichis in fact unfounded. The
invalidity orinoperativeness of the instrument is notapparent on the face of such instrument, andit
has to be proved by extrinsic evidence. (Evangelista, et al. v. Santiago, G.R. No.157447, April 29, 2005)

In an action for quieting of title, the objective is for the competent court to remove the cloud by
determining the rights of the parties so that the ones entitled to the subject property may exercise
said rights without fear, disturbance, or interference from those who have no right over the same. Two
requisites must be established in order that a complaint for quieting of title may prosper. First, the
plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title or interest in the property subject of the complaint.
Second, the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding allegedly casting doubt over one's title must
be proven to be in truth invalid, void or inoperative despite the prima facie appearance of validity.
(HEIRS OF EÑANO V. SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES INC. HERNANDO, J.)

17. ANTICHRESIS (Q: EITHER 1. A FARM LAND OWNER BORROWED MONEY, AS PAYMENT HE GAVE THE
CREDITOR RIGHT TO CULTIVATE THE LAND AND HARVEST THE FRUITS UNTIL THE LOAN IS FULLY PAID.
OR 2. A LANDLORD OF A RENTED PROPERTY BORROWED MONEY AND AS PAYMENT HE ALLOWED THE
CREDITOR TO COLLECT THE RENTS IN AN ARRANGEMENT CALLED “SANGLA-UPA”. IN EITHER CASE, THE
 QUESTON IS WHETHER THE ARRANGEMENT IS VALID? TN: THE REQUISITES OF ANTICHRESIS, WHEN IT
IS EXTINGUISHED.

Antichresis is a contract which gives the creditor the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his
debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the
principal of his credit (Article 2132, Civil Code)

Antichresis involves an express agreement between parties whereby:

a. the creditor will have possession of the debtor’s real property given as security;
b. such creditor will apply the fruits of the said property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any,
then to the principal amount;
c. the creditor retains enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally paid what he owes;
and
d. should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding
from the accessory character of the agreement. Reyes vs. Heirs of Benjamin Malance, G.R. No.
219071, August 24, 2016

Note: For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that the amount of
the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of antichresis shall be
void. Bangis vs. Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo, G.R. No. 190875, June 13, 2012)

18. HOTEL KEEPERS AS DEPOSITARY (Q: A GUEST CHECK IN A HOTEL. HE HAD EXPENSIVE JEWELY WITH
HIM. HE WAS ASKED BY THE HOTEL RECEPTIONIST IF HE HAD VALUABLES FOR SAKE-KEEPING, AFRAID THAT
THE JEWELY WOULD BE STOLEN HE DID NOT TELL THE HOTEL RECEPTIONIST ABOUT THEM. SO HE JUST
KEPT THEM INSIDE HIS LUGGAGE. THE FOLLOWING DAY, AFTER TOURING THE CITY, HE ARRIVED AS HIS
ROOM FINDING THAT THE ROOM DOOR WAS BROKEN AND HIS JEWELRY WAS TAKEN. TN: REQUISITES OF
NECESSARY DEPOSIT IN HOTELS BY GUESTS, IF WHEN THE HOTEL IS LIABLE AND NOT LIABLE

When hotel-keeper liable: (Art. 2000 – 2002)

Note: Hotelkeeper is liable REGARDLESS of the amount of care exercised in the following cases:

a. The loss or injury to personal property is caused by his servants or employees as well as by strangers
(Art.2000).

b. The loss is caused by the act of a thief or robber done without the use of arms and irresistible force.
(Art. 2001) Reason: Hotel-keeper is apparently negligent.

When hotel-keeper not liable:

a. The loss or injury is caused by force majeure, like flood, fire, theft or robbery by a stranger (not the
hotel-keeper’s servant or employee) with the use of firearms or irresistible force.

XPN: Unless the hotel-keeper is guilty of fault or negligence in failing to provide against the loss or injury
from this cause.

b. The loss is due to the acts of the guests, his family, servants, visitors.
 c. The loss arises from the character of the things brought into the hotel. Exemption or Diminution of
Liability The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he
is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. (Art. 2003)

Limited Liability Stipulation is VOID Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the
responsibility of the former (as set forth in Art. 1998-2001) is suppressed or diminished shall be VOID. (Art.
2003)

Hotel-keeper’s right to retain:

The hotel-keeper has a right to retain the things brought into the hotel by the guest, as a security for
credits on account of: a. Lodging; b. supplies usually furnished to hotel guests. Reason: It is given to hotel-
keepers to compensate them for the liabilities imposed upon them by law. The right of retention
recognized in this article is in the nature of a pledge created by operation of law

19. FOREIGN MARRIAGES AND FOREIGN DIVORCE (Q: A FILIPINA WHO IS MARRIED TO A FOREIGNER.
LATER, THEY DIVORCED ABROAD. IS IT VALID HERE IN THE PHILIPPINES? WHAT LAW WILL APPLY TO THE
MARRIAGE AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT DIVORCE. TN: NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE, CAPACITY OF PARTIES TO
MARRY. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by the court, the party pleading it must first prove the
fact of divorce and its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. As both of these purport to be official acts
of a sovereign authority, the required proof are their official publications or copies attested by the officers
having legal custody thereof, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Under Article 26 of Executive Order No. 209, series of 1987, as amended, or The Family Code of the
Philippines, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as
it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse's national law. Before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by the court, the party pleading it must first prove the fact of divorce and its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it.

The Acceptance Certificate was accompanied by an Authentication from the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo,
Japan. According the case of Morana v. Republic, a divorce report issued by the Office of the Mayor is
sufficient as it is deemed as an act of an official body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce
Report is clearly the equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of
divorce obtained by petitioner and her former husband.

In addition, the Supreme Court in Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, had already ruled that an authentication form
the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce.

In Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila and Arreza v. Toyo, the Court held that the submission of the same
document does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan's law on divorce and
that the translations by the publisher of the document submitted by Jocelyn are not advertised as a source
of official translations of Japanese laws
LACK OF OFFICIAL TRANSLATION:

The absence of an official translation of Japanese divorce laws was seen as a significant issue. Without an
official translation, the document submitted by one of the parties (Jocelyn) was not deemed sufficient
evidence to prove that the divorce between Jocelyn and Fumio was valid under Japanese law.

As a result of the insufficient evidence and lack of an official translation, the court could not establish that
the divorce obtained by Jocelyn and Fumio in Japan was valid and consistent with Japanese divorce law.
Therefore, the court likely did not recognize the divorce in the Philippines, which could have legal
implications for matters such as marital status.

20. PRETERITION (EITHER 1. THE SPOUSE IS OMITTED IN THE WILL OR 2. THE CHILD IS OMITTED. WHAT IS
THE EFFECT OF THEIR OMISSION? VOID WILL? TOTALLY OR THERE IS AN EXCEPTION? TN: REQUISITES OF
PRETERITION. EXCEPTION OF LEGACIES AND DEVISEES

Omission in the testator’s will of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator.

• Omitted heir is compulsory heir in the direct line.

• Omission must be total and complete in character

• Annuls the institution of an heir

• Does not affect devise and legacy if not inofficious.

a) Requisites of Preterition

1. The omission from the inheritance must be total or complete.

No preterition in the following situations:

a. If the compulsory heir is given a devise or a legacy, he is not considered preterited even if the legacy or
devise is worth less than the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

b. If the estate is worth P100T but the testator says, “I hereby institute my heir to one-half of my estate.”
That is the only provision in the will.

Ex. A is a son, an heir. There is no preterition even if A is not mentioned because something is
being left for A in the inheritance.

c. As long as there is still a balance after all the provisions in the will have been given effect, there are still
undisposed properties which the omitted compulsory heir may partake so there is no preterition.

2. The omitted heir must be a compulsory heir in the direct line

b) Governing Law

Article 854 of the Civil Code

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Article 855 of the Civil Code

The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not
disposed of by the will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be taken
proportionally from the shares of the other compulsory heirs.

MANINANG V. CA

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may
be rendered nugatory.

In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's
Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid
disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.

Preterition 'consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.

Disinheritance, in turn, 'is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law.'

21. BIGAMY / JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE (Q: A MAN WHO MARRIED TWICE. THE
SECOND MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED WITHOUT HAVING THE FIRST MARRIAGE JUDICIALLY ANNULLED OR
NULLIFIED. HE WAS CHARGED WITH BIGAMY. HE RAISED THE DEFENSE THAT THE FIRST MARRIAGE WAS
VOID DUE TO LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE. IS THIS DEFENSE VALID WITHOUT A PRIOR JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE?

PULIDO V. PEOPLE

After a careful scrutiny of the records and rigorous reexamination of the applicable law and jurisprudence,
we find that there is enough basis to abandon our earlier pronouncement and now hold that a void ab
initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and second
marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy.

• Plainly, Article 40 of the Family Code does not categorically withhold from the accused the right to invoke
the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without a judicial decree of absolute nullity in criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

To adopt a contrary stringent application would defy the principle that penal laws are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
• Nothing in Article 40 mentions the effect thereof on the criminal liability of the accused in bigamy cases.
It would indeed be unfair to withhold from the accused in a bigamy case the right and the opportunity to
raise the defense of nullity of a void ab initio marriage when the law does not explicitly say so.

• All told, we hold that in a criminal prosecution for bigamy, the accused can validly interpose the defense
of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.

• The said view is more in accord with the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the purpose of
and legislative intent behind Article 40 of the Family Code, and the rule on statutory construction of penal
laws. Therefore the absence of a "prior valid marriage" and the subsequent judicial declaration absolute
nullity of his first marriage, Pulido is hereby acquitted from the crime of Bigamy as charged.

SUMMARY:

The parties are not required to obtain a Judicial declaration of nullity of a void ab initio first and subsequent
marriages in order to raise it as a defense in a bigamy case.

The same rule applies to all marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code.

• Article 40 of the Family Code did not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused
the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

However, if the first marriage is merely voidable, the accused cannot interpose an annulment decree as a
defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy since the voidable first marriage is considered valid and
subsisting when the second marriage was contracted. The crime of bigamy, therefore, is consummated
when the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence of the voidable first marriage. The same
rule applies if the second marriage is merely considered as voidable

SOURCES:

-ATTY. RGL

-JURISTS

-HERNANDO CASES

-ATTY JUMRANI’S PREDICTIONS