Neo-Realism
Neo-Realism
● Waltz’ Realism or Neo-Realism provides extension
and modification to the classical realist thought.
● It is also called as structural realism.
● Neo-realists holds that structural constraints
instead of strategy, egoism, or motivation will
determine behaviours in international relations.
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● This theory is usually associated with Kenneth
Waltz (1924–2013)
● In 1979 he published a book named Theory of
International Politics.
● This book entails a general framework for
explaining patterns of state behaviour and state
interaction in the international system.
Explaining assumptions….
● Neo-realism holds that the nature of the
international structure is defined by its ordering
principle that is anarchy, and by the distribution of
capabilities (measured by the number of great
powers within the international system).
● The anarchic ordering principle of the
international structure is decentralized.
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● Every sovereign state is formally equal in this
system. But in reality power defines status of the
state.
● These states act according to the logic of self-
help, meaning states seek their own interest and
will not subordinate their interest to the interests
of other states.
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● States ensure their own survival as this is a
prerequisite to pursue other goals.
● This driving force of survival is the primary factor
influencing their behaviour and in turn ensures
states develop military capabilities as a means to
increase their relative power.
● States seeks relative gains instead of absolute
gains.
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● States can never be certain of other states' future
intentions, there is a lack of trust between states
which requires them to be on guard against
relative losses of power which could enable other
states to threaten their survival.
● This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called
the security dilemma.
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● States are considered similar in terms of needs
but not in capabilities for achieving them.
● The structural distribution of capabilities limits
cooperation among states through fears of
relative gains made by other states, and the
possibility of dependence on other states.
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● This phenomena of impeding cooperation could
be best understood by observing prisoner’s
dilemma.
● Imagine two criminals taken in separately by the
police for questioning.
● Each is offered a favourable plea bargain in return
for testimony against the other.
● Without a confession, though, they can be
convicted only of a lesser crime.
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● Each must choose between cooperating (remaining
silent) and defecting (testifying against the other).
● Imagine also that both have the following preference
ordering:
● (1) confess while the other remains silent;
● (2) both remain silent;
● (3) both confess;
● (4) remain silent while the other confesses.
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● Assume finally that their aversion to risk takes a
particular form: they want to minimize their maximum
possible loss.
● Cooperating (remaining silent) rewards both with their
second choice (conviction on the lesser charge).
● But it also leaves the cooperator vulnerable to the
worst possible outcome (serving a long prison term –
and knowing that your partner put you there)
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● Each can assure himself against disaster by
confessing (defecting).
● The rational choice thus is to defect (confess)
even though both know that they both could be
better off by cooperating.
● Both end up with their third choice, because this
is the only way to assure that each avoids the
worst possible outcome.
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● Conflict here does not arise from any special defect in
the actors.
● They are mildly selfish but not particularly evil or
vicious.
● Far from desiring conflict, both actually prefer
cooperation.
● They are neither ignorant nor ill informed. In an
environment of anarchy, even those capable of
mastering their own desires for gain and glory are
pushed by fear towards treating everyone else as an
enemy.
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● Anarchy can defeat even our best intentions – which
realists see as rare enough to begin with. Without
insurance schemes that reduce the risk of
cooperating, and without procedures to determine how
to divide the gains, even those who want to cooperate
may remain locked in a vicious cycle of mutually
destructive competition. For example, states may
engage in costly and even counter-productive arms
races because arms control agreements cannot be
independently verified
