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 TAA2
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SMARTBOOK
Second Edition
with Change 1

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The Military Engagement, Security

Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook

Foreign
Train, Advise & Assist
Second Edition with Change 1 (Sept 2017)

The Lightning Press

Norman M Wade
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(TAA2) The Military Engagement, Security

Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook, 2nd Ed.
Train, Advise & Assist (w/Change 1)
TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook is the re-titled
and re-focused second edition of The Stability, Peace & Counterinsurgency SMARTbook.
Topics and references include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0); Train, Advise &
Assist (SFA/FID/IDAD/HN/FSF); Stability Operations (JP & ADRP 3-07); Peace Operations
(JP & FM 3-07.3); Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24); Civil-Military Operations
(JP 3-57); Multinational Operations (JP 3-16); and Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08).
* Change 1 to TAA2 (Sept 2017) incorporates new material and text edits from JP 3-0
(Jan 2017), JP 3-07 (Aug 2016), JP 3-20 (May 2017), JDN 1-3 (Apr 2013), and JP 3-08
(Oct 2016). An asterisk marks changed pages.

Copyright © 2016 Norman M. Wade

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ISBN: 978-1-935886-69-3

All Rights Reserved

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No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or other means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval
systems, without permission in writing by the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to
The Lightning Press.
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Notice of Liability
The information in this SMARTbook and quick reference guide is distributed on an “As Is”
basis, without warranty. While every precaution has been taken to ensure the reliability and
accuracy of all data and contents, neither the author nor The Lightning Press shall have
any liability to any person or entity with respect to liability, loss, or damage caused directly
or indirectly by the contents of this book. If there is a discrepancy, refer to the source docu-
ment. This SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from
public release.
“The views presented in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Department of Defense or its components.”
SMARTbook is a trademark of The Lightning Press.
Photo Credits. Cover: Marines with 3rd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company and Japanese
soldiers coordinate plans during a combined arms shoot with naval gunfire, attack rotary
aircraft and 120mm mortars at San Clemente Island, California, Sept. 1, 2015. ANGLICO Ma-
rines and Japanese soldiers conducted the live-fire shoot as part of Exercise Dawn Blitz 2015
(USMC Photo/Released). Other photos courtesy of the Dept of Defense and Dept of Army.
Printed and bound in the United States of America.

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(TAA2)
Notes to Reader
TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation &
Stability SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. (Train, Advise & Assist)
Throughout U.S. history, U.S. forces have learned that military force alone cannot
secure sustainable peace. U.S. forces can only achieve sustainable peace through a
comprehensive approach in which military objectives nest in a larger cooperative effort
of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongov-
ernmental organizations, multinational partners, the private sector, and the host nation.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and stability missions, tasks, and
actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national
power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other
countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set con-
ditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in these and related
activities such as security force assistance and foreign internal defense helps shape
the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or
groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.
Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted
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outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain
or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental ser-
pl
vices, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
Peace Operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations con-
ducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations to contain
conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and
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rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

A counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability
operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires military forces to
employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmili-
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tary agencies and to be nation builders as well as warriors.

Civil-military operations are a primary military instrument to synchronize military
and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, coun-
terinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.

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study guides at education and professional development courses, and as lesson
plans and checklists in support of training. Visit [Link]!
Introduction-1
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(TAA2)
References
The following references were used to compile TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security
Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. All references are considered public domain,
available to the general public, and designated as “approved for public release; distribution
is unlimited.” TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook,
2nd Ed. does not contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

Joint Publications (JPs)

JP 3-0* Jan 2017 Joint Operations
JP 3-07* Aug 2016 Stability Operations
JP 3-07.3 Aug 2012 Peace Operations
JP 3-08* Oct 2016 Interorganizational Cooperation
JP 3-16 Jul 2013 Multinational Operations
JP 3-20* May 2017 Security Cooperation
JP 3-22
JP 3-24
Jul 2010
Nov 2013
e Foreign Internal Defense
Counterinsurgency
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JP 3-57 Sept 2013 Civil-Military Operations
JP 5-0* Jun 2017 Joint Planning
JDN 1-13* Apr 2013 Security Force Assistance
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Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) and

Army Doctrinal Reference Publications (ADRPs)
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ADRP 3-07 Sept 2012 Stability

ADRP 5-0 Mar 2012 The Operations Process

Army Techniques Publications (ATPs) and

Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATTPs)
ATP 3-07.5 Aug 2012 Stability Techniques
ATP 3-07.31 Nov 2014 Peace Operations
ATP 3-57.70 May 2014 Civil-Military Operations Center

Field Manuals (FMs)

FM 3-07 Jun 2014 Stability
FM 3-07.1 May 2009 Security Force Assistance (rescinded)
FM 3-07.31 Oct 2003 Peace Operations (rescinded)
FM 3-22 Jan 2013 Army Support to Security Cooperation
FM 3-24 May 2014 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies

* New/updated since last publication.

2-References
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(TAA2)
Table of Contents
The Range of Military
Chap 1

Operations (ROMO)
The Conflict Continuum (Range of Military Operations).............1-1*
I. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO).................................................... 1-1*
II. Military Operations and Related Missions, Tasks and Actions....................... 1-2*
I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence.....1-3*
The Conflict Continuum..................................................................................... 1-5*
I. Typical Operations and Activities.................................................................... 1-8*
A. Military Engagement Activities................................................................. 1-8*
B. Emergency Preparedness....................................................................... 1-8*
C. Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament.................................. 1-8*
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D. Combating Terrorism............................................................................... 1-9*
E. Support to Counterdrug (CD) Operations................................................ 1-9*
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F. Sanction Enforcement.............................................................................. 1-9*
G. Enforcing Exclusion Zones...................................................................... 1-9*
H. Freedom of Navigation and Overflight................................................... 1-10*
I. Foreign Assistance.................................................................................. 1-10*
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J. Security Assistance (SA)........................................................................ 1-10*
K. Security Force Assistance (SFA)........................................................... 1-10*
L. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)...............................................................1-11*
M. Humanitarian Assistance........................................................................1-11*
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N. Protection of Shipping............................................................................1-11*
O. Show of Force Operations......................................................................1-11*
P. Support to Insurgency............................................................................ 1-12*
Q. Counterinsurgency................................................................................ 1-12*
II. Other Considerations................................................................................... 1-12*
II. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations........1-13*
I. Typical Crisis Response Operations............................................................. 1-14*
A. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)....................................... 1-14*
B. Peace Operations (PO)......................................................................... 1-14*
C. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)............................................... 1-15*
D. Recovery Operations............................................................................. 1-15*
E. Strikes and Raids................................................................................... 1-15*
II. Unique Considerations................................................................................ 1-16*
III. Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)....... 1-18*
III. Large-Scale Combat Operations.............................................1-19*
Joint Operation Model (Example Activities)..................................................... 1-20*
I. Considerations for Deterrence...................................................................... 1-22*
- Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) and Flexible Response Options (FROs).. 1-24*
III. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative..................................................... 1-22*
III. Considerations for Dominance................................................................... 1-26*
V. Considerations for Stabilization................................................................... 1-27*
VI. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority................................................ 1-27*
Table of Contents-1
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Chap 2
Train, Advise
& Assist
Train, Advise & Assist (Overview)................................................. 2-1*
Security Relationships....................................................................................... 2-1*
I. Security Cooperation...................................................................................... 2-1*
II. Security Cooperation Activities.................................................................... 2-1a*
III. Integrated Security Cooperation Activities.................................................... 2-2*
IV. Security Cooperation Purposes.................................................................... 2-3*
I. Security Force Assistance (SFA)............................................... 2-5*
I. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Tasks.......................................................... 2-5*
A. Organize.................................................................................................. 2-5*
B. Train......................................................................................................... 2-6*
C. Equip....................................................................................................... 2-8*
D. Rebuild and Build.................................................................................... 2-8*
E. Advise and Assist..................................................................................... 2-8*
II. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Activities.................................................... 2-7*
III. Types of Security Force Assistance (SFA).................................................... 2-9*
A. Advising................................................................................................... 2-9*
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B. Partnering................................................................................................ 2-9*
C. Augmenting.............................................................................................. 2-9*
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IV. The Advisor................................................................................................. 2-10*
II. Foreign Internal Defense (FID/IDAD)........................................2-11
I. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)....................................................................... 2-11
- The Foreign Internal Defense Framework.................................................2-12
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- Foreign Internal Defense Coordination......................................................2-13

II. Internal Defense & Development (IDAD).......................................................2-15
III. Foreign Internal Defense Within the Range of Military Operations..............2-16
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A. Indirect Support.......................................................................................2-17
B. Direct Support Not Involving Combat Operations....................................2-17
C. Combat Operations.................................................................................2-17
D. Transition and Redeployment..................................................................2-19
IV. Planning for Foreign Internal Defense..........................................................2-18
V. Foreign Internal Defense Training.................................................................2-19
A. Training and Advising...............................................................................2-19
B. FID Training Plan.....................................................................................2-21
C. Trainer/Advisor Checklists.......................................................................2-22
D. Executing the FID Mission.......................................................................2-24
VI. Embassy and Security Cooperation Working Relationships........................2-26
III. Understanding Culture..............................................................2-27
I. Understanding Culture....................................................................................2-27
- Culture Influences How People View Their World.....................................2-28
- Culture is Holistic.......................................................................................2-28
- Culture is Learned and Shared..................................................................2-29
- Culture is Created by People and Can Change.........................................2-29
II. Assessing a Cultural Situation.......................................................................2-30
- Cultural Assessments................................................................................2-31
- Key Leader Engagements (KLE)...............................................................2-31
III. Organizing to Understand Culture................................................................2-33
A. Green Cell and Cultural Advisors.............................................................2-33
B. Human Terrain System............................................................................2-34
2-Table of Contents
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IV. Working with Host-Nation Forces............................................2-35

I. Assessing & Developing a Host-Nation Force................................................2-36
- Competence...............................................................................................2-36
- Capability...................................................................................................2-36
- Commitment...............................................................................................2-36
- Confidence.................................................................................................2-36
II. Multinational Relationships............................................................................2-40
A. Parallel.....................................................................................................2-40
B. Lead Nation.............................................................................................2-41
C. Partnered.................................................................................................2-41
D. Integrated................................................................................................2-41
E. Advising...................................................................................................2-41
V. Developing Host-Nation Security Forces.................................2-43
I. Phases in Development of HN Forces...........................................................2-43
- Phase I - Planning and Resourcing...........................................................2-43
- Phase II - Generating the HN Security Force............................................2-44
- Phase III - Employment of the HN Security Force.....................................2-44
- Phase IV - Transition Responsibility to HN Security Force........................2-44
- Phase V - Sustainment..............................................................................2-46
II. Security Cooperation Planning......................................................................2-45
III. Parallel Planning...........................................................................................2-47
IV. Host-Nation Contributions............................................................................2-48
VI. Working Effectively with Foreign Security Forces................2-49
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I. Relationship Building......................................................................................2-49
II. Rapport..........................................................................................................2-49
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Building Rapport...........................................................................................2-50
A. Understanding.........................................................................................2-50
B. Respect....................................................................................................2-50
C. Trust.........................................................................................................2-52
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III. Types of Skills Needed.................................................................................2-52

A. Hard Skills...............................................................................................2-52
B. Soft Skills................................................................................................2-52
Communication............................................................................................2-53
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IV. Cross-Cultural Negotiation...........................................................................2-54

VII. Conflict Resolution & Meetings..............................................2-55
I. Negotiations....................................................................................................2-56
II. Mediation.......................................................................................................2-57
III. Arbitration.....................................................................................................2-62
Setting Up and Conducting Meetings................................................................2-60
VIII. Linguist Support/Interpreters................................................2-63
Linguist Support Categories..............................................................................2-63
I. Selecting an Interpreter..................................................................................2-64
II. Employing Linguists.......................................................................................2-66
III. Establishing Rapport....................................................................................2-66
IV. Training the Interpreter.................................................................................2-67
V. Communication Techniques..........................................................................2-68
VI. Preparing & Conducting Presentations........................................................2-70

Table of Contents-3
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Chap 3
Stability
in Operations
Stability in Operations (Actions/Tasks/Efforts)........................... 3-1*
I. Stability in Operations..................................................................................... 3-1*
II. Stability within the Range of Military Operations........................................... 3-2*
III. Understanding Stability................................................................................. 3-3*
- End State Conditions for Stability............................................................ 3-3a*
IV. Understanding the Root Causes and Immediate Drivers of Instability......... 3-4*
A. The Fragile States Framework................................................................. 3-6*
B. Elements of Stable States....................................................................... 3-6*
C. Understanding the Immediate Drivers of Stability................................. 3-10*
V. Fundamentals of Stabilization....................................................................... 3-5*
VI. Principles of Joint Operations to Achieve Stability....................................... 3-8*
- Maintaining Legitimacy.............................................................................. 3-9*
VII. The Stabilization Framework..................................................................... 3-10*
A. Initial Response Stage........................................................................... 3-12*
B. Transformation Stage............................................................................ 3-12*
C. Fostering Sustainability Stage............................................................... 3-12*
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VIII. Stability Actions in Other Joint Operations............................................... 3-13*
IX. An Integrated Approach (Linking Military and Civilian Activities)................ 3-14*
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- Stabilization and Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix (ETM).............. 3-14*
X. A Comprehensive Approach........................................................................ 3-18*
XI. A Whole of Government Approach............................................................. 3-20*
I. Primary Army Stability Tasks.....................................................3-21
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I. Primary Army Stability Tasks..........................................................................3-21

A. Establish Civil Security............................................................................3-30
B. Establish Civil Control..............................................................................3-31
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C. Restore Essential Services......................................................................3-32

D. Support to Governance...........................................................................3-34
E. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development............................3-35
II. Stability Operations (Underlying Logic).........................................................3-22
- The American Experience with Stability.....................................................3-22
III. Joint Stability Functions.............................................................................. 3-24*
A. Security.................................................................................................. 3-25*
B. Humanitarian Assistance....................................................................... 3-25*
C. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure............................................. 3-25*
D. Rule of Law............................................................................................ 3-25*
E. Governance and Participation............................................................... 3-25*
* Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS)........................... 3-25*
IV. Department of State Stabilization & Reconstruction Essential Tasks...........3-26
A. Security....................................................................................................3-26
B. Justice and Reconciliation.......................................................................3-27
C. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being.....................................3-27
D. Governance and Participation.................................................................3-27
E. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure...............................................3-27
V. Stability Phases.............................................................................................3-29
II. Stability Considerations............................................................3-37
I. Military Role in Prevention Activities...............................................................3-37
II. Security Cooperation.....................................................................................3-38
III. Peace Operations.........................................................................................3-40
4-Table of Contents
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IV. Transitions....................................................................................................3-41
V. Security Sector Reform (SSR).......................................................................3-42
VI. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).............................3-44
VII. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)................................................... 3-46*
VIII. Counterinsurgency.....................................................................................3-48
IX. Protection of Civilians...................................................................................3-48
X. Inform and Influence Activities in Stability.....................................................3-50
XI. Lethal and Non-Lethal Actions.....................................................................3-52
XII. Intelligence..................................................................................................3-52
III. Stabilization Planning............................................................. 3-53*
I. Stabilization Planning................................................................................... 3-53*
II. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE)...................................... 3-54*
The Operational Environment (OE) in Stabilization Efforts........................ 3-55*
A. Planning, Execution and Assessment.................................................... 3-54*
B. Establish an Evolving Common Operational Picture (COP).................. 3-56*
C. Joint Intelligence Preparation of Environment (JIPOE) ........................ 3-56*
III. Planning Stabilization Efforts...................................................................... 3-57*
A. Operational Approach............................................................................ 3-57*
B. Stability and Defeat Mechanisms.......................................................... 3-59*
IV. Phasing Major Operations and Campaigns................................................ 3-60*
V. Operational Art and Stability in Operations.................................................. 3-62*
A. End State and Conditions...................................................................... 3-62*
B. Decisive Points...................................................................................... 3-63*
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C. Lines of Effort......................................................................................... 3-64*
D. Operational Approach............................................................................ 3-65*
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E. Force Organization................................................................................ 3-66*
F. Assessment............................................................................................ 3-66*
VI. Planning Transitions and Transferring Authorities...................................... 3-68*
IV. Civil-Military Teaming (PRT/JIACG/JCMOTF/JIATF)............ 3-69*
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I. Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms........................................................... 3-69*

II. Civil-Military Integration Structures.............................................................. 3-70*
V. Transitional Governing Authorities........................................ 3-71*
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I. Transitional Military Authority (TMA)............................................................. 3-73*

- Establishing Transitional Military Authority............................................... 3-73*
- Forms of Transitional Military Authority.................................................... 3-75*
A. Existing Laws, Customs, and Boundaries............................................. 3-72*
B. Local Government Officials and Departments....................................... 3-74*
II. Interim Civil Authority................................................................................... 3-74*
IV. Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority............................................... 3-76*
VI. Small Unit Tasks & Activities...................................................3-79
A. Patrolling.......................................................................................................3-81
B. Observing and Reporting..............................................................................3-82
C. Movement Control (Roadblocks and Checkpoints).......................................3-86
D. Conducting Searches....................................................................................3-88
E. Monitor Compliance with an Agreement.......................................................3-90
F. Verification of Weapons and Forces..............................................................3-90
G. Demilitarization.............................................................................................3-91
H. Convoy Operations.......................................................................................3-92
I. Curfews...........................................................................................................3-94
J. Crowd Control................................................................................................3-95
K. Civil Disturbances.........................................................................................3-96
L. Refugees and Displaced Persons.................................................................3-98
M. De-mining and Unexploded Ordnance.........................................................3-98

Table of Contents-5
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Chap 4
Peace
Operations (PO)
Peace Operations (Overview)..........................................................4-1
I. Types of Peace Operations..............................................................................4-1
II. Characteristics of Peace Operations...............................................................4-3
III. Legal Basis of Peace Operations...................................................................4-4
IV. The Peace Operations Environment..............................................................4-4
V. Command and Control Considerations...........................................................4-5
VI. The Planning Process....................................................................................4-5
VII. Fundamentals of Peace Operations..............................................................4-6
VIII. Transition Planning.......................................................................................4-9
IX. Key Documents in Peace Operations..........................................................4-10
I. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)...............................................4-11
I. Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations.................................................. 4-11
II. Peacekeeping Tasks......................................................................................4-12
III. Employment..................................................................................................4-14
A. Assignment to a Specific Operational Area..............................................4-14
B. Rotation among Operational Areas..........................................................4-14
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C. Separation of Parties to the Dispute........................................................4-14
II. Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO).....................................4-15
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I. Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations..........................................4-15
II. Peace Enforcement Tasks.............................................................................4-16
III. Employment..................................................................................................4-17
A. Preparation and Deployment...................................................................4-17
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B. Establishment of Presence in the Operational Area................................4-17

C. Expansion of the Operational Area..........................................................4-17
D. Enforcement of the Mandate...................................................................4-18
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E. Transition and Redeployment..................................................................4-18

III. Peace Building (PB)..................................................................4-19
I. Fundamentals of Peace Building....................................................................4-19
II. Peace Building Phases..................................................................................4-20
III. Peace Building Mission Sectors...................................................................4-20
A. Security Mission.......................................................................................4-20
- Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration,................4-21
and Resettlement (DDRRR)
B. Justice and Reconciliation Mission Sector...............................................4-22
C. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being.....................................4-24
D. Governance and Participation.................................................................4-24
E. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Mission..................................4-24
F. Public Diplomacy and Information Operations.........................................4-24
IV. Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)........................4-25
V. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques & Procedures....................4-27.
I. Creating a Secure Environment.....................................................................4-27.
II. Protected Areas.............................................................................................4-28
III. Site Security.................................................................................................4-29
IV. Separation/Neutralization of Forces (Interpositioning).................................4-30
V. Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)............................................................................4-33
VI. Search Operations.......................................................................................4-33
VII. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)............................................4-34
6-Table of Contents
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Chap 5
Counterinsurgency
Operations (COIN)
Counterinsurgency Operations (Overview)...................................5-1
I. Insurgency........................................................................................................5-1
II. Approach to Counterinsurgency......................................................................5-2
U.S. Strategy and Policy................................................................................5-3
A. Political Control..........................................................................................5-2
B. COIN Is Population-Centric.......................................................................5-4
C. Assessing Relevant Actors........................................................................5-4
D. Understanding the Operational Environment............................................5-4
III. Governance and Legitimacy...........................................................................5-5
A. Governance...............................................................................................5-5
B. Legitimacy..................................................................................................5-6
A Whole-of-Government Effort.......................................................................5-7
IV. Strategic Principles.........................................................................................5-8
I. Insurgency Prerequisites & Fundamentals..............................5-11
I. Nature of Insurgency...................................................................................... 5-11
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II. Prerequisites for Insurgency..........................................................................5-12
A. Opportunity..............................................................................................5-12
B. Motive......................................................................................................5-13
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C. Means......................................................................................................5-13
III. Insurgent Objectives.....................................................................................5-14
IV. Insurgent Narrative, Strategy, Dynamics and Organization..........................5-15
A. Insurgent Narrative..................................................................................5-15
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B. Strategy...................................................................................................5-15
C. Dynamics of Insurgency..........................................................................5-18
D. Organization............................................................................................5-22
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- Political and Military Components........................................................5-22

- Insurgent Elements...............................................................................5-23
V. Other Analytical Frameworks.........................................................................5-26
II. Insurgency Threat Characteristics...........................................5-27
I. Disposition and Activities................................................................................5-27
A. Political Activities.....................................................................................5-27
B. Population Control...................................................................................5-28
C. Military Tactics.........................................................................................5-28
D. Support Activities.....................................................................................5-28
E. Associated Threats..................................................................................5-31
III. COIN Operational Environment (OE).......................................5-33
I. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE).........................................5-33
II. Operational Environment in COIN ................................................................5-33
A. Components...........................................................................................5-33
B. Relevant Actors........................................................................................5-33
C. Physical Factors......................................................................................5-34
D. Information Environment.........................................................................5-34
III. Tools & Methods for Understanding the OE.................................................5-34
A. Traditional Intelligence Approaches.........................................................5-34
B. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.....................................5-34
C. Sociocultural Analysis..............................................................................5-35
D. Analytical Frameworks.............................................................................5-35

Table of Contents-7
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- Operational Variables (PMESII-PT)......................................................5-36

- Mission Variables (METT-TC)...............................................................5-36
- Civil Considerations (ASCOPE)...........................................................5-37
E. Network Analysis.....................................................................................5-35
F. Social Science..........................................................................................5-38
G. Information Management and Information Technology...........................5-38
H. Identity Intelligence (I2)...........................................................................5-38
IV. Planning for Countering Insurgencies....................................5-39
I. Joint Operation Planning................................................................................5-39
II. Conceptual Planning.....................................................................................5-40
- Counterinsurgency Paradoxes...................................................................5-41
III. Elements of Operational Design...................................................................5-42
A. Termination....................................................................................................5-42
B. Military End State and Objectives............................................................5-42
C. Effects......................................................................................................5-42
D. Centers of Gravity (COGs)......................................................................5-42
E. Decisive Points........................................................................................5-43
F. Direct and Indirect Approaches................................................................5-43
G. Lines of Operation (LOOs) and Lines of Effort (LOEs)............................5-44
H. Anticipation..............................................................................................5-46
I. Operational Reach....................................................................................5-46
J. Culmination..............................................................................................5-46
K. Arranging Operations...............................................................................5-46
e
L. Forces and Functions...............................................................................5-46
IV. Military Operational Considerations..............................................................5-48
pl
Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Interaction Scale............5-49
A. Negotiation and Diplomacy......................................................................5-48
B. Security Cooperation (SC).......................................................................5-48
C. Unconventional Warfare (UW).................................................................5-50
m
D. Counterterrorism......................................................................................5-51
E. Counterguerrilla Operations.....................................................................5-52
F. Stability Operations..................................................................................5-52
G. Peace Operations (PO)...........................................................................5-52
Sa

H. Related Operations..................................................................................5-52
IV. Additional Operational Options.....................................................................5-52
A. Generational Engagement.......................................................................5-53
B. Limited Support/Light Footprint................................................................5-53
C. Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate (ISI2R)................5-53
D. Attack the Network (AtN).........................................................................5-54
E. Partnering................................................................................................5-54
F. Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transition (SCHBT)........................................5-54
V. Direct Approaches......................................................................5-55
I. Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework..............................................5-56
II. Other Direct Enablers....................................................................................5-64
A. Targeted Threat Infrastructure.................................................................5-64
B. Strike........................................................................................................5-64
VI. Indirect Approaches.................................................................5-65
I. Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation.................................................5-65
II. Generational Engagement.............................................................................5-66
III. Negotiation and Diplomacy...........................................................................5-68
IV. Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate (ISI2R)....................5-59
V. Other Indirect Enablers..................................................................................5-74
- Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations..................................................5-74

8-Table of Contents
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Chap 6
Civil-Military
Operations
Civil-Military Operations (Overview)...............................................6-1
I. Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs, and Unified Action.................................6-1
II. CMO and the Range of Military Operations.....................................................6-2
- Strategic Aspects of Civil-Military Operations..............................................6-3
III. Civil-Military Operations and the Levels of War..............................................6-4
IV. CMO in Joint Operations................................................................................6-6
I. Organizing for Civil-Military Operations......................................6-9
Comparison of Ops and Coordination Centers....................................................6-9
A. J-9 CMO Directorate.......................................................................................6-9
B. Joint Task Force (JTF)...................................................................................6-10
C. Joint CMO Task Force (JCMOTF)................................................................. 6-11
D. Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).......................................................6-12
E. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)................................6-13
F. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).......................................................6-13
G. Civil-Military Teams.......................................................................................6-16
e
H. NATO CIMIC.................................................................................................6-17
I. UN Operations................................................................................................6-17
J. Other Organizational Humanitarian Structures..............................................6-18
pl
II. Civil Affairs Forces & Operations.............................................6-19
I. Civil Affairs Responsibilities............................................................................6-19
II. Supporting the Operations Process...............................................................6-20
m

III. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)......................................................6-22

IV. CMO Campaign Sequence...........................................................................6-23
V. Characteristics of Civil Affairs Operations.....................................................6-24
VI. Civil Affairs Forces........................................................................................6-26
Sa

Multinational
Chap 7

Operations
Multinational Operations (Overview)..............................................7-1
I. Strategic Context..............................................................................................7-1
II. Security Cooperation (SC)...............................................................................7-2
III. Nature of Multinational Operations.................................................................7-3
IV. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI)...........................7-4
I. Multinational Command and Coordination.................................7-5
I. Command and Control of U.S. Forces in Multinational Operations..................7-5
II. Unified Action...................................................................................................7-5
III. Multinational Force.........................................................................................7-5
IV. Command Structures of Forces in Multinational Operations..........................7-6
A. Integrated Command Structure.................................................................7-6
B. Lead Nation Command Structure..............................................................7-6
C. Parallel Command Structure.....................................................................7-6

Table of Contents-9
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II. Multinational Planning and Execution........................................7-7

I. Diplomatic and Military Considerations...........................................................7-7
II. Factors in Multinational Participation...............................................................7-8
III. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force............................................7-10

Interorganizational
Chap 8

Cooperation
Interorganizational Cooperation (Overview).................................8-1*
I. Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination............................................ 8-2*
II. Unity of Effort................................................................................................. 8-2*
III. US Government Department and Agency Coordination............................... 8-3*
IV. Coordinating Efforts...................................................................................... 8-4*
- Applying the Military Component............................................................... 8-4*
- Capitalizing on Organizational Diversity.................................................... 8-4*
- Gathering the Right Resources.................................................................. 8-5*
- Identifying Authorities................................................................................. 8-5*
V. Whole-of-Government Approach................................................................... 8-6*
e
VI. Working Relationships and Practices........................................................... 8-6*
VII. Considerations for Effective Cooperation.................................................... 8-6*
I. Joint Planning Considerations....................................................8-7*
pl
I. Whole-of-Government Approach.................................................................... 8-7*
II. Joint Planning and Interorganizational Cooperation...................................... 8-8*
- The National Security Council (NSC)......................................................... 8-9*
m
A. Plan Development and Coordination..................................................... 8-10*
B. Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)...................................... 8-10*
C. Annex V (Interagency Coordination)...................................................... 8-14*
D. Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG)..................................... 8-14*
Sa

III. Stakeholders................................................................................................8-11*
A. International Organizations.....................................................................8-11*
B. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)...............................................8-11*
C. The Private Sector..................................................................................8-11*
IV. Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in the Interagency Process................................. 8-12*
- Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)...................................................... 8-13*
- Joint Support Force (JSF)........................................................................ 8-13*
II. Foreign Considerations............................................................8-15*
I. USG Structure in Foreign Countries............................................................. 8-15*
A. The Diplomatic Mission.......................................................................... 8-15*
B. Combatant Commands (CCMDs).......................................................... 8-15*
II. Foreign Operations...................................................................................... 8-18*
A. The Political-Military Dimension............................................................. 8-18*
B. Theater or Regional Focus.................................................................... 8-18*
C. CCMD Campaign Plans, Crisis Response, and Limited........................ 8-16*
Contingency Operations
D. Crisis Action Organization..................................................................... 8-20*
III. Stakeholders............................................................................................... 8-19*
IV. Joint Task Force (JTF) Considerations....................................................... 8-22*
V. Civil-Military Teams (JIATFs/PRCs)............................................................. 8-22*
VI. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)................................................... 8-23*
VII. Aligning Words with Deeds........................................................................ 8-24*

10-Table of Contents
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Military Ops
Range of
Chap 1
The Conflict Continuum
(Range of Military Ops)
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), chap. V.

I. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military
activities and operations in scope and purpose. The potential range of military activi-
ties and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and
deterrence in times of relative peace up through large-scale combat operations.

Range of Military Operations

Peace Conflict Continuum War

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Range of
e
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Military
Operations
pl
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence
m

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. V-2. Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities develop local
and regional situational awareness, build networks and relationships with partners,
Sa

shape the OE, keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the
threshold of armed conflict, and maintain US global influence. Many missions asso-
ciated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as DSCA and FHA, may
not require combat. But others, such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia,
can be dangerous and may require combat operations to protect US forces.
The complex nature of the strategic environment may require US forces to conduct
different types of joint operations and activities simultaneously across the conflict
continuum. Although this publication discusses specific types of operations and
activities under the various categories in the range of military operations, each type
is not doctrinally fixed and could shift within that range.
• Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. See pp. 1-3 to 1-12.
• Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. See pp. 1-13 to 1-18.
• Large-Scale Combat Operations. See pp. 1-19 to 1-30.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine

SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational
Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include
joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint
planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33),
information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16),
interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!

(ROMO) The Conflict Continuum 1-1*

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Military Ops
Range of

II. Military Operations and Related Missions,

Tasks, and Actions
In general, a military operation is a set of actions intended to accomplish a task or
mission. Although the US military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained,
large-scale combat anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct these opera-
tions also enable a wide variety of other operations and activities. In particular,
opportunities exist prior to large-scale combat to shape the OE in order to prevent,
or at least mitigate, the effects of war. Characterizing the employment of military
capabilities (people, organizations, and equipment) as one or another type of military
operation has several benefits. For example, publications can be developed that de-
scribe the nature, tasks, and tactics associated with specific types of diverse opera-
tions, such as NEO and COIN. These publications provide the basis for related joint
training and joint professional military education that help joint forces conduct military
operations as effectively and efficiently as possible even in difficult and dangerous
circumstances. Characterizations also help military and civilian leaders explain US
military involvement in various situations to the US and international public and news
media. Likewise, such characterizations, supplemented by operational experience,
can clarify the need for specific capabilities that enhance certain operations. For
example, facial recognition software associated with biometric capabilities helps
military and law enforcement personnel identify terrorists and piece together their
human networks as part of combating terrorism.
Military operations are often categorized by their focus, as shown in Figure V-1. In
e
some cases, the title covers a variety of missions, tasks, and activities. Many activi-
ties accomplished by single Services, such as tasks associated with security coop-
pl
eration, do not constitute a joint operation. Nonetheless, most of these occur under a
joint “umbrella,” because they contribute to achievement of CCDRs’ TCP objectives.

Examples of Military Operations and Activities

m

• Stability activities • Foreign internal defense

• Defense support of civil authorities • Counterdrug operations
Sa

• Foreign humanitarian assistance • Combating terrorism

• Recovery • Counterinsurgency
• Noncombatant evacuation • Homeland defense
• Peace operations • Mass atrocity response
• Countering weapons of mass • Security cooperation
destruction • Military engagement
• Chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear response

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. V-1. Examples of Military Operations and Activities.

For further discussion and an overview of these types of military operations and
activities, see:
• Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. See pp. 1-3 to 1-12.
• Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. See pp. 1-13 to 1-18.
• Large-Scale Combat Operations. See pp. 1-19 to 1-30.

*1-2 (ROMO) The Conflict Continuum

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Military Ops
Range of
Chap 1
I. Engagement, Security
Cooperation & Deterrence
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), chap. VI.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and
actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national
power is tasked to support other instruments of national power as represented by
interagency partners, as well as cooperate with international organizations (e.g., UN,
NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter
conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. This may also involve
domestic operations that include supporting civil authorities. These activities gener-
ally occur continuously in all GCCs’ AORs regardless of other ongoing joint opera-
tions. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities usually
involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from but integrated
with the efforts of interorganizational participants. These activities are conducted as
part of a CCDR’s routine theater or functional campaign plan and country plan objec-
tives and may support deterrence.
Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of international waters,
e
international airspace, space, and cyberspace. Military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence help assure operational access for crisis response and
contingency operations despite changing US overseas defense posture and the
pl
growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe. The more a GCC can promote favor-
able access conditions in advance across the AOR and in potential OAs, the better.
Relevant activities include KLEs; security cooperation activities, such as bilateral and
multinational exercises to improve multinational operations; missions to train, advise,
m

and equip foreign forces to improve their national ability to contribute to access; ne-
gotiations to secure basing and transit rights, establish relationships, and formalize
support agreements; the use of grants and contracts to improve relationships with
Sa

and strengthen PNs; and planning conferences to develop multinational plans.

Military Engagement
Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or ele-
ments of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed
forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and
confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.
Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to inter-
action with domestic civilian authorities. GCCs seek out partners and communicate
with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This military
engagement increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource
allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions and may preclude
conflict; or, if conflict is unavoidable, allow a more informed USG to enter into it with
stronger alliances or coalitions.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine

SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational
Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include
joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint
planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33),
information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16),
interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!

(ROMO) I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence 1-3*

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Military Ops
Range of

Security Cooperation
Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establish-
ments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests,
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational
operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the
HN. The policy on which security cooperation is based resides in Presidential Policy
Directive-23, Security Sector Assistance. This directive refers to the policies, pro-
grams, and activities the US uses to work with foreign partners and help shape their
policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain
the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety,
and justice for their people; and, enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that
address common security challenges.
Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping activities and
critical aspect of communication synchronization. GCCs shape their AORs through
security cooperation and stability activities by continually employing military forces to
complement and support other instruments of national power that typically provide
development assistance or humanitarian assistance to PNs. The GCC’s TCP
provides a framework within which CCMDs conduct cooperative security cooperation
activities and development with PNs. Ideally, security cooperation activities mitigate
the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires US mili-
tary intervention. Security assistance and security force assistance (SFA) normally
provide some of the means for security cooperation activities.

Deterrence e
Deterrence prevents adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat
of unacceptable counteraction and belief that the cost of the action outweighs the
pl
perceived benefits. The nature of deterrent options varies according to the nature of
the adversary (e.g., traditional or irregular, state or non-state), the adversary’s actions,
US national objectives, and other factors. Deterrence stems from an adversary’s belief
that the opponent’s actions have created or can create an unacceptable risk to the
m

adversary’s achievement of objectives (i.e., the contemplated action cannot succeed

or the costs are too high). Thus, a potential aggressor chooses not to act for fear of
failure, risk, or consequences. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct
Sa

decisive operations immediately. However, if available forces lack the combat power
to conduct decisive operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional
forces deploy. Effective deterrence requires a TCP and a coordinated CCS effort that
emphasize security cooperation activities with PNs that support US interests, DOD
force posture planning, and contingency plans that prove the willingness of the US to
employ forces in defense of its interests. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force
and enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve
and willingness to use force when necessary. Other TCP actions that help maintain
or set the CCDR’s desired conditions support deterrence by enhancing a climate of
peaceful cooperation and FHA, thus promoting stability. Joint actions such as antiter-
rorism, DOD support to CD operations, show of force operations, and arms control are
applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives.
Sustained presence contributes to deterrence and promotes a secure environment
in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the
causes of instability can perform as designed. Presence can take the form of forward
basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Forward presence activities
demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stabil-
ity, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access.
In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence involves periodic
rotational deployments and redeployments, access and storage agreements, multina-
tional exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support, and
both military-to-military and military-to-civilian contacts. Given their location and knowl-
edge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first to respond to a crisis.
*1-4 (ROMO) I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence
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Military Ops
Range of
The Conflict Continuum
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17),pp. VI-1 to VI-3.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities provide the

foundation of the CCDR’s theater campaign. The goal is to prevent and deter conflict
by keeping adversary activities within a desired state of cooperation and competition.
The joint operation model described in section V, “Joint Operations Across the Conflict
Continuum,” has limited application with respect to phasing these activities for normal
cooperative and competitive environments. Figure VI-1 shows a notional depiction of
activities in an environment of cooperation and competition. DOD forces, as part of
larger whole-of-government efforts, conduct operations with partners to prevent, deter,
or turn back escalatory activity by adversaries.

The Conflict Continuum

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Desired State/Zone of Cooperation and Competition Large-Scale Combat Operations

USG/Multinational Partner Nation Coordinated Action Named Joint/Coalition Operation

e
Plans, Operations
and Campaigns to
Prevent Conflict
pl
Diplomacy Joint
Operation
Effort Diplomatic efforts (shaded area) increase
Resources during times of increased tension. Increasingly,
Intensity legal actions, economic sanctions, and other or
Risk
deterrent options may be used to reduce nsion
ing Te
tension and return to an environment of Increas
m
peaceful cooperation and beneficial
competition.
Return to
The Goal: Prevent Conflict Diplomacy
Sa

Cooperation Competition Conflict/War

DOD Focus is Cooperation/Prevention/Deterrence DOD Focus is

OPLAN Execution

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. VI-1 The Conflict Continuum.

Global and theater shaping increases DOD’s depth of understanding of an environ-
ment, a partner’s viewpoint of that environment, and where the US and PN have com-
mon interests. This understanding allows the US, through the relationships that have
been developed, to shape the OE. These initiatives help advance national security
objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their severity), and reduce the
risk of employing US military forces in a conflict.
In an environment that is more competitive, tensions increase. A partner’s resources
can enhance USG understanding of an adversary’s capabilities and intent, and expand
options against the adversary. In the best case, conflict can be averted or diminished
by coordinated USG/PN action.
Despite the efforts to prevent or mitigate conflict, an armed conflict may occur. As condi-
tions and objectives become more defined, GCCs may transition to the notional phasing
construct for execution of a specific contingency operation. However, time spent “to the
left” allows DOD to develop a deeper understanding of the environment to see and act
ahead of conflict flashpoints, develop options, and maximize the efficiency of resources.

(ROMO) I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence 1-5*

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Military Ops
Range of

Sample Security Cooperation &

Security Assistance Activities
Combined Exercises
Combined exercises and other exercises involving U.S. and foreign militaries are re-
quired by law to have each participant pay for its own costs. In some cases, U.S. O&M
funds may legally be used for training HN forces when such training tests and evaluates
mutual capabilities. Such exercises have a primary benefit to U.S. readiness and use of
such funds is not necessarily prohibited. Such O&M-funded training of HN forces may
include safety training, familiarization training, and interoperability training.

Conferences and Seminars

Conferences and seminars provide for discussions, interaction, and sometimes policy
proposals for U.S. and HN approval.

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)

DCS involve purchases negotiated directly between a friendly government and a U.S.
company. Although it must approve the contract, the U.S. government does not guar-
antee delivery or satisfaction with DCS. Some purchasers prefer to buy major items
through DCS and then receive follow-on logistics support through FMS.

Defense Shows and Exhibitions

e
Defense shows and exhibitions are key opportunities to display U.S. military hardware
for potential buyers. A prohibition on direct U.S. military participation was terminated.
pl
Deployment for Training
Deployment for training is usually funded by O&M funds. Its primary benefit is for the
U.S. military personnel or unit to perform deployment to a foreign country, perform one of
m
its mission tasks (such as road-building or medical treatment) and redeploy.

Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

The EDA program provides equipment declared excess by DOD to be sold at prices
Sa

ranging from 5 percent to 50 percent of original cost, or provided as a grant. While Con-
gress has established ceiling amounts and specific country restrictions, exceptions and
exemptions still provide significant transfers. Recipient nations pay for all transportation,
repairs, and upgrades.

Exchange Programs
Exchange programs are intended to foster understanding and familiarize each force
with the capabilities and differences of the other. Programs include Individual Exchange
Program, the Personnel Exchange Program (a 1-3 year PCS move) and Reciprocal Unit
Exchanges.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

FMF are grants and loans for the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and
related training. With almost no exceptions, all of these funds must be spent in the U.S.
Despite the term “financing,” FMF monies currently are grant funds.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

FMS are government-to-government contracts for the sale of equipment and training.
FMS prices include surcharges for the administrative costs of security assistance and
the non-recurring costs of research, development, and production. In 1976, Congress
required FMS to be used for major items and some special items, reversing a previous
preference for DCS. FMS not only includes major defense items of equipment, but also
military training.

*1-6 (ROMO) I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence

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Military Ops
Range of
Humanitarian Assistance
Examples: Protection or support to agencies or organizations providing relief outside the
U.S.; humanitarian demining (although the U.S. military rarely actually does demining, it
does provide training for demining schools, publicity in local languages, and selected fund-
ing for demining groups)

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

IMET provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied
and friendly nations. The purpose of IMET is to increase mutual understanding, improve
management and heighten human rights awareness. Annually, IMET provides programs,
including professional military education, to approximately 5,000 students from about 120
countries. In 1991, the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program was implemented to promote
professionalism and civilian oversight of the military by providing training and education to
host nation civilian officials from ministries of defense and other defense management and
resource allocation organizations. Since FY95, E-IMET also has been available to civilians
who are not members of the government but are essentially members of non-governmental
organizations.

Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET)

U.S. law generally requires the HN to pay for training that benefits its forces. “SOF excep-
tion” training, or training provided by U.S. SOF forces to a HN military, are an exception to
that rule because some SOF missions require the SOF capability to train foreign forces.
e
Therefore, although primary benefit must be to SOF, and training must not equate or dupli-
cate training purchased or provided by security assistance.
pl
Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)
JCTP is the program term for small U.S. military liaison teams who are located in and
directly assist designated Ministries of Defense with planning and implementing selected
TSC activities. The program began in order to accelerate TSC interaction in former Soviet
m

Union and Warsaw Pact countries.

Leased Defense Articles (LDA)

The LDA program provides approved nations with U.S. equipment that DOD does not
Sa

declare excess but certifies as not required for the period of the lease. Recipients, including
the UN, generally pay leasing costs including a rental charge for depreciation, transporta-
tion fees and any repairs. “No-cost” leases, such as those offered recently for F-16 aircraft,
still include payment for transportation and repairs.

Mobile Training Team (MTT)

Security assistance (generally HN) funds provide training, and follow-on logistics support or
repair parts to an FMS customer or weapon system logistic office. The primary beneficiary
is the HN military.

Regional Study Centers

Regional study centers are educational facilities that include seminars, conferences, and
longer courses to increase, educate, and build relationships between military officers in
the region. Examples include USEUCOM’s Marshall Center and USPACOM’s Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies.

Senior Officer Visits

Senior officer visits are highly visible interaction between senior military and civilian lead-
ers to build and enhance personal relationships and increase understanding. Obviously
they are an example of informational power as they are publicized and demonstrate U.S.
approval and support. They may sometimes be used to express concerns and to influence
HN policies.

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Military Ops
Range of

I. Typical Operations and Activities

Typical operations include: military engagement; emergency preparedness; arms
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament; counterterrorism; support to CD opera-
tions; sanction enforcement; enforcement of exclusion zones; freedom of navigation
and overflight; foreign assistance; security assistance; security force assistance;
FID; humanitarian assistance programs; protection of shipping; show of force opera-
tions; support to insurgency; and COIN.

A. Military Engagement Activities

Numerous routine missions (e.g., security cooperation) and continuing operations
or tasks (e.g., freedom of navigation) occur globally on a continuing basis under the
general heading of military engagement. These activities build strong relationships
with partners, increase regional awareness and knowledge of a PN’s capabilities
and capacity, and can be used to influence events in a desirable direction. Military
engagement activities can also increase understanding of an adversary’s capabili-
ties, capacity, and intentions and can provide forewarning of undesirable events. In
some cases, what begins as a military engagement activity (e.g., limited support to
COIN through a security assistance program) can expand to a limited contingency
operation or even a major operation when the President commits US forces. Military
engagement activities are generally governed by various directives and agreements
and do not require a joint OPLAN or OPORD for execution.

B. Emergency Preparedness e
Emergency preparedness consists of measures taken in advance of an emergency
to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation’s institutions from all
pl
types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency management program of
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. At the strategic level, emer-
gency preparedness encompasses those planning activities, such as continuity of
operations and continuity of government, undertaken to ensure DOD processes,
m

procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and SecDef in a
designated national security emergency.
• Continuity of operations ensures continuous conduct of functions, tasks,
Sa

or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission supporting the

national strategy. Continuity of operations includes the functions and duties
of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed
by the staff and others under the authority and direction of the commander. If
the President directs, DOD may be tasked with additional missions relating to
emergency preparedness.
• Continuity of government involves a coordinated effort within each USG branch
(executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue minimum
essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency.

C. Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and

Disarmament
Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament are not synonymous. The following
are examples of US military personnel involvement in arms control, nonproliferation,
and disarmament activities: verifying an arms control treaty; seizing and securing
WMD; escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (e.g., enriched
uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; conducting and host-
ing site inspections; participating in military data exchanges; implementing arma-
ment reductions; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous
material.

*1-8 (ROMO) I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence

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Military Ops
Range of
Chap 1
II. Crisis Response &
Limited Contingency Ops
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), chap. VII.
Crisis response and limited contingency operations typically are focused in scope
and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational-level ob-
jective in an OA. They may be conducted as a stand-alone response to a crisis (e.g.,
NEO) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex operation. Joint forces
conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations to achieve operational
and, sometimes, strategic objectives.
CCDRs plan for various situations that require military operations in response
to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies and crises as
directed by appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and resources
depends on the circumstances. Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of
US citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving the ability to operate
with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Many
of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities operat-
ing in close cooperation with interorganizational participants. APEX integrates crisis
e
action and deliberate planning into one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort
and transition from planning to execution.
pl
Initial Response
When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond. If the crisis re-
volves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint forces to
deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train in
m

Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability,
US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE
DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g.,
Sa

natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct DSCA
and HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt deployment
of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy
larger forces later. Effective early intervention can also deny an adversary time to set
conditions in their favor, achieve destabilizing objectives, or mitigate the effects of a
natural or man-made disaster. Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deter-
ring or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success.
Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing the adversary that the deployed
force is able to conduct decisive operations and the national leadership is willing to
employ that force and to deploy more forces if necessary.

Strategic Aspects
Two important aspects about crisis response and foreign limited contingency opera-
tions stand out. First, understanding the strategic objective helps avoid actions
that may have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in some
operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions that have
significant strategic implications. Second, commanders should remain aware of
changes not only in the operational situation, but also in strategic objectives that may
warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious.
Therefore, commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which may eventually
lead to disconnects between national objectives and military operations. Failure to
recognize changes in national objectives early may lead to ineffective or counterpro-
ductive military operations.

(ROMO) II. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Ops 1-13*

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Military Ops
Range of

I. Typical Crisis Response Operations

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), pp. VII-2 to VII-5.

A. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

NEOs are operations directed by DOS or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with
DOD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from locations within foreign countries to
safe havens designated by DOS when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest,
or natural disaster. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may
also include citizens from the HN, as well as citizens from other countries. Pursuant to
Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, DOS
is responsible for the protection and evacuation of US citizens abroad and for safeguard-
ing their property. This order also directs DOD to advise and assist DOS to prepare and
implement plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US ambassador, or chief of the
diplomatic mission, prepares the emergency action plans that address the military evacu-
ation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The GCC
conducts military operations to assist in the implementation of emergency action plans as
directed by SecDef.
B. Peace Operations (PO)
PO are multiagency and multinational operations involving all instruments of national
power—including international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military
missions—to contain conflict, restore the peace, and shape the environment to support
e
reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.
For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass PKO, predominantly military
pl
PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, PM processes, and conflict prevention. PO
are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities and humanitarian ef-
forts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to
each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or
m
after conflict. PO support national/multinational strategic objectives. Military support im-
proves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic
actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.
• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). PKO are military operations undertaken with the
Sa

consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implemen-
tation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support dip-
lomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Such actions are often taken
under the authority of Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter.
• Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO). PEO are the application of military force
or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel
compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and
order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protec-
tion of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or
parties to a dispute. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the
states involved or of other parties to the conflict.
• Peace Building (PB). PB consists of stability actions (predominantly diplomatic,
economic, and security related) that strengthen and rebuild governmental infra-
structure and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction
to prevent a return to conflict. Military support to PB may include rebuilding roads,
reestablishing or creating government entities, or training defense forces.
• Peacemaking (PM). This is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or
other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute or resolves
issues that led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military,
economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power. The purpose
is to instill in the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative

*1-14 (ROMO) II. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Ops

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Military Ops
Range of

III. Homeland Defense and Defense

Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), pp. VII-5 to VII-6.
Security and defense of the US homeland is the USG’s top responsibility and is con-
ducted as a continuous, cooperative effort among all federal agencies, as well as state,
tribal, and local government. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though
limited in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions—HD and DSCA.
Commander, US Northern Command, and Commander, US Pacific Command, have
specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. These responsibilities include conducting
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US, its
territories, and interests within their assigned AORs, as directed by the President or
SecDef. However, DOD support to HD is global in nature and is often conducted by all
CCDRs beginning at the source of the threat. In the forward regions outside US territo-
ries, the objective is to detect and deter threats to the homeland before they arise and to
defeat these threats as early as possible when so directed.
Homeland Defense (HD)
HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense
infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the
President. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other agen-
cies, to defend against external threats and aggression.
e
However, against internal threats DOD may be in support of another USG department or
agency. When ordered to conduct HD operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate
pl
closely with other government agencies. Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will
provide capabilities to support CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national
security. These include invasion, cyberspace attack, and air and missile attacks.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
m

DSCA is support provided by US federal military forces; DOD civilians, DOD contract
personnel, DOD component assets, DOD agencies, and National Guard forces (when
SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests
Sa

to use those forces in Title 32, USC status) in response to requests for assistance
from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other
domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. For DSCA operations,
DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. The majority of DSCA operations
are conducted IAW the NRF, which establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards
approach to domestic incident response. Within a state, that state’s governor is the key
decision maker and commands the state’s National Guard forces when they are not in
federal Title 10, USC, status. When the governor mobilizes the National Guard, it will
most often be under state active duty when supporting civil authorities.
Other DSCA operations can include CD activities, support to national special security
events, or other support to civilian law enforcement IAW specific DOD policies and US
law. Commanders and staffs must carefully consider the legal and policy limits imposed
on intelligence activities in support of LEAs, and on intelligence activities involving US
citizens and entities by intelligence oversight regulations, policies, and executive orders.

Refer to The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook (Protecting the

Homeland / Defense Support to Civil Authority) for complete discussion.
Topics and references include homeland defense (JP 3-28), defense
support of civil authorities (JP 3-28), Army support of civil authorities
(ADRP 3-28), multi-service DSCA TTPs (ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2), DSCA
liaison officer toolkit (GTA 90-01-020), key legal and policy documents, and
specific hazard and planning guidance.

*1-18 (ROMO) II. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Ops

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Military Ops
Range of
Chap 1
III. Large-Scale
Combat Operations
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), chap. VIII.

Campaign
Traditionally, campaigns are the most extensive joint operations, in terms of the
amount of forces and other capabilities committed and duration of operations. In the
context of large-scale combat, a campaign is a series of related major operations
aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Major Operations
A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and
strikes, and is the primary building block of a campaign. Major operations and cam-
paigns typically include multiple phases (e.g., the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 2003 OIF). Campaign planning is appropriate when
the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.
Campaigns can occur across the continuum of conflict. In campaigns characterized
by combat, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible;
e
conclude hostilities; and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the US, and its
multinational partners. Establishing these conditions may require joint forces to con-
duct stability activities to restore security, provide essential services and humanitarian
pl
relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction. Some crisis-response or contingency
operations may not involve large-scale combat, but could meet the definition of a ma-
jor operation or campaign based on their scale and duration (e.g., the Tsunami relief
m
efforts in Indonesia or Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in the US, both in 2005).
Campaigns are joint in nature—functional and Service components of the joint force
conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Within a campaign,
forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and space, conduct opera-
Sa

tions to achieve strategic or operational objectives in one or more OAs. Forces

operate simultaneously or sequentially IAW a common plan, and are controlled by a
single Service commander or the JFC.

Combatant Command (CCMD) Planning

The CCMD strategy links national strategic guidance to development of CCMD cam-
paign and contingency plans. A CCMD strategy is a broad statement of the GCC’s
long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision for the global employ-
ment of functional capabilities. CCDRs prepare these strategies in the context of
SecDef’s priorities outlined in the GEF and the CJCS’s objectives articulated in the
NMS. However, the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically
magnify the planning challenges. There are three categories of campaigns, which
differ generally in scope and focus.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine

SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational
Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include
joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint
planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33),
information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16),
interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!

(ROMO) III. Large-Scale Combat Operations 1-19*

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Military Ops
Range of

Joint Operation Model (Example Activities)

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), pp. V-17 to V-20.

The six general groups of activity provide a convenient basis for thinking about a joint
operation in notional phases, as Figure V-7 depicts.

Phasing an Operation
Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V Phase 0
Shape Deter Seize Dominate Stabilize Enable Shape
Initiative Civil
Authority

Enable
Level of Military Effort

Stabilize Activities
Activities

Develop Dominate Revise,

and Activities Maintain,
Maintain or Cancel
Operation Operation
Plan Plan
XXXX XXXX

e
Seize Initiative Activities

Deter Activities
pl
Operation Shaping Activities
Theater Shaping Activities

Global Shaping Activities

m

Operation Order Operation Order

Activation Termination
Sa

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. V-7. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant Military Activities.

A. Shape
In general, shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater operations. Shap-
ing activities include long-term persistent and preventive military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure friends, build partner capacity and capa-
bility, and promote regional stability. They help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate
competitor and adversary actions that challenge country and regional stability. A GCC’s
TCP provides these and other activities tasked by SecDef/CJCS strategic guidance in
pursuit of national objectives. Likewise, CCDRs may direct more focused geographic
and functional shaping activities at the potential execution of specific contingency plans
for various types of operations. In the best case, shaping activities may avert or diminish
conflict. At the least, shaping provides a deeper, and common, understanding of the OE.
Preparatory intelligence activities inform operation assessment, planning, and execution
to improve the JFC’s understanding of the OE.

B. Deter
Successful deterrence prevents an adversary’s undesirable actions, because the adver-
sary perceives an unacceptable risk or cost of acting. Deterrent actions are generally
weighted toward protection and security activities that are characterized by preparatory
actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and indicate the intent to execute
subsequent phases of the planned operation. A number of FDOs, FROs, and force

*1-20 (ROMO) III. Large-Scale Combat Operations

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Military Ops
Range of
enhancements could be implemented during this phase. The nature of these options
varies according to the nature of the adversary (e.g., traditional or irregular, state or
non¬state), the adversary’s actions, US national objectives, and other factors. Once a
crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other
predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of intelligence
collection assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection,
and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS. CCDRs continue to conduct
military engagement with multinational partners to maintain access to areas, thereby
providing the basis for further crisis response. Many deterrent actions build on security
cooperation activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.

C. Seize Initiative
JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through decisive use of joint force capa-
bilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive operations at the earliest
possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for
decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay,
impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression and to deny the enemy its initial objectives.
Operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and expand friendly freedom of action
continue during this phase, while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the
intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

D. Dominate
These actions focus on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to
e
control the OE. Successful domination depends on overmatching enemy capabilities at
critical times and places. Joint force options include attacking weaknesses at the leading
pl
edge of the enemy’s defensive perimeter to roll enemy forces back, and striking in depth
to threaten the integrity of the enemy’s A2/AD, offensive weapons and force projection
capabilities, and defensive systems. Operations can range from large-scale combat to
various stability actions depending on the nature of the enemy. Dominating activities may
m

establish the conditions to achieve strategic objectives early or may set the conditions for
transition to a subsequent phase of the operation.

E. Stabilize
Sa

These actions and activities are typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained
combat operations to stability activities. These operations help reestablish a safe and
secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastruc-
ture reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent is to help restore local political,
economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may lead operations during part
or all of this period, but the JFC typically will provide significant supporting capabili-
ties and activities. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance
(i.e., military government), and integrate the efforts of other supporting interagency and
multinational partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. The JFC continu-
ously assesses the impact of operations on the ability to transfer authority for remaining
requirements to a legitimate civil entity.

F. Enable Civil Authority

Joint force support to legitimate civil governance typically characterizes these actions
and activities. The commander provides this support by agreement with the appropriate
civil authority. In some cases, especially for operations within the US, the commander
provides this support under direction of the civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil
authority regain its ability to govern and administer to the services and other needs of the
population. The military end state typically is reached during this phase, signaling the
end of the joint operation. CCMD involvement with other nations and other government
agencies beyond the termination of the joint operation, such as lower-level stability activi-
ties and FHA, may be required to achieve national objectives.

(ROMO) III. Large-Scale Combat Operations 1-21*

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Military Ops
Range of

* Editor’s Note: For the purposes of this book, only pertinent material related to
“military engagement, security cooperation and stability activities” have been
included in the following discussion of large combat operations and campaigns from
JP 3-0 Joint Operations (Jan ‘17). For the complete discussion from JP 3-0, refer to
JFODS5: The Joint Forces & Operations Doctrine SMARTbook.

I. Considerations for Deterrence

The deter phase is characterized by preparatory actions that indicate resolve to com-
mit resources and respond to the situation. These actions begin when a CCDR or
JFC identifies that routine operations may not achieve desired objectives due to an
adversary’s actions. This requires the commander to have identified CCIRs and as-
sessed whether additional resources, outside those currently allocated and assigned
for ongoing operations, are required to defuse the crisis, reassure partners, demon-
strate the intent to deny the adversary’s goals, and execute subsequent phases of the
operation. Deterrence should be based on capability (having the means to influence
behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of believability that the proposed actions
may actually be employed), and communication (transmitting the intended message
to the desired audience) to ensure greater effectiveness (effectiveness of deterrence
must be viewed from the perspective of the agent/actor that is to be deterred).

Isolating the Enemy

With Presidential and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support, JFCs strive
to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away
e
as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s
potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked by the Presi-
dent and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.
pl
The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its strategic leader-
ship and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved through the
use of IRCs and the interdiction of LOCs or resources affecting the enemy’s ability
m
to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the enemy both
physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and
military from their public support.

Flexible Deterrent Options/ Flexible Response Options

Sa

(FDOs/FROs)
FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an
issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both military and nonmilitary FDOs
can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression
during a crisis. FROs, usually used in response to terrorism, can also be employed
in response to aggression by a competitor or adversary.
See following pages (pp. 1-24 to 1-25) for further discussion.

II. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabili-
ties to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks deci-
sive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize
and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives,
and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the
JFC coordinates with other USG departments and agencies to facilitate coherent use
of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives.

Stability Activities
Combat in this phase provides an opportunity to begin various stability activities that
will help achieve military strategic and operational-level objectives and create the
conditions for the later stability and enable civil authority phases. Operations to neu-

*1-22 (ROMO) III. Large-Scale Combat Operations

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Military Ops
Range of
Preparing the Operational Area
(Deterrence)
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), pp. VIII-7 to VIII-8.

Special Operations (SOF)

SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the operational area and environment
by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations.
The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language capabilities, and relation-
ships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of con-
ventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can provide
operational leverage by gathering critical information, undermining an adversary’s will
or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, multina-
tional, or indigenous/surrogate forces.
Stability Activities
Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities
should establish a sound foundation for operations in the stabilize and enable civil
authority phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum
created when sustained combat operations wind down. Considerations include:
• Limit the damage to key infrastructure (water, energy, medical) and services.
e
• Assist with the restoration and development of power generation facilities.
• Establish the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilized mili-
pl
tary and paramilitary forces.
• Provide for the availability of cash or other means of financial exchange.
• Determine the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer,
medical, multinational).
m

• Assess availability of HN law enforcement and health and medical resources.

• Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law enforcement and first
responder services.
Sa

• Develop and disseminate information necessary to suppress potential new

enemies and promote new governmental authority.
Civil Affairs (CA)
CA forces have a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being
planned. CA forces conduct military engagement, humanitarian and civic assistance,
and nation assistance to influence HN and foreign nation populations. CA forces
assess impacts of the population and culture on military operations, assess impact
of military operations on the population and culture, and facilitate interorganizational
coordination. Establishing and maintaining civil-military relations may include interac-
tion among US, allied, multinational, and HN forces, as well as other government
agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.
Sustainment
Thorough planning for logistic and personnel support is critical. Planning must include
active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces, as well
as interagency personnel. This planning is done through theater distribution plans
(TDPs) in support of the GCCs’ TCPs. Setting the conditions enables the JFCs to
address global, end-to-end distribution requirements and identify critical capabilities,
infrastructure, and relationships required to be resourced and emplaced in a timely
manner to sustain and enable global distribution operations.

(ROMO) III. Large-Scale Combat Operations 1-23*

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Military Ops
Range of

Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs)

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), pp. VIII-8 to VIII-9.

Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions care-

fully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both military
and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter
further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national
power, but they are most effective when used in combination.
• Military FDOs can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning of enemy
action. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early
response, generally require economy of force; however, military FDOs should not
increase risk to the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect.
Military FDOs must be carefully tailored regarding timing, efficiency, and effective-
ness. They can rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA, especially
in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and
maritime forces, MISO, and protection without precipitating armed response from
the adversary. Care should be taken to avoid undesired effects such as eliciting an
armed response should adversary leadership perceive that friendly military FDOs
are being used as preparation for a preemptive attack.
• Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions taken by other government
agencies to dissuade an adversary from initiating hostilities. Nonmilitary FDOs
e
need to be coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with military FDOs to focus
all instruments of national power.
pl
Example Diplomatic FDOs Example Military FDOs
• Alert and introduce special teams (e.g., • Upgrade alert status
public diplomacy) • Increase ISR activities
m

• Reduce international diplomatic ties • Initiate show-of-force actions

• Initiate noncombatant evacuation opns • Increase training & exercise activities
• Restrict activities of diplomatic missions • Take steps to increase U.S. public
Sa

• Prepare to withdraw or withdraw US support

embassy personnel • Increase defense support to public
• Take actions to gain international support diplomacy
• Restrict travel of US citizens • Deploy forces into or near the
• Gain support through the UN potential operational area

Example Informational FDOs Example Economic FDOs

• Increase public awareness of the prob- • Freeze or seize real property in
lem and potential for conflict the United States where possible
• Interrupt satellite downlink transmissions • Freeze monetary assets in the U.S.
• Publicize violations of international law • Freeze international assets where
• Publicize increased force presence, possible
joint exercises, military capability • Encourage US and international
• Increase informational efforts corporations to restrict transactions
• Implement meaconing, interference, • Embargo goods and services
jamming, and intrusion of enemy infor- • Enact trade sanctions
mational assets • Enact restrictions on technology
• Maintain dialogue with the news media transfer

*1-24 (ROMO) III. Large-Scale Combat Operations

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Chap 2
Train, Advise
& Assist

Train, Advise
& Assist
Ref: JP 3-20, Security Cooperations (May ‘17); ADRP 3-07, Stability (Sept ‘12); and
adaptations from FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May ‘09, rescinded).

A complex relationship exists among security cooperation, security assistance, and

the military instrument of foreign internal defense. The left side of the illustration
below depicts this relationship, including how aspects of foreign internal defense and
security assistance overlap. The right side illustrates how foreign internal defense
focuses on internal threats to a host nation and how security assistance focuses on
external threats. The column depicts how security (military, intelligence, and civilian),
economic, and governance are considerations common to both foreign internal
defense and security assistance. Security Force Assistance supports the military
instrument of foreign internal defense, much of security assistance efforts, and some
security cooperation efforts.

Security Relationships
e
pl
m
Sa

Ref: FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, fig. 1-3, p. 1-7.

I. Security Cooperation (SC)

Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interac-
tions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions
to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to
provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or
to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objec-
tives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and
security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily
perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security as-
sistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation,
and information sharing and collaboration.

(Train, Advise & Assist) Overview 2-1*

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II. Security Cooperation Activities

Ref: JP 3-20, Security Cooperation (May ‘17), chap. 2.

Security Cooperation (SC) uses a combination of programs and activities by which DOD,
in coordination with DOS, encourages and enables countries and organizations to part-
Train, Advise

ner with the US to achieve strategic objectives.

& Assist

Foreign Assistance
Foreign assistance consists of a number of legally authorized programs that can be grouped
into the general categories of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and SA
with the strategic purpose of promoting long-term host nation (HN) and regional stability.
Security Assistance (SA)
SA is a group of programs the USG uses to provide defense articles, military training,
and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance
national policies and objectives. SA is generally overseen by DOS, and in many cases
administered by DOD as SC.
Security Cooperation (SC)
SC is the group of programs or activities employed by DOD in cooperation with PNs to
achieve US security objectives, and some SC is foreign assistance, but not all. Secu-
rity force assistance is the set of DOD SC activities that contribute to unified action by
the USG to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of FSF and their
e
supporting institutions, whether of a PN or an international organization (e.g., regional
security organization), in support of US objectives.
pl
Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Security sector reform (SSR) is a comprehensive set of programs and activities that an HN
government undertakes with USG assistance to improve the way it provides safety, security,
m
and justice. Defense institution building (DIB) is a primary form of DOD support to SSR.

Defense Institution Building (DIB)

DIB comprises SC typically conducted at the ministerial/department, military staff/service
Sa

headquarters, and related agency/supporting entity level to develop the strategic and
operational aspects of a PN’s defense institutions.

Other SC-related Activities

Other SC-related activities and programs include military engagements; joint combined
exchange training; Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program; com-
bined exercises for training, train-and-equip initiatives, and international military educa-
tion and training (IMET); and international armaments cooperation.

Security Cooperation and Joint Operations

A significant number of SC activities are conducted as a part of the GCCs’ TCPs, but limited
contingencies, crises responses, or major operations can also involve some form of SC.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

The foreign internal defense program is the participation by civilian and military agencies
of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other
designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.

Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the comprehensive civilian and military effort designed
to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. COIN is

*2-1a (Train, Advise & Assist) Overview

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

primarily a political struggle and incorporates a wide range of activities by the HN gov-
ernment of which security is only one, albeit an important one.

Counterterrorism (CT)
Counterterrorism are those activities and operations conducted to neutralize terror-

Train, Advise
ists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using

& Assist
violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)

Countering weapons of mass destruction, across the three lines of effort (prevent
acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises), includes activities
conducted across the USG to counter efforts to coerce or attack the US, its Armed
Forces, allies, partners, and interests with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
weapons.

Counterdrug (CD) Operations

Counterdrug operations are those civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate
illicit drug trafficking.

Stability Activities
Stability activities include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the
US in coordination with or in support of other instruments of national power to maintain
e
or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
pl
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)
Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US
and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or
privation.
m

Peace Operations (PO)

Peace operations normally include international efforts and military missions to contain
conflict, reestablish the peace, shape the environment to support reconciliation and
Sa

rebuilding between two or more factions within the indigenous population, and facilitate
the transition to legitimate governance.

Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

Civil-military operations are the activities of a commander performed by designated
civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations
between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting
efforts for stability within an HN or a region.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO)

Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, ob-
jective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.

Countering Threat Networks (CTN)

Countering threat networks is the aggregation of activities across the USG that identify,
analyze, neutralize, disrupt, or destroy threat networks.

Personnel Recovery (PR)

Personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the
recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

(Train, Advise & Assist) Overview 2-1b*

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III. Integrated Security Cooperation Activities

Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul 2010), chap. 1.

Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence encompass a wide

range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports other instru-
Train, Advise

ments of national power to protect and enhance national security interests and deter
& Assist

conflict.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE:

INTEGRATED SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

Security Cooperation

INDIRECT SUPPORT

Security Assistance
Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation
Exchange Programs
Joint/Multinational Exercises
e
DIRECT SUPPORT
pl
(not involving combat operations)

Civil-Military Operations
m

Military Information Support Operations

Military Training to Host Nation Forces
Logistic Support
Intelligence Cooperation
Sa

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Security Cooperation

Ref: JP 3-22, fig. I-3. Foreign Internal Defense: Integrated Security Cooperation Activities.

Nation Assistance (NA)

Within this range of military operations, nation assistance (NA) is civil or military as-
sistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA]) rendered to a nation by
US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war,
based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.
NA operations support the host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and
growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.
NA programs include security assistance (SA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA),
and foreign internal defense (FID).

*2-2 (Train, Advise & Assist) Overview

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Chap 2
I. Security Force
Assistance (SFA)

Train, Advise
Ref: Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security Force Assistance (Apr ‘13); ADRP

& Assist
3-07, Stability (Sept ‘12), chap. 3; and adaptations from FM 3-07.1, Security Force
Assistance (May ‘09, rescinded).

Security force assistance (SFA) is the set of Department of Defense (DOD) activities
that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support
the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and sup-
porting institutions. FSF are all organizations and personnel under host nation (HN)
control that have a mission of protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal as well
as external threats. SFA activities are primarily used to assist an HN in defending
against internal and transnational threats to stability (i.e., supporting foreign internal
defense [FID], counterterrorism, counterinsurgency [COIN], or stability operations).

I. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Tasks

The ultimate goal of SFA activities is to create FSF that are competent, capable, sus-
tainable, committed, and confident, and have a security apparatus tied to regional
stability. Regional security may partly be achieved in partnership with an HN by
e
developing its ability to deter and defend against military aggression by its neighbors
and to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorist threats.
pl
Security Force Assistance Tasks
m

A Organize
Sa

B Train

C Equip

D Rebuild and Build

E Advise and Assist

Ref: FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, pp. 2-2 to 2-8.

This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding
individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals
or groups that pose a security risk, and setting conditions in the operational area that
enable the success of other actors.

(Train, Advise & Assist) I. Security Force Assistance 2-5*

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

A. Organize
Organize is a SFA task that encompasses all measures taken to assist FSF in im-
proving its organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. U.S.
forces must understand the existing security organizations of FSF to better assist
them. Subsequently, SFA personnel may help the host nation organize its security
forces to meet the needs of its security environment.
Train, Advise

Organizing a foreign security force depends on the host nation’s social and eco-
& Assist

nomic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats. SFA aims to
create an efficient organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations
structure viable for the host nation. Conventional forces with limited special purpose
teams (such as explosive ordnance disposal) are preferred. Doctrine or standing op-
erating procedures should apply across the force, as should unit structures. The or-
ganization must facilitate the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence
across and throughout all security forces. As the foreign security force strengthens,
U.S. leaders and trainers should expect more independent organizational decisions.
The host nation determines the structure of its military forces, to include approving
all organizational designs. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types
of units, and internal organizational designs.
Organization should address all FSF, from the ministerial level to the patrolling police
officer and soldier. Building a competent FSF infrastructure—including civilian infor-
mation systems—is critical for success.
Organizing a foreign security force requires resolving issues related to: recruiting,
e
promotion screening and selection, pay and benefits, leader recruiting and selection,
personnel accountability, and demobilization of security force personnel.
pl
B. Train
Train is a SFA task to assist FSF by developing programs and institutions to train
and educate. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements of their security
m
environment.
Establishing Training Standards
Training in SFA involves many of the individual and collective skills performed in con-
Sa

ventional military operations. All levels of training for all components should include
values training. Metrics for evaluating units should include subjective measures,
such as loyalty to the host-nation government, as well as competence in military
tasks. Soldiers know how to evaluate military training. However, the acceptance
of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption, may be a better
measure of training effectiveness. Gauging this acceptance is far more difficult than
evaluating task performance. While the operational environment varies widely, FSF
and trainers can still establish clear measures to evaluate the training of individuals,
leaders, and units.
Training Foreign Security Forces
Members of FSF develop through a systematic training program (individual training
and education as well as collective training). The program builds basic skills, then
teaches them to work as a team, and finally allows them to function as a unit. Basic
military, intelligence, or law enforcement training focuses first on basic skills such as
legal considerations, first aid, marksmanship, and fire discipline. Leaders have train-
ing in tactics, including patrolling, urban operations, and legal evidence collection.
Everyone must master rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict. FSF units
should train to standard for conducting the major operations they will face.

*2-6 (Train, Advise & Assist) I. Security Force Assistance

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

II. Security Force Assistance Activities

Ref: Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security Force Assistance (Apr ‘13), fig. III-2.
SFA activities should be a critical part of strategic and operational planning from the begin-
ning, including the Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC’s) theater strategy and theater

Train, Advise
campaign and contingency planning to support GCC’s strategic objectives. SFA should be
integrated into the specific operation or campaign plans in all phases, not just as an after-

& Assist
thought for the stabilize and enable civil authority phases following combat operations.

Resources/ Security Force Foreign Security Purpose

Funding/ Assistance (SFA) Force
Programs Missions/Operations

Security
Major Combat  Deter/defeat
Cooperation Operations external threat
Title 22, USC –
Foreign Relations Foreign Internal  Deter/defeat
Defense internal threat
FMS
IMET
FMF Counterinsurgency  Defeat
SFA insurgency
Title 10, USC – Activities
Armed Forces Counterterrorism  Disrupt/defeat

PEP
JCET
PfP
e
Organize
Unconventional 
terrorists

Defeat enemy/
pl
Warfare illegitimate
Train
authority
Other
Equip
Section 1206 Stability Operations  Provide security
Section 1208 and essential
m
Section 1033 Rebuild/
services
Build

USG Advise Humanitarian  Save lives

Assistance
Sa

Federal Law
Enforcement Peace Operations  Separate the
opponents
Title 28, USC
(DOJ, FBI) Maritime Security  Provide security
Title 14, USC Operations in the maritime
(USCG) domain

Means Ways Ends

Legend
DOJ Department of Justice PEP personnel exchange program
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation PfP Partnership for Peace
FMF foreign military financing USC United States Code
FMS foreign military sales USCG United States Coast Guard
IMET international military education and training USG United States Government
JCET joint combined exchange training

Methodology: Ends, Ways, Means

Successful strategies typically employ all USG instruments of national power. Ends are the
desired strategic outcomes or end states. Ways are the methods, tactics, and procedures
used to achieve the ends. Means are the resources required to achieve the ends, such as
troops, weapons systems, money, will, and time. All strategies are subject to risk, often as-
sociated with the means allocated against a particular way. The ends must be reasonable
given the means and ways available. Figure III-2 depicts a model for SFA activities.

(Train, Advise & Assist) I. Security Force Assistance 2-7*

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II. Internal Defense & Development (IDAD)

Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul ‘10), chap. 2.
An IDAD program focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social
institutions that respond to the needs of the HN’s society. Its fundamental goal is to

Train, Advise
prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and

& Assist
defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The
HN government mobilizes its population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, the IDAD
program is ideally preemptive/Phase 0; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist,
or other threat develops, the IDAD program evolves to combat that threat. Commanders
and their staffs must understand the HN’s IDAD program and its objectives if they are to
plan effectively to support it. The objectives of FID will be to assist the HN in formulating
an appropriate IDAD program, which often includes fusing several separate strategic
plans and programs into one broader strategy.
An IDAD program should integrate security force and civilian actions into a coherent,
comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that per-
mits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires
change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn
promote unrest in the society. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain
conditions under which orderly development can take place.

IDAD Functions e
An IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats.
These functions are balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.
pl
Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and
economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the
rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies
legitimate grievances that the opposition attempts to exploit. The government must
m

recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take pre-
ventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long term
solution to the problem.
Sa

Security includes all activities implemented in order to protect the populace from
violence and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the
populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection
and control of the populace permit development and deny the adversary access to
popular support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the HN
can provide for its own security with limited US support. Neutralization is a political
concept that:
• makes an insurgent or criminal element irrelevant to the political process
• is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the
population
• includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s legiti-
macy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization
• can involve public exposure and the discrediting of insurgent and criminal leaders
during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence
• can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken, or
• can involve combat action when the adversary’s violent activities escalate
All neutralization efforts must be legal. They must scrupulously observe HN laws and
policy provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to
act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforc-
es government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue.

(Train, Advise & Assist) II. Foreign Internal Defense 2-15

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

IV. Planning for Foreign Internal Defense

Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul ‘10), pp. xvi to xvii.

A comprehensive planning process at both the national and theater level is vital in
order to provide the means to bolster the internal stability and security of the support-
Train, Advise

ed nation. The type of planning necessary is dictated by the type or types of support
& Assist

being provided. Support in anticipating and precluding threats is preventive in nature

and is likely to require a mix of indirect support and direct support not involving combat
operations. Depending on whether the mission has originated through DOD or DOS,
how, where, and at what level the planning, coordination, and resourcing takes place
will vary. Some basic imperatives when integrating FID into strategies and plans are:
• Maintain HN Sovereignty and Build Legitimacy. Ultimately, FID operations are
only as successful as the HN’s IDAD program.
• Understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US
assistance efforts. Building HN development and defense self-sufficiency may
require large investments of time and materiel.
• Tailor military support to FID for the operational environment and the
specific needs of the supported HN. The tendency to use a US frame of refer-
ence can result in equipment, training, and infrastructure not at all suitable for the
nation receiving US assistance.

e
• Ensure Unity of Effort/Unity of Purpose. Planning should consider and, where
appropriate, integrate all instruments of national power and intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and HN capabilities in order to re-
pl
duce inefficiencies and enhance strategy in support of FID and HN IDAD efforts.
• Understand US Foreign Policy. NSC directives, plans, or policies are the guid-
ing documents; however, US policy may change as a result of developments in
m
the HN or broader political changes in either country. DOD planners should seek
guidance from the COM and country team in interpreting foreign policy and guid-
ing US efforts in a particular country.
• Understand the Information Environment. In an environment characterized
Sa

by “instant communications,” proactive PA and PSYOP programs can address

regional, trans regional, and even global audiences that may have (or perceive
they have) a stake in US FID operations.
• Sustain the Effort. Plan for the US sustainment effort as well as the efforts neces-
sary for the HN to sustain its operations after the US or multinational forces depart.
GCCs base strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and
missions provided in the JSPS. The NMS supports the aims of the National Security
Strategy (NSS) and implements the national defense strategy. Through the guidance
and resources provided in the JSCP, the GCCs develop their operation plan and opera-
tion plan in concept format to support FID. The Guidance for Employment of the Force
provides the foundation for all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments,
and supports the President’s NSS. The GCC, using an integrated priority list, also iden-
tifies requirements to support FID efforts and request authorization and resourcing.
Military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and
plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level. Theater strategy translates
national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into long-term, regionally focused
operational tasks and direction to accomplish specific missions and objectives. In
peacetime, FID is an integral part of the strategy of deterring hostilities and enhancing
stability in the theater. The GCC’s theater campaign plan is the primary document that
focuses on the command’s steady-state activities, which include operations, SC, and
other activities designed to achieve theater strategic end states.

2-18 (Train, Advise & Assist) II. Foreign Internal Defense

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

C. Trainer/Advisor Checklists
Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul ‘10), chap. 5, pp. 5-7 to 5-10.

The predeployment site survey (PDSS) leader—along with any subordinates he may
Train, Advise

specify—establishes effective initial rapport with the HN unit commander. The PDSS
& Assist

leader:
• Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner using the HN language
• Briefs the HN commander on the joint force advisors’ PDSS mission and the restric-
tions and limitations imposed on the unit by the higher US commander. The PDSS
leader should use the HN language and, if required, visual aids translated into the
HN language.
• Assures the HN commander that all PDSS team members are fully supportive of
the HN’s position and that they firmly believe a joint and HN-unit effort will be suc-
cessful
• Assures the HN commander that his assistance is needed to develop the tentative
objectives for advisory assistance to include advisory team agreements with the HN
commander on training objectives
• Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s actual estimate of his unit’s capabilities
and perceived advisory assistance and material requirements
e
• Explains the PDSS team’s initial plan for establishing counterpart relationships,
obtains approval from the HN commander for the plan, and requests to conduct the
counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the PDSS leader and the HN
pl
commander
• Supervises the linkup between PDSS team members and their HN counterparts to
determine if the HN personnel understand the purpose of the counterpart relation-
m
ship and their responsibilities within it
• Identifies reachback requirements
• The PDSS leader should not make any promises or statements that could be con-
Sa

strued as promises to the HN commander regarding commitments to provide the

advisory assistance or fulfill material requirements
The PDSS team members analyze the HN unit’s status according to their area of exper-
tise for the purpose of determining the HN requirements for advisory assistance. The
PDSS team members:
• Explain the purpose of the analysis to counterparts
• Encourage counterparts to assist in the analysis, the preparation of estimates, and
the briefing of the analysis to the advisory team and HN unit commanders
• Collect sufficient information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and tenta-
tive advisory assistance COAs selected prior to deployment
• Collect and analyze all information relating to FP
• Prepare written, prioritized estimates for advisory assistance COAs
• Brief, with their counterparts, the estimates to the PDSS team and HN unit com-
mander
• Inspect, with their counterparts, the HN facilities that will be used during the assis-
tance mission
• Identify deficiencies in the facilities that will prevent execution of the tentatively
selected advisory assistance COAs

2-22 (Train, Advise & Assist) II. Foreign Internal Defense

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

• Prepare written or verbal estimates of COAs that will correct the deficiencies or
negate their effects on the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs
• Supervise the preparation of the facilities and inform the JFC of the status of the
preparations compared to the plans for them
Once received, the PDSS leader supervises the processing of the survey results. The

Train, Advise
PDSS leader then:

& Assist
• Recommends to the HN unit commander the most desirable COAs emphasizing
how they satisfy actual conditions and will achieve the desired advisory assistance
objectives
• Ensures that his counterpart understands that the desired COAs are still tentative
contingent on the tasking US commander’s decision
• Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on joint units, after obtaining
input from the HN unit commander
• Ensures the higher in-country US commander is informed of significant findings in
the team survey for HN assistance
The PDSS team plans its security in accordance with the anticipated threat. Adjustments
are made as required by the situation on the ground. The PDSS team members:
• Fortify their positions (quarters, communications, medical, command) in accordance
with the available means and requirements to maintain low visibility
• Maintain a team internal guard system, aware of the locations of all other joint force
e
advisors, and ready to react to an emergency by following the alert plan and start-
ing defensive actions
pl
• Maintain a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an emergen-
cy Maintain communications with all subordinate team members deployed outside
of the immediate area controlled by the team
• Establish plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an insurgent
m

or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction

• Discuss visible team security measures with HN counterparts to ensure their under-
standing and to maintain effective rapport
Sa

• Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security measures

that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN unit status and
the inspection of its facilities
• Establish mutual plans with the HN unit, through counterparts, for defensive actions
in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack
• Rehearse team alert and defensive plans
• Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual, full-force rehears-
als of defensive plans

Unit Training
Much of the training necessary to prepare personnel to support FID activities may be
conducted within the unit. This training can be individually focused or, in the case of unit-
size participation, may involve large-scale collective training. Training resources may be
drawn from a variety of sources, but SOF are particularly valuable because of their area
orientation and FID focus. When feasible, units should conduct operational rehearsals of
the FID mission. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the opera-
tion and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the
potential situations that a unit may encounter during a FID mission.

(Train, Advise & Assist) II. Foreign Internal Defense 2-23

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

Chap 2
IV. Working with
Host-Nation Forces

Train, Advise
& Assist
Ref: FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May ‘14),
chap. 11, pp. 11-1 to 11-10.
To enable a host-nation (HN) security force to conduct counterinsurgency opera-
tions, United States (U.S.) or multinational forces conduct various security coopera-
tion activities. Commanders often view host-nation security force development as
an essential task and one of their primary lines of effort. The resulting increase in a
host nation’s ability to secure its own population yields significant benefits because
host-nation troops are normally more effective in conducting operations among the
local population than U.S. or multinational forces. Transitioning responsibility for
operations to the host-nation security force reduces the visible presence of U.S. or
multinational troops, further enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government.

e
pl
m
Sa

(U.S. Army photo)

U.S. or multinational efforts to develop the capability and capacity of a host-nation

security force must focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation
counterparts. Developing a sound plan to develop a host nation’s capability to
address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate, comprehensive
assessment of that host nation’s security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or
multinational forces selects to assess a host-nation security force must be appropri-
ate for the type of security force being assessed. For example, assessment of a
host-nation army may require a completely different set of criteria from those used
to assess a host-nation police force. Likewise, a host nation’s border or customs
police, local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must
(Train, Advise & Assist) IV. Working with HN Forces 2-35
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

all be assessed according to their specific mission requirements, while taking into
consideration that host nation’s federal or local laws, political considerations, culture,
and tribal affiliations.
The use of security cooperation tools to build governmental capability, including
building a host nation’s forces, may be essential. In the eyes of a local population,
the credibility of the host-nation government is vital in counterinsurgency efforts to
Train, Advise

address the threat and conditions of instability. The host nation’s military, police, and
paramilitary forces are often the most visible elements of a host-nation government’s
& Assist

power and authority. Therefore, building the capacity of a host nation’s security
forces should work toward improving the security force’s competence, capability,
commitment, and confidence.

Developmental Area Developmental Indicators

Competence Host-nation security forces must possess and demonstrate
individual and collective skills in their respective warfighting or
law enforcement tasks. They must also support institutional
functions.
Capability Host-nation security force organizations must be appropriately
sized to accomplish their respective missions. A host-nation
security force must be adequately manned and equipped at a
level that is sustainable, given that host nation’s own resources.
A host-nation security forces’ supporting institutions, such as
their national level force generation and logistic agencies, must
be organized and directed in a manner that adds value to the
lower-level, host-nation security forces’ mission requirements.
Commitment
e
A host-nation security force must be committed to the peaceful
transition of political power. It must also be committed to the
pl
security and survival of the state, the rule of law, the
preservation of human rights, civil liberties for the population,
and to fighting hard (when necessary) to defeat the active
insurgency.
Confidence A host-nation’s population must believe that its host-nation
m

security forces’ actions are always in the best interests of the

people. A host-nation government must believe that its
host-nation security force supports that government’s legal
authority. Also, the international community must see a host
Sa

nation’s security force as a force for good that respects human

rights and the international law of war.

Ref: FM 3-24, table 11-1. Developing a host-nation security force.

One issue with developing security forces is the issue of the quality versus the
quantity of host-nation counterinsurgency forces. In the case of counterinsurgency,
quality tends to be more important than quantity. While quantity and quality must be
balanced to some degree and “quantity has a quality all its own” to the extent that
too small a force will not be able to accomplish its mission, quantity is not a substi-
tute for quality.

I. Assessing & Developing a Host-Nation Force

Assessment of host-nation army or land forces typically comes more naturally to
U.S. or multinational forces than assessing host-nation police forces. It is easier for
a Soldier or Marine to assess another Army or Marine Corps unit than it is for a Sol-
dier or Marine to accurately assess a police precinct, fire department, or sanitation
department. Developing measures of performance and measures of effectiveness
based on their standards and how effective those standards are is important.
See FM 3-24, chapter 12, for more information on assessments.
One method to create an assessment framework is to form a working group of
subject matter experts. This working group will review any lines of effort and tasks
identified by the host nation and recommend additions and subtractions based on

2-36 (Train, Advise & Assist) IV. Working with HN Forces

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IV. Host-Nation Contributions

Ref: FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May ‘14), pp. 11-13 to 11-14.

Task Reason for Contribution

Train, Advise

Understand an operational An area of operations is a host nation’s home and its

& Assist

environment culture; a host-nation force knows the language, the

different groups, the political situation, educational levels,
economic considerations, historical bad actors, and
unofficial community leaders.
Provide human intelligence Host-nation security forces may be able to better gather
information that leads to human intelligence for many
reasons, including speaking the same language and
understanding the important players in the area.
Put the pieces together Host-nation forces can often better integrate the different
fragments of intelligence into the context of an operational
environment.
Determine credibility of Host-nation forces possess a vastly superior sense of
intelligence assets (sources, cultural intelligence and may be able to assist in assigning
walk-ins, call-ins) credibility to sources.
Validate and check Host-nation forces can assist in confirming the locally hired
interpreters interpreters’ abilities to interpret.
Identify and root out Host-nation forces can pick out minute differences between
infiltrators
Gain information superiority
e
normal and abnormal behaviors.
Host-nation forces can help write messages that may
pl
resonate with the local population.
Vet locally hired personnel for Host-nation forces have access to resources not
counterintelligence and necessarily available to U.S. personnel.
security purposes
m

Ref: FM 3-24, table 11-2. Host-nation contributions.

Tactical-level planners in the U.S. military employ either the military decisionmak-
ing process or the Marine Corps planning process to gain an understanding of an
Sa

operational environment, identify the tactical problem, develop possible courses of

action, and evaluate and select the best course of action to most effectively address
the tactical problem. Commanders and staffs first properly frame the problem. When
given a set of inputs, such as an order from higher headquarters or some other initiat-
ing directive, certain intelligence products, and an initial commander’s visualization,
commanders and staffs complete the steps to work toward a specified output, such as
a finished operation order. In cases where host-nation security force leaders have been
directly involved in combat operations over many years, those leaders who survive
often owe their lives to their own ability to improvise. As a result, many host-nation
security force leaders apply an intuitive, instead of a process-oriented, method of mak-
ing decisions. They can immediately size up a tactical situation, almost instantaneously
recognize dangers and opportunities, and decide upon a course of action. While this
capability can serve in critical situations, it cannot be taught to others, and it is of no
use in situations unrelated to the leader’s own experiential learning. Therefore, U.S. or
multinational advisors may have to work patiently with their host-nation security force
counterparts for them to develop a planning and decision support process instead of
allowing them to rely solely on the intuitive approach.
U.S. and multinational planners ensure that they have conducted basic mission analy-
sis prior to parallel planning with host-nation partners. This allows advisors to develop
and assess assumptions, identify implied and specified tasks, determine what assets
and capabilities are available, and formulate a tentative timeline to coordinate advisory
efforts throughout the planning process.

2-48 (Train, Advise & Assist) V. Developing HN Security Forces

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Chap 2
VI. Working Effectively
w/Foreign Security Forces

Train, Advise
& Assist
Ref: FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation (Jan ‘13), chap. 6.

I. Relationship Building
Building relationships can lead to partnerships, and is central to security cooperation
whether conducting military engagement with a foreign partner in Europe and Asia,
or conducting Soldier and leader engagements with foreign security forces (Foreign
security forces) during operations that may include counterinsurgency. It is essential
for the Soldier, particularly the advisor, to place a considerable amount of time and
energy in establishing solid relationships among U.S. forces and Foreign security
forces. By its very nature, the advisor mission forces its members out of their tradi-
tional roles. An advisor must purposefully look to build solid relationships between
U.S. and foreign security force commanders, staffs, and the defense establishment,
as well as a variety of governmental and nongovernmental entities.

e
pl
m
Sa

(U.S. Army photo)

II. Rapport
Since Soldiers conducting security cooperation missions that include security force
assistance are in a unique military position, they establish rapport with their foreign
counterparts. This position is one in which the leader has no positional authority
over the actions of their foreign counterparts. This lack of authority means that the
doctrinal view of leadership is modified to emphasize interpersonal relationships and
de-emphasize authoritarian roles. Soldiers use their interpersonal skills to build rap-
port. Soldiers cannot simply order a specific action; instead, they use interpersonal
skills to positively affect the actions and decisions of their foreign counterparts and
(Train, Advise & Assist) VI. Working Effectively with Security Forces 2-49
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Chap 3
Stability in Operations
(Actions/Tasks/Efforts)
Ref: JP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘16), chap. 1 and ADP/ADRP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘12).

Stability is achieved through the process of stabilization through the balanced ap-
plication of the instruments of national power in partnership with the host nation (HN)
and local communities. Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary
actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of
conflict, foster HN resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace

Operations
Stability in
and security. Stability can be described as the overarching characterization of the
effects created by activities of the United States Government (USG) outside the US
using one or more of the instruments of national power to minimize, if not eliminate,
economic and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across one or
more of the five USG stability sectors.

I. Stability in Operations
Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situa-
tion as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions consist of the level
e
of violence; the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions; and
the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.
pl
Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. First, instability stems from
decreased support for the government based on what locals actually expect of their
government. Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government
elements, which usually occurs when locals see spoilers as helping to solve the
m

priority grievance. Lastly, instability stems from the undermining of the normal func-
tioning of society where the emphasis must be on a return to the established norms.
Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources
of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. While long-term devel-
Sa

opment requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. There-
fore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability
and by building the capacity of local institutions.

Stability Tasks (Army Definition)

Across the range of military operations, Army units use the principles of stability with
the principles of joint operations to carry out stability tasks. Effective commanders
better understand the joint principles in the context of stability as part of decisive ac-
tion and in the context of how to use the principles.
Stability tasks are based on principles that lay the foundation for long-term stability.
Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States
in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a
safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emer-
gency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-07).
Stability tasks focus on identifying, targeting, and mitigating the root causes of
instability to set the conditions for long-term development by building the capacity of
local institutions. See pp. 3-21 to 3-26 for further discussion.

Stability Actions (Joint Definition)

Military contributions to stabilization consist of those various military missions, tasks,
and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide

(Stability) Overview 3-1*

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End State Conditions for Stability

Ref: ADRP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘12), pp. 1-13 to 1-16
To achieve conditions that ensure a stable and lasting peace, stability tasks in opera-
tions capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among
military and nonmilitary organizations. These complementary civil-military efforts aim to
strengthen legitimate governance, restore or maintain rule of law, support economic and
infrastructure development, and foster a sense of national unity. These complementary
efforts also seek to reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security and
create the conditions that enable the host-nation government to assume responsibility for
civil administration.
Successful efforts require an overarching framework that serves as a guide to develop
strategy in pursuit of broader national or international policy goals. The following purpose-
Operations
Stability in

based framework—derived from work within the USG and led by the United States Institute
of Peace with the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute—is founded on
five broad conditions that describe the desired end state of a successful stability operation.
In turn, a series of objectives link the execution of tactical tasks to that end state.
This framework provides the underpinnings for strategic, whole-of-government planning,
yet also serves as a focal point for integrating operational- and tactical-level tasks. It is
flexible and adaptive enough to support activities across the range of military operations
but relies on concrete principles and fundamentals in application.
1. Safe and Secure Environment e
Security is the most immediate concern of the military force, a concern typically shared by
pl
the local populace. A safe and secure environment is one in which these civilians can live
their day-to-day lives without fear of being drawn into violent conflict and being victimized
by criminals or by the forces there to protect them. Achieving security requires extensive
collaboration with civil authorities, the trust and confidence of the people, immediate atten-
m
tion to any reported civilian harm as a result of operations, and strength of perseverance.
In the aftermath of conflict or disaster, conditions often create a significant security vacuum
within the state. The government institutions are either unwilling or unable to provide secu-
rity. In many cases, these institutions do not operate within internationally accepted norms.
Sa

They are rife with corruption, abusing the power entrusted to them by the state. Sometimes
these institutions actually embody the greatest threat to the populace. These conditions
only serve to ebb away at the very foundation of the host nation’s stability.
Many challenges threaten a safe and secure environment. Generally, the immediate threat
to a safe and secure environment is a return to fighting by former warring parties. However,
insurgent forces, criminal elements, and terrorists also significantly threaten the safety and
security of the local populace.
2. Established Rule of Law
While military forces aim to establish a safe and secure environment, the rule of law re-
quires much more—security of individuals and accountability for crimes committed against
them. These basic elements are critical for a broader culture of rule of law to take hold in a
society emerging from conflict. A broad effort integrates activities of many actors, focus-
ing civilian and military law and order capabilities to support host-nation civil institutions
in establishing and supporting the rule of law. These activities come from a shared sense
of confidence among the population that the justice sector focuses on serving the public
rather than pursuing narrow interests. Planning, preparing, and executing the transfer of re-
sponsibility from military to host-nation control for rule of law—although critical for building
public confidence—often proves the most difficult and complex transition conducted in a
stability operation. Failure to ensure continuity of rule of law through this transition threat-
ens the safety and security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation,
and impedes long-term development and achieving the desired end state.

*3-3a (Stability) Overview

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3. Social Well-Being
The immediate needs of a host-nation population emerging from conflict or disaster
generally consist of food, water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care. International
aid typically responds quickly, often due to their presence in, or proximity to, the affected
area. If allowed, and once forces stabilize and secure the situation, local and interna-
tional aid organizations provide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the people,
establish sustainable assistance programs, and assist with displaced civilians.
However, forces also must attend to long-term requirements: developing educational
systems, avoiding inadvertent civilian harm, addressing past abuses, and promoting
peaceful coexistence among the host-nation people. These requirements most appropri-
ately get supported from civilian actors, including other government agencies, intergov-
ernmental organizations, and NGOs. Resolving issues of truth and justice are paramount
to this process, and systems of amends, compensation, and reconciliation are essential.

Operations
Stability in
4. Stable Governance
Since the end of the Cold War, all international interventions have aimed to establish stable
governments with legitimate systems of political representation at the national, regional,
and local levels. In a stable government, the host-nation populace regularly elects a repre-
sentative legislature according to established rules and in a manner generally recognized
as free and fair. Legislatures must be designed consistently with a legal framework and
legitimate constitution. Officials must be trained, processes created, and rules established.
Typically, early elections in a highly polarized society empower elites, senior military
e
leaders, and organized criminal elements. However, the local populace often seeks early
and visible signs of progress. Effective reform processes begin with elections at the
provincial or local level to minimize the likelihood of national polarization and reemer-
pl
gence of violent divisions in society. Popular leaders—capable of delivering services and
meeting the demands of their constituents—and effective processes can emerge. Since
elections can also become flashpoints for violence and instability between groups, U.S.
m
forces consider security measures as part of the election process.
Successful, stable governments also require effective executive institutions. Such capac-
ity building generally requires a long-term commitment of effort from the international
community to reestablish effective ministries and a functional civil service at all levels
Sa

of government. Stable governments also require free and responsible media, multiple
political parties, and a robust civil society. Further, in many countries, formal systems of
governance exist alongside informal governance systems, such as tribal elders. Such
informal systems can play an important stabilization role, acting as an enduring and ef-
fective alternative to formal structures, which may have limited reaches within a country.
5. Sustainable Economy
Following conflict or a major disaster, economies tend toward a precarious state. They
often suffer from serious structural problems that need immediate attention. However,
they also possess significant growth potential. Commerce—legitimate and illicit—previ-
ously inhibited by circumstances emerges quickly to fill market voids and entrepreneur-
ial opportunities. International aid and the requirements of intervening military forces
often infuse the economy with abundant resources, stimulating rapid growth across the
economic sector. However, much of this growth is temporary. It tends to highlight increas-
ing income inequalities, the host-nation government’s lagging capacity to manage and
sustain growth, and expanding opportunities for corruption.
Rather than focus efforts toward immediately achieving economic growth, intervening
elements aim to build on those aspects of the economic sector that enable the economy
to become self-sustaining. These aspects include physical infrastructure, a sound fiscal
and economic policy, an effective and predictable regulatory and legal environment, a
viable workforce, business development and increased access to capital, and effective
management of natural resources

(Stability) Overview 3-3b*

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The Immediate Drivers of Instability

Ref: JP 3-07, Stability Operations (Sept ‘11), pp. I-11 to I-12.

The root causes are critical to understanding why a state is unstable, but additional
analysis is required to understand how they have manifested in specific political
dynamics that threaten the HN. To develop an effective plan for stabilization, the
joint force must analyze the immediate drivers of instability. Opportunity, motive, and
means are central to understanding and mapping the drivers of instability as a basis
for the design and detailed planning to create stability.

Opportunity
Opportunity may emerge slowly over time due to a decline in HN capacity to control
its territory and population. It can also arise when HN security force capacity remains

Operations
Stability in
level, but the willingness of the HN population to cooperate with HN forces declines.
Conversely, opportunity can also emerge suddenly as the result of a natural, indus-
trial, or humanitarian disaster that overwhelms the capacity of the HN government to
maintain control. In these cases, the HN government may face criminal or political
opportunists seeking to exploit a sudden vacuum of authority.
Motive
The motives for violence vary between individuals and communities, and between
elites, combatants, and supporters. For a joint force conducting stability activities, it
e
is important to distinguish between the root causes that made a society vulnerable
to instability, and how those conditions were transformed into drivers of instability by
established or aspiring elites. The existence of grievances does not automatically
pl
cause instability: poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate essential
services, political marginalization, and repression are unfortunately commonplace, and
exist in many places that are reasonably stable. It takes leaders to build a compelling
narrative that links grievances to a political agenda. Those leaders use that narra-
m

tive to mobilize support for some political purpose, including possibly undermining the
government’s ability to constrain their freedom of action. The narrative explains who
is to blame for the grievances, how the grievances should be addressed and what the
Sa

population should do. The success of a narrative is based not only on the substance
of its promises and threats, but how it is presented to the target audience. Successful
narratives typically frame grievances in terms of an ethnic, religious, political, class,
or geographic identity, emphasizing its marginalization by the HN government. The
identity provides the symbols, myths, and historical references that are woven into the
narrative to bolster its credibility and appeal.
Means
Finally, acquiring the means to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent govern-
ment authorities is a significant task for armed actors, and the way such groups go
about securing those resources can strongly influence their behavior. The leaders
of destabilizing actors must assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and
systems of secure communications and logistics—often covertly. Leveraging exist-
ing social networks, diaspora support, illicit economies, or state sponsorship can all
provide armed actors with the means to challenge HN authority, but each comes with
drawbacks as well. Relying on existing social networks can provide a resilient, deeply
rooted source of people and funds, but that social identity may limit the ability to win
broader support. Diaspora politics and priorities can diverge significantly from those in
the theater of operations, creating tensions between local factions and their geograph-
ically removed backers. Deepening involvement in illicit economies can transform
organizations into criminal organizations as profit becomes an end in itself. State
sponsors can often prove the strongest support base, but have their own agendas and
expect to wield influence or even outright control.

(Stability) Overview 3-11*

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III. Joint Stability Functions

Ref: JP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘16), chap. 3.

While the assignment of specific tasks and prioritization among them depends on the
mission and conditions of the OE, the stability sectors are a tool to help visualize the
scope of stabilization efforts within a joint operation. JIPOE, mission analysis, and the
CONOPS sequence necessary activities within the LOEs aligned to operational and
tactical objectives and develop appropriate priorities for those activities and resource
allocation. Individually, the joint stability functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated
tasks that constitute stability activities in a stability sector. Collectively, they are the
framework through which the USG identifies the possible tasks required in a stabilization
effort. Incorporating tasks within each sector into coherent LOEs is required to ensure
that efforts are properly aligned to their specific objective and integrated to create cross-
Operations
Stability in

cutting effects.

Integrated Approach to Stabilization

Security Stabilization

Governance and Line of Effort 1

Participation

Foreign
e Line of Effort 2
pl
Political Political
Humanitarian Settlement
Assistance Strategy Line of Effort 3

Line of Effort 4
Rule of Law
m

Economic
Stabilization and
Infrastructure Each line of effort integrates
elements of all the stability
Sa

functions to achi
eve a specific
operational objective.

Ref: JP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘16), fig. III-2. An Integrated Approach to Stabilization.
Although some tasks are executed sequentially, success necessitates an integrated
approach that focuses on synchronized actions, whether concurrent or sequential,
throughout the OE. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one area of
stabilization depend upon the successful integration and synchronization of activities
across the other areas. The JFC should establish LOEs based on the political strategy
that integrates the stability functions within each LOE. Preferably, the JFC should use
them simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across all sectors of the
HN. In hostile environments, joint forces may be tempted to utilize all available capac-
ity on security efforts. However, security is usually conditional on a degree of popular
consent and this, in turn, is conditional on the restoration of basic governance functions.
Accordingly, the JFC should not presume that others could implement, for example,
governance functions once the joint force has managed to reduce the level of violence.
Some tasks are interdependent and a minimal level of security, governance, and rule of
law will be necessary to facilitate an initial sense of stabilization.
The joint stability functions are security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure,
rule of law, and governance and participation. These functions are based upon the sec-
tors developed in the stability ETM as interagency guidance on stability and reconstruc-
tion activities across the USG.

* 3-24 (Stability) I. Primary Stability Tasks

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

A. Security
Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations, territory, and national
assets such as infrastructure or natural resources. Such activities may be performed as
part of a military occupation during or after combat; as a component of a COIN or peace-
keeping operation; or in response to a natural disaster. They seek to reassure rather
than compel the civil population, while communicating a clear, credible threat of force to
opportunists or potential adversaries.
B. Humanitarian Assistance
The humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human
needs to ensure the well-being of the population. Well-being is characterized by access to
and delivery of basic needs and services (i.e., water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health
services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or voluntary
resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social fabric

Operations
Stability in
and community life.
C. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure
The economic stabilization and infrastructure function includes programs conducted to
ensure an economy in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predict-
able system of economic governance bound by law. A sustainable economy is characterized
by market based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-
based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.
D. Rule of Law
e
The rule of law function refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and
institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which
pl
is supreme. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal frameworks, public
order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law
requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudi-
cated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. It also requires
m

measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the
law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, partici-
pation in decision making, and legal certainty.
Sa

E. Governance and Participation

Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and
behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exer-
cised in a society. Participation is a process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by
which they make rules and by which those rules are enforced and modified, and refers to
programs conducted to help the people to share, access, or compete for power through
nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the
nation. These rules and processes must be seen as predictable and tolerable in the eyes
of the population to be deemed legitimate. They are manifested in three core functions:
representation, security, and welfare.

Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS)

Stabilization efforts, depend on the exercise and establishment of legitimacy, credibility,
and trust. Fundamental to each of these principles is the alignment of words, images,
and deeds. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) who fail to synchronize their communi-
cation into a coherent and unifying narrative, across all Lines of Effort (LOEs) and all
units, agencies, and partners supporting these LOEs, risk credibility gaps that provide
the threat fodder for its propaganda and jeopardize support for joint and multinational
operations and, ultimately, the HN. In other words, it is essential to synchronize themes,
messages, images, and actions with operations, and when appropriate, vice versa.
See also pp. 3-50 to 3-51. For further details, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and Joint
Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization.

(Stability) I. Primary Stability Tasks 3-25 *

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B. Establish Civil Control

Establishing civil control is a preliminary step toward instituting rule of law and stable,
effective governance. Although establishing civil security is the first responsibility of
military forces in a stability operation, they can only accomplish it by also restoring
civil control. Internal threats often manifest themselves as an insurgency, subver-
sive elements within the population, organized crime, or general lawlessness. Each
significantly threatens law and order and therefore the overall effort to establish a
secure, stable peace. Civil control centers on justice reform and the rule of law, sup-
ported by efforts to rebuild the host-nation judiciary, police, and corrections systems.
It encompasses the key institutions necessary for a functioning justice system, includ-
ing police, investigative services, prosecutorial arm, and public defense. Civil control
includes helping the state select an appropriate body of laws to enforce; usually this
is the host nation’s most recent criminal code, purged of blatantly abusive statutes.
In a fragile state, the justice system often ceases to function altogether with absent

Operations
Stability in
judges and legal professionals, looted or destroyed courts and prisons, damaged or
destroyed records, and any surviving vestiges of the justice system stripped of essen-
tials. With a transitional military authority, intervening forces may perform both judicial
and correctional functions. Promoting the rule of law in these cases requires that
military forces abide by the law and are held accountable for any crimes committed.
To provide for the safety and security of the populace successfully, an effective
judiciary branch and a functioning corrections system must complement the state’s
security institutions. Together with governance and civil security, civil control is a
e
core element of security sector reform. This reform sets the foundation for broader
government and economic reform and successful humanitarian relief and social
development. Establishing civil control protects the integrity of the security sector
pl
reform program. Civil control tasks prevent corruption that threatens security institu-
tions when institutions lack the support of judges to apply the law and prisons to
incarcerate the convicted.
m
Building host-nation capacity for civil control is paramount to establishing the founda-
tion for lasting civil order. Community-oriented police services under civilian control
that clearly separate the roles of the police and military are essential to success. As
with host-nation security forces, the development of police forces proves integral to
Sa

providing a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Military forces first need to
restore and then maintain civil order until formed police units trained in stability policing
skills can perform these functions and begin training host-nation police forces. In some
cases, military forces also train, or oversee the training of, host-nation police forces.
Host-nation justice system actors who participated with a corrupt or authoritarian
regime and continued their service in such capacities are inconsistent with institu-
tional reform programs. As with other elements of the civil security and governance
sectors, an appropriate authority vets the judiciary, police, and corrections staffs and
oversees their activities as part of the security sector reform program. Conducted in
parallel with other reform processes, near-term efforts focus on building host-nation
capacity by restoring the components of the justice system. Long-term develop-
ment aims to institutionalize a rule of law culture within the government and society.
Establishing this culture often relies on the delicate balance between retribution and
reconciliation in a state recovering from the effects of collapse. Successful develop-
ment depends on the ability of the host nation to reconcile with its past—determining
whom to punish, whom to forgive, whom to exclude, and whom to accept within the
new order of the state.
Civil control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. It
reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. Within the justice and
reconciliation stability sector, initial response tasks aim to develop interim mecha-
nisms for establishing rule of law. Transformation tasks focus on restoring the justice
system and processes for reconciliation. Fostering sustainability tasks serve to

(Stability) I. Primary Stability Tasks 3-31

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establish a legitimate, functioning justice system founded on international norms.

These conditions define success within the sector while reflecting the end state
necessary to ensure the foundation for enduring stability and peace.

Conditions to Establish Civil Control

Civil control ensures that citizens live in a safe society in which individuals and
groups do not take the law into their own hands. Rather, they respect the
decisions of and adhere to the rule of law. Rule of law enables a populace to
have equal access to a self-sustaining justice system consistent with interna-
tional human rights standards and to apply access equally. This is a long-term
process conducted by civilian entities. Nevertheless, Army units take initial
actions to begin establishing some level of civil control in public order and safety.
Initially, Army units are the only authorities capable of implementing some level
of civil control and will likely be involved in building host-nation capacity. Army
Operations
Stability in

units quickly transfer the lead for these efforts to the U.S. country team.
Civil control includes the following necessary conditions:
• Just legal frameworks
• Public order
• Accountability to the law
• Access to justice
• Culture of lawfulness
e
Establish Civil Security Subordinate Tasks
pl
• Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements
• Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence
services
m
• Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
• Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement
• Support identification
Sa

• Protect key personnel and facilities

• Clear explosive and other hazards

C. Restore Essential Services

Efforts to restore essential services ultimately contribute to achieving a stable
democracy, a sustainable economy, and the social well-being of the population. In
the aftermath of armed conflict and major disasters, military forces support efforts to
establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter,
and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services
are restored. Military forces also protect them until transferring responsibility to a
transitional civil authority or the host nation. In addition, these efforts typically include
providing or supporting humanitarian assistance, providing shelter and relief for
displaced civilians, and preventing the spread of epidemic disease. The immediate
humanitarian needs of the local populace are always a foremost priority.
However, activities associated with this primary stability task extend beyond simply
restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While
military forces generally center their efforts on the initial response tasks that provide
for the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations
focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Typically, local and
international aid organizations already provide assistance, although the security
situation or obstacles to free movement may limit their access to all populations.
3-32 (Stability) I. Primary Stability Tasks
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Chap 3
III. Stabilization
Planning
Ref: JP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘16), chap, IV and ADRP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘12), chap. 4.

I. Stabilization Planning
The development of OPLANs that integrate offense, defense, and stability actions
and integrate the military’s stabilization efforts with the activities of interorganizational
partners is the responsibility of JFCs and their staffs. JFCs must also ensure that
subordinate commanders executing stability actions understand the overall planning

Operations
Stability in
of the operation, including, in particular, how various military and civilian stability
efforts interrelate and, when possible, integrate with each other and with combat mis-
sions, tasks, and activities, if any.
It is the responsibility of CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs to incorporate stability
actions into the deliberate and crisis action planning processes when directed by
the President or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In addition to the
important role stability actions play in major operations or campaigns and limited
contingency operations, stability actions contribute to shaping the operational envi-
ronment (OE) and supporting the GCCs’ Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs).

Stability Actions
e
pl
Stability actions can be an integral part of joint operations that focus on achieving
both elements essential to strategic success—defeating the adversary and ensuring
that in the aftermath that secure and stable conditions are in place that enable recon-
struction and development toward a lasting peace. Stabilization efforts are executed
m

continuously throughout joint operations. Executed early enough and in support of

broad national interests and policy goals, stabilization efforts provide an effective
proactive tool for building partner capacity and reducing the risks associated with
natural disasters and violent conflict in partner states. Effective stabilization efforts
Sa

do this by preparing HNs for crisis and by anticipating and addressing the possible
drivers of conflict long before the onset of hostilities or disaster. There is no separate
planning process for stability from that used for combat operations. The balance and
simultaneity in execution of offense, defense, and stability actions within each phase
of a joint operation demands a similar balance and simultaneity in planning efforts.

Establishing Stable Conditions

While defeating an enemy may remove a physical threat to peace and security,
establishing stable conditions that will foster peace and security in the mid-term to
long-term will remain a significant challenge. Therefore, joint planning must also
consider the key elements of conflict transformation—of how joint, interagency, and
multinational actions can transform the factors producing violent conflict over time to
return stability and attain strategic end states.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine

SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational
Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include
joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint
planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33),
information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16),
interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!

(Stability) III. Stabilization Planning 3-53*

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II. Understanding the Operational

Environment (OE)
A holistic understanding of the operational environment enables the design of Under-
standing the OE. An understanding of the OE in stabilization enables the develop-
ment of an approach that includes realistic, achievable objectives, and properly
aligns ends, ways, and means. Understanding of the OE is accomplished through
JIPOE and the collective staff assessment.
Through enhanced understanding of the OE, the JFC can improve the ability to:
• Decipher the true nature of the problem the stabilization efforts is meant to
resolve.
• Develop realistic end states and objectives.
• Develop an operational approach that is relevant to the nature of the conflict,
Operations
Stability in

appropriate for the operational area, and achievable based on JFC capabilities
and available resources.
• Consider relevant aspects of the OE during the planning and execution of
activities and operations that produce lethal and nonlethal effects.
• Determine second and third order effects.
• Inform the feedback loop from the JFC to policy makers about the operational
feasibility of policy objectives for a given stabilization mission.
The OE is a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect how
e
the JFC uses available capabilities and makes decisions. The OE typically en-
compasses the relevant actors and physical areas and factors of physical domains
pl
and information environment (which includes cyberspace). Understanding the OE
requires a holistic view of operationally relevant aspects of the OE. Decision making
and associated behavior of relevant actors are particularly important to understand.
Success during stabilization efforts ultimately depends on the ability of the JFC and
m

partners to apply lethal and nonlethal state power in a manner that influences the
behavior of people in accordance with US stabilization objectives. Understanding the
OE requires an understanding of factors that shape the decision making and associ-
ated behavior of relevant actors. A holistic understanding of all relevant components
Sa

within the OE, helps the JFC to understand how the OE can be shaped, how the OE
affects capabilities, and how friendly, adversary, and neutral actors’ actions affect or
shape the conflict. Importantly, understanding relevant aspects of the OE enables
the JFC to leverage aspects of the OE to achieve its stabilization objectives.

A. Planning, Execution and Assessment

Understanding the OE in stabilization informs planning, execution, and assessment
of various aspects of the operation.

Planning
To perform the mission analysis process during planning, a planner needs an under-
standing of the OE. It helps identify the true nature of the problem, the mission, and
the factors within the OE that must be targeted through lethal and nonlethal means
to attain the desired end state. Understanding the OE enables planning missions
and activities that make sense for the nature of the conflict and that are appropriate
in the context of the operational area. It also enables JFC planners to improve plan-
ning by better understanding potential second- and third-order effects.

Execution
Once a mission or activity in support of the operation is planned, understanding of
relevant factors within the OE enables operators to better execute their missions
in a manner that furthers progress toward the objectives of the stabilization efforts.

*3-54 (Stability) III. Stabilization Planning

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B. Stability and Defeat Mechanisms

Ref: ADRP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘12), pp. 4-9 to 4-10.

Stability Mechanisms
Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ the force to conduct
stability tasks in unified land operations. A stability mechanism is the primary method
through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support
establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADRP 3-0). Some of these mechanisms recover
quickly from change in terms of conflict transformation, as they can act as mitigators for
drivers of conflict. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and re-
inforcing effects that help shape the human dimension of operational environments more
effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability
Operations
Stability in

mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.

Compel involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of lethal force to establish
control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities,
peace agreements, or other arrangements. Compliance and legitimacy interrelate. While
legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance itself depends on how
local populace perceives the force’s ability to exercise force to accomplish the mission.
The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to suc-
cess in operations otherwise underscored by stability tasks; it closely ties to legitimacy.
Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or comple-
e
ment efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates
and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of
force—can adversely affect the legitimacy of the mission or the military instrument of
pl
national power. The effect of civilian casualties—even from unintended incidents such
as traffic accidents and collateral damage—can have a lasting and negative impact on
the mission. Commanders should have plans in place to mitigate these events including
m
response mechanisms for incidents that do occur. Good will is much harder to rebuild
once lost than to build in the first place. Even one ignored civilian casualty incident can
put the mission and troops at risk.
• Control involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, routes,
Sa

sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key
terrain and facilities. As a stability mechanism, control closely relates to the primary
stability task—establish civil control. However, control is also fundamental to effec-
tive, enduring security. When combined with the stability mechanism compel, it is
inherent to the activities that compose disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion, as well as broader security sector reform programs. Without effective control,
efforts to establish civil order—including efforts to establish both civil security and
control over an area and its population—will not succeed. Establishing control
requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts.
• Influence involves altering the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation population
through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct. It applies nonlethal
capabilities to complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of
stability mechanisms. Influence aims to affect behavioral change through nonlethal
means. It is more a result of public perception than a measure of operational suc-
cess. It reflects the ability of forces to operate successfully among the people of the
host nation, interacting with them consistently and positively while accomplishing
the mission. Here, consistency of actions and messages is vital. Influence requires
legitimacy. Military forces earn the trust and confidence of the people through the
constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, not through lethal or coercive
means. Positive influence is absolutely necessary to achieve lasting control and
compliance. It contributes to success across the lines of effort and engenders sup-
port among the people.

*3-58 (Stability) III. Stabilization Planning

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• Support involves establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for

the other instruments of national power to function effectively; coordinating and co-
operating closely with host-nation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations
as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Support
is vital to a comprehensive approach to stability tasks. The military instrument of
national power brings unique expeditionary and campaign capabilities to opera-
tions emphasizing stability tasks. These capabilities enable the force to address
the immediate needs of the host-nation and local populace quickly. In extreme
circumstances, support may require committing considerable resources for a pro-
tracted period. However, easing the burden of support on military forces requires
enabling civilian agencies and organizations to fulfill their respective roles. Typically
commanders ease the burden by combining the effects of the stability mechanisms
compel, control, and influence to reestablish security and control; restoring essen-
tial civil services to the local populace; and helping to secure humanitarian access

Operations
Stability in
necessary for aid organizations to function effectively.

Defeat Mechanisms
Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy
force. A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their
mission against enemy opposition (ADRP 3-0). They are defined in terms of the broad
operational and tactical effects they produce—physical or psychological. Commanders
translate these effects into tactical tasks, formulating the most effective method to de-
feat enemy aims. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those
e
aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Military forces prove
most successful when applying deliberate combinations of defeat mechanisms. As
pl
with stability mechanisms, this produces complementary and reinforcing effects not at-
tainable with a single mechanism. The four defeat mechanisms are destroy, dislocate,
disintegrate, and isolate:
• Destroy involves identifying the most effective way to eliminate enemy capabili-
m

ties. It may be attained by sequentially applying combat power over time or with a
single, decisive attack.
• Dislocate involves compelling the enemy to expose forces by reacting to a spe-
Sa

cific action. It requires enemy commanders to either accept neutralization of part

of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning.
• Disintegrate involves exploiting the effects of dislocation and destruction to
shatter the enemy’s coherence. It typically follows destruction and dislocation,
coupled with the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and
maintain situational understanding
• Isolate involves limiting the enemy’s ability to conduct operations effectively by
marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the enemy’s ability to influence events.
It exposes the enemy to continued degradation through the massed effects of
other defeat mechanisms.

Combining Stability and Defeat Mechanisms

Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning and the Army design methodol-
ogy by providing focus in framing complex problems; they offer the conceptual means
to solve them. By combining the mechanisms, commanders can effectively address the
human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Therefore,
one element of the force can focus on reestablishing security and control while another
element can address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace. These
focuses are essential in operations conducted among the people where success is
often gauged by the effectiveness of long-term reconstruction and development efforts.
Thus, early and deliberate combinations of the stability and defeat mechanisms are
vital to success, especially in environments where actors may face active opposition.

(Stability) III. Stabilization Planning 3-59*

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Stability Assessment Tools

Ref: JP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘16), app. B.

Operation assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward
mission accomplishment. A constant challenge during stabilization efforts is the difficulty to
effectively analyze progress using systematic reliable indicators and data collection methods.
Assessment Metrics
The staff should develop metrics to determine if stability actions are properly linked to
the JFC’s overall plan and the larger hierarchy of operational and national objectives.
Assessment indicators include Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of
Performance (MOPs).

Operations
Stability in
Assessment Tools
• Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). The ICAF is a framework
that can be used to help people from different USG departments and agencies work
together to reach a shared understanding of a country’s conflict dynamics and consen-
sus on potential entry points for additional USG efforts. This assessment will provide
for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in a country or region.
• USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF). USAID carries out conflict as-
sessments in a country where changes in conditions or circumstances on the ground
e
are needed to enable an environment for sustainable development, the environment
requires a blend of immediate relief and stabilization assistance, or where the coun-
pl
try context requires contingency or scenario planning due to the likelihood of a rapid
change in the environment requiring resources to be redirected in response to a new
or renewed crisis.
• Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE). The USACE, US Institute for
m

Peace, Office of the Sec of Defense, and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Opera-
tions Institute developed MPICE as a framework. Fundamentally, the ICAF is an assess-
ment to ascertain the root causes, the drivers of conflict, and the potential resiliency of a
HN. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) complements the ICAF.
Sa

• USAID Anticorruption Assessment. This USAID handbook is tailored to conduct

anticorruption assessments efficiently and at a level sufficiently detailed to produce
targeted and prioritized recommendations.
• District Stability Framework (DSF). The USAID District Stability Framework is a
methodology designed for use by both military and civilian personnel to identify the un-
derlying causes of instability and conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the
root causes of instability and conflict, and measure the effectiveness of programming.
• Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool. CJSART is designed to assist policy-
makers and program managers prioritize and administer HN criminal justice sectors.
• USAID Guidelines for Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters.
REA is a tool to identify, define, and prioritize potential environmental impacts in
disaster situations and is used to identify and rank environmental issues and follow-
up actions during a disaster. REA is designed as a best practice tool for effective
disaster assessment and management.
• Democracy and Governance Assessment. Conducting a Democracy and Gover-
nance Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development provides a framework
for constructing donor, in particular USAID, democracy and governance strategies.
• The Operation Assessment Process. JFCs measure the effectiveness and
performance of stability actions in relation to accomplishing missions and achieving
progress toward overall USG stability goals.

(Stability) III. Stabilization Planning 3-67*

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Establishing Transitional Military Authority

Ref: FM 3-07, Stability (Jun ‘14), pp. 2-8 to 2-9 and JP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘16), app. D.

The JFC is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of the transitional
military authority under the general guidelines received from the President and
SecDef. The structure and organization of the transitional military authority depend on
international law; UN Security Council resolution; the mission of the military force; the
organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces; the military and political
conditions of the OE, the nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former
HN government; and the physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the
HN. The JFC may execute the authorities of civil administration directly, invest the
authority in subordinate operational commanders, or establish a separate JCMOTF.

Operations
Stability in
A transitional military authority restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety
and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Transitional
military authority is not limited to the occupation of enemy territory. During operations
outside the United States and its territories, necessity may also require establishing
transitional military authority in various situations, including:
• An allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces
• A technically neutral or allied territory proven to be hostile
• Ungoverned areas
e
The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based
on the requirements of both the military operation and international law. To establish
transitional military authority, commanders may require from the host-nation population
pl
a level of obedience commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides
security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of
the operational area. Commanders can reward civil obedience by reducing infringe-
ment on the individual liberties of the local populace.
m

The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to
several factors, including:
• The legal authorities of the military commander under international law
Sa

• The relationship that previously existed between the U.S. Government and the
host-nation government
• Existing attitudes and the level of cooperation among the host nation’s national,
regional, and local leaders and the local populace
• Ongoing and projected military operations
• The presence of hostile or enemy forces
• The level of civil obedience
As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the
degree of control exercised by a military authority can decrease. Authority and control
can transfer either to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority.

Command Responsibility for Transitional Military Authority

The exercise of transitional military authority is a command responsibility, exercised
in accordance with international law. To ensure that situational understanding and
cultural awareness inform planning and the conduct of transitional military authority,
commanders at all levels maintain open, continuous dialogue. They also collaborate
among the echelons of command and various agencies, organizations, and institutions
that share in efforts to restore legitimate governance to the host nation.
The authority to implement transitional military authority resides with the President,
exercised through the Secretary of Defense and the joint force commander.

(Stability) V. Transitional Governing Authorities 3-73*

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Chap 3
VI. Small Unit Stability
Tasks & Activities
Ref: FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ’03), chap. IV and FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10),
The Infantry Rifle Company (Jul ‘06), chap. 6.
This section highlights small unit tasks and activities related to stability, peace
and counterinsurgency operations. For discussion of tasks and activities more
closely related to peace operations -- protected areas, separation/neutralization
of belligerent forces, interpositioning, nonlethal weapons, and noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEO) -- see pp. 4-27 to 4-34.

Operations
Stability in
Stability, peace and counterinsurgency operations encompass various military mis-
sions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with
other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure
environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations can be conducted in
support of a host-nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no
government exists.

e
pl
m
Sa

Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. They
help to establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among
local or regional adversaries. Stability operations can also help establish political,
legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local
governance. It is essential that stability operations maintain the initiative by pursing
objectives that resolve the causes of instability. Stability operations cannot succeed if
they only react to enemy initiatives. (Dept. of Army photo)
Coordination, integration, and synchronization between host-nation elements, other
government agencies, and Army forces are enhanced by transparency and cred-
ibility. The degree to which the host nation cooperates is fundamental. Commanders
publicize their mandate and intentions. Within the limits of operations security, they
make the populace aware of the techniques used to provide security and control.
Actions on the ground reinforced by a clear and consistent message produce trans-
parency. This transparency reinforces credibility. Credibility reflects the populace’s
assessment of whether the force can accomplish the mission.
(Stability) VI. Small Unit Tasks & Activities 3-79
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A. Patrolling
Ref: FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ’03), pp. IV-1.

Patrolling is also a high-frequency task during stability operations. The primary advan-
tage of the dismounted patrol is that they provide a strong presence and enable regu-
lar interface with the local population. This procedure greatly helps in gathering vital
information as well as in developing the base of knowledge of the unit’s AO. Planning
and execution of an area security patrol and presence patrol are similar to procedures
for other tactical patrols except that the patrol usually occurs in urban areas and patrol
leaders must consider political implications and ROE.
Patrolling is the basis of operations in a hostile area. It is aimed at acquiring informa-
tion, identifying and apprehending persons, and neutralizing hostile groups. The kind
of patrol depends on the mission and can be either mounted or dismounted.

Operations
Stability in
Types of patrols can include the following:
1. Presence Patrols
PO forces use presence patrols when the situation in the area is stabilized and there is
no direct danger for the forces. The patrol is recognized as a unit of the PO force. The
intention is to show the local people that forces are in the area and alert. The patrol
is armed, but is acting in a friendly and frank way. The patrols are conducted during
daylight hours.
2. Combat Patrols e
Conducted in areas where forces may encounter armed, organized groups may be
encountered, it may be necessary to conduct combat patrols. In such circumstances,
pl
imposing a curfew will ensure that the combat patrol is not placed at a disadvantage
it will usually be sensible to impose a curfew so as not to place the combat patrol at a
disadvantage.
m

3. Ambush Patrols
Ambushes are sometimes useful in rural operations. If conducted under cover of a
curfew and the necessary precautions are taken to ensure that innocent people do
not get involved, it is possible to set a conventional style ambush designed to capture
Sa

hostile persons.
4. Reconnaissance Patrols
Reconnaissance patrols play a major role in PO for several reasons. They will need to
visit all outlying communities in order to both acquire information and provide the reas-
surance of a security force presence. These patrols may have to search areas and
they may need to set up hasty roadblocks.
5. Air and Space Assets
Use air and space assets to cover large areas and gain certain types of information
quickly. For example, the use of thermal imaging cameras can gain timely information,
both day and night, for monitoring movement and activity. The threat of applying lethal
air power can limit movement of hostile forces.
6. Naval Patrolling
Naval assets provide operational support, including anything from patrolling inland wa-
terways to major ocean coastlines. Other missions commonly performed can include
search and rescue (SAR) operations, observation and reporting on pollution damage
to the marine environment, and combined training missions with ground elements of
the PO force. Examples of training missions include insertion and extraction of person-
nel at coastal remote sites, re-supply, SAR exercises, small arms live fire exercises,
and familiarization rides to encourage mutual understanding and cohesion among
contingents.

(Stability) VI. Small Unit Tasks & Activities 3-81

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L. Refugees and Displaced Persons

Military forces do not have primary responsibility for the international response that
assists refugees and DP’s. However, they may support the activities of their civilian
partners. Refugees and DP’s operations are a subset of DC operations under popu-
lace and resources control (PRC).
IDP's are frequently confused with refugees or other DP’s. The distinction between
the two categories is essentially a matter of location. A refugee gains that status
crossing an international border. An internally DP, on the other hand, remains within
the boundary of the country of origin.
A fundamental point of population movement is that it does not occur without reason.
Usually, indicators exist that individual rights are, or soon will be, in jeopardy. They
may request that the military provide intelligence support to assist in determining the
direction and magnitude of these movements.
Operations
Stability in

Technical and Legal Considerations

The distinction between refugees and IDP’s has less to do with reasons for move-
ment and more to do with technical and legal considerations associated with the
individual’s ultimate destination. Both the refugee and IDP may be fleeing the same
threat, and both may experience the same requirements to alleviate the threat.
Virtually every humanitarian agency has the flexibility to respond to the needs of
both refugees and IDP’s. The UNHCR, whose mandate specifically charges the
organization to respond to the needs of refugees, can serve the interests of IDP’s on
e
a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs must work to ensure the UN system protects and assists persons who are
not covered by other UN mandates. This office, as the title implies, coordinates the
pl
humanitarian response to emergencies, and advocates the interests of the internally
displaced community.

Stages
m

The five stages of movement are preflight and flight, arrival, asylum, repatriation,
and reintegration.
• Preflight and flight. Call on military forces to provide intelligence support to
Sa

determine the timing, magnitude, and direction of the population movement.

• Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location, call on
the military to assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN during the
initial arrival of the refugees.
• Asylum. Army forces may secure refugee camps and settlements in the host
country while at the same time assisting with stabilization of the refugees’
country of origin.
• Repatriation. When conditions in the operational area improve, and the
displaced community returns to its native country, they may need military sup-
port to secure repatriation crossing points, screening points, transit sites, and
returnee movement to local communities.
• Reintegration. Reintegration is the final phase. During this phase, command-
ers may require military forces to assist with the security of returnees as they
are absorbed into their local communities. This support would be especially
critical in the absence of a capable host-nation public safety establishment or
active resistance to resettlement. International civilian police normally assume
the primary responsibility for community law and order.

M. De-mining and Unexploded Ordnance

Every year, landmines kill 15,000 to 20,000 people and severely maim countless
more.

3-98 (Stability) VI. Small Unit Tasks & Activities

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Chap 4
Peace
Operations (PO)
Ref: JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations (Aug ‘12), chap. I, and ATP 3-07.31, Peace
Operations (Nov ‘14), chap. I.

Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and
normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress
the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and
to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO may be conducted under the
sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another intergovernmental organization
(IGO), within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally.

Operations
Peace
e
pl
m
Sa

Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations,
including international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the
peace, and shape the environment in support of reconciliation and rebuilding and
facilitating the transition to legitimate governance. (United Nations photo.)

I. Types of Peace Operations

PO includes the five types of operations. PO include peacekeeping operations
(PKO), peace enforcement operations (PEO), conflict prevention, peacemaking
processes, and peace building post conflict actions. Conduct PO in conjunction with
various diplomatic activities necessary in securing a negotiated truce and resolving
the conflict.
Note: The US adopted the term peace operations while others such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the term peace-support operations.

(Peace Operations) Overview 4-1

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1. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

PKO consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to
establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.
PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties
to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations.
Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire is in effect, and the parties to
the dispute must consent to the operation. A main function of the PKO force is to
establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters
confidence in the peace process. Agreements often specify which nations’ forces are
acceptable, as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute.
See pp. 4-11 to 4-14 for further discussion.

2. Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)

Peace enforcement operations (PEO) enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to
maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions
and exclusion zones, protection of personnel providing FHA, restoration of order, and
forcible separation of belligerent parties. PEO may be conducted pursuant to a lawful
mandate or in accordance with international law and do not require the consent of the
HN or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. Forces
conducting PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with
resolutions or sanctions. Forces conducting PEO generally have full combat capabili-
Operations

ties, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting.

Peace

e
See pp. 4-15 to 4-18 for further discussion.

3. Peace Building (PB)

pl
PB consists of actions that support political, economic, social, and security aspects
of society. Although the major responsibility for PB is with the civil sector, early in
PO, when critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by civilian organizations
temporarily exceed their capabilities, PO forces should assist and cooperate with the
m

HN civil sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IGOs, to ensure that

those tasks are accomplished.
See pp. 4-19 to 4-24 for further discussion.
Sa

4. Peacemaking (PM)
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of
peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that
led to the conflict.
Military support to the peacemaking process includes military-to-military relations,
security assistance, or other activities, which influence disputing parties to seek a
diplomatic settlement.
An example of military support to peacemaking was the involvement of the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe and the Joint Staff plans directorate during the develop-
ment of the Dayton Accords by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia outlin-
ing a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention employs complementary diplomatic, civil, and military means to
monitor and identify the causes of a conflict, and takes timely action to prevent the
occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Chapter VI of the United Na-
tions (UN) Charter covers activities aimed at conflict prevention. Conflict prevention
includes fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring.
An example of military support to conflict prevention is Operation ABLE SENTRY.

4-2 (Peace Operations) Overview

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II. Characteristics of Peace Operations

Ref: ATP 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Nov ‘14), pp. 1 to 3.

The United States (US) participates in a broad range of military operations (ROMO),
including counterinsurgency, crisis response, and contingency operations, necessitat-
ing interaction with indigenous populations and institutions. Peace operations (PO) are
crisis response and limited contingency operations, including international efforts and
military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment
in support of reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitating the transition to legitimate
governance.
The typical PO operational area is characterized by complex and ambiguous situations
and may possess the following:
• Asymmetrical threats
• Failed states
• Absence of rule of law
• Gross violations of human rights
• Collapse of civil infrastructure
• Presence of dislocated civilians (DCs)

Operations
Political mandates or constraints affect tactical operations and operations at the tacti-

Peace
e
cal level can have strategic implications.
Risk management is a key consideration. PO are dangerous and leaders at every level
pl
must continuously assess the risk to their forces and take appropriate risk mitigation
actions.
PO involve multiple agencies within the US Government (USG) including the De-
partment of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for
m

International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Civil-military

operations (CMO) are a central focus of PO with military in a supporting role.
Most PO are multinational in character. This creates challenges because each nation
Sa

contributes its individual perspectives and unique capabilities.

US national policy determines US participation in PO. The US may participate with
regional organizations (e.g., NATO) under the auspices of the UN, in cooperation with
other countries or unilaterally.
There is no standard mission for PO. Each PO is unique, with its own political, diplo-
matic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.

(Peace Operations) Overview 4-3

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II. Peace Enforcement Tasks

Ref: JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations (Aug ‘12), pp. III-2 to III-3.

PEO tasks may include some of those conducted in PKO as well as enforcement of
sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, operations to restore order, and
forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.
See pp. 4-27 to 4-34 for discussion of related multi-service TTPs.

1. Enforcement of Sanctions and Exclusion Zones

These include a broad range of possible tasks. Commanders must understand that
actions to enforce sanctions, while endorsed by the UNSC, have traditionally been
considered acts of war and should posture their forces accordingly.

2. Protection
PEO contingent forces may be tasked to provide protection for FHA missions. This
could include protection for IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, and other military personnel who are
providing FHA. Such protection may include establishing secure base areas, protect-
ing routes or corridors for the transport of relief supplies, and providing security for
distribution sites. If belligerent parties oppose the delivery of relief supplies by IGOs,
NGOs, or other agencies, PEO forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or
Operations

other forms of logistic support. The CMOC, when established, serves as the focal point
Peace

e
for requests for support from US forces.

3. Operations to Restore Order

pl
These are conducted to halt violence and support, reinstate, or establish civil authori-
ties. They are designed to restore stability to the point where indigenous police forces
can effectively enforce the law and reinstate civil authority.
m

4. Forcible Separation of Belligerent Parties

This PEO task can pose a very high risk to the contingent force. Forcible separation
may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties.
The contingent force will normally retain the right of first use of force. Forces conduct-
Sa

ing forcible separation require extensive offensive combat capability, as well as combat
support and combat service support (CSS). The goal is to force the belligerent parties
to disengage, withdraw and, subsequently, to establish a BZ or DMZ.

5. Conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Operations

If PEO require forcible separation of belligerent parties, then there will be a require-
ment to conduct I/R operations as contingent forces capture or detain parties to the
conflict. Depending on the type of conflict that results from forcible separation, I/R
operations will need to be conducted for enemy prisoners of war/civilian internees and/
or DCs. Forces responsible for conducting I/R operations must ensure that appropriate
CSS assets are deployed to support this PO mission. The I/R operations will become
critical as forces transition from PEO to PKO.

4-16 (Peace Operations) II. Peace Enforcement Operations

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Chap 4
V. Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques & Procedures
Ref: ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31], Peace Operations Multi-Service TTPs (Nov ’14) and
adaptations from FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ’03).

This section highlights multiservice tactics, techniques and procedures related to

peace operations. For related discussion of small unit tasks and activities in support
of stability operations -- patrolling, observing and reporting, movement control,
searches, demilitarization, convoy operations, curfews, civil disturbances, refugees
and displaced persons -- see pp. 3-79 to 3-98.

I. Creating a Secure Environment

The goal of a peace force is to create the conditions for other political, economic,
and humanitarian peace building activities to achieve the political objective stated
in the mandate and to transition from military to civil control. The peace force must
separate and neutralize belligerent forces to ensure public security, establish/main-
tain freedom of movement, and protect FHA.

Operations
A. Principles

Peace
•
e
Focus the operation at the tactical level
pl
• Sustain consent for the operation
• Keep the entire operation transparent
• Act as liaison to all key parties and local authorities
• Belligerents must fully participate for success
m

• The PO force must have full freedom of movement

• Observing, reporting, and monitoring are the essential tools
• IO are key
Sa

• Maintain law and order

B. Military Tasks
• Physically occupy key terrain to establish control over urban and rural areas
• Separate belligerent forces
• Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate
• Control weapons
• Control borders. Commanders must regulate the movement of persons or
goods across borders. They may task units to guard ground, maritime, or air (or
a combination of all) borders.
• Secure key sites
• Establish control measures that are visible and known to the local population.
• Ensure freedom of movement
• Establish secure base(s)
• Establish and maintain presence in the AO
• Establish protected areas
• Ensure public security

(Peace Operations) V. Multi-Service TTPs 4-27

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Chap 5
Counterinsurgency
Operations (COIN)
Ref: JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Nov ‘13), chap. 1 and FM 3-24, Insurgencies and
Countering Insurgencies (May ‘14), chap. 1.

I. Insurgency
Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or
challenge political control of a region. Insurgency uses a mixture of subversion,
sabotage, political, economic, psychological actions, and armed conflict to achieve
its political aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the
control and legitimacy of an established government, a military occupation govern-
ment, an interim civil administration, or a peace process while increasing insurgent
control and legitimacy—the central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency has
its own unique characteristics but they have the following aspects: a strategy, an
ideology, an organization, a support structure, the ability to manage information,
and a supportive environment. It is these aspects that set an insurgency apart from
other spoilers and present a significant threat. Typically, insurgents will solicit, or be
offered, external support from state or non-state actors.
e
Insurgencies will continue to challenge security and stability around the globe in the
21st century. While the possibility of large scale warfare remains, few nations are
pl
likely to engage the US, allies, and partner nations. Globalization, numerous weak
nation-state governments, demographics, radical ideologies, environmental con-
cerns, and economic pressures are exacerbated by the ease of interaction among
insurgent groups, terrorists, and criminals; and all put both weak and moderately

insurgency
m

Counter-
governed states at risk. Today, a state’s failure can quickly become not only a
misfortune for its local communities, but a threat to global stability and US national
interests.
Long-standing external and internal tensions tend to exacerbate or create core
Sa

grievances within some countries, which can result in political strife, instability, or, if
exploited by some groups to gain political advantage, even insurgency. Moreover,
some transnational terrorists with radical political and religious ideologies may in-
trude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat.
The United States Government (USG) has supported numerous allies and partner
nations to prevent or disrupt threats to their stability and security through foreign
assistance and security cooperation (SC) activities as part of geographic combat-
ant commanders’ (GCCs’) theater campaign plans in conjunction with other USG
efforts. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) efforts can include counterterrorism
(CT) operations and foreign internal defense (FID) programs supported by stability
operations tasks. If a friendly nation appears vulnerable to an insurgency, and it is in
the best interest of the USG to help the host nation (HN) mitigate that insurgency, the
USG would support the affected nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD)
strategy and program through a FID program. When an HN government supported
by a FID program appears to be overwhelmed by internal threats, and if it is in the
national security interests of the USG, then the third category of FID, US combat
operations, may be directed by the President. Those US combat operations would
be in the form of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, whether in conjunction with
the HN forces, or in place of them, until the HN has the necessary capability and
capacity to take on combat operations. However, the HN must retain responsibility
for dealing with the insurgency even though US forces may temporarily be conduct-
ing COIN operations.

(Counterinsurgency) Overview 5-1

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IV. Strategic Principles

Ref: FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May ‘14), pp. 1-19 to 1-22.

Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgency takes, sev-
eral strategic principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation
with certain capabilities or directly using its land forces, the principles listed in below are
relevant to most counterinsurgency operations. However, these principles are not meant to
be exclusive rules for every conflict. They are provided for the practitioner and planner as a
foundation for how they think about planning and executing counterinsurgency operations.
1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective
Fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government that can
provide security and acts in the best interests of its people may be essential to counter-
ing an insurgency. Legitimacy can be seen as the willing acceptance of a government
by its population. Counterinsurgency forces may achieve this objective by the balanced
application of both military and nonmilitary means. Governments rule through a combina-
tion of consent and coercion. Governments that are “legitimate” normally rule with the
consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely
on coercion. Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for fear of the consequences of
doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. Legitimacy is a per-
ceived condition by the population that can only be achieved by host-nation government
actions that lead to an acceptance of its primacy by the people.
e
2. COIN Forces Must Understand the Environment
Successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly understand-
pl
ing the society and culture within which they are being conducted. In most counterinsur-
gency operations in which foreign forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage
in their level of local knowledge. They speak the language, move easily within the soci-
ety, and are more likely to understand the population’s interests. Thus, for foreign forces
insurgency

m
Counter-

participating in counterinsurgency operations, they require a greater emphasis on certain

skills, such as language and cultural understanding. Understanding the operational envi-
ronment allows the counterinsurgent to identify the conditions which impact the prerequi-
sites for the insurgency and the root causes that are driving the population to accept the
Sa

insurgency. Only through understanding the operational environment can the counterin-
surgent plan and execute successful operations to counter the conditions that allow the
insurgency to exist in the first place. Nevertheless, U.S. forces must never assume they
will be welcomed by a local population. They may even be viewed as occupiers.
3. Intelligence Drives Operations
Effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, relevant, tailored, predic-
tive, accurate, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible
level and disseminated throughout the force. Without accurate and predictive intel-
ligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act. Gaining situational understanding
before action is often essential in avoiding long term damage to mission objectives. In
environments where commanders do not have situational understanding, the first action
they should take is to use forces to gain that understanding while not creating unintended
and lasting harm to the mission.
Because of the dispersed nature of counterinsurgency operations, the actions of coun-
terinsurgency forces are key generators of intelligence. In counterinsurgency operations,
a cycle often develops where intelligence drives operations, which produces additional
intelligence that facilitates subsequent operations. Reporting by tactical units and civilian
agencies is often of greater importance than reporting by specialized national intelligence
assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable tempo (rate of military
operations) drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest
practical level. Commanders are responsible for driving the intelligence process.

5-8 (Counterinsurgency) Overview

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4. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

Whenever possible, security forces should be provided by the host nation. To establish
legitimacy, the affected government must strive to transition security activities from

Continued on next page

military authorities to host-nation law enforcement authorities as quickly as feasible.
When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Prior to any transition
to full host-nation responsibility, however, the violence level must be reduced enough for
the host-nation counterinsurgency forces to maintain order; otherwise, the host-nation
counterinsurgency forces will be unable to secure the population and the host nation
may lose the legitimacy gained by the transition. U.S. counterinsurgent forces must also
understand how the military and police are viewed by the population and not assume
they are always seen as protectors. The goal of a change to a host-nation security force
is an accountable, self-sustaining, capable, and credible force able to meet the security
challenges faced by the host nation and seen as legitimate by the population.

5. COIN Forces Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

Counterinsurgency operations can be protracted. Though most insurgencies are quickly
defeated by the host nation and its military forces, U.S. involvement normally comes in
insurgencies that are not quickly defeated. Insurgents can become extremely difficult to
identify, track, and interdict if they are effective in acting clandestinely. Insurgencies may
persist for many years after the main threat has been broken. Thus, counterinsurgency
operations may demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. The popula-
tion must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and any
e
counterinsurgency forces supporting it. The population may prefer the affected govern-
ment to the insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless
they are convinced that the government has the means, ability, stamina, and will to win.
pl
Stabilizing the security situation and transforming a failed, failing, or ineffectual govern-
ment into a functional one is an extremely difficult task that may take an extended period
to complete.

insurgency
m

Counter-
6. Manage Information and Expectations
Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgency forces manage
both. To limit discontent and build support, the affected government and any counterin-
surgency forces assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among
Sa

the population, friendly military forces, and the international community. The key tools
to accomplish this are information operations through the effective coordination and
synchronization of information related capabilities. Effective counterinsurgency com-
manders tell the truth; they refuse to give projections; and they do not promise more than
can be provided. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations can
increase the population’s tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences of ongoing counter-
insurgency operations. Where a large foreign force is present to help establish a regime,
this progress can extend the period until foreign forces are perceived by the population
as an army of occupation.
Effective counterinsurgency forces must ensure that their deeds match their words and
Continued on next page

both are consistent with the broader narrative. They should also understand that any
action has an information reaction. Counterinsurgency forces should carefully consider
that information reaction’s impact on the many audiences involved in the conflict and on
the sidelines. They should work actively to shape responses that further their ends. In
particular, messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global informa-
tion environment, people in the area of operations can access the internet and satel-
lite television to determine the messages counterinsurgency forces are sending to the
international community. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines
counterinsurgency efforts.

(Counterinsurgency) Overview 5-9

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Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal

Defense Interaction Scale
Ref: JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Nov ‘13), pp. V-8 to V-10.
The US will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and
military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. Foreign Internal
Defense (FID) conducted by conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF)
can assist the HN in reducing these contributing factors to insurgency and terrorism.
FID operations can be indirect support or direct support (noncombat or combat).

Counterinsurgency
(No Host Nation)

Counterinsurgency in Support
of Foreign Internal Defense Foreign Internal
Defense
(Not Countering an
Insurgency)

e Host-Nation Governance
pl
Coalition Civilian Governance

insurgency
m
Military Governance

Counter-
Failed State Failing State Recovering State
Sa

Active
Normalization
Insurgency

Ref: JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, fig. V-1, p. V-9.

Indirect Support. These are FID operations that emphasize the principle of HN self-
sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through
economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.
Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations). These operations involve the
use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military.
They differ from SA in that they are joint or Service funded, do not usually involve the
transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually, but may, include training local
military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has
not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats
beyond its capability to handle. DOD support could include activities such as providing
intelligence, mobility support, or logistics support.
US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations
requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN
forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace. If com-
bat is authorized, normally this will include major operations.

(Counterinsurgency) IV. Planning for Countering Insurgencies 5-49

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Chap 5
VI. Indirect
Approaches
Ref: FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May ‘14), chap. 10.

An indirect approach seeks to support existing governments, security forces, and

groups through increasing capacity to counter an insurgency and enabling existing
capabilities. This approach indirectly counters an insurgency by working through
host-nation institutions or with groups in the society. The United States (U.S.) can
use nation assistance and security cooperation to aid a host nation in building its
institutions.
Beyond nation assistance and security cooperation, there are several methods that
are indirect methods for countering an insurgency. Among these are generational
engagement, negotiation and diplomacy, and identify, separate, isolate, influence,
and reintegrate. Beyond these methods, there are several indirect enablers that
are important in any counterinsurgency. This includes integrated monetary shaping
operations.

I. Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation

e
Nation assistance is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that
nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP
pl
3-0). This civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance) is
rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime,
crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between
the U.S. and that nation. Nation assistance operations support the host nation by

insurgency
m
promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal

Counter-
is to promote long-term regional stability.
Nation assistance involves other government agencies that provide expertise in
building civil institutions. This is an essential element in counterinsurgency because
Sa

the military lacks the expertise to build civil control over the population, perform
economic reforms, or aid in other basic functions that a host nation may need to
prevent or prevail against an insurgency. Using a whole-of-government approach is
essential in conducting nation assistance to prevent insurgencies from developing
freedom of movement by exploiting the root causes of conflict within an operational
environment.
Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security
interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multina-
tional operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to
a host nation. (JP 3-22). This includes-
• Military to military exchanges (for example, seminars and symposia)
• Combined exercises
• Humanitarian assistance
• Security assistance
When these activities are used to defeat an insurgency, they are part of a counter-
insurgency operation. While not all security cooperation activities are in support of
counterinsurgency, security cooperation can be an effective counterinsurgency tool.
See chap. 1 and chap. 2 for further discussion of these activities.

(Counterinsurgency) VI. Indirect Approaches 5-65

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II. Generational Engagement

Ref: FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May ‘14), pp. 10-2 to 10-4.
Generational engagement is a method that can be conducted in conjunction with other
approaches that seeks to get the host nation to educate and empower the population to
participate in legal methods of political discourse and dissent. This can be done in both
high threat situations and situations where an insurgency is at its infancy and combat is
less intense. It is best that the host nation undertake this method as soon as possible to
affect the next generation. Generational engagement focuses on the population. Gen-
erational engagement focuses on building new constituents in the host-nation population
to counter insurgent actions. Generational engagement is a method of political mobiliza-
tion of the people. The purpose of the method is to get population groups to side with
the host nation.
Figure 10-1 below provides a general framework for generational engagement.
First, counterinsurgents identify the population that they wish to engage. This relevant
population may politically engage and this will encourage the host nation to redress any
grievances. This may lead to a reduction of violence. This is all built on a foundation of
education, empowerment, and participation.

e
pl
insurgency

m
Counter-

Sa

Education Empowerment Participation

Ref: FM 3-24, fig. 10-1, Generational engagement.

Five principles are fundamental to generational engagement:
• Groups with whom counterinsurgents partner (such as nongovernmental organiza-
tions [NGOs]) must be seen as indigenous, not as foreign constructs.
• Independence of funding and resources are important. Support groups can lose
credibility the more they are perceived as solely reliant on foreign funding, possibly
due to a shift in priorities by a sole and influential benefactor. Organizations and
their partners should identify alternative sources of support, including local spon-
sors, funding from the relevant ministries, or collecting dues from members.
• In selecting partners, counterinsurgents should not limit themselves to the vocal
intellectual elite. If the insurgency is based on the root causes of a rural popula-
tion, intellectual elites might not have legitimacy among the rural poor. Therefore,
counterinsurgents should balance support between the central leadership and local
branches in the provinces or townships (where youth engagement is usually most
important).

5-66 (Counterinsurgency) VI. Indirect Approaches

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Chap 6
Civil-Military
Operations
Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Sept ‘13), chap. 1.

I. Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs

In carrying out their civil-military operations (CMO) responsibilities, commanders
use civil affairs operations (CAO). The relationship between CMO and CAO is best
considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchroniza-
tion, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmen-
tal entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. JFCs seek this synergy
by several means, one of the more prominent being through the conduct of CMO
that bring together the activities of joint forces and multinational forces (MNFs) and
nonmilitary organizations to achieve common objectives.

Civil-Military
Unified Operations
Action, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs

Unified Action

e
The synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to
pl
achieve unity of effort
 Takes place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands,
and joint task forces under the direction of these commanders
m

Civil-Military Operations
 The responsibility of a commander
Sa

 Normally planned by civil affairs personnel, but implemented by all

elements of the joint force
Civil-Military
Operations
Civil Affairs
 Conducted by civil affairs forces
 Provides specialized support of civil-military operations
 Applies functional skills normally provided by civil government

Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, fig I-4, p. I-17.

There are six civil affairs (CA) functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability,
governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and informa-
tion. CA functional specialists advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct
subordinate civilian counterparts. These specialists should be employed to provide
analysis in their specialty area that supports planning of interagency efforts or HN ef-
forts, and in a general support role to joint force components requiring such capabilities.
GCCs can establish civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9) to plan,
coordinate, conduct, and assess CMO. While CA forces are organized, trained, and
equipped specifically to support CMO, other joint forces supporting CMO include

(Civil-Military Operations) Overview 6-1

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IV. CMO in Joint Operations

Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Sept ‘13), pp. I-13 to I-16.

CMO may occur in any phase of military operations. CMO can be broadly separated
into population-centric actions and support to civil actions, though at times these opera-
tions can become mixed depending upon the OE.
CMO planners should forecast and continuously reevaluate CMO requirements by ana-
lyzing the mission to determine specific tasks. This includes establishing guidance for
the specific CMO tasks and developing estimates of the situation to include area stud-
ies. In denied areas, CMO planners use intelligence products to access, gather, and
validate information for area or functional oriented studies. Planners should consider
their knowledge of CMO, geographic areas of specialization, language qualifications,
civil sector functional technical expertise, and contacts with IPI. This will allow for timely
and critical information on the civilian capabilities and resources in the operational area.
Civilian contacts may provide more extensive insight than information collected through
intelligence channels, but CMO planners should validate all critical information and
assumptions through intelligence capabilities. CA area studies and area assessments
provide operational analysis of the civil component of the OE.
CMO tasks vary throughout operation phases. Although JFCs determine the number
and actual phases used during a campaign or operation, use of the phases provides a
flexible model to arrange CMO. These activities may be performed by CA personnel,
e
other military forces, or combination.

Phase 0—Shape
pl
During the implementation of the CCDR’s security cooperation planning objectives
CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis. CA
support FID and contribute to contingency and crisis action planning. In a crisis, CA
forces working with HNs, regional partners, and IPI can shape the environment. Shap-
m

ing operations can include regional conferences to bring together multiple factions with
competing concerns and goals, economic agreements designed to build interdepen-
dency, or regional aid packages to enhance stability.
Sa

Phase I—Deter
CMO should be integrated with flexible deterrent options to generate maximum stra-
tegic or operational effect. CMO in the deter phase builds on activities from the shape
Civil-Military
Operations

phase. CA forces support NA, SA, FID, and PO. CA can also conduct area studies and
update area assessments to identify potential civil sector and civilian COGs.

Phase II—Seize the Initiative

During this phase, CMO are conducted to gain access to theater infrastructure and to
expand friendly freedom of action in support of JFC operations. CMO are designed to
minimize civil-military friction and support friendly political-military objectives.

Phase III—Dominate
CMO also help minimize HN civilian interface with joint operations so that collateral
damage to IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability operations is limited. Limiting collat-
eral damage may reduce the duration and intensity of combat and stability operations.
Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next
phase, relieve suffering, and set conditions for civil-military transition.

Phase IV—Stabilize
The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil govern-
ing authority. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance,
integrate the efforts of other supporting or contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or

6-6 (Civil-Military Operations) Overview

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

USG department and agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning.
This phase can be marked by transition from sustained combat operations to stability
operations. As this occurs, CMO facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration
of public services as fighting subsides. Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously
assesses whether current operations enable transfer of overall regional authority to a
legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase.

Phase V—Enable Civil Authority

This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil
governance in the operational area. This includes coordination of CMO with interagency,
multinational, IPI, IGO, and NGO participants; establishing and assessing measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs); and favorably influenc-
ing the attitude of the HN population regarding both the US and the local civil authority’s
objectives.

Measures of Performance and Effectiveness

Measures of Performance Measures of Effectiveness
 Shape: foreign humanitarian  Shape: perception by host nation
assistance supplied, quick impact government and host nation populace,
projects. reduction of turmoil, return to pre-

events.
e
Deter: levels of violent/disruptive

event levels.
Deter: restoration of pre-event civil
activities.
pl
 Seize the Initiative: integration with
host nation civil-military authorities, host  Seize the Initiative: perception that
nation government, integration with host nation government and civil-
local populace. military authorities are legitimate/
credible and that United States
 Dominate: decrease in hostilities,
m
Government (USG) intervention is
decrease in collateral damage/deaths,
welcome.
injuries.
 Dominate: host nation government
 Stabilize: humanitarian assistance
lead and legitimacy, USG supporting
relief, restoration of services,
role is unhindered and unchallenged.
Sa

repair/rebuilding projects.
 Stabilize: self-sufficiency/stability at
 Enable Civil Authority: train/equip law
pre-event levels or better.
enforcement and military, political
elections, mentoring of government Enable Civil Authority: self-
Civil-Military

sufficient/legitimate military and law
Operations
officials.
enforcement, legitimate/unquestioned
political elections, legitimate
government.

Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, fig. 1-3, p. 1-14.

Dislocated Civilian (DC) operations are designed to minimize civil-military friction, reduce
civilian casualties, alleviate human suffering, and control DC movements.
CMO coordinates with civilian agencies to implement measures to locate and identify
population centers. CMO also coordinate with civilian agencies to create, restore, and
maintain public order. CMO coordinate resources (e.g., labor, supplies, and facilities).
CMO coordinate immediate life sustaining services to civilians in the operational area(s)
and assist with planning for disease control measures to protect joint forces.
CMO assets may designate routes and facilities for DCs to minimize their contact with
forces engaged in combat.
CMO may help contribute to logistics operations. CMO planners can help logistic plan-
ners identify available goods and services by using their contacts within the civilian
sector.

(Civil-Military Operations) Overview 6-7

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Authority to Conduct CMO

Authority to conduct CMO can be derived from joint operations, an international
cooperative agreement, or an agreement between the USG or appropriate military
commander and the government of the area or country in which US forces may be
employed. A commander’s authority to undertake CMO derives from Presidential or
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) decisions. US strategic objectives, US policy, and
relations between the HN government and the USG also influence the authority to
conduct CMO.
The law of war requires occupying powers to restore public order and safety while
respecting, to the extent possible, the laws of the occupied country; and to establish
a civil administration and to control or conduct governmental matters during and after
hostilities. International law determines when a territory or a region is actually under
the authority of an occupying force, which generally follows the cessation of hostili-
ties. Occupation is a question of fact based on the ability of the occupying force to
render the occupied government incapable of exercising public authority or, in the
absence of a local government, an ungoverned area. However, mere presence of
foreign forces in a nation does not confer occupation rights or responsibilities on that
force. Foreign forces present in a sovereign state by consent exercise rights and
responsibilities arising from established accords or international agreements.

Liaison
Effective CMO require extensive liaison and coordination among US, multinational,
and indigenous security forces and other engaged government departments and
e
agencies as well as NGOs, IGOs, IPI, or the private sector. Liaison officers are
commonly employed to establish close, continuous, and physical communications
between organizations resulting in enhanced interoperability and increased mission
pl
success.

Unified Action
One of the major challenges facing the JFC in CMO is successfully coordinating the
m

activities of the joint force with those of the multinational forces (MNFs) and multiple
civilian organizations within the joint operations area (JOA), with each potentially
having their own purpose and goals. The joint force operates under a single respon-
Sa

sible commander, but unified action requires interagency coordination among all
USG participants and interorganizational coordination among all participants. CMO
should be closely coordinated with interagency partners such as the US embassy
Civil-Military

country team. The JFC should coordinate CMO amongst components, supporting
Operations

forces, the country team, and HN. This is particularly important for lethal opera-
tions involving tactical air support or indirect fires. CMO operations at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels should be nested to ensure unity of effort. Effective
planning and coordination for unified action should result in unity of effort during
execution.

Civilian-Military Relations
Civilian-military relations are normally the responsibility of the JFC. CMO have
proven essential for those relations and typically facilitate accomplishment of the
commander’s overall mission. Adversaries may use irregular warfare (IW) to avoid
direct confrontation with the US. They may target civilian populations instead of
military forces. This erodes distinction between civilian and military institutions, infra-
structures, and systems; military and civilian “dual use” infrastructures are becom-
ing more prevalent. Cities and social and cultural hubs are often centers of gravity
(COGs) or decisive points rather than military forces or geographic locations. As
more people and the influence of their greater numbers migrate to densely popu-
lated urban areas, the joint force is more likely to be operating in urban areas than
in remote locations. Consequently, CMO should be considered in the planning and
execution of military operations.

6-8 (Civil-Military Operations) Overview

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E. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

(HACC)
During FHA operations, CCDRs may organize a HACC to assist with interagency
partners, IGO, and NGO coordination and planning. Normally, the HACC is a tempo-
rary body that operates in early planning and coordination stages. Once a CMOC or
HOC is established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accom-
plished through normal CCDR’s staff and crisis action organization.

Joint Task Force-Haiti Humanitarian Assistance

Coordination Center
The joint task force (JTF)-Haiti commander organized boards, centers, cells,
and working groups to facilitate collaboration and align JTF operations with the
United Nations (UN) Stabilization Mission in Haiti and other partners. JTF-
Haiti stood up a 30-person humanitarian assistance coordination cell (HACC)
as a civil-military operations center like mechanism to integrate with the UN
cluster system. The JTF Commander designated Brigadier General Matern, a
Canadian exchange officer assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters,
the responsibility to lead the HACC efforts. Primarily staffed by members of the
96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the HACC began the task of integrating US military
support to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
UN cluster system, and the Government of Haiti by coordinating, planning, and
e
assisting the establishment of medical clinics and food and water distribution
points. The JTF also provided key support to the staffs and working groups of
pl
USAID and the UN. Possibly the most important assistance provided was in the
area of planning and planners. A UN strategic plans officer recently commented
about Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. The military’s planning capability is not
the most expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable. The international
m
coordination structure would not have stood up as quickly if they were not
tapped into the JTF planning capacity.
Various Sources
Sa

F. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) Civil-Military

CMOCs are tailored to the mission and augmented by engineer, medical, and Operations
transportation assets to the supported commander. The CMOC is the primary coor-
dination interface for US forces and IPI, humanitarian organizations, IGOs, NGOs,
MNFs, HN government agencies, and other USG departments and agencies. The
CMOC facilitates coordination among the key participants.
A CMOC is formed to:
• Execute JFC CMO guidance.
• Lead JFC CIM.
• Liaise with other departments, agencies, and organizations.
• Provide a joint force forum for organizations which want to maintain their
neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for
stakeholder discussions, but not a stakeholder decision-making forum.
• Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, and
the private sector. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force
for action.
See following pages (pp. 6-14 to 6-15) for an overview and further discussion. See
also p. 6-22.

(Civil-Military Operations) I. Organizing for CMO 6-13

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Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Sept ‘13), pp. II-19 to II-22. See also p. 6-22.

CMOC-type organizations should be convenient for interorganizational partners and use

joint force communications, transportation, and staff planning capacity to develop unity of
effort. JFC should build the CMOC from organic assets and CA personnel, logistic, legal,
and communications elements. United States Army (USA) CA units are organized to pro-
vide the JFC the manpower and equipment to form the nucleus of the CMOC. CMOCs
generally have representatives from:
• Liaisons from Service and functional components
• USAID representatives
• Embassy country team and other USG representatives
• Military liaison personnel from participating countries
• Host country or local government agency representatives
• Representatives of NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector (as appropriate)

Notional Composition of a CMO Center

Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

United Nations
UNICEF
e Military CARE
Doctors of the
pl
World
United Nations
World Food IGOs NGOs Save the
Programme Children
United Nations CMOC International
m
High Rescue
Commissioner Committee
Other
for Refugees Government Other Relief
Departments
and Agencies CMT and Benefit
Sa

Organizations
Civil-Military
Operations

OFDA/DART, USDA, Civil-Military Team,

DOS Liaison Officers

Legend
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief IGO intergovernmental organization
Everywhere NGO nongovernmental organization
CMOC civil-military operations center OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
CMT civil-military team UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
DART disaster assistance response team USDA United States Department of Agriculture
DOS Department of State

Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military

Figure Operations,
II-7. Notional fig. 2-7,
Composition of p. 2-20.
a Civil-Military Operations Center
It is not the intent of this figure to emphasize the CMOC as the center of coordination for
all activities, but rather to illustrate organizations that a JFC may cooperate with and hold
discussions with concerning an ongoing operation.
Political representatives in the CMOC may provide avenues to coordinate military and
political actions. The CMOC may provide NGOs and IGOs a single point of coordination
with US forces and help promote unified action.
It is incumbent on the military not to attempt to dictate what will happen but to coordinate
a unified approach to problem resolution.

6-14 (Civil-Military Operations) I. Organizing for CMO

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Chap 7
Multinational
Operations
Ref: JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (Jul ‘13), chap. I and executive summary.

Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations,

usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible
arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such
as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Two primary forms of multinational partnership that the joint force commander (JFC)
will encounter are an alliance or a coalition.

Alliance
An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or
more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the
members.

Coalition
e
A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
Coalitions are typically ad hoc, formed by different nations, often with different objec-
tives, usually for a single event or for a longer period while addressing a narrow sec-
pl
tor of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition
members are referred to as coalition operations.

I. Strategic Context
m

Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek op-
portunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against
real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and
Sa

disaster relief operations, and engage in peace operations (PO). Cultural, diplo-
matic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence
multinational operations and participation. However, a nation’s decision to employ
military capabilities is always a political decision.
US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multina-
tional force (MNF). These operations could span the range of military operations and
require coordination with a variety of US Government (USG) departments and agen-
cies, foreign military forces, local authorities, IGOs, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). The move to a more comprehensive approach toward problem solv-
ing, particularly in regard to counterinsurgency or stability operations, increases the
need for coordination and synchronization among military and nonmilitary entities.
Multinational
Operations

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine

SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational
Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include
joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint
planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33),
information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16),
interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!

(Multinational Operations) Overview 7-1

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IV. Command Structures of Forces

in Multinational Operations
Ref: JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (Jul ‘13), pp. II-4 to II-8.

No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one
absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate
shape of the command structure. Organizational structures include the following:

A. Integrated Command Structure

Multinational commands organized under Combined
an integrated command structure provide Integrated Commander
unity of effort in a multinational setting. A Headquarters Staff
good example of this command structure
is found in the North Atlantic Treaty Or- Integrated Integrated Integrated
Component Component
ganization where a strategic commander Component

is designated from a member nation, Personnel

Multinational Multinational Multinational
but the strategic command staff and the Services
Forces Forces
Forces
commanders and staffs of subordinate
commands are of multinational makeup.

B. Lead Nation Command Structure e

A lead nation structure exists when all
Lead Nation
member nations place their forces under
pl
Headquarters
the control of one nation. The lead nation
command can be distinguished by a
dominant lead nation command and staff National Forces US Forces National Forces
arrangement with subordinate elements Commander Commander Commander
m

retaining strict national integrity. A good

Personnel
example of the lead nation structure is National
Services US Forces
National
Forces Forces
Combined Forces Command-Afghan-
Sa

istan wherein a US-led headquarters

provides the overall military C2 over the
two main subordinate commands: one
predominately US forces and the other
predominately Afghan forces.

C. Parallel Command Structures

Under a parallel command structure, no Personnel
United States
National National
single force commander is designated. President
Services
and SecDef Government Government
The coalition leadership must develop a
means for coordination among the partic-
Multinational

Legitimizing
Operations

ipants to attain unity of effort. This can be Authority*

accomplished through the use of coor- Personnel

Combatant Lead Nation
dination centers. Nonetheless, because Services
Commanders Headquarters
of the absence of a single commander,
the use of a parallel command structure
should be avoided if at all possible. US National National National
Force Force Force

National Command
Command Authority Delegated to Multinational Force Cdr
Nation to Nation Communication

See pp. 8-16 to 8-17 for discussion and listing of US organizational structures in foreign
countries: Ambassadors, Chiefs of Mission, Country Team, Defense Attaches, etc.

7-6 (Multinational Operations) I. Command & Coordination

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Chap 7
II. Multinational
Planning & Execution
Ref: JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (Jul ‘13), chap. III and executive summary.

I. Diplomatic and Military Considerations

Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational re-
sponse, from man-made actions (such as interstate aggression) to natural disasters
(like an earthquake). In responding to such situations, nations weigh their national
interests and then determine if, when, and where they will expend their nation’s
resources. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement
for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The composition of an MNF
may change as partners enter and leave when their respective national objectives
change or force contributions reach the limits of their nation’s ability to sustain them.

Factors Affecting Military Capabilities of Nations

National Interests
Domestic Politics
Objectives
e
pl
Arms Control Limitations
Doctrine
Organization
Training
m

Leader Development
Equipment
History
Sa

Defense Budget
Domestic Law
Treaties

Ref: JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (Jul ‘13), fig. III-1, p. III-2.

Some nations may even be asked to integrate their forces with those of another,
so that a contribution may, for example, consist of an infantry company containing
platoons from different countries. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in
every case, a calculated diplomatic decision by each potential member of a coalition
or alliance. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the MNTF’s
Multinational
Operations

command structure. In a parallel command structure, national forces essentially

operate under their own doctrine and procedures within the guidelines determined
by the strategic national guidance and are not significantly impacted by multinational
influences. Under the integrated and LN command structures, more multinational
involvement and interaction occurs.
As shown in Figure III-1 above, numerous factors influence the military capabilities of
nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific constraints
and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences
when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders (similar to
JTF commanders) at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consult-
ing and negotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role
as diplomats should not be underestimated.
(Multinational Operations) II. Planning & Execution Considerations 7-7
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Chap 8
Interorganizational
Cooperation
Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct ‘16), chap. I.

JP 3-08 describes the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) coordination with various
external organizations that may be involved with, or operate simultaneously with,
joint operations. This coordination includes the Armed Forces of the United States;
United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; state, territorial, local,
and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies;
international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private
sector. Interagency coordination describes the interaction between USG depart-
ments and agencies and is a subset of interorganizational cooperation.

Interorganizational Cooperation Relationships

Interorganizational Cooperation
e
pl
Interagency Coordination
(Engaged US Government Departments
and Agencies)
m
Department
Department of
of Defense
State
Department
Department of Homeland
Sa

of Security
Justice

Domestic Governments Intergovernmental Organizations

 State  United Nations
 Territorial
 Local  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 Tribal
Nongovernmental Organizations
Multinational
 Mercy Corps
 Foreign military forces
 Foreign government
 World Vision
agencies
Private Sector
 Business
 Academia

NOTE:
The organizations listed under each category are included for example purposes only.

Ref: JP 3-08, fig. I-1, Interorganizational Cooperation Relationships.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational cooperation across
Interorganizational
Cooperation

a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of

interest, structures, and authorities. The terms “interagency” and “interorganization-
al” do not define structures or organizations, but rather describe processes occurring
among various separate entities.
(Interorganizational Cooperation) Overview 8-1*
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Key Coordination Terms

The following terms are a range of interactions that occur among stakeholders. The
following descriptions provide a baseline for common understanding.
• Collaboration is a process where organizations work together to attain common
goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and building consensus.
• Compromise is a settlement of differences by mutual concessions without viola-
tion of core values; an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing
positions, by reciprocal modification of an original position. Compromise should not
be regarded in the context of win/lose.
• Consensus is a general or collective agreement, accord, or position reached by
a group as a whole. It implies a serious consideration of every group member’s
position and results in a mutually acceptable outcome even if there are differences
among parties.
• Cooperation is the process of acting together for a common purpose or mutual
benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association
between organizations. It is the alternative to working separately in competition.
Cooperation with other departments and agencies does not require giving up
authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.
• Coordination is the process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numer-
e
ous organizations are involved, and bringing their contributions together to form a
coherent or efficient whole.
pl
• Synchronization is the process of planning when and how—across time and
space—stakeholders will apply their resources in a sequenced fashion.
m

Key Considerations
Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission
analysis. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA),
Sa

structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquar-
ters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military,
political, humanitarian, and other issues. The crux of interorganizational cooperation is
understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive.
Organizational Environments
Sharing information among department and agency participants is critical to ensure no
participant is handicapped by a lack of situational awareness, uncertainties are reduced
as much as possible, and interagency decision making is empowered by a common
operational picture. Common unifying goals should be clarified with a discussion on the
way to achieve them based upon the roles and responsibilities of each organization with
their assigned resources.
Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS)
The USG uses strategic guidance and direction to coordinate use of the informational in-
strument of national power in specific situations. Commander’s communication guidance
is a fundamental component of national security direction.
See pp. 3-50 to 3-51 for further discussion.

Cyberspace Considerations
Interorganizational
Cooperation

Access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability to compromise the integrity of US
critical infrastructures/key resources in direct and indirect ways. Threats to all interorganiza-
tional networks present a significant risk to national security and global military missions.

(Interorganizational Cooperation) Overview 8-5*

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Chap 8
I. Joint Planning
Considerations
Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct ‘16), chap. II.
USG organizations working to achieve national security objectives require increased
and improved communications and coordination. This section provides a frame of
reference that reflects all levels of interorganizational involvement.

Joint Planning
Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission
analysis. Where direct participation is not feasible, joint planners should consider
the activities and interests of external stakeholders that affect the command’s mis-
sion. The CCDR, through the campaign plan, works with civilian organizations to
build annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the joint plan. Emphasis should be
placed on operationalizing the theater TCP or functional campaign plan (FCP) to
facilitate cooperation among all partners, awareness of non-partners, and collec-
tive problem framing and synchronization of the CCDR’s campaign plan with other
interagency planning products. Subordinate JFCs leverage the planning efforts of
the CCMD while also building civilian organization participation into their plan and
e
participate in integrated planning with the embassies. Within the area of responsi-
bility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the
pl
CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service
component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and
other issues. This section identifies tools for the commander to facilitate interorgani-
zational cooperation in domestic or foreign operations.
m

I. Whole-of-Government Approach
A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of USG de-
partments and agencies to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-
Sa

of¬government approach identifies combinations of USG capabilities and resources

that could be directed toward the strategic objectives in support of US regional goals
as they align with global security priorities. Commanders integrate the expertise and
capabilities of participating USG departments and agencies, within the context of
their authorities, to accomplish their missions.
Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC-sponsored processes by which mul-
tiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address
challenges to national interests. Whole-of-government planning is distinct from the
contributions of USG departments and agencies to DOD planning, which remains a
DOD responsibility.
Planning and consulting with stakeholders optimizes the instruments of national
power to achieve operational objectives and attain strategic end states in support of
US regional goals in support of global security priorities.
USG civilian departments and agencies have different cultures and capacities, and
understand planning differently. Many organizations do not conduct operational
planning. To compensate for these differences, commanders should ensure joint
force organization initiatives and broader interagency processes help sustain civilian
Interorganizational

presence in military planning.

Cooperation

(Interorganizational Cooperation) I. Joint Planning Considerations 8-7*

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Hallmarks of successful whole-of-government planning and operations include:

• A designated lead or primary agency.
• All USG instruments of national power are integrated into the process.
• Agency core missions are related to mission goals.
• Participants forge a common understanding of the operational environment and
the problem USG activities are intended to solve.
• Active lines of communications and pre-established relationships to allow for
the ease of information sharing.
• A shared USG goal and clearly stated objectives to achieve results through
comprehensive integration and synchronization of activities at the implementa-
tion level.
• A common determination of what resources and capabilities are to be aligned
to achieve the planning objectives.
• A defined strategic objective.
Guidelines to operationalize a whole-of-government approach require that:
• Commanders and civilian decision makers consider all USG capabilities to
achieve objectives.
• Planning groups include personnel from all sectors and organizations.
• Ongoing or existing policies and programs are reassessed, modified where
necessary, and integrated into the objectives and desired outcomes defined for
e
the mission and strategic end state.
• Planners consider and incorporate interagency capabilities, resources, activi-
pl
ties, and comparative advantages in the application of the instruments of
national power.

II. Joint Planning and Interorganizational

m

Cooperation
CCMD campaign plans, also known as TCPs and FCPs, implement the military por-
tion of national policy and defense strategy as identified in the Guidance for Employ-
Sa

ment of the Force (GEF) or other issuances, and implement the military portion of
national policy and defense strategy. Designated CCMD campaign plans direct the
activities the command will do to shape the operational environment and deter crises
on a daily basis. The commander identifies the resources assigned and allocated
to the CCMD, prioritizes objectives (to include the contingencies the command is
directed to prepare for), and commits those resources to shape the operational en-
vironment and support the national strategic objectives. The commander assesses
the commitment of resources and makes recommendations to civilian leadership on
future resources and national efforts in the region. CCMD campaign plans direct
military activities (including ongoing operations, security cooperation activities, intel-
ligence collection, exercises, and other shaping or preventive activities) that shape
the operational environment to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies.

Strategic Guidance
CCDRs develop objectives based on strategic guidance provided by the President,
SecDef, and CJCS. CCDRs coordinate planning for operations, actions, and activi-
ties at the theater, strategic, and operational levels to achieve strategic objectives.

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)

Interorganizational
Cooperation

Once approval has been provided within the proper chains of command, the CCDRs
coordinate with affected USG entities throughout the Adaptive Planning and Execu-
tion (APEX) enterprise to align the instruments of national power. The CCDR is guid-

*8-8 (Interorganizational Cooperation) I. Joint Planning Considerations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

The National Security Council (NSC)

Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct ‘16), pp. II-1 to II-2.

The NSC is the President’s principal forum to consider and decide national security
policy. The NSC is the President’s principal arm to coordinate these policies among
various USG departments and agencies.

DOD Role in the National Security Council System (NSCS)

Key DOD players in the NSCS come from the OSD and JS. SecDef is a regular mem-
ber of the NSC and the National Security Council/Principals Committee (NSC/PC).
The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the National Security Council/Depu-
ties Committee (NSC/DC). If appointed, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair a
National Security Council/interagency policy committee (NSC/IPC).
A primary statutory responsibility assigned to the CJCS in Title 10, USC, is to act as
the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC. The CJCS does
this through the NSCS. CJCS regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice
and views in this capacity. The other members of the JCS may submit advice or an
opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice provided by the CJCS.
The Military Departments implement, but do not participate directly in, national security
policy-making activities of the interagency process. They are represented by the
CJCS.

Joint Staff Role in the NSCS

e
The CJCS acts as spokesperson for CCDRs operational requirements and represents
pl
CCMD interests in the NSCS through direct communication with the CCDRs and their
staffs.
The JS provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS (or designee)
m
for policy decisions made by the OSD. It coordinates with the CCMDs, Services, and
other USG departments and agencies, and prepares directives (e.g., warning, alert,
and execute orders) for SecDef approval. These orders include definitions of com-
mand and interagency relationships.
Sa

Within the JS, the offices of the CJCS, Secretary of the JS, Joint Staff J-2 [Intelligence
Directorate], Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate], Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics Director-
ate], Joint Staff J-5 [Plans Directorate], and Joint Staff J-7 [Joint Force Development
Directorate] are focal points for NSC-related actions. The JS J-3 provides advice on
execution of military operations, the JS J-4 assesses logistic implications of contem-
plated operations, and the JS J-5 often focuses on a particular NSC matter for policy
and planning purposes. Each JS directorate solicits Service input through the Military
Departments. SecDef may also designate one of the Service Chiefs or functional
CCDRs as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities for
specific mission areas.
For more information on the NSC and its membership, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for
the Armed Forces of the United States, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

Combatant Commander (CCDRs’) Role in the NSCS

Although the CJCS presents the views of the CCDRs at the NSC, the CJCS may
request and leverage CCMD participation at key NSC forums, including IPCs, NSC/
DCs, NSC/PCs, and other events (e.g., Cabinet-level exercises). Execution of CCMD
Interorganizational
Cooperation

campaign plans by CCDRs is enhanced by robust interaction with interagency partners

based on standing authorities. JS and OSD will coordinate authorizations through the
NSCS.

(Interorganizational Cooperation) I. Joint Planning Considerations 8-9*

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USG Structure in Foreign Countries

Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination (Oct ‘16), pp. IV-2 to IV-7.

The Diplomatic Mission

The US has bilateral diplomatic relations with 190 of the world’s other 193 independent
states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic
mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, of which the US is a signatory. DOS provides the core staff of a diplomatic mission
and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in the country.
A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times the chargé
d’affaires (the chargé), when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the
ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second
in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the
COM. For countries with which the US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of
another country represents US interest and at times houses an interests section staffed
with USG employees. In countries where an IGO is headquartered, the US may have a
multilateral mission to the IGO in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.
• The Ambassador. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
appoints the ambassador. The ambassador is the personal representative of the
President to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which ac-
credited and, as such, is the COM, responsible for recommending and implement-
e
ing national policy regarding the foreign country or IGO and for overseeing the
activities of USG employees in the mission. While the majority of ambassadors
pl
are career members of the Foreign Service, many are appointed from outside the
Foreign Service. The ambassador has extraordinary decision-making authority as
the senior USG official on the ground during crises.
• Chief of Mission (COM). The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel
m

in country, except for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral

mission, or an IGO. The COM may be accredited to more than one country. The
COM interacts daily with DOS’s strategic-level planners and decision makers. The
COM provides recommendations and considerations for CAP directly to the GCC
Sa

and commander of a JTF. While forces in the field under a GCC are exempt from
the COM’s statutory authority, the COM confers with the GCC regularly to coordi-
nate US military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG
toward the HN. The COM’s political role is important to the success of military
operations involving the Armed Forces of the United States. Generally, each COM
has a formal agreement with the GCC as to which DOD personnel fall under the
security responsibility of each.
• Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career for-
eign service officers through a rigorous selection process to be the principal deputy
to the ambassador. Although not appointed by the President, the DCM wields
considerable power, especially when acting as the COM while in chargé. The DCM
is usually responsible for the day-to-day activities of the embassy.
• The Embassy. The HQ of the mission is the embassy, located in the political
capital city of the HN. Although the various USG agencies that make up the mis-
sion may have individual HQ elsewhere in the country, the embassy is the focal
point for interagency coordination. The main building of the embassy is termed the
chancery; the ambassador’s house is known as the residence.
Interorganizational

• Consulates. The size or principal location of commercial activity in some countries

Cooperation

necessitates the establishment of one or more consulates—branch offices of the

mission located in key cities, often at a distance from the embassy. A consulate is
headed by a principal officer.

*8-16 (Interorganizational Cooperation) II. Foreign Considerations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

IV. Joint Task Force (JTF) Considerations

JFCs are responsible to conduct civil-military operations (CMO). They may establish
a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond
the organic CMO capability. The US Army CA command and brigade, or the United
States Marine Corps (USMC) CA group, are staffed to provide the operational core of
a JCMOTF. NGOs in the operational area may not have a similarly defined structure.
Operations by USG departments and agencies, the equivalent agencies of other na-
tional governments, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities,
in concert with or supplementing those of HN entities, may be in progress when US
forces arrive in a JOA.

Regional Strategy
In further analyzing the mission, consider how the theater or functional strategy will
affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA. The NSC, DOS,
COM, and the supported CCDR will provide the regional strategy and an apprecia-
tion for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected opera-
tions. This may affect COA development, themes and messages, and planning and
execution activities. A well-defined regional strategy will delineate the military mission
and assist in determining force requirements and defining the theater objectives.

JTF Assessment Team

A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF as-
sessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to
e
establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present,
multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives.
pl
USAID, because of the extensive contacts it develops in carrying out development
work at the community level, can provide key situational awareness for JTF assess-
ments. The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if
provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment
m
in association with the HAST.

Organizational Tools for the JTF

The CJTF should establish structures to coordinate all activities in the JOA. In ad-
Sa

dition to military operations, these structures should include political, civil, admin-
istrative, legal, and humanitarian elements, as well as international organizations,
NGOs, private sector entities, and the media. The CJTF should consider how joint
force actions and those of other organizations contribute to the desired objectives.
This consideration requires liaison and routine contact with all parties, as well as
reliable communications. An assessment team can develop recommendations for
the CJTF concerning formation of an executive steering group (ESG), CMOC, and
liaison teams.

V. Civil-Military Teams (JIATFs/PRCs)

A civil-military team combines diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
capabilities to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government.
A civil-military team can combine military and civil efforts to diminish the means and
motivations of conflict, while developing provincial, district, state, or local institutions
so they can lead in governance, provide basic services and economic develop-
ment, and enforce the rule of law. Civil-military teams of interagency experts can
be formed to conduct specific missions (e.g., agricultural, economic, and CT).
Examples of civil-military teams include JIATFs, and provincial reconstruction teams
Interorganizational
Cooperation

(PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan.

See pp. 6-16 to 6-18 and 3-69 to 3-70 for further discussion of civil-military teams.

*8-22 (Interorganizational Cooperation) II. Foreign Considerations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

(TAA2)

Index
Index
Counterterrorism, 5-51
A Civil-Military Integration
Structures, 3-70 Criminal Justice Sector
Advise and Assist, 2-8 Assessment Rating Tool,
Civil-Military Operations
Advising, 2-9, 2-41 (CMO), 6-1 3-67
Advisor, 2-10 Civil-Military Operations Cen- Crisis Action Organization,
Aligning Words with Deeds, ter (CMOC), 6-13, 6-22, 8-20
8-24 8-23 Crisis Response and Limited
American Experience with Civil-Military Teaming (PRT/ Contingency Operations,
Stability, 3-22 JIACG/JCMOTF/JIATF), 1-13
Analytical Frameworks, 5-26, 3-69, 6-16, 8-22 Cross-Cultural Negotiation,
5-35 Combating Terrorism, 1-9 2-54
Annex V (Interagency Coor- Command and Control of Crowd Control, 3-95
dination), 8-14 U.S. Forces in Multina- Culmination, 5-46
Anticipation, 5-46 tional Operations, 7-5 Cultural Assessments, 2-31
Applying the Military Compo- Commander’s Communica- Curfews, 3-94
nent, 8-4
Arbitration, 2-62
e
tion Synchronization
(CCS), 3-25 D
pl
Arms Control, Nonprolifera- Common Operational Picture
Decisive Points, 3-63, 5-43
tion, and Disarmament, (COP), 3-56
Demilitarization, 3-91
1-8 Communication, 2-53
De-mining, 3-98
Army Stability Tasks, 3-21 Comprehensive Approach,
m

3-18 Democracy and Governance

Arranging Operations, 5-46
Assessment, 3-67
Assessing & Developing a Conducting Searches, 3-88
Department of State Stabili-
Host-Nation Force, 2-36 Conflict Continuum, 1-1, 1-5
zation & Reconstruction
Sa

Assessing Relevant Actors, Conflict Resolution & Meet- Essential Tasks, 3-26
5-4 ings, 2-55
Deterrence 1-22
Assessment of Stability Convoy Operations, 3-92
Deterrence, 1-3
Activities, 3-66 Coordinating Efforts, 8-4
Diplomatic Mission, 8-15
Associated Threats, 5-31 Counterguerrilla Operations,
Direct Approaches, 5-43,
Attack the Network (AtN), 5-52
5-55
5-54 Countering Insurgencies,
Disarmament, Demobiliza-
Augmenting, 2-9 5-39
tion, and Reintegration
Counterinsurgency and (DDR), 3-44, 4-21
C Foreign Internal Defense
Displaced Persons, 3-98
Interaction Scale, 5-49
Campaigns, 1-19 District Stability Framework
Counterinsurgency (COIN),
Centers of Gravity (COGs), (DSF), 3-67
1-12, 3-48, 5-1
5-42 Dominance, 1-26
Counterinsurgency Ap-
Civil Affairs Forces and Op- Dynamics of Insurgency,
proach, 5-2
erations, 6-19 5-18
Counterinsurgency Opera-
Civil Affairs, 6-1
tional Environment (OE),
Civil Considerations 5-33 E
(ASCOPE), 5-37
Counterinsurgency Opera- Economic Stabilization and
Civil Disturbances, 3-96 tions, 5-1 Infrastructure Mission,
Civil-Military Integration Counterinsurgency Para- 3-25, 3-27, 4-24
Mechanisms, 3-69 doxes, 5-41 Effective Cooperation, 8-6
Index-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]
Index

Effects, 5-42 Fundamentals of Stabiliza- Information Management and

Elements of Operational tion, 3-5 Information Technology, 5-38
Design, 5-42 Initial Response Stage, 3-12
Elements of Stable States, G Insurgency, 5-1
3-6 Gathering the Right Re- Insurgency Prerequisites &
Embassy and Security Coop- sources, 8-5 Fundamentals, 5-11
eration Working Relation-Generational Engagement, Insurgency Threat Character-
ships, 2-26 5-53, 5-66 istics, 5-27
Emergency Preparedness, Governance, 5-5 Insurgent Elements, 5-23
1-8 Insurgent Narrative, 5-15
Governance and Participa-
Enabling Civil Authority, 1-27 tion, 3-25, 3-27, 4-24 Insurgent Objectives, 5-14
End State Conditions for Green Cell and Cultural Integrated Approach (Linking
Stability, 3-3a, 3-62 Advisors, 2-33 Military and Civilian Activi-
Enforcement of the Mandate, Guidance for Employment of ties), 3-14
4-18 the Force (GEF), 8-10 Integrated Command Struc-
Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Guidelines for Transitional ture, 7-6
1-9 Military Authority, 3-76 Integrated Monetary Shaping
Equip, 2-8 Operations, 5-74
Establish Civil Control, 3-31H Intelligence, 3-52
Establish Civil Security, 3-30 Intelligence, Surveillance,
Hard Skills, 2-52
Establishing Rapport, 2-66 and Reconnaissance,
Homeland Defense and
Existing Laws, Customs, and
Boundaries, 3-72
e
Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA), 1-18
5-34
Interagency Conflict Assess-
ment Framework (ICAF),
pl
Host-Nation Forces, 2-35
F Host-Nation Security
3-67
Interim Civil Authority, 3-74
Flexible Deterrent Options Forces, 2-43
(FDOs), 1-24 Internal Defense & Develop-
Human Terrain System, 2-34
m
ment (IDAD), 2-15
Flexible Response Options Humanitarian Assistance,
(FROs), 1-24 International Organizations,
1-11, 3-25
8-11
Force Organization, 3-66 Humanitarian Assistance
Interorganizational Coopera-
Sa

Forces and Functions, 5-46 and Social Well-Being,

tion, 8-1
Foreign Assistance, 1-10 3-27, 4-24
Interpositioning, 4-30
Foreign Considerations, 8-15 Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination Center Interpreters, 2-63
Foreign Humanitarian Assis-
tance (FHA), 1-15, 3-46 (HACC), 6-13
Humanitarian Operations J
Foreign Internal Defense
(FID), 1-11, 2-11 Center (HOC), 6-12 J-9 CMO Directorate, 6-9
Foreign Internal Defense Joint CMO Task Force (JC-
Framework, 2-12 I MOTF), 6-11
Foreign Internal Defense Identify, Separate, Isolate, Joint Intelligence Preparation
Training, 2-19 Influence, and Reinte- of Environment (JIPOE),
Foreign Operations, 8-18 grate (ISI2R), 5-53, 5-59 3-56
Foreign Security Forces Identity Intelligence (I2), Joint Interagency Coordinat-
(FSF), 2-49 5-38 ing Group (JIACG), 8-14
Fostering Sustainability Immediate Drivers of Stabil- Joint Interagency Task Force
Stage, 3-12 ity, 3-10 (JIATF), 8-13
Fragile States Framework, Indirect Approach, 5-43, Joint Operation Model (Phas-
3-6 5-65 ing), 1-20
Freedom of Navigation and Inform and Influence Activi- Joint Planning and Interor-
Overflight, 1-10 ties in Stability, 3-50 ganizational Cooperation,
Information Environment, 8-8
5-34 Joint Stability Functions, 3-24
Index-2
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

Operational Art and Stability

Index
Joint Support Force (JSF), Military Engagement Activi-
8-13 in Operations, 3-62
ties, 1-8
Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in Operational Environment
Military Information Support
the Interagency Process, (OE), 3-54, 3-55, 5-4,
Operations (MISO), 3-50
8-12 5-33
Military Operational Consid-
Justice and Reconciliation Operational Reach, 5-46
erations, 5-48
Mission, 3-27, 4-22 Operational Variables
Military Operations and
(PMESII-PT), 5-36
Related Missions, Tasks
K and Actions, 1-2 Opportunity, 5-12
Key Documents in Peace Military Tactics, 5-28 Organizational Diversity, 8-4
Operations, 4-10 Mission Variables (METT- Organize, 2-5
Key Leader Engagements TC), 5-36
(KLE), 2-31 Monitor Compliance with an P
Agreement, 3-90 Parallel Command Structure,
L Motive, 5-13 2-40, 7-6
Large-Scale Combat Opera- Movement Control (Road- Partnered, 2-41
tions, 1-19 blocks and Checkpoints), Partnering, 2-9, 5-54
Lead Nation Command 3-86 Patrolling, 3-81
Structure, 2-41, 7-6 Multinational, 7-1 Peace Building (PB), 4-19
Legal Basis of Peace Opera- Multinational Command and Peace Enforcement Opera-
tions, 4-4 Coordination, 7-5 tions (PEO), 4-15
Legitimacy, 5-6
Lethal and Non-Lethal Ac-
e
Multinational Force, 7-5
Multinational Operations,
7-1
Peace Enforcement Tasks,
4-16
pl
tions, 3-52 Peace Operations (PO),
Limited Contingency Opera- Multinational Planning and 1-14, 4-1
tions, 1-13 Execution, 7-7 Peace Operations (PO),
Lines of Effort (LOEs), 3-64, Multinational Relationships, 3-40, 5-52
m

5-44 2-40 Peace Operations Environ-

Lines of Operation (LOOs), ment, 4-4
5-44 N Peacekeeping Operations
Linguist Support/Interpreters, Nation Assistance, 5-65 (PKO), 4-11
Sa

2-63 National Security Council Peacekeeping Tasks, 4-12

Linguist Support Categories, (NSC), 8-9 Phasing Major Operations
2-63 NATO CIMIC, 6-17 and Campaigns, 3-60
Local Government Officials Nature of Insurgency, 5-11 Physical Factors, 5-34
and Departments, 3-74
Negotiation and Diplomacy, Planning, Execution and As-
5-48, 5-68 sessment (Stability), 3-54
M Negotiations, 2-56 Planning Stabilization Efforts,
Maintaining Legitimacy, 3-9 Network Analysis, 5-35 3-57
Mass Atrocity Response Op- Noncombatant Evacuation Planning Transitions and
erations (MARO), 4-25 Operations (NEO), 1-14, Transferring Authorities,
Means, 5-13 4-34 3-68
Measuring Progress in Nongovernmental Organiza- Political Activities, 5-27
Conflict Environments tions (NGOs), 8-11 Political-Military Dimension,
(MPICE), 3-67 Nonlethal Weapons (NLW), 8-18
Mediation, 2-57 4-33 Population Control, 5-28
Meetings, 2-60 Prerequisites for Insurgency,
Military End State and Objec- O 5-12
tives, 5-42 Private Sector, 8-11
Observing and Reporting,
Military Engagement, 3-82 Protected Areas, 4-28
Security Cooperation, & Operational Approach, 3-57, Protection of Civilians, 3-48
Deterrence, 1-3 3-65
Index-3
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at [Link]

Protection of Shipping, 1-11 Train, Advise & Assist (TAA),

Index

Show of Force Operations,

Public Diplomacy and Infor- 1-11 2-1
mation Operations, 4-24 Site Security, 4-29 Trainer/Advisor Checklists,
Small Unit Tasks & Activities, 2-22
R 3-79 Training and Advising, 2-19
Range of Military Operations Social Science, 5-38 Training the Interpreter, 2-67
(ROMO), 1-1 Sociocultural Analysis, 5-35 Transformation Stage, 3-12
Rapport, 2-49 Soft Skills, 2-52 Transition and Redeploy-
Rationalization, Standardiza- Stability, 3-1 ment, 4-18
tion, and Interoperability Stability Actions (Joint Defi- Transition Planning, 4-9
(RSI), 7-4 nition), 3-1, 3-13 Transitional Governing Au-
Rebuild and Build, 2-8 Stability and Defeat Mecha- thorities, 3-71
Recovery Operations, 1-15 nisms, 3-59 Transitional Military Authority
Refugees, 3-98 Stability Considerations, (TMA), 3-73
Relationship Building, 2-49 3-37 Transitions, 3-41
Relevant Actors, 5-4, 5-33 Stability in Operations (Ac- Trust, 2-52
Respect, 2-50 tions/Tasks/Efforts), 3-1
Restore Essential Services, Stability Operations, 5-52 U
3-32 Stability Operations (Under- Unconventional Warfare
Rule of Law, 3-25 lying Logic), 3-22 (UW), 5-50
Stability Phases, 3-29 Understanding Culture, 2-27
S
Sanction Enforcement, 1-9
e
Stability Tasks (Army Defini-
tion), 3-1, 3-21
Understanding the Opera-
tional Environment (OE),
pl
Stabilization, 1-27, 3-5 3-54, 5-4, 5-33
Search Operations, 4-33
Stabilization and Recon- Understanding the Root
Secure Environment, Causes and Immediate
struction Essential Tasks
4-27 Drivers of Instability, 3-4
Matrix (ETM), 3-14
m
Security, 3-25, 3-26 Unexploded Ordnance, 3-98
Stabilization Framework,
Security Assistance (SA), 3-10 Unified Action, 7-5
1-10
Stabilization Planning, 3-53 Unity of Effort, 8-2
Security Cooperation (SC),
Stable States, 3-6
Sa

US Government Dept and

1-3, 2-1, 3-38, 5-48, 5-65,
Stakeholders, 8-11, 8-19 Agency Coordination, 8-3
7-2
Strategic Principles, 5-8 USAID Anticorruption As-
Security Cooperation Activi-
Strike, 1-15, 5-64 sessment, 3-67
ties, 2-1a, 2-2
Support Activities, 5-28 USAID Conflict Assessment
Security Cooperation Plan-
Support to Counterdrug Framework (CAF), 3-67
ning, 2-45
(CD) Operations, 1-9 USAID Guidelines for Rapid
Security Force Assistance
Support to Economic and Environmental Impact As-
(SFA), 1-10, 2-5, 2-7, 2-9
Infrastructure Develop- sessment in Disasters, 3-67
Security Mission, 4-20
ment, 3-35 USG Structure in Foreign
Security Relationships, 2-1 Countries, 8-15
Support to Governance,
Security Sector Reform
3-34
(SSR), 3-42 V
Support to Insurgency, 1-12
Seizing the Initiative, 1-22
Verification of Weapons and
Selecting an Interpreter, 2-64
T Forces, 3-90
Separation of Parties to the
Dispute, 4-14 Targeted Threat Infrastruc-
ture, 5-64 W
Separation/Neutralization of
Forces (Interpositioning), Termination, 5-42 Whole-of-Government, 3-20,
4-30 Theater or Regional Focus, 5-7, 8-6, 8-7
Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Tran- 8-18 Working with Host-Nation
sition (SCHBT), 5-54, 5-56 Train, 2-6 Forces, 2-35

Index-4
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In today’s complicated and uncertain world, the military must be ready to meet the
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TAA2
The Military Engagement,
Security Cooperation & Stability
SMARTBOOK
Train, Advise & Assist
Military engagement, security cooperation, and stability missions, tasks,
and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument
of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g.,
UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security
interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations.
Use of joint capabilities in these and related activities such as security force
assistance and foreign internal defense helps shape the operational envi-
ronment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below
the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

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Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national
power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide
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essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction,
and humanitarian relief.
Peace operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations
conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations
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to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support
reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.
A counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive, and
stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires
military forces to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often
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associated with nonmilitary agencies and to be nation builders as well as

warriors.
Civil-military operations are a primary military instrument to synchronize
military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of
stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and
irregular threats.

DIME is our DOMAIN!

TM

SMARTbooks: Reference Essentials for the Instruments of National Power

Part of our “Military Reference” Series ISBN 9781935886693

90000 >

9 781935 886693

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