(Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link].

com

INFO1
[Link]

SMARTBOOK
First Edition (INFO1)
Information Operations
(IO Defined & Described)
Information
in Joint Operations
Information Roles
& Responsibilities
e Info-Related Capabilities
pl
(PA, CA, MILDEC, MISO,
OPSEC, CO, EW, Space, STO)
Information Planning
(IE Analysis, IPB, MDMP, JPP)
m

Information Preparation
Information Execution
Sa

(IO Working Grp, Weighted

Efforts, Enabling Actions)

IO
Fires & Targeting
Information Assessment

information
OPERATIONS&CAPABILITIES
Guide to Information Operations & the IRCs

The Lightning Press

Norman M Wade
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

INFO1
[Link]

SMARTBOOK

e
pl
m
Sa

IO information
OPERATIONS&CAPABILITIES
Guide to Information Operations & the IRCs

The Lightning Press

Norman M Wade
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

The Lightning Press

2227 Arrowhead Blvd.
Lakeland, FL 33813
24-hour Order/Voicemail: 1-800-997-8827
E-mail: SMARTbooks@[Link]
[Link]

(INFO1) The Information Operations

& Capabilities SMARTbook
Guide to Information Operations & the IRCs
Over the past two decades, information operations (IO) has gone through a number of
doctrinal evolutions, explained, in part, by the rapidly changing nature of information, its
flow, processing, dissemination, impact and, in particular, its military employment. INFO1:
The Information Operations & Capabilities SMARTbook examines the most current doctrinal
references available and charts a path to emerging doctrine. INFO1 chapters and topics
include information operations (IO defined and described), information in joint operations
(joint IO), information-related capabilities (PA, CA, MILDEC, MISO, OPSEC, CO, EW,
Space, STO), information planning (information environment analysis, IPB, MDMP, JPP),
e
information preparation, information execution (IO working group, IO weighted efforts and
enabling activities, intel support), fires & targeting, and information assessment.
pl
Copyright © 2021 The Lightning Press
ISBN: 978-1-935886-60-0
m

All Rights Reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or other means, electronic
or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
Sa

retrieval systems, without permission in writing by the publisher. Inquiries should be ad-
dressed to The Lightning Press.
SMARTbook is a trademark of The Lightning Press.

Notice of Liability
The information in this SMARTbook and quick reference guide is distributed on an “As Is”
basis, without warranty. While every precaution has been taken to ensure the reliability and
accuracy of all data and contents, neither the author nor The Lightning Press shall have
any liability to any person or entity with respect to liability, loss, or damage caused directly
or indirectly by the contents of this book. If there is a discrepancy, refer to the source docu-
ment. This SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from
public release. “The views presented in this publication are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or its components.”
Credits: Cover image - Soldiers from A Co., 1st Bn, 111th Inf, 56th Stryker BCT conduct a
night live-fire during Exercise Decisive Strike 2019 (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Frances
Ariele Tejada). All other images courtesy Dept. of the Army and/or Dept. of Defense.

Printed and bound in the United States of America.

View, download FREE samples and purchase online:

[Link]
 (INFO1)
(Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Notes to Reader
INFO1: The Information Operations & Capabilities SMARTbook
Over the past two decades, information operations (IO) has gone through a number
of doctrinal evolutions, explained, in part, by the rapidly changing nature of informa-
tion, its flow, processing, dissemination, impact and, in particular, its military employ-
ment. INFO1: The Information Operations & Capabilities SMARTbook examines the
most current doctrinal references available, and charts a path to emerging doctrine
on information operations.
Information is a resource. As a resource, it must be obtained, developed, refined,
distributed, and protected. The information element of combat power is integral to
optimizing combat power, particularly given the increasing relevance of operations in
and through the information environment to achieve decisive outcomes.
Information Operations (IO) is the integrated employment, during military opera-
tions, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential
adversaries while protecting our own. The purpose of IO is to create effects in and
through the information environment that provide commanders decisive advan-
tage over enemies and adversaries.
e
The joint force commander (JFC) leverages informational aspects of military
activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this
pl
advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities
ultimately affects strategic outcomes. The joint force attacks and exploits infor-
mation, information networks, and systems to affect the ability of relevant
actors to leverage information in support of their own objectives. This includes
m

the manipulation, modification, or destruction of information or disruption of the flow

of information for the purpose of gaining a position of military advantage. This also
includes targeting the credibility of information.
Sa

An information-related capability (IRC) is a tool, technique, or activity employed

within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects
and operationally desirable conditions. IO brings together information-related ca-
pabilities (IRCs) at a specific time and in a coherent fashion to create effects in and
through the information environment that advance the ability to deliver operational
advantage to the commander.

SMARTbooks - DIME is our DOMAIN!

SMARTbooks: Reference Essentials for the Instruments of National Power (D-I-M-E:
Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic)! Recognized as a “whole of government”
doctrinal reference standard by military, national security and government professionals
around the world, SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library.
SMARTbooks can be used as quick reference guides during actual operations, as
study guides at education and professional development courses, and as lesson
plans and checklists in support of training. Visit [Link]!

Notes to Reader-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

INFO1: The Information Operations

& Capabilities SMARTbook
Over the past two decades, information operations (IO) has gone through a number of
doctrinal evolutions, explained, in part, by the rapidly changing nature of information, its
flow, processing, dissemination, impact and, in particular, its military employment. INFO1:
The Information Operations & Capabilities SMARTbook examines the most current doc-
trinal references available and charts a path to emerging doctrine.
Joint Publication 3-0
T OF T H
EN E
TM HI
S W E' L L
DE
FE

T
ND

AR

AR
• DE P

MY
•
I CA
U NI

ER
TE

M
ST A

D
AT E S O F

Joint Operations

17 January 2017
Incorporating Change 1
22 October 2018

FM 3-13 ATP 3-13.1 JP 3-13 (Chg 1) JP 3-0 (Chg 1)

Joint Publication 3-0

T OF T H
EN E
TM HI
S W E' L L
DE
FE
T

ND
AR

AR
• DE P

MY
•
I CA
U NI

ER
TE

ST A
D

AT E S O F

Joint Operations

e 17 January 2017
Incorporating Change 1
22 October 2018
pl
Plus more than a dozen primary references on the IRCs and more!

INFO1 chapters and topics include information operations (IO defined and described), infor-
m

mation in joint operations (joint IO), information-related capabilities (PA, CA, MILDEC, MISO,
OPSEC, CO, EW, Space, STO), information planning (information environment analysis, IPB,
MDMP, JPP), information preparation, information execution (IO working group, IO weighted
Sa

efforts and enabling activities, intel support), fires & targeting, and information assessment.

Chap 1: Information Operations (Defined & Described)

Information is a resource. As a resource, it must be obtained, developed, refined,
distributed, and protected. The information element of combat power is integral to
optimizing combat power, particularly given the increasing relevance of operations in and
through the information environment to achieve decisive outcomes.
Information Operations (IO) is the integrated employment, during military operations, of
information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt,
corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while pro-
tecting our own. The purpose of IO is to create effects in and through the information
environment that provide commanders decisive advantage over enemies and adversaries.
Chap 2: Information in Joint Operations
The joint force commander (JFC) leverages informational aspects of military activi-
ties to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to
others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strate-
gic outcomes. The joint force attacks and exploits information, information networks,
and systems to affect the ability of relevant actors to leverage information in sup-
port of their own objectives. This includes the manipulation, modification, or destruction
of information or disruption of the flow of information for the purpose of gaining a position
of military advantage. This also includes targeting the credibility of information.

2-Introduction
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3: Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)

An information-related capability (IRC) is a tool, technique, or activity employed within
a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and opera-
tionally desirable conditions. IO brings together information-related capabilities (IRCs) at
a specific time and in a coherent fashion to create effects in and through the information
environment that advance the ability to deliver operational advantage to the commander.
All unit operations, activities, and actions affect the information environment. Even if they
primarily affect the physical dimension, they nonetheless also affect the informational and
cognitive dimensions. For this reason, whether or not they are routinely considered an IRC,
a wide variety of unit functions and activities can be adapted for the purposes of conducting
information operations or serve as enablers to its planning, execution, and assessment.
Chap 4: Information Planning
Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired fu-
ture, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. Commanders, supported
by their staffs, ensure IO is fully integrated into the plan, starting with Army design meth-
odology (ADM) and progressing through the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).
The focal point for IO planning is the IO officer (or designated representative for IO).
However, the entire staff contributes to planning products that describe and depict how
IO supports the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
Chap 5: Information Preparation
e
Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their
ability to execute an operation. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly force
pl
opportunities for success. Because many IO objectives and IRC tasks require long lead
times to create desired effects, preparation for IO often starts earlier than for other types
of operations. Initial preparation for specific IRCs and IO units (such as 1st IO Command
or a Theater IO Group) may begin during peacetime.
m

Chap 6: Information Execution

Execution of IO includes IRCs executing the synchronization plan and the commander and
staff monitoring and assessing their activities relative to the plan and adjusting these efforts,
Sa

as necessary. The primary mechanism for monitoring and assessing IRC activities is the IO
working group. There are two variations of the IO working group. The first monitors and as-
sesses ongoing planned operations and convenes on a routine, recurring basis. The second
monitors and assesses unplanned or crisis situations and convenes on an as-needed basis.
Chap 7: Fires & Targeting
The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and
converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range
of military operations. These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects
delivered from both Army and Joint forces, as well as other unified action partners.
Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropri-
ate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0).
IO is integrated into the targeting cycle to produce effects in and through the information
environment that support objectives.
Chap 8: Information Assessment
Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process. It is
also part of targeting. In short, assessment occurs at all levels and within all operations
and has a role in any process or activity. The purpose of assessment is to improve the
commander’s decision making and make operations more effective. Assessment is a key
component of the commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine the results of unit
actions in the context of overall mission objectives.

Introduction-3
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

(INFO1)
References
The following references were used in part to compile INFO1: The Information Operations
& Capabilities SMARTbook. All military references used to compile SMARTbooks are in the
public domain and are available to the general public through official public websites and
designated as approved for public release with unlimited distribution. The SMARTbooks do not
contain ITAR-controlled technical data, classified, or other sensitive material restricted from
public release. SMARTbooks are reference books that address general military principles,
fundamentals and concepts rather than technical data or equipment operating procedures.

Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Oct 2018 Joint Operations (w/Change 1)
JP 3-12 Jun 2019 Cyberspace Operations
JP 3-13 Nov 2014 Information Operations (w/Change 1)
JP 3-13.1 Feb 2012 Electronic Warfare
JP 3-13.2 Dec 2011 Military Information Support Operations (w/Change 2)
JP 3-13.3
JP 3-14
Jan 2012
Oct 2020
e Operations Security
Space Operations
pl
JP 3-57 Sep 2013 Civil-Military Operations
JP 3-61 Aug 2016 Public Affairs (w/Change 1)
m
Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs)
ADP 3-19 Jul 2019 Fires

Army Techniques Publications (ATPs)

Sa

ATP 3-13.1 Oct 2018 The Conduct of Information Operations

ATP 3-13.3 Jul 2019 Army Operations Security for Division and Below
ATP 3-60 May 2015 Targeting
ATP 3-36 Dec 2014 Electronic Warfare Techniques

Field Manuals (FMs)

FM 3-0 Dec 2017 Operations (w/Change 1)
FM 3-12 Apr 2017 Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 3-13 Dec 2016 Information Operations
FM 3-14 Oct 2019 Space Operations
FM 3-61 Apr 2014 Public Affairs Operations
FM 6-0 Apr 2016 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations
(w/Change 2)

Other Publications
PAM 525-3-1 Dec 2018 The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028
JDN 2-13 Dec 2013 Commander’s Communication Synchronization

4-References
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

(INFO1)
Table of Contents
Information
Chap 1

Operations (IO)
I. Information Operations (Defined & Described)..........................1-1
I. Information Operations (IO)..............................................................................1-1
II. The Purpose of Information Operations...........................................................1-2
- Positions of Relative Advantage (Gaining the “Information Advantage”).....1-3
- Information Operations (Overview)..............................................................1-4
- Integrated Employment of Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)............1-5
III. Operational & Information Environment.........................................................1-6
A. Operational Environment (OE)..................................................................1-6
B. Information Environment............................................................................1-7
e
C. The Multi-Domain Extended Battlefield.....................................................1-8
- Information Environment Operations (IEO)............................................1-9
IV. Three Interrelated Efforts..............................................................................1-10
pl
V. Army-Joint Relationships...............................................................................1-10
II. Information (as an Element of Combat Power)........................1-11
I. The Information Element of Combat Power.................................................... 1-11
m

II. Information Operations & the Command & Control Warfighting Function.....1-12
- Warfighting Function Tasks (FM 3-0*)........................................................1-12
- The Six Warfighting Functions...................................................................1-13
III. IO and the Operations Process....................................................................1-14
Sa

- IO Planning................................................................................................1-15
- IO Preparation............................................................................................1-15
- IO Execution..............................................................................................1-15
- Targeting....................................................................................................1-15
- IO Assessment...........................................................................................1-15
III. IO & the Army Strategic Roles.................................................1-17
- Positions of Relative Advantage......................................................................1-19
I. Shape.............................................................................................................1-18
SHAPING Activities (IO Considerations)......................................................1-20
- Military Engagement.............................................................................1-20
- Security Cooperation............................................................................1-21
- Other Shaping Activities.......................................................................1-21
II. Prevent..........................................................................................................1-18
PREVENT Activities (IO Considerations).....................................................1-22
- Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO)...........................................................1-22
- Flexible Response Option (FRO).........................................................1-22
III. Conduct Large-Scale Ground Combat.........................................................1-24
IO in Support of DECISIVE ACTION............................................................1-25
- Decisive Action.....................................................................................1-25
- IO Weighted Efforts (& Enabling Activities)...........................................1-25
IV. Consolidate Gains........................................................................................1-26
Win.....................................................................................................................1-26

Table of Contents-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

IV. IO Across the Range of Military Operations...........................1-27

A. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.......................1-27
B. Crisis and Limited Contingency Operations..................................................1-28
C. Major Operations and Campaigns................................................................1-28
V. IO Roles, Responsibilities, & Organizations............................1-29
I. The Commander.............................................................................................1-29
II. The Staff........................................................................................................1-30
III. The IO Officer...............................................................................................1-32
- IO Working Group......................................................................................1-33
IV. Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs).......................................................1-33
V. Theater Information Operations Groups........................................................1-34
VI. Brigade & Below Information Operations.....................................................1-36
- Presence, Profile, and Posture (PPP)........................................................1-36
- Soldier and Leader Engagements (SLE)...................................................1-37
- Leveraging Other IRCs..............................................................................1-37
VII. Information Operations Support Units.........................................................1-38
VIII. Individual Soldiers and Army Civilians.......................................................1-38

Information
e
Chap 2

pl
in Joint Operations
m

I. Information in Joint Operations...................................................2-1

I. Information (as a Joint Function)......................................................................2-1
- The Information Function.............................................................................2-1
Sa

II. Information Function Activities.........................................................................2-2

A. Understand Information in the Operational Environment (OE)..................2-2
- Language, Regional, and Cultural Expertise..........................................2-2
B. Leverage Information to Affect Behavior....................................................2-3
- Influence Relevant Actors.......................................................................2-3
- Inform Domestic, International, and Internal Audiences.........................2-3
- Attack and Exploit Information, Information Networks, and Systems.....2-3
C. Support Human and Automated Decision Making.....................................2-3
- Facilitating Shared Understanding.........................................................2-3
- Protecting Friendly Information...............................................................2-3
III. Joint Capabilities, Operations, & Activities for Leveraging Information..........2-4
IV. Information (one of seven Joint Functions)....................................................2-6
II. Joint Information Operations (JP 3-13)......................................2-7
I. The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the
Application of Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)....................................2-8
II. The Information Environment........................................................................2-10
A. The Physical Dimension..........................................................................2-10
B. The Informational Dimension...................................................................2-10
C. The Cognitive Dimension.........................................................................2-10

2-Table of Contents
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

III. Integrating / Coordinating Functions of IO.............................2-11

I. IO and the Information-Influence Relational Framework................................ 2-11
II. The Information Operations Staff and Information Operations Cell...............2-12
- IO Staff.......................................................................................................2-12
- IO Cell........................................................................................................2-12
III. Relationships and Integration.......................................................................2-12
Commander’s Communications Synchronization (CCS).............................2-12
A. Strategic Communication (SC)................................................................2-12
B. Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).......................................2-13
C. Public Affairs (PA)....................................................................................2-14
D. Civil-Military Operations (CMO)...............................................................2-14
E. Cyberspace Operations...........................................................................2-14
F. Information Assurance (IA).......................................................................2-15
G. Space Operations....................................................................................2-15
H. Military Information Support Operations (MISO).....................................2-15
I. Intelligence................................................................................................2-15
J. Military Deception (MILDEC)....................................................................2-16
K. Operations Security (OPSEC).................................................................2-16
L. Special Technical Operations (STO)........................................................2-16
M. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)...........................2-16
N. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) ..............................................................2-16
IV. IO Responsibilities & Legal Considerations...........................2-17
I. Authorities.......................................................................................................2-17
e
II. Responsibilities..............................................................................................2-17
- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]).......................................2-17
pl
- Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I])................................2-17
- Joint Staff...................................................................................................2-17
- Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC).............................2-17
- Combatant Commands..............................................................................2-18
m
- Service Component Commands................................................................2-18
- Functional Component Command.............................................................2-18
III. Legal Considerations....................................................................................2-18
V. IO Planning Considerations......................................................2-19
Sa

I. Information Operations Planning....................................................................2-19

A. The IO Cell and the Joint Planning Group (JPG).....................................2-19
B. IO Planning Considerations....................................................................2-19
II. IO Planning within the Joint Planning Process (JPP)*...................................2-20
- Joint Planning Process (JPP)*...................................................................2-20
- IO Planning (Within the Seven Steps of the JPP*)....................................2-22
Step 1 - Planning Initiation......................................................................2-23
Step 2 - Mission Analysis........................................................................2-23
Step 3 - COA Development....................................................................2-24
Step 4 - COA Analysis and War Gaming................................................2-24
Step 5 - COA Comparison......................................................................2-25
Step 6 - COA Approval............................................................................2-25
Step 7 - Plan or Order Development......................................................2-25
III. IO Phasing and Synchronization..................................................................2-21
IV. Multinational Considerations........................................................................2-26
VI. IO Assessment..........................................................................2-27
I. Understanding IO Assessment.......................................................................2-27
- Purpose of Assessment in Information Operations....................................2-27
- Impact of the Information Environment on Assessment.............................2-27
II. The IO Assessment Process.........................................................................2-28

Table of Contents-3
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
Information-Related
Capabilities (IRCs)
Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) ........................................3-1
I. Intrinsic and Extrinsic IRCs (by Echelon).........................................................3-2
- Determination of Assets...............................................................................3-3
- Requesting Capabilities Not On Hand.........................................................3-3
II. Overview of IRCs.............................................................................................3-4
I. Public Affairs (PA).........................................................................3-5
Public Affairs Guidance (PAG).............................................................................3-5
I. Public Affairs and the Operational Environment (OE).......................................3-6
- Public Perception.........................................................................................3-7
II. Public Affairs Information Synchronization......................................................3-9
III. Public Affairs Fundamentals.........................................................................3-10
- Principles of Information............................................................................3-10
- Tenets of Public Affairs...............................................................................3-10
- PA and Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS) ................ 3-11
IV. Audiences, Stakeholders, and Publics.........................................................3-12
V. Narrative, Themes, and Messages................................................................3-13
e
VI. Visual Information Function (COMCAM)......................................................3-14
VII. PA Actions in the Joint Planning Process....................................................3-16
pl
II. Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations (CMO)....................3-17
I. Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations........................................................3-17
II. CMO and the Range of Military Operations...................................................3-18
- Strategic Aspects of Civil-Military Operations............................................3-19
m

III. Civil-Military Operations and the Levels of War............................................3-20.

IV. CMO in Joint Operations..............................................................................3-22
V. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)......................................................3-24
Sa

III. Military Deception (MILDEC)....................................................3-27

I. Military Deception Process and Capability.....................................................3-27
II. Principles of Military Deception.....................................................................3-27
III. Military Deception in Support of Operations.................................................3-28
- Military Deception Tactics...........................................................................3-29
- Common Military Deception Means...........................................................3-29
IV. Military Deception Planning Steps................................................................3-31
V. Military Deception in the Operations Process................................................3-32
IV. Military Information Support Operations (MISO)....................3-33
I. MISO Purpose................................................................................................3-34
II. MISO Missions...............................................................................................3-34
III. Information Roles & Relationships...............................................................3-35
IV. Example Joint MISO Activities......................................................................3-38
V. Operations Security (OPSEC)...................................................3-39
I. Purpose of Operations Security......................................................................3-39
II. OPSEC and Intelligence (JIPOE)..................................................................3-40
III. Implement Operations Security (OPSEC)....................................................3-41
IV. The Operations Security Process.................................................................3-42
A. Identify Critical Information......................................................................3-42
B. Threat Analysis........................................................................................3-42
C. Vulnerability Analysis...............................................................................3-43
D. Risk Assessment.....................................................................................3-43
4-Table of Contents
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

V. Operations Security Indicators......................................................................3-44

- Association.................................................................................................3-44
- Profile.........................................................................................................3-44
- Contrast......................................................................................................3-44
- Exposure....................................................................................................3-44
VI. Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)....................3-45
A. Cyberspace Operations................................................................................3-45
B. Electronic Warfare (EW)................................................................................3-45
Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)................................................3-46
VI(a). Cyberspace Operations (CO)..............................................3-47
I. The Cyberspace Domain................................................................................3-48
II. Cyberspace Operations (CO)........................................................................3-50
- Cyberspace Missions.................................................................................3-51
- Cyberspace Actions...................................................................................3-51
III. Effects Outside of DODIN & Cyberspace.....................................................3-52
- Cyberspace Actions...................................................................................3-52
- Effects........................................................................................................3-52
IV. Army Cyberspace Missions and Actions.......................................................3-54
VI(b). Electronic Warfare (EW).......................................................3-55
I. Electronic Warfare (EW).................................................................................3-55
II. Electronic Warfare Missions..........................................................................3-56
A. Electronic Attack (EA) .............................................................................3-57
e
B. Electronic Protection (EP)........................................................................3-58
C. Electronic Warfare Support (ES).............................................................3-59
pl
* Electronic Warfare Reprogramming...........................................................3-59
III. Spectrum Management................................................................................3-60
- The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS).......................................................3-60
- Spectrum Management Operations (SMO)...............................................3-60
m

VII. Space Operations....................................................................3-61

Space Domain...................................................................................................3-61
I. Space Operations...........................................................................................3-61
Sa

II. Space Capabilities.........................................................................................3-62

III. Unity of Effort................................................................................................3-64
- Space Control............................................................................................3-64
- Space Superiority.......................................................................................3-64
IV. Army Space Capabilities...............................................................................3-66
V. Planning Joint Space Operations..................................................................3-68
- Combined Space Tasking Order (CSTO)...................................................3-69
VIII. Additional IRCs.......................................................................3-71
A. Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJSTO).................................3-72
B. Special Access Programs (SAP)...................................................................3-72
C. Personnel Recovery (PR).............................................................................3-72
D. Physical Attack..............................................................................................3-72
E. Physical Security...........................................................................................3-73
F. Presence, Profile, and Posture (PPP)...........................................................3-73
G. Soldier and Leader Engagement (SLE)........................................................3-74
H. Police Engagement.......................................................................................3-74
I. Social Media...................................................................................................3-74

Table of Contents-5
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 4
(Information Operations)
PLANNING
PLANNING (Overview).....................................................................4-1
A. IO & Army Design Methodology (ADM)...........................................................4-2
B. IO & the Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP)........................................4-2
I. Synchronization of Information-Related Capabilities................4-3
I. Commanders’ Responsibilities.........................................................................4-3
Commander’s Responsibilities (Overview)....................................................4-4
- Commander’s Narrative..........................................................................4-4
- Commander’s Intent...............................................................................4-5
- Guidance................................................................................................4-5
- Concept of Operations............................................................................4-5
- Risk Assessment....................................................................................4-5
II. Staff Responsibilities.......................................................................................4-3
Key IO Planning Tools and Outputs...............................................................4-3
A. IO Running Estimate..................................................................................4-6
B. Logic of the Effort.......................................................................................4-8
C. CCIRs and EEFIs......................................................................................4-9
e
- Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).....................4-9
- Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)...............................................4-9
pl
- Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs).................................4-9
- Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs)...............................4-9
IV. IO Input to Operation Orders and Plans.......................................................4-10
A. Mission Statement................................................................................... 4-11
m

B. Scheme of Information Operations..........................................................4-12

C. IO Objectives & IRC Tasks......................................................................4-14
D. IO Synchronization Matrix.......................................................................4-16
II. Information Environment Analysis...........................................4-17
Sa

IO and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).....................................4-17

Analyze and Depict the Information Environment.............................................4-17
Information Environment Analysis (Overview)...................................................4-18
IPB Considerations for the Information Environment........................................4-20
Step 1: Define the Information Environment......................................................4-22
Step 2: Describe the Information Environment Effects......................................4-23
Step 3: Evaluate the Threat’s Information Situation..........................................4-28
Step 4: Determine Threat Courses of Action.....................................................4-34
III. IO & the MDMP...........................................................................4-35
Step I. Receipt of Mission..................................................................................4-36
Step II. Mission Analysis....................................................................................4-39
Step III. Course of Action Development.............................................................4-50
Step IV. Course of Action Analysis & War-Gaming............................................4-56
Step V. Course of Action Comparison...............................................................4-58
Step VI. Course of Action Approval...................................................................4-60
Step VII. Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition.............................4-60
IV. Appendix 15 (IO) to Annex C (Operations)..............................4-61
V. Battle Drills.................................................................................4-65
A. Identify Critical Events...................................................................................4-66
B. Define Information End State........................................................................4-66
C. Develop Battle Drill Scheme of Information Operations................................4-66
6-Table of Contents
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 5 (Information Operations)

PREPARATION
PREPARATION (Overview)..............................................................5-1
I. IO Preparation Activities...................................................................................5-1
A. Improve Situational Understanding............................................................5-2
B. Revise and Refine Plans and Orders........................................................5-2
C. Conduct Coordination and Liaison...........................................................5-3
D. Initiate Information Collection....................................................................5-6
E. Initiate Security Operations........................................................................5-6
F. Initiate Troop Movements...........................................................................5-6
G. Initiate Network Preparation......................................................................5-6
H. Manage and Prepare Terrain.....................................................................5-6
I. Conduct Confirmation Briefings..................................................................5-8
J. Conduct Rehearsals...................................................................................5-8
II. Fundamentals of Preparation..........................................................................5-7

(Information Operations) e
Chap 6

EXECUTION
pl
m

EXECUTION (Overview)...................................................................6-1
I. Information Operations Working Group............................................................6-1
II. IO Responsibilities Within the Various Command Posts.................................6-4
Sa

III. Assessing During Execution...........................................................................6-5

A. Monitoring IO.............................................................................................6-5
B. Evaluating IO.............................................................................................6-8
IV. Decision Making During Execution.................................................................6-6
I. IO Weighted Efforts and Enabling Activities...............................6-9
Unified Land Operations......................................................................................6-9
Decisive Action....................................................................................................6-9
I. Weighted Efforts.............................................................................................6-10
IO and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)...................................6-10
A. (IO Weighted Effort) DEFEND................................................................. 6-11
B. (IO Weighted Effort) ATTACK...................................................................6-12
C. (IO Weighted Effort) STABILIZE..............................................................6-13
II. IO Enabling Activities.....................................................................................6-10
A. Analyze and Depict the Information Environment....................................6-14
B. Determine IRCs and IO Organizations Available.....................................6-14
C. Optimize IRC Effects...............................................................................6-14
II. Coordination of Intelligence Support.......................................6-15
I. Intelligence Support to Information Operations..............................................6-15
II. Intelligence “Push” and “Pull”........................................................................6-16
III. Requests for Information..............................................................................6-16
IV. Information Operations.................................................................................6-17
V. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).............................................6-18
Table of Contents-7
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 7
Fires &
Targeting
I. Fires (IO Considerations)..............................................................7-1
I. The Fires Warfighting Function.........................................................................7-1
II. Fires Overview.................................................................................................7-2
III. Execute Fires Across the Domains.................................................................7-4
IV. Joint Fires (IO Considerations).......................................................................7-6
V. Foundations of Fire Support (FS)....................................................................7-8
- Attack & Delivery Capabilities......................................................................7-8
VI. Scheme of Information Operations..............................................................7-10
II. Targeting (IO Integration)...........................................................7-11
Targeting Methodology...................................................................................... 7-11
I. Targeting Process Considerations..................................................................7-12
- Targeting Overview....................................................................................7-12
- Various Targeting Cycles............................................................................7-12
- Targeting Categories..................................................................................7-13
- Find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA)...............................7-13
e
- Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD)......................7-13
II. Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A)..........................................................7-14
III. Targeting Tasks during the MDMP................................................................7-16
pl
IV. Dynamic Targeting (F2T2EA) ......................................................................7-22

(Information Operations)
m
Chap 8

ASSESSMENT
Sa

ASSESSMENT (Overview)...............................................................8-1
I. Assessment Framework...................................................................................8-1
II. IO Assessment Considerations.......................................................................8-2
- Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)...............................................................8-2
- Measures of Performance (MOP)................................................................8-3
- Indicators.....................................................................................................8-3
III. Assessment Rationale....................................................................................8-4
IV. Principles That Enhance the Effectiveness of IO Assessment.......................8-4
V. Assessment Focus..........................................................................................8-5
VI. Assessment Methods.....................................................................................8-6
VII. Assessment Process.....................................................................................8-6
A. Monitoring Information Operations............................................................8-6
B. Evaluating Information Operations............................................................8-7
Criteria Development.....................................................................................8-8
- Measure of Effectiveness (MOEs) Development....................................8-8
­- Measure of Performance (MOPs) Development....................................8-9
- Indicator Development............................................................................8-9
- Logic of Effort or Theory of Change........................................................8-9
VIII. Assessment Products.................................................................................8-10

8-Table of Contents
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Information
Operations
Chap 1
I. Information Operations
(Defined & Described)
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 1-2 to 1-6.

I. Information Operations (IO)

Information Operations (IO) is the integrated employment, during military op-
erations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation
to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and
potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13).
FM 3-13 uses the term IO comprehensively to capture all activity employed to af-
fect the information environment and contribute to operations in and through the
information environment. IO includes:
• Integration and synchronization of information-related capabilities.
• Planning, preparing, execution, and assessment.
• The capability and capacity that ensures the accomplishment of IO, to
include the units and personnel responsible for its conduct.
e
Breaking down the definition into constituent parts helps to understand its meaning
pl
and implications for land forces:

Information Operations (IO) is the...

m

Integrated Employment of Information-Related

Capabilities (IRCs)...
IO brings together IRCs at a specific time and in a coherent fashion to create effects
Sa

in and through the information environment that advance the ability to deliver opera-
tional advantage to the commander. While IRCs create individual effects, IO stresses
aggregate and synchronized effects as essential to achieving operational objectives.
See p. 1-5 (and chap. 3) for an overview and further discussion of the IRCs.

During Military Operations...

Army forces, as part of a joint force, conduct operations across the conflict contin-
uum and range of military operations. Whether participating in security cooperation
efforts or conducting major combat operations, IO is essential during all phases (0
through V) of a military operation.

In Concert with Other Lines of Operation...

Commanders use lines of operations and lines of effort to visualize and describe
operations. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of
a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and that links the force with its
base of operations and objectives (ADRP 3-0). Lines of operations connect a series
of decisive points that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. A
line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than
geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic
conditions (ADRP 3-0). Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when
positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. Commanders
may describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combina-
tion of both. Commanders, supported by their staff, ensure information operations

(Overview) I. Information Operations (Defined & Described) 1-1

Information (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Operations

are integrated into the concept of operation to support each line of operation and
effort. Based on the situation, commanders may designate IO as a line of effort to
synchronize actions and focus the force on creating desired effects in the information
environment. Depending on the type of operation or the phase, commanders may
designate an IO-focused line of effort as decisive.

To Influence, Disrupt, Corrupt, or Usurp...

IO seeks to create specific effects at a specific time and place. Predominantly, these
effects occur in and through the information environment. Immediate effects (disrupt,
corrupt, usurp) are possible in the information environment’s physical and informa-
tional dimensions through the denial, degradation, or destruction of adversarial or
enemy information-related capabilities. However, effects in the cognitive dimen-
sion (influence) take longer to manifest. It is these cognitive effects—as witnessed
through changed behavior—that matter most to achieving decisive outcomes.

The Decision Making of Enemies and Adversaries...

While there are differences among the terms adversaries, threats, and enemies, all
three refer to those individuals, organizations, or entities that oppose U.S. efforts.
They therefore must be influenced in some fashion to acquiesce or surrender to or
otherwise support U.S. national objectives by aligning their actions in concert with
commanders’ intent. [The joint phrasing “adversaries and potential adversaries” is
revised to “enemies and adversaries” to better align with Army terminology.]

While Protecting Our Own...

e
Friendly commanders, like enemy and adversary leaders, depend on an array of
systems, capabilities, information, networks, and decision aids to assist in their
pl
decision making. Gaining operational advantage in the information environment is
equally about exploiting and protecting the systems, information, and people that
speed and enhance friendly decision making, as it is about denying the same to the
threat.
m

II. The Purpose of Information Operations

The purpose of IO is to create effects in and through the information environ-
ment that provide commanders decisive advantage over enemies and adver-
Sa

saries. Commanders achieve this advantage in several ways: preserve and facilitate
decision making and the impact of decision making, while influencing, disrupting
or degrading enemy or adversary decision making; get required information faster
and with greater accuracy and clarity than the enemy or adversary; or influence the
attitudes and behaviors of relevant audiences in the area of operations having an
impact on operations and decision making.
To support achievement of these various ways, IO employs and synchronizes
IRCs to affect the will, awareness, understanding, and capability of these audiences,
while protecting our own. Will, awareness, understanding, and capability all contrib-
ute to and sustain decision making and, if compromised, can impair that decision
making. In terms of will, awareness, understanding, and capability, advantage is
achieved when commanders preserve their will to fight, as well as their situational
understanding and their full capacity and ability to prosecute operations. Further,
commanders achieve advantage when they preserve their freedom of action in the
information environment while degrading enemy or adversary freedom of action.
See following pages (pp. 1-4 to 1-5) for an overview and further discussion.

1-2 (Overview) I. Information Operations (Defined & Described)

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Information
Operations
Positions of Relative Advantage
(Gaining the “Information Advantage”)
Ref: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec ‘17), pp. 1-18 to 1-19.
Gaining the “information advantage” to achieve “decision dominance” is an emerging
doctrinal concept with regard to operations in the information environment. While not
currently defined in joint or service doctrine, components of the concept are similar to
those found in FM 3-0’s discussion of “position of relative advantage”:
See p. 7-7 (& 2-3) for related discussion of “leveraging information” from joint doctrine.
A position of relative advantage is a location or the establishment of a favorable
condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary
freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to
accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage (ADRP 3-0). Positions of relative
advantage occur in all domains, providing opportunities for units to exploit. Com-
manders maintain momentum through exploitation of opportunities to consolidate
gains, and they continually assess and reassess friendly and enemy effects for future
opportunities. A key aspect in achieving a position of advantage is maneuver, the em-
ployment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires
to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0).
Positions of relative advantage are usually temporary and require initiative to exploit.
e
While friendly forces are seeking positions of advantage, enemy forces are doing the
same. There are multiple forms of positional advantage that provide opportunities to
exploit. Some are considerations that should be understood when formulating tactical
pl
and operational concepts, while others are goals that can be worked towards as a
means of destroying or defeating the enemy and achieving the overall purpose of the
operation. Examples of positional advantage include—
m
• Physical and geographical (including strategic positioning, sanctuary, and control
of key terrain)
• Combat power and warfighting function overmatch (including range, lethality,
precision, and mass)
Sa

• Relationships and influence (including allies, interoperability, access, and indig-

enous forces)
• Legitimacy, ideas, and popular perception (including what is good versus bad,
accepted versus opposed, and a believable narrative)
• Time (including speed of recognition, speed of decision making, speed of action,
and operational tempo)
• Freedom of action (including secure lines of communications, standoff, depth,
access to cyberspace, maritime and air enablers, and friendly A2 & AD measures)
• Moral (including alignment of words & deeds, just & unjust, international support)
• Will (including doing what must be done, continuing as long as it takes, and
maintaining support from domestic leaders)
Relative positional advantage is something to gain, protect, and exploit across all do-
mains. Combining positional advantages across multiple domains during each phase
of operations provides opportunities for exploitation through maneuver. Physical or
geographic positions of relative advantage are often identified first as decisive points
and then depicted in operational graphics as objectives. The greater the number of
positions of advantage a commander can generate, the increased number of dilemmas
that commander can present to an enemy. The combination of positional advantages
change over time relative to changes in the OE, and this change includes how the
enemy reacts to friendly forces’ activities. It is the exploitation of positions of advantage
through maneuver which deters, defeats, or destroys an enemy.

(Overview) I. Information Operations (Defined & Described) 1-3

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Information
Operations
Chap 1
II. Information (as an
Element of Combat Power)
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 1-7 to 1-8 and ADP 3-0,
Operations (Jul ‘19), chap. 5.
Information is a resource. As a resource, it must be obtained, developed, refined,
distributed, and protected. IO, along with knowledge management and information
management, are the ways that units harness this resource and ensure its availabil-
ity, as well as operationalize and optimize it.

The Information Element of Combat Power

The information element of combat power is integral to optimizing combat
power, particularly given the increasing relevance of operations in and through the
information environment to achieve decisive outcomes. IO and the information
element of combat power are related but not the same.

Elements of Combat Power

e
pl
m
Sa

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), fig. 5-1. The elements of combat power.
Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using
leadership and information.
Commanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is the
multiplying and unifying element of combat power. An Army commander, by virtue
of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to ac-
complish organizational goals.
Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on
how best to apply combat power.

IO, a component of the command and control* warfighting function, supports

all other warfighting functions and makes each one more potent. The effects that IO
achieves in the information environment amplify the effects of movement and maneu-
ver, intelligence, fires, sustainment and protection, both constructive and destructive.
See pp. 2-1 to 2-6 for discussion of information (as one of the seven joint functions).
(Overview) II. Information (as an Element of Combat Power) 1-11
Information (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Operations

II. Information Operations and the

Command & Control* Warfighting Function
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations, pp. 1-7 to 1-8.
The command and control warfighting function* enables commanders to balance the
art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting
functions. It also enables a shared understanding of an operational environment and the
commander’s intent. IO’s focus on protecting information, information systems, and deci-
sion making, enhances commanders’ ability to integrate the other warfighting functions
and create necessary shared understanding. At the same time, it seeks to degrade the
enemy’s decision-making ability.
IO supports the accomplishment of several mission command warfighting tasks, includ-
ing inform and influence audiences inside and outside an organization, conduct knowl-
edge management and information influencing are effects that occur in the cognitive
dimension of the information environment. By effectively synchronizing IRCs and, when
appropriate, conducting cyberspace electromagnetic activities, commanders tailor their
influence and manner of informing to the situation and audience at hand. Information and
knowledge management support the commander and staff’s ability to access information
quickly and completely, as well as segment and protect information, thereby enhancing
their decision making and gaining advantage over adversaries and enemies.
Warfighting Function Tasks (FM 3-0*)
e
While staffs perform essential functions, commanders are ultimately responsible for
accomplishing assigned missions. Throughout operations, commanders encourage
pl
disciplined initiative through a clear commander’s intent while providing enough direc-
tion to integrate and synchronize the force at the decisive place and time. To this end,
commanders perform three primary mission command warfighting function tasks. The
commander tasks are—
m

• Drive the operations process through the activities of understanding, visualizing,

describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.
• Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with unified action partners.
Sa

• Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations.

Staffs support commanders in the exercise of mission command by performing four
primary mission command warfighting function tasks. The staff tasks are—
• Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
(See following pages for specific discussion of IO and the operations process.)
• Conduct knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.
• Conduct information operations.
• Conduct cyberspace electromagnetic activities.
Six additional tasks reside within the mission command warfighting function—
• Conduct CA operations.
• Conduct military deception.
• Install, operate, and maintain the DODIN.
• Conduct airspace control.
• Conduct information protection.
• Plan and conduct space activities.
*Editor’s Note: The “mission command” warfighting function tasks provided above are from
FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec ‘17). The newer ADP 6-0, Mission Command (Jul ‘19)
renamed and redefined the warfighting function formally called the “mission command
warfighting function” as the “command and control warfighting function.”

1-12 (Overview) II. Information (as an Element of Combat Power)

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Information
Operations
Chap 1
III. IO & the
Army Strategic Roles
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. 7.
Army IO supports joint IO across the range of military operations and across all opera-
tional phases. In accordance with latest joint doctrine (JP 3-0 w/Chg 1, dated Oct ‘18),
the joint operation model describes six general groups of activity as shown in figure
V-4 as a convenient basis for thinking about a joint operation in notional phases.

Joint Combat Operation Model (Notional)

Enable
Activities
Dominate
Level of Military Effort

Stabilize
Activities Activities
Develop Revise,
and Maintain,
Maintain or Cancel
Operation Operation
Plan
XXXX e Plan
XXXX
pl
Seize Initiative Activities

Deter Activities
Operation Shaping Activities
m
Theater Shaping Activities

Global Shaping Activities

Operation Order Operation Order

Sa

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), fig. V-4. A Notional Joint Combat Operation Model.
The Army recognizes that today’s operational environment encompasses the physi-
cal areas of the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains, as well as the
information environment (which includes cyberspace) and the electromagnetic spec-
trum. Thus, the Army now uses a multi-domain approach to operations, integrating
joint and Army capabilities and synchronizing actions across all domains to fulfill its
strategic roles of shape, prevent, win, and consolidate gains.

U.S. Army Strategic Roles

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct ‘17), fig. 1-4. Army strategic roles and their relationships to joint
phases.

(Overview) III. IO & the Army Strategic Roles 1-17

Information (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Operations

I. Shape
Army operations to shape bring together all the activities intended to promote
regional stability and to set conditions for a favorable outcome in the event of a
military confrontation. Army operations to shape dissuade adversary activities to
achieve regional goals short of military conflict. Shaping activities include enhancing
security cooperation and forward presence to promote U.S. interests; developing
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations;
and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.
Regionally aligned and engaged Army forces are essential to achieving objectives
that strengthen the global network of multinational partners and prevent conflict.
These military operations and activities specifically shape perceptions and influence
behaviors of all relevant audiences as necessary to meet U.S. strategic objectives.
As such, IO has a significant role in shaping operational environments and may be
the decisive line of effort in Phase 0.
Although shaping operations are ongoing, they are specific to each theater and
operational area in which they occur (although effects in one theater may well create
effects or achieve objectives in another). The balance of defend, attack, and stabilize
IO efforts varies based on the specific operational area, the mission, and the actors
or audiences involved. IO considerations or actions during shaping operations may
include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Understanding IO implications in the theater campaign plan.
• Embedding IO training and cooperation as part of day-to-day security cooperation.
e
• Military support to public diplomacy.
• Leveraging available and requested IRCs to achieve cooperative and persua-
sive influence in the information environment that promotes stability, coop-
pl
eration, and partnership among allies and potential allies, as well as fosters
legitimacy of U.S. and coalition efforts.
• Integrating and synchronizing IRCs to achieve persuasive influence in the in-
m
formation environment that dissuades adversaries or potential adversaries from
gaining a malign or disruptive advantage or informs and inoculates the local
populace against enemy or adversary propaganda.
• Reviewing contingency plans to ensure requisite IRCs are available in theater
Sa

and, if not, taking appropriate action to assign or pre-position them or coordi-

nate their proper placement in the time-phased force and deployment data flow.
See following pages (pp. 1-20 to 1-21) for discussion of IO considerations for
SHAPING.

II. Prevent
Army operations to prevent include all activities to deter an adversary’s undesir-
able actions. These operations are an extension of operations to shape designed to
deny the adversary any opportunities to further exploit positions of relative advan-
tage. Army operations to prevent accomplish this by raising the potential costs to
adversaries of continuing activities that threaten U.S. interests. Prevent activities are
generally weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners,
and to indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation.

Refer to AODS6-1 (w/SMARTupdate 1): The Army Operations & Doctrine

SMARTbook (Guide to FM/ADP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of
Combat Power), chap. 2 for complete discussion of the U.S.
Army strategic roles from FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1). See pp. 2-37 to 2-42
for a description of Army forces, as part of a joint team, shape
operational environments; pp. 2-43 to 2-60 discussion of prevent
conflict; pp. 2-61 to 2-68 for discussion of large-scale ground
combat; pp. 2-101 to 2-110 for discussion of consolidate gains; and
p. 2-22 for discussion of paths to victory (win).
1-18 (Overview) III. IO & the Army Strategic Roles
Information (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Operations

SHAPING Activities (IO Considerations)

Ref: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec ‘17), chap. 3.

Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security coop-

eration, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions intended to assure friends, build
partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. Operations to shape
typically occur in support of the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater
campaign plan (TCP) or the theater security cooperation plan. Ultimately, operations to
shape focus on four purposes:
• Promoting and protecting U.S. national interests and influence.
• Building partner capacity and partnerships.
• Recognizing/countering adversary attempts to gain positions of relative advantage.
• Setting conditions to win future conflicts.
Army operations to shape align with military engagement and security cooperation
activities. Army prevent activities align with deterrence and crisis response and limited
contingency operations.
Optimally, shaping activities ensure regions remain stable, a crisis does not occur, and
there is no need for an escalation of force. Upon activation of a joint operation order
(OPORD) for a crisis or a limited contingency operation Army operations to shape occur
simultaneously within a joint operations area (JOA) or designated theater of operations
e
and across the GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR). Shaping activities involving Army
forces in support of the GCC to promote favorable access include—
pl
• Key leader engagements.
• Bilateral and multinational exercises to improve multinational interoperability and
operations.
• Missions to train, advise, and equip foreign forces.
m

• Negotiations to secure basing and transit rights, establish relationships, and formal-
ize support agreements.
• The use of grants and contracts to improve relationships with and strengthen part-
Sa

ner nations.
• Designing interoperability into acquisition programs.
• Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) mapping of adversary capabilities.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities usually involve a com-
bination of military forces and capabilities separate from, but integrated with, the efforts of
interagency participants, and they are coordinated by ambassadors and country teams.

Military Engagement
Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or ele-
ments of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed
forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and
confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP
3-0). Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but it also extends to
interaction with domestic civilian authorities. GCCs seek out partners and communicate
with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This increases
the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military
engagements can reduce tensions and may prevent conflict, or, if conflict is unavoidable,
they may allow the U.S. to enter into it with greater access and stronger alliances or
coalitions. Army forces support military engagement through key leader engagement and
Soldier and leader engagement.

1-20 (Overview) III. IO & the Army Strategic Roles

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Information
Operations
Security Cooperation
Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security
establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security
interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-de-
fense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and
contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). These efforts may include
Army forces participating in joint and multinational exercises and employing regionally
aligned forces. Conducting security cooperation is one of the Army’s primary stability
tasks. Security cooperation is governed by various sections of Title 10, USC; Title 22,
USC; and specific public laws addressing Department of Defense (DOD) interactions
with other nations.
Commanders and staffs conduct security cooperation to develop allied and friendly
military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, to improve information
exchange and intelligence sharing, to provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contin-
gency access, and to mitigate conditions that could lead to a crisis. Security cooperation
activities include—
• Security assistance.
• Security force assistance (SFA).
• Foreign internal defense.
• Security sector reform.

Other Shaping Activities e

As part of operations to shape, Army forces participate in and conduct numerous other
pl
activities in support of the combatant commander’s TCP. These include developing
intelligence, countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), providing support to
humanitarian efforts, conducting information operations, and organizing and participating
in combined training and exercises.
m

• Intelligence. Identifying threat capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and intent

accurately is critical to providing commanders the timely indications and warnings
necessary to ensure operational success.
• Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Sa

• Humanitarian Efforts. The United States Agency for International Development is

the lead U.S. government agency, responsible to the Secretary of State, for admin-
istering civilian foreign aid and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster re-
lief. The United States Agency for International Development often works in concert
with Army forces when Soldiers are tasked to provide assistance.
• Information Operations. The primary stability mechanisms Army units employ
during operations to shape are influence and support. By influencing regional per-
ceptions and improving the ability of partner nations to secure themselves through
unilateral security partnerships and regional alliances, Army forces can isolate
adversaries and thwart behavior that runs counter to U.S. interests.
• Combined Training and Exercises. Combined training and exercises with multi-
national partners play a key role in shaping an OE. Through training and exercises,
Army forces build partner combat readiness and set conditions for future operations.

Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation &

Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further
discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP
3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, &
Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP
3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-
Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16),
Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08), and more.

(Overview) III. IO & the Army Strategic Roles 1-21

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Information
Operations
Chap 1
IV. IO Across the Range
of Military Operations
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 1-5 to 1-7 and JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1),
Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. V.
Army forces conduct IO within joint force parameters. From peace to war, and across
the range of military operations, commanders integrate and synchronize IO to focus
combat power and gain advantage in the information environment. In all situations,
Army forces do not act in isolation. Army forces conduct operations in support of
a larger joint or multinational plan. Figure V-2 from JP 3-0 depicts the three main
categories of military operations within the range of military operations construct:
See pp. 1-17 to 1-26 for related discussion of IO and the Army strategic roles.

Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

Peace Conflict Continuum War

e
Large-Scale Combat Operations

Range of
pl
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Military
Operations

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

m

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), fig. V-2. Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum.
Sa

A. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation,

and Deterrence
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations are ongoing
and recurring military activities that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations
with other nations and domestic civil authorities. The general objective is to protect
U.S. interests at home and abroad. IO contributes significantly to military engage-
ment, security cooperation, and deterrence. Military engagement and security
cooperation depend heavily on influencing partners and potential partners to align
with U.S. interests and, thereby, prevent threats from achieving objectives in or
through these same partners and the countries and regions they inhabit. Military
engagement and security cooperation are themselves forms of deterrence, but other
forms are possible. Deterrence is not only the actual capacity to harm another state
or non-state entity who fails to comply with or accommodate U.S. demands, but also
the perception of that entity that the U.S. has the ability to do harm, if provoked. IO
provides essential support to the shaping and maintaining of this perception through,
among other things, the protection of friendly information (OPSEC).
Complementing IO support to military engagement, security cooperation, and deter-
rence, as well as crisis response, contingency operations and major operations and
campaigns is the Attack the Network framework. This framework consists of activities
that employ lethal and nonlethal means to support friendly networks, influence neutral

(IO Overview) IV. IO Across the Range of Military Operations 1-27

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Information
Operations
Chap 1
V. IO Roles, Responsibilities,
& Organizations
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations, chap. 3.
Every member of a unit—from the commander, to the staff, to the IO officer or repre-
sentative, to individual Soldiers and Army civilians—contributes to IO. Also essential
to mission success are the IRCs supporting the unit’s IO efforts, as well as any
augmenting IO units. Each has a specific role and important responsibilities to fulfill
or undertake, as well as vital relationships to forge and sustain, in order to achieve
advantage in and through the information environment.

I. The Commander
Commanders, at all levels, are responsible for knowing what threats their units face
and how to exploit or defeat them. They are their unit’s chief influencers and engage
relevant audiences and actors, as necessary, to shape the information environment
to their advantage. Commanders rely on their staff and IO officer, in particular, to as-
sist in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing IO. They also personally direct
and review analysis of the information environment, issue guidance on the employ-
ment and synchronization of IRCs, and direct adjustments based on assessment
results. e
Cognizant of the pervasive impact of the information environment on operations and
pl
the need to affect this environment to their advantage, commanders are mindful of
the following:
• Every operation has, to some degree, an effect on the information environ-
ment.
m

• IO planning is integral to operations from the start.

• Effects in and through the information environment, if essential to success, are
part of the commander’s intent.
Sa

• Combat power cannot be optimized without IO.

• The warfighting functions (particularly movement and maneuver and fires)
produce effects in the information environment, whether intentional or not.
• IO is essential to operational success at all levels, whether or not the unit has
an assigned IO officer.
• All communication can quickly become global and have strategic consequenc-
es.
• IRCs can have lengthy lead times to coordinate and employ, as well as lengthy
lag times before their effects are realized.
• The alignment of words, deeds, and images is essential to building trust and
confidence with relevant audiences in the area of operations.
• IO requires prioritized intelligence support.
• Effects in the information environment are not always caused as expected; as-
sessment is difficult and benefits from commanders’ interest, prioritization and
support.
• U.S. IO can be constrained by policy and law, while the threat is often uncon-
strained in its use of information.

(Overview) V. IO Roles, Responsibilities, Organizations 1-29

Information (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Operations

II. The Staff

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 3-1 to 3-4.
Each staff section collaborates routinely, but to varying degrees, with the IO officer to plan, syn-
chronize, support, and assess IO. Representatives from the G-2 (S-2), G-3 (S-3), assistant chief
of staff, plans G-5 (S-5), assistant chief of staff, signal G-6 (S-6) and assistant chief of staff, civil
affairs operations (G-9/S-9), in particular, serve as core members of the IO working group.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 (S-1), PERSONNEL
The G-1 (S-1) is the principal staff officer for personnel functions. The G-1 (S-1) processes re-
quirements for individual, team and unit augmentation or attachment. It coordinates reception
of these individuals, teams, or units and validates their requirements. It also builds manning
documents, as required. Additional IO-related responsibilities include, but are not limited to:
• Designating a representative to the IO working group.
• Providing IO-focused instructions in the personnel appendix of the sustainment annex.
• Reviewing the IO mission and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available,time available, and civil considerations from a personnel support perspective.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 (S-2), INTELLIGENCE
The G-2 (S-2) is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning military intelligence, secu-
rity operations, and military intelligence training. The G-2 (S-2) produces the intelligence used
by the IO officer, element, working group and IRCs. IO-related responsibilities of the G-2 (S-2)
include, but are not limited to:
• Participating as a core member of the IO working group and providing intelligence brief-
ings or updates.
e
• Providing IO-focused instructions in the intelligence annex.
• Including requests for information from the IO officer in intelligence reach.
pl
• Answering information requirements (IRs) submitted by the IO officer.
• Coordinating with counterintelligence; law enforcement; and information system develop-
ers, providers, administrators, and users to ensure timely sharing of relevant information.
• Preparing a threat assessment of enemy command and control systems, including:
m
- Political, economic, social, and cultural influences.
- Targets and methods for offensive operations.
- Enemy decision-making processes.
- Biographical backgrounds of key threat leaders, decision makers, and communicators,
Sa

and their advisors. Including motivating factors and leadership styles.

- A comprehensive comparison of enemy offensive information capabilities against
friendly IO vulnerabilities.
• Collecting data to establish an electronic warfare database and command and control
target list.
• Providing intelligence support to military deception operations; specifically:
- Helping the G-6 (S-6) plan use of friendly information systems as deception means.
- Establishing counterintelligence measures to protect the military deception operation
from detection.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 (S-3), OPERATIONS
The G-3 (S-3) is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning training and leader devel-
opment, operations and plans, and force development modernization. IO-related responsibili-
ties include, but are not limited to:
• Exercising primary responsibility for IO staff functions and overseeing the IO officer, who
is part of the movement and maneuver cell.
• With assistance from the IO officer, integrating IO planning into the military decisionmak-
ing process.
• Validating or approving, as necessary, IO officer inputs, actions and outputs. Among the
inputs and outputs, the mission statement, scheme of IO, and IO objectives require G-3
(S-3) review,refinement, and emphasis.
• If additional IRCs or IO units are required, prioritizing and facilitating the augmentation
requestor request for forces.
• Tasking units and assets necessary to achieve IO objectives.

1-30 (Overview) V. IO Roles, Responsibilities, Organizations

Information (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Operations

III. The IO Officer

The IO officer (who heads the IO element at division and higher) or representative
(at brigade and below) is the staff focal point for IO. The IO officer is responsible for
the following specific tasks, among others:
• Analyzing the information environment to discern impacts it will have on unit
operations and to exploit opportunities to gain an advantage over threat forces.
• Identifying the most effective IRCs to achieve objectives.
• Synchronizing IRCs to achieve objectives in the information environment.
• Assessing the risk, typically described as risk to mission and risk to force, as-
sociated with the employment of any capability, product, program or message.
• Providing input to the synchronization matrix for the use of available IRCs in
support of unit operations.
• Identifying IRC gaps not resolvable at the unit level.
• Coordinating with other Army, Service, or joint forces to use IRCs to augment
existing unit capability shortfalls.
• Providing information as required in support of operations security (OPSEC) at
the unit level.
• Providing information as required in support of military deception at the unit level.
• Leading the IO working group.

e
• Assessing the effectiveness of employed IRCs.
The IO officer contributes to the overall intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) by assisting the G-2 (S-2) in identifying and evaluating threat information
pl
capabilities, as well as the means to influence the population. Additionally, the IO
officer submits to the G-2 (S-2) any IRs regarding intelligence shortfalls about the
information environment and coordinates with the G-2 (S-2) in developing templates,
m
databases, and other relevant products, including but not limited to:
• Religion, language, and culture of key groups and decision makers.
• Agendas of nongovernmental organizations.
Sa

• Size and location of threat IO or information warfare forces and assets.

• Military and civilian communication infrastructures and connectivity.
• Population demographics, linkages, and related information.
• Audio, video, and print media outlets and centers and the populations they
service.
• Location and types of electromagnetic systems and emitters.
• Network vulnerabilities of friendly, neutral, and threat forces.
Additional tasks for which the IO officer is responsible include, but are not limited to:
• Participating in the military decisionmaking process.
• Developing IRs.
• Producing information and combined information overlays.
• Developing the scheme of IO.
• Through commander’s communication synchronization, contribute to develop-
ment of the commander’s narrative.
• Integrating IO into the unit’s targeting process.
• Deconflicting the employment of IRCs.
• Ensuring IO-related information is updated in the common operational picture.
• Integrating external augmentation.

1-32 (Overview) V. IO Roles, Responsibilities, Organizations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 2
I. Information
in Joint Operations

Information
in Joint Ops
Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. III.

I. Information (as a Joint Function)

All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features
and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning
and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that
drive behavior and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of
military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede
this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities
ultimately affects strategic outcomes.
The information function encompasses the management and application of
information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or
maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors
and to support human and automated decision making. The information function
helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of
e
information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations.
This function provides JFCs the ability to integrate the generation and preserva-
tion of friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of
pl
military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the end state.
See p. 2-6 for discussion of information as related to the seven joint functions.

The instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and eco-

m

nomic) provide leaders in the US with the means and ways of dealing with crises
around the world. Employing these means in the information environment requires
the ability to securely transmit, receive, store, and process information in near real
Sa

time. The nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the signifi-
cance of this new technology, and will use information-related capabilities (IRCs) to
gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more tradi-
tional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments.
Regardless of its mission, the joint force considers the likely impact of all operations
on relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior. The JFC then
plans and conducts every operation in ways that create desired effects that include
maintaining or inducing relevant actor behaviors. These ways may include the timing,
duration, scope, scale, and even visibility of an operation; the deliberately planned
presence, posture, or profile of assigned or attached forces in an area; the use of sig-
nature management in deception operations; the conduct of activities and operations
to similarly impact behavioral drivers; and the employment of specialized capabilities
-- e.g., information-related capabilities (IRCs) -- to reinforce the JFC’s efforts.
Inform activities involve the release of accurate information to domestic and inter-
national audiences to put joint operations in context; facilitate informed perceptions
about military operations; and counter adversarial misinformation, disinformation,
and propaganda. Inform activities help to assure the trust and confidence of the US
population, allies, and partners and to deter and dissuade adversaries and enemies.
The joint force attacks and exploits information, information networks, and sys-
tems to affect the ability of relevant actors to leverage information in support of their
own objectives. This includes the manipulation, modification, or destruction of infor-
mation or disruption of the flow of information for the purpose of gaining a position of
military advantage. This also includes targeting the credibility of information.
(Joint IO) I. Information (as a Joint Function) 2-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

II. Information Function Activities

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. III-17 to III-22.

The information function includes activities that facilitate the JFC’s understanding of the
role of information in the OE, facilitate the JFC’s ability to leverage information to affect
Information
in Joint Ops

behavior, and support human and automated decision making.

A. Understand Information in the Operational

Environment (OE)
In conjunction with activities under the intelligence joint function, this activity facilitates
the JFC’s understanding of the pervasive nature of information in the OE, its impact on
relevant actors, and its effect on military operations. It includes determining relevant actor
perceptions, attitudes, and decision-making processes and requires an appreciation of
their culture, history, and narratives, as well as knowledge of the means, context, and
established patterns of their communication.
Information affects the perceptions and attitudes that drive the behavior and decision
making of humans and automated systems. In order to affect behavior, the JFC must
understand the perceptions, attitudes, and decision-making processes of humans and
automated systems. These processes reflect the aggregate of social, cultural, and techni-
cal attributes that act upon and impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views,
and actions.
e
The human and automated systems whose behavior the JFC wants to affect are referred
to as relevant actors. Relevant actors may include any individuals, groups, and popula-
pl
tions, or any automated systems, the behavior of which has the potential to substantially
help or hinder the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action. For the
purpose of military activities intended to inform audiences, relevant actors may include
US audiences; however, US audiences are not considered targets for influence.
m

See pp. 1-6 to 1-7 for related discussion of the operational environment (OE).

Language, Regional, and Cultural Expertise

Sa

Language skills, regional knowledge, and cultural awareness enable effective joint
operations. Deployed joint forces should understand and effectively communicate with
HN populations; local and national government officials; multinational partners; national,
regional, and international media; and other key stakeholders, including NGOs. This ca-
pability includes knowledge about the human aspects of the OE and the skills associated
with communicating with foreign audiences. Knowledge about the human aspects of the
OE is derived from the analysis of national, regional, and local culture, economy, politics,
religion, and customs. Consequently, commanders should integrate training and capabili-
ties for foreign language and regional expertise in contingency, campaign, and supporting
plans and provide for them in support of daily operations and activities. Commanders
should place particular emphasis on foreign language proficiency in technical areas iden-
tified as key to mission accomplishment.
For specific planning guidance and procedures regarding language and regional
expertise, refer to CJCSI 3126.01, Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC)
Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing.

2-2 (Joint IO) I. Information (as a Joint Function)

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

B. Leverage Information to Affect Behavior

Tasks aligned under this activity apply the JFC’s understanding of the impact information
has on perceptions, attitudes, and decision-making processes to affect the behaviors of
relevant actors in ways favorable to joint force objectives.
Influence Relevant Actors

Information
in Joint Ops
Regardless of its mission, the joint force considers the likely impact of all operations on
relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior. The JFC then plans
and conducts every operation in ways that create desired effects that include maintain-
ing or inducing relevant actor behaviors. These ways may include the timing, duration,
scope, scale, and even visibility of an operation; the deliberately planned presence, pos-
ture, or profile of assigned or attached forces in an area; the use of signature manage-
ment in deception operations; the conduct of activities and operations to similarly impact
behavioral drivers; and the employment of specialized capabilities (e.g., KLE, CO, mili-
tary information support operations [MISO], EW, CA) to reinforce the JFC’s efforts. Since
some relevant actors will be located outside of the JFC’s OA, coordination, planning, and
synchronization of activities with other commands or mission partners is vital.

Inform Domestic, International, and Internal Audiences

Inform activities involve the release of accurate information to domestic and international
audiences to put joint operations in context; facilitate informed perceptions about military
operations; and counter adversarial misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda.
e
Inform activities help to assure the trust and confidence of the US population, allies, and
partners and to deter and dissuade adversaries and enemies.
pl
Attack & Exploit Information, Information Networks, & Systems
The joint force attacks and exploits information, information networks, and systems to
affect the ability of relevant actors to leverage information in support of their own objec-
tives. This includes the manipulation, modification, or destruction of information or disrup-
m

tion of the flow of information for the purpose of gaining a position of military advantage.
This also includes targeting the credibility of information.

C. Support Human & Automated Decision Making

Sa

The management aspect of the information joint function includes activities that facilitate
shared understanding across the joint force and that protect friendly information, informa-
tion networks, and systems to ensure the availability of timely, accurate, and relevant
information necessary for JFC decision making.
Facilitating Shared Understanding
Facilitating shared understanding is related to building shared understanding in the C2
joint function. Where building shared understanding is an element of C2 and focuses on
purpose (i.e., the commander’s objective), facilitating shared understanding is concerned
with process (i.e., the methods). Key components of facilitating understanding are col-
laboration, KS, and IM.

Protecting Friendly Information

Information Networks, and Systems. The information function reinforces the protection
function and focuses on protecting friendly information, information networks, and systems.
This aspect of the information function includes the preservation of friendly information
across the staff and the joint force and any information shared with allies and partners.
These activities reinforce the requirement to assure the flow of information important to the
joint force, both by protecting the information and by assessing and mitigating risks to that
information. The preservation of information includes both passive and active measures
to prevent and mitigate adversary collection, manipulation, and destruction of friendly
information, to include attempts to undermine the credibility of friendly information.

(Joint IO) I. Information (as a Joint Function) 2-3

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 2
II. Joint Information
Operations (JP 3-13)

Information
in Joint Ops
Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, Information Operations (Nov ‘14), chap. I & exec. summary.

The instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic)

provide leaders in the US with the means and ways of dealing with crises around the
world. Employing these means in the information environment requires the ability
to securely transmit, receive, store, and process information in near real time. The
nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of
this new technology, and will use information-related capabilities (IRCs) to gain
advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more traditional
military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments. As the
strategic environment continues to change, so does information operations (IO).
Based on these changes, the Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the in-
tegrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other
lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making
of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.
Joint force commanders (JFCs) may establish an IO staff to provide command-level
e
oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates and supporting organizations on
all aspects of IO. Most combatant commands (CCMDs) include an IO staff to serve
as the focal point for IO. Faced with an ongoing or emerging crisis within a geograph-
pl
ic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) area of responsibility, a JFC can establish an IO
cell to provide additional expertise and coordination across the staff and interagency.
IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but rather the use of those
m
capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect. There are many
military capabilities that contribute to IO and should be taken into consideration dur-
ing the planning process. These include: strategic communication, joint interagency
coordination group, public affairs, civil-military operations, cyberspace operations
Sa

(CO), information assurance, space operations, military information support opera-

tions (MISO), intelligence, military deception, operations security, special technical
operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key leader engagement.
The Information and Influence Relational Framework and
the Application of Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)
IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of
the information environment. The joint force (means) employs IRCs (ways) to affect the
information provided to or disseminated from the target audience (TA) in the physical
and informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making.
The change in the TA conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in some
cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed decisions, contributes to
the desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed
for future operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabili-
ties such as operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA), counterdecep-
tion, physical security, electronic warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection.
These capabilities are critical to enabling and protecting the JFC’s C2 of forces.
The relational framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization
of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of TAs to create a
desired effect to support achievement of an objective.
See following pages for further discussion of the relational framework and the IRCs.

(Joint IO) II. Joint Information Operations 2-7

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 2
III. Integrating / Coord-
inating Functions of IO

Information
in Joint Ops
Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, Information Operations (Nov ‘14), chap. II.
This section addresses how the integrating and coordinating functions of IO help
achieve a JFC’s objectives. Through the integrated application of IRCs, the relation-
ships that exist between IO and the various IRCs should be understood in order to
achieve an objective.

I. Information Operations and the

Information-Influence Relational Framework
Influence is at the heart of diplomacy and military operations, with integration of IRCs
providing a powerful means for influence. The relational framework describes the
application, integration, and synchronization of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt,
or usurp the decision making of TAs to create a desired effect to support achieve-
ment of an objective. Using this description, the following example illustrates how
IRCs can be employed to create a specific effect against an adversary or potential
adversary.
e
Notional Information Operations Cell
pl
Targeting
Cell J-2 Counterintelligence
OPSEC
m

MILDEC Civil-Military
J-2T Rep J-2 Rep
Operations
OPSEC Rep J-2X Rep
MISO
J-9 Rep
Sa

MILDEC Rep J-4

MIS Rep J-4 Rep
JCEWS/EWC
J-5
EW Rep IO Cell Chief J-5 Rep
STO
STO Rep
J-39
J-6 Rep J-6
Cyberspace Rep IO Cell J-7 Rep
Cyberspace
Operations J-7
SOF Rep
JIACG Rep
Physical Security
Special Ops Rep PA Rep
Task Force JIACG
Joint Fires Legal
Rep Component
MNF Rep
Liaison
Physical Security Reps Officers PA

Joint Fires Legal

Element MNF Services

Ref: JP 3-13 (with change 1), Information Operations, fig. II-3, p. II-6.

(Joint IO) III. Integrating/Coordinating IO Functions 2-11

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

III. IO Phasing and Synchronization

Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, Information Operations (Nov ‘14), fig. IV-1, p. IV-3.
Through its contributions to the GCC’s TCP, it is clear that joint IO is expected to play a
major role in all phases of joint operations. This means that the GCC’s IO staff and IO

Information
cell must account for logical transitions from phase to phase, as joint IO moves from

in Joint Ops
the main effort to a supporting effort.
Shape
Joint IO planning should focus on supporting the TCP to deter adversaries and po-
tential adversaries from posing significant threats to US objectives. Joint IO planners
should access the JIACG through the IO cell or staff. Joint IO planning during this
phase will need to prioritize and integrate efforts and resources to support activities
throughout the interagency. Due to competing resources and the potential lack of
available IRCs, executing joint IO during phase 0 can be challenging. For this reason,
the IO staff and IO cell will need to consider how their IO activities fit in as part of a
whole-of-government approach to effectively shape the information environment to
achieve the CCDR’s information objectives.
Deter
During this phase, joint IO is often the main effort for the CCMD. Planning will likely
emphasize the JFC’s flexible deterrent options (FDOs), complementing US public
diplomacy efforts, in order to influence a potential foreign adversary decision maker
e
to make decisions favorable to US goals and objectives. Joint IO planning for this
phase is especially complicated because the FDO typically must have a chance to
work, while still allowing for a smooth transition to phase II and more intense levels of
pl
conflict, if it does not. Because the transition from phase I to phase II may not allow
enough time for application of IRCs to create the desired effects on an adversary or
potential adversary, the phase change may be abrupt.
m

Seize Initiative
In phase II, joint IO is supporting multiple lines of operation. Joint IO planning during
phase II should focus on maximizing synchronized IRC effects to support the JFC’s
objectives and the component missions while preparing the transition to the next phase.
Sa

Dominate
Joint IO can be a supporting and/or a supported line of operation during phase III.
Joint IO planning during phase III will involve developing an information advantage
across multiple lines of operation to execute the mission.
Stabilize
CMO, or even IO, is likely the supported line of operation during phase IV. Joint IO
planning during this phase will need to be flexible enough to simultaneously support
CMO and combat operations. As the US military and interagency information activity
capacity matures and eventually slows, the JFC should assist the host-nation security
forces and government information capacity to resume and expand, as necessary. As
host nation information capacity improves, the JFC should be able to refocus joint IO
efforts to other mission areas. Expanding host-nation capacity through military and
interagency efforts will help foster success in the next phase.
Enable Civil Authority
During this phase, joint IO planning focuses on supporting the redeployment of US
forces, as well as providing continued support to stability operations. IO planning during
phase V should account for interagency and country team efforts to resume the lead
mission for information within the host nation territory. The IO staff and cell can anticipate
the possibility of long term US commercial and government support to the former adver-
sary’s economic and political interests to continue through the completion of this phase.

(Joint IO) V. IO Planning Considerations 2-21

 in Joint Ops
Information

Information Operations Planning within the Joint Operation Planning Process

Input Planning Step IO Cell Functions and Outputs
 Convene the IO Cell
 HHQ WARNORD, PLANORD, FRAGORD, OR JSCP Step 1: Planning Initiation  Review Strategic Guidance Documents
 Identify Level of Planning Detail Required (Level 1, 2, 3, 4)
 Submit RFIs (As Required)

 Monitor Situation

 HHQ WARNORD, PLANORD, FRAGORD, OR JSCP Step 2: Mission Analysis  IO Mission Statement  Initial IO-Related Recommended
 COG/CV Analysis  IO Tasks CCIRs
 JIPOE and CIO  IO Assumptions  IO Staff Estimate Commenced
SecDef IPR-A
 Commander’s Intelligence Estimate  IO Constraints/Restraints  Submit Recommended CDR’s IO
1 (Approved Mission)  Initial IO Shortfalls Identified Planning Guidance
 Initial IO Risks Identified

CDR Issues Planning Guidance

 
COG/CV Products IO Concept of Support  Refined CCIRs
Step 3: COA Development
 Mission Analysis Products  IO effects
 Additional IO-Related Shortfalls
 IO-Related CDR’s Planning Guidance  IO tasks
(As Required)
 Intel Support  MOEs  IO Staff Estimate Continues

  Target development and prioritization

Updated IPB and CIO
SecDef IPR-C  IO synchronization inputs
Sa
2 (Approved Concept)  IO concept of operations

 narrative/sketch
 Identify required supplemental ROE

 CDR’s Wargaming Guidance

m
Step 4: COA Analysis and War Gaming  IO Concept of Support Refined (As Required)  IO Staff Estimate

2-22 (Joint IO) V. IO Planning Considerations

 IO Concept of Support  IO effects, tasks, moes refined Continues
1). An overview of the seven steps of JOPP follows:

 IO Synchronization Matrix  IO synchronization matrix inputs refined

 Target Nominations  Targets refined

 IO-related risks refined

 IO-related decision points refined

 Advantages & Disadvantages of IO Concept of Support

 IO Concept of Support Step 5: COA Comparison  IO Staff Estimate Continues
 CDR’s Governing Factors
 Recommended COA to J-3/JPG
COA Brief Presented to CDR  Submit IO-Related COA Approval Brief Inputs to JPG
pl

IO Intelligence Integration/JIPOE Continuous

Information Operations Planning

  CDR Approve COA

IO Staff Estimate Step 6: COA Approval
 IO Inputs for COA Approval Briefing (As Required)
e  IO Cell Inputs to CDR’s Estimate
(Within the Seven Steps of the JPP*)

  Appendix-3 to Annex-C
CDR’s Approved COA w/Corresponding IO Concept
 JPG Guidance Step 7: Plan or Order Development  Staff Coordination
Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, Information Operations (Nov ‘14), fig. IV-1, p. IV-3.

Type of order to be developed  Back-briefs from Component IO Cells, Rehearsals, etc.


FRAGORD, matrix, graphic, etc. 3 SecDef IPR-F  Maintain Up-To-Date IO Estimate

(Approved Plan)

Legend (Part 1 of 2)
(Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Throughout JOPP, IRCs are integrated with the JFC’s overall CONOPS (see Figure IV-

Typical time when warning orders are issued to subordinates (may vary as directed by CDR)
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Step 1 - Planning Initiation

Integration of IRCs into joint operations should begin at step 1, planning initiation. Key IO
staff actions during this step include the following:

Continued on next page

a. Review key strategic documents
b. Monitor the situation, receive initial planning guidance, and review staff estimates

Information
in Joint Ops
from applicable operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs).
c. Alert subordinate and supporting commanders of potential tasking with regard to IO
planning support.
d. Gauge initial scope of IO required for the operation.
e. Identify location, standard operating procedures, and battle rhythm of other staff
organizations that require integration and divide coordination responsibilities among
the IO staff.
f. Identify and request appropriate authorities.
g. Begin identifying information required for mission analysis and course of action
(COA) development.
h. Identify IO planning support requirements (including staff augmentation, support
products, and services) and issue requests for support according to procedures
established locally and by various supporting organizations.
i. Validate, initiate, and revise PIRs and RFIs, keeping in mind the long lead times
e
associated with satisfying IO requirements.
j. Provide IO input and recommendations to COAs, and provide resolutions to con-
pl
flicts that exist with other plans or lines of operation.
k. In coordination with the targeting cell, submit potential candidate targets to JFC or
component joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). For vetting, validation, and
deconfliction follow local targeting cell procedures because these three separate
m

processes do not always occur at the JTCB. Integrating Information-Related Capa-

bilities Into the Joint Operation Planning Process
l. Ensure IO staff and IO cell members participate in all JFC or component planning
Sa

and targeting sessions and JTCBs.

Step 2 - Mission Analysis

The purpose of step 2, mission analysis, is to understand the problem and purpose of an
operation and issue the appropriate guidance to drive the remaining steps of the planning
process. The end state of mission analysis is a clearly defined mission and thorough
staff assessment of the joint operation. Mission analysis orients the JFC and staff on the
problem and develops a common understanding, before moving forward in the planning
process. During mission analysis, all staff sections, including the IO cell, will examine the
mission from their own functional perspective and contribute the results of that analysis
to the JPG. As IO impacts each element of the operational environment, it is important
Continued on next page

for the IO staff and IO cell during mission analysis to remain focused on the information
environment. Key IO staff actions during mission analysis are:
a. Assist the J-3 and J-2 in the identification of friendly and adversary center(s) of
gravity and critical factors (e.g., critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical
vulnerabilities).
b. Identify relevant aspects of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions
(whether friendly, neutral, adversary, or potential adversary) of the information
environment.
c. Identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.
d. Identify facts, assumptions, constraints, and restraints affecting IO planning.

(Joint IO) V. IO Planning Considerations 2-23

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
Information-Related
Capabilities (IRCs)
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 1-2 to 1-6 and ATP 3-13.1, The
Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. 3.
IO brings together information-related capabilities (IRCs) at a specific time and in
a coherent fashion to create effects in and through the information environment
that advance the ability to deliver operational advantage to the commander. While
IRCs create individual effects, IO stresses aggregate and synchronized effects as
essential to achieving operational objectives.

Info-Related
Capabilities
An information-related capability (IRC) is a tool, technique, or activity employed
within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects
and operationally desirable conditions (JP 1-02). The formal definition of IRCs en-
courages commanders and staffs to employ all available resources when seeking to
affect the information environment to operational advantage. For example, if artillery
fires are employed to destroy communications infrastructure that enables enemy de-
cision making, then artillery is an IRC in this instance. In daily practice, however, the
term IRC tends to refer to those tools, techniques, or activities that are inherently
e
information-based or primarily focused on affecting the information environment.

IRC’s include—
pl
• Public affairs
• Civil affairs operations
• Military deception
m

• Military information support operations (MISO)

• Operations security (OPSEC)
• Cyberspace electromagnetic activities
Sa

• Electronic warfare
• Cyberspace operations
• Space operations
• Soldier and leader engagement (SLE), to include police engagement
• Combat camera
• Special technical operations
All unit operations, activities, and actions affect the information environment. Even
if they primarily affect the physical dimension, they nonetheless also affect the infor-
mational and cognitive dimensions. For this reason, whether or not they are routinely
considered an IRC, a wide variety of unit functions and activities can be adapted for
the purposes of conducting information operations or serve as enablers to its plan-
ning, execution, and assessment. Some of these include, but are not limited to:
• Commander’s communications strategy or communication synchronization.
• Presence, profile, and posture
• Foreign disclosure
• Physical security
• Physical maneuver
• Special access programs
• Civil military operations
• Intelligence
• Destruction and lethal actions
(IRCs) Information-Related Capabilities 3-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

II. Overview of IRCs (INFO1 SMARTbook)

The INFO1 SMARTbook discusses the following IRCs in greater detail:

Public Affairs See pp. 3-5 to 3-16.

Army public affairs is communication activities with external and internal audiences (JP
3-61). Public affairs operations help to establish conditions that lead to confidence in
the Army and its readiness to conduct unified land operations.

Civil Affairs & Civil-Military Operations See pp. 3-17 to 3-26.

Civil affairs operations encompass actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil
affairs forces. Civil-military operations are activities of a commander performed by des-
ignated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions.
Info-Related
Capabilities

Military Deception (MILDEC) See pp. 3-27 to 3-32.

Military deception (MILDEC) involves actions executed to deliberately mislead adver-
sary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers. The intent
of MILDEC is to feed information that deliberately misleads the enemy decision mak-
ers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations and lead the enemy to
take actions (or inactions) that contribute to accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO) See p. 3-33.

e
Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives,
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
pl
groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives (JP 3-13.2).

Operations Security (OPSEC) See pp. 3-39 to 3-44.

Operations security is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indi-
m

cators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates coun-
termeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities (JP 3-13.3).

Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) See p. 3-45.

Sa

Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating, and

synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations in support of unified land
operations (ADRP 3-0).

Cyberspace Operations (CO) See pp. 3-47 to 3-54.

Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the
primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0).

Electronic Warfare (EW) See pp. 3-55 to 3-60.

Electronic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed
energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1).

Space Operations See pp. 3-61 to 3-70.

Space operations are operations that occur in the space domain and seek to gain
superiority over enemies and adversaries in the space domain and its corresponding
environment.

Additional IRCs See pp. 3-71 to 3-74.

Additional IRCs discussed include integrated joint special technical operations
(IJSTO); special access programs (SAP); personnel recovery (PR); physical attack;
physical security; presence, profile, and posture (PPP); soldier and leader engagement
(SLE); police engagement; and social media.

3-4 (IRCs) Information-Related Capabilities

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
I. Public
Affairs (PA)
Ref: JP 3-61 (w/Chg 1), Public Affairs (Aug ‘16) and FM 3-61, Public Affairs Operations
(Apr ‘14).

Public affairs (PA) doctrine and principles apply across the range of military opera-
tions. PA is a command responsibility and should not be delegated or subordinated
to any other staff function below the command group. The public should perceive
information communicated by PA as accurate.

Info-Related
Capabilities
Public Affairs Guidance (PAG)
Public affairs guidance (PAG) supports the public discussion of defense
issues and operations and serves as a source document when responding to
media representatives and the public. PAG also outlines planning guidance
for related public affairs responsibilities, functions, activities, and resources.
The development and timely dissemination of PAG ensures that all information
is in consonance with policy when responding to the information demands of
joint operations. PAG also conforms to operations security and the privacy
e
requirements of the members of the joint forces.
pl
The US military has an obligation to communicate with its members and the US
public, and it is in the national interest to communicate with international publics. The
proactive release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences
puts joint operations in context, facilitates informed perceptions about military opera-
m

tions, undermines adversarial propaganda, and helps achieve national, strategic,

and operational objectives.
Over the past two decades, there have been dramatic changes in the information en-
Sa

vironment. Notably, traditional media is no longer the only voice influencing key pub-
lics. The abundance of information sources, coupled with technology such as smart
phones, digital cameras, video chat, and social media enterprises, allows information
to move instantaneously around the globe. As such, it is imperative for PA personnel
to rapidly develop themes and messages to ensure that facts, data, events, and utter-
ances are put in context. Coordination and synchronization of themes and messages
take place to ensure unity of effort throughout the information environment.
These tools provide the US military the ability to reach various audiences without
mass media, as well as create the opportunity to join the conversation (as opposed
to simply delivering a message) with an audience. Two-way conversation permits
greater transparency and clarity. Joint operations will be supported by tailored
communication that addresses friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences. Often,
these audiences want to both listen to and be heard by US forces. PA personnel will
focus their communication efforts to a given public or publics. The speed of modern
communications and the disparity of multiple audiences increase the importance of
quickly and agilely synchronizing communication.
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of the press, but within the Department of
Defense (DOD) this right must be balanced against the military mission that requires
operations security (OPSEC) at all levels of command to protect the lives of US or
multinational forces and the security of ongoing or future operations. These compet-
ing goals sometimes lead to friction between the media and the military. The Privacy
Act of 1974 prevents the release of certain personal information to the media, but

(IRCs) I. Public Affairs 3-5

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

does not forbid individuals from releasing information about themselves in social
media. In addition, stringent restrictions exist for protecting personally identifiable
information, and there are strict reporting requirements if personally identifiable
information is released, even inadvertently.
The tempo of military operations, OPSEC concerns, and the number and variety of
other information sources competing for the attention of the populace complicate the
joint force commanders’ (JFCs’) ability to provide information to diverse publics at
the same pace as the media and other sources. The ability of anyone with Internet
access to share information and provide graphic visuals without validating facts as
an event unfolds further complicates the military’s effort to accurately inform the me-
dia and populace. JFCs and public affairs officers (PAOs) should evaluate missions
to identify public information and visual information (VI) requirements, as well as the
means to acquire and move those products in a timely manner. PA planning should
include considerations to reduce the time lag between an event and when informa-
Info-Related
Capabilities

tion about it, if any, can be shared.

The public can get information about the military and its operations from official
DOD and unofficial sources (e.g., information disseminated by Service members,
distributed by the public, the media, or by groups hostile to US interests). Regardless
of the source, intention, or method of distribution, information in the public domain
either contributes to or undermines the achievement of operational objectives. Offi-
cial information can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the
advancement of national interests and policies and mitigate any adverse effects from
unofficial, misinformed, or hostile sources.
e
PA is a command responsibility. Official communication with US and international au-
diences will have a significant impact on the operational environment (OE). Effective
pl
PA is a key enabler for the commander to build and maintain essential relationships.
Public support for the US military’s presence or operations is likely to vary. The PAO,
in conjunction with others on the staff, must be able to quickly and accurately assess
the information environment to provide valuable guidance and courses of action
m

(COAs) to the commander. Such assessments enable the commander to better

inform relevant audiences about ongoing operations and engender their support.

I. Public Affairs and the Operational

Sa

Environment (OE)
Information in the public domain affects the OE and influences operations. Com-
manders should carefully evaluate how various friendly, enemy, adversary, and
neutral actions, images, and words impact planned and ongoing operations. PA un-
derstands that various audiences have differing information needs and works closely
with other information providers to ensure consistency of messaging and accuracy
of content. By conveying the facts about joint force activities in a proactive manner,
PA helps the JFC to impact the information environment, particularly as it relates to
public support. The joint force must coordinate all of its messages; further, it must
integrate those messages with its partner nations’ message as part of the ongoing
alignment to maintain unity of effort and stand out in a saturated information environ-
ment. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations,
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
For additional discussion of the OE, see pp. 1-6 to 1-7. See facing page for a
discussion of public perception.
Effective PA contributes to:

Enhanced Morale and Readiness

PA activities enable military personnel, DOD civilians, and their family members to
better understand their roles by explaining the legitimacy of policies, programs, and
operations affecting them. PA activities can help alleviate uncertainty and concern
3-6 (IRCs) I. Public Affairs
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

V. Narrative, Themes, and Messages

Ref: JP 3-61 (w/Chg 1), Public Affairs (Aug ‘16), pp. I-11 to 1-14

Narrative
A narrative is a short story used to underpin operations and to provide greater under-
standing and context to an operation or situation.
• Narrative in National Security Strategy. The national security narrative is formed
primarily by broad national policies, as articulated in strategic documents like the
National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. More specific national
strategy is developed in National Security Council (NSC) meetings and executed by
the relevant departments. For every military operation, the President or NSC staff
may create the national/strategic narrative to explain events in terms consistent with
national policy.

Info-Related
Capabilities
• Conflicting Narratives. Across areas of responsibility (AORs) and during opera-
tions within a specified operational area, there can be a struggle to define the
prevailing narrative at all levels (internationally, nationally, and within the operational
area) on favorable terms. To gain superiority over the adversary’s narrative, dimin-
ish its appeal and followership, and supplant it or make it irrelevant, the USG needs
to establish the reasons for and desired outcomes of the conflict, in terms under-
standable and acceptable to all relevant publics.

Supporting Themes and Messages

e
Themes are developed by the NSC staff, Department of State (DOS), DOD, and other
USG departments and agencies. JFCs support strategic themes by developing themes
pl
appropriate to their mission and authority. Figure I-3 depicts how United States Forces
Korea established a theater-strategic narrative linked to a long-term campaign plan.
Themes at each level of command should support the themes of the next higher level,
while also supporting USG strategic themes.
m

Operational-level themes are often created for each phase of an operation. Operational
themes are nested with strategic themes and enduring national narratives to mitigate the
risk that phase-by-phase themes appear to give conflicting messages.
Sa

Messages support themes by delivering tailored information to a specific public and can
also be tailored for delivery at a specific time, place, and communication method. While
messages are more dynamic, they must always support the more enduring themes up
and down the chain of command. The more dynamic nature and leeway inherent in mes-
sages provide joint force communicators and planners more agility in reaching publics.
Theater and operational themes should nest within the CCDR’s and USG’s strategic
themes. Theater and operational-level messages must also support themes at their level.
This enables consistent communications to local and international audiences, which sup-
ports strategic objectives.
Sources of information for the national narrative include Presidential speeches and White
House communications ([Link]), Secretary of State speeches and DOS
communications ([Link] and rapid response unit products), Secretary of Defense
speeches and DOD communications ([Link]), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS) speeches and communications ([Link]), and CCDR speeches and
combatant command (CCMD) communications. Sources of information for the joint force
themes should include the mission, commander’s intent, and any other guidance con-
tained within the warning order, planning order, operation order (OPORD), and execute
order (EXORD). This is not an exhaustive list; other official sources providing national
strategic narratives can contribute to a joint force’s narrative. The Defense Press Office
(DPO) can help joint force communications with strategic guidance. The DPO routinely
coordinates DOD communications with the NSC staff and participating USG departments
and agencies.

(IRCs) I. Public Affairs 3-13

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
II. Civil Affairs and Civil-
Military Operations (CMO)
Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Sept ‘13), chap. 1.

I. Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations

In carrying out their civil-military operations (CMO) responsibilities, commanders
use civil affairs operations (CAO). The relationship between CMO and CAO is best
considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchroniza-
tion, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmen-

Info-Related
Capabilities
tal entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. JFCs seek this synergy
by several means, one of the more prominent being through the conduct of CMO
that bring together the activities of joint forces and multinational forces (MNFs) and
nonmilitary organizations to achieve common objectives.

Civil-Military
Unified Operations
Action, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs

Unified Action

e
The synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to
pl
achieve unity of effort
 Takes place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands,
and joint task forces under the direction of these commanders
m

Civil-Military Operations
 The responsibility of a commander
Normally planned by civil affairs personnel, but implemented by all
Sa


elements of the joint force

Civil Affairs
 Conducted by civil affairs forces
 Provides specialized support of civil-military operations
 Applies functional skills normally provided by civil government

Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, fig I-4, p. I-17.

Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation &

Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further
discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP
3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, &
Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP
3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-
Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16),
Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08), and more.

(IRCs) II. Civil Affairs & Civil-Military Operations 3-17

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

III. Civil-Military Operations

and the Levels of War
Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Sept ‘13), pp. I-4 to I-6.

The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objec-
tives and tactical actions. The national strategic objectives facilitate theater strategic
planning. Military strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations (refer to JP
3-0, Joint Operations). CMO are applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical lev-
els of war. Specific actions at one level of war may affect all three levels simultaneously
but with different effects at each level. CMO guidance should therefore include higher
headquarters objectives and end states presented by USG policy and guidance. Individu-
Info-Related

als and units conducting CMO must understand the interrelationships of the levels of war.
Capabilities

Engaged civilian organizations likely will be more concerned with a predetermined

agenda and not distinguish between the various levels of war. NGO or IGO members
who communicate with US forces may report conversations to foreign officials at the
highest level, who may then discuss them directly with the USG officials. Misperceptions
of CMO actions by nonmilitary agencies can cause a commander to be distracted from
the mission. Most civilian agencies are not organized with distinct operational, tactical,
or strategic levels. NGO and IGO representatives collocated with forward-deployed joint
forces often do not have the authority to make decisions that may change their original
mission. As such, it is important that JFCs conducting CMO should understand the civil-
e
ian participant’s organizational and hierarchical relationships as they relate to decision
making. This will help clarify working relationships and reduce friction with all parties
pl
concerned.
CMO are conducted at multiple levels. The effort at each level may be focused on differ-
ent objectives, but the activities should be mutually supporting.
m

A. Strategic
At the strategic level, CMO focus on larger and long-term issues that may be part of
a Department of Defense (DOD) global campaign, or USG reconstruction, economic
development initiatives, and stability operations in failing or recovering nations. CMO
Sa

are a component of a geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater security

cooperation guidance within the theater campaign plan (TCP). As such, the GCC’s TCP
objectives must align with national strategic objectives.

B. Operational
At the operational level, CMO integrate and synchronize interagency, IGO and NGO
activities with joint force operations. Interagency, IGO, and NGO activities generally
support security cooperation and feature programs to build relationships and mitigate the
need for military force. Consequently, CMO focus on immediate or near-term issues such
as health service infrastructure; movement, feeding, and sheltering of dislocated civilians
(DCs); police and security programs; promoting government legitimacy; and coordination
for CMO support to tactical commanders.
Joint force planners and interagency partners should identify civil-military objectives early
in the planning process. CMO are integrated into plans and operations through inter-
agency coordination, multinational partnerships, and coordination with IGOs and NGOs.
Coordination of CMO for current and future operations is conducted at the operational
level. Information is valuable to interorganizational coordination, to efficiently and effec-
tively marshall and distribute resources (to include funding), and to assess success in an
OE where success may not be measured by traditional operational indicators. Informa-
tion management (IM) enables CMO for operational commanders and facilitates the
required interorganizational coordination necessary.

3-20 (IRCs) II. Civil Affairs & Civil-Military Operations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

C. Tactical
Often, a civil-military team or civil-military operations center (CMOC) may facilitate
tactical-level CMO among the military, the local populace, NGOs, and IGOs. Com-
manders derive tactical-level CMO from the core tasks of support to civil administration
(SCA), populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA),
nation assistance (NA), and CIM. Tactical-level CMO normally are more sharply focused
and have more immediate effects. Often, a civilian-military team or CMOC will facilitate
these actions between the military, the local populace, and NGOs/IGOs. During certain
contingency operations, the Secretary of State and SecDef will integrate stabilization and
reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans and will develop a gen-
eral framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military
operations at all levels where appropriate. The DOS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization

Info-Related
is tasked to implement policy requirements from NSPD-44, Management of Interagency

Capabilities
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. This could provide a framework at
the national strategic level for stabilization and reconstruction planning and coordination.
SecDef, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), provides direction to
combatant commanders (CCDRs) and subordinate JFCs to implement joint operation
planning for the NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruc-
tion and Stabilization, process.
Annex G (Civil Affairs) promulgates CMO requirements in a formal plan or operation
order. CMO require coordination among CA, maneuver, health support, MP, engineer,
transportation, and SOF. CMO involve cross-cutting activities across staff sections and
e
subordinate units. Annex G identifies, consolidates, and deconflicts the activities of the
various sections and units. Planning and coordination at lower echelons require signifi-
pl
cantly more details than discussed in annex G.
Changes in the military or political situation, as well as natural or man-made disasters,
can divert the joint force’s main effort from CMO to combat operations. The JFC should
identify early indicators and warnings of changes in the OE and allocate resources to
m

monitor these changes in order to anticipate changes in force requirements. Branch and
sequel planning and preventive action may mitigate disruption of CMO. Possible Escala-
tion Indicators include:
Sa

• Political activities and movements

• Food or water shortages
• Outbreaks of disease
• Military setbacks
• Natural disasters
• Crop failures
• Fuel shortages
• Onset of seasonal changes (winter may exacerbate fuel and food shortages, for
example)
• Police force and corrections system deterioration
• Judicial system shortcomings
• Insurgent attacks
• Sharp rise in crime
• Terrorist bombing
• Disruption of public utilities, e.g., water, power, sewage, and economic strife due to
socioeconomic imbalance
• Increase in local government corruption

(IRCs) II. Civil Affairs & Civil-Military Operations 3-21

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
III. Military
Deception (MILDEC)
Ref: FM 6-0 (C2), Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (Apr ‘16), chap. 11.

This section provides information on military deception. Initially this section ad-
dresses the principles of military deception. It then discusses how commanders use
military deception to shape the area of operations in support of decisive action. The
section concludes with a discussion of how to plan, prepare, execute, and assess
military deception.

Info-Related
Capabilities
I. Military Deception Process and Capability
Modern military deception is both a process and a capability. As a process, military
deception is a methodical, information-based strategy that systematically, deliberate-
ly, and cognitively targets individual decisionmakers. The objective is the purposeful
manipulation of decisionmaking. As a capability, military deception is useful to a
commander when integrated early in the planning process as a component of the
operation focused on causing an enemy to act or react in a desired manner.

e
Refer to JP 3-13 for a discussion in information operations and JP 3-13.4 for a more
detailed discussion on military deception.

II. Principles of Military Deception

pl
Military deception is applicable during any phase of military operations in order to
create conditions to accomplish the commander’s intent. The Army echelon that
plans a military deception often determines its type. The levels of war define and
m

clarify the relationship between strategic and tactical actions. The levels have no
finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific levels of responsibility and mili-
tary deception planning. They help organize thought and approaches to a problem.
Sa

Decisions at one level always affect other levels. Common to all levels of military
deception is a set of guiding principles:
• Focus on the target
• Motivating the target to act
• Centralized planning and control
• Security
• Conforming to the time available
• Integration

Focus on the Target

Leaders determine which targeted decisionmaker has the authority to make the de-
sired decision and then can act or fail to act upon that decision. Many times it is one,
key individual, or it could be a network of decisionmakers who rely on each other for
different aspects of their mission or operation.

Motivating the Target to Act

Leaders determine what motivates the targeted decisionmaker and which informa-
tion-related capabilities are capable of inducing the targeted decisionmaker to think a
certain way. The desired result is that the targeted decisionmaker acts or fails to act
as intended. This result is favorable to friendly forces. Often, the military objective is

(IRCs) III. Military Deception 3-27

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

III. Military Deception in Support of Operations

Ref: FM 6-0 (C2), Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (Apr ‘16), pp. 11-2 to 11-4.

Military deception often relies on the basic understanding that the complexities and un-
certainties of combat make decisionmakers susceptible to deception. The basic mecha-
nism for any deception is either to increase or decrease the level of uncertainty, or ambi-
guity, in the mind of the deception target (or targeted decisionmaker). Military deception
and deception in support of operations security present false or misleading information to
the targeted decisionmaker with the deliberate intent to manipulate uncertainty. The aim
of deception is to either increase or decrease the targeted decisionmaker’s ambiguity in
order to manipulate the target to perceive friendly motives, intentions, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities erroneously and thereby alter the target’s perception of reality.
Info-Related
Capabilities

Ambiguity-Decreasing Deception
Ambiguity-decreasing deception reduces uncertainty and normally confirms the enemy
decisionmaker’s preconceived beliefs, so the decisionmaker becomes very certain about
the selected course of action (COA). This type of deception presents false information
that shapes the enemy decisionmaker’s thinking, so the enemy makes and executes a
specific decision that can be exploited by friendly forces. By making the wrong decision,
which is the deception objective, the enemy could misemploy forces and provide friendly
forces an operational advantage. For example, ambiguity-decreasing deceptions can
present supporting elements of information concerning a specific enemy’s COA. These
e
deceptions are complex to plan and execute, but the potential rewards are often worth
the increased effort and resources.
pl
Ambiguity-Increasing Deception
Ambiguity-increasing deception presents false information aimed to confuse the enemy
decisionmaker, thereby increasing the decisionmaker’s uncertainty. This confusion can
m
produce different results. Ambiguity-increasing deceptions can challenge the enemy’s
preconceived beliefs. These deceptions draw enemy attention from one set of activi-
ties to another, create the illusion of strength where weakness exists, create the illusion
of weakness where strength exists, and accustom the enemy to particular patterns of
Sa

activity that are exploitable at a later time. For example, ambiguity-increasing deceptions
can cause the target to delay a decision until it is too late to prevent friendly mission suc-
cess. They can place the target in a dilemma for which there is no acceptable solution.
They may even prevent the target from taking any action at all. Deceptions in support of
operations security (OPSEC) are typically executed as this type of deception.

Tactical Deception
Most often, Army commanders will be faced with deciding when and where to employ
military deception in support of tactical operations. The intent of tactical deception is to
induce the enemy decisionmakers to act in a manner prejudicial to their interests. This
is accomplished by either increasing or decreasing the ambiguity of the enemy decision-
maker through the manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence. Military deception
undertaken at the tactical level supports engagements, battles, and stability tasks. This
focus is what differentiates tactical deception from other forms of military deception.
Refer to JP 3-13.4 for more information on military deception.

Strategic and Operational Military Deception

Less frequently, Army commanders will employ strategic and operational military decep-
tion to influence enemy strategic decisionmakers’ abilities to successfully oppose U.S.
national interests and goals or to influence enemy decisionmakers’ abilities to conduct
operations. These deceptions are joint or multinational efforts. In these cases, Army

3-28 (IRCs) III. Military Deception

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
IV. Military Information
Support Operations (MISO)
Ref: JP 3-13.2 (w/Chg 1), Military Information Support Operations (Dec ‘11).

Today’s global information environment is complex, rapidly changing, and requires

integrated and synchronized application of the instruments of national power to
ensure responsiveness to national goals and objectives. In the current operational
environment, effective influence is gained by unity of effort in what we say and do,
and how well we understand the conditions, target audiences (TAs), and operational

Info-Related
Capabilities
environment. Within the military and informational instruments of national power,
the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States
Government (USG) communications strategy. To be effective, all DOD communica-
tions efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG
activities.
Military information support operations (MISO) play an important role in DOD
communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically
designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned opera-
tions to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
e
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the
pl
originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a delib-
erate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environ-
ment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned
messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce
m
observable, measurable behavioral responses.
The employment of MIS units is governed by explicit legal authorities that direct and
determine how their capability is utilized. This legal foundation establishes MISO as
a communications means and allows their integration with those strategies that ap-
Sa

ply the instruments of national power. Leaders and planners interpret relevant laws
and policies to conduct MISO in any situation or environment, internationally and
domestically.
Joint MISO support policy and commanders’ objectives from strategic to tactical
levels. Although military leadership and local key communicators are examples of
TA engaged at the operational and tactical levels that are capable of affecting the
accomplishment of a strategic objective.
MISO are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political,
and economic power and resolve. In conflict, MISO as a force multiplier can degrade
the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral
damage, and maximize the local populace’s support for operations.
MISO contribute to the success of both peacetime engagements and major opera-
tions. The combatant commander (CCDR) receives functional and theater stra-
tegic planning guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified
Command Plan (UCP), and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). These
documents are derived from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) National Defense
Strategy, which interprets the President’s national security policy and strategy, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy.

(IRCs) IV. Military Information Support Operations 3-33

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

III. Information Roles & Relationships

Ref: JP 3-13.2 (w/Chg 1), Military Information Support Operations (Dec ‘11), fig. II-1, p. II-9.

Continued on next page

There are a variety of functions and capabilities that help a JFC formulate the
command’s message and communicate with local, international, and US domestic
audiences as part of broader policy and in support of operational objectives. DOD
information activities include IO, MISO, PA (to include visual information), and DSPD.

Dept of Defense Information Activities

INFORMATION PRIMARY FOCUS OF DESIRED
ACTIVITY TASK ACTIVITY PURPOSE OUTCOME

Info-Related
Capabilities
US Government Coordinate Understand Better enable the Create, strengthen,
(USG) Strategic information, and engage USG to engage or preserve
Communication themes, plans, key foreign audiences conditions
(Department of programs, and audiences holistically and with favorable to
State Lead) actions that are unity of effort advance national
synchronized with interests and
other elements of objectives
national power

Department of Use DOD Key Improve the The conduct of

Defense (DOD) operational and audiences alignment of DOD military activities
support to informational actions and and operations in a
Strategic activities and information with shaped
Communication strategic
communication
processes in
support of
e policy objectives environment
pl
Department of
State's broader
public diplomacy
efforts
m
Information Integrate Adversary Influence, disrupt, Optimum
Operations information audiences corrupt, or usurp application of
operations core, adversarial human capability to
supporting, and and automated desired military
related decision making outcome
capabilities as while protecting our
Sa

part of a military own.

plan

Military Influence target Approved Shape, deter, Perceptions,

Information audience foreign motivate, persuade attitudes, and
Support perceptions, audiences to act behavior conducive
Operations attitudes, and to US/multinational
subsequent partner objectives
behavior

Provide truthful, US, allied, Keep the public Maintain credibility

timely, accurate national, informed, counter and legitimacy of
Public Affairs information about international, adversary US/multinational
DOD activities and internal information partner military
Continued on next page

(inform) audiences activities, deter operations with

adversary actions, audience
and maintain trust
and confidence of
US population, and
friends and allies

PA and MISO are separate and unique activities that are governed by policy and
practice in terms of audiences, focus, and scope. SC integrates various instruments
of national power with other activities across the USG to synchronize crucial themes,
messages, images, and actions. SC is policy driven and generally conducted under
DOS lead. DOD SC activities are designed to support the continuity of DOD strategic-
and operational-level messages and activities with overall USG policy and SC themes.

(IRCs) IV. Military Information Support Operations 3-35

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
V. Operations Security
(OPSEC)
Ref: JP 3-13.3, Operations Security (Jan ‘12) and ATP 3-13.3, Army Operations Security
for Division and Below (Jul ‘19).

Joint forces often display personnel, organizations, assets, and actions to public
view and to a variety of adversary intelligence collection activities, including sensors
and systems. Joint forces can be under observation at their peacetime bases and
locations, in training or exercises, while moving, or when deployed to the field con-

Info-Related
Capabilities
ducting actual operations. Frequently, when a force performs a particular activity or
operation a number of times, it establishes a pattern of behavior. Within this pattern,
certain unique, particular, or special types of information might be associated with
an activity or operation. Even though this information may be unclassified, it can ex-
pose significant US military operations to observation and/or interdiction. In addition,
the adversary could compile and correlate enough information to facilitate predicting
and countering US operations.

I. Purpose of Operations Security

e
The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of US and multinational
forces from successful adversary exploitation of critical information. OPSEC ap-
plies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces.
pl
The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect
critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with
military operations and other activities to:
m
• Identify those actions that may be observed by adversary intelligence sys-
tems.
• Determine what specific indications could be collected, analyzed, and inter-
preted to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
Sa

• Select countermeasures that eliminate or reduce vulnerability or indicators

to observation and exploitation.
• Avoid patterns of behavior, whenever feasible, and thus preclude the pos-
sibility of adversary intelligence constructing an accurate model.
• Prevent the display or collection of critical information, especially during
preparation for and execution of actual operations.
• Avoid drastic changes as OPSEC countermeasures are implemented.
Changes in procedures alone will indicate to the adversary that there is an
operation or exercise starting.

An indicator is data derived from friendly detectable actions and open-source

information that adversaries can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or
estimates of critical or classified information concerning friendly intentions, capabili-
ties, or activities. Selected indicators can be developed into an analytical model or
profile of how a force prepares and how it operates. An indication is an observed
specific occurrence or instance of an indicator.
Adversary intelligence personnel continuously analyze and interpret collected
information to validate and/or refine the model. As adversary analysts apply more
information to the analytical model, the likelihood increases that the analytical model
will replicate the observed force. Thus, current and future capabilities and courses of
action (COA) can be revealed and compromised. Critical information consists of
(IRCs) V. Operations Security 3-39
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

V. Operations Security Indicators

Ref: ATP 3-13.3, Army Operations Security for Division and Below (Jul ‘19).

The indicator’s signature is a characteristic that serves to set the indicator apart. A
signature makes the indicator identifiable or causes it to stand out. Uniqueness and
stability are properties of a signature. Uncommon or unique features reduce the ambi-
guity of an indicator.
Association. Association is the process of forming mental connections to an
indicator. It is the key to interpretation. An enemy compares current data with previously
gathered information to identify possible relationships. Continuity of actions, objects, or
other indicators, which register as patterns, provides another association. For example,
the presence of special operations aviation aircraft, such as the MH-6, MH-60, and
Info-Related
Capabilities

MH-47,may be indicators of other special operations forces operating in the area.

Certain items of equipment particular to specific units are indicators of the potential
presence of related equipment. For instance, the sighting of an M-88A2 Hercules
Recovery Vehicle likely indicates the presence of an armored unit equipped with M1A2-
series tanks, as the M-88A2 is rated to recover and tow the M1A2-series tanks. Such
continuity can result from repetitive practices or sequencing instead of from planned
procedures. When detecting some components of symmetrically-arrayed organizations,
the enemy can assume the existence of the rest. As another example, the adversary
would suspect the presence of an entire infantry battalion when intelligence detects the
e
headquarters company and one line company. When evaluated as a whole, the pattern
can be a single indicator, which simplifies the enemy’s analysis.
Profile. A profile is accumulated data that portray the significant features of an
pl
indicator. Profiles are linked to functional activity, which has a profile comprising unique
indicators, patterns, and associations. This profile, in turn, has several sub-profiles for
the functional activities needed to deploy the particular mission aircraft (for example,
m

fuels, avionics, munitions,communications, air traffic control, supply, personnel, and

transportation). If a functional profile does not appear to change from one operation
to the next, it is difficult for an enemy to interpret. However, if it is distinct, the profile
may be the key or only indicator needed to understand the operation. Unique profiles
Sa

reduce the time needed to make accurate situational assessments. They are primary
warning tools because they provide a background for contrasts.
Contrast. Contrast is the change in an indicator’s established profile. The key
to obtaining the contrast of an indicator lies in how it differs from what has been
shown previously. Contrasts are the simplest and most reliable means of detection
because they only need to be recognized, not understood. One question prompts
several additional ones concerning contrasts in profile. The nature of the indicator’s
exposure is an important aspect when seeking profile contrasts. For example, if the
adversary identifies items specific to special operations aviation at an airfield, this will
contrast with what is “normal” at the airfield and will indicate the deployment of special
operations aircraft to the airfield without having actually observed them.
Exposure. Exposure is the condition of being presented to view or made known—the
condition of being unprotected. For an OPSEC indicator, exposure increases according
to the duration, repetition, and timing of its appearance. The exposure of an indicator
often reveals its relative importance and meaning. Limited duration and repetition reduces
detailed observation and associations. An indicator that appears for a short time will
likely fade into the background of insignificant anomalies. An indicator that appears over
a long period of time, however, becomes part of a profile. Indicators exposed repeatedly
present the biggest danger. Operations conducted the same way several times with
little or no variation provide an adversary the information needed to determine where,
when, how, and with what to attack. Repetitive operations cost many lives in wartime.

3-44 (IRCs) V. Operations Security

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
VI(a). Cyberspace
Operations (CO)
Ref: FM 3-12, Cyberspace & Electronic Warfare Operations (Apr ‘17), chap. 1.
Superiority in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) provides a de-
cisive advantage to commanders at all levels in modern combat. The Army’s ability
to exploit cyberspace and EW capabilities will prove critical to the success of unified
land operations. As cyberspace and EW operations develop similar and complemen-
tary capabilities, the Army must plan, integrate, and synchronize these operations
with unified land operations.

Info-Related
Capabilities
Employing cyberspace and EW capabilities under a single planning, integration, and
synchronization methodology increases the operational commander’s ability to un-
derstand the environment, project power, and synchronize multiple operations using
the same domain and environment. Synchronizing offensive and defensive activities
allows a faster response to enemy and adversary actions. The EMS is the common
denominator for both cyberspace and EW operations, and also impacts every opera-
tion in the Army.
The distinctions between cyberspace and EW capabilities allow for each to oper-
e
ate separately and support operations distinctly. However, this also necessitates
synchronizing efforts to avoid unintended interference. Any operational requirement
specific to electronic transfer of information through the wired portion of cyberspace
pl
must use a cyberspace capability for affect. If the portion of cyberspace uses only
the EMS as a transport method, then it is an EW capability that can affect it. Any
operational requirement to affect an EMS capability not connected to cyberspace
must use an EW capability.
m

The Department of Defense information network-Army (DODIN-A) is the Army's

critical warfighting platform, which enables mission command, precision fires, intel-
ligence, logistics, and tele-medicine, and supports all operations. Access to the
Sa

DODIN-A allows commanders to project combat power, conduct support operations,

and achieve joint and Army force commander objectives. Securing and operating
this expansive network is one of the most complex and important operations the
Army currently undertakes. A single vulnerability within this network can place units
and operations at risk, potentially resulting in mission failure. Understanding how to
operationalize cyberspace and the EMS is a fundamental staff proficiency and com-
mander's priority.
Superiority in cyberspace and the EMS to support Army operations results from
effectively synchronizing Department of Defense information network (DODIN)
operations, offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace opera-
tions (DCO), electronic attack, electronic protection, electronic warfare support, and
spectrum management operations (SMO). Cyberspace electromagnetic activities
is the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and elec-
tronic warfare operations in support of unified land operations (ADRP 3-0). Through
CEMA, the Army plans, integrates, and synchronizes these missions, supports and
enables the mission command system, and provides an interrelated capability for
information and intelligence operations.
Cyberspace and the EMS will likely grow increasingly congested, contested, and
critical to successful unified land operations. Success will be measured by the ability
to execute operations freely in cyberspace and the EMS, while controlling the ability
of others to operate in the domain.
See following pages (p. 3-48 to 3-49) for a discussion of the cyberspace domain.

(IRCs) VI(a). Cyberspace Operations 3-47

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

I. The Cyberspace Domain

Ref: FM 3-12, Cyberspace & Electronic Warfare Operations (Apr ‘17), pp. 1-2 to 1-4.

Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the

interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers. The Army performs cyberspace operations and supporting
activities within this domain as part of joint and Army operations. Friendly, enemy, ad-
versary, and host nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone
systems, social media Web sites, and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace.
Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary
purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). The interrelated
Info-Related

cyberspace missions are DODIN operations, DCO, and OCO. A cyberspace capabil-
Capabilities

ity is a device, computer program, or technique, including any combination of software,

firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace.

Cyberspace (Visualization in an Operational Environment)

e
pl
m
Sa

Ref: FM 3-12 (Apr ‘17), fig. 1-1. Visualization of cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum in an operational environment.

3-48 (IRCs) VI(a). Cyberspace Operations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

IV. Army Cyberspace Missions and Actions

Ref: FM 3-12, Cyberspace & Electronic Warfare Operations (Apr ‘17), pp. 1-6 to 1-7.

Cyberspace missions and actions are interrelated; synchronizing and supporting efforts
among the cyberspace missions is imperative to maintaining freedom of maneuver in
cyberspace. Supporting the cyberspace missions are the cyberspace actions: cyber-
space defense; cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); cyber-
space OPE; cyberspace attack; and cyberspace security. Cyberspace actions support
DODIN operations, DCO, OCO, or any combination thereof. Executing cyberspace ac-
tions at any echelon is dependent on authority, capability, and coordination. The actions
are interrelated and a cyberspace mission may require more than one action to achieve
mission success.
Info-Related
Capabilities

Army forces can execute cyberspace missions and actions under the proper authority.
Since DODIN operations and some DCO tasks may overlap, Army forces may conduct
multiple cyberspace missions or actions as part of their daily duties and responsibilities.
Situational requirements may dictate the transition from cyberspace security to DCO
internal defensive measures (DCO-IDM). Figure 1-3 below shows the relationship of the
cyberspace missions and cyberspace actions both external and internal to the DODIN
and the owned, leased, shared partner portions of cyberspace. EW can affect the
cyberspace capabilities that use the EMS.

e
pl
m
Sa

Ref: FM 3-12 (Apr ‘17), 1-3. Cyberspace & EW operations, missions and actions.

Refer to CYBER1: The Cyberspace Operations & Electronic Warfare

SMARTbook (Multi-Domain Guide to Offensive/Defensive CEMA and CO).
Topics and chapters include cyber intro (global threat, contemporary operating
environment,and
Figure 1 -3. Cyberspace information as a jointoperations
electronic warfare function), -joint cyberspace
missions operations
and actions
(CO), cyberspace operations (OCO/DCO/DODIN), electronic warfare (EW)
operations, cyber & EW (CEMA) planning, spectrum management operations
(SMO/JEMSO), DoD information network (DODIN) operations, acronyms/
abbreviations, and a cross-referenced glossary of cyber terms.

3-54 (IRCs) VI(a). Cyberspace Operations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
VI(b). Electronic
Warfare (EW)
Ref: FM 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations (Apr ‘17), pp. 1-25 to 1-35.

I. Electronic Warfare (EW)

Electronic warfare refers to military action involving the use of electromagnetic and
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP
3-13.1). EW capabilities enable Army forces to create conditions and effects in the
EMS to support the commander’s intent and concept of operations.

Info-Related
Capabilities
Electronic Warfare (EW) Operations
A Electronic Attack (EA)

B Electronic Protection (EP)

C e
Electronic Warfare Support (ES)
pl
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO)
EMSO are comprised of EW and SMO. The importance of the EMS and its
m
relationship to the operational capabilities of the Army is the focus of EMSO.
EMSO include all activities in military operations to successfully control the
EMS. Figure 1-8 illustrates EMSO and how they relate to SMO and EW.
Sa

Ref: FM 3-12 (AprFigure

‘17), 1-8.
[Link] spectrum operations
1-8. Electromagnetic spectrum operations.

Throughout this document, the term EW operations refers to planning,

preparing, execution, and continuous assessment of the electronic warfare
activities of an operation. The term EMSO indicates the addition of those
operationally related spectrum management operations activities.

(IRCs) VI(b). Electronic Warfare 3-55

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

II. Electronic Warfare Missions

Ref: FM 3-12, Cyberspace & Electronic Warfare Operations (Apr ‘17), fig. 1-9.

With proper integration and deconfliction, EW can create reinforcing and complementa-
ry effects by affecting devices that operate in and through wired and wireless networks.

Electronic Warfare (EW) Missions

Info-Related

A Electronic Attack (EA) B Electronic Protection (EP)

Capabilities

Use of electromagnetic energy, Actions taken to protect personnel,

directed energy, or antiradiation facilities, and equipment from any
weapons to attack personnel, effects of friendly or enemy use
facilities or equipment with the of the electromagnetic spectrum
intent of degrading, neutralizing, that degrade, neutralize, or destroy
or destroying enemy combat friendly combat capability.
capability and is considered
a form of fires.

e
pl
C Electronic Warfare Support (ES)
Actions tasked by, or under the direct control
of, an operational commander to search for,
m

intercept, identify, and locate or localize

sources of intentional and unintentional
radiated electromagnetic energy for the
purpose of immediate threat
Sa

recognition, targeting, planning,

and conduct of future operations.

Threat Collection Direction

Warning supporting finding
electronic
warfare
Electromagnetic jamming Spectrum managment
(such as counter-radio-controlled improvised
Electromagnetic hardening
explosive device and standoff jamming)
Emission control
Electromagnetic decpption
Directed energy
Antiradiation missile
Expendables (such as flares and active decoys)

Ref: FM 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations (Apr ‘17), fig. 1-9.
Electronic warfare missions.

3-56 (IRCs) VI(b). Electronic Warfare

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3
VII. Space
Operations
Ref: JP 3-14 (w/Chg 1), Space Operations (Oct ‘20).

Access to space is vital to the collective security of the United States and its allies
and partners. The Department of Defense (DOD) space policy is focused on deter-
ring adversaries, defending against threats, and pursuing resilient space architec-
tures that contribute to achieving space mission assurance and objectives. Further,
the United States must sustain the ability to attribute malicious or irresponsible

Info-Related
actions that jeopardize the viability of space for all. Sustained space access is vital

Capabilities
to the collective security of the United States and its allies and partners.

Space Domain
The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects
on airborne objects become negligible. United States Space Command
(USSPACECOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is the area surrounding the Earth
at altitudes equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers (54 nautical miles) above
mean sea level. Like the air, land, and maritime domains, space is a physical
e
domain within which military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. The
relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that many space opera-
tions depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of cyberspace can only be
pl
provided via space operations.

Proper planning and execution of military operations in space enables activities

such as intelligence collection; early warning; environmental monitoring; satellite
m

communications (SATCOM); and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). Activities

conducted in space support freedom of action throughout the operational environ-
ment (OE), and operations in other domains may create effects in space.
Sa

I. Space Operations
Space operations are those operations impacting or directly utilizing space-and
ground-based capabilities to enhance the potential of the United States and multina-
tional partners. Joint space forces are the space and terrestrial systems, equipment,
facilities, organizations, and personnel, or combination thereof, necessary to conduct
space operations. Space systems consist of three related segments: space, link, and
ground.
• The ground segment consists of ground-based facilities and equipment sup-
porting command and control (C2) of space segment resources, as well as
ground-based processing equipment, Earth terminals or user equipment, space
situational awareness (SSA) sensors, and the interconnectivity between the
facilities in which this equipment is housed.
• The link segment consists of signals connecting ground and space segments
through the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). This link normally includes
telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C) signals necessary for controlling
the spacecraft and payload. Separate from the TT&C signals, the satellite pay-
load may contribute to the link segment through the use of SATCOM signals
between two terminals on the ground or a PNT signal enhancing air, ground,
and naval maneuver.
• The space segment involves the operational spacecraft within the space
domain.

(IRCs) VII. Space Operations 3-61

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

II. Space Capabilities

Ref: JP 3-14 (w/Chg 1), Space Operations (Oct ‘20), chap. 2.

Due to the complexities of the operational environment (OE) and the required integration
and coordination between elements of the joint force, a shared understanding of selected
aspects of specific space capabilities is essential to foster and enhance unified action.

Space Situational Awareness (SSA)

Space situational awareness (SSA) is the requisite foundational, current, and predictive
knowledge and characterization of space objects and the OE upon which space opera-
tions depend—including physical, virtual, information, and human dimensions—as well
as all factors, activities, and events of all entities conducting, or preparing to conduct,
space operations. Space surveillance capabilities include a mix of space-based and
Info-Related
Capabilities

ground-based sensors. SSA is dependent on integrating space surveillance, collection,

and processing; environmental monitoring; status of US and cooperative satellite sys-
tems; understanding of US and multinational space readiness; and analysis of the space
domain.

Space Control
Space control includes offensive space control and defensive space control operations
to ensure freedom of action in space and, when directed, defeat efforts to interfere with or
attack US or allied space systems. Space control uses a broad range of response options
e
to provide continued, sustainable use of space. Space control contributes to space deter-
rence by employing a variety of measures to assure the use of space; attributing enemy
attacks; and being consistent with the right to self-defense, target-threat space capabilities.
pl
See following page (p. 3-64) for further discussion of space control and superiority.

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)

m
Military users depend on assured positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems for
precise and accurate geo-location, navigation, and time reference services. PNT informa-
tion, whether from space-based global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs), such as
Global Positioning System, or non-GNSS sources, is considered mission-essential for
Sa

virtually every modern weapons system.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

Space-based intelligence collection synchronizes and integrates sensors, assets, and
systems for gathering data and information on an object or in an area of interest on a
persistent, event-driven, or scheduled basis. Space-based intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, which includes overhead persistent infrared (OPIR), is conducted by an
organization’s intelligence collection manager to ensure integrated, synchronized, and
deconflicted operations of high-demand assets.

Satellite Communications (SATCOM)

Satellite communications (SATCOM) systems inherently facilitate beyond line-of-sight
connectivity. Depending on its configuration, a robust SATCOM architecture provides
either equatorial coverage (nonpolar) or high-latitude coverage (includes poles). This
provides national and strategic leadership with a means to maintain situational aware-
ness and convey their intent to the operational commanders responsible for conducting
joint operations.

Environmental Monitoring
Terrestrial environmental monitoring provides information on meteorological and oceano-
graphic factors that affect military operations. Space environmental monitoring provides
data that supports forecasts, alerts, and warnings for the space environment that may

3-62 (IRCs) VII. Space Operations

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Combined Space Tasking Order (CSTO)

Ref: JP 3-14 (w/Chg 1), Space Operations (Oct ‘20), p. IV-7.
Specific to space operations, the CFSCC produces plans/orders for the management of
assigned space forces through the CSTO. The CSTO and special instructions (SPINS)
direct space forces, assign tasks to meet joint force operational objectives, and syn-
chronize space operations with other CCMD operations (see Figure IV-1).
The operational planning cycle includes inputs into the joint targeting cycle, as depicted
in Figure IV-1. The space operations directive captures the CFSCC’s guidance and in-
tent. The space operations directive conveys prioritization and apportionment guidance
focused on the applicable execution period. This is then used to form the master space
plan. The master space plan is used to allocate resources to each desired effect and

Info-Related
serves as the source to generate unit tasking and coordination within the CSTO and

Capabilities
SPINS. The CSTO tasks execution and the SPINS provide amplifying guidance.
Space Coordinating Authority

OPORD:
OLYMPIC DEFENDER
CFSCC CFSCC
Current USSPACECOM
OPORD CSPOC Leadership

Combatant Commands
e Strategy Plans Division

Guidance,
SOD
pl
Objectives, and
Effects

Operation Space Operations

Targeting
Assessment Directive
m
Master Space Plan

Intelligence Combined Space

SSR/RFI Tasking Order
Force Weaponeering Joint Mission Plan
Execution and Allocation
Sa

Combat
Operations
CSTO Division Tasking MSP

CSTO
Operational
Level Command
and JMP
Control of Space

Legend
CFSCC Combined Forces Space Component OPORD operation order
Command RFI request for information
CSPOC Combined Space Operations Center SOD space operations directive
CSTO combined space tasking order SSR space support request
JMP joint mission plan USSPACECOM United States Space Command
MSP master space plan

Ref: JP 3-14 (w/Chg 1), fig. IV-1. Combined Space Tasking Order Process.
The planning process may significantly compress during a crisis or to support ma-
jor combat operations. In periods of conflict, the CSTO cycle may compress from a
30¬day production cycle to synchronize with the supported CCDR’s air tasking order
cycle. The CSTO transmits the CFSCC’s guidance and priorities for a short-duration
timeframe, assigns tasks to meet operational objectives, and, when required, synchro-
nizes and integrates CFSCC activities with other CCMD operations.

(IRCs) VII. Space Operations 3-69

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 3

VIII. Additional IRCs

Ref: JP 3-14 (w/Chg 1), Space Operations (Oct ‘20).

In addition to the specific IRCs covered on the previous pages, FM 3-13 discusses
additional capabilities as outlined below.

Additional IRCs

Info-Related
Capabilities
Integrated Joint Special Technical
A Operations (IJSTO)

B Special Access Programs (SAP)

C Personnel Recovery (PR)

e
D
pl
Physical Attack

E
m

Physical Security

F
Sa

Presence, Profile, and Posture (PPP)

G Soldier and Leader Engagement (SLE)

H Police Engagement

I Social Media

All unit operations, activities, and actions affect the information environment. Even
if they primarily affect the physical dimension, they nonetheless also affect the infor-
mational and cognitive dimensions. For this reason, whether or not they are routinely
considered an IRC, a wide variety of unit functions and activities can be adapted for
the purposes of conducting information operations or serve as enablers to its plan-
ning, execution, and assessment.
See p. 3-1 for additional discussion.
(IRCs) VIII. Additional IRCs 3-71
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 4
(Information Operations)
PLANNING
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 4-1 to 4-2.
Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a de-
sired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0).
Planning helps commanders create and communicate a common vision between
commanders, their staffs, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners.
Planning results in a plan and orders that synchronize the action of forces in time,
space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.
Commanders, supported by their staffs, ensure IO is fully integrated into the plan,
starting with Army design methodology (ADM) and progressing through the military
decisionmaking process (MDMP). The focal point for IO planning is the IO officer (or
designated representative for IO). However, the entire staff contributes to planning
products that describe and depict how IO supports the commander’s intent and con-
cept of operations. The staff also contributes to IO planning during IO working group
meetings to include assessing the effectiveness of IO and refining the plan.

Information
Planning
Commanders, supported by their staffs, ensure IO is fully integrated into the
e
plan, starting with Army design methodology and progressing through the military
decisionmaking process.
pl
Army Design Methodology (ADM)
ADM helps commanders and staffs with the conceptual aspects of planning. These
aspects include understanding, visualizing, and describing operations to include
m
framing the problem and identifying an operational approach to solve the problem.

Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP)

The MDMP helps commanders and staffs translate the commander’s vision into
Sa

an operations plan or operations order that synchronizes the actions of the force
in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Both the problem the com-
mander needs to solve and the specific operation to advance towards its solution
have significant information-related aspects.

See pp. 4-3 to 4-16 for discussion of commander, staff, and IO working group
responsibilities for synchronizing information-related capabilities.
Planning activities occupy a continuum ranging from conceptual to detailed. Con-
ceptual planning involves understanding operational environments and problems,
determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach to
attain that end state. Detailed planning translates the commander’s operational
approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associ-
ated with the science of control including synchronizing forces in time, space, and
purpose to accomplish missions.

Refer to BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 6th Ed. for further discus-
sion. BSS6 covers the operations process (ADP 5-0); commander’s activ-
ities; Army planning methodologies; the military decisionmaking process
and troop leading procedures (FM 7-0 w/Chg 2); integrating processes
(IPB, information collection, targeting, risk management, and knowledge
management); plans and orders; mission command, C2 warfighting func-
tion tasks, command posts, liaison (ADP 6-0); rehearsals & after action
reviews; and operational terms and military symbols (ADP 1-02).
(Planning) Overview 4-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 6
I. Synchronization of
Info-Related Capabilities
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. 4.
Creating effects in the information environment is not random. Units synchronize
and sequence IRCs so that they actively contribute to fulfilling the unit’s mission in
accordance with the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Mission com-
mand places responsibility for IRC synchronization on the staff; however, without the
commander’s direct involvement, stated intent, guidance, concept of operations, and
narrative, the staff will fail to achieve desired and required operational outcomes.

I. Commanders’ Responsibilities
Commanders drive the conduct of IO and are their unit’s key informers and influenc-
ers. Their influence is a function of their position, authority, decisions, personal ac-
tions, and the combat power their unit generates. Every action they take, operation
they lead, capability they employ, and word or image they convey sends a message.
Ultimately, they have the responsibility to align and combine each message into a

Information
comprehensive and compelling narrative while ensuring their unit fulfills this narra-

Planning
tive. Their narrative explains the why of military operations.
e
Commanders (and subordinate leaders) are responsible for driving the conduct of
IO through their narrative, stated intent, guidance, concept of operations, and risk
pl
assessment to achieve desired and required operational outcomes.
See following pages (pp. 4-4 to 4-5) for an overview and further discussion.

II. Staff Responsibilities

m

The staff has responsibility for conducting IO through synchronizing IRCs. As the
staff lead for IO, the IO officer or designated representative develops a range of
products and chairs the IO working group. The IO working group is the primary
mechanism for synchronization and produces several outputs that drive the unit’s
Sa

efforts in the information environment.

Key IO Planning Tools and Outputs

Key staff outputs include the:
• IO running estimate (See pp. 4-6 to 4-7.)
• Logic of the effort (See p. 4-8.)
• Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and CCIRs and
essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) (See p. 4-9.)
• Combined Information Overlay (CIO) (See pp. 4-32 to 4-33.)
Information operations input to base orders and plans include:
• Mission Statement (See p. 4-11.)
• Scheme of information operations (See pp. 4-12 to 4-13.)
• IO Objectives & IRC tasks (See pp. 4-14 to 4-15.)
• IO Synchronization Matrix (See p. 4-16.)
• Battle drills (See pp. 4-65 to 4-68.)
• Other products as needed

See p. 6-3 for related discussion of the IO working group inputs and outputs (fig. 4-1)
and chap. 7 for fires and targeting products.
(Planning) I. Synchronization of Information-Related Capabilities 4-3
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

A. IO Running Estimate See also pp. 4-37.

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 4-3 to 4-6.
A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to deter-
mine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if
planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Running estimates help the IO
officer record and track pertinent information about the information environment leading
to a basis for recommendations to the commander. The IO officer uses the running es-
timate to assist with completion of each step of the MDMP. An effective running estimate
is as comprehensive as possible within the time available but also organized so that
the information is easily communicated and processed. Normally, the running estimate
provides enough information to draft the applicable IO sections of warning orders as
required during planning and, ultimately, to draft applicable IO sections of the operation
order or operation plan. Running estimates enable planning officers to track and record
pertinent information and provide recommendations to commanders. A generic written
format of a running estimate contains six general considerations: situation, mission,
course of action, analysis, comparison, and recommendation. (Fig. 4-2, below).

1. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Area of Interest. Identify and describe those factors of the area of interest that affect
functional area considerations.
Information

b. Characteristics of the Area of Operations.

Planning

e
(1) Terrain. State how terrain affects a functional area’s capabilities.
(2) Weather. State how weather affects a functional area’s capabilities.
pl
(3) Enemy Forces. Describe enemy disposition, composition, strength, and systems in
a functional area. Describe enemy capabilities and possible courses of action (COAs)
and their effects on a functional area.
(4) Friendly Forces. List current functional area resources in terms of equipment,
personnel, and systems. Identify additional resources available for the functional area
m

located at higher, adjacent, or other units. List those capabilities from other military
and civilian partners that may be available to provide support in the functional area.
Compare requirements to current capabilities and suggest solutions for satisfying
discrepancies.
Sa

(5) Civilian Considerations. Describe civil considerations that may affect the functional
area, including possible support needed by civil authorities from the functional area as
well as possible interference from civil aspects.
c. Facts/Assumptions. List all facts and assumptions that affect the functional area.
2. MISSION. Show the restated mission resulting from mission analysis.
3. COURSES OF ACTION.
a. List friendly COAs that were war-gamed.
b. List enemy actions or COAs that were templated that impact the functional area.
c. List the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staffs use the same
criteria.
4. ANALYSIS. Analyze each COA using the evaluation criteria from COA analysis.
Review enemy actions that impact the functional area as they relate to COAs. Identify
issues, risks, and deficiencies these enemy actions may create with respect to the
functional area.
5. COMPARISON. Compare COAs. Rank order COAs for each key consideration. Use
a decision matrix to aid the comparison process.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.
a. Recommend the most supportable COAs from the perspective of the functional
area.
b. Prioritize and list issues, deficiencies, and risks and make recommendations on
how to mitigate them.

4-6 (Planning) I. Synchronization of Information-Related Capabilities

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Variations on this format, such as the example provided in Figure 4-3 below enable
the IO officer to spotlight facts and assumptions, critical planning factors, and available
forces. The latter of these requires input from assigned or available IRCs. The graphic
format also offers a clear, concise mechanism for the IO officer to articulate recommend-
ed high-payoff targets, commander’s critical information requirements, and requests for
forces. Maintaining both formats simultaneously provides certain benefits: the narrative
format enables the IO officer to cut-and-paste sections directly into applicable sections of
orders; the graphic format enables the IO officer to brief the commander and staff with a
single slide.

Example Graphical IO Running Estimate

Forces or systems Facts Specified tasks Limitations
available • Civilian and Identify key MISO messaging and
• 413 civil affairs BNs government-controlled communicators OCO release authority
• 344 tactical MISO COs media outlets (radio within AO SWORD held by CCDR
and television) reach in order to deliver
• 1-55th Signal CO (-) 3x population within AO non-interference
• 2x EC-130J Commando SWORD HPT nominations
Solo @ CFACC • Adversary forces have • Denial of adversary
• OCO available used civilian radio social media site
stations to broadcast during decisive

Information
Information environment coalition forces’ troop Implied tasks operations

Planning
• Radio is the best movements and • Deny adversary • Identify tribal leaders
medium to reach the
civilian population within
AO SWORD, followed by Assumptions
e
propaganda in the AO use of social
media
messaging CCIR nominations
pl
social media • Civilian population will during decisive • Block axis of
• Religious leaders within support HNSF and operations advance by civilian
contested areas are key coalition forces once • Develop Soldier population during
communicators to the security is restored and leader attack
population engagement,
m
• Civilian population will • Damage to HN
• Displaced civilians in remain in place during and MISO essential services
camps along main routes attack unless there is a products to infrastructure and
may impede coalition loss of essential support non- religious structures
forces’ advance services interference
EEFI nominations
Sa

N/A
Critical planning Objectives Request for forces
factors 1. Influence civilian population to minimize interference Request OCO to deny
Air tasking order cycle with coalition forces information operations team to use of social media
request 72 hours prior prevent civilian casualties site during decisive
2. Disrupt enemy forces use of media outlets in order operations
to support freedom of movement of coalition forces.
AO area of operations EEFI essential element of friendly information
BN Battalion HN host nation
CCDR combatant commander HNSF host-nation security forces
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement HPT high-payoff target
CFACC combined force air component commander MISO military information support operations
CO Company N/A not applicable
COMCAM combat camera OCO offensive cyberspace operations

Ref: ATP 3-13.3, fig. 4-3. Example graphical information operations running estimate.
Running estimate development is continuous. The IO officer maintains and updates the
running estimate as pertinent information is received. While at home station, the IO of-
ficer maintains a running estimate on friendly capabilities. The unit prepares its running
estimate based on researching and analyzing the information environment within its
region and anticipated mission sets.

See related discussion of the running estimate on p. 4-37.

(Planning) I. Synchronization of Information-Related Capabilities 4-7

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

B. Scheme of Information Operations

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 4-9 to 4-11.
The scheme of IO begins with a clear, concise statement of where, when, and how the
commander intends to employ synchronized IRCs to create effects in and through the
information environment to support the overall operation and accomplish the mission.
Based on the commander’s planning guidance, the IO officer develops a separate
scheme of IO for each COA the staff develops during COA development. IO schemes of
support are expressed both narratively and graphically, in terms of IO objectives and IRC
tasks required to achieve these objectives.
Figure 4-5 provides a sample scheme of an IO statement. Figure 4-6 illustrates a sup-
porting sketch with articulated objectives and IRCs.
1 SBCT coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes IRCs in support of Phase III (Defense) in AO
RAIDER. CO collects against Donovian frequencies and communica�ons east of PL MAINE. EW
conducts jamming of Donovian armor mission command systems in EAs THOMPSON, UZI, and
RUGER. CMOC informs IDPs of collec�on instruc�ons and safe rally points. MISO influences
IDPs to not interfere with military movements and counters Donovian propaganda. The goal
of all IRCs is to elicit the surrender or deser�on of enemy forces, reduce CIVCAS, and prevent
massing of enemy armor and indirect fires. PA controls release of opera�onal informa�on in
order to bolster OPSEC and facilitates media engagement strategy to highlight opera�onal
Information

successes. Maneuver, CAO, and MISO will conduct SLEs to enable 1 SBCT elements freedom of
Planning

maneuver throughout AO RAIDER. Finally, 1 SBCT will capture opera�onal successes through

area of opera�ons
e
COMCAM and other visual informa�on capabili�es while OPSEC will protect EEFIs.
AO IDP internally displaced person
pl
CAO civil affairs opera�ons IRC informa�on-related capability
CIVCAS civilian casualty MISO military informa�on support operations
CMOC civil-military opera�ons center OPSEC opera�ons security
CO cyberspace opera�ons PA public affairs
COMCAM combat camera PL phase line
EA engagement area SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
m
EEFI essen�al elements of friendly informa�on SLE Soldier and leader engagement
EW electronic warfare

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, fig. 4-5. Sample scheme of information operations statement.
Sa

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, fig. 4-6. Example scheme of information operations sketch.

4-12 (Planning) I. Synchronization of Information-Related Capabilities

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

D. IO Synchronization Matrix
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 4-14 to 4-16.
The synchronization matrix is used to monitor progress and results of IO objectives
and IRC tasks as well as to keep IO execution focused on contributing to the overall
operation. It is one of the IO working group’s primary tools for monitoring and evaluating
progress and assessing whether planned effects have been achieved.
Tasked unit or system IO task Time on target or Location Remarks
time of effect
EA-6B EW-01 H-1 through H- TAI 002 and 003 Successful if enemy
hour is unable to send
early warning
Tactical PSYOP team MISO-01 H-24 and continue Objective Successful if no
SPRUCE civilian interference
Civil affairs team CAO-01 H-24 through H- Objective PINE N/A
hour
Special Instructions: None
Ref:
CAO
ATP 3-13.1, table 4-2. Example 2 – Information
civil affairs operations N/A
operations synchronization matrix.
not applicable
EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft (Prowler) PSYOP psychological operations
IRC
IO Phase Ioperations
information Phase II TAI Phase
target area III
of interest Phase IV
MISO military information support operations
EW Monitor signals of Electronic attack to N/A N/A
interest. Electronic disrupt enemy
protection for communications.
personnel and Electronic
Information

equipment. protection for

Planning

personnel and

MISO Broadcast
harassment
e
equipment.
N/A Broadcast via
mobile radio to
Broadcast on
mission success.
pl
messages against keep population Coordinate with
enemy. Broadcast informed on COMCAM for post-
noninterference mission. mission messaging
messages for local and countering the
populace. effect of adversary
m
information
activities.
OPSEC Determine essential Implement N/A N/A
elements of friendly measures to protect
information for essential elements
Sa

mission. of friendly
information to
protect movement
routes, mission
command, and
objective.
MILDEC N/A N/A N/A N/A
CAO Prepare N/A N/A Assist personnel
Commander’s returning to
Emergency villages. Assess
Response Program small-scale
paperwork for funds immediate projects.
disbursement.
Coordinate with
Provincial
reconstruction
team.
PA Prepare press N/A N/A Distribute press
releases. releases. Conduct
Embed media. press conference
and set up
interviews with
subject matter
experts.
COMCAM Document Document Document Document
operation. operation. operation. operation.
CAO civil affairs operations MISO military information support operations
Ref: ATP 3-13.1,
COMCAM combattable
camera4-1. Example 1 – Information
N/A notoperations
applicable synchronization matrix.
EW electronic warfare OPSEC operations security
IRC information-related capability PA public affairs
4-16MILDEC
(Planning)
militaryI. Synchronization of Information-Related Capabilities
deception
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 4
II. Information
Environment Analysis
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. 2.
IO and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
The mechanics of analyzing the information environment and enemy or adver-
sary operations in the information environment are generally the same as those
established to support intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for other
military planning. IPB is a critical component of the military decisionmaking process
(MDMP). It provides a systematic approach to evaluating the effects of significant
characteristics of an operational environment for missions.
IPB to support IO refines traditional IPB to focus on the information environ-
ment. Its purpose is to gain an understanding of the information environment in a
geographic area and determine how the enemy or adversary will operate in this en-
vironment. The focus is on analyzing the enemy’s or adversary’s use of information
to gain positions of relative advantage. The end state is the identification of threat

Information
information capabilities in the information environment against which friendly forces

Planning
must contend and threat vulnerabilities that friendly forces can exploit with IO.
e
Analyze and Depict the Information Environment
pl
To achieve advantage in the information environment, commanders, with spe-
cialized advice and support from the IO officer, ensure that IO planning is fully
integrated into the operations process. This begins with analysis to understand,
visualize, and describe the information environment.
m

A significant part of what makes the operational environment complex is the

information environment because it includes such components as cyberspace,
the electromagnetic spectrum, data flow, encryption and decryption, the media,
Sa

biases, perceptions, decisions, key leaders and decision makers, among many
others. What occurs in the physical dimension of the information environment
and, more broadly, the operational environment, always has second- and third-
order effects in the informational and cognitive dimensions of the information
environment. Thus, there must be holistic and nuanced understanding of how
these various components and dimensions interrelate and the whole operates.
This understanding is depicted through a series of information overlays and
comprehensive combined information overlays, which vary depending on com-
manders’ priorities, the nature of the operation, and the type of analysis being
conducted. Modeling or mapping social or human networks also enhances this
understanding. While complex, the information environment still needs to be
captured in a way that the commander can visualize and understand it, draw
necessary insights and conclusions, and make informed decisions. The IO officer
should not be locked into any specific method for analyzing and depicting the
information environment but develop a process and overlays that best serve the
commander and, as appropriate, follow unit standard operating procedures. As
new technologies and interactive capabilities emerge, they should be incorpo-
rated as tools to facilitate the visualization and understanding processes.

(Planning) II. Information Environment Analysis 4-17

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

In addition to the running estimate, IPB to support IO results in producing a graphic

or visualization product known as the combined information overlay. This overlay
results from a series of overlays that depict where and how information aspects such
as infrastructure, content, and flow potentially affect military operations. In certain
instances, staffs may need more than one combined information overlay to capture
the full complexity of the information environment.
See pp. 4-6 to 4-7 for discussion of running estimates and pp. 4-32 to 4-33 for
discussion of the combined information overlay.
During mission analysis, the IO officer or representative ensures that IPB addresses
the information environment and supports the planning and execution of operations.
The intent is to better visualize the impact of the information environment on unit
operations and to identify potential threat capabilities and vulnerabilities that the unit
can protect against or exploit. This analysis involves four substeps that mirror the
steps discussed in ATP 2-01.3 (IPB):

Step 1: Define the Information Environment

During the first step of mission analysis, the IO officer or representative coordinates
with other staff officers and elements, particularly the intelligence staff section.
Defining the information environment begins by clearly delineating the AO, as well
as areas of interest, including contiguous areas to the AO that may affect information
flow and decision making. Once delineated, the IO officer identifies the significant
Information

characteristics of the information environment within this defined area in all three
Planning

dimensions (physical, informational, and cognitive) that can affect friendly and threat
e
operations, as well as influence friendly courses of action and command decisions.
These significant characteristics can include, but are not limited to, the following:
pl
• Terrain (and weather).
• Populace.
• Societal structures.
m
• Military or government information and communications infrastructure.
• Civilian information and communications infrastructure.
• Media.
• Third party organizations.
Sa

Terrain (and Weather)

One characteristic that the IO officer identifies is the terrain (and weather). The IO
officer looks at the various ways physical, geographical, and atmospheric aspects
of the AO impact information content and flow. These aspects can include compart-
mentalization, canalization, signal attenuation, radio wave propagation, and atmo-
spheric and environmental limits on employing information systems.
Populace
Populace is another characteristic that the IO officer identifies. This characteristic
involves identifying the human composition of the AO or area of interest in all its
diversity to determine factors that impact information flow, receipt, and understand-
ing. These factors tend to be static and non-voluntary; they are enduring traits or pat-
terns of behavior that are innate or culturally ingrained to the point they are habitual
and non-reflexive. Often IO officers study demographic and linguistic factors such as
age, gender, education level, literacy, birth rate, ethnic composition, family structure,
employment or unemployment rates, and languages.
Societal Structures
Societal structures affect friendly and threat operations. IO officers identify human net-
works, groups, and subgroups that affiliate along religious, political, or cultural lines,
including commonly held beliefs and local narratives. These affiliations are voluntary
and varied—over time, over space, and among individuals. IO officers focus their
analysis on preferred means, methods, and venues that each social affiliation uses to
4-22 (Planning) II. Information Environment Analysis
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Examples of Operational Variables

Crosswalked with Civil Considerations
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 2-5 to 2-6.

Due to the complexity and volume of data involving civil considerations, no simple or
single model exists for presenting this analysis. It typically comprises a series of products,
such as data files, overlays, and assessments.
Political Military Economic Social Information Infrastructure
• Enclave, • Areas of • Commercial • Refugee • Broadcast • Road system
province, influence and • Fishery camp coverage • City limit
district interest • Ethnic, area
• Industrial • Power grid
• National • Area of social, tribal • Social
boundaries operations • Markets enclave media reach • Irrigation
Areas

• Mining or network
• Shadow • Safe haven • School
government • Smuggling district penetration • Suburb,
• Local nation exurb, urban
influence area base or routes • Online group • Word of
mouth core
training area • E-commerce
• Graffiti
• Court house • Base and • Banking • Club • Cell tower • Emergency
• Government base • Fuel • Jail • Broadcast shelter
center buildings facility • Public building
• Factory • Library
• Training
Structures

• Capitol • Warehousing • Religious • Physical • Airfield,

building facility internet bridge,
• Online store building
• Known structure railroad
Information

• Meeting hall • Restaurant

leader house • “Wall Street” • Postal • Construction
Planning

versus “Main • Social media service sites

• Civil authority, • Doctrine

e Street”

• Currency
platform

• Social
• Print shop

• News
• Electric
station
• Law
pl
practices and • Organization • Food network operation enforcement
rights security • Nonprofit • Newspaper • Fire fighting
• Training
• Executive, • Market or support to • Social • Maintenance
Capabilities

legislative, • Materiel disasters

black market media • Transportation
and judicial • Leadership • Social platform
functions • Raw material • HVAC
• Personnel services • Literacy rate
• Tariff (heating,
m
• Dispute • Facilities
resolution • BITCOIN • Intelligence ventilation,
• Civil-military service and air
relationship • Imports or conditioning)
exports • Internet
access
• Major political • Host-nation • Bank • Clan • Media group • Construction
Sa

party forces • Business • Online or • Public company

• Nongovern- • Insurgent organization in-person relations • Trade union
mental group or affinity group firm
Organizations

• Guild • Cooperative
organization network • Patriotic or • Social
• Labor union
• Host • Terrorist service media
government • Landowner organization information
• Military
• Court system lobbying • Cooperative • Familial group
• Insurgent group • News
group organization
affiliation
• United • Key leader • Banker • Community • Decision • Builders
Nations • Thought • Employer or leader maker • Local
representative leader employee • Teacher • Elder development
• Political • Employment • Entertainer • Religious council
leader
People

rate • Criminal leader • Road

• Governor • Merchant • Internet repairers
• Migration
• Elder • Smuggler patterns personality • Police, fire
• Legislator, fighter
judge, and
prosecutor
• Election • Combat • Drought, • Celebration • Censorship • Scheduled
• Council • Military yield • Civil • Publishing maintenance
meeting parade • Labor disturbance dates • School
• Treaty signing • Unit relief migration • Funeral • Online construction
Events

• National • Loss of • Market day • Online launch • New bridge

parade leadership • Payday forum • Press opening
• Speech • Business • Social briefing • Disaster,
opening media • Interview man-made
• Significant or natural
legal trial livestream • Disruption
of service

Table 2-2. Examples of operational variables crosswalked with civil considerations.

4-26 (Planning) II. Information Environment Analysis

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Example Overlay
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 2-7 to 2-11.

IO officers and planners often use one common technique to present analysis. They
prepare an overlay (graphical depiction) for each significant characteristic that visually
displays its salient features and identifies gaps in intelligence or information that are
subsequently refined into requirements for collection (requests for information, requests
for collection).
The following figures provide example overlays. The first focuses on population centers
and the second focuses on communications infrastructure. Both examples are based
on the Decision Action Training Environment or DATE scenario as employed at the Joint
Readiness Training Center.
Note. These overlays depict “a” way, not “the” way. IO officers or representatives must
adapt their products to the situation at hand, their units’ standard operating procedures,
and commander’s preference.

Information
Planning
e
pl
m

Figure 2-1. Example overlay that depicts Figure 2-2. Example overlay that depicts
relevant information about the populace in relevant information about communications
Sa

the area of operations. infrastructure in the area of operations.

Sangari: Turani: Janan:

• 2nd largest town in Kirsham • Joint municipality with Dara Lam • Small rural village
• Strong allegiance to ROA (pre- • Strong allegiance to ROA • Dependent on NGO/IGO for
SAPA) • Strong economic growth essential services
• Active municipal gov. (pre-SAPA) • Majority ethnic Atropian • Agricultural economy; minimal
• ROA/U.S. built ‘Model City” growth
• Moderate inter-ethnic friction
• Regular access to school, medical • Majority ethnic Atropian; dislike
• Adequate transportation SAPA/likely support anti-SAPA
facility, and emergency services
• USAID and NGO activity activity
• Many businesses
• Clinic funded and operated by • Ethnic unrest; Persian residents
• Majority ethnic Persian; minimal likely support insurgents/resent U.S.
town (USAID rehabilitation project)
ethnic tension pre-SAPA presence
• SAPA restricts information flow • Inadequate transportation
AO area of operations OA operational area
ASR alternate supply route ROA Republic of Atropia
MSR main supply route SAPA South Atropian People’s Army
IGO intergovernmental organization USAID United States Agency for International Development
NGO nongovernmental organization

Figure 2-1. Example overlay that depicts relevant information about the populace in the
area of operations (continued).

(Planning) II. Information Environment Analysis 4-27

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Combined Information Overlay (CIO)

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 2-16 to 2-17.

In addition to the running estimate, IPB to support IO results in producing a graphic

visualization product known as the combined information overlay (CIO). The CIO results
from the prior analysis conducted in Steps 1 through 4, aggregating the information,
threat, and situation templates (or overlays) to depict where and how aspects—such as
infrastructure, terrain, and populace—can affect military operations. In certain instances,
the IPB may require more than one CIO to capture the full complexity of the information
environment.
The CIO gives the commander and the staff a visual depiction of the ways in which
information affects the AO. Similar to the modified combined obstacle overlay, which
the intelligence staff officer develops during the IPB, the CIO is a simplified depiction of
numerous interconnected variables. The CIO is a tool to visualize a collection of inputs
that can never be completely synthesized. As such, it never becomes a final product; it is
continually updated as new information arises and as time and staffing permits.
Reachback capabilities, such as provided by the 1st IO Command, sometimes provide a
starting point for a CIO, but the IO working group must verify and refine these products
with more localized analysis. The IO officer, aided by the IO working group, is ultimately
Information

responsible for the product. Although the CIO may include classified information, par-
Planning

ticularly when dealing with technical or military aspects of an operational environment

e
or intelligence products, it primarily consists of open-source and publically available
information that is useful once validated. With a request for information, the IO officer
pl
can obtain additional information about the threat from the intelligence staff.
Note. Using open-source and publically available information for other than intelligence
purposes should not be confused with open-source intelligence (known as OSINT). Only
intelligence personnel conduct open-source intelligence (refer to ATP 2-22.9 for more on
m

this topic).

A thorough understanding of the current state of the information environment, local

communications means, methods, trusted sources, key influencers, established cog-
Sa

nitive patterns, cultural norms, perspectives, historical narrative, system of opposi-

tion, and adversary and HN IRCs is critical to the development of the commander’s
communication synchronization effort.
Significant characteristics, further analyzed within the physical, informational, and
cognitive dimensions, can be graphically represented on a combined information
overlay. The analyst can use this overlay to identify strengths and/or vulnerabilities
of the information environment that can be exploited by friendly or adversary forces.
The adversary mindset should be evaluated to determine the probable state of mo-
rale in both the civil and military population. Morale is a significant factor not only in
assessing the overall capability of a military force, but also in evaluating the extent to
which the civil populace will support military operations. The degree of regime loyalty
should be assessed not only for the populace but also, if possible, for individual lead-
ers. Depending on the situation, factors such as ethnic, religious, political, or class
grievances or differences may be exploitable for military information support opera-
tions (MISO) purposes. Psychological profiles on military and political leaders may
facilitate understanding an adversary’s behavior, evaluating an adversary’s vulner-
ability to deception, and assessing the relative probability of an adversary’s adopting
various COAs.
- JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (May ‘14),
pp. III-23 to III-24.

4-32 (Planning) II. Information Environment Analysis

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Figure 2-5 below illustrates a sample CIO. What appears in or on the CIO depends on
the situation, mission, commander preferences, and the resulting analysis. Templates in-
clude a combination of narrative (descriptive) elements, pictorial elements, and graphical
elements. Whether the “so what” statement appears on the template itself or in accompa-
nying notes, it needs to be conveyed concisely to the commander. The proportion of one
element to the others depends on the conclusions the IO officer reaches and a judgement
call on the best way to convey these conclusions.

Information
Planning
e
pl
m
Sa

Figure 2-5. Example of combined information overlay.

(Planning) II. Information Environment Analysis 4-33

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 4

III. IO & the MDMP

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 4-2 to 4-29.
Commanders use the MDMP to understand the situation and mission confronting them
and make informed decisions resulting in an operations plan or order for execution.
Their personal interest and involvement is essential to ensuring that IO planning is inte-
grated into MDMP from the beginning and effectively supports mission accomplishment.
See pp. 2-22 to 2-25 for related discussion of IO planning as related to the joint plan-
ning process (JPP).
IO planning is integral to several other processes, to include intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB) and targeting. The G-2 (S-2) and fire support representatives
participate in the IO working group and coordinate with the IO officer to integrate IO
with their activities and the overall operation.

Information
Planning
e
pl
m
Sa

Figure 4-1. Relationship among the scheme of IO, IO objectives, and IRC tasks.
Commanders use their mission statement for the overall operation, the IO mission
statement, scheme of IO, IO objectives, and IRC tasks to describe and direct IO, as
seen in fig. 4-1. See pp. 4-3 to 4-16 for in-depth discussion IO mission statement,
scheme of IO, IO objectives, and IRC tasks (synchronization of IRCs).

Refer to BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 6th Ed. for further discus-
sion. BSS6 covers the operations process (ADP 5-0); commander’s activ-
ities; Army planning methodologies; the military decisionmaking process
and troop leading procedures (FM 7-0 w/Chg 2); integrating processes
(IPB, information collection, targeting, risk management, and knowledge
management); plans and orders; mission command, C2 warfighting func-
tion tasks, command posts, liaison (ADP 6-0); rehearsals & after action
reviews; and operational terms and military symbols (ADP 1-02).

(Planning) III. IO & the MDMP 4-35

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Scheme of IO See pp. 4-12 to 4-13.

The scheme of IO is a clear, concise statement of where, when, and how the com-
mander intends to employ and synchronize IRCs, to create effects in and through
the information environment to support overall operations and achieve the mission.
Based on the commander’s planning guidance, to include IO weighted efforts, the IO
officer develops a separate scheme of IO for each course of action (COA) the staff
develops. IO schemes of support are written in terms of IO objectives—and their
associated weighted efforts—and IRC tasks required to achieve these objectives.
For example, the overall scheme may be oriented primarily on defending friendly
information but also include attack and stabilize objectives.

IO Objectives See pp. 4-14 to 4-15.

IO objectives express specific and obtainable outcomes or effects that commanders
intend to achieve in and through the information environment. In addition to be being
specific, these objectives are measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bounded
(or SMART), which facilitates their attainment and assessment (see chapter 8).
IO objectives serve a function similar to that of terrain or force-oriented objectives
in maneuver operations. They focus the IO effort on achieving synchronized IRC
effects, at the right time and place, to accomplish the unit’s mission and support the
commanders’ intent and concept of the operation.
Accurate situational understanding is key to establishing IO objectives. Operational-
Information

and tactical-level IO objectives must nest with strategic theater objectives. Joint
Planning

and component staffs develop IO objectives to help integrate and synchronize their
e
campaigns and major operations.
The IO officer develops objectives as part of developing the scheme of IO during
pl
COA development. These objectives help the staff determine tasks to subordinate
units during COA development and analysis.

IRC Tasks See pp. 4-14 to 4-15.

m
Tasks are developed to support accomplishment of one or more IO objectives.
These tasks are developed specifically for a given IRC. In concert with IRC rep-
resentatives, the IO officer develops tasks during COA development and finalizes
them during COA analysis. During COA development and COA analysis, tasks are
Sa

discussed in general terms but not assigned to a subordinate unit. During orders
production, these tasks are assigned to IRC units.

Step I. Receipt of Mission

Upon receipt of a mission, the commander and staff perform an initial assessment.
Based on this assessment, the commander issues initial guidance and the staff
prepares and issues a warning order (WARNORD). Between receiving the com-
mander’s initial guidance and issuing the WARNORD, the staff performs receipt of
mission actions.
See pp. 4-48 to 4-49 for a summary of the inputs, actions and outputs required of the
IO officer during mission analysis.
During receipt of mission, the IO officer—
• Reviews and updates the running estimate.
• Participates in the initial assessment.
• Provides input to the commander’s initial guidance.
• Provides input to the warning order.
• Prepares for subsequent planning.
See facing page for an overview of the running estimate. See also pp. 4-6 to 4-7 for
more in-depth discussion.

4-36 (Planning) III. IO & the MDMP

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

A. Review and Update the Running Estimate

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), p. 4-4. (See also pp. 4-6 to 4-7.)
Running estimates are integral to IO planning. A running estimate is the continuous
assessment of the current situation, and is used to determine if the current operation
is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations
are supportable (ADP 5-0). Running estimates help the IO officer record and track
pertinent information about the information environment leading to a basis for recom-
mendations to the commander.
The IO officer uses the running estimate to assist with completion of each step of the
MDMP. An effective running estimate is as comprehensive as possible within the time
available but also organized so that the information is easily communicated and pro-
cessed. Normally, the running estimate provides enough information to draft the ap-
plicable IO sections of WARNORDs as required during planning and ultimately to draft
applicable IO sections of the operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN).

Information
Planning
e
pl
m
Sa

Figure 4-2. Example graphical IO running estimate.

Variations on the standard, narrative format, such as the example provided in figure
4-2, enable the IO officer to spotlight facts and assumptions, critical planning factors,
and available forces. The latter of these requires input from assigned or available
IRCs. The graphical format also offers a clear, concise mechanism for the IO officer to
articulate recommended high-payoff targets, commander's critical information require-
ments, and requests for forces. Maintaining both formats simultaneously provides
certain benefits: the narrative format enables the IO officer to cut-and-paste sections
directly into applicable sections of orders; the graphical format enables the element to
brief the commander and staff with a single slide.
Running estimate development never stops. The IO officer continuously maintains
and updates the running estimate as pertinent information is received. While at home
station, the IO officer maintains a running estimate on friendly capabilities. If regionally
aligned, the unit prepares its estimate based on research and analysis of the informa-
tion environment within its region and anticipated mission sets.

(Planning) III. IO & the MDMP 4-37

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

B. Participate in Commander’s Initial Assessment

Initial assessment primarily focuses on time and resources available to plan, prepare
and begin execution of an operation. The IO officer assesses readiness to partici-
pate in ADM and MDMP, as well as what external support might be necessary to
ensure effective IO planning.
During the initial assessment, the IO officer establishes a battle rhythm, including
locations, times, preparation requirements, and the anticipated schedule. Upon
receiving a new mission, the IO officer begins gathering planning tools, including a
copy of the higher command OPLAN or OPORD, maps of the area of operations,
appropriate references, and the running estimate. During initial assessment, the IO
officer also coordinates with organic, assigned, and available IRCs and subordinate
units to gauge their planning readiness.
Initial time allocation is important to IO because some operations and activities
require significant time to produce effects or for assessment. The time available may
be a limiting factor for some IRCs. The IO officer identifies activities for which this is
the case and includes these limitations in estimates and recommendations.
The commander determines when to execute time-constrained MDMP. Under time-
constrained conditions, the IO officer relies on existing tools and products, either
his or her own or those of higher headquarters. The lack of time to conduct recon-
naissance requires planners to rely more heavily on assumptions and increases the
Information

importance of routing combat information and intelligence to the people who need it.
Planning

A current running estimate is essential to planning in time-constrained conditions.

e
C. Provide Input to Commander’s Initial Guidance
pl
Commanders include IO-specific guidance in their initial guidance, as required.
Examples include authorized movements of IRCs, initiation of information collection
necessary to support IO, and delineation of IRs.

D. Provide Input to the Initial Warning Order

m

A WARNORD is issued after the commander and staff have completed their initial
assessment and before mission analysis begins. It includes, at a minimum, the
type and general location of the operation, initial timeline, and any movements or
Sa

reconnaissance that need to be initiated. When they receive the initial WARNORD,
subordinate units begin parallel planning.
Parallel planning and collaborative planning are routine MDMP techniques. The time
needed to achieve and assess effects in the information environment makes it espe-
cially important to successful IO. Effective parallel or collaborative planning requires
all echelons to share information fully as soon as it is available. Information sharing
includes providing higher headquarters plans, orders, and guidance to subordinate
IO officers or representatives.
Because some IRCs require a long time to plan or must begin execution early in an
operation, follow-on WARNORDs may include detailed IO information. Although the
MDMP includes three points at which commanders issue WARNORDs, the number
of WARNORDs is not fixed. WARNORDs serve a purpose in planning similar to that
of a fragmentary order (FRAGORD) during execution. Commanders issue both, as
the situation requires. Possible IO officer input to the initial WARNORD includes:
• Tasks to subordinate units and IRCs for early initiation of approved IO actions,
particularly for military deception operations and MISO.
• Essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) to facilitate defend weighted
efforts and begin the OPSEC process.
• Known hazards and risk guidance.
• Military deception guidance and priorities.

4-38 (Planning) III. IO & the MDMP

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Mission Analysis
(Summary of IO Inputs, Actions & Outputs)
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), table 4-1, pp. 4-14 to 4-18.
Table 4-1 provides a summary of the inputs, actions and outputs required of the IO
officer. Only those sub-steps within mission analysis with significant IO activity are listed.
MDMP Sub
-
Inputs IO Officer Actions IO Officer Outputs
Step
• Higher HQ IPB • Develop IPB products • Input to IPB products
• Higher HQ • Analyze and describe the • IRs to G-2 (S-2), as
running information environment in well as the foreign
estimates the unit’s area of operations disclosure officer
• Higher HQ and its effect on friendly, • Refined EEFIs
OPLAN or neutral, adversary, and (OPSEC)
OPORD enemy information efforts
• Higher HQ • Identify threat information
combined capabilities and
information vulnerabilities
overlay • Identify gaps in current
Conduct IPB

intelligence on threat
information efforts
• Identify IO-related high-value
targets
Information

• Determine probable threat

Planning

information-related COAs
• e Assess the potential effects
of IO on friendly, neutral,
adversary, and enemy
pl
operations
• Determine threat’s ability to
collect on friendly critical
information
• Determine additional EEFIs
m
(OPSEC)
• Specified tasks • Identify specified tasks in the • Specified, implied and
from higher HQ higher HQ OPLAN or essential tasks
Determine Specified, Implied, and

OPLAN or OPORD • List of IRCs to G-3 (S-

OPORD • Develop implied tasks 3)
Sa

• IPB and Determine if there are any Input to command

Essential Tasks

• •
combined essential tasks targeting guidance
information
overlay products • Develop input to the • Refined EEFIs
command targeting guidance (OPSEC)
• Assemble critical and
defended asset lists,
especially low density
delivery systems
• Determine additional EEFIs
(OPSEC)
• Current task • Identify friendly IRCs (include • List of available IRCs
organization for capabilities that are joint, [IO running estimate
information interorganizational, and paragraph 1b(4)]
Review Available Assets

related multinational) • Request for additional

capabilities • Analyze IRC command and IRCs, if required
• Higher HQ task support relationships
organization for • Determine if available IRCs
information can perform tasks necessary
related to support lines of operation
capabilities or effort
• Status reports • Identify additional resources
• Unit standard (such as air assets) needed
operating to execute or support IO
procedure
• Commander’s • Identify IO-related constraints • List of constraints (IO
Constraints
Determine

initial guidance appendix to Annex C;

• Higher HQ scheme of IO or
OPLAN or coordinating
OPORD instructions)

4-48 (Planning) III. IO & the MDMP

(Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

MDMP Sub
-
Inputs IO Officer Actions IO Officer Outputs
Step
• Higher HQ • Identify facts and • List of facts and

Facts and Develop

OPLAN or assumptions affecting IRCs assumptions (IO
Identify Critical

Assumptions
OPORD • Submit IRs that will confirm running estimate
• Commander’s or disprove assumptions paragraph 1c.)
initial guidance • Identify facts and • IRs that will confirm or
• Observations assumptions regarding disprove facts and
and reports OPSEC indicators that assumptions
identify vulnerabilities
• Higher HQ • Identify and assess hazards • List of assessed
OPLAN or associated with IO hazards
OPORD
Management

• Propose controls • Input to risk

Begin Risk

• IPB • Identify OPSEC indicators assessment

• Commander’s • Assess risk associated with • Develop risk briefing
initial guidance OPSEC indicators to matrix
determine vulnerabilities • List of provisional
• Establish OPSEC measures OPSEC measures

• IO IRs • Determine information the • Submit IRs

Develop Initial

commander needs in order to

CCIRs and

make critical decisions

EEFIs

concerning IO efforts
• Identify IRs to recommend as
commander’s critical
information requirements

Information
• Initial IPB • Identify gaps in information

Planning
PIRs or IO IRs needed to support planning,
Determine Initial

•
e
Collection Plan

execution, and assessment

Information

of early initiation actions

• Confirm that the initial
pl
information collection plan
includes IRs concerning
enemy capability to collect
EEFIs
• Revised G-5 (S- • Determine time to accomplish • Timeline (provided to
5)/G-3 (S-3) IO planning requirements G-5 (S-5), with
m
Update Plan for

Available Time

plans timeline Assess viability of planning emphasis on the

the Use of

•
timeline vis-à-vis higher HQ effect(s) of long-lead
timeline and threat timeline time events
as determined during IPB
Refine initial time allocation
Sa

•
plan
• Public affairs • Assess impact of initial • PA themes/ messages
Develop Initial Themes and

themes and themes and messages on the and MISO actions/

messages information environment messages de-
adjusted and • Assess whether planned IO conflicted
refined from
Messages

effects will reinforce themes • Initial list of talking

higher HQ and messages points
• MISO actions • Contribute to development of • IRC actions to
and messages talking points aimed at disseminate approved
adjusted and influencing perceptions and messages/ talking
refined from behaviors points
higher HQ

• Commander’s • Prepare input to the warning • Input to mission,

intent and order. Input may include — commander’s intent,
Issue a Warning

guidance - Early tasking to subordinate commander’s critical

• Approved restated units information
Order

mission and initial - Initial mission statement requirements, and

objectives - OPSEC planning guidance concept of the
• Mission analysis - Reconnaissance and operations
products surveillance tasking
• Military deception guidance

COA course of action IPB intelligence preparation of the OPSEC operations security
EEFI essential element of friendly battlefield PA public affairs
information IR information requirements PIR priority intelligence requirement
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence IRC information related capability S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations MISO military information support officer
G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans operations S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff
HQ headquarters OPLAN operations plan officer
IO information operations OPORD operations order S-5 battalion or brigade plans staff
officer

(Planning) III. IO & the MDMP 4-49

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Step VI. Course of Action Approval

After completing the COA comparison, the staff identifies its preferred COA and
recommends it to the commander in a COA decision briefing, if time permits. The
concept of operations for the approved COA becomes the concept of operations for
the operation itself. The scheme of IO for the approved COA becomes the scheme
of IO for the operation. Once a COA is approved, the commander refines the com-
mander’s intent and issues additional planning guidance. The G-3 (S-3) then issues
a WARNORD and begins orders production.
The WARNORD issued after COA approval contains information that executing units
require to complete planning and preparation. Possible IO input to this WARNORD
includes:
• Contributions to the commander’s intent/concept of operations.
• Changes to the CCIRs.
• Additional or modified risk guidance.
• Time-sensitive reconnaissance tasks.
• IRC tasks requiring early initiation.
• A summary of the scheme of IO and IO objectives.
During the COA decision briefing, the IO officer is prepared to present the associated
scheme of IO for each COA and comment on the COA from an IO perspective. If the
Information

IO officer perceives the need for additions or changes to the commander’s intent or
Planning

guidance with respect to IO, they ask for it. e

pl
MDMP Inputs IO Officer Actions IO Officer Outputs
Step

• Updated IO running • Provide input to COA • Finalized scheme of

estimate recommendation IO for approved COA
m
• Evaluated COAs • Re-evaluate input to the • Finalized tasks based
• Recommended COAs commander’s intent and guidance on approved COA
• Updated assumptions • Refine scheme of IO, objectives, • Input to WARNORD
and tasks for approved COA and • Updated
update synchronization matrix
Course of Action Approval

synchronization matrix
Sa

• Prepare input to the WARNORD

• Participate in the COA decision
briefing
• Recommend the COA that IO can
best support
• Request decision on executing any
OPSEC measures that entail
significant resource expenditure or
high risk

COA course of action IO information operations MDMP military decisionmaking process WARNORD warning order

Step VII. Orders Production, Dissemination,

and Transition
Based on the commander’s decision and final guidance, the staff refines the ap-
proved COA and completes and issues the OPLAN/OPORD. Time permitting, the
staff begins planning branches and sequels. The IO officer ensures input is placed in
the appropriate paragraphs of the base order and its annexes, especially the IO ap-
pendix to the operations annex. When necessary, the IO officer or appropriate special
staff officers prepare appendixes for one or more IRCs/
See p. 4-61 for table 4-6 (summary of IO inputs to orders production, dissemination
and transition) along with an annotated format of appendix 15 (Information
Operations) to Annex C (Operations).

4-60 (Planning) III. IO & the MDMP

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Appendix 15 (IO) to Annex C (Operations)

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), fig. A-1. Appendix 15 (IO) to Annex C (Operations).
[CLASSIFICATION]
Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD.
Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in
parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.
Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

Include heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level
attachment.

APPENDIX 15 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION

PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]- [issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
Information

(U) References: Refer to higher headquarters· OPLAN or OPORD and identify map
Planning

sheets for operation (optional). Add any other specific references to IO if needed.
e
1. (U) Situation. Include information affecting information operations (IO) that paragraph
1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion.
pl
a. (U) Area of Interest. Describe the information environment as it relates to IO. Refer
to Tab 1 (Combined Information Overlay) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to An-
nex C (Operations) as required.
m
b. (U) Area of Operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C
(Operations).
(I) (U) Information Environment. Describe the physical. informational. and cogni-
tive dimensions of the information environment that affect IO. Refer to Tab 1 (Combined
Sa

Information Overlay) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) as

required.
(2) (U) Weather. Describe aspects of weather that impact information operations.
Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required
c. (U) Enemy Forces. List known and templated locations and activities of enemy
information unitsfor one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and
information-related capabilities that will impact friendly operations. State probable enemy
courses of action and employment of enemy information assets. Describe the informa-
tional and cognitive dimensions of the information environment that affect enemy actions.
Refer to Tab 1 (Combined lnformation Overlay) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations)
to Annex C (Operations) as required.
d. (U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters· plan as it pertains to IO.
List designation. location. and outline of plan of higher. adjacent. and other jUnctional
area assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and
additional support. Identify friendly IO/lRC assets and resources that affect subordinate
commander IO planning. Identify friendly forces IO vulnerabilities. Identify friendly foreign
forces with which subordinate commanders may operate. Identify potential conflicts
within the information environment especially if conducting joint or multinational opera-
tions. Identijj; and deconflict IRC employment and information environment effects.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

4-62 (Planning) IV. Appendix 15 (IO) to Annex C (Operations)

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

[CLASSIFICATION]
APPENDIX 15 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION
PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]- [issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

Continued on next page

e. (U) Interagency Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify
and describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact the conduct
of IO or implementation of IO-specific equipment and tactics.
f. (U) Civil Considerations. Describe critical aspects of the civil situation that impact
IO. See Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex
B (Intelligence) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required Also refer to Tab 1
(Combined Information Overlay) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C
(Operations) as required.
g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. List IRCs or IO units only as necessary to clarify
task organization. Examples include Tactical MISO Teams, Mobile Public Affairs Detach-
ments, and Visual Information Teams. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) as required.
h. (U) Assumptions. List any IO-specific assumptions.
2. (U) Mission. State the IO mission.
3. (U) Execution.
a. (U) Scheme of Support. Describe how IO supports the commander’s intent and

Information
concept of operations. Establish the priorities of support to unitsfor each phase of the

Planning
operation. Establish IO objectives to employ IRCs to achieve the desired endstate. De-
e
scribe how IO weighted efforts will support offense, defense, and stability tasks. Identify
target sets and effects, by priority. Describe the general conceptfor the integration of
pl
IO. List the staff sections, elements, and working groups responsible for aspects of IO.
Include IO collection methodsfor information developed in staff sections, elements, and
working groups outside the IO element and working group. Ensure subordinate units
and higher headquarters receive the IO synchronization plan. Describe the plan for the
m
integration of unified action and nongovernmental partners and organizations. Refer to
Annex C (Operations) as required This section is designed to provide insight and under-
standing a/how IO is integrated across the operational plan.
b. (U) Assessment. Describe the priorities for assessment and Identify the measures
Sa

of performance and effectiveness and indicators used to assess information operations

objectives against end state conditions. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required.
c. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. List IO tasks assigned to specific subordinate
units not contained in the base order.
d. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List only IO instmctions applicable to two or more
subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight any IO-specific
rules of engagement risk reduction control measures, environmental considerations,
coordination requirements between units, and CCIRs and EEFIs that pertain to IO.
4. (U) Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for IO key tasks and speciJj; ad-
Continued on next page

ditional instructions as required Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required

a. (U) Logistics. Use subparagraphs to Identify priorities and specific instruction for
logistics pertaining to IO. See Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) and An-
nex P (Host-Nation Support) as required.
b. (U) Personnel. Use subparagraphs to Identify priorities and specific instruction for
human resources support pertaining to IO. See Appendix 2 (personnel Services Support)
to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.
c. (U) Health System Support. See Appendix 3 (Army Health System Support) to
Annex F (Sustainment) as required
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

(Planning) IV. Appendix 15 (IO) to Annex C (Operations) 4-63

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 4
(Information Operations)
V. Battle Drills
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 4-1 to 4-2.
FM 3-13 describes battle drills as planning aids designed to speed response to
crisis situations occurring during the conduct of a mission. For IO, quick responses
to enemy or adversary activities, actions, and events in the operational area are nec-
essary to prevent the enemy or adversary from gaining advantage in the information
environment or, conversely, to sustain friendly advantage.

IO Battle Drills

A Identify Critical Events

Information
B Define Information End State

Planning
C
e
Develop Battle Drill
pl
Scheme of Information Operations
m

Staffs develop battle drills during the planning process; however, drills are not
complete and final COAs. Rather, battle drills are predeveloped concepts that antici-
pate crises. Once a crisis occurs, units can adjust the battle drill quickly to address
Sa

the realities of the situation at hand.

A military operation can be thought of as a series of events, planned and unplanned,
that force both friendly and enemy forces to react to a changing situation. Some of
these events, referred to as critical events, directly link to or precipitate mission suc-
cess of friendly or enemy forces. Critical events—
• Can create both intended and unintended effects and may be brought on by
friendly, adversary, or third-party actions.
• Can be either negative or positive. The staff can develop drills that react to
either type:
- For negative critical events, a battle drill should mitigate the impact of the
event on the populace and friendly forces.
- For positive critical events, a battle drill should exploit the event to maximize
the impact on the populace and adversary forces.
• Can be triggers or cues for the staff to initiate a battle drill.
An IO battle drill is a generic scheme of IO that addresses a friendly force IO re-
sponse to a critical event that may occur during execution of the operation. While no
doctrinally established format exists for a battle drill, its format should mirror existing
products or follow unit standard operating procedure. Battle drills are developed to
suit specific missions and potential branches and sequels of missions. Each battle
drill should—

(Planning) V. IO Battle Drills 4-65

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 5 (Information Operations)

PREPARATION
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), chap. 5.

Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to

improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates
conditions that improve friendly force opportunities for success. Because many
IO objectives and IRC tasks require long lead times to create desired effects,
preparation for IO often starts earlier than for other types of operations. Initial
preparation for specific IRCs and IO units (such as 1st IO Command or a Theater
IO Group) may begin during peacetime.

I. IO Preparation Activities
Peacetime preparation by units or capabilities involves building contingency plan
databases about the anticipated area of operations. These databases can be used
for IO input to IPB and to plan IO to defend friendly intentions, such as network
protection and operations security (OPSEC). IO portions of contingency plans are
e
continuously updated. Normal IO working group participants maintain their own data
to provide the IO officer with the latest information.
pl
During peacetime, IO officers prepare for future operations by analyzing anticipated
area(s) of operations’ information environment and likely threat information capabili-
ties. Examples of factors to consider include, but are not limited to—
• Religious, ethnic, and cultural mores, norms, and values.

Information
Preparation
m

• Non-military communications infrastructure and architecture.

• Military communication and command and control infrastructure and architecture.
• Military training and level of proficiency (to determine susceptibility to denial,
Sa

deception, and IO).

• Literacy rate.
• Formal and informal organizations exerting influence and leaders within these
organizations.
• Ethnic factional relationships and languages.
Preparation includes assessing unit readiness to execute IO. Commanders and
staffs monitor preparations and evaluate them against criteria established during
planning to determine variances. This assessment forecasts the effects these factors
have on readiness to execute the overall operation as well as individual IRC tasks.
Preparation for IO takes place at three levels: staff (IO officer), IRC units or ele-
ments, and individual. The IO officer helps prepare for IO by performing staff tasks
and monitoring preparations by IRC units or elements. These units perform prepara-
tion activities as a group for tasks that involve the entire unit, and as individuals for
tasks that each soldier and leader must complete.

Refer to BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 6th Ed. (Plan, Prepare,
Execute, & Assess Military Operations), pp. 1-48 to 1-51 for further
discussion of preparation activities from ADP 5-0 (2019). Specific discus-
sion includes preparation activities commanders, units, and Soldiers
conduct to ensure the force is protected and prepared for execution.
See also p. 5-7 for discussion of preparation fundamentals from ADP
5-0.

Preparation 5-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chapter 3 of ADP 5-0 provides a comprehensive overview of preparation activities.

The activities most relevant to conducting IO include—
• Improve situational understanding.
• Revise and refine plans and orders.
• Conduct coordination and liaison.
• Initiate information collection.
• Initiate security operations.
• Initiate troop movements.
• Initiate network preparation.
• Manage and prepare terrain.
• Conduct confirmation briefs.
• Conduct rehearsals.

A. Improve Situational Understanding

The IO officer/element must understand and share their understanding of the infor-
mation environment with the commander and staff. During preparation, information
collection begins, which helps to validate assumptions and improve situational un-
derstanding. Coordination, liaison, and rehearsals further enhance this understand-
ing. Given the information environment’s complexity, this task is never-ending and
depends on everyone, not just the IO officer, to update and refine understanding of
the information environment. e
B. Revise and Refine Plans and Orders
pl
Plans are not static; the commander adjusts them based on new information. This
information may be the result of analysis of unit preparations, answers to IO IRs, and
updates of threat information capacity and capability.
Information
Preparation

During preparation, the IO officer adjusts the relevant portions of the operation plan
(OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) to reflect the commander’s decisions. The
IO officer also updates the IO running estimate so that it contains the most current
information about adversary information activities, changes in the weather or terrain,
Sa

and friendly IRCs.

The IO officer ensures that IO input to IPB remains relevant throughout planning and
preparation. To do this, they ensure that IO input to the information collection plan is
adjusted to support refinements and revisions made to the OPLAN/OPORD.
IO preparation begins during planning. As the IO appendix begins to take shape, IO
officer coordination with other staff elements is vital because IO affects every other
warfighting function. For example, planning an attack on a command and control
(C2) high-payoff target requires coordination with the targeting team. A comprehen-
sive attack offering a high probability of success may involve air interdiction and
therefore needs to be placed on the air tasking order. It may involve deep attack:
rocket and missile fires have to be scheduled in the fire support plan. Army jammers
and collectors have to fly the missions when and where needed. The IO officer en-
sures the different portions of the OPLAN/OPORD contain the necessary coordinat-
ing instructions for these actions to occur at the right time and place.
Effective IO is consistent at all echelons. The IO officer reviews subordinate unit
OPLANs/OPORDs to ensure IO has been effectively addressed and detect incon-
sistencies. The IO officer also looks for possible conflicts between the command’s
OPLAN/OPORD and those of subordinates. When appropriate, the IO officer re-
views adjacent unit OPLANs/OPORDs for possible conflicts. This review allows the
IO officer to identify opportunities to mass IO effects across units.

5-2 Preparation
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 6 (Information Operations)

EXECUTION
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), chap. 6.

Execution is the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to
accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situa-
tion (ADP 5-0). In execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders
focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. They direct action to apply
combat power at decisive points and times to achieve objectives and accomplish
missions. Inherent in execution is deciding whether to execute planned actions
(such as phases, branches, and sequels) or to modify the plan based on unfore-
seen opportunities or threats.

Execution of IO includes IRCs executing the synchronization plan and the com-
mander and staff monitoring and assessing their activities relative to the plan and
adjusting these efforts, as necessary. The primary mechanism for monitoring and
assessing IRC activities is the IO working group. There are two variations of the
IO working group. The first monitors and assesses ongoing planned operations
e
and convenes on a routine, recurring basis. The second monitors and assesses
unplanned or crisis situations and convenes on an as-needed basis.
pl
I. Information Operations Working Group
The IO working group is the primary means by which the commander, staff and
other relevant participants ensure the execution of IO. The IO working group is a
m
collaborative staff meeting led by the IO officer, and periodically chaired by the G-3
(S-3), executive officer, chief of staff or the commander. It is a critical planning event
integrated into the unit's battle rhythm.

Purpose
Sa

The IO working group is the primary mechanism for ensuring effects in and through the
information environment are planned and synchronized to support the commander's
intent and concept of operations. This means that the staff must assess the current sta-
Information
Execution
tus of operations relative to the end state and determine where efforts are working well
and where they are not. More specifically, they must ensure targets are identified and
nominated at the right place and time to achieve decisive results. The IO working group
occurs regularly in the unit's battle rhythm and always before the next targeting working
group. The only exception is a crisis IO working group (also referred to as consequence
management or crisis action working group), which occurs as soon as feasible before
or after an event or incident that will significantly alter the information environment and
give the threat operational advantage unless handled quickly and adeptly.

Inputs/Outputs
The example in figure 6-1 (following page) is not exhaustive. In terms of inputs, it
identifies those documents, products, and tools that historically and practically have
provided the IO working group the information necessary to achieve consensus and
make informed recommendations to the G-3 (S-3) and commander. The outputs
listed are those considered essential to ensuring the staff can effectively conduct IO.
One tool that the IO working group uses to affirm and adjust the synchronized
employment of IRCs is the IO synchronization matrix. An updated synchronization
matrix is the working group's key output and essential input to the next targeting
meeting. See p. 4-16.
(Execution) Overview 6-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

IO Working Group
Roles & Responsibilities
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), table 6-1, pp. 6-3 to 6-4.
Representative Responsibility
• Distribute read-ahead packets
• Lead working group
Information • Establish and enforce agenda
Operations • Lead information environment update
• Recommend commander’s critical information requirements
• Keep records, track tasks, and disseminate meeting notes
• Provide cyber electromagnetic activities-related information and
Cyber capabilities to support information operations analysis and objectives
Electromagnetic • Coordinate, synchronize and deconflict information operations efforts with
Activities cyberspace electromagnetic activities efforts or cyberspace
electromagnetic activities efforts with information operations efforts
• Advise on both psychological effects (planned) and psychological impacts
(unplanned)
• Advise on use of lethal and nonlethal means to influence selected
audiences to accomplish objectives
Military Information • Develop key leader engagement plans
Support Operations • Monitor and coordinate assigned, attached, or supporting military
information support unit actions
•

•
e
Identify status of influence efforts in the unit, laterally, and at higher and
lower echelons
Provide target audience analysis
pl
• Provide an intelligence update
• Brief information requirements and priority information requirements
G-2 (S-2)
• Develop the initial information collection plan
• Provide foreign disclosure-related guidance and updates
m

• Provide operations update and significant activity update

• Task units or sections based on due outs
G-3 (S-3)
• Update fragmentary orders
Sa

• Maintain a task tracker

Subordinate unit • Identify opportunities for information operations support to lines of effort
information • Provide input to assessments
operations • Provide input to information environment update
Information

• Develop media analysis products

Execution

• Develop media engagement plan

Public Affairs • Provide higher headquarters strategic communication plan
• Provide changes to themes and messages from higher headquarters
• Develop command information plan
• Provides specific country information
• Ensures the timely update of the civil component of the common
operational picture through the civil information management process
• Advise on civil considerations within the operational environment
• Identify concerns of population groups within the projected joint
operational area/area of operations and potential flash points that can
G-9 (S-9) result in civil instability
• Provide cultural awareness briefings
• Advise on displaced civilians movement routes, critical infrastructure, and
significant social, religious, and cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities
• Advise on information impacts on the civil component
• Identify key civilian nodes
Information-related • Serve as subject-matter expert for their staff function or capability
capabilities (IRCs) • Identify opportunities for information-related capability support to lines of
representatives effort or operations

6-2 (Execution) Overview

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Agenda
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 4-3 to 4-4.
The IO working group has a purpose, agenda and proposed timing, inputs and out-
puts, and structure and participants. Figure 4-1 below illustrates these components.
To enhance the IO working group’s effectiveness, the IO officer and element (if one
exists) consider a number of best practices before, during, and after the meeting.
Because it relies on information from the commander’s daily update briefing and feeds
the targeting process, the IO working group occurs between the two events in the
unit’s battle rhythm.

IO Working Group (Agenda/Components)

Purpose Agenda and Proposed Timing
Prioritize, request, and Part 1: Operations and intelligence update 30 min
synchronize IRCs and IO
• Intelligence update 5 min
augmentation to optimize
effects in and through the • Information environment update 3 min
information environment.
• Operations update or significant activities 7 min
Battle rhythm:
Before targeting working • Review plans, future operations, and current operations 5 min
group • Assessment update (information requirements, indicators) 5 min
• Calendar update, due outs, and responsibilities from previous 5 min
meeting
e
Part 2: Stabilize efforts, if any
Part 3: Defend efforts
}
• Review and update
synchronization matrix
6 min
12 min
pl
• Guidance and comments
Part 4: Attack efforts 12 min
Inputs and Outputs Structure and Participants
Inputs: Outputs: Lead: IO officer or representative
• Higher headquarters orders and • Updated scheme of IO [Chair: G-3 (S-3), executive officer,
m
guidance • Updated IO deputy commanding officer, or
• Commander’s intent, concept of synchronization matrix commander]
operations, and narrative • Key leader engagement
• IRC status (running estimates) recommendations Core participants: MISO, G-2 (S-2),
Sa

• Intelligence collections assets • Refined themes and subordinate unit representatives, G-3
messages (S-3), fires, G-9 (S-9), operations
• CIO and IPB security, public affairs, CEMA (CO and
• Media monitoring analysis • Refined operational EW)
products
Information
• Cultural calendar
• Target nominations
Execution
• Engagements schedule Other participants (mission and
• Updated CIO situation dependent): G-1 (S-1), G-4
• Audience analysis (S-4), G-5 (S-5), G-6 (S-6), space
• Plans and orders
• Scheme of IO and update operations, MILDEC, combat camera,
synchronization matrix FAO, FDO, special forces liaison, KM
• Information officer, engineer, STO chief, chaplain,
• Commander’s objectives for IO requirements staff judge advocate, unified action
• Measures of effectiveness and partner representatives
performance
CEMA cyberspace electromagnetic activities IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
CIO combined information overlay IRC information-related capability
CO cyberspace operations KM knowledge management
EW electronic warfare MILDEC military deception
FAO foreign area officer min minute
FDO foreign disclosure officer MISO military information support operations
G-1 assistant chief of staff, personnel S-1 personnel staff officer
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence S-2 intelligence staff officer
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations S-3 operations staff officer
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics S-4 logistics staff officer
G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans S-5 plans staff officer
G-6 assistant chief of staff, signal S-6 signal staff officer
G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations S-9 civil affairs operations staff officer
IO information operations STO special technical operations

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, fig. 4-1. Components of an information operations working group.

(Execution) Overview 6-3

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 6
I. IO Weighted Efforts
and Enabling Activities
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), chap. 2.

Unified Land Operations

Unified land operations applies land power as part of unified action to defeat the
threat on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander’s end
state. Combat power is the primary means by which Army forces apply land power.
IO synchronization supports combat power by harnessing the information element to
optimize the warfighting functions and leadership. In turn, this optimization enables
commanders to seize the initiative through decisive action.
Unified land operations span the entire competition continuum. They are conducted
to support all four Army strategic roles. The relative emphasis on the various ele-
ments of decisive action vary with the purpose and context of the operations being
conducted.
See pp. 1-17 to 1-26 for discussion of how IO supports the four Army strategic roles
from ADP 3-13.1 (Oct ‘18). See pp. 1-11 to 1-16 for discussion of information as an
element of combat power.
e
pl
m
Sa

Information
Execution

The mission determines the relative weight of effort among the elements.
Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), fig. 3-1. Decisive action.

Decisive Action
Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive,
and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks (ADRP 3-0). IO contributes
to decisive action through the continuous and simultaneous combination and
synchronization of IRCs in support of offense, defense, and stability tasks. IO itself
is not offensive, defensive, or stabilizing, but contributes to all of these simultane-
ously by weighting its efforts in such a way that it achieves requisite effects in and
through the information environment in support of the commander’s intent.
See following pages for discussion of IO weighted efforts in decisive action.

(Execution) I. IO Weighted Efforts & Enabling Activities 6-9

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

I. Weighted Efforts
IO weighted efforts are broad orientations used to focus the integration and synchroni-
zation of IRCs to create effects that seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in the in-
formation environment. Commanders, supported by their staffs, visualize and describe
how IO will support the concept of operations by aligning and balancing the efforts of
defend, attack, and stabilize with corresponding decisive action tasks as shown below.

e
pl
m
Ref: FM 3-12, fig. 2-1. IO weighted efforts. See following pages (pp. 6-11 to 6-13) for
further discussion of IO weighted efforts: defend, attack, and stabilize.

IO and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Sa

IO does not participate in defense support of civil authorities. However, if

requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense, select
IRCs may support civil authorities in the conduct of their operations.
Information
Execution

To support decisive action effectively, the commander and staff undertake

three enabling activities—analyze and depict the information environment,
determine IRCs and IO organizations available, and optimize IRC effects. These
activities start with understanding and visualizing the information environment in all
its complexity. They progress to determining the array of IRCs and IO organizations
available to affect the information environment. They culminate with optimizing IRC
effects through effective planning, preparation, execution and assessment.

II. IO Enabling Activities

To support decisive action, as well as accomplish IO’s purpose, commanders, staffs,
and in particular, the IO officer or representative, undertake and accomplish three
enabling activities:
• Analyze and depict the information environment in all its complexity.
• Determine the array of IRCs and IO organizations (such as Theater IO Groups)
available to affect the information environment and the advantages each offers.
• Optimize the effects of IRCs through effective planning, preparation, execution,
and assessment.
See p. 6-14 for further discussion of these IO enabling activities.

6-10 (Execution) I. IO Weighted Efforts & Enabling Activities

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

(IO Weighted Effort)

A. DEFEND

Continued on next page

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 2-1 to 2-2.

When the IO effort necessitates a defend orientation, it seeks to create effects

in the information environment that accomplish any one or combination of the
following (not all inclusive):
Physical Dimension
• Locking or otherwise physically securing documents, equipment and
infrastructure that facilitate decision making.
• Protecting documents, equipment, and structures from destruction or
degradation.
• Protecting key personnel from attack or exploitation.
• Using obscurants to mask movements.

Informational Dimension
• Encrypting communications.
• Preserving the free-flow of information and access to data and informa-
tion sources. e
• Employing knowledge management principles.
pl
• Proactively identifying instances of social engineering or malware and
keeping virus andother protections current.
• Using forensics to determine sources of attack.
m
• Countering enemy or adversary information efforts.

Cognitive Dimension
• Making decentralized decisions.
Sa

• Checking facts and assumptions.

• Using precedents or best practices.
• Using red teaming.
Information
Execution
IRCs that are most often synchronized to achieve a defend orientation in the
information environment include, but are not limited to:
• Cyberspace operations.
• Electronic warfare.
• Military deception.
Continued on next page

• MISO.
• Operations security (OPSEC).
• Physical security.
• Destruction and lethal actions.
• Special technical operations.

(Execution) I. IO Weighted Efforts & Enabling Activities 6-11

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 6
II. Coordination of
Intelligence Support
ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. 5-1 to 5-3.

I. Intelligence Support to Information

Operations
An important synergy exists between IO and the intelligence and fires warf-
ighting functions. Among the doctrinal tasks of the intelligence warfighting function
is providing support to IO, IRCs, and targeting. The integration of IO into the target-
ing process—a task managed within the fires warfighting function—is important to
mission accomplishment across the range of military operations.
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration,
evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or poten-
tial operations (JP 2-0). IO planning and execution rely on the existing intelligence
capabilities of the command to provide support. IO significantly increases the de-
mand for intelligence to support detailed analysis of the information environment and
e
the adversary’s use of the information environment.

Key Terms
pl
• Information requirement. Any information elements the commander and staff
require to successfully conduct operations (ADRP 6-0).
• Intelligence requirement. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the
m

command’s knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat

forces (JP 2-0).
• Priority intelligence requirement. An intelligence requirement that the
commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the
Sa

operational environment (JP 2-01). The commander designates PIRs. Informa-

tion requirements not designated by the commander as PIRs become intelligence
requirements.
Information

• Intelligence estimate. The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available

Execution

intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining

the courses of action open to the enemy or adversary and the order of probability
of their adoption (JP 2-0).
• Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The systematic process of analyz-
ing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an
area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3).

Intelligence support to IO is an intelligence community task. Agencies outside

the intelligence community provide information that contributes to the overall support
of IO that is integrated into intelligence products supporting the mission. The intel-
ligence staff is responsible for coordinating and overseeing all command intelligence;
however, each staff section and element involved in planning and execution has a
responsibility to assist in this task. Thus, IO planners work closely with intelligence
personnel throughout the intelligence process to ensure ethical, effective, and ef-
ficient intelligence support. Additionally, the IO staff conducts its own research and
analysis.

(Execution) II. Coordination of Intelligence Support 6-15

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 7
I. Fires
(IO Considerations)
Ref: ADP 3-19, Fires (Jul ‘19), chap. 1 and ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), p. 5-5.
Success in large-scale combat operations is dependent on the Army’s ability to em-
ploy fires. Fires enable maneuver. Over the past two decades, potential peer threats
have invested heavily in long-range fires and integrated air defense systems, making
it even more critical that the U.S. Army possess the ability to maneuver and deliver
fires in depth and across domains.

I. The Fires Warfighting Function

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and
converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range
of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and
nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and Joint forces, as well as other
unified action partners. The fires warfighting function does not wholly encompass,
nor is it wholly encompassed by, any particular branch or function. Many of the
capabilities that contribute to fires also contribute to other warfighting functions, often
e
simultaneously. For example, an aviation unit may simultaneously execute missions
that contribute to the movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment,
protection, and command and control warfighting functions. Additionally, air defense
pl
artillery (ADA) units conduct air and missile defense (AMD) operations in support of
both fires and protection warfighting functions.
Commanders must execute and integrate fires, in combination with the other
elements of combat power, to create and converge effects and achieve the
m

desired end state. Fires tasks are those necessary actions that must be conducted
to create and converge effects in all domains to meet the commander’s objectives.
The tasks of the fires warfighting function are:
Sa

Integrate Army, multinational, and joint fires through:

• Targeting.
• Operations process.
• Fire support.
• Airspace planning and management.
• Electromagnetic spectrum management.
• Multinational integration.
• Rehearsals.
• Air and missile defense planning and integration.
Execute fires across all domains and in the information environment, employing:
Targeting
Fires &

• Surface-to-surface fires.
• Air-to-surface fires.
• Surface-to-air fires.
• Cyberspace operations and EW.
• Space operations.
• Multinational fires.
• Special operations.
• Information operations.
See pp. 7-4 to 7-5 for an overview and further discussion.
(Fires & Targeting) I. Fires 7-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

IV. Joint Fires (IO Considerations)

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. III.
To employ fires is to use available weapons and other systems to create a specific effect
on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the employment of forces from two or
more components in coordinated action to produce desired results in support of a common
objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects, but various other tools and methods
can be employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This function encom-
passes the fires associated with a number of tasks, missions, and processes, including:
• Conduct joint targeting. This is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and
matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of command objectives,
operational requirements, and capabilities.
• Provide joint fire support. This task includes joint fires that assist joint forces to
move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, space, cyberspace, airspace,
and key waters.
• Countering Air and Missile Threats. This task integrates offensive and defensive
operations and capabilities to achieve and maintain a desired degree of air superior-
ity and force protection. These operations are planned to destroy or negate enemy
manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch.
• Interdict Enemy Capabilities. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the
enemy’s military surface capabilities before they can be used effectively against
friendly forces or to otherwise achieve their objectives.
e
• Conduct Strategic Attack. This task includes offensive action against targets—
whether military, political, economic, or other—which are selected specifically in
pl
order to achieve national or military strategic objectives.
• Employ IRCs. IRCs are tools, techniques, or activities employed within the infor-
mation environment to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. In
the context of the fires function, this task focuses on the integrated employment
m

of IRCs in concert with other LOOs and LOEs, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp an enemy’s decision making.
• Assess the Results of Employing Fires. This task includes assessing the effec-
Sa

tiveness and performance of fires as well as their contribution to the larger opera-
tion or objective.

Joint Fires (Key Considerations Related to IO)

Capabilities That Can Create Nonlethal Effects. Some capabilities can generate
nonlethal effects that limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and may reduce
opportunities for enemy or adversary propaganda. They may also reduce the number
of casualties associated with excessive use of force, limit reconstruction costs, and
maintain the good will of the local populace. Some capabilities are nonlethal by de-
sign and include, but are not limited to, blunt impact and warning munitions, acoustic
and optical warning devices, and vehicle and vessel stopping systems.
Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace attack actions create various direct denial effects
Targeting
Fires &

in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) and manipulation that

leads to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains.
Electronic Attack (EA). EA involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed
energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment to
degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capability.
Military Information Support Operations (MISO). MISO convey selected informa-
tion and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and
objective reasoning, and ultimately induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior
favorable to the originator’s objectives.

7-6 (Fires & Targeting) I. Fires

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Leveraging Information
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations, w/Chg 1 (Oct ‘18), pp. III-17 to III-22.

All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features and
details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain
understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior
and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities
to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to
others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects
strategic outcomes.
Regardless of its mission, the joint force considers the likely impact of all operations on
relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior. The JFC then plans
and conducts every operation in ways that create desired effects that include maintain-
ing or inducing relevant actor behaviors. These ways may include the timing, duration,
scope, scale, and even visibility of an operation; the deliberately planned presence, pos-
ture, or profile of assigned or attached forces in an area; the use of signature manage-
ment in deception operations; the conduct of activities and operations to similarly impact
behavioral drivers; and the employment of specialized capabilities -- e.g., key-leader
engagements (KLE), cyberspace operations (CO), military information support operations
(MISO), electronic warfare (EW), and civil affairs (CA) -- to reinforce the JFC’s efforts.
Tasks aligned under this activity apply the JFC’s understanding of the impact informa-
tion has on perceptions, attitudes, and decision-making processes to affect the behav-
e
iors of relevant actors in ways favorable to joint force objectives.

Influence Relevant Actors

pl
Regardless of its mission, the joint force considers the likely impact of all operations on
relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior. The JFC then plans
and conducts every operation in ways that create desired effects that include maintain-
m

ing or inducing relevant actor behaviors. These ways may include the timing, duration,
scope, scale, and even visibility of an operation; the deliberately planned presence, pos-
ture, or profile of assigned or attached forces in an area; the use of signature manage-
ment in deception operations; the conduct of activities and operations to similarly impact
Sa

behavioral drivers; and the employment of specialized capabilities (e.g., KLE, CO, mili-
tary information support operations [MISO], EW, CA) to reinforce the JFC’s efforts. Since
some relevant actors will be located outside of the JFC’s OA, coordination, planning,
and synchronization of activities with other commands or mission partners is vital.

Inform Domestic, International, and Internal Audiences

Inform activities involve the release of accurate information to domestic and interna-
tional audiences to put joint operations in context; facilitate informed perceptions about
military operations; and counter adversarial misinformation, disinformation, and propa-
ganda. Inform activities help to assure the trust and confidence of the US population,
allies, and partners and to deter and dissuade adversaries and enemies.
Targeting

Attack and Exploit Information, Information Networks, and

Fires &

Systems
The joint force attacks and exploits information, information networks, and systems
to affect the ability of relevant actors to leverage information in support of their own
objectives. This includes the manipulation, modification, or destruction of information
or disruption of the flow of information for the purpose of gaining a position of military
advantage. This also includes targeting the credibility of information.

See p. 1-19 for related discussion of “information advantage” (positions of relative

advantage) and also pp. 2-1 to 2-6, information (as one of the joint functions).

(Fires & Targeting) I. Fires 7-7

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 7
II. Targeting
(IO Integration)
Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), chap. 7 and ATP 3-13.1, The
Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. 5.
Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appro-
priate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP
3-0). IO is integrated into the targeting cycle to produce effects in and through the
information environment that support objectives. The targeting cycle facilitates the
engagement of the right target with the right asset at the right time. The IO officer
or representative is a part of the targeting team, responsible to the commander and
staff for all aspects of IO.

Targeting Methodology
Army targeting methodology is based on four functions: decide, detect, deliver,
and assess (D3A) (see figure 7-1). The decide function occurs concurrently with
planning. The detect function occurs during preparation and execution. The deliver
function occurs primarily during execution, although some IO-related targets may
be engaged while the command is preparing for the overall operation. The assess
function occurs throughout. e
pl
m
Sa

Targeting
Fires &

Ref: FM 3-13, fig. 7-1. The operations process, targeting cycle and IO-related tasks.
The targeting process is cyclical. The command’s battle rhythm determines the
frequency of targeting working group meetings. IO-related target nominations are
developed by the IO officer and by the IO working group, which validates all IO-
related targets before they are nominated to the targeting working group. Therefore,
the IO working group is always scheduled in advance of the targeting working group.

(Fires & Targeting) II. Targeting 7-11

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

II. Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A)

Army targeting methodology is based on four functions: decide, detect, deliver, and
assess (D3A). The decide function occurs concurrently with planning. The detect
function occurs during preparation and execution. The deliver function occurs
primarily during execution, although some IO-related targets may be engaged while
the command is preparing for the overall operation. The assess function occurs
throughout.

D - Decide
The decide function is part of the planning activity of the operations process. It oc-
curs concurrently with the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). During the de-
cide function, the targeting team focuses and sets priorities for intelligence collection
and attack planning. Based on the commander’s intent and concept of operations,
the targeting team establishes targeting priorities for each phase or critical event of
an operation. The following products reflect these priorities—
• High-payoff target list.
• Information collection plan.
• Target selection standards.
• Attack guidance matrix.
• Target synchronization matrix.

e
The high-payoff target list is a prioritized list of targets whose loss to the enemy will
significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff
targets (HPTs) are those high-value targets (HVTs) identified during COA develop-
pl
ment and validated in subsequent steps that must be acquired and successfully at-
tacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. Examples of IO-related
HPTs are threat command and control nodes and intelligence collection assets/
capabilities.
m

The information collection plan, prepared by the G-3 (S-3) and coordinated with the
entire staff, synchronizes the four primary means information collection to provide
intelligence to the commander. The G-2 (S-2) ensures all available collection assets
Sa

provide the required information. Information requirements submitted by the IO

officer can require longer lead times to detect targets and dwell times to assess the
effects of IRCs directed against these targets.
Target selection standards establish criteria for deciding when targets are located
accurately enough to attack. These criteria are often more complicated for IO, espe-
cially when attempting to identify actors and audiences with precision.
The attack guidance matrix addresses how and when targets are to be engaged and
desired effects of the engagement. For IO-related targets, effects are diverse, run-
ning the gamut from destruction of assets to changed behaviors.
The target synchronization matrix is a list of HPTs by category and the agencies
responsible for detecting them, attacking them, and assessing the effects of the
Targeting

attacks. It combines data from the high-payoff target list, information collection plan
Fires &

and attack guidance matrix.

The targeting team develops or contributes to these products throughout the MDMP.
The commander approves them during COA approval. The IO officer ensures they
include information necessary to engage IO-related targets. IO-related vulnerability
analyses done by the G-2 (S-2) and IO officer provide a basis for deciding which IO-
related targets to attack.
See following pages (pp. 7-16 to 7-21) for further discussion of “Decide” targeting
tasks during the MDMP.

7-14 (Fires & Targeting) II. Targeting

(Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

D - Detect
This function involves locating HPTs accurately enough to engage them. It primarily
entails execution of the information collection plan. All staff agencies, including the
IO officer, are responsible for passing to the G-2 (S-2) information collected by their
assets that answer IRs. Conversely, the G-2 (S-2) is responsible for passing combat
information and intelligence to the agencies that identified the IRs. Sharing informa-
tion allows timely evaluation of attacks, assessment of IO, and development of new
targets. Effective information and knowledge management are, therefore, essential.
The information collection plan focuses on identifying HPTs and answering PIRs.
These are prioritized based on the importance of the target or information to the
commander’s concept of operation and intent. When designated by the commander,
PIRs can include requirements concerning IO; obtaining answers to these require-
ments will assist the IO officer in assessing IO. Thus, there is some overlap between
detect and assess functions. Detecting targets for nonlethal attacks may require
information collection support from higher headquarters. The targeting team adjusts
the high-payoff target list and attack guidance matrix to meet changes as the situa-
tion develops. The IO officer submits new IO IRs/RFIs as needed.
During the detect function, the IO officer updates the high-payoff target list and target
synchronization matrix. In addition to the information collection plan, the IO officer will
use other information sources, particularly culturally-attuned ones that have unique
access to or knowledge of the information environment and its various audiences.
Examples include atmospheric teams; cultural attaches or advisors; joint, interorgani-
e
zational or multinational partner cultural experts; interpreters, or indigenous leaders.

D - Deliver
pl
This function occurs primarily during execution, although some IO-related targets
may be engaged while the command is preparing for the overall operation. The
key to understanding the deliver function is to know which assets are available to
perform a specific function or deliver a specific effect and to ensure these assets
m

are ready and capable. Examples of delivery methods include but are not limited to:
corps/division/brigade commander, provincial reconstruction team member or other
unified action partner, host nation government leader, loudspeaker, media broad-
Sa

cast., social media posts and videos, and patrols.

During this step, the IO officer executes relevant portions of the target synchroniza-
tion matrix. As IO-related delivery means and methods are multi-faceted and often
involve human interaction, this step includes recording the delivery act and keeping
detailed accounts or notes of actions taken or the proceedings, discussions, and
commitments involved. The IO officer will ensure that required reporting procedures
are explained and disseminated in the operations order or as part of the unit’s stan-
dard operating procedures.

A - Assess
There are multiple types and levels of assessment. Assessment within D3A specifi-
Targeting

cally focuses on whether the commander’s targeting guidance was met for a specific
Fires &

target. From an IO perspective, such guidance may speak in terms of influence or

degraded decision making, which are difficult to quantify. In the case of engage-
ments, for example, assessment will help determine whether messages were
retained by the target, whether these messages resulted in changed behavior, and
whether reengagement may be necessary. An ongoing consideration in the informa-
tion environment is that there may be a significant lag between the time of delivery,
the effect taking place, and determination of an effect.
During this step, the IO officer and IRCs evaluate measures of effectiveness and
performance to determine if desired effects were achieved. If not, it recommends
re-engagement or other actions.

(Fires & Targeting) II. Targeting 7-15

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

III. Targeting Tasks during the MDMP

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 7-2 to 7-6.

A. Mission Analysis
The two targeting-related IO products of mission analysis are a list of IO-related HVTs
and recommendations for the commander’s targeting guidance. The IO officer works
with the G-2 (S-2) during IPB to develop IO-related HVTs, and with other members of
the targeting team to develop IO targeting guidance recommendations.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

IPB includes preparing templates that portray threat forces and assets unconstrained
by the environment. The intelligence cell adjusts threat templates based on terrain
and weather to create situational templates that portray possible threat COAs. These
situational templates allow the intelligence to identify HVTs. The IO officer works with
the intelligence cell throughout IPB to identify threat information-related capabilities and
vulnerabilities and other key groups in the area of operations. These capabilities and
vulnerabilities become IO-related HVTs.
See pp. 4-17 to 4-34 for related discussion of IO & IPB (information environment analysis).

Targeting Guidance
Issued within the commander’s guidance is targeting guidance. This guidance describes
e
the desired effects the commander wants to achieve. IO targeting focuses on HVTs that
support critical, information-related threat capabilities that underpin their objectives and
are vulnerable to friendly IO exploitation.
pl
The IO officer develops input to targeting guidance based on the initial mission and
available and anticipated IRCs. The IO officer identifies the functions, capabilities, or
units to be attacked; the effects desired; and the purpose for the attack. The IO officer
m
uses the targeting guidance to select IO-related HPTs from among identified HVTs.
These HPTs are confirmed during COA analysis.
Targeting guidance is developed separately from IO objectives. IO objectives are generally
broad in scope. They encompass all IO weighted efforts (attack, defend, stabilize). The IO
Sa

officer develops recommendations for targeting guidance that supports achieving objectives.
When developing IO input to the targeting guidance, the IO officer considers the time
required to achieve effects and the time required to determine results. Some IRCs require
targeting guidance that allows for the acquisition, engagement, and assessment of targets
while the unit is preparing for the overall operation. For example, the commander may
want to psychologically and electronically isolate the enemy’s reserve before engaging
it with fires. Doing this requires electronic attack of threat command and control systems
and military information support operations (MISO) directed at the threat 24 to 48 hours
before lethal fires are initiated. Successfully achieving IO objectives for this phase of the
operation requires targeting guidance that gives IO-related targets the appropriate priority.

B. COA Development
Targeting
Fires &

Feasible COAs, that integrate the effects of all elements of combat power, are devel-
oped by the staff. The IO officer prepares a scheme of IO that identifies objectives and
IRC tasks for each COA. The IRC tasks are correlated with targets on the HVT list. A
single IRC or multiple IRCs can be planned against a single HVT.
For each COA, the IO officer identifies HVTs that will support attainment of an IO objec-
tive. IO-related HVTs that subsequently support friendly IO objectives, and that can
be engaged by IRCs, become HPTs. The targeting team also performs target value
analysis, coordinates and deconflicts targets, and establishes assessment criteria. The
IO officer participates in each of these tasks.

7-16 (Fires & Targeting) II. Targeting

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Target Value Analysis (TVA)

The targeting team performs target value analysis for each COA the staff develops. The
initial sources for target value analysis are target spreadsheets and target sheets. Target
spreadsheets (target folders) identify target sets associated with adversary functions that

Continued on next page

could interfere with each friendly COA or that are key to adversary success. IO-related
targets can be analyzed as a separate target set or incorporated into other target sets.
The IO officer establishes any IO-specific target sets. Each target set is assigned a prior-
ity based on its contribution to the success of a friendly objective, its impact on an enemy
or adversary COA, and friendly capability to service the target.
The targeting team uses target spreadsheets during the war game to determine which
HVTs to attack. The IO officer ensures that target spreadsheets include information
on threat capabilities and IO-related HVTs and that the IO target set, if designated, is
assigned a value appropriate to IO’s relative importance to each friendly COA. If an IO
target set is not designated, the IO officer ensures that IO-related targets are assigned an
appropriate priority within the target sets used.
Target sheets contain the information required to engage a specific target. Target sheets
state how attacking the target affects the threat’s operation. The IO officer prepares target
sheets for HVTs to analyze them from an IO planning perspective. These HVTs are ex-
pressed as target subsets, such as decision makers. Information requirements include:
• What influences these decision makers.
• How they communicate.
• With whom they communicate. e
• Weaknesses, susceptibilities, accessibility, feasibility, and pressure points.
pl
Deconflicting and Coordinating Targets
The IO officer and working group consider the possible consequences of attacking any
target or target set. Their purpose is to identify possible duplication or attenuation of ef-
fects. The attack of physical targets always has second- and third-order effects (informa-
m

tional and cognitive) that could diminish or enhance their value to the overall operation.
For example, fires that result in the collateral deaths of civilian non-combatants can have
a negative cognitive effect, while using fires to destroy the enemy’s fiber network so that
Sa

it relies on radio communications vulnerable to jamming can have a positive informational

effect. Also, the effects achieved by one IRC might compete with or diminish the effects of
another IRC. Thus, IRC synchronization and the integration of IO into other lines of effort
requires methodical coordination and deconfliction efforts.
IO working group members consider all targets from their various perspectives. Deconflic-
tion in this context means ensuring that engaging a target does not produce effects that
interfere with the effects of other IRC tasks or IO-related targets, or otherwise inhibit mis-
sion accomplishment. Coordination ensures that the effects of engaging different targets
complement each other and further the commander’s intent.
IO officers at different echelons may seek to engage the same targets and, possibly,
Continued on next page

desire different effects. Therefore, IO-focused targeting includes coordinating and de-
conflicting targets with higher and subordinate units before the targeting working group
Targeting
Fires &

meets. Some IO-related targets may also be nominated by other staff elements. The IO
officer presents the effects required to accomplish the IO objective associated with those
targets when the targeting team determines how to engage them. IO officers must also
coordinate and deconflict targets with unified action partners whose doctrinal use of IRCs
and policies governing their employment differ. Such coordination extends the planning
horizon and may limit how IRCs are integrated.
One way to achieve this coordination and deconfliction is by beginning parallel planning
as early as possible in the MDMP. This means that the IO officer and the targeting team
should share all pertinent information with subordinate units and adjacent and higher
headquarters.

(Fires & Targeting) II. Targeting 7-17

 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Chap 8
(Information Operations)
ASSESSMENT
Ref: ATP 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. 6 and FM
3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), chap. 8.

I. Assessment Framework
All plans and orders have a general logic. This logic links tasks given to subordinate
units with achieving objectives and achieving objectives with attaining the opera-
tion’s end state. An assessment framework incorporates the logic of the plan and
uses measures—MOEs and MOPs—as tools to determine progress toward attaining
desired end state conditions, as shown on figure 6-1.

e
pl
m
Sa

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, fig. 6-1. Framework for assessment.

The purpose of assessment is to support the commander’s decision making.

Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current con-
ditions and determine how the operation is progressing. Continuous assessment
helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force to changing circumstances.
Commanders incorporate assessments by the staff, subordinate command-
ers, and unified action partners into their personal assessments of the situation.
Based on their own assessments, commanders modify plans and orders to adapt
the force to changing circumstances. Assessment is a staff-wide effort, not simply
the product of a working group or a particular staff section or command post cell.
Assessment of IO objectives and effects is an integral part of the staff-wide as-
sessment process. Assessment requires a commitment of resources that must be
balanced against other competing requirements and priorities of work; however,
Information
Assessment

without sufficient resources, assessments often prove ineffective or fail altogether.

This means that the IO officer will need to negotiate and prioritize this effort to
make it meaningful to support decision making.

Assessment 8-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

II. IO Assessment Considerations

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec ‘16), pp. 8-3 to 8-5. See also pp. 8-7 to 8-9.
Assessment of IO in general and of specific effects in the information environment
require careful development of measures of effectiveness and performance, as well as
identification of indicators that will best signal achievement of these measures and de-
sired outcomes. Assessment in the information environment is not easy and adherence
to the following considerations will aid in making IO assessment more effective.

e
Ref: FM 3-13, fig. 8-2. Logic flow and components of an IO objective. Figure 8-2 portrays
pl
the relationship between objectives (the change that needs to happen) and measures of
performance, indicators, and measures of effectiveness. The logic of the effort is shown
as a relationship between available, selected, and synchronized IRCs and the effects
expected over time. While the figure suggests that this logic is generic, it is not. It is
m

unique to every objective and combination of IRCs.

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)
A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior,
Sa

capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an

end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). Measures of
effectiveness help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. They are
commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans.
Time is a factor when assessing IO and developing measures of effectiveness. The
attainment of IO objectives leading to the commander’s desired end state often requires
days or months to realize. It is essential, therefore, to have a baseline from which to
measure change and also to time-bound the change. Time-bounding makes clear how
long it will take before the change is observed. It helps to set necessary expectations,
foster patience, and avoid a rush to judgment. If a behavioral objective is anticipated to
take considerable time, assessment planning may choose to break the objective into
smaller increments, each with more immediate observable outcomes. Finally, it is also
important to analyze and understand the cultural relevance of time in the area of opera-
tions and account for and adapt to it.
Developing informational, behavioral and sentiment baselines often requires significant
time and resource investments. Sentiment baselines, such as those determined through
surveys or interviews, may require contracted labor to accomplish. The IO officer must
factor in the lead time necessary to contract a third-party, provide it time to develop the
survey instrument, administer the survey, and tabulate and report on the results.
Information
Assessment

Commanders and staffs, particularly the IO officer, must account for the order of effects
when assessing IO or, more broadly, any effect. For example, an effect in the physical
dimension (1st order) can resonate in unexpected ways in the informational and cogni-

8-2 Assessment
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

VIII. Assessment Products

Staff assessment products should directly support the commander’s requirements,
such as deepening understanding of the operational and information environments,
measuring progress toward achieving objectives and accomplishing the mission, and
informing the commander’s intent and guidance. Efficient staffs also develop, tailor,
and optimize products to meet the commander’s expectations and ways of receiving
information. Campaign assessments are substantially fuller or richer in terms of the
scope of information presented than is a task assessment.
As figure 6-5 depicts below, achieving IO objectives depends on producing specific
effects in the information environment that ultimately cause the enemy or adver-
sary—as well as many intervening variables, actors, or audiences—to change
behavior. Figure 6-6 illustrates several common methods for depicting trends or
the status of a given condition in an information environment. Figure 6-7 provides a
counterinsurgency example that depicts indicator trends supporting an MOE.

e
pl
m

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, fig. 6-6. Sample assessment product templates

Sa

Ref: ATP 3-13.1, fig. 6-7. Example counterinsurgency MOE assessment.

Note. Staffs can use each of these methods to measure progress among any of the
Information
Assessment

various elements of an IO objective, either singly or in combination: the objective

itself or the MOE, MOP, and indicators that support it. Also, effective staffs pair a
diagram with additional essential or optional information that facilitates decision
making, most importantly the bottom line or “so what.”

8-10 Assessment
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

(INFO1)

Index
Index
A Civil-Military Operations Cen- Crisis and Limited Contin-
Additional IRCs, 3-71 ter (CMOC), 3-24 gency Operations, 1-28
Analyze and Depict the Civil-Military Operations, Criteria Development, 8-8
Information Environment, 3-17 Critical Events, 4-66
4-17, 6-14 CMO and the Range of Mili- Cyberspace Actions, 3-51,
Appendix 15 (IO) to Annex C tary Operations, 3-18 3-52
(Operations), 4-61 CMO in Joint Operations, Cyberspace Domain, 3-48
Application of Information- 3-22 Cyberspace Electromagnetic
Related Capabilities COA Analysis and War Gam- Activities (CEMA), 3-45,
(IRCs), 2-8, 2-11 ing (JPP), 2-24 3-46
Army Cyberspace Missions COA Approval (JPP), 2-25 Cyberspace Missions, 3-51
and Actions, 3-54 COA Comparison (JPP), Cyberspace Operations
Army Design Methodology 2-25 (CO), 2-14, 3-45, 3-47,
(ADM), 4-2 COA Development (JPP), 3-50
Army Space Capabilities,
3-66
Army-Joint Relationships,
e
2-24
Cognitive Dimension, 2-10
Combat Camera (COM-
D
Decide, Detect, Deliver, As-
pl
1-10 CAM), 3-14 sess (D3A), 7-14
Assessing During Execution, Combat Power, 1-11 Decision Making During
6-5 Combatant Commands, 2-18 Execution, 6-6
m
Assessment, 2-27, 8-1 Combined Information Over- Decisive Action, 6-9
Assessment Focus, 8-5 lay (CIO), 4-32 Defense Support of Civil
Assessment Framework, 8-1 Combined Space Tasking Authorities (DSCA)
Assessment Methods, 8-6 Order (CSTO), 3-69 6-10
Sa

Assessment Process, 8-6 Command Posts, 6-4 Determination of Assets, 3-3

Assessment Products, 8-10 Commander, 1-29, 4-3 Determine IRCs and IO
Organizations Available,
Assessment Rationale, 8-4 Commander’s Communica-
6-14
Attack & Delivery Capabili- tion Synchronization
(CCS), 2-12, 3-11 Determine Threat Courses of
ties, 7-8
Action (IPB), 4-34
Attack and Exploit Informa- Commander’s Critical In-
formation Requirements Dynamic Targeting
tion, Information Net-
(CCIRs), 4-9 (F2T2EA), 7-22
works, and Systems, 2-3
Audiences, Stakeholders, Commander’s Guidance, 4-5
and Publics, 3-12 Commander’s Intent, 4-5
E
Effects Outside of DODIN &
Authorities, 2-17 Commander’s Narrative, 4-4 Cyberspace, 3-52
Commanders’ Responsibili- Electromagnetic Spectrum
B ties, 4-3, 4-4 (EMS), 3-60, 4-21
Battle Drills, 4-65 Common Military Deception Electronic Attack (EA), 3-57
Brigade & Below Information Means, 3-29
Electronic Protection (EP),
Operations, 1-36 Concept of Operations, 4-5 3-58
Consolidate Gains, 1-26 Electronic Warfare (EW),
C Coordination of Intelligence 3-45, 3-55
Civil Affairs, 3-17 Support, 6-15 Electronic Warfare Repro-
Civil-Military Operations
gramming, 3-59
(CMO), 2-14, 3-17
Index-1
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Index

Electronic Warfare Support Information (as a Joint Func- Intelligence Preparation of

(ES), 3-59 tion), 2-1 the Battlefield (IPB), 4-17,
Enabling Activities, 6-9, 6-10 Information (as an Element 6-18
Essential Elements of Friend- of Combat Power), 1-11 Intelligence Support to IO,
ly Information (EEFIs), Information (one of seven 6-15
4-9 Joint Functions), 2-6 Intrinsic IRCs, 3-2
Evaluating Information Op- Information Advantage, 1-3 IO & the Army Strategic
erations, 6-8, 8-7 Information and Influence Roles, 1-17
Execute Fires Across the Relational Framework, IO & the C2 Warfighting
Domains, 7-4 2-8, 2-11 Function, 1-12
Execution, 6-1 Information Assurance (IA), IO Across the Range of Mili-
Extrinsic IRCs, 3-2 2-15 tary Operations, 1-27
Information End State, 4-66 IO and the Operations Pro-
F Information Environment, cess, 1-14
Facilitating Shared Under- 1-7, 2-10, 4-17 IO Assessment, 1-15, 2-27
standing, 2-3 Information Environment IO Cell, 2-12, 2-19
Find, fix, finish, exploit, Analysis, 4-17, 4-18, IO Enabling Activities, 6-10
analyze, and disseminate 6-14 IO Execution, 1-15
(F3EAD), 7-13 Information Environment IO Input to Operation Orders
Find, fix, track, target, Operations (IEO), 1-9 and Plans, 4-10
engage, and assess Information Function Activi- IO Objectives & IRC Tasks,
(F2T2EA), 7-13 ties, 2-2 4-14
Fires (IO Considerations),
7-1
e
Information in Joint Opera-
tions, 2-1
IO Officer, 1-32
IO Organizations, 1-29
pl
Fires Overview, 7-2 Information Operations (IO),
IO Phasing and Synchroniza-
Fires Warfighting Function, 1-1, 1-4
tion, 2-21
7-1 Information Operations
IO Planning, 1-15, 2-19
Flexible Deterrent Option Objectives, 4-14
m

(FDO), 1-22 IO Planning (within the Joint

Information Operations
Planning Process), 2-20,
Flexible Response Option Planning, 2-19
2-22
(FRO), 1-22 Information Operations
IO Preparation, 1-15
Sa

Friendly Force Information Working Group, 6-1

Requirements (FFIRs), IO Preparation Activities, 5-1
Information Roles & Rela-
4-9 tionships, 3-35 IO Roles & Responsibilities,
Functional Component Com- 1-29, 2-17
Informational Dimension,
mand, 2-18 2-10 IO Running Estimate, 4-6
Information-Related Capa- IO Staff, 2-12
G bilities (IRCs), 1-5, 1-33, IO Support Units, 1-38
Gaining the “Information 3-1 IO Synchronization Matrix,
Advantage”, 1-3 Information-Related Capa- 4-16
bility Tasks, 4-15 IO Weighted Efforts, 6-9,
I Integrated Employment of 6-10
Identify Critical Information, Information-Related Ca- IO Working Group, 1-33, 6-1
3-42 pabilities (IRCs), 1-5 IRC Effects, 6-14
Indicator Development, 8-9 Integrated Joint Special
Indicators, 8-3 Technical Operations J
Individual Soldiers and Army (IJSTO) , 3-72 Joint Capabilities, Opera-
Civilians, 1-38 Integrating / Coordinating tions, & Activities for Le-
Influence Relevant Actors, Functions of IO, 2-11 veraging Information, 2-4
2-3 Intelligence, 2-15 Joint Electromagnetic
Inform Domestic, Interna- Intelligence “Push” and Spectrum Operations
tional, and Internal Audi- “Pull”, 6-16 (JEMSO), 2-16
ences, 2-3

Index-2
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

Index
Joint Fires (IO Consider- Military Deception Planning
ations), 7-6 Steps, 3-31 Personnel Recovery (PR),
Joint Information Operations Military Deception Process 3-72
(JP 3-13), 2-7 and Capability, 3-27 Physical Attack, 3-72
Joint Information Operations Military Deception Tactics,Physical Dimension, 2-10
Warfare Center (JIOWC), 3-29 Physical Security, 3-73
2-17 Military Decisionmaking Pro-
Plan or Order Development
Joint Interagency Coordina- cess (MDMP), 4-2, 4-35 (JPP), 2-25
tion Group (JIACG) Military Engagement, Se- Planning Initiation (JPP),
, 2-13 curity Cooperation, and 2-23
Joint MISO Activities, 3-38 Deterrence, 1-20, 1-27
Planning Joint Space Opera-
Joint Operations, 1-28, 2-1 Military Information Support tions, 3-68
Joint Planning Group (JPG), Operations (MISO), 2-15,
Planning, 4-1
2-19 3-33
Police Engagement, 3-74
Joint Planning Process Mission Analysis (JPP), 2-23
Positions of Relative Advan-
(JPP), 2-20 Mission Statement, 4-11
tage, 1-3, 1-19
Joint Planning Process, 3-16 Mixed-Method, 8-6
Preparation, 5-1
Joint Staff, 2-17 Monitoring Information
Presence, Profile, and Pos-
Operations, 8-6
ture (PPP), 1-36, 3-73
K Monitoring IO, 6-5
Prevent Activities (IO Consid-
Key IO Planning Tools and Multi-Domain Extended erations), 1-22
Outputs, 4-3 Battlefield, 1-8
Key Leader Engagement
(KLE), 2-16
e
Multinational Consider-
ations, 2-26
Prevent, 1-18
Principles of Information,
3-10
pl
Language, Regional, and
Priority Intelligence Require-
Cultural Expertise, 2-2 N ments (PIRs), 4-9
Narrative, Themes, and
L Messages, 3-13 Protecting Friendly Informa-
m

Large-Scale Ground Combat, tion, 2-3

1-24 O Public Affairs (PA), 2-14, 3-5
Legal Considerations, 2-17, Operation Orders and Plans, Public Affairs and the Opera-
2-18 4-10 tional Environment (OE),
Sa

Leverage Information to Af- Operational Environment 3-6

fect Behavior, 2-3, 7-7 (OE), 1-6 Public Affairs Fundamentals,
Leveraging Other IRCs, 1-37 Operational Variables, 4-24 3-10
Logic of the Effort, 4-8, 8-9 Operations Process, 1-14 Public Affairs Guidance
(PAG), 3-5
Operations Security (OP-
M SEC), 2-16, 3-39, 3-41 Public Perception, 3-7
Major Operations and Cam- Operations Security Indica- Purpose of Information Op-
paigns, 1-28 tors, 3-44 erations, 1-2
MDMP, 4-2, 4-35 Operations Security Pro- Purpose of Operations Secu-
Measure of Effectiveness cess, 3-42 rity, 3-39
(MOEs), 8-2, 8-8 OPSEC and Intelligence “Push” and “Pull”, 6-16
Measure of Performance (JIPOE), 3-40
(MOPs), 8-3, 8-9 Optimize IRC Effects, 6-14 Q
Military Deception (MILDEC), Other Shaping Activities, Qualitative, 8-6
2-16, 3-27 1-21 Quantitative, 8-6
Military Deception in Support Overlay, 4-25
of Operations, 3-28 Overview of IRCs, 3-4
R
Military Deception in the Op- Range of Military Operations
erations Process, 3-32 (ROMO), 1-27
Relationships and Integra-
tion, 2-12

Index-3
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]
Index

Requesting Capabilities Not

On Hand, 3-3 T
Targeting, 1-15, 7-11, 7-12
Requests for Information,
6-16 Targeting Categories, 7-13
Roles & Responsibilities, Targeting Cycles, 7-12
1-29, 2-17 Targeting Methodology, 7-11
Risk Assessment, 3-43, 4-5 Targeting Process Consider-
Running Estimate, 4-6 ations, 7-12
Targeting Tasks during the
S MDMP, 7-16
Scheme of Information Op- Tenets of Public Affairs, 3-10
erations, 4-12, 7-10 Theater Information Opera-
Security Cooperation, 1-21 tions Groups, 1-34
Service Component Com- Theory of Change, 8-9
mands, 2-18 Threat Analysis, 3-42
Shape, 1-18 Threat Center of Gravity
Shaping Activities (IO Con- Analysis, 4-30
siderations), 1-20 Threat Templates, 4-29
Six Warfighting Functions, Three Interrelated Efforts,
1-13 1-10
Social Media, 3-74
Soldier and Leader Engage- U
ment (SLE), 1-37, 3-74
Space Capabilities, 3-62
e
Understand Information in
the Operational Environ-
pl
ment (OE), 2-2
Space Control, 3-64
Unified Action, 1-28
Space Domain, 3-61
Unified Land Operations,
Space Operations, 2-15, 3-61
6-9
m
Space Superiority, 3-64
Unity of Effort, 3-64
Special Access Programs
(SAP), 3-72
Special Technical Operations
V
Sa

Various Targeting Cycles,

(STO), 2-16
7-12
Spectrum Management Op-
Visual Information Function
erations (SMO), 3-60
(COMCAM), 3-14
Spectrum Management, 3-60
Vulnerability Analysis, 3-43
Staff Responsibilities, 4-3
Staff, 1-30 W
Strategic Aspects of Civil- Warfighting Function Tasks,
Military Operations, 3-19 1-12
Strategic Communication Weighted Efforts, 6-9, 6-10
(SC), 2-12 Win, 1-26
Support Human and Auto-
mated Decision Making,
2-3
Synchronization Matrix, 4-16
Synchronization of Informa-
tion-Related Capabilities,
4-3

Index-4
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

SMARTbooks
INTELLECTUAL FUEL FOR THE MILITARY
Recognized as a “whole of government” doctrinal reference standard by
military, national security and government professionals around the world,
SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library designed
with all levels of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians in mind.

e
pl
m
Sa

The SMARTbook reference series is used by military, national security,

and government professionals around the world at the organizational/
institutional level; operational units and agencies across the full range of
operations and activities; military/government education and professional
development courses; combatant command and joint force headquarters;
and allied, coalition and multinational partner support and training.

Download FREE samples and SAVE 15% everyday at:

[Link]
The Lightning Press is a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business, DOD-
approved vendor and federally registered — to include the SAM, WAWF, FBO, and FEDPAY.
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

SMARTbooks
INTELLECTUAL FUEL FOR THE MILITARY

MILITARY REFERENCE:
SERVICE-SPECIFIC
Recognized as a “whole of government” doctrinal reference standard by military profes-
sionals around the world, SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library.

MILITARY REFERENCE:
MULTI-SERVICE & SPECIALTY e
pl
SMARTbooks can be used as quick reference guides during operations, as study
guides at professional development courses, and as checklists in support of training.
m
Sa

JOINT STRATEGIC, INTERAGENCY,

& NATIONAL SECURITY
The 21st century presents a global environment characterized by regional instability,
failed states, weapons proliferation, global terrorism and unconventional threats.

The Lightning Press is a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business, DOD-

approved vendor and federally registered — to include the SAM, WAWF, FBO, and FEDPAY.
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

RECOGNIZED AS THE DOCTRINAL

REFERENCE STANDARD BY MILITARY
PROFESSIONALS AROUND THE WORLD.
THREAT, OPFOR,
REGIONAL & CULTURAL
In today’s complicated and uncertain world, the military must be ready to meet the
challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats.

HOMELAND DEFENSE, DSCA, e

& DISASTER RESPONSE
pl
Disaster can strike anytime, anywhere. It takes many forms—a hurricane, an
earthquake, a tornado, a flood, a fire, a hazardous spill, or an act of terrorism.
m
Sa

DIGITAL SMARTBOOKS (eBooks)

In addition to paperback, SMARTbooks are also available
in digital (eBook) format. Our digital SMARTbooks are
for use with Adobe Digital Editions and can be used
on up to six computers and six devices, with free
software available for 85+ devices and platforms—
including PC/MAC, iPad and iPhone, Android tablets
and smartphones, Nook, and more! Digital SMART-
books are also available for the Kindle Fire (using
Bluefire Reader for Android).

Download FREE samples and SAVE 15% everyday at:

[Link]
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

[Link] Purchase/Order
SMARTsavings on SMARTbooks! Save big when you order our titles
together in a SMARTset bundle. It’s the most popular & least expensive way
to buy, and a great way to build your professional library. If you need a quote
or have special requests, please contact us by one of the methods below!

View, download FREE samples and purchase online:

[Link]
Order SECURE Online
Web: [Link]
Email: SMARTbooks@[Link]

24-hour Order & Customer Service Line

e
Place your order (or leave a voicemail)
at 1-800-997-8827
pl
Phone Orders, Customer Service & Quotes
Live customer service and phone orders available
m
Mon - Fri 0900-1800 EST at (863) 409-8084

Mail, Check & Money Order

Sa

2227 Arrowhead Blvd., Lakeland, FL 33813

Government/Unit/Bulk Sales
The Lightning Press is a service-disabled,
veteran-owned small business, DOD-approved
vendor and federally registered—to include the
SAM, WAWF, FBO, and FEDPAY.
We accept and process both Government
Purchase Cards (GCPC/GPC) and Purchase
Orders (PO/PR&Cs).

Keep your SMARTbook up-to-date with the latest doctrine! In

addition to revisions, we publish incremental "SMARTupdates" when
feasible to update changes in doctrine or new publications. These
SMARTupdates are printed/produced in a format that allow the reader
to insert the change pages into the original GBC-bound book by
simply opening the comb-binding and replacing affected pages. Learn
more and sign-up at: [Link]/smartupdates/
 (Sample Only) Find this and other SMARTbooks at: [Link]

(INFO1)
INFO1
[Link]

The Information Operations

& Capabilities SMARTbook
Guide to Information Operations
& the IRCs
Over the past two decades, information operations (IO) has
gone through a number of doctrinal evolutions, explained, in part,
by the rapidly changing nature of information, its flow, processing,
dissemination, impact and, in particular, its military employment.
INFO1: The Information Operations & Capabilities SMARTbook
examines the most current doctrinal references available and
charts a path to emerging doctrine on information operations.
Information is a resource. As a resource, it must be obtained,
e
developed, refined, distributed, and protected. The information
element of combat power is integral to optimizing combat power,
particularly given the increasing relevance of operations in and
pl
through the information environment to achieve decisive outcomes.
Information Operations (IO) is the integrated employment,
during military operations, of information-related capabilities in
concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt,
m

or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adver-

saries while protecting our own.
An information-related capability (IRC) is a tool, technique, or
Sa

activity employed within a dimension of the information environ-

ment that can be used to create effects and operationally desir-
able conditions. IO brings together information-related capabili-
ties (IRCs) at a specific time and in a coherent fashion to create
effects in and through the information environment that advance
the ability to deliver operational advantage to the commander.

DIME is our DOMAIN!

TM

SMARTbooks: Reference Essentials for the Instruments of National Power

Part of our “Military Reference” Series ISBN 9781935886600

90000 >

9 781935 886600

[Link]