CIVIL PROCEDURE I

CASE DIGEST

PREPARED BY:
NATHAÑEL B. MALAPITAN
MLS-JD BLOCK 1-A

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

G.R. NO. 208232

Heirs of Bautista vs. Lindo, GR 208232, 2014 ........................................................................................................... 3

G.R. NO. 201816

Heirs of Mesina vs. Heirs of Fian, G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013 .................................................................. 4

G.R. NO. 212987

Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, [August 6, 2018] ..................................................................................... 5

G.R. NO. 155173

Lafarge Cement Phil. Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp., G.R. No. 155173, [November 23, 2004] .. 6

G.R. NO. 153696

Spouses de los Santos vs. Carpio, 501 SCRA 390 .................................................................................................... 7

G.R. NO. 157171

Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 732................................................................................................................. 8

G.R. NO. L-22033

Duruge v. Biranya, G.R No L-22033 ........................................................................................................ 9

G.R. NO. 200134

Otero v Tan, 678 SCRA 583 ..................................................................................................................... 10

G.R. NO. 180543

Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, [July 27, 2010] ...................................................... 11

G.R. NO. 193494

Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494, [March 12, 2014] .............................................. 12

G.R. NO. 217138

Vitarich Corp. v. Dagmil, G.R. No. 217138, [August 27, 2020] ....................................................................... 13

G.R. NO. 217138

Spouses Lumanas v. Sablas, G.R. No. 144568, [July 3, 2007] ........................................................................... 14

G.R. NO. 139371

Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371, [April 4,
2001]............................................................................................................................................................................................. 15

G.R. NO. 172315

Republic v. Africa, G.R. No. 172315, [August 28, 2007] ..................................................................................... 16

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 G.R. No. 208232 March 10, 2014

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, namely: EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA and

ZOEY G. BAUTISTA, Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO LINDO and WELHILMINA LINDO; and HEIRS OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN,
namely: MA. LOURDES DAQUIGAN, IMELDA CATHERINE DAQUIGAN, IMELDA
DAQUIGAN and CORSINO DAQUIGAN, REBECCA QUIAMCO and ANDRES
QUIAMCO, ROMULO LORICA and DELIA LORICA, GEORGE CAJES and LAURA CAJES,
MELIDA BANEZ and FRANCISCO BANEZ, MELANIE GOFREDO, GERV ACIO CAJES
and ISABEL CAJES, EGMEDIO SEGOVIA and VERGINIA SEGOVIA, ELSA N. SAM,
PEDRO M. SAM and LINA SAM, SANTIAGO MENDEZ and MINA MENDEZ, HELEN M.
BURTON and LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE JACINTO and BIENVENIDA JACINTO,
IMELDA DAQUIGAN, LEO MA TIGA and ALICIA MATIGA, FLORENCIO ACEDO JR.,
and LYLA VALERIO, Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista) inherited a free-patent land in 1983. He sold the land to
several vendees, the respondents, in 1991. Three years later, Bautista filed a complaint for
repurchase against the respondents, based on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
which allows for repurchase of land acquired under free patent provisions.

Issue
Whether or not the action filed by the petitioners is one involving title to or possession of
real property or any interest therein, or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Decision
The Supreme Court ruled that the action filed by the petitioners is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, specifically an action for specific performance. The Court found that
the petitioners’ right to repurchase the property under Section 119 of CA 141 is a binding
prestation that Bautista could enforce. The Court determined that the action for
repurchase is not a real action, as the principal relief sought is not the recovery of a sum
of money, but the enforcement of the right to repurchase the property.

Rationale
The Court's ruling emphasizes how crucial prompt objections are to court cases. The
respondents implicitly accepted the RTC's jurisdiction by actively engaging in the matter
for nine years. Their premature attempt to contest jurisdiction was dismissed because it
was thought to be an attempt to drag out the proceedings.

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 G.R. No. 201816 April 8, 2013

HEIRS OFF AUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA,
Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, ET AL., Respondents.

VELASCO, JR. J.:

Facts
The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina) bought two parcels of
land on installment from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian (spouses Fian).
After the spouses Fian died, their heirs refused to acknowledge the payments and denied
the sale. The heirs of the spouses Mesina filed an action for quieting of title and damages
against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as their representative.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that the Heirs of Fian, not being individually
named, could not be the real parties in interest. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision,
holding that all the heirs of the spouses Fian are indispensable parties and should have
been impleaded in the complaint.

Issue
Whether or not the failure to implead all the heirs of the spouses Fian is a failure to state
a cause of action, warranting the dismissal of the complaint.

Decision
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action
is improper. The Court held that the inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does not fall under
any of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action. The Court reasoned that the
proper course of action is to direct the plaintiff to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian,
Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice, with a warning that failure to do
so shall mean dismissal of the complaint. The Court clarified that non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal but a procedural matter that can be
remedied by impleading the missing parties.

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 G.R. No. 212987 August 6, 2018
ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN, Petitioner
vs.
ANTONIO S. CAISIP, Respondent

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts
The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina) bought two parcels of
land on installment from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian (spouses Fian).
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs, claiming ownership of the land and taking
possession, refused to acknowledge payments and denied the sale to the spouses Mesina.
Norman Mesina (Norman), as attorney-in-fact for his siblings, filed an action for quieting
of title and damages against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa)
as their representative. The complaint was dismissed by the RTC for failure to state a cause
of action, finding that the Heirs of Mesina and Heirs of Fian were not juridical persons
and were not individually named. The RTC also found the verification defective. The CA
affirmed the RTC's decision, ruling that the other heirs of the spouses Fian were
indispensable parties and should have been impleaded in the complaint. The CA further
upheld the RTC's finding of a defective verification.

Issue
Whether or not the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
due to the non-joinder of indispensable parties and a defective verification.

Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the CA and RTC decisions, finding that the dismissal of the
complaint was improper. The Court held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for dismissal but rather a procedural issue that can be addressed by
impleading the missing parties. The Court further ruled that the verification, while not
including the phrase "or based on authentic records," was not defective as the provision
used the disjunctive word "or," indicating an alternative. The Court also emphasized that
verification is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional, and that the RTC could have
simply ordered the correction of the unverified pleading. The Court highlighted that the
complaint was not defective for failing to state a cause of action, but rather for the non-
joinder of indispensable parties.

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 G.R. No. 155173 November 23, 2004

LAFARGE CEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., (formerly Lafarge Philippines, Inc.), LUZON

CONTINENTAL LAND CORPORATION, CONTINENTAL OPERATING CORPORATION
and PHILIP ROSEBERG, petitioners,
vs.
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, GREGORY T. LIM and ANTHONY A.
MARIANO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts:
Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. (Lafarge) and Continental Cement Corporation (CCC)
entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) in 1998. Lafarge was aware of a
pending case against CCC in the Supreme Court. Lafarge allegedly refused to pay a
retained amount to APT, the petitioner in the Supreme Court case, despite the finality of
the Decision in favor of APT. CCC filed a complaint against Lafarge, seeking to compel
them to pay the retained amount. Lafarge filed an Answer and Compulsory
Counterclaims against CCC, its president Gregory T. Lim, and its corporate secretary
Anthony A. Mariano, seeking damages. CCC moved to dismiss Lafarge's counterclaims,
arguing they were not compulsory. The trial court dismissed the counterclaims.

Issue:
Whether or not the failure to file a responsive pleading by a new party impleaded in a
compulsory counterclaim results in their automatic submission to the court's jurisdiction.

Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the general rule that a defendant in a compulsory
counterclaim need not file a responsive pleading does not apply to new parties impleaded
in the counterclaim. The Court reasoned that filing a responsive pleading is a voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction, and a new party cannot be considered to have
automatically submitted to the court's jurisdiction without their knowledge or
participation.

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 G.R. No. 153696 September 11, 2006

SPOUSES HUMBERTO DELOS SANTOS and CARMENCITA DELOS SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 16, Davao City and
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a complaint for sum of money
against spouses Humberto and Carmencita delos Santos (petitioners) before the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City (Branch 16). The petitioners were served with the summons and
a copy of the complaint on January 22, 2001. They failed to file an answer within the
reglementary period, and Metrobank filed a Motion to Declare them in Default on
February 9, 2001. The hearing was set for February 16, 2001. However, four days before
the scheduled hearing, the trial court issued an Order dated February 12, 2001, declaring
the petitioners in default. The petitioners filed an Opposition to Metrobank's Motion to
Declare them in Default and a Motion to Admit Answer, along with their Answer, on
February 15, 2001. The trial court disregarded the petitioners' Opposition and denied their
Motion to Admit Answer.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring the petitioners in default before the
scheduled hearing of Metrobank's Motion to Declare them in Default.

Decision
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in declaring the petitioners in default
before the scheduled hearing of Metrobank's Motion to Declare them in Default. The
Court found that the trial court should have heard the petitioners' arguments before
declaring them in default, as the Rules of Court require. The Court also found that the
petitioners' affirmative defense of litis pendentia was a meritorious defense, and the trial
court should have considered it. The Court held that the trial court should have allowed
the petitioners to file their Answer, as the Rules of Court allow for extensions of time to
plead.

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 G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:
Election officer Arsenia B. Garcia was accused, along with others, of reducing the number
of votes cast for senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. in the May 8, 1995, elections
in Alaminos, Pangasinan. The alleged change of the number of votes from 6,998 to 1,921
in the Statement of Votes (SOV) and Certificate of Canvass (COC) served as the basis for
the claim. An information dated March 30, 1998, was submitted to the Alaminos Regional
Trial Court (RTC) based on a complaint-affidavit by Pimentel. Garcia and the other
accused were acquitted when the RTC determined during the trial that the evidence
against them was insufficient. Garcia was found guilty and given a six-year prison term
without the possibility of probation. He was also denied the ability to vote and was not
allowed to seek public office. The Court of Appeals, which heard Garcia's appeal, upheld
the RTC's ruling but changed the punishment by raising the minimum penalty from six
months to a year. Garcia then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the
Court of Appeals' ruling contained errors.

Issue:
Whether or not Garcia's failure to plead specific defenses related to good faith and lack of
criminal intent affected her case under the Rules of Court regarding civil procedure.

Decision:
The court found that Garcia's failure to adequately plead defenses related to good faith
and lack of criminal intent limited her ability to contest the accusations effectively. The
court emphasized that such defenses are crucial in determining liability and that failure
to raise them in the pleadings can negatively impact a defendant's case.

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 G.R. No. L-22033 July 30, 1966

MARIA FLOR V. DIRIGE, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
VICTORIANO BIRANYA, defendant and appellant.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Facts
Maria Flor V. Dirige initiated a forcible entry lawsuit against Victoriano Biranya in Del
Gallego, Camarines Sur's Justice of the Peace Court. The initial trial resulted in dismissal,
prompting Dirige to appeal to the Court of First Instance. Notice of this appeal, received
by Biranya's son on October 30, 1959, went unanswered by the defendant.
Consequently, on July 8, 1960, the court declared Biranya in default, scheduling evidence
presentation for July 21st. Judgment was rendered the same day, ordering Biranya's
eviction and payment of damages, fees, and expenses. Dirige received notification on July
25th.
Biranya's subsequent petition for relief, filed February 24, 1961, sought to overturn the
default order and judgment, requesting a new trial. However, the trial court rejected this
petition on July 29, 1961, citing the expiration of the six-month reglementary period.
Biranya's appeal to the Court of Appeals was ultimately certified to the Supreme Court
due to the purely legal nature of the issues involved. The case highlights the importance
of timely responses to legal proceedings and the strict adherence to procedural deadlines.

Issue
Whether or not the defendant's failure to plead in the case resulted in a valid default
judgment against him.

Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that the defendant's failure
to plead constituted a valid basis for the default judgment. The court emphasized that the
defendant's failure to answer the complaint within the prescribed period, despite
receiving notice of the case, resulted in the default order and subsequent judgment.

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 G.R. No. 200134 August 15, 2012

ROBERTO OTERO, Petitioner,

vs.
ROGER TAN, Respondent.

REYES, J.:

Facts:
Roger Tan filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against Roberto
Otero with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cagayan de Oro City. Tan claimed
that Otero had purchased petroleum products on credit from his Petron outlet in Valencia
City, Bukidnon. Otero failed to file an answer to the complaint, despite being served with
summons and a copy of the complaint.
The MTCC declared Otero in default and allowed Tan to present his evidence ex parte.
Tan presented testimonies of his employees and statements of account to prove Otero's
debt. The MTCC ruled in favor of Tan. Otero appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
arguing that the MTCC's decision was factually baseless and that he was deprived of due
process. The RTC affirmed the MTCC's decision, finding that the statements of account
were sufficient evidence of Otero's debt.
Otero then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the
statements of account were inadmissible because they were not authenticated. The CA
denied the Petition for Review, holding that Otero had waived any defenses by failing to
file an answer.

Issue
Whether or not Otero, having been declared in default by the MTCC, could still raise the
issue of the lack of authentication of the statements of account in the appellate
proceedings.

Decision
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court held that while a defendant declared
in default loses his standing in court and his right to present evidence, he retains the right
to appeal on limited grounds. One of these grounds is the failure of the plaintiff to prove
the material allegations of the complaint.
The Court found that the CA erred in dismissing Otero's arguments about the
admissibility of the statements of account. The Court ruled that the statements of account
were inadmissible because they were not authenticated. However, the Court found that
Tan had presented sufficient evidence to prove the material allegations of his complaint,
even without the statements of account.

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 G.R. No. 180543 August 18, 2010
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION and BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, as
represented by JOVITO R. SALONGA, Petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY;
GREGORY S. ONG, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN; and THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts
The petitioners, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation, filed a
motion for voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge in the RTC case, which was denied
by the RTC. Despite the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the order denying
the motion for inhibition, the RTC proceeded to hear the case and declared the petitioners
in default. The RTC subsequently granted the petition of private respondent Gregory Ong,
recognizing him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in declaring petitioners in default and denying their motion
to vacate the order of default.

Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the RTC’s decision, finding that petitioners failed to comply
with the requirements for setting aside an order of default. The Court emphasized that
the motion to vacate the order of default must be made under oath, explain the reasons
for the failure to file an answer, and demonstrate a meritorious defense. Petitioners’
motion did not meet these requirements.

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 G.R. No. 193494

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION and the PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.

LEONEN, J.:

Facts
Lui Enterprises, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in the interpleader case filed by Zuellig
Pharma Corporation. However, the motion was filed four days late. The trial court
declared Lui Enterprises in default for failing to file its answer within the required period.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled in favor of the Philippine Bank of
Communications, awarding them the total consigned amount of P6,681,327.30 and
ordering Lui Enterprises to pay Zuellig Pharma P50,000.00 in attorney's fees. Lui
Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
Lui Enterprises then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court,
arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing its appeal and denying its motion
to set aside the order of default. They also argued that the pending nullification of deed
of dation in payment case barred the filing of the interpleader case and that Zuellig
Pharma was not entitled to attorney's fees.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside the
order of default.

Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, which upheld the trial
court’s denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside the order of default. The Supreme
Court found that Lui Enterprises failed to show that its failure to answer within the
required period was due to excusable negligence.

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 G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020

VITARICH CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

VS.
FEMINA R. DAGMIL, RESPONDENT.

LOPEZ, J.:

Facts
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation had a 10-year lease agreement for a
property in Davao City. The Philippine Bank of Communications claimed ownership of
the property and demanded rent directly from Zuellig Pharma. Zuellig Pharma filed an
interpleader complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking to consign the rental
payments due to the conflicting claims. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss the
interpleader case, arguing that it had already filed a nullification of deed of dation in
payment case in the Regional Trial Court of Davao, which involved the same issue of
ownership of the property. The Makati trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
declared Lui Enterprises in default for failing to file its answer within the required period.
Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside the order of default, arguing excusable
negligence, but the Makati trial court denied the motion. The Makati trial court then
proceeded to hear the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises' participation and
awarded the rental payments to the Philippine Bank of Communications. Lui Enterprises
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Makati trial court's
decision. Lui Enterprises then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’
motion to set aside the order of default.

Decision
The Supreme Court denied Lui Enterprises' petition for review on certiorari, affirming the
Court of Appeals' decision and the Regional Trial Court of Makati's decision. The Court
found that Lui Enterprises failed to comply with the rules on the contents of the
appellant's brief, which led to the dismissal of its appeal. The Court also found that Lui
Enterprises failed to show excusable negligence for its failure to answer the complaint
within the required period, and therefore, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to
set aside the order of default. The Court further found that there was no litis pendentia
between the nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case, as
there was no identity of parties or reliefs prayed for. Finally, the Court deleted the award
of attorney's fees to Zuellig Pharma, finding that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
attorney's fees without sufficient justification

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 G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020

VITARICH CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

VS.
FEMINA R. DAGMIL, RESPONDENT.

LOPEZ, J.:

Facts
Vitarich Corporation filed a sum of money case against Femina Dagmil. Femina's counsel,
Atty. Solilapsi, moved to dismiss the case for improper venue. The RTC denied the motion
and ordered Femina to answer the complaint. Femina did not file an answer. Vitarich
sought to declare Femina in default. Femina's new counsel, Atty. Quianzon, Jr., entered
his appearance and filed a motion to admit answer. The RTC declared Femina in default
and allowed Vitarich to present evidence. The RTC denied Atty. Quianzon, Jr.'s entry of
appearance and Femina's motion to admit answer. The RTC granted the complaint and
ordered Femina to pay Vitarich.

Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the judgment of default rendered
by the Regional Trial Court.

Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in rendering the judgment of default despite Femina's several
attempts to file an answer and present her defense. The Court emphasized that Femina
filed her motion to admit answer before she was declared in default. The Court also found
that persuasive reasons justified the belated filing of the motion, such as Atty. Solilapsi's
health issues and the mistake of his secretary.

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 G.R. No. 139371 April 4, 2001

INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (CHED), respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts
Indiana Aerospace University (IAU) was originally registered as "Indiana School of
Aeronautics, Inc." and later changed its name to "Indiana Aerospace University." CHED
issued a Cease and Desist Order against IAU for using the term "university" in its name,
leading to a Complaint for Damages filed by IAU against CHED. The trial court denied
CHED's Motion to Dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of IAU.
CHED appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled in favor of CHED, dismissing
the Complaint for Damages and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Indiana Aerospace University
had no cause of action against CHED due to its failure to comply with the requirements
for university status.

Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, finding that IAU lacked a
valid cause of action against CHED. The Court determined that IAU had not been
conferred university status as required by law and CHED regulations, and therefore had
no right to use the term "university" in its name. The Court emphasized that a certificate
of incorporation does not automatically grant university status, and that IAU's failure to
comply with the necessary requirements meant it had no legal basis to challenge CHED's
actions.

15
 G.R. No. 172315 August 28, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ANDRES L. AFRICA, VICTOR AFRICA, LOURDES A. AFRICA, NATHALIE A AFRICA-
VERCELES, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, PAUL DELFIN A. AFRICA, ROSARIO N.
ARELLANO, JUAN DE OCAMPO, RACQUEL S. DINGLASAN, VICTORIA N. LEGARDA,
ANGELA N. LOBREGAT, PABLO LOBREGAT, BENITO V. NIETO, CARLOS V. NIETO,
MANUEL V. NIETO III, RAMON V. NIETO, MA. RITA N. DELOS REYES, EVELYN A.
ROMERO, ROSARIO A. SONGCO, CARMEN N. TUAZON, RAFAEL C. VALDEZ and
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts
The Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint in Civil Case No. 0178 against Andres
L. Africa, et.al., seeking the recovery of 3,305 shares of stock in the Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. The shares were allegedly held in trust for former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. The Complaint was filed on
October 29, 1997, by the Republic through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government. The shares were registered in the names of the private respondents, and the
Republic alleged that the private respondents' addresses were unknown. The Republic
filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint on January 27, 2005, to implead the
heirs of Andres L. Africa and Rosario A. Songco, who had passed away, and to properly
summon Racquel S. Dinglasan and Evelyn A. Romero. The Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint on February 2, 2005, for failure
to properly set it for hearing. The Republic's motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution was denied by Resolution of May 3, 2005. The Republic filed another Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint on July 4, 2005, attaching an Amended Complaint
dated July 1, 2005. The Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint on November 15, 2005, stating that the Republic had failed to
comply with the procedures for impleading proper defendants. The Republic's Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautela was denied by Resolution of March 6, 2006.

Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Republic's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint.

Decision
The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
denied the Republic's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. The Court held that
the Republic's proposed amendments pertained only to the non-answering private
respondents and that the amendments may still be made as a matter of right under Section
2 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. The Court further stated that the exercise of this right
does not depend upon the discretion or liberality of the Sandiganbayan. Therefore, the
Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions of November 15,
16
2005, and March 6, 2006, and ordered the Sandiganbayan to admit the July 1, 2005
Amended Complaint of the Republic of the Philippines.

17