3

National Security
Determinants of
Foreign Policy
P. S. Raghavan

The foreign policy of a country is geared to further its national objec-

tives. At a fundamental level, India’s national objectives can be defined
as achieving economic growth with equitable development, aiming
to become a developed country in the shortest possible time frame.
While this is a national effort, driven largely by domestic policies and
actions, it may be facilitated or impeded by external influences. It is
quite obvious as well that a secure domestic and external environment
facilitates growth and development.
India’s foreign policy, therefore, works to sustain a network of
external relationships that promotes the best security environment for
the country and maximizes the government’s room for manoeuvre to
pursue policies that, in its judgement, would put the country on the
fastest path towards its national objectives.
A cardinal objective of national security management is a security
equilibrium in the country’s neighbourhood, characterized by mutual
trust and cooperation. Cooperation is required to tackle inflows of
arms, drugs and fake currencies across our borders, and to discourage
neighbours from sheltering and arming insurgents who operate in our
bordering states. From a broader perspective, a secure and stable neigh-
bourhood enables an aspiring global power to interact with greater
confidence with other major powers.
There are some complex realities in India’s relations with its neigh-
bours. As the largest country in South Asia by size, and economic and
military strength, it has to deal with neighbours’ ‘small neighbour
syndrome’: an apprehension of abridgement of their sovereignty by
political domination, economic influence or cultural affinities of the
larger neighbour. With another big and strong country, China, in the
neighbourhood, some of India’s neighbours have tried to play one off
against the other, to maximize their room for manoeuvre. Some have
also tried to increase their leverage with India by giving refuge and
assistance to Indian insurgents.
Bangladeshi politics is polarized between secular and radical forces,
with the latter tending to seek inspiration from Pakistan. India-related
issues, including sharing of river waters and transit facilities between
East and Northeast India, have often got caught up in domestic
Bangladesh politics. In Nepal, the struggle for identity and political rep-
resentation of the Madhesi population has inevitably drawn in Indian
political circles, causing other Nepalese elements to seek Chinese help
to counter India’s influence. Similarly, the Sri Lankan Tamils’ agitation
for more equitable representation in the country’s polity finds sympa-
thy in Tamil Nadu where a large number of Sri Lankan Tamil separatists
have taken refuge. This has led some political elements in Sri Lanka to
strengthen links with Pakistan and China.
These trends need to be countered by policies that promote mutually
beneficial cooperation, address insecurities and dampen the motiva-
tion for blackmail vis-à-vis the other big neighbour. This also means
willingness to make non-reciprocal concessions, provided core political,
economic and security interests are protected.
Continuing tensions with Pakistan, exacerbated by cross-border
incursions and Pakistan’s arming and training groups for terrorist acts
in India, are a perennial security threat, requiring imaginative foreign
policy responses. Successive Indian governments have tried varying
blends of dialogue with Pakistani governments and military responses
to cross-border terrorism. Public sentiment, articulated in the media
and by political forces, demands harsh responses to Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism. At the same time, there is constant pressure from the USA
and other Western countries for a dialogue to defuse tensions. The

National Security Determinants of Foreign Policy 35

government has to formulate a Pakistan policy that it considers best
suited for India’s national security interests, steering carefully between
domestic public expectations and foreign exhortations.
In the recent decades, Afghanistan (whose border with India is in
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) has become an arena of India–Pakistan
rivalry. In Pakistan’s calculus, Afghanistan provides it strategic depth
vis-à-vis India. In the 1990s, its influence in the country gave it a wider
territory for arming and housing anti-India terrorist elements. An active
Indian presence in Afghanistan denies this opportunity to Pakistan.
Hence, since the early 2000s, India has strengthened its partnership with
Afghanistan, supporting its government’s anti-terrorist and ­economic
reconstruction efforts. This has predictably led Pakistan to sponsor ter-
rorist attacks on Indian personnel and interests in Afghanistan.
Urging the USA, Europe, Russia and China to exert and sustain
pressure on Pakistan to restrain its support for terrorism in India and
Afghanistan is an important part of India’s foreign policy towards these
countries. This is distinct from an invitation to mediate, which India
has strenuously opposed.
The one important neighbour of India, which is also one of the
world’s major powers, is China. Engaging with China will remain a
critical foreign policy and national security challenge for India over
decades. The 4,000+ km India–China border is still un-demarcated and
there are a number of disputed pockets along the border, including
in Jammu & Kashmir and areas around the India–Nepal–China and
India–Bhutan–China tri-junctions. The claim to Arunachal Pradesh,
that China has started pressing more vigorously over the past decade
or so, is another major irritant.
Since the 1950s, China has extended political and military support to
Pakistan, including assistance to its nuclear and missile programmes. In
the recent years, it has strengthened its economic and military coopera-
tion with other South Asian countries—Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka
and the Maldives—trying to undermine India’s influence with them.
China sees India as a long-term strategic rival. There is a gap between
India and China today, in economic and military strength. Analysts
believe that China seeks to slow the narrowing of this gap and to keep
India bogged down in its South Asian neighbourhood, so as to inhibit
its global outreach. This analysis is validated by the US$62 billion
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will strengthen China’s
political and economic influence in Pakistan, besides establishing
Chinese naval presence off India’s West Coast.

36 P. S. Raghavan
 At the same time, China is India’s largest trade partner and a
s­ ignificant investor. It is a major supplier to India of pharmaceutical
raw materials, solar panels, photovoltaic cells and smartphones. It has
a near-monopoly over rare earth manufactures, which go into products
from smartphones to cruise missiles. Its GDP is about 5 times that of
India, its foreign exchange reserves about 10 times. It is a permanent
member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear-weapon state.
India’s China policy has to factor in both the interdependence and the
asymmetry. This means cooperating with China on areas where it is of
mutual benefit, even while firmly standing up for its core interests, as it
did during the nearly two-month long India–China military stand-off in
2017 in the Doklam plateau near the India–Bhutan–China tri-junction.
Meanwhile, India needs to work quietly, but purposefully, to
strengthen its position vis-à-vis China—building domestic economic
and military strength, securing its influence with neighbours, pursuing
convergences with Russia and the USA, and making common cause
with other countries in China’s neighbourhood, which have also been
at the receiving end of China’s assertiveness. China has asserted its ter-
ritorial claims in the South China Sea by occupying claimed islands,
changing facts on the ground, militarizing the area and ignoring the
2016 judgement of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which did not
accept the basis for China’s claims.
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is shaped by these perspectives. India has
important economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific space—
from the eastern shores of Africa to the Western shores of the USA.
The share of foreign trade in India’s GDP is over 40 per cent, and over
90 per cent of this trade is through the Indian Ocean, including most
of its energy supplies. Protection of Indian Ocean sea lanes is, therefore,
in India’s vital economic interest. Terrorism, piracy, smuggling, human
trafficking, territorial disputes and claims to global commons threaten
India’s security and strategic interests. These interests dictate that India
should work against political, economic and military domination of
this region by any country.
Most Western analysts and policymakers, as well as those in South
East and East Asia, use the expression Indo-Pacific for the area from the
east coast of India to the US Pacific Coast. The following paragraphs
use that definition. The security and strategic issues in the Western
Indo-Pacific are very different from those in the eastern part and require
different approaches from an Indian perspective. This is touched upon
in a subsequent section.

National Security Determinants of Foreign Policy 37

 The recent resurrection of the India–US–Japan ‘MALABAR’ naval
exercises in the Indian Ocean and of the India–US–Japan–Australia
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) signalled the support of their
participants for an inclusive security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
These initiatives need sustained follow-up and wider regional support
to have an impact on the ground. There is also a growing realization
that fundamental changes are required in the current security archi-
tecture, which dates back to the Cold War. The military rise of China
and the Russia–China strategic partnership challenge the credibility
of the US security umbrella, which was originally intended to coun-
ter a Soviet threat. Regional powers have to develop credible military
capability, since the present extreme asymmetry in military strength
in the region is not conducive to a security equilibrium. The thrust to
strengthen Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean should be seen
in this context.
In addition to these initiatives, India’s strategy includes building
bilateral and plurilateral linkages to promote convergence of political
approaches. Bilateral partnerships with Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Australia and others have strengthened. India has taken the
initiative to impart fresh momentum to the Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) for
enhancing regional connectivity and maritime security in this important
enclave of the Indian Ocean. BIMSTEC includes India, Nepal, Bhutan,
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka. A dialogue of BIMSTEC
National Security Advisors (NSAs) has been initiated to emphasize the
importance of the security dimension of this partnership.
The resurgence of India–US relations in the 2000s reflected mutual
economic and strategic interests. India’s expanding market, its huge
defence imports and its ambitious nuclear power expansion plans
attracted US interest. From a broader strategic perspective, the USA rec-
ognized the increasing threat from China to its superpower dominance
and saw a rising, democratic India as a useful strategic counterpoise.
India welcomed the opportunity to attract US technologies and invest-
ments. The prospect of defence cooperation with the USA accorded
with India’s desire to dilute its near-total dependence on Russia for its
military acquisitions and to access sophisticated US military technolo-
gies. The pivotal role of the USA in getting the Nuclear Suppliers Group
to open up international civil nuclear cooperation with India cemented
the India–US strategic partnership. The USA endorsed India’s support
for democracy and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. To some
extent, depending on the prevailing US priorities of the day, the India–
US partnership encouraged US pressure on Pakistan to curb cross-border

38 P. S. Raghavan
terrorism. But for India, as it grapples with the China-induced strategic
challenges in its near and extended neighbourhood, the US stake in
a strong India is the most important strategic underpinning of the
India–US relationship.
India–US defence cooperation has reached unprecedented levels,
with the signing of three of the four ‘foundational agreements’ that the
USA normally concludes with its defence partners, and the US grant
of the Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1) trading status to India,
putting it on par with US allies for procurement of military technolo-
gies. At the same time, the intense US pressure on India to withdraw
from ‘significant defence transactions’ with Russia, with the threat of
sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act (CAATSA), puts severe pressure on the India–US relationship, since
it would have an impact on India’s defence preparedness. Recently,
there have also been differences on the bilateral trade imbalance. More
worryingly for India, US moves for a precipitate disengagement from
Afghanistan seem to be yielding a principal role to Pakistan for broker-
ing an agreement with the Taliban. Concerns over CAATSA and the US
course on Afghanistan need to be resolved in the context of the broader
canvas of the India–US strategic partnership.
The India–Russia relationship is successor to the strong India–USSR
relations of the Cold War years, which was characterized by solid Soviet
support to India (most importantly in the UN Security Council) on its
core political and security concerns, economic assistance for the indus-
trialization of post-Independence India and extensive military assistance.
The India–Russia strategic partnership is built on this foundation, with
cooperation in defence, nuclear energy and hydrocarbons as core ele-
ments. Defence cooperation over the years has ensured that today, about
60–70 per cent of the weapons with the Indian armed forces are of Soviet
or Russian origin. Despite the diversification of India’s military acquisi-
tions since 2000, Russia remains its principal supplier of sophisticated
weaponry, with technology transfers and co-development of weapons
systems enhancing the quality of the cooperation. Further, Russia is a
permanent member of the UN Security Council with a veto, which it
has used in the past for India’s benefit. Its riches in natural resources
offer economic opportunities for resource-hungry India.
Russia is a huge land mass to India’s north, bordering much of its
near and extended neighbourhood. Its actions in that ­neighbourhood—
in Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Central Asia—have an impact on
India’s interests. Strong India–Russia relations could ensure that these
actions do not harm Indian interests. This is particularly relevant in the

National Security Determinants of Foreign Policy 39

context of Russia–China relations, which have acquired deep strategic
content, particularly as Russia’s face-off with the West has intensified
in the recent years. A vibrant defence and economic partnership with
India could enhance Russia’s resistance to Chinese pressures for acting
against India’s security interests. Through membership of Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO, which includes Russia, China and
four Central Asian countries) and a Free Trade Agreement with Eurasian
Economic Union (EaEU, comprising Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia), India seeks to establish a political and eco-
nomic presence in the strategically important region of Central Asia,
bordering Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, where
Russia maintains a strong security presence and China is a dominant
economic power.
In addition to these strategic considerations, terminating defence
cooperation with Russia, under US pressure, is not a viable option for
India, given the predominance of Russian weapons and equipment
with India’s armed forces. Disruption of the defence cooperation would
be a hugely expensive proposition. As mentioned earlier, Russia is still
the source of major weapons’ platforms and cutting-edge technologies.
A total shift from Russia to other suppliers would introduce serious
vulnerabilities in India’s defence for a considerable period. It would
undermine the fundamental strategic premise of India–US relations of
a strong India, with a robust foreign policy, which could hold its own
in its near and extended neighbourhood, in the face of the inexorable
expansion of China’s economic and military influence. The challenge
to India’s diplomacy is to embed these perspectives in the framework
of India–US relations.
The recent turbulences in global geopolitics, triggered by the acri-
monious Russia–West stand-off, have not benefitted India’s strategic
interests. US sanctions against Russia have complicated India’s effort
to preserve its strategic autonomy in global affairs. They have driven
Russia into a much closer embrace of China than their history of
strategic rivalry would otherwise have permitted. The more recent US
political and economic pressure on China will accentuate the new
Russia–China convergences, unless it is accompanied by a less hostile
posture against Russia.
It is not only India that is concerned about the potentially disruptive
consequences for the world order of this distortion in the triangle of
US–Russia–China relations. European and ASEAN countries, Japan and
a number of other countries also share these concerns. India needs to
work with these countries to try to shape this triangle in such a way as

40 P. S. Raghavan
to maximize strategic autonomy and avoid being caught in the crossfire
between them.
India has important political, economic and security interests in
the West Asian region. About 8 million Indians work there, remitting
about $40 billion annually to India. About 70 per cent of India’s energy
imports come from that region. There are important security interests
too: West Asia has been a conduit for terrorists, terrorist financing and
drugs coming into India. Major efforts have been made to strengthen
India’s relations with West Asian countries, with the political and
economic cooperation reinforcing security and defence cooperation.
Effective links have been established with a number of these countries
to enable tracking of terrorist movements and their financing. India’s
relations in West Asia today transcend the religious, sectarian and politi-
cal divides in that region. High-level political exchanges with Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Qatar and Israel illustrate this point. Israel has become an
important defence partner.
West Asia also offers a potentially significant trade route to Central
Asia. The shortest land route through Pakistan is closed for obvious
political and security reasons. The sea route via Europe is circuitous,
time-consuming and expensive. A multimodal transport corridor—by
sea from western Indian ports to Bandar Abbas or Chabahar port in Iran,
and then by road or rail to Afghanistan, Central Asia or Russia—has
been discussed with Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. Trial runs have shown
the commercial viability of all legs of this corridor. India is already
developing terminals in Iran’s Chabahar port. Some further railway
infrastructure needs to be created. Completion of this project would
now require negotiation with the USA, which has recently introduced
fresh sanctions against Iran. This transport corridor will further India’s
strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Central Asia, which have been
elaborated in the foregoing.
India’s initiatives in West Asia have promoted its security interests in
the Western Indian Ocean. As China seeks to expand its reach in this
region through its Maritime Silk Road initiative, India has also strength-
ened partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral countries with a range of
development assistance programmes. The Indian Ocean Rim Association,
which has 22 member states, over half of them in the Western Indian
Ocean, offers a platform for such cooperation. Prime Minister (PM) Modi
announced in 2015 a partnership programme, Security and Growth
for All in the Region (SAGAR), involving cooperative efforts for capac-
ity building and security. The India–Japan initiative for an Asia–Africa
Growth Corridor seeks to promote connectivity, infrastructure and

National Security Determinants of Foreign Policy 41

development in the Indian Ocean. Transfer of an offshore patrol vessel to
Mauritius and a maritime surveillance aircraft to Seychelles are examples
of India’s security cooperation in the region.
Issues relating to defence cooperation with Russia and threats of US
sanctions draw attention to a major Indian security vulnerability. India
is today among the world’s largest importers of arms. Its indigenous
defence manufacturing sector remains small and its defence exports are
negligible. This situation generates intense international competition
to capture India’s defence market. It encourages blackmail, such as the
threat of CAATSA. Dependence on external agencies for upgrades and
spare parts of equipment exposes a vulnerability, particularly in times of
crisis. Progressive indigenization of weapons manufacturing is, therefore,
a national security imperative. It has to be built into defence acquisition
policies. India should leverage its market size to extract the best possible
technology transfer terms from defence suppliers so that over time, the
country develops the capacity to develop and manufacture major weap-
ons platforms. This effort has to be reinforced with a defence exports
policy that makes indigenous defence manufacturing economically
viable. Discussions on transfers of cutting-edge US or European defence
technologies have not yet gone far, for various reasons, including con-
cerns about their ‘leakage’ to other countries. The recent conclusion of
the ‘foundational agreements’ and the US grant of STA-1 status to India
may improve this picture. Even as India seeks to get military technolo-
gies from the USA, France and Israel, the Russian example sets the bar
for the levels of technology that India should seek to extract from them.
The external linkages of national security challenges have resulted
in an interlocking of foreign policy and national security perspectives.
The external interactions of different sections of the political, economic,
defence and security establishments have to be harmonized within
the framework of a national security strategy. This is not a new reality,
but has been brought into sharper focus by the new challenges cre-
ated by the recent flux in great power relations. The global commons
in oceans and in space are becoming areas of rivalry. Technology has
facilitated the transnational reach of terrorism and organized crime,
necessitating new patterns of cooperation between security agencies. It
can also be used today to create major disruptions in distant c­ ountries:
penetrating banking operations, destabilizing capital markets or disa-
bling critical infrastructure. Developing broad bilateral security and
political partnerships can help to forestall or thwart these threats or
to mitigate their impact. Such partnerships can open doors to ensure
security of critical materials supply and promote defence self-reliance
through indigenization.

42 P. S. Raghavan
 The effort to retain strategic autonomy of foreign policy involves
give and take across sectors. Securing US understanding of India’s
defence cooperation with Russia or connectivity links through Iran
may need meeting US political and economic interests elsewhere. The
diversification of India’s defence acquisitions, reducing Russia’s total
dominance, has to be compensated by broadening the base of India–
Russia economic and energy cooperation, to ensure continued strong
mutual stakes in that partnership. Optimal utilization of the billion
dollar credit line, announced by PM Modi to promote development of
the Russian Far East, will require innovative economic initiatives and
financial mechanisms. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy needs a blend of
military interactions, connectivity projects, development cooperation
and diplomatic initiatives—all of them in bilateral and multilateral
formats. A multi-pronged approach has to be developed to protect
India’s technology, economic and security interests, in the face of the
sharpening US–China divide on the global roll-out of fifth-generation
(5G) communications technologies. Since India is a natural resource-
deficient country, its external strategy needs to ensure the country’s
continued access to critical raw materials and energy resources, particu-
larly in times of crises. International cooperation in space activities,
geo-spatial information and technology security requires coordination
with multiple departments and agencies.
A holistic approach to national security, including its external
dimensions, was introduced in 1999, with the constitution of a National
Security Council (NSC), chaired by the PM and including the Ministers
of Home, External Affairs, Defence and Finance. The NSC is expected to
develop long-term national strategies for internal and external security
threats, the latter including those involving atomic energy, space and
those arising from global economic, energy and ecological develop-
ments. The NSC is assisted by the NSA, who is its principal advisor on
security issues. The NSA is also a part of the PM’s Office, assisting the
PM on foreign policy, defence, atomic energy and space issues (besides
internal and external security); this emphasizes the interlinkages
between these areas.
The NSA maintains regular contact with its counterparts in India’s
major partner countries. NSAs’ dialogues, in bilateral and multilateral
formats, have become standard features of global ‘security diplomacy’.
The level of information shared on sensitive security issues would
depend on the state of bilateral relations; the obverse is that the
tenor of the bilateral relationship can be qualitatively enhanced, if
­information-sharing on security issues becomes more intense. Perhaps
the most graphic illustration of the complexity of security diplomacy

National Security Determinants of Foreign Policy 43

is the participation of both Indian and Pakistani security experts in the
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO, which is meant
to share information on terrorist threats in the region and to discuss
ways of countering them.
The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which functions
under the direction of the NSA, collates and analyses intelligence and
other inputs on developments impinging on national security, develops
strategy papers after consultations with all stakeholders, facilitates inter-
departmental coordination of actions and monitors implementation
of major decisions on the strategic direction of India’s foreign policy.
In 2017–2018, the mechanisms set up in 1999–2000 were reviewed
and restructured, with an emphasis on domain knowledge and tech-
nical specialization. The NSCS is being enlarged and equipped with
technology and analytical tools to strengthen its capacity to provide
professionally sound advice to the political leadership.
The NSCS has played an important role in establishing the national
cybersecurity architecture and coordinating the cybersecurity-related
policies of the government. This includes cybersecurity dialogues with a
range of countries, in bilateral and multilateral formats. These dialogues
would provide useful security inputs for, inter alia, the government’s
5G roll-out strategy. The NSCS represents India in the SCO-RATS. It is
the Secretariat for multilateral NSA level dialogues including in BRICS
(Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa), BIMSTEC, Russia–India–
China dialogue on Afghanistan and the India–Maldives–Sri Lanka
Maritime Trilateral. It coordinates bilateral NSA and Deputy NSA level
dialogue with over 20 countries.
In today’s circumstances, therefore, the making of foreign policy and
the coordination of its implementation are no longer the sole preserve
of the Ministry of External Affairs. A coherent pursuit of the country’s
national security objectives requires coordination between multiple
stakeholders and an all-of-government approach that rises above secto-
ral interests. This needs directions from the apex political leadership so
that sectoral interests of departments are trimmed in line with the larger
national security interests. The newly reformed structures for national
security management, which function under the direction of the apex
political leadership, would provide valuable inputs for formulation of
foreign policies that promote national security in all its dimensions
and will play an important role in coordinating their implementation
by the multiple actors in and outside government.

44 P. S. Raghavan