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Quasi Judicial

By

Justice (R) Shabbir Ahmed

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Quasi-Judicial.
The dictionary meaning of the word quasi is 'not exactly'
and it is just in between a judicial and administrative
function. It is true, in many cases, the statutory authorities
were held to be quasi-judicial authorities and decisions
rendered by them were regarded as quasi judicial, where
there were contest between the two contending parties and
the statutory authority was required to adjudicate upon the
rights of the parties. In Cooper vs. Wilson (1937) 2 KB
309, it is stated that "the definition of a quasi-judicial
decision clearly suggests that there must be two or more
contending parties and an outside authority to decide those
disputes".
In view of the aforesaid statement of law, where there are
two or more parties contesting each other's claim and the
statutory authority is required to adjudicate the rival claims
between the parties, such a statutory authority was held to
be quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it as a quasi-
judicial order. Thus, where there is a lis or two contesting
parties making rival claims and the statutory authority
under the statutory provision is required to decide such a
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dispute, in the absence of any other attributes of a quasi-

judicial authority, such a statutory authority is quasi-
judicial authority.
But there are cases where there is no lis or two contending
parties before a statutory authority yet such a statutory
authority has been held to be quasi-judicial and decision
rendered by it as quasi-judicial decision when such a
statutory authority is required to act judicially. In Queen
vs. Dublin Corporation (1878) 2 Ir. R. 371, it was held thus
:
"In this connection the term judicial does not necessarily
mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the
determination of matters of law, but for purpose of this
question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by
competent authority upon consideration of facts and
circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the
rights. And if there be a body empowered by law to
enquire into facts, makes estimates to impose a rate on a
district, it would seem to me that the acts of such a body
involving such consequence would be judicial acts."
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Atkin L.J. as he then was, in Rex vs. Electricity

Commissioners (1924) 1 KB 171 stated that when any
body of persons having legal authority to determine
questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the
duty to act judicially, such body of persons is a quasi-
judicial body and decision given by them is a quasi-
judicial decision. In the said decision, there was no contest
or lis between the two contending parties before the
Commissioner. The Commissioner, after making an
enquiry and hearing the objections was required to pass
order. In nutshell, what was held in the aforesaid decision
was, where a statutory authority is empowered to take a
decision which affects the rights of persons and such an
authority under the relevant law required to make an
enquiry and hear the parties, such authority is quasi-
judicial and decision rendered by it is a quasi-judicial act.
The legal principles laying down when an act of a statutory
authority would be a quasi-judicial act, are these :
Where (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute
to do any act;
(b) which would prejudicially affect the subject;
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(c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and

the contest is between the authority and the subject; and
(d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under
the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-
judicial.
The presence of a lis or contest between the contending
parties before a statutory authority, in the absence of any
other attributes of a quasi-judicial authority is sufficient to
hold that such a statutory authority is quasi judicial
authority. However, in the absence of a lis before a
statutory authority, the authority would be quasi-judicial
authority if it is required to act judicially.
What distinguishes an administrative act from quasi-
judicial act is, in the case of quasi-judicial functions under
the relevant law the statutory authority is required to act
judicially. In other words, where law requires that an
authority before arriving at decision must make an enquiry,
such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-
judicial authority.
The following passage from Wade & Forsyth's
Administrative Law is instructive:
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"A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function

which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as
if it were judicial. A typical example is a minister deciding
whether or not to confirm a compulsory purchase order or
to allow a planning appeal after a public inquiry. The
decision itself is administrative, dictated by policy and
expediency. But the procedure is subject to the principles
of natural justice, which require the minister to act fairly
towards the objections and not (for example) to take fresh
evidence without disclosing it to them. A quasi-judicial
decision is therefore an administrative decision which is
subject to some measure of judicial procedure."
The question which arises, is whether in the absence of any
express or implied power, the quasi-judicial authority is
empowered to withdraw a quasi-judicial order on the
strength of the provisions of Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act runs as
under:
Section 21. "Power to issue, to include power to add to
amend, vary or rescind, notification, orders, rules or bye-
laws. Where by any central Act or regulation, a power to
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issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred,

then that power includes a power exercisable in the like
manner and subject to the like sanction, and conditions (if
any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications,
orders, rules or bye-laws so issued."
On perusal of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the
expression 'order' employed in Section 21 shows that such
an order must be in the nature of notification, rules and
bye-laws etc. The order which can be modified or
rescinded on the application of Section 21 has to be either
executive or legislative in nature. The order which is
neither a legislative nor an executive order but is a quasi-
judicial order, the provisions of Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act cannot be invoked to confer powers of recall.
Case of Venkatesh Yeshwant Deshpande v. Emperor (AIR
1938 Nagpur 513) (full bench), is also instructive in this
regard, wherein the question was whether order granting
remission of sentence to the prisoner in terms of Section
401 of the Criminal Procedure Code falls in the category
of the ‘order’ contemplated of S. 21 of General Clauses
Act.
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“It is well recognized rule of construction that the words

used in a statute must be interpreted according to their
context. S. 21 General Clauses Act must therefore be read
in the light of Ss. 14 to 20 which precede and Ss. 22 to 24
which follow. S. 21 occurs among Sections which are
grouped under the heading “provisions as to orders, rules,
etc. made under enactments”. The relevant words in S. 21
are:-
‘Where by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue
notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred’. The
power to issue orders, etc. is the power indicated in S. 14
of the Act, and such provisions are to mention a few to be
found in S. 6 Air Craft Act, (22 of 1934), S. 6 Factories
Act, 25 of 1934 ------------- S. 21 Prisoners Act, and Ss. 9
to 39 Criminal Procedure Code. The word ‘Order’ is used
in S. 21 alongwith “notifications, rules and bye-laws”.
They are all comprised in the expression Indian Laws
which is defined in S. 27 (a) of S. 3 (read Clause 37 (b)
Pakistan Laws). There the law is described as including
any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation
passed or made at any time by any competent Legislature,
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authority or person in India. The meaning of the word

‘Order’ becomes clear when S. 21 is read in conjunction
with S. 24. These considerations make it clear that the
word ‘Order’ is used in S. 21 General Clauses Act, is a
legislative or statutory order, that is an order having the
force of law. The order passed under Section 401granting
remission of punishment falls in a category different from
the order contemplated in S. 21 of General Clauses Act.
The applicability of Section therefore highly doubtful.”

Justice (R) Shabbir Ahmed.