STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS:

INTRODUCTION OF THE COURSE –

COURSE OUTLINE & BRIEFING
STRATEGIC INTELIGENCE ANALYSIS
DHR331: ANALISIS RISIKAN STRATEGIK
 REFERENCES
• 1. GERARDUS BLOKDYK (2020). STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE: A
COMPLETE GUIDE, OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
• 2. GRANA, G AND WINDELL, J. (2017). CRIME AND INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS. TAYLOR AND FRANCIS.
• 3. PHERSON, KATHERINE H. (2019). CRITICAL THINKING FOR
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. 2nd ed. USA: CQ PRESS.
• 4. PETER GILL. (2018). INTELLIGENCE IN AN INSECURE WORLD.
CAMBRIDGE POLITY.
• * RULES AND REGULATION FOR EXAMINATION REFER TO BUKU
PERATURAN AKADEMIK UPNM
 OBJECTIVE
• The aim of this course is to provide the students with an in depth
knowledge about the various concepts in strategic intelligence such as
the application and the utility of intelligence in war and peace;
historical practice of strategic intelligence; the evolution of
intelligence; counterintelligence, covert action, and other roles of
strategic intelligence. Throughout the course, students will also be
introduced to some case studies of the practice of strategic
intelligence.
 COURSE LEARNING OUTCOME
• Demonstrate an understanding of the fundamental concepts, theories
and development of strategic intelligence.

• Examine the evolution and historical context of strategic intelligence

• Evaluate the effectiveness and limitations of strategic intelligence in

war and peace
SECOND WEEK: THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE? –
THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE; WHAT IS IT ABOUT;
HOW DID IT DEVELOP AS AN ACADEMIC FIELD; KEY
CONCEPTS AND ISSUES; STRATEGIC CONTEXT;
INTRODUCING SOME KEY STRATEGIC THINKERS.
THIRD WEEK: THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE –
COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
AND EXAMPLES
FOURTH WEEK: INFORMATION REVOLUTIONS
AND INTELLIGENCE METHODS – ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, NEW SOCIAL MEDIA, AND
INTELLIGENCE SOURCING
FIFTH WEEK : INTELLIGENCE AND ASYMMETRIC
THREATS – CHANGING ROLES OF STRATEGIC
INTELLIGENCE AND NEW THREATS
•SIXTH WEEK: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE -
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES AND
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
• SEVENTH WEEK: COVERT ACTION AND POLITICAL
WARFARE – THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
COVERT ACTION (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) AND
PROPAGANDA/ PSYOPS
• EIGHTH WEEK: INTELLIGENCE AND POLICING –
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE, CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE, AND
THE ROLE OF SPECIAL BRANCH
•NINTH WEEK: CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE AND
INTELLIGENCE: CULTURAL INFLUENCES AND
BIAS; POSTMODERN INTELLIGENCE
• TENTH WEEK: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE IN
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS – INTRODUCTION TO
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS; THE ROLE OF
INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORTING HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS
• ELEVENTH WEEK: BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE – THE
BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE CYCLE, BUSINESS
INTELLIGENCE MODEL, AND STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT.
• TWELVE WEEK: GEOPOLITICS AND INTELLIGENCE
– AN INTRODUCTION TO GEOPOLITICS AND THE
INFLUENCE OF GLOBALIZATION ON STRATEGIC
INTELLIGENCE.
THRTEEN WEEK: INTELLIGENCE IN WAR –
LESSONS OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE DURING
WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II AND THE
COLD WAR
• FOURTEEN WEEK: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY – DISCUSSION OF CONTEMPORARY TRENDS AND FUTURE
EXPECTATIONS AS WELL AS PROBLEMS IN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
 MARKING SYSTEM
• ASSIGNMENT 1 : 30%

• QUIZ & ASSIGNMENT 2: 30%

• FINAL EXAM: 40%.

Q&A
STRATEGIC
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
(WEEK 2)
 OBJECTIVE

• The aim of this course is to provide the students with an in depth knowledge about the
various concepts in strategic intelligence such as the application and the utility of
intelligence in war and peace; historical practice of strategic intelligence; the evolution of
intelligence; counterintelligence, covert action, and other roles of strategic intelligence.
Throughout the course, students will also be introduced to some case studies of the
practice of strategic intelligence.
 COURSE LEARNING OUTCOME

• Demonstrate an understanding of the fundamental concepts, theories and development

of strategic intelligence.

• Examine the evolution and historical context of strategic intelligence

• Evaluate the effectiveness and limitations of strategic intelligence in war and peace
WEEK 2: THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE? – THE ORIGINS
OF INTELLIGENCE; WHAT IS IT ABOUT; HOW DID IT
DEVELOP AS AN ACADEMIC FIELD; KEY CONCEPTS AND
ISSUES; STRATEGIC CONTEXT; INTRODUCING SOME KEY
STRATEGIC THINKERS.
WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND WITH THE
TERMINOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE….
WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND WITH THE
TERMINOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE….
GENERAL IDEAS ON INTELLIGENCE; STARTING POINTS

• Intel is based on common sense.

• Intel is link or connecting the dot and the dot as a single information.
• Intel is not a fact yet. It is an analytical process before jump to conclusion.
• Intel produces ‘estimates’ not certainties.
• Intel may be right, may be wrong. Why.
• Information is not an intel. It is only the beginning of the long process.
• Intel is derived from various information.
• Info needs to be analyzed before it can be dissemintated to the end users as intelligence products.
• Info can obtain through various medium and platform. (humint, geoint, sigint, cyberint etc.)
 QUOTATION

• ‘INTELLIGENCE HAS NEVER BEEN MORE IMPORTANT IN WORLD POLITICS

THAN IT IS NOW AT THE OPENING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY’ Len
Scott & Peter Jackson

• ‘IF IT WERE FACT, IT WOULDN’T BE INTELLIGENCE’ Michael Hayden Ex-

Director of NSA.
 THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE? – THE
ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE;
INTELLIGENCE IS EVOLUTION PROCESS.
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO MODERN APPROACH.
HISTORICALLY, DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE HAVE BEEN SHAPED BY PATTERNS OF STATE
DEVELOPMENT.
MOST ANCIENT RELIGIOUS TEXTS MAKE REFERENCE TO ESPIONAGE AS HUMAN BASED
INTELLIGENCE.
KADESH BATTLE 1274 BETWEEN RAMESE 11 EGYPT AND KING MUWATALLIS FROM HITTITES EMPIRE.
IT FULL OF DECEPTION. KING MUWATALLIS SENT TWO MAN IMPERSONATED AS DESERTION ARMY
TO INFILTIRATE EGYPT AND TOLD THAT THE HITTIES ARMY IS STILL FAR FROM THEIR POSITION.
 THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE? – THE
ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE;
HISTORICALLY, DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE HAVE BEEN SHAPED BY PATTERNS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT.
MOST ANCIENT RELIGIOUS TEXTS MAKE REFERENCE TO ESPIONAGE. SUN TZU
THE EMERGENCE OF SOPHISTICATED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS OFTEN ACCOMPANIED THE DEPLOYMENT OF
MILITARY-TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO THE STATE.
FROM THE MID 19 CENTURY, THE ABILITY OF COMMANDERS TO MOVE AND CONTROL MILITARY FORCE AT SPEED,
FACILITATED BY THE TELEGRAPH AND THE RAILWAY, PRESENTED A NEW KIND OF CHALLENGE. THIS MANIFESTED
ITSELF AS A SURPRISE ATTACK.
(THE SAME PERIOD SAW THE EMERGENCE OF MORE MODERN INTELLIGENCE BUREAUX THAT
SOUGHT TO COUNTER THIS THREAT.)
THE NEXT FEW DECADES WITNESSED A REVOLUTION IN METHODS OF WAR AND DIPLOMACY DURING WHICH
INTELLIGENCE WOULD BE PRODUCED ON AN INDUSTRIAL SCALE.
• RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE THE TASK OF DEFINING
INTELLIGENCE NO EASIER.
• NON STATE ACTORS ARE MORE IMPORTANT. (WHO IS NON STATE ACTOR).
• SINCE 1970s, THE EMERGENCE OF THE MARKET STATE HAS MEANT THAT
LARGER AND LARGER PARTS OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ARE ALSO IN
PRIVATE HANDS. ie; TELCO and ISP providers are now required by law to work with
government as intelligence collectors.
 WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE ABOUT
1. PROBLEM CENTERS ON THE LACK OF SATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF INTELLGENCE.
1. SPECIFIC ATTRIBUTES SUCH AS SECRECY AND ASSOCIATE INTELLIGENCE WITH THIS ATTRIBUTES.
ANYTHING SECRET FALL UNDER THE REALM OF INTELLIGENCE. .

2. AS INPUT TO THE POLICY PROCESS. MARK LOWENTHAL A FORMER CONGRESSIONAL STAFFER

WHO HAS WORKED ON OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE, SAYS THAT INTELLIGENCE IS
INFORMATION THAT MEETS THE STATED OR UNDERSTOOD NEEDS OF POLICYMAKERS AND HAS
BEEN COLLECTED , REFINED AND NARROWED TO MEET THOSE NEEDS.

3. AS OUTPUT OF INTELLIGENCE PROCESS. JEFFREY RICHELSON WHO COVERS INTELLIGENCE

MATTERS AT NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE IN WASHINGTON EMPLOYS THE DEFINITION USED BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; INTELLIGENCE IS THE PRODUCT RESULTING FROM THE
COLLECTION, PROCESSING, INTEGRATION, ANALYSIS, EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION OF
AVAILABLE INFORMATION CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND AREAS.
 MARK LOWENTHAL, THE DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN
SCHOLAR OF INTELLIGENCE; INTELLIGENCE IN 3 WAYS

• 1. AS PROCESS, THROUGH WHICH INTELLIGENCE IS REQUESTED BY POLICY

MAKERS OR OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS, THEN COLLECTED, ANALYSED AND
FED TO THE CONSUMERS. KNOWN AS INTELLIGENCE CYCLE.
• 2. WE CAN DEFINE AS A PRODUCT, CIRCULATED AS PAPER, BUT NOW
THROUGH MULTI LEVEL SECURE ELECTRONIC DATABASE.
• 3. WE CAN TALK OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITIES AS INSTITUTIONS
 HOW DID IT DEVELOP AS AN ACADEMIC FIELD
INTELLIGENCE IS A NEW FIELD IN WORLD ACADEMIC COMPARED TO OTHERS FOR
EXAMPLE MEDICAL, ENGINEERING, DEFENCE, SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY, PSYCOLOGY .
1. TOP SECRET MATTERS.
2. POLITICAL INFLUENCE.
3. JEORPADIZE TO THE INDIVIDUAL PRESTIGIOUS.
4. NO INTENTION TO SHARE WITH THE MASS PUBLICS.
5. TO AVOID MANIPULATION.
6. TO BE SUED FOR ANY BREACH OR CONTRADICT WITH ANY PROCEDURAL, IF ANY.
7. ARCHIEVE CONTROL AND INTERNAL/DOMESTIC PROCEDURAL.
8. SOMEONE WILL GO TO PRISON IF UNNECESSARY OPEN TO PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.
9. IT’S NOT FREE FOR ALL FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN.
 SCENARIO 1: INTEL OPEN TO PUBLIC

• IN UK, SINCE 9/11, A TORRENT OF INFORMATION HAS ENTERED THE PUBLIC

DOMAIN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE, BUT FOR QUITE DIFFERENT REASONS.
• TOGETHER OSAMA LADEN AND SADDAM HUSSEIN MANAGED TO COMPLETELY
TRANSFORM THE POLICY OF THE UK GOVERNMENT ON THE PUBLIC USE OF
INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT POLICY MAKER. OVER SIX MONTHS IN LATE 2002
AND EARLY 2003, THE BLAIR GOVERNMENT RELEASED TWO MUCH-DISCUSSED
DOSSIERS ON IRAQ, BOTH OF WHICH INCORPORATED SOME INTELLIGENCE
MATERIAL. (UNPRECEDENTED FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO PRODUCE FULL
DOCUMENTS OF THIS KIND FOR THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS).
SCENARIO 2: INTEL IS STILL HALF SHARING.

• IN WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, GOVERNMENT ONLY INTENDED TO PLACE

SELECTED MORSELS OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
• 9/11 – TO TIGHTENING UP OF SECURITY. US AUTHORITIES HAD ALREADY BEGUN
A BIZARRE PROCESS OF RE-CLASSIFYING MANY ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS.
• JUST POINT TO PONDER; US SPENT $16 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR AND HAS
EMPLOYED 31,000 FULL TIME OFFICIALS TO SAFEGUARD CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENTS.TODAY IT IS TOP SECRET DOCUMENT, 2 DAYS LATER IT MADE THE
PAGES OF THE WASHINGTON POST.
CASE STUDY: EXAMPLE THE CASE OF DIRECTOR OF MIEO. DEALS
WITH ISSUE OF SECRECY. WHAT LAWYER SAYS
 KEY CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
1. INTEL IS NOT SOLELY GOVERNMENT MATTERS. IN US, THE REQUIREMENTS TO SURGE
INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY SINCE 9/11 HAS ACCELERATEDTHIS PROCESS AND IN 2003 APPROXIMATELY
A THIRD OF CIA EMPLOYEES WERE PRIVATE CONTRACTORS. THEY CAN NO LONGER CLAIM THAT
INTELLIGENCE IS A PREDOMINANTLY STATE-BASED ACTIVITY.
2. TRAIN THE CIVILIAN AS AN AGENT TO COLLECT INFORMATION NEEDS A VERY
COMPREHENSIVE VETTING TO AVOID ANY UNCERTANTY OR EXPLOITATION BY THIRD PARTIES.
3. THE GROWTH OF OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE HAS ALSO BLURRED TRADITIONAL
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION AND THE BARRIER BETWEEN SECRET
AND NON SECRET.
4. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HAS ALSO SUBVERTED THE FAMILIAR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE,
ALOWWING POLICY MAKERS TO BECOME THEIR OWN DIY ANALYST
STRATEGIC CONTEXT; INTRODUCING SOME
KEY STRATEGIC THINKERS.
1. TACTICAL LEVEL.
2. OPERATIONAL LEVEL. IN ANY CAMPAIGN OR OPERATION, THE RANGE OF ARTILERRY OR
WARSHIP FIRE AS AREA OF OPERATION WHICH FALLS UNDER THE RESPECTIVE COMMANDER
COMMAND OR RESPONSIBILTY.
3. STRATEGIC LEVEL. FOR MILITARY, IT WOULD INVOLVE FROM LEVEL 1 TO 3.
4. NATIONAL LEVEL.
SOME SCHOOL OF THOUGHT COMBINED 3 AND 4 AS ONE, STRATEGIC LEVEL.
WHERE YOU ARE IN THIS COURSE

• BASICALLY IN ANY INTELLIGENCE OUTPUT, THE LEVEL OF EXECUTION, PLAYS

VERY IMPORTANT PART IN DETERMINING THE AREA OR LEVEL WHERE YOU ARE
SUPPOSED TO OPERATE.
• TO MAKE THE MATTERS EASIER, THE DIAGRAM SHOWN AS A GUIDELINES WHERE
YOU ARE, YOUR ROLES UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY POSITION AND WHERE
THE COURSE IS COVERED UNDER STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
EXAMPLE: DURING WORLD WAR II

WORLD WAR II OCCURED WORLD

BASED ON MANY CAMPAIGN WAR II
LAUNCHED

CAMPAIGN DURING WORLD MALAYA EUROPEAN AFRICAN

WAR II CAMPAIGN CAMPAIGN CAMPAIGN

IN EVERY CAMPAIGN MANY BATTLE ect

BATTLES REPORTED THROUGH BATTLE OF BATTLE OF
OUT THE INVANSION ie ect in
JITRA MUAR
JAPANESE INVASION Europe

BATTLE of ect,
ect,etc
Refer nx slide
BATTLES OF MALAYA CAMPAIGN
OTHER EXAMPLE OF CAMPAIGN: AFRICAN CAMPAIGN.
AFRICAN CAMPAIGN CONSIST OF MANY BATTLES
DURING WORLD WAR II
DURING THE WAR THE INTELLIGENCE PLAYS VERY
CRUCIAL ROLES IN EVERY LEVEL OF WAR
 EXAMPLE: INTELLIGENCE LEVEL DURING WORLD
WAR II
HERE
YOU NATIONAL LEVEL OR STRATEGIC
LEVEL. SOME SCHOOL OF THOUGT WORLD
ARE
NATIONAL
DIVIDE INTO 4 LEVEL BY SEPARATED WAR II
LEVEL
STRATEGIC LEVEL AND THE
HIGHEST LEVEL IS NATIONAL LEVEL

MALAYA EUROPEAN AND OTHER

OPERATIONAL LEVEL
CAMPAIGN CAMPAIGN CAMPAIGN

PEACE BATTLE ect

BATTLE OF BATTLE OF
TACTICAL LEVEL ect in
JITRA MUAR
Europe

BATTLE
OF ect, ect
WEEK 3: The intelligence cycle – Components
of the intelligence cycle and examples
• CONCLUSION
• Q &A
LECTURE 2: The intelligence cycle – Components of
the intelligence cycle and examples
 GENERAL IDEAS
• The Intelligence Cycle is the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for
policymakers/Commanders to use in decision making and action. The steps taken may be different
in but the objective is still same to produce reliable intelligence input. Some countries and intel
organization divide into four, five, six or even seven steps which constitute the Intelligence Cycle.
The common cycle that being used in most of the countries are 4 steps of cycles.

• For the purpose of discussion, the seven phases of the intelligence process will be included.

• The seven phases of Intelligence Cycles mentioned in a book ‘Intelligence. From Secrets to
Policy’ by Mark M.Lowenthal, Saga Publication Ltd, pg 73, 2017.

• What it means the raw information. In can be in any types of information. Details discussion under
the topic ‘Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaisance’ (ISR) – DHR 3323.
• The sources of Information can be in form of humint, sigint,
geoint etc.

• Intelligence might be described as information that has

been systematically and professionally processed and
analysed.

• There are many definition of intelligence, but every

professional intelligence officer understands precisely what
he or she is required to deliver.

• For the professional, intelligence is simply defined as:

• ‘Processed, accurate information, presented in

sufficient time to enable a decision maker to take
whatever action is required’
THE CYCLE IN INTELLIGENCE
CYCLES OF FOUR
 BRIEF EXPLANATION FOUR CYCYLE OF INTEL
• IT COMES FROM AMERICAN MODEL CREATED IN
THE 1920s AND IS A PRODUCTION-BASED
PROCESS, WHICH HAS A MECHANICAL SEQUENCE
SIMILAR TO A MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION –
LINE PRINCIPLE.
• BY 1926 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN USA WAS
SAID TO OPERATE REQUIREMENT, COLLECTION,
UTILIZATION (ANALYSIS) AND DISSEMINATION.
• THE COMMANDER SET THE MISSION AND THIS
DETERMINED THE DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION
EFFORT, WHICH MOVE FROM COLLECTING TO
PROCESSING TO USE OF INFORMATION.
 Continued;
• TODAY THE THEORY AND CONCEPTS OF INTELLIGENCE ARE USED IN
MANY OTHER FIELDS AND ARE NOT RESTRICTED TO THE MILITARY,
GOVERNMENT, THE CORPORATE SECTOR, AND THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES.

• OFTEN THE COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVE INCLUDES INTERNATIONAL

MARKETS AND GEOPOLITICAL AND MACRO ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE,
AND THE DISCUSSION TAKING PLACE ARE FOCUSED BY WHAT HAS
BEEN TERMED BUSSINESS INTELLIGENCE (BI) METHODS.

• NOW POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, NON GOVERNMENT

ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) AND SMALLER COMMERCIAL, NON PROFIT
AND CHARITABLE BUSSINESS USE MANY OF THESE STRATEGIC AND
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND PLANNING TECHNIQUE
CYCLES OF FIVE
CYCLES OF SIX
THE SEVEN PHASES OF INTELLIGENCE
PROCESS
1. IDENTIFYING REQUIREMENTS.
2. COLLECTION.
3. PROCESSING & EXPLOITATION.
4. ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION.
5. DISSEMINATION.
6. CONSUMPTION.
7. FEEDBACK
(REFER: INTELLIGENCE; FROM SECRETS TO POLICY, 7th edition, Mark M
Lowenthal, Saga Publications Ltd,2017)
BRIEF EXPLANATION ON THE BASIC CYCLES
OF INTELLIGENCE
 1. Planning and Direction
• This is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need for data to delivering
an intelligence product to a consumer. It is the beginning and the end of the cycle--the
beginning because it involves drawing up specific collection requirements and the end
because finished intelligence, which supports policy decisions, generates new
requirements.

• The whole process depends on guidance from public officials. Policymakers--the

President, his aides, the National Security Council, and other major departments and
agencies of government--initiate requests for intelligence. (REFER TO OUR MALAYSIAN,
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 2016)

• Direction: The commander or political leader states his intelligence requirement, usually
in the form of question.
2. Collection
• ...is the gathering of the raw information needed to produce finished intelligence. There are many
sources of information including open sources such as foreign broadcasts, newspapers, periodicals,
and books. Open source reporting is integral to CIA's analytical capabilities. Malaysian Intelligence
agencies also do the same approach in gathering information from open source. There are also secret
sources of information. CIA's operations officers collect such information from agents abroad and from
defectors who provide information obtainable in no other way.

• Collection: The intelligence staff convert the commander’s intelligence requirement into a series of
essential elements of information (EEIs) and task the intelligence agencies using a collection plan.

• Finally, technical collection--electronics and satellite photography--plays an indispensable role in

modern intelligence, such as monitoring arms control agreements and providing direct support to
military forces.
POINTS ON COLLECTION
• An intelligence collection plan (ICP) is the systematic process used by
most modern armed forces and intelligence services to meet
intelligence requirements through the tasking of all available
resources to gather and provide pertinent information within a
required time limit.
• Creating a collection plan is part of the intelligence cycle.
HUMINT INTELLIGENCE
Human intelligence (abbreviated HUMINT and pronounced as
hyoo-mint) is intelligence gathered by means of interpersonal
contact, as opposed to the more technical intelligence
gathering disciplines such as signals intelligence (SIGINT),
imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signature
intelligence (MASINT). A United States Marine asks a local
woman about weapons in Fallujah, Iraq

NATO defines HUMINT as "a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources."
HUMINT, as the name suggests, is mostly done by people rather than any technical means, and is commonly provided by
covert agents and spies. For instance, Oleg Penkovsky was a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) colonel who served as a
source to the UK and the United States by informing them of the precise knowledge necessary to address rapidly
developing military tensions with the Soviet Union. A typical HUMINT activity consists of interrogations and conversations
with persons having access to information.

The manner in which HUMINT operations are conducted is dictated by both official protocol and the nature of the source
of the information. Within the context of the U.S. military, HUMINT activity may involve clandestine activities, however
these operations are more closely associated with CIA projects.

Both counter intelligence and HUMINT include clandestine HUMINT and clandestine HUMINT operational techniques.
TERMS IN HUMINT: ESPIONAGE
• Whats is an example of espionage?
• Espionage is defined as the act of spying or the use of spies by a
government or a company. An example of espionage is when a spy
infiltrates the government of another country to learn valuable state
secrets. The use of spies by a government to learn the military secrets of
other nations.

• Espionage against a nation is a crime under the legal code of many

nations. In the United States, it is covered by the Espionage Act of 1917.
The risks of espionage vary. A spy violating the host country's laws may be
deported, imprisoned, or even executed.
OTHERS TYPES ON INTEL GATHERING
• OSINT. Open-source intelligence are gathered from open sources. OSINT can be further segmented by the source
type: Internet/General, Scientific/Technical, and various HUMINT specialties, e.g. trade shows, association meetings,
and interviews.
• SIGINT. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) are gathered from interception of signals.

• GEOINT. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) are gathered from satellite and aerial photography, or
mapping/terrain data.

• MASINT. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) are gathered from an array of signatures
(distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. According to the Air Force Institute of Technology's
Center for MASINT Studies and Research, MASINT is split into six major disciplines: electro-optical, nuclear, radar,
geophysical, materials, and radiofrequency.[2]

• CYBERINT.

• Details process will be covered under Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconaisance. Course Code DHR 3323 (Compulsory) – OSINT,
PROINT, HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT and case study.
3. Processing

• ...involves converting the vast amount of information collected to a form usable by analysts through
decryption, language translations, and data reduction.

• Collation: The intelligence staff collates all the information from the various sources into a readily
accessible database. It is essential that all the information collected can be retrieved.
4. All Source Analysis and Production
• ...is the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating, and
analyzing all available data--which is often fragmentary and even contradictory--and preparing intelligence
products. Analysts, who are subject-matter specialists, consider the information's reliability, validity, and
relevance. They integrate data into a coherent whole, put the evaluated information in context, and produce
finished intelligence that includes assessments of events and judgments about the implications of the
information for the United States.

• The Intelligence agency devotes the bulk of its resources to providing strategic intelligence to
policymakers. It performs this important function by monitoring events, warning decision makers about
threats to the country, and forecasting developments. The subjects involved may concern different regions,
problems, or personalities in various contexts--political, geographic, economic, military, scientific, or
biographic. Current events, capabilities, and future trends are examined.

• The Intel Agency produces numerous written reports, which may be brief--one page or less--or lengthy
studies. They may involve current intelligence, which is of immediate importance, or long-range
assessments. The Agency presents some finished intelligence in oral briefings. The Intelligence Agency
also participates in the drafting and production of National Intelligence Estimates, which reflect the collective
judgments of the Intelligence Community.
INTERPRETATION- ANALYZED INTELLIGENCE
• Interpretaion is where the collated information is analyzed and
turned into intelligence. This is usually done by asking the key
questions:
• 1. Who is it…
• 2. What is it doing….
• 3. What does it mean…..
 Intelligence reflects a progressive
refinement of data and information
 WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT
• An intelligence requirement (IR) relates to any form of intelligence (information)
required by a decision maker. Once an intelligence requirement is identified, it is
the responsibility of the decision maker's intel staff or if requested, supporting
intel organization(s), to collect and disseminate the required information. The
identification of intelligence requirements and the collection and dissemination
of the required information are parts of the intelligence cycle.

• Intelligence requirements are determined by a decision maker to meet

his/her objectives. In the federal government of the United States,
requirements can be issued from the White House or the Congress.[citation
needed] In NATO, a commander uses requirements (sometimes
called Essential elements of information (EEIs)) to initiate the intelligence
cycle.
•
WHAT IS EEI?
• Essential elements of information (EEI) is any critical intelligence
information required by intelligence consumers to perform their
mission. The EEI are specific to a particular event, thing, or other
target individual. The EEI are written out in advance as questions
by consumers of the EEI information. Then, the EEI questions are
used by collectors of the information that may not be in direct contact
with the consumer at the time the information is collected. A specific
set of EEIs are used by collectors to develop a collection plan to find
the answers to the questions in the EEIs. EEIs are also used in non-
intelligence fields, such as responders to crisis events or medical
emergencies.
 EEI & the ignorance of politicians
• Politicians are usually ignorant of what is required to make intelligence
work.
• Although the decision maker is clearly responsible for spelling out his
EEI(they shoud determined), in practice, government ministers very rarely
exercise this role.
• The Israeli Shlomo Gazit, one time head of the Israel Defence’s Force
Military Intelligence, spelled it out very clearly at high level meeting of
retired intelligence officers and academics in 1999;
• In most cases the decision maker simply doesn’t understand the problems involved
in producing the EEI. In most cases he doesn’t even understand just what you want
from him. Thus the head of the service in charge of the national intelligence
assessment and in charge of coordinating the collection effort has to bring along his
suggested plan …. for the decision maker’s signature.
5. DISSEMINATION
• Dissemination can take any form: a written brief, an urgent signal, a
routine intelligence summary, or, more usually in urgent cases, a
verbal brief to the political leader or commander.

• In US : President’s Daily Brief, Worldwide intelligence review, DIA/J2

Executive Highlights, National Intelligence Estimates
6. CONSUMPTION
• THE PROCESS OF DISSEMINATION FROM PRODUCERS TO THE
CONSUMERS.
7. FEEDBACK
• Communication between the policy community and the intelligence
community are at best imperfect throughout the intelligence process.
• This is most noticebale after intelligence has been transmitted.
• Ideally, the policy makers should give continual feedback to their
intelligence produces-- detailing what has been useful, what has not,
which area need continuing or increased emphasis, which can be
reduced and so on.
SAMPLE 1: 5 STEPS
SAMPLE 2: 7 STEPS: A SHEMATIC
SAMPLE 3: 7 STEPS; MULTILAYERED
 IN A NUTSHELL
• The stages of the intelligence cycle include the issuance of requirements by
decision makers, collection, processing, analysis, and publication of
intelligence. The circuit is completed when decision makers provide
feedback and revised requirements.

• The intelligence cycle is also called the Intelligence Process by the

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the uniformed services. The
intelligence cycle is an effective way of processing information and
turning it into relevant and actionable intelligence.
TOPIC FOR NEXT CLASS
• Information Revolutions and Intelligence Methods – Electronic media,
new social media, and intelligence sourcing
Strategic Intelligence
Analysis
Information Revolutions and Intelligence
Methods – Electronic media, new social
media, and Intelligence sourcing
 GENERAL IDEAS
• EVERY TIME NEW MEDIAS ARE CREATED, THIS ALTERS THE WAY IN
WHICH INDIVIDUALS, SOCIETY AND BUSINESS OPERATE. IT CHANGES
THE WAY IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS AND GROUP ENGAGE WITH OTHERS
AND UNDERSTANDS THEMSELVES.
• NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND DELIVERY ARE ALSO USED ENGAGE
AND CHANGE CURRENT CONFLICTS, CRIMES, GEOPOLITICS AND
ECONOMICS. *SEE SEC 130 PENAL CODE
• NEW INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSES OFFER
DIFFERENT WAYS OF COMMUNICATING, MARKETING AND
ENTERTAINING BUT THEY ALSO ALTER THE WAY WORLD IS PERCEIVED
AND ANALYSED.
 THE EFFECTS OF NEW MEDIA
• LATE 1990, 24 HR CHANNEL AND THE EFFECTS OF WEB NEWS BEGAN
HAVE THEIR GLOBALIZING INFLUENCE AND AS WE MOVED INTO NEW
CENTURY THEY BEGAN TO CHANGE THE MORE TRADITIONAL
ECONOMIC MODEL NEWSPAPER DELIVERY AND PRINT.
• A MORE GLOBAL ECONOMY HAD OTHER COMPETITIVE EFFECTS THAT
REDUCE COSTS AND IMPROVED DELIVERY.
• WORLD POPULATION INCREASED – HAS BROUGHT WITH IT GROWING
GLOBAL NUMBERS OF LITERATE INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS NUMBERS
OF POOR.
ILLITERATE & POOR
LITERATE POPULATION
• DURING THIS PERIOD EVERYTHING FROM
SATELLITE TELEVISION TO TRADITIONAL
PRINT STILL FOUND AN AUDIENCE
BECAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN THE
LITERATE POPULATION, AND MOST
ASPECTS OF MEDIA CONTINUED TO
GROW.

• BUT ELECTRONIC SOCIAL NETWORKING

AND MOBILE CONNECTIVITY WERE
GROWING AT AN EVEN FASTER RATE AND
BEING USED BY DIFFERENT SOCIAL
GROUPS TO EFFECTS CHANGE IN THE
MOMENT, AS CAN BEEN SEEN BY SOCIAL
MONITORING OF SOME OF MORE
RADICAL EFFECTS.
RADICAL CHANGES IN MEDIA BROUGHT BY
GUTENBERG

NEWS WILL BE
DISSEMINATED BY
INDIVIDUAL/READER
MOBILE FROM ONE
PLACE TO ANOTHER
PLACE
14 CENTURY
 5000 YEARS BACK
• ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MEDIA HAVE BEEN GOING ON A LOT
LONGER THAN THIS.
• FOR MORE THAN 5000 YEARS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ORGANIZING AND
RECORDING THEIR THOUGHT AND ACTIONS AS PICTURES, DATA AND
INFORMATION FOR RETRIEVEL AND SEARCHING AT LATER TIME.
• THESE RECORDING HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED BY PICTURES IN CAVES,
MARKS ON TABLETS, THE COMPILING RECORDS, HIEROGLYPHICS, THE
STORING, ORGANIZING, AND INDEXING OF PAPYRI, GAZETTES, BOOKS
AND ALL NEW FORMS OF MEDIA.
HIERGYPH
PAPYRUS
 3000 YEARS BACK
• AT DIFFERENT TIME THE LAST 3000 YEARS , LIBRARIES AND INDEX SYSTEMS
HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED.
• THE OLDEST KNOWN LIBRARY WAS CREATED IN ELBA, IN THE FERTILE
CRESCENT (3000 AND 2500 BCE) AND BY 300 BCE PTOLEMY SOTER, A
MACEDONIAN GENERAL CREATED THE GREAT LIBRARY AT ALEXANDARIA.
• EVEN AFTER THE INCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC TRANSFORMATION LIBRARIES
THAT CAN BE ACCESSED IN MOST COUNTRIES, IN 2009 5.3 BILLION NON-
VIRTUAL ITEMS (BOOKS, INFORMATION RECORDS, CDs, DVDs, et al) WERE
CHECKED OUT FROM LIBRARIES IN THE AMERICANS, CANADA, AND
EUROPE, AN INCREASE OF 11 PERCENT OVER THE PREVIOUS YEAR.
MACEDONIAN
• NONETHELESS, THIS TRADITIONAL USE OF INFORMATION AND
KNOWLEDGE IS BEING OVER-WHELMED BY THE ELECTRONIC
REVOLUTION, WHICH EXPERIENCES A FAR HIGHER RATE OF GROWTH.
– USE OF WEB TECHNOLOGY, --- AND IT’S LACK OF EASY
VERIFICATION---UNCLEAR.
• AND OF COURSE SIMILAR EFFECTS, BELIEFS AND PRACTICES HAVE
HAD AN IMPACT ON THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS THROUGH OUT
HISTORY.
• IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER THE DISCUSS HOW THESE DIFFERENT
MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES HAVE AFFECTED OUR OWN
UNDERSTANDINGS AND OUR INTERPRETATION OF THOSE OF OTHERS.
 PRIOR THE INVENTION OF SMART
NEW WORLD’S ICT HAND PHONE
• FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION MORE • PRESS, MEDIA IS CONTROLLED BY
OPENESS GOVERNMENT.

• OPEN INFORMATION SOURCES • INFORMATION PRINTED HAS TO

COMPLY WITH STATUTORY
PROVISION.
 ENVIRONMENTAL GOSSIP; WESTERN VIEW

BASED ON HUMAN HISTORY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

• VERBAL EXCHANGES - WEST • 200,000 YEARS AGO HUMANS TO
PERSPECTIVE. PRIMATES. (Western START TALKING. HUNTER FOR
perspective vs Islam perspective) FOOD COLLECTIVELY.
• MIGRATE TO OTHER CONTINENTAL.
• STICK RHYTHMS, ROCK BEATING, • CULTURE, LANGUANGE, SPEECH.
SHOUTING, CHANTING, HAND • MADE A MARKER IN CAVE,
SIGNALS, MIME, ROCK THROWING,
SMOKE SIGNALS AND BODY • MARKING STONE, TREES, STICKS
PAINTING. ETC FOR COUNTING.
• SIGNIFICANTLY; SYMBOLS USED.
 KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN CIVILIZATION
• PETROGLYPS – ROCK CARVING. • PRINTING – TYPE IN KOREA –
• PICTOGRAM – OBJECT/IMAGE LOGOGRAPHS.
• CARVING • 105 AD CHINESE IMPERIAL CT –
ANNOUCED THE INVENTION OF PAPER
• IDEOGRAMS • 1605 JOHANN CAROLUS CREATED THE
• CHINESE PROTO WRITING – 6000 BCE, FIRST NEWSPAPER.
• MIDDLE EASTERN – 4000 BCE.BRONZE • THE FIRST MODERN NEWSPAPER WAS
AGE. THE AVISA, PUBLISHED IN GERMANY
• WRITING AS THE CATALYST FOR THE 1609. ---
CHANGE
• THE FIRST PURE ALPHABET WAS
CREATED IN ABOUT 2000 BCE IN • .
ANCIENT EGYPT.
• OVER THE CENTURIES WE HAVE RECORDED MANY TYPES OF
INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING TO CREATE KNOWLEDGE AND
BELIEFS AND MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN USED TO GIVE
GOVERNMENTS, THE MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
UNDERSTANDING AND INTELLIGENCE.
• WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY COLLECTED, COLLATED AND INDEXED
INFORMATION IN LARGE LIBRARIES, ORGANIZATIONAL FILES AND
DATA RECORDS.
 ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND MODERN
INTELLIGENCE
• TODAY , THE VAST AMOUNT OF INFORMATION SUPPORTED ON THE WEB IS
FAR IN EXCESS OF ANYTHING COLLECTED IN THE LIBRARIES OF THE PAST.
• FROM AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE, THE SHEER QUANTITIES OF THE
AVAILABLE IMAGERY AND DATA AND INFORMATION ARE ARRESTING.
• ESTIMATES OF THE APPROXIMATE SIZE OF THE WEB CURRENTLY RUN
FROM AROUND 15 BILLION TO 1 TRILLION PAGES.
• MOST SEARCH ENGINE TRAWLS ONLY THE SURFACE TIDES AND WAVES;
THEY RARELY REACH THE INNER DEPTHS OF THE DEEP WEB. A SEARCH LIKE
GOOGLE SEARCHES ONLY ABOUT 3 OR 4 PERCENTS OF THE ENTIRE WEB’S
CONTENT.
• THEREFORE 96-97 PERCENT OF THE DEEP WEB, MOST OF WHICH IS FREE
TO USE, IS OFTEN UNEXPLORED.
• CURRENTLY, ANALYSTS AND INTELLIGENCE PRACTITIONERS HAVE TO
ENGAGE WITH THE INFORMATION OVERLOAD, WHICH HAS
EXPANDED AT AN EXPLOSIVE RATE AND IS ALTERING THEIR VIEWS,
BUT THE THEORETICAL MODELS OF INTELLIGENCNE CREATION
REMAIN LARGELY UNALTERED.
• WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS, THE ORGANIZATION THAT
REVIEWS THE INFORMATION, ANALYSES THE DATA, AND CREATE
INTELLIGENCE CREATION AND ITS SECRECY ARE OFTEN CONSIDERED
THE DEFINING ELEMENTS THAT SEPARATE INTELLIGENCE FROM
INFORMATION.
• THROUGHT THE AGES DIFFERENT TYPES OF TECHNOLOGICAL
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED , AND THESE
HAVE ALTERED THE PERSPECTIVE OVER WHAT HAS BEEN
INTERPRETED AS INTELLIGENCE.

• THE BROADER DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE HAVE OFTEN BEEN

LOST OR IGNORED, WHILE POLICY AND CURRENT POLITICS TAKE THE
FOREGROUND. OFTEN THE REASONING IS THAT TIME IS OF THE
ESSENCE AND HISTORY DOES NOT APPLY, SINCE THE CURRENT
SITUATION IS DIFFERENT AND CHANGES THE THINKING.
• THE CULTURAL INFLUENCES WITHIN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
HAVE ALWAYS ATTRACTED DEBATE AND ARGUMENT, AS THEY DO
WITHIN THE STAFF OF ANY LARGE ORGANIZATION.

• BIAS AND SAYING WHAT OTHERS WANT TO HEAR ARE MAJOR ISSUES.
• THE JUDICIARY SYSTEM – ETHIC AND SOP FOR JUDGES.
• THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL PETRAEUS TO
HEAD THE CIA IS INTERESTING TO NOTE, AS HE MADE A
POINT OF SPEAKING TO HIS NEW, LARGE TEAM OF
PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE WAS APPOINTED, AND
HE SOON HIT THIS LONG STANDING DEBATE IN
PARTICULAR.
• WE DON’T DO THE PRESIDENT ANY FAVORS UNLESS WE GIVE
HIM THE CLEAREST PICTURE POSSIBLE OF WHATEVER ISSUE
HE’S FACING…. PLEASE FEEL FREE TO TELL IT TO ME STRAIGHT;
IN FACT, FEEL OBLIGATED TO DO SO. THERE SHOULD NOT BE A
CASE WHEN SOMEONE WALKS OUT OF MY OFFICE, OR THE
DEPUTY’S, OR ANY OF THE OTHER SENIOR OFFICES, AND SAYS, ‘
MAN, I WISH I HAD SAID……’ WHATEVER. THAT SHOULD NOT
HAPPEN.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WORK
• TODAY’S INTELLIGENGE ANALYSIS CAN ALSO BECOME
OVERWHELMED BY THE SHEER QUANTITITES OF AVAILABLE
INFORMATION.
• THERE IS NOW AN OVERLOAD OF INFORMATION AND DATA TENDING
TO MAKE COLLECTION SOMETIMES SEEM MORE IMPORTANT THAN
ANALYSIS.
• NEW SOFTWARE AND DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGIES ARE AND WILL BE
USED TO ANALYSE DATA, BUT INTELLIGENCE NEVER WAS JUST ABOUT
THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION.
• CERTAINLY THE POLICYMAKERS SEE JUDGEMENT AS THEIR PART OF
THE PROCESS, AND ONE THAT IS OFTEN MORE RELEVANT THAN THE
INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE ITSELF.
• BOTH FROM THE ANALYST’S PERSPECTIVE AND THAT OF THE
POLICYMAKER, THESE PROCESSES ARE RARELY SEEN AS JUST SET
PIECE OF ACADEMIC ANALYSIS.
• THE INTELLIGENCE OUTCOME CAN BE AS MUCH AS AN ART AS A
SCIENCE AND UNFORTUNATELY CAN SOMETIMES INCLUDE
PROPAGANDA, UNINTENTIONAL BIAS AS WELL AS CLEAR, OBJECTVE
JUDGEMENTS.
• GIVEN THE DECISION TIMESCALES INVOLVED, ALL THESE ELEMENTS NEED
TO BE BALANCED QUITE QUICKLY IN ORDER TO REACH A DECISION.
• WITHIN AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION’S STRUCTURE AND CULTURE
PROCESS TENDS TO REFLECT THE TIMES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE
ORGANISATION WAS CONSTRUCTED.
• EVERY DISCIPLINE, AS NIETSCHE SAID, AND I PURPOSELY REPEAT, IS
CONSTRAINED BY WHAT IT FORBIDS IT PRACTITIONERS TO DO.
• DISCIPLINARY AND INTERNAL CULTURE OF ANY ORGANISATION HAVE
IMPLICIT, OFTEN UNSPOKEN RULES ON THE WAY OPERATIONS USE
THOUGHT AND CREATIVE IMAGINATION, AND THE RULES SURROUNDING
INTELLIGENCE AND THE ORGANISATIONS THAT ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE IT
ARE NO DIFFERENT.
• WE OFTEN TEND TO LOOK AT THE WORLD THROUGH THE EYES OF
OUR PARENTS, FRIENDS, AND GRANDPARENTS, AND THE STRUCTURE
AND ORGANISATIONS OF OUR LARGER BEURACRACIES CONTINUE TO
HAVE AN UNDERLYING SIMILARITY TO THE PAST.
• TODAY THE BROAD RANGE OF POLICYMAKERS, FROM COUNTRY
LEADERS, POLITICIANS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMANDERS, TO
CEOs OF COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS NOW USE WHAT THE TERM
INTELLIGENCE.
• THE OBJECTIVE IS STILL SEEN AS TO GAIN ADVANTAGES IN
EVERYTHING, FROM WAR TO COMMERCIAL COMPETITION.
• ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUALS MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY CALL IT
INTELLIGENCE, THEY SEEK ADVANTAGES BY USING INFORMATION
GLEANED FROM GOSSIP AND CONVERSATION, AS WELL AS FROM
WHATEVER MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY, OR COVERT METHODS ARE
AVAILABLE.
• IN DISCUSSION WITH MYSELF AFTER MEETING AT A CONFERENCE IN
BELGIUM IN OCTOBER 2011, ILAN MIZRAHI OF MOSSAD INTELLIGENCE
SUMMED UP HIS VIEWPOINT AS FOLLOWS:
• ‘CIRCUMSTANCES, TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE ARE THE THREE IMPORTANT
PILLARS WHEN DEALING WITH INTELLIGENCE. CURRENTLY CIRCUMSTANCES AND
TECHNOLOGY ARE CHANGING RAPIDLY, YET HUMAN NATURE IS NOT.
• THE PRESENT PROBLEM OF RADICAL INCREASING INFORMATION AND THEREFORE
INCREASES IN THE GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE WILL CONTINUE TO GET BIGGER.
• THEREFORE AS A STARTING POINT WE NEED TO CLEARLY DEFINE NATIONAL
SECURITY.
• IT SEEMS WE NEED A BROADER DEFINITION OF WHAT WE MEAN BY NATIONAL
SECURITY AS WHAT NOW TENDS TO GET INCORPORATED WITHIN THIS ARENA HAS
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED.
• FROM THIS WE WILL NEED TO RECEIVE MORE PRECISE PIR (PRECISE
INTELLIGENCE/INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS) FROM DECISION MAKERS.
• OPEN SOURCE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO DECISION MAKERS’ BELIEFS THAT NOW
WHEN THEY ARE MUCH MORE EDUCATED THEY NEED ANALYSIS FROM
INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEIR INDEPENDENCE
ON INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATIONS WILL INCREASE TO SUPPLY THEM WITH
MORE INFORMATION.
• INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION WILL CONTINUE TO PREFER SECRET
INFORMATION BECAUSE PROFESSIONALLY THEY ARE WELL AWARE OF IT
BIASES AND MANIPULATIONS BUT ALSO TO NOT PROMOTE IT THREATENS
THEIR UNIQUE POSITION WITH DECISION MAKERS.
LAST SLIDE:
• OPEN SOURCE TODAYS HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO TACTICAL-
OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC TRENDS AND PROCESSES.
• AND THIS WILL ALTER SOME ORGANISATIONS AS GIANT QUANTITIES OF
INFORMATION IN TWITTER AND FACEBOOK WILL NEED THOSE YOUNGSTERS
WHO UNDERSTAND IT MUCH BETTER THAN THE TRADITIONAL MANPOWER
BUT STILL ARE WE REALLY TO RECRUIT 16 – 18 YEAR OLDS TO THE SERVICES
OR OUTSOURCE THEIR SERVICESé.
• THE WEAKEST POINT STANDING IN FRONT OF THESE OCEANS OF
INFORMATION WILL BE THE HUMAN NATURE ASPECTS OF COLLECTING ,
ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINTAION.