Group 1 - AVALON
Group Members: Sara Zhelegu, Elizaveta Vilcu, Victoire Pons, Ana Cristina Schlumberger, Arnaud
Brochier, Laura Kopf
Word Count: 3331
Facts and Introduction to the Case
After three centuries of colonial control by its neighbor, Cameliard, the Republic of Avalon
became an independent, sovereign, and insular state in 1960. It is made up of several islands and is
home to three different ethnic groups: the Boii (10% Hindu), the Galatians (43% animist), and the
Gallaeci (47% Christian). Ever since attaining independence, Avalon has had socio-political conflicts
stemming from historical and ethnic differences.
Most people in Avalon voted in favour of independence in 1959 in a referendum overseen by
the United Nations. The Tigers of Avalon Liberation Army (TALA), which aimed to maintain its
affiliation with Cameliard, was founded by the Galatian minority in Gwent in protest at the outcome.
Cameliard provided TALA with financial and military support to keep its sway over the area. This
assistance changed throughout the years from secret financial assistance to the open distribution of
weapons, military instruction, and strategic direction. TALA had taken over most of Gwent by 2018.
Among their actions were violent assaults on military and civilian targets in Avalon, which resulted in
numerous fatalities and forced relocations.
The violence was rekindled on June 8th, 2024, when a Hindu temple in Annuvin was attacked
by TALA, resulting in over 30 fatalities and over 100 injuries. The island of Ór, which is mainly
inhabited by the Boii ethnic group, was devastated by a tsunami in July. Fifty thousand people were
displaced by the disaster; many of them sought safety in Cameliard but were first turned away despite
the urgent humanitarian need. Refugees were turned away and made their temporary home in
Cellywig, a city in Gwent. TALA stormed the region on August 10 and left 800 people dead and
others injured. When the survivors finally arrived in Elibel, Cameliard, they were accepted into a
refugee camp run by the UNHCR. One of them, TALA commander Modred Fay, was hiding to
escape prosecution. To capture Fay, Avalon's forces carried out a targeted operation within the camp
on August 24. Fay, four Galatian refugees, two Cameliard guards, and a Swiss aid worker were all
killed in the operation.
Due to this operation, Cameliard filed a complaint against Avalon at the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), alleging that Avalon had violated international law by killing civilians and aid
workers, violating the sanctity of a UNHCR-run refugee camp, and unlawfully using force on
Cameliard's territory. Avalon filed a counterclaim in response, alleging that Cameliard violated
Avalon's sovereignty and destabilized an already tense situation, engaged in the illegal use of force by
proxy, and broke international humanitarian law by denying asylum to vulnerable Boii refugees in
violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
Legal Framework and Applicable Law
1. UN Charter (1945)
a. Article 2(1)
b. Article 2(4)
c. Article 51
2. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)
a. Article 8 (Attribution of Conduct to a State)
b. Article 16 (Aid or Assistance in the Commission of an Internationally Wrongful Act)
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966)
a. Articles 6 and 7 - the right to life and the protection from torture
4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol
a. Essential for addressing issues related to the refugees from the tsunami and the
victims of TALA's attacks who sought asylum.
5. Case Law from the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
a. Nicaragua v. United States (1986)
b. Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (2004)
c. UN General Assembly Resolution 2131
d. UN general Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)
Defence for Avalon
Issue I: Was Avalon’s raid of the refugee camp in Cameliard, targeting Modred Fay, a known war
criminal, legally justifiable under international law?
The use of force by states is generally prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which
enshrines the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Article 51 provides an
important exemption to Article 2(4), affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense in the event of an armed attack. Customary international law also recognises this right of self-
defence as a universal legal principle, as seen in Nicaragua v. United States where . The ICJ affirmed
that the right of self-defense could be invoked in response to armed attacks not only by regular state
forces but also by non-state actors if the necessary legal conditions are met.
In Nicaragua v. United States , the ICJ defined “armed attack” to include acts of force by organised
armed groups, “An armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed
forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State
of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or
its substantial involvement therein.” (Nicaragua v. United States, ICJ Judgment, 1986, para. 195). In
the present case, Avalon was subjected to numerous serious and continued attacks by TALA, a well-
armed non-state actor operating with longstanding financial, military, and political support from
Cameliard. TALA’s June 8, 2024 attack and Cellywig massacres constituted armed attacks under
Article 51. The ICJ’s reasoning in Nicaragua v. United States affirms that such attacks, if enabled by
substantial state support, can trigger the right to self defence.
Although Cameliard did not have effective control over TALA, it provided TALA with substantial
support, significantly contributing to TALA’s military and strategic capacity. The Cellywig massacres
perpetrated by TALA constituted armed attack against the State of Avalon and its civilian population,
consequently triggering Avalon’s inherent right to self-defense under Article 51. Cameliard
significantly contributed to the threat Avalon faced, justifying Avalon’s use of force in self-defense.
Furthermore, the ICJ has stated that self-defence actions must be proportionate and necessary. Given
the failure of diplomatic efforts, the gravity of the attacks by TALA, and the group’s continued
existence, the use of force was Avalon’s only means to defend itself and repel any future attacks. The
August 2024 raid on the refugee camp was necessary self-defense. It was a targeted military operation
with the legitimate military objective of neutralising TALA’s leadership responsible for numerous
war crimes, with the intention of preventing future massacres; it was not an attack on civilians.
Fay was hiding in Cameliard territory, and there was a credible risk that he could resume his
leadership, especially because he had already escaped once. Considering the gravity of the massacres
TALA conducted on July 8, 2024 and in Cellywig, Fay‘s capture was necessary to prevent further
atrocities. Cameliard’s failure to extradite or arrest Fay further meant that Avalon had limited options
to neutralize the threat he posed as the leader of TALA. Therefore, Avalon’s actions were necessary
to neutralize Fay and to protect its essential security interests from the threat he posed.
Avalon did not attack any government buildings or civilians beyond incidental harm; no civilians or
general infrastructure were intentionally targeted. While regrettable, the incidental harm to four
Galatian refugees, two Cameliard guards, and a Swiss aid worker was not excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Avalon ceased the attack upon the target’s
neutralization, meaning the raid was not an act of aggression or expansionism, but a reactive and
proportionate exercise of self-defense, conducted only after diplomatic efforts had failed and in
response to repeated armed attacks by TALA.
Conclusion
Avalon’s targeted strike against Modred Fay in Cameliard was both a necessary and proportionate
response to the continuous armed attacks by TALA, an organized armed group operating with the
tolerance and support of Cameliard. The operation constituted a lawful exercise of self-defence
according to Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law, as can be seen in
Nicaragua v. United States (1986).
Counterclaims against Cameliard
Issue II: Did Cameliard’s support for Tigers of Avalon Liberation Army (TALA) violate the
principle of non-intervention?
The state's right to sovereignty and sovereign equality are outlined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter.
The sovereignty of a state refers to territorial control and political independence free from
intervention, making it the foundation of the non-intervention principle outlined in Article 2(4) and
UN General Assembly Resolution 2131, which is viewed as a codification of customary international
law and often used by ICJ in its decisions. Cameliard has violated the principle of non-intervention by
exerting indirect control. TALA’s actions, even if carried out by a non-state actor, can be attributed to
Cameliard under international customary law since it has provided military training, long-term
military and financial support, and political support for TALA and its separatist ambitions. As decided
by the ICJ in Nicaragua v. The United States, supporting separatist armed groups within the borders
of another state with the prospect of establishing the political climate constitutes prohibited
interference that amounts to a wrongful act.
Article 16 of ARSIWA reads as follows “A State which aids or assist another State in the commission
of an Internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: A) that
State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act and B) the act
would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State” (ARSIWA, Art. 16). Cameliard
supported TALA from its inception, knowing their aspirations, and provided training personnel
specializing in surprise attacks, as well as tripling its support in recent years, which would satisfy the
condition of knowingly aiding in the commitment of wrongful acts under Article 16 of the ARISWA.
If Cameliard were to carry out the same activities as TALA on Avalon’s territory such acts would be
viewed as wrongful, thereby satisfying the second condition of Article 16, which allows the
attribution of infringement of non-intervention principle to Cameliard even if it did not commit the
actions itself.
Cameliard may attempt to bring up the exceptions to the principle of non-intervention, that are
embedded in customary law and Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter, like consent of the State.
Cameliard’s support does not qualify for any of those. If Cameliard decided to justify its intervention
using the invitation by non-state actors, the ICJ would deem it invalid according to the Nicaragua v.
United States.
Conclusion
To ensure that Cameliard ceases all forms of support to TALA, Avalon insists on firm assurances of
non-repetition. In accordance with the principles set in the ARSIWA particularly Article 16 which
outlines state obligations to prevent assistance in internationally wrongful acts and to ensure non-
repetition of such acts. Cameliard must enact legislative reforms to prohibit any future financial and
military support to non-state groups. Thus, agreeing to periodic reviews of its compliance with these
commitments by the UN to ensure adherence to the UN Charter Article 2(1).
Issue III: Did the financial and military support provided by Cameliard to the Tigers of Avalon
Liberation Army (TALA) violate the prohibition of the use of force?
The prohibition of the use of force is a jus cogens rule, as confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Therefore, it is universally accepted and non-derogable, meaning that an action in violation of a jus
cogens rule is legally void and presumes international responsibility under universal jurisdiction. The
prohibition of use of force doesn’t solely prohibit direct intervention, but also recognizes indirect use
of force. Indirect use of force can manifest itself through the State’s support for armed groups active
in another State. General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) expands the scope of Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter, and includes an obligation to refrain from “organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist attacks in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when these acts present a
threat or use of force”. (UN General Assembly, A/RES/2625(XXV), section: the principle concerning
the duty not to use force)
Cameliard has supported TALA, a non-state military group engaged in violence towards the Republic
of Avalon, by providing financial, military, and training support as well as political backing. In
Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ recognizes that “arming and training can be said to involve the
threat or use of force”(Nicaragua v. United States, ICJ Judgment, 1986, para. 228). Following the
reasoning of Resolution 2625 and ICJ decisions, the actions of Cameliard are an indirect use of force
against Avalon since they undermine political independence and territorial integrity, thereby
destabilizing an armed conflict in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
If that reasoning alone does not satisfy the court, actions of TALA can be attributed to Cameliard
through Article 8 of ARSIWA: “The conduct of a group of persons shall be considered an act of a
State under international law if the group of persons is acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”(ARSIWA, Art. 16). Cameliard will
claim it played an exclusively supportive role, however, Avalon refutes this claim. Effective control
test utilized in Nicaragua v. United States and Bosnian genocide cases can be carried out in order to
establish state responsibility under Article 8 of ARSIWA. Providing Cameliard’s personnel, providing
military training and forming elite groups specializing in surprise attacks, amounts to strategic
planning. Since the attack on Hindu Temple and Cellywig massacre were surprise attacks it is evident
that Cameliard has participated in strategic execution of those.
If the court deems the evidence insufficient for meeting the threshold of Article 8 of ARSIWA, the
claim can be fortified by Article 16 of ARSIWA. Cameliard is internationally responsible for
knowingly aiding and assisting in unlawful application of force, which still amounts to a violation of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Conclusion
Avalon claims legal responsibility for Cameliard for acting in violation of the prohibition of the use of
force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. Avalon seeks reparations
to address the damage caused. The reparations shall cover all the damages suffered by Avalon, first to
reconstruct what was destroyed and to enable the state to distribute financial subsidiaries to the family
of the dead.
Issue IV: Did Cameliard’s pushback of Boii refugees violate the Obligation of Non-Refoulement?
The principle of non-refoulement is an essential obligation within the international law outlined in
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Committee has
deliberated Article 7 of the ICCPR to include in its scope the non-refoulement component and
consider it non-derogable. The non-derogability component of the ICCPR outlined in Article 7 is
binding if it mirrors customary international law or a jus cogen rule, even to those who have not
ratified the statute.
Cameliard violated the principle of non-recoupment by refusing entry to 50,000 Boii refugees from
the island of Gwent, Avalon, after a natural disaster (tsunami) happened amid an armed conflict. The
Boii population of Avalon was systematically persecuted, forcibly displaced, and massacred by
TALA for a period of 23 years, indicating the real risk of persecution, torture, and inhumane
treatment.
Cameliard has used its naval fleet to push back refugee boats. Cameliard’s actions forced the Boii to
return to Avalon. When pushing back the refugee vessels, the Cameliard is reasonably considered to
have been knowledgeable of the risk of persecution, torture, and death those refugees would face in
Avalon at the hand of TALA. The ongoing internal conflict in Avalon, mass displacement in Avalon,
and TALA leadership’s call for the “removal” of the Boii prove the existence of such knowledge.
Conclusion
Avalon asks for a declaration of Cameliard’s failure to perform its obligations, outlined in Article
33(1) of the Refugee Convention.
Request to the court
Under international law, the Republic of Avalon respectfully submits this request to the
International Court of Justice in order to have the UNHCR-run refugee camp in Elibel, Cameliard, the
site of a targeted military operation on August 24, 2024, determined to be a legitimate exercise of
Avalon's inalienable right to self-defence under international law. The only goal of this operation was
to eliminate Modred Fay, a senior leader of the Tigers of Avalon Liberation Army (TALA), who had
been instrumental in the organisation and commission of multiple war crimes. Atrocities such as the
massacre of 800 displaced inhabitants in Cellywig and the June 8, 2024, attack on a Hindu temple that
claimed over 30 lives were carried out in large part because of Fay's guidance.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which acknowledges a state's inalienable right to
use force in self-defence in the event of an armed attack, provides a legal framework within which the
operation was fully within. Avalon asserts this right, given the persistent and serious acts of
aggression carried out by TALA, a highly militarized non-state actor that has long received funding,
guidance, and backing from the Republic of Cameliard. According to the precedent established by the
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States, armed violence committed by irregular
troops may qualify as an armed attack if its scope and impact are substantial. Avalon's defensive
reaction was both required and appropriate in light of TALA's protracted and bloody war, its
successful territorial control in Gwent, and Cameliard's strategic assistance.
The August 24 strike was a targeted, limited action meant to remove an immediate and direct threat to
Avalon's national security, and not a broad assault. Although extremely sad, the deaths of four
Galatian refugees, a Swiss aid worker, and two Cameliard guards were unforeseen and accidental
outcomes of a legitimate operation. Following the rules of necessity and proportionality that regulate
the legitimate use of force under both the UN Charter and customary international law, Avalon
quickly stopped the operation once its goal had been accomplished. Furthermore, the state was
unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by a proven war criminal within its borders because
Cameliard failed to arrest or extradite Fay despite having reasonable information of his whereabouts.
Avalon was forced by this reality to take unilateral action in self-defence in order to stop additional
atrocities.
Avalon presents a number of counterclaims against the Republic of Cameliard's grave
violations of international law . First, by directly supporting a separatist rebellion and meddling in
Avalon's internal affairs, Cameliard has transgressed the fundamental principle of non-intervention.
Foreign assistance for armed revolt within another state is illegal under customary international law
and is a violation of sovereignty, as stated in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter and made clear by case
law such as Nicaragua v. United States. Given its direct engagement in assisting in the commission of
internationally wrongful acts, Cameliard's activities not only meet, but also surpass the threshold for
attribution of responsibility under Articles 8 and 16 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).
Second, according to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Cameliard's ongoing financial, military,
and political assistance to TALA is an illegal use of force. The UN General Assembly Resolution
2625 (XXV), which specifically forbids indirect uses of force, including the formation and support of
armed groups acting against another state, solidifies this rule, and has been repeatedly upheld in
international jurisprudence. It is obvious that Cameliard's support for TALA goes beyond just political
pity and entails active involvement in undermining Avalon's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Lastly, Avalon contends that by denying admittance to tens of thousands of Boii refugees
who were escaping both a natural disaster and ethnic conflict, Cameliard had violated its duties under
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. A pillar of international refugee law, the concept of
non-refoulement forbids nations from sending people back to areas where their freedom or life would
be in danger. It has even achieved the level of customary international law. Despite being well aware
of the persecution that awaits them in Avalon, Cameliard's wilful use of naval force to send back
refugee boats constitutes a serious violation of its legal obligations. Due to its policy of exclusion and
inaction, Cameliard has direct culpability for the Cellywig massacre, which resulted from the
continued brutality against these refugees, many of whom had already been displaced by TALA's acts.
Given the above arguments, the Republic of Avalon humbly asks the Court to reject the
Republic of Cameliard's case in its entirety. In response to repeated armed attacks by a non-state actor
backed by Cameliard, Avalon exercised its right to self-defense lawfully and proportionately on
August 24, 2024.
Avalon further requests that the Court hold Cameliard legally responsible for violating the
principle of non-intervention. In order to guarantee future adherence to international legal
commitments, the Republic of Avalon further requests that the Court order make legally binding
pronouncements. Cameliard must enact legislative reforms to prohibit any future financial and
military support to non-state groups. Thus, agreeing to periodic reviews of its compliance with these
commitments by the UN to ensure adherence to the UN Charter Article 2(1).
Avalon further requests suitable reparations to restore its communities and compensate the
stages to the families of the dead.
Lastly, Avalon requests Cameliard to be held responsible for its violation of the principle of
non-refoulement.
Such actions are required to safeguard civilian populations, maintain the integrity of the
international legal order, and respect the norms of international law in addition to correcting the
injustices experienced by the people of Avalon.
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