| a

SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

HANDBOOK
FOR NEW
ACTORS IN
S PAC E

2ND EDITION, 2024

SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

Nothing contained in this book is to be considered as rendering legal advice for specific cases, and
readers are responsible for obtaining such advice from their legal counsel. This book is intended for
educational and informational purposes only.

The Handbook for New Actors in Space by the Secure World Foundation is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

www.swfound.org

2nd Edition, 2024

ISBN 979-8-9882626-6-4

ii | HANDBOOK FOR NE W AC TO R S IN SPAC E

Secure World Foundation is a private operating foundation that promotes cooperative
solutions for space sustainability and the peaceful uses of outer space. The Foundation
acts as a research body, convener, and facilitator to promote key space security and
other space sustainability-related topics and to examine their influence on governance
and international development.

Edited by:

Dr. Peter Martinez, Executive Director

Lisa G. Croy, Chief Operating Officer
Victoria Samson, Chief Director, Space Security and Stability
Krystal Azelton, Senior Director, Program Planning
Ian A. Christensen, Senior Director, Private Sector Programs
Christopher D. Johnson, Director, Legal Affairs and Space Law
Robert Pemberton, Director, Communications
Tamara Tanso, DC Operations Associate

iii
SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Secure World Foundation was assisted by many experts from governments, space
agencies, private industry, and academia in the drafting of the first edition of this
Handbook, its translations, and this second edition. This Handbook reflects the position
and views of the Secure World Foundation and not those of the experts consulted.
While all errors or omissions are entirely our fault, we are deeply grateful to the
following individuals and organizations for their views and input.

Agencia Espacial Mexicana, Carlos Enrique Alvarado, Kahina Aoudia, P.J. Blount, Gérard
Brachet, Dennis Burnett, Victoria Carter-Cortez, Sergio Camacho, Shenyan Chen,
Richard DalBello, Laura Delgado López, Matt Duncan, Andrew D’Uva, Stephen Earle,
Paul Frakes, Jonathan Garon, Bailey Geist, Michael Gleason, Andrea Harrington, Henry
Hertzfeld, Talal Al Kaissi, T.S. Kelso, Karl Kensinger, Rich Leshner, Mike Lindsay, Peter
Marquez, Tanja Masson-Zwaan, T.J. Mathieson, Nicolas Maubert, Steve Mirmina, Philippe
Moreels, Monique Moury, Clay Mowry, Mark Mulholland, Yui Nakama, Nicole Nir, Gerald
Oberst, Nobu Okada, Mazlan Othman, Xavier Pasco, Ivan Petitville, Kevin Pomfret,
Daniel Porras, Myland Pride, Ruth Pritchard-Kelly, Rajeswari Rajagopalan, Ben Reed, Jay
Santee, Satellite Associates, Franceska Schroeder, Michael K. Simpson, Kazuto Suzuki,
Glenn Tallia, Gary Thatcher, Seth Walton, Guoyu Wang, Brian Weeden, Joshua Wolny,
Greg Wyler, Ciro Arévalo Yepes, Yuan Yue, Jessica Young, and Luis Zea.

iv | HANDBOOK FOR NEW AC TO RS IN SPAC E

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments...............................................................................................iv

List of Figures.......................................................................................................xi

List of Tables......................................................................................................xiii

Foreword.............................................................................................................xiv

How to Use This Book........................................................................................xvi

CHAPTER ONE 2
The International INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Framework for
Space Activities FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Freedom of Exploration and Use of Space....................................4
Core Treaties........................................................................................6
Peaceful Purposes..............................................................................9
International State Responsibility................................................ 10
UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability
of Outer Space Activities (LTS Guidelines)................................... 11

REGISTRATION OF SPACE OBJECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

UNGA Resolution 62/101............................................................... 16
Online UN Index of Objects Launched Into Outer Space........ 16
National Registration...................................................................... 16
UNGA Resolution 62/101............................................................... 16
Online UN Index of Objects Launched Into Outer Space........ 16
National Registration...................................................................... 16
Suborbital Launches....................................................................... 17

INTERNATIONAL FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

World Radiocommunication Conference.................................... 20
Laser Communications................................................................... 21

REMOTE SENSING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Wassenaar Arrangement............................................................... 24
Missile Technology Control Regime............................................. 24
Hague Code of Conduct................................................................. 24

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 SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Liability Convention......................................................................... 27
International Court of Justice........................................................ 28
Arbitration and Mediation............................................................. 28

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Protection of the Earth Environment........................................... 29
Back Contamination of Earth........................................................ 30
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Space...................................... 30
Space Debris..................................................................................... 31

ADVANCED ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Boundary Between Airspace and Outer Space.......................... 34
Space Traffic Management............................................................ 36
Dark and Quiet Skies...................................................................... 38
Status of Humans in Space........................................................... 38
Protecting Celestial Bodies............................................................ 39
Space Resources.............................................................................. 42
Future of International Space Governance................................ 44

CHAPTER TWO 46
National Space INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Policy and
Administration PUBLIC POLICY FOR SPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Rationales, Objectives, and Principles......................................... 49
Government Roles and Responsibilities...................................... 49

Case Study: United Arab Emirates Mars Mission.................... 50

Role of Space in Science, Technology, and
Innovation Policy............................................................................. 51
International Cooperation............................................................. 53

Case Study: Lunar Governance Initiatives.............................. 54

Export Control and Technology Transfer.................................... 55
Government Relationship with the Private Sector.................... 56

Case Study: Collaboration between Governments

and Industry........................................................................... 58
Property Rights................................................................................ 59

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 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL OVERSIGHT . . . . . . 60
National Regulators........................................................................ 60
Licensing........................................................................................... 60
National Registries of Space Objects........................................... 61
Insurance Requirements................................................................ 62
Waivers.............................................................................................. 62
National Frequency Administration and
Broadcasting Regulations............................................................. 63
Administration of Export and Technology-
Transfer Controls............................................................................. 63

Case Study: Export Controls in the United States................... 64

Congestion in Space....................................................................... 65

Case Study: New Zealand’s Space Regulatory and

Sustainability Platform.......................................................... 65

IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS: REMOTE SENSING POLICY

AND ADMINISTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Remote Sensing Policy.................................................................... 68
Oversight of Non-Government Remote Sensing Activities....... 69
Data Policies..................................................................................... 71
Broader Policy Context................................................................... 72

CHAPTER THREE 74
Responsible INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Operations in
Space PRE-LAUNCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Mission Architecture Design and Planning................................. 76
Developing a Post-Mission Disposal Plan................................... 77
Design for Demise........................................................................... 78
Cyber Security................................................................................... 78
Pre-Launch Payload Testing.......................................................... 79
The Links Between Testing and Anomaly Mitigation................ 81
Space Mission Licensing................................................................. 82
Launch Vehicle Selection................................................................ 87
Multiple Payload Launch and Deployment Options................. 88
Launch Services Agreement.......................................................... 90
Insurance.......................................................................................... 91
Launch Mission Assurance............................................................ 92

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LAUNCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Terrestrial Environmental Safety Considerations...................... 93
Ground Safety Considerations...................................................... 94

Case Study: SpaceX Starbase.................................................. 95

Range Safety During Launch Operations................................... 96
Public Risk Criteria.......................................................................... 97
Flight Termination System............................................................. 97
Flight Safety Plan............................................................................. 97
Safety-Critical Preflight Operations.............................................. 98
Launch Vehicle Stage Disposal..................................................... 99

IN–SPACE ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Satellite Orbit Determination and Tracking............................... 99
Orbit Propagation......................................................................... 101
Conjunction Assessment Procedures and Standards............. 101
Operational Conjunction Assessment....................................... 103

Case Study: Europe’s Sentinel 1-A Satellite.......................... 105

Risk Assessment and Avoiding Collisions.................................. 106
Large Constellation Management............................................. 107

Case Study: Voluntary Best Practices for Space Safety

and Sustainability................................................................ 108
Space Weather............................................................................... 111

Case Study: Starlink Satellite Loss Due to

Space Weather...................................................................... 113
Satellite Anomaly Recognition, Response,
and Recovery.................................................................................. 113

END-OF-LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Post-Mission Disposal................................................................... 117
Launch Vehicle and Satellite Passivation.................................. 117
Geosynchronous Region Disposal.............................................. 119
Passing Through LEO Disposal................................................... 120
Atmospheric Re-Entry and Risk Assessment............................. 121

EMERGING ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Orbital Carrying Capacity............................................................ 124

viii | HAN DBOOK FOR NE W AC TO RS IN SPAC E

 Potential Atmospheric Effects from Launches
and Re-Entries................................................................................ 125
Sustainable Practices for Cislunar Space and
Lunar Surface Operations........................................................... 125
In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing................. 126
Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety..................................... 126

ANNEX 128
Relevant INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
Organizations
and Fora INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AGENCIES, AND
OTHER FORA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRY GROUPS . . . . . . . . . . 134

SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . .136

List of Abbreviations........................................................................................ 141

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x | HANDBOOK FOR NE W AC TO RS IN SPAC E

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 A close look at one of the original copies of the Outer Space Treaty. . . . . . . . 4

Figure 1.2 The figure above illustrates the number of states party to the
space law treaties as of May 2024. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Figure 1.3 These figures illustrate what information appears in the UNOOSA
registration form.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Figure 1.4 This figure illustrates the three regions for radio regulations,
as defined by the ITU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Figure 1.5 The chart illustrates the electromagnetic spectrum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Figure 1.6 The Chandrayaan-3 spacecraft lifts off onboard a LVM-3 rocket
from Satish Dhawan Space Centre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Figure 1.7 The growth of space debris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Figure 1.8 Depiction of protected regions as developed by the IADC. . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Figure 1.9 Graphic depicting layers of Earth’s atmosphere. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Figure 1.10 Starlink satellites imaged from Cerro Tololo

Inter-American Observatory (CTIO). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Figure 1.11 NASA Astronaut Kate Rubins conducts a spacewalk on Sept. 1, 2016. . . . . . 39

Figure 1.12 Internal asteroid contents from Japan’s Hayabusa2 mission,

which collected samples from asteroid 162173 Ryugu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Figure 2.1 A digital composite of Mars with its smaller moon, Deimos, combining
data captured by the Hope Orbiter from the Emirates Mars Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Figure 2.2 Initial signing of the Artemis Accords. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Figure 2.3 Members of the public watch the launch of a SpaceX Falcon 9,
a successful outcome of the COTS program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Figure 2.4 Sample from LeoLabs and NZSA’s platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Figure 2.5 The composite image uses shortwave infrared data overlaid on a
natural-color mosaic image based on Landsat 8 observations for added
geographic detail of the 2023 wildfire in Lahaina, Hawaii. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figure 2.6 Aims of remote sensing policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Figure 3.1 An example of a vibration testing station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Figure 3.2 Example of a satellite ground station that would require licensing
to communicate with satellites above. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Figure 3.3 Image of an H-2A rocket body taken by a space-based sensor. . . . . . . . . . 84

Figure 3.4 Vega’s Small Spacecraft Mission Service dispenser with multiple
satellites is lowered onto the rocket’s payload adapter at Guiana Space Centre
in Kourou, French Guiana in June 2020. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

List of Figures | xi
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Figure 3.5 Robotic deployment of satellites, in this figure from the Small
Satellite Orbital Deployer (SSOD) held by the ISS’s Kibo robotic arm, presents
other opportunities to launch satellites into orbit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Figure 3.6 This figure illustrates the typical stages a launch vehicle goes
through and the types of safety considerations at each stage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Figure 3.7 Photo taken from the ISS shows SpaceX Starbase and surrounding
areas in southern Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Figure 3.8 Operational collision risk management process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Figure 3.9 Depiction of NASA’s Afternoon Constellation (“A-Train” and “C-Train”). . . . . . 104

Figure 3.10 ESA illustration of the Sentinel 1-A C-band synthetic aperture
radar (SAR) satellite. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Figure 3.11 Graphic depicting effects of space weather on space and terrestrial
infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Figure 3.12 The final re-entry breakup process, showing that debris surviving
re-entry would fall through airspace potentially occupied by aircraft and could
spread over a long, narrow path. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 The core treaties on space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Table 1.2 Important UN declarations on space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Table 1.3 This additional table from COSPAR shows the level of contamination
concern for each COSPAR mission type. Additionally, the chart shows a short list of
requirements that would need to be fulfilled to meet these protection standards. . . . . . 41

Table 3.1 A summary of the various analyses required as part of a full flight
safety analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Table 3.2 Examples of CA screening volumes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Table 3.3 International orbital debris limitation documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

List of Tables | xiii

SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

Peter Martinez, PhD

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Secure World Foundation

Foreword

The Secure World Foundation is proud to present the second

edition of this Handbook for New Actors in Space.
By whatever metric one chooses, the global space arena is expanding at a breathtaking
pace. When the first edition of this Handbook was published in 2017, there were
some 1,700 active satellites in space and the space economy was valued at around
$383.5 billion. Now, seven years later, in mid-2024, there are more than 10,200 active
satellites in orbit and the global space economy has grown to more than $630 billion.
Much of this growth is fueled by the commercial space sector and entrepreneurs who
have access to more abundant capital, access to more commercial sources of flight-
proven off-the-shelf space components, and more opportunities to access space at a
lower launch cost per kilogram than was the case seven years ago. These trends are
supporting the development of new kinds of space applications for societal benefit and
new capabilities for space logistics, such as on-orbit refueling and servicing, and in-
space assembly and manufacturing. These on-orbit capabilities will be foundational for
the continued growth and development of the global space economy. At the same time,
the greater pace of space activities is placing more responsibilities for regulation and
oversight on the governments of countries involved in the space arena.

Space is a domain beyond national jurisdiction, but which borders all nations on Earth.
Regardless of whether one is a commercial actor, an academic actor, or a state actor, it
is important to have a basic knowledge and understanding of how space activities are
governed and regulated at national and international level. It is also important to be
cognizant of norms and best practices for safe and sustainable space operations. The
goal of this Handbook is to provide new actors in space with a broad overview of the
fundamental principles, laws, norms, and best practices for the safe and responsible
conduct of peaceful activities in outer space. It is intended to reach two broad
categories of new actors: firstly, those working in national governments beginning to
develop their national space policies and regulations, and secondly, those working in
expanding or start-up companies, investment and insurance firms, universities, and
other non-governmental entities taking new steps into the space arena.

xiv | HAN DBOOK FOR NEW AC TO R S IN SPAC E

As in the first edition of the Handbook, this updated second edition is structured in
three chapters. The first chapter focuses on what new actors should know about the
international legal framework for space activities, the second chapter focuses on
national policies and the regulation of space activities, and the third chapter deals
with the safe and responsible conduct of space activities, through all the phases of a
space project.

The content of the Handbook has been revised and updated extensively to reflect
developments in the space arena since the publication of first edition. These updates
include new sections on: the UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of
Outer Space Activities (LTS Guidelines); the UN Online Index of Objects Launched Into
Outer Space; Dark and Quiet Skies; Orbital Carrying Capacity; Potential Atmospheric
Effects from Launches and Re-entries; and Sustainable Practices for Cislunar Space
and Lunar Surface Operations; In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing; and
Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety. Several new case studies have also been added.

Despite the rapid pace of development since the publication of the first edition of the
Handbook, the basic fundamentals of space governance and safe and sustainable
space operations haven’t changed all that much. What has changed is that the space
arena is becoming much more crowded and complex, with many new actors entering
from other domains. These new actors bring with them a wealth of expertise into
the space arena, but they may lack knowledge of the basic “rules of the road” for
space actors. We hope that this Handbook will provide a helpful introduction to space
governance and the safe and sustainable conduct of space activities for those new
actors making their first forays into the space arena. 

Peter Martinez is the Executive Director of the Secure World Foundation. He has extensive experience
in multilateral space diplomacy, space policy formulation and space regulation. He also has extensive
experience in capacity building in space science and technology and in workforce development.
Prior to joining SWF, from 2011 - 2018 he chaired the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities
that negotiated a set of international consensus guidelines to promote the safety and sustainability of
space operations.

Foreword | xv
SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

This Handbook is structured in three main chapters. Though meant to complement
each other for a broad understanding of the entire scope of concern to new actors,
certain chapters and sections will be of heightened interest to readers depending on
their own expected space activity and the role that they will be playing in that activity.

CHAPTER ONE deals with the international legal and political order applicable to
space activities, and gives an introduction to the most important and relevant topics in
international space law and how they apply to states.

CHAPTER TWO discusses how national space policy and national regulation apply
to space, beginning with rationales for developing space policy and discussing in
particular how to broadcast goals internationally and give guidance domestically. The
chapter also includes a discussion of the common aspects of national space legislation

CHAPTER THREE addresses responsible space operations and provides an overview of

the process from pre-launch frequency selections and coordination to payload review,
launch services agreements between launch providers and operators, and mission and
post-mission concerns. More technical than Chapters One or Two, this final chapter
explores the operational side of space activities.

Last, while textbooks on any of the various topics discussed in this book run into many
hundreds of pages, this book aims to be both concise and readable. Rather than an
exhaustive compendium of every facet and nuance of this incredibly rich field, this
commentary is broad but contains only the most fundamental principles and topics
with links to additional outside resources as appropriate.

Finally, readers should be mindful that the space arena is growing and evolving rapidly,
so any statistics or other numbers listed in this Handbook should only be used with
independent verification of the latest figures. Where possible, we’ve provided a link
to resources and references for the reader to access. Any numbers quoted in this
edition were correct as of May 2024 and updates to the online version after that date
will be noted.

xvi | HAN DBOOK FOR NE W AC TO R S IN SPAC E

HANDBOOK FOR
NEW ACTORS
IN SPACE

Table of Contents | 1
SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

CHAPTER ONE

The International Framework

for Space Activities

CHAPTER ONE FOCUS

The focus of Chapter One is the international legal and regulatory framework, beginning
with the rights and obligations of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and the subsequent space
treaties which expand and elaborate upon it, and especially the treaty’s obligations in terms
of international state responsibility and international registration of space objects. Relevant
international organizations and multilateral fora are also included and discussed. International
frequency management is then presented, as well as international principles relevant to
remote sensing, international standards and standard-generating bodies in the space sector,
and international export control measures. Discussion of state liability and the various avenues
of dispute settlement then follows.

Various international environmental concerns are then explored, including protection of the
Earth environment, back contamination of the Earth from space missions, nuclear power
sources in space, space debris, and the protection of celestial bodies. To conclude the chapter,
more advanced issues are explored, including the unresolved issues related to the lack of
a legal definition of where outer space begins, the legal status and protections of humans
in space, the effects of satellites in low Earth orbit on terrestrial activities, the use of space
resources, and future governance issues.

This international framework for the conduct of space activities should be explored and
understood by all governmental and non-governmental space actors so that they can be
cognizant of the licensing and regulatory processes associated with space activities, and also
as a general due-diligence exercise to ensure that they adhere to responsible and sustainable
practices in space.

2 | HANDBOOK FOR NE W AC TO RS IN SPAC E

 Simonetta Di Pippo
Professor of Practice of Space
Economy & Director of the Space Economy Evolution Lab
(SEELab), SDA Bocconi; Director of the United Nations Office
for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), 2014-2022

INTRODUCTION

In 2017, the Secure World Foundation published the first version of the
Handbook for New Actors in Space. The first version of the Handbook had two
main audiences: governments new to space activities and private entities like
commercial space startups. While governments and commercial companies have
different aims and interests in conducting space activities, the SWF Handbook
contains crucial information and insights for both.

Since the first edition of the Handbook came out, the diversity of actors looking
upward to space has only increased. Likewise, the range of activities that new
entrants to space are aiming to undertake has also only continued to grow and
diversify. Meanwhile, the audiences that stand to benefit from the Handbook have
also continued to expand. This is because, as Chapter 1 explains, the international
legal and regulatory framework governing space activities is broadly applicable to
all actors in the space domain—be it the government, private sector, the scientific
community, academia, civil society, or otherwise—with Member States remain
in charge of all the commitments they took in adhering to the Treaties and in
approving the relevant guidelines.

Indeed, everyone interested in space activities, even if just how they impact
other areas, should be aware of the international regime discussed in Chapter 1.
Diplomats, legislators, regulators, as well as engineers, scientists, and principal
investigators are just some of the types of stakeholders who should have a basic
understanding of the international legal, regulatory, and even political context
surrounding the regulation of humankind’s activities in outer space. Space
activities, in fact, cannot be conducted responsibly without knowledge on the full
range of topics mentioned. To strive, this is the recipe.

In my role as Director of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA) from 2014 to 2022, I saw global space activities accelerate at
an impressive pace, and I also saw the wide and growing need for a broad
understanding of the global governance of space, which is why I’m pleased to see
this latest iteration of SWF’s Handbook for New Actors in Space. Chapter 1 should
serve as a solid foundation and a good jumping-off point for more specialized
understandings of space governance, including what is explained in later
chapters, and in the numerous references given throughout this latest version of
the Handbook.

The International Framework for Space Activities | 3

SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

CHAPTER ONE
The International Framework
for Space Activities

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

Three core principles lie at the heart of the international framework for space
activities: freedom of exploration and use of space, peaceful purposes, and state
responsibility. These principles, as contained in the five core treaties, form the
foundation of international space law and are reflected in many of the other legal
and political mechanisms that make up the international framework for space
activities. The following sections provide an overview of each principle.

Freedom of Exploration and Use of Space

Outer space is free to be explored, and no nation or state can restrict another
state’s legitimate access to space for peaceful purposes. This freedom is enshrined
in the most important source of space law, the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty.

Figure 1.1 | A close look at one of the original copies of the Outer Space Treaty.
Credit: Max Alexander

4 | HANDBOOK FOR NE W AC TO RS IN SPAC E

 THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
Like all treaties, the Outer Space Treaty balances rights with obligations. The
freedoms to use and explore space are balanced with the obligations listed
throughout the treaty. Those obligations can be considered positive obligations
requiring a state to perform certain actions, or negative obligations that prohibit
actions. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty lists these all-important freedoms,
explaining that:

Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a
basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

This free access means that new and emerging actors in space have just as much
right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes as the established space
actors. The preceding clause of Article I also directly states that the activity of
exploring and using outer space is the “province of all mankind.”

The Outer Space Treaty then requires that “[t]here shall be freedom of scientific
investigation in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
and States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such
investigation.” Indeed, the very nature of the Outer Space Treaty encourages
international cooperation and scientific investigations as ways to promote peace
and stability among the nations of the world.

Like most international treaties, the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty does not
contain legally operative language establishing rights, obligations, or prohibitions.
Rather, it contains the object and purpose of the treaty—the subject matter being
addressed, the reason the treaty is being drafted, and what the treaty is intended
to establish. The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty explains the motives and
aspirations behind the creation of the treaty, formalizing the reasons that states
decided to create it; these being because they:

• recognize the common interest of all humankind in the progress of the

exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

• believe that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out
for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development;

• desire to contribute to broad international development of both the

scientific and legal aspects of space exploration and use; and

• believe that this international cooperation will drive mutual understanding

and strengthen friendly relations among states and peoples.

These beliefs in the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty reflect the intentions
of the drafters who created this international legal instrument. All international
space law should be read with the understanding that these are the intentions
and aspirations behind the Outer Space Treaty. No interpretation of space law

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(whether that law is international or national)

should circumvent, subvert, or defeat the
motives and purposes listed above. In fact, The freedom to explore
any valid interpretation of any of the articles of outer space is held by
the Outer Space Treaty must reflect, conform, all states, and through
and serve these purposes. These aspirations, them, by all peoples
contained in the preamble but forming an
of the world. No state
integral part of the treaty, should always be
remembered when considering the freedom to
can lawfully prevent or
access space, explore space, or partake in any restrict any new entrant
other activity or use of space. to the field of peaceful
space activities.
Additionally, it should be noted that the words
“exploration” and “use” are in the very title of the
Outer Space Treaty. The use of outer space, including the use of the Moon and the
use of any celestial bodies, was contemplated by the drafters and negotiators of
the treaty, and is part of the freedom of access, exploration, and use as codified
in Article I. Consequently, the freedom to explore outer space is held by all states,
and through them, by all peoples of the world. No state can lawfully prevent or
restrict any new entrant to the field of peaceful space activities.

While some treaties may address space activities in a tangential fashion, there are
five core treaties, listed in Table 1.1, that address space activities specifically.
Adoption Number of
by General Entered Ratifying
Treaty Assembly into Force States*

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 1966 1967 115
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts 1967 1968 100
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Astronaut
Agreement)

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 1971 1972 100
Objects (Liability Convention)

Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 1974 1976 75

(Registration Convention)

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 1979 1984 16
Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement)

*As of May 2024

Table 1.1 | The core treaties on space

Core Treaties
The core space treaties were negotiated and drafted by the United Nations (UN)
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), a standing body of
Member States of the United Nations that has considered the political, legal, and
scientific aspects of space activities since the beginning of the space age. The

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titles of the treaties in Table 1.1 illustrate their basic subject matter, and the four
treaties adopted after the Outer Space Treaty largely elaborate upon and refine
provisions of the foundational Outer Space Treaty. The 1968 Astronaut Rescue
and Return Agreement refines and expands on the protection given to astronauts,
while the 1972 Liability Convention similarly expands the provisions for liability for
damage incurred in the launching and operation of space objects. The Liability
Convention establishes absolute liability for physical damage suffered on the
surface of the Earth, or to aircraft in flight, and establishes a fault-based liability
regime for space objects in outer space. The 1975 Registration Convention makes
mandatory both international registration and the establishment of national
registries of space objects.

Growth in the Number of States Party

to the Space Law Treaties
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0

UN Member States Liability Convention (1972)

Outer Space Treaty (1967) Registration Convention (1975)
Rescue Agreement (1968) Moon AGreement (1979)

Figure 1.2 | The figure above illustrates the number of states party to the space law treaties
as of May 2024.

The core UN treaties on space were all drafted from the mid-1960s until the late
1970s. This era of broad treaty-making by the United Nations is now over, and
subsequent decades have seen the United Nations use General Assembly use
resolutions to communicate principles on a number of subsequent space-related
topics, such as direct television broadcasting, remote sensing from space, the use
of nuclear power sources in space, aspects of the use of geostationary orbit, and
enhanced practices in the registration of space objects, and other topics.

While these documents are not strictly binding in the way that treaties are, they
have significant normative value—especially as they were developed within
COPUOS, adopted through consensus, and many of them were then subsequently
endorsed at the UN General Assembly. They have served as indications of state
positions on a variety of topics, and have served as the basis for national policy
and regulation.

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Year Title UN Doc

1961 International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Res. 1721 A and B (XVI)

1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Res. 1962 (XVII)
Exploration and Use of Outer Space

1982 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Res. 37/92
International Direct Television Broadcasting

1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space Res. 41/65

1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Res. 47/68
Outer Space

1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use Res. 51/122
of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking
into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries

2000 International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Res. 55/122

2004 Application of the Concept of “Launching State” Res. 59/115

2007 Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and Res. 62/101

International Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering
Space Objects

2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Res. 62/217
Uses of Outer Space

2009 Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in

Outer Space

2013 Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Res. 68/74

Exploration and Use of Outer Space

2019 Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of A/74/20
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

Table 1.2 | Important UN declarations on space

Article III of the Outer Space Treaty incorporates space law into the larger body
of international law. Consequently, other sources of public international law,
including the UN Charter, impact the law of outer space. The practices of states,
along with general principles of law, are also valid and often applicable. For
example, one principle of general international law can be summarized as “that
which is not explicitly prohibited is otherwise permitted.” The consequence of
these explicit freedoms, and their context in the larger body of international law,
is the creation of a wide scope of state freedom in outer space with only certain
particular and explicitly codified legal prohibitions.

For states looking to begin their first forays into conducting space activities,
signing and ratifying the core treaties sends a signal to the world that the rights
and obligations of international space law are understood and accepted, and
underlies their serious approach to beginning space activities. It shows that they
intend to be a responsible and law-abiding actor in space, and that they have
“joined the club” of spacefaring nations.

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Peaceful Purposes
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty requires that states refrain from placing
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or
installing or stationing them on celestial
bodies. It further requires that the Moon and
other celestial bodies be used exclusively For states looking
for peaceful purposes. Next, it forbids the to begin their
establishment of military bases, installations, first forays into
or fortifications on celestial bodies, and also
conducting space
forbids testing weapons and conducting
activities, signing
military maneuvers on celestial bodies.
Another treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of and ratifying the core
1963, prohibited states from testing nuclear treaties sends a signal
weapons or performing nuclear explosions to the world that the
beyond the limits of the atmosphere, rights and obligations
including in outer space, while another—
of international space
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of
1996—prohibits any nuclear weapon law are understood
test explosions. and accepted, and
underlies their serious
An important point is that this focus on approach to beginning
peaceful purposes is not a prohibition on
space activities.
military uses of space. There have been
military and security aspects to space
activities since the very beginning of the
space age. As a foundational security treaty negotiated between Cold War powers,
the Outer Space Treaty addresses this dual-use nature of space capabilities. Since
the treaty entered into force, there has always been a debate about the definition
of peaceful purposes, with two main interpretations arising: one says that peaceful
purposes means “nonmilitary” in any regard; the other holds that peaceful merely
means “nonaggressive.” The latter interpretation has gradually gained broader
acceptance. However, the explicit prohibitions mentioned above remain, and there
are still debates today over the interpretation of the peaceful purposes principle.

As other sources of international law are also applicable to space activities

through their inclusion in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, the general
prohibition on the threat of, or use of, force between UN Member States is
therefore applicable to outer space. Article 2.4 of the UN Charter requires that:

[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.

Additionally, Articles 39 through 51 address threats and breaches of the peace,

acts of aggression, and the inherent right of self-defense. This general regime of
public international law between states underpins the special regime of space law
and creates the same prohibitions and restrictions for military conflict in space as

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

on Earth. There is also ongoing scholarly work

on the specific applications of international law
Under Article VI of the
to conflict in space as exists in the maritime, air,
and terrestrial domains, with projects such as Outer Space Treaty,
the Manual on International Law Applicable to states are directly
Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS) and the responsible for all their
Woomera Manual on the International Law of national space activities,
Military Space Activities and Operations.
whether that activity
is conducted by the
International State Responsibility government itself or
In the usual affairs of humankind, governments by any of its citizens or
are not generally responsible for the actions of companies, and whether
their citizens. If a citizen of state A goes abroad
launching domestically
to state B, and someone in state B wants to
or possibly even when its
bring a claim against them, they don’t often also
name state A’s government as a co-defendant. In citizens are conducting
the usual dealings between people and foreign space activities abroad.
governments, people are not the responsibility
of their governments. This is not the case in
outer space activities.

Under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, states are directly responsible for
all their national space activities, whether that activity is conducted by the
government itself or by any of its citizens or companies, and whether launching
domestically or possibly even when its citizens are conducting space activities
abroad. The direct responsibility of national governments is relatively unique in
international law. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty begins with:

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out
in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.

The second sentence continues:

The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the

Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.

Because the direct responsibility and potential international liability for all national
activities is relatively unique and quite broad, this provision of the Treaty should
always be taken into account by all space actors engaged in the authorization,
supervision, planning, or conducting of space activities. The requirement that
space activities be carried out in conformity with the treaty acts as a limiting
provision to Article I’s freedoms of access, exploration, and use. When space
activities cause physical damage on the ground, to aircraft in flight, or to space

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 THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
objects in space, then mere international responsibility expands to international
liability, a separate but related issue expanded upon in Chapter One: International
Liability.

Today, many space activities are international in nature, and in any multinational
space project, all states involved are under these obligations. This expansive
international state responsibility is an incentive for developing and enacting
national space policy and space legislation, the subject of Chapter Two.

UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability

of Outer Space Activities (LTS Guidelines)
In 2019, following an eight-year process, the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) adopted a set of twenty-one guidelines
reflecting global best practices in fostering and ensuring space sustainability. The
Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, referred to
as the LTS Guidelines, are voluntary in nature and are non-legally binding. They
are intended to support states developing space capabilities with the best existing
practices for the safety of space operations and to avoid causing harm to the
outer space environment.

The LTS Guidelines address policy, regulatory, operational, safety, scientific,

technical, international cooperation, and capacity-building aspects of space
activities. New actors in space are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the
content of these guidelines as a means of ensuring that their space activities are
conducted in a sustainable manner. Although non-binding, a growing number of
states are adapting their national regulatory frameworks to implement aspects
of these guidelines as a way of demonstrating their commitment to utilizing the
space environment in a safe and sustainable manner.

REGISTRATION OF SPACE OBJECTS

Along with international responsibility for national space activities, and potential
international liability for damage caused to other states, states are also obligated
to register their space objects. The tracking of which states are responsible for
which space activities is aided by the registration of space objects in both national
and international registries of space objects.

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International registration of space objects was first called for in United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1721 B (XVI), adopted by the UN at the dawn
of the space age in 1961. This resolution calls upon states launching space objects
to promptly provide the UN with launch information for a UN-maintained public
registry. This international registry was intended to aid other states in determining
which activities in space are being conducted by whom. Today this voluntary
notification to the UN would be called a transparency and confidence-building
measure (TCBM), as notifying the rest of the world about launches also helps show
that a state is open about its activities.

While UNGA Res. 1721 B (XVI) is not legally binding and imposes no mandatory
obligations on states, international registration of launched space objects was
made mandatory in 1975 with the Registration Convention—at least for those
states which are a party to that convention. As of May 2024, 75 states have ratified
the Registration Convention. Although this is significantly fewer than the number
of states that are party to the Outer Space Treaty, it includes all the major and
historical space powers.

Articles III and IV of the Registration Convention require that the UN Secretary-
General establish a registry of space objects with open access to all. Article IV
requires that any launching state placing its launched space object on a national
registry shall also communicate to the Secretary-General certain information for
the international registry. That information is:

INFORMATION TO COMMUNICATE FOR REGISTRATION

» The name of the launching state (or states)

» An appropriate designator of the space object or

its registration number

» Date and territory or location of launch

» Basic orbital parameters, including:
• Nodal period
• Inclination
• Apogee
• Perigee

» General function of the space object

The remaining requirements include updating the UN with additional information

and adding information on objects that are no longer in Earth orbit. On behalf
of the Secretary-General, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
(OOSA) is the keeper of this international registry established by the Registration
Convention, as well as the registry of objects registered pursuant to UNGA Res.
1721 B (XVI). For states not party to the Registration Convention, international
registration can be made pursuant to UNGA Res.1721 B (XVI). OOSA maintains a
standard form for both registries, which it recommends that states use (see Figure
1.3). The required registration information is not overly detailed.

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Part A:

Yes Check Box

UN document
for previously registered space number in
object which previous

1721B: A/AC.105/INF. was distributed

to Member
States

Under the

Other launching States only one State

of registry can
exist for a space
object.

Designator

Name

number as used by State of

registry

Date of launch hrs min Coordinated

dd/mm/yyyy sec Universal Time
(UTC)

Basic orbital parameters

Nodal period minutes

degrees
Apogee kilometres
Perigee kilometres

Figure 1.3 | These figures illustrate what information appears in the

UNOOSA registration form. This representation was created by Secure
World Foundation.

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

Part A:

Change of status

Date of decay/reentry/deorbit hrs min Coordinated

dd/mm/yyyy sec Universal Time
(UTC)

designators

Online Index of Objects Launched

into Outer Space

Part B:

Date when space object is no hrs min Coordinated

Universal Time
dd/mm/yyyy sec (UTC)
Date when space object is moved hrs min Coordinated
to a disposal orbit (hours, minutes, Universal Time
dd/mm/yyyy sec (UTC)

object is moved to a disposal

orbit (see COPUOS Space Debris

Basic orbital parameters

degrees East
(where applicable, planned/actual)

Website:

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Part C:

Change of supervision of the space object

Date of change in supervision hrs min Coordinated

dd/mm/yyyy sec Universal Time
(UTC)

or operator

degrees East

degrees East

the space object

Part D:
Launched into Outer Space

Space object owner or operator

Launch vehicle

(if not Earth, please

specify)

of registry may wish to furnish

62/101

Guidelines

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UNGA Resolution 62/101

The registry form (Figure 1.3) also references UNGA Res. 62/101 from 2007
entitled, “Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international
intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects.” The resolution
expresses a desire for states to proffer additional information regarding space
objects, including updated circumstances such as a change of function, change
of operational status, change of orbital position, removal to a disposal orbit, or
change in the owner and/or operator of the registered space object. This ability to
update information provided to the UN is a key advancement and has implications
for more advanced or complex space activities such as launches with multiple
launching states, and for satellite servicing, satellite replacement in orbital
constellations, or debris removal in the future.

Online UN Index of Objects Launched Into Outer Space

UNOOSA maintains an online index of objects launched into outer space.
The online index is a searchable database and can be a useful first source of
information about a nation’s launched and registered space objects, with inclusion
of the details and particulars in the form listed above.

The Outer Space Objects Index allows users to search using a variety of
parameters, including: “State or Organization” (which has launched or procured
the launch of the object); “Launch Facility” (i.e., location of the launch); and
“Year” (of launch). The online index also employs a number of other interesting
and useful filters, such as “Status,” which reflects the approximate location or
destination of the space mission with categories such as “in orbit” for an object
orbiting Earth, “decayed,” “deorbited,” “on Mars,” and even “interstellar.” Another
filter is “In Orbit,” where the user can either select “Yes” or “No,” which is a useful
way to refine one’s search. Another useful filter is “UN Registered,” reflecting
whether the space object has been officially registered with the UN (or whether
UNOOSA has simply entered the information, absent direct notification).

As a general transparency measure, the UNOOSA online index of space objects

can be a useful first stop when answering questions about which state or states
are internationally responsible for which space object.

National Registration
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty does not address international registration.
Rather, it discusses national registration, stating that

[a] State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over
any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership
of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed
on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their
presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth.

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In an area where state sovereignty is absent, the effect of this article is to provide
a crucial component of state sovereignty, namely jurisdiction. The right of a state
to exercise jurisdiction over space objects depends upon that state listing its
launched objects on a national registry. Each state might need to consolidate that
international right in its national legislation.

Enshrining in an international treaty the national right to exercise jurisdictional

powers in an extraterritorial manner through a national registry gives states
an incentive to establish national registers, and to list their space objects on
them. In doing so, it furthers the transparency of space activities, and as long as
national registries are publicly searchable, outsiders can determine which space
objects belong to which country. Coupled with this are the final sections of Article
VIII, whereby states retain ownership of their launched space objects and their
component parts while in outer space and upon return to Earth. States party to
the Outer Space Treaty should consider establishing and maintaining a national
space registry because the Registration Convention makes the creation of such
national registries obligatory.

As of May 2024, 39 states have national space registries, and some make
their national registries available and searchable online. While international
organizations cannot be parties to the Registration Convention, the European
Space Agency (ESA) and the European Organisation for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) also keep registries of their space objects.
As the method for exercising jurisdiction over launched space objects, the national
registry is an important component of a state’s oversight and responsibility
requirements. National registration is discussed further in Chapter Two: National
Registration.

Suborbital Launches
The Registration Convention requires registration of objects “launched into
Earth orbit or beyond,” and the previous UNGA resolution likewise calls upon
states launching objects into orbit or beyond to furnish information through
the Secretary-General for the registration of launchings. However, there is no
international requirement or call to register objects that are only being launched
for suborbital operations. How to deal with suborbital space activities is an open
question that new actors will need to consider from a registration perspective,
as registration may impact whether suborbital activities are considered to be
their national space activities, incurring international responsibility. To date,
many states have not made a legal determination whether and to what extent
international space law is applicable to suborbital activities.

However, one of the main goals of international registration is to alert the world
to a state’s space activities. Consequently, continuing to observe the above
mentioned international registration requirements fulfills these objectives of
international transparency and confidence-building about national space activities.

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INTERNATIONAL FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT

Spacecraft communicate using the electromagnetic spectrum, and nearly all of
them use the radio-frequency part of the spectrum that is shared with all other
space and terrestrial users. Consequently, frequency coordination and allocation
among users is one of the most important processes for the successful operation
of a space project.

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is a specialized agency of the

United Nations. The oldest organization within the UN system, the ITU traces its
origin to international telegraph unions in the mid-19th century. Today, the ITU
has 193 member states that are party to its principal treaties: the ITU Constitution
and the ITU Convention. Since the beginning of the space age, the ITU has
aided the exploration and use of space through international coordination and
frequency allocation. The ITU is tasked with ensuring the rational, equitable,
efficient, and economical use of the radio-frequency spectrum. Within the ITU,
this task is primarily managed by the ITU Radiocommunication (ITU-R) sector.
The ITU-R also keeps track of which orbital locations are using those frequencies,
either in specific “slots” along the Equatorial axis assigned to satellites in
geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), or in altitudes and planes used by
non-geostationary satellites.

GEO is a limited natural resource defined as a circular orbit 35,786 kilometers

above the Equator where satellites appear to hover over a fixed position on
the surface of the Earth. Non-geostationary satellites, by default, occupy all the
other altitudes, most usually those in medium or low Earth orbits (between 500
and 15,000 kilometers). Any satellites using the same frequency in proximity to
other users (satellites or terrestrial) can cause interference to each other, thus
the ITU Radio Regulations require coordination between users to prevent
harmful interference.

The ITU-R maintains the ITU Radio Regulations (the “Radio Regs”), which are
updated roughly every four years when the Member States of the ITU gather for
the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) whose output is considered a
treaty-level agreement. The ITU also maintains the Master International Frequency
Register (MIFR) of all coordinated frequencies. The MIFR, along with the Frequency
Allocation Table maintained by the pertinent nation, should be consulted very
early on in a space project, when considering which frequency or frequencies a
space project’s space systems and Earth stations will use.

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Figure 1.4 | This figure illustrates the three regions for radio regulations, as defined by the
ITU. Credit: ITU

The ITU-R divides the world into three regions for spectrum allocations, as shown
in Figure 4. Region 1 includes Europe, Africa, the former countries of the Soviet
Union, and Mongolia. Region 2 includes the Americas and Greenland. Region 3 is
the rest of Asia, Australasia, and the Pacific. Each spectrum region has allocated
particular frequencies to particular technologies and services for terrestrial and
space applications. The ITU has allocated a number of frequencies for specific
space activities, including frequencies for Earth exploration, meteorology, radio
astronomy, emergency telecommunications, radio navigation, space operations,
space research, and amateur satellites.

The radio-frequency spectrum is divided into bands that are either exclusively
allocated to specific types of applications or that share allocations for various
applications. Applications with broad international usage enjoy harmonized
allocations in all three regions. A shared portion of the spectrum is available for
one or more services, either on a worldwide or regional basis. Within the shared
bands, different services are classed into either primary or secondary services.
Primary services enjoy superior rights to secondary services.

The Radio Regulations require that secondary services:

• not cause harmful interference to stations of primary services to which

frequencies are already assigned or may be assigned at a later date;

• cannot claim protection from harmful interference from stations or a

primary service to which frequencies are already assigned or may be
assigned at a later date; and

• can, however, claim protection from harmful interference from stations

of the same or other secondary services to which frequencies may be
assigned at a later date.

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

Figure 1.5 | The chart illustrates the electromagnetic spectrum. Credit: NASA

Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of applications into different parts of the
spectrum, each of which also depends on the region of the world in which that use
is located. National administrators implement and apply the ITU Radio Regulations
on the national level. A deeper discussion follows in Chapter Two, dealing with
the procedure of coordinating with the ITU through national administrators, and
in Chapter Three, dealing with coordination between operators and national
administrators, and among the operators themselves.

World Radiocommunication Conference

World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC) are held every three to four
years, under the auspices of the ITU-R. Their purpose is to allow member states
to review and revise the treaty deciding use of the radio-frequency spectrum and
of the geostationary satellite and non-geostationary satellite orbit. A month-long
conference with thousands of participants, the WRC is the primary venue through
which frequency assignments for terrestrial, aerial, and space-based applications
are reviewed and made. As such, decisions taken at the WRC can have significant
impact on the spectrum resources available to satellite operators. In fact, the
Radio Regulations are updated after each WRC to contain the complete texts of
the Radio Regulations adopted by the World Radiocommunication Conference of
1995 (WRC-95) as revised and adopted by subsequent World Radiocommunication
Conferences, including all Appendices, Resolutions, Recommendations, and ITU-R
Recommendations incorporated by reference.

The WRC also determines the “Questions” for examination by the

Radiocommunications Assembly and its Study Groups in preparation for future
WRCs. Because agendas and questions are set years in advance, space actors
should determine what areas being studied might affect their project plans and
spectrum needs and whether they themselves need to advocate for changes to
the Radio Regulations to accommodate their future plans.

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Companies and other interested parties can become sector members of the ITU,
allowing them to observe meetings and provide industry perspectives to the Study
Groups and Working Parties.

In addition to the coordination efforts carried out under the aegis of the ITU,
an additional notable group is the Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG),
which is an informal group of frequency managers from civil space agencies
established in 1980 to facilitate the exchange of information among the agencies
on future plans for space systems or for other systems potentially affecting space
systems. More details on the SFCG are contained in the Annex.

Laser Communications
In recent years, there has been considerable advancement in the development
of laser communications systems for satellites. Unlike radio communications,
which utilize signals in the radio part of the electromagnetic spectrum, laser
communications utilize signals in the optical part of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Laser technologies have been demonstrated for communicating
between ground stations and satellites orbiting the Earth, between two satellites
orbiting the Earth, and between satellites orbiting the Moon and Mars and ground
stations on Earth.

There are several major differences between traditional radio satellite

communications and laser communications. Most significantly, laser
communications allow data transfer rates 10 to 100 times faster than radio
frequency systems. Laser communications are line-of-sight, meaning that there
must be a clear, direct line path between the transmitter and receiver.

This means that laser communications are not able to broadcast over a wide
reception footprint. But this also makes laser communications much harder
to intercept, and there is very little chance of unintentional interference. Laser
communications can also support much higher bandwidth and data rates than
radio waves.

Laser communications pose significant questions for international regulation.

Under the current definitions adopted by the ITU, satellites utilizing laser
communications are not restricted to a particular allocation of frequencies, and
their member state might not require a license. The ITU member states currently
only develop standards and regulations pertaining to radio-frequency spectrum,
which does not include optical laser spectrum. However, there are some who feel
the definition of “space-based communications” should be expanded to cover
laser communications, as the assignment of spectrum licenses is currently one of
the few ways to regulate space activities.

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REMOTE SENSING
Each state enjoys sovereignty over its territory, and therefore states are often
concerned about others gaining insight into what is happening within their
territory, either for commercial, political, or military purposes. So while space is
free to be explored and used, including freedom of overflight for spacecraft, many
states feel some uneasiness about spacecraft turning their cameras back towards
Earth, enabling neighbors to gain information.

To date, no international treaty directly governs remote sensing. Rather, a number

of UNGA resolutions establish certain principles relevant to remote sensing. UNGA
Resolution 41/65 of 1986 relates fifteen principles for states to follow in their
remote sensing activities. The resolution first establishes a difference between
“primary data” and “processed data.” Primary data means those “raw data that
are acquired by remote sensors borne by a space object and that are transmitted
or delivered to the ground from space.” Conversely, processed data means the
“products resulting from the processing of the primary data.” Analyzed information
is defined as “information resulting from the interpretation of processed data,
inputs of data, and knowledge from other sources.”

Principle XII of UNGA 41/65 is perhaps the most important of the remote sensing
principles, and strikes a balance between the freedom to explore space and the
concerns states have about being observed (“sensed states”):

As soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning

the territory under its jurisdiction is produced, the sensed State shall
have access to them on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost
terms. The sensed State shall also have access to the available analysed
information concerning the territory under its jurisdiction in the possession
of any State participating in remote sensing activities on the same basis
and terms, taking particularly into account the needs and interests of the
developing countries.

While Resolution 41/65 is a non-binding resolution from the United Nations

General Assembly, it is meant to reflect the best practices of spacefaring states.
Beyond this resolution, data sharing has become a key principle in remote sensing
activities because of an early recognition of the links between accessibility to such
data and societal benefits, scientific progress, and commercial applications.

Open data exchange at the international level has been upheld especially
for global meteorological data and related products, as adopted in World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) Resolution 40 and is promoted actively
by the Group on Earth Observations and the Committee on Earth Observation
Satellites. For more information on these groups, see Annex. Additionally, the
International Charter Space and Major Disasters is a global collaboration among
seventeen space agencies and other governmental organizations, through which
satellite-derived information and products are made available to support disaster
response efforts.

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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
International standards are used in many fields in order to increase safety,
reliability, and quality, and are increasingly being implemented in the space field.
A standard is a document that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines,
or characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products,
processes, and services are fit for their purposes. Standards can be as specific as
an outline on how to interface with a particular class of device, or as general as
providing details around management best practices for ensuring quality.

While standards can be developed by any organization or entity, international

standards are becoming increasingly important in a more globalized world.
Adopting an international standard can help ensure compatibility across entire
global sectors and can also be used by companies to signal to potential customers
that their products or services are high-quality. Multiple organizations in a sector
can use standards to codify lessons learned from past mistakes to help improve
overall safety in a sector.

The development of standards for the space sector has often been led by
international non-governmental and industry-organized organizations. These
include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Consultative
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), the International Committee on
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), the United Nations Committee of
Experts on Global Geospatial Information Management (UN-GGIM), and the
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T). For more information on these
organizations and how they develop standards for space, see Annex. The United
States Office of Space Commerce also provides the Space Industry Technical
Standards Compendium for reference.

INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL

There is significant international concern over the uncontrolled spread of both
conventional military goods and technologies and dual-use technology such
as space technology. Dual-use technology is commonly defined as technology
having both civil and military applications. An example in the space industry is the
chemical rocket, which can be used as a space launch vehicle to place satellites
and humans into orbit, but which can also serve as a ballistic missile for delivering
weapons of mass destruction. All new actors, including private non-governmental
space actors, should be acutely aware of the sensitive nature and politically
charged context of all space activities. There are several international export
control measures in place to regulate the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
their supporting technologies as well as the transfer of other sensitive dual-use
technologies. These international measures are described below. Chapter Two
provides examples of similar measures employed at the national level—including
the U.S. export control regime, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

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Wassenaar Arrangement
At the international level, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a significant effort
to control the proliferation of specific types of military and dual-use goods and
technologies. It was established in 1996 and as of May 2024 has 42 participating
states, mostly located in North America and Europe. The goal of the Wassenaar
Arrangement is to contribute to regional and international security and stability by
promoting transparency and greater responsibility for transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing
accumulations. Participating states control items in the “List of Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies and Munitions List” and work to prevent unauthorized transfers
of those items. The arrangement also uses export controls as a way to combat
terrorism, and is not designed to work against any particular state or group of
states. Participating states agree to exchange information on sensitive dual-
use goods and technologies, follow agreed-upon best practices, and report any
transfers or denied transfers of controlled items made to recipients outside of the
Wassenaar Arrangement.

Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is another important international
control in the realm of space activities. The MTCR is a voluntary regime that was
originally established in 1987, and in May 2024 had 35 participating countries.
Four additional countries have agreed to abide by MTCR export control rules but
have not formally joined. The goal of the MTCR is to coordinate national export
licensing efforts in order to prevent the proliferation of delivery systems capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

Hague Code of Conduct

In 2002, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, also
known as the Hague Code of Conduct, was created to augment the MTCR. The
Hague Code of Conduct calls on participating states to exercise restraint in the
testing, production, and export of ballistic missiles. While the Hague Code is less
restrictive than the MTCR, with 145 participating states as of May 2024 it has
significantly more international acceptance, and it serves as a solid transparency
and confidence-building measure (TCBM). Subscribing states agree to making pre-
launch notifications and annual declarations of their policies.

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INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
In international law, liability is a concept related to, but distinct from, responsibility.
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty establishes the obligation that states
launching space objects shall be internationally liable for

damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical

persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in
outer space, including the Moon or other celestial bodies.

This obligation to be held liable for resulting damage is necessarily linked

with responsibility, but is distinct enough to require close attention. Whereas
responsibility, discussed above, is an obligation to ensure that all national activities
are carried out in conformity with the Outer Space Treaty, the liability provision
requires that states undertake action towards the compensation of other states
should damage occur. The definition of damage, as contained in the 1972 Liability
Convention, is

loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage

to property or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international
intergovernmental organizations.

This definition is usually interpreted to mean actual physical damage, rather than
pecuniary interests or other forms of non-physical damage.

Responsibility is placed on the state or states responsible for national activities.

Liability may be imposed upon any “launching state” of space objects causing
damage. While space launches are inherently dangerous, and the execution of a
launch is not illegal per se, the imposition of liability for damage means that states
shall offer compensation after damage
occurs, with an understanding that no
violation of international law is necessarily
For states, the liability
found if damage occurs.
obligation means that
The Outer Space Treaty defines four while they are at liberty
categories of launching state: (1) the state to conduct launches, they
“that launches,” (2) that which “procures the must ensure that they
launching of a space object,” and each state
are otherwise lawful,
from whose (3) territory or (4) facility an
object is launched. The Liability Convention and they must be ready
and the Registration Convention reiterate to pay compensation
these categories. Consequently, there may to other states should
be more than one launching state for the certain damages occur
purposes of liability. Indeed, this is how many (either on the ground,
space activities are conducted today.
in the air, or in space).

International Liability | 25
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For states, the liability obligation means that while they are at liberty to conduct
launches, they must ensure that they are otherwise lawful, and they must be ready
to pay compensation to other states should certain damages occur (either on
the ground, in the air, or in space). While a launch may take place from another
country’s territory, a state may still be exposed to potential liability if its activities
fall within one of the four broad categories of launching state. In multilateral
space activities, it makes sense for state partners to contractually determine
beforehand which of them they shall mutually consider as a state of registry.

UNGA Resolution 59/115 of 2004, Application of the concept of “launching

State,” further addressed the often complex, multi-state aspect of modern
launch activities, and recommended that states conducting space activities
consider “enacting and implementing national laws authorizing and providing
for continuing supervision of the activities in outer space of non-governmental
entities under their jurisdiction.” It also recommended that states “consider
the conclusion of agreements in accordance with the Liability Convention with
respect to joint launches or cooperation programmes;” as well as inviting COPUOS
member States to “submit information on a voluntary basis on their current
practices regarding on-orbit transfer or ownership of space objects.”

Figure 1.6 | The Chandrayaan-3 spacecraft lifts off onboard a LVM-3 rocket from Satish
Dhawan Space Centre. Credit: ISRO

Once a state is a “launching state” of a particular space object, it will always be

considered a launching state of that space object And while there can be more
than one launching state, there should usually be only one state that is the
state of registry. It might seem that a launching state would always be the state
of registry, but complex, multi-state international launches happen more and
more frequently.
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 THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
While being deemed a launching state is tied to the concept of liability, the state of
registry is tied to oversight, licensing, authorization, supervision, and jurisdictional
competency over the space object.

In short, states are both responsible for all their national space activities and
potentially liable for activities in which they are considered the launching state.
For new entrants to the field of space activities, these obligations mean that
supervising states should seek to limit risky launches or those that might cause
damage to other states. The supervising state may also put in place provisions
to reduce or offset their potential exposure to liability, such as requiring that
new non-governmental entrants find insurance for their proposed space
activities should damage occur. Insurance is discussed in both Chapter Two and
Chapter Three

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Though the desired outcome of any space activity would ideally never include
a need for dispute resolution, either among states or private parties, or a
combination of the two, it is essential to consider which dispute resolution
mechanisms are available if needed. This section addresses the basic mechanisms
of dispute resolution open to states and private parties.

Liability Convention
The 1972 Liability Convention provides a framework by which states can pursue
claims for damage caused by a space object—to another space object, to aircraft
in flight, or on the surface of Earth. It should be remembered that a liability claim
is not an allegation that a launching state has violated international law, but
merely that damage has occurred for which it is alleged to be responsible. The
Liability Convention sets out specific parameters for diplomatic claim resolution,
beginning in Article IX. According to Article X of the Liability Convention,

A claim for compensation for damage may be presented to a Launching State

no later than one year following the date of the occurrence of the damage or
the identification of the Launching State which is liable.

Pursuit of a claim under the Liability Convention does not require the prior
exhaustion of remedies in national courts. While a claim can be pursued either
in national courts or through the Liability Convention, both avenues cannot be
pursued concurrently.

If one or both parties to a dispute are not party to the Liability Convention, the
Liability Convention does not apply. In that situation, any diplomatic resolution
must follow the rules of international law that otherwise apply to the relevant
states that are party to the dispute. For example, if both states are parties to the
Outer Space Treaty, the provisions of Article VII of the treaty would apply.

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Where a resolution cannot be achieved through diplomatic channels, the Liability

Convention provides for the non-adversarial settlement of disputes in the context
of a three-member claims commission, which can be initiated by any party to the
dispute. The procedure for the formation of a claims commission is described in
Articles XIV through XX. Whether they are resolved through diplomatic channels or
through a claims commission, disputes decided under the Liability Convention are
“determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and
equity,” which generally attempt to restore the state that suffered damage to the
position they would have been in had the damage not occurred.

To date, there has never been an international case of damages brought under
the Liability Convention that has led to the creation of a claims commission. In
the late 1970s, the Cosmos 954 incident in northern Canada resulted in Canada
presenting a diplomatic claim for damages to the Soviet Union due to a nuclear-
fueled satellite from the Soviet Union crashing over Canadian territory. However,
this situation was settled without a clear precedent under the Liability Convention
for a state suffering physical damage receiving compensation, as the Soviet Union
paid Canada without accepting liability for the crash.

International Court of Justice

With regard to the settlement of space-related disputes between states, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides yet another option. Of course, the
parties to a dispute must either agree to refer the dispute to the ICJ or recognize
compulsory jurisdiction under the ICJ statute. Only states may bring claims to
the ICJ. Meanwhile, Article 96 of the UN Charter stipulates that the UN General
Assembly and the UN Security Council (and other UN organs and specialized
agencies so authorized by the UNGA) may request advisory opinions from the ICJ.

While the ICJ has yet to decide a space-related case to date, it would arguably
have subject-matter jurisdiction over any space dispute that would be considered
a dispute of international law. A claimant state before the ICJ would allege that the
respondent state has violated its international obligations—an assertion that is
distinct from an allegation of mere liability for damage.

Arbitration and Mediation

Arbitration agreements usually take the form of a compromis, or a clause in a
contract setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties. Such arbitration
clauses are globally well recognized and are even favored in some jurisdictions,
as they reduce the burden on court systems. However, not all parties share the
same priorities for dispute resolution. An arbitration clause provides the parties
with the authority to establish the arbitrator selection process and set arbitrator
qualifications, and to determine whether and what discovery is available, what
rules apply (evidentiary and procedural), scheduling, level of confidentiality, the
role the arbitrators will serve, decision format and whether the decision is binding,
the appeal process (if any), choice of law, provisional remedies, and methods of
enforcement. Arbitration clauses can specify a particular arbitral tribunal, in which
case the parties must comply with the rules and requirements of that tribunal.

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Mediation, like both arbitration and adjudication, also employs neutral third
parties to resolve a dispute. However, the mediator/s would not issue a binding
decision. The procedures for mediation are less structured and more flexible than
those followed by either courts or arbitral tribunals and can be entirely consensual
or court-ordered. Resolution of disputes between non-governmental actors, such
as corporations or other private entities, is dealt with in the following chapters.

In 2011, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), situated in The Hague,

Netherlands, promulgated its Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating
to Outer Space Activities. Additionally, the PCA recommends a model clause for
insertion into contracts. These rules establish an alternative means of settling
disputes among states, international organizations, and private entities.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
In order to ensure their continued habitability and usability, it is necessary to
protect both terrestrial and space environments. However, space activities such
as launch are considered inherently dangerous and risky. Consequently, there are
various international norms addressing environmental regulation which either
forbid certain activities, or which establish international responsibility (including
liability) for damage and environmental degradation.

Protection of the Earth Environment

Launching into space is an inherently In order to ensure their
dangerous activity, usually involving the continued habitability
combustion of large amounts of solid and/or
and usability, it is
liquid fuel and the rapid transit of advanced
hardware through harsh and unforgiving
necessary to protect
environments. For that reason, launch sites both terrestrial
are chosen in isolated places, far from where and space environments.
accidents can cause harm to others.

A number of sources of law address protecting the Earth environment and

allocate the burden of making compensation in case damage happens. On
the international level, states are generally responsible for transboundary
international harm they cause to other states. This obligation exists in the general
custom of states, and is widely recognized. Particular to space law, Article VII of
the Outer Space Treaty creates the liability rules for space launches, and includes
liability for launching states causing damage to other states party to the treaty on
the Earth, in air space, or in outer space.

Additionally, states are absolutely liable for damage their space launches cause
on the surface of the Earth or damage to aircraft in flight. This absolute liability
does not require that any fault or negligence be proven, merely that the damage
occurred resulting from the activities of the responsible state. Consequently, while
space activities are generally lawful, their ultra-hazardous nature is reflected in this
absolute liability regime from the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention.

Environmental Issues | 29
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Back Contamination of Earth

Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty largely concerns protecting the space
environment, but the second sentence concerns protecting the Earth environment
from space material. It reads:

States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies in outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so
as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the
environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial
matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for
this purpose.

The International Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) is an interdisciplinary

science organization that has long been concerned with protecting the unique
and pristine conditions of space environments—pristine, at least, in relation
to humankind’s interaction with them. To this end, COSPAR has promulgated
planetary protection principles for space missions, and while the protection of
other celestial bodies is discussed below, COSPAR’s highest levels of precaution
are recommended for Earth-return missions, which may cause so-called
“back contamination.”

COSPAR subdivides Earth-return missions into “Restricted Earth Returns” and

“Unrestricted Earth Returns.” The Unrestricted Earth Return classification applies
to missions returning from celestial bodies such as the Moon and Venus, which
have neither indigenous life forms nor the types of environments where life could
flourish. Restricted Earth Return applies to missions returning from Mars and
Europa, for example.

Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Space

Nuclear power sources have been used on spacecraft since the beginning
of the space age. The steady and predictable decay of radioactive material
gives off energy in amounts and in a manner suitable for a spacecraft’s needs.
Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and radioisotope heat units (RHUs)
are historically proven methods of power generation, with both the United States
and the Russian Federation utilizing such nuclear power sources in various
space activities.

Recognizing the particular suitability of nuclear power sources for space missions,
UNGA Resolution 47/68 of 1992 established 11 principles relevant to their use.
The nuclear power principles reiterate the applicability of international law and the
concepts and framework already established by the Outer Space Treaty and the
Liability Convention regarding the responsibility for and potential liability of the
launching state, and the jurisdiction and control of the registering state.

Principle 3 of the resolution discusses guidelines and criteria for use, stating that
nuclear power sources in space shall be restricted to those missions that “cannot
be operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a reasonable manner.” It further
requires that nuclear reactors shall only use highly enriched uranium-235 as fuel,

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 THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
and that reactors shall be designed and constructed so that they can only become
critical upon reaching orbit or an interplanetary trajectory, and through no other
way (including rocket explosion, re-entry, or impact with water or land).

Principle 5 contains instructions for making notifications about malfunctioning

nuclear power sources that risk re-entry of radioactive materials to Earth. The
information to be furnished includes basic launch and orbital parameters as
well as information on the nuclear power source itself and the probable physical
form, amount, and general radiological characteristics of the components likely
to reach the ground. The notification should be sent to concerned states and
to the UN Secretary-General. The principles further call for consultations and
assistance between states, and reinforce the roles of responsibility, liability and
compensation, and the settlement of disputes from the existing space treaties.

Subsequent to UNGA Res. 47/68, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of

COPUOS worked jointly with the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop
the Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Applications in Outer Space. This
framework, though not legally binding, is intended to be used as a guide for
national and intergovernmental safety purposes. The framework deals with the
safe use of nuclear power sources in space missions, and contains guidance for
governments on how to authorize space missions with nuclear power sources,
guidance for the management of responsibility and safety roles of such missions,
and technical guidance. When planned space missions involve nuclear power
sources, these guidelines should be consulted early in the project.

Space Debris
After more than sixty-six years of space activities, humanity has created a
significant amount of space debris. Space debris is generally defined as the
non-operational satellites, spent rocket stages, and other bits and pieces created
during the launch and operation of satellites. As of June 2024, there are currently
more than 35,000 space debris objects being tracked in Earth’s orbit by space
situational awareness tracking systems. In addition, is estimated that, in total,

Figure 1.7 | The growth of space debris. Credit: ESA

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there are 1,100,000 space debris objects of between 1 cm to 10 cm (0.4 to 4

inches) in size orbiting Earth. Each of these small, largely untracked objects could
severely damage an active satellite in a collision. This debris is concentrated in the
most heavily used regions of Earth orbit, where many active satellites also reside.

Former U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) scientist

Donald Kessler was one of the first to predict what has since become known
as the Kessler Syndrome: as the amount of space debris in orbit grows, the
increasing density of space debris will lead to random collisions between space
debris. These random collisions would in turn generate more debris at a rate
faster than it can be naturally removed from orbit by the Earth’s atmosphere.
Unlike the dramatic scenarios sometimes depicted in popular fiction, this process
would take place much more slowly over decades or centuries.

There is now a general consensus among scientists that there is enough

human-generated space debris concentrated in the critical region in LEO
between 700 and 900 kilometers (430 to 560 miles) to create more debris even
if no new satellites were launched. These debris-on-debris collisions will not lead
to an infinite growth in the debris population. Rather, they will lead to a future
equilibrium point that has a larger population of debris than today. The growth
of debris will increase the risks—and thus the associated costs—of operating
satellites in critical regions such as LEO. These increased costs could result from
the need for more spare satellites to replace those lost in collisions, the need
for heavier and more resilient satellites that cost more to build and launch,
and increased operating costs resulting from trying to detect and avoid
potential collisions.

Tracking of space debris, and efforts to reduce collision risk (and the creation
of additional debris from collisions) is a key part of the purpose of space
situational awareness systems and space traffic management and coordination
efforts. Efforts to address space debris risk generally fall into two broad
categories: mitigation efforts to reduce the creation of future debris through
space operations; and remediation efforts to address the existing space debris
population resulting from legacy activities.

Debris mitigation includes designing satellites and space systems to minimize the
amount of debris they release during normal operations, developing methods to
reduce the risk of fragmentation or explosion at end-of-life by venting leftover fuel
or discharging batteries, and properly disposing of spacecraft and spent rocket
stages after they are no longer useful. In recent years there has been increased
focus on compliance with post-mission disposal timeline.

In the late 1990s, several major space agencies came together to form the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). The purpose of the IADC
is to help coordinate and share research on space debris among participating
space agencies. In 2007, the IADC published the first international Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, which were updated most recently in June 2021 These
technical guidelines define specific protected regions of Earth orbit and the
recommended operational practices satellite operators should take to minimize

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Figure 1.8 | Depiction of protected regions as developed by the IADC. Credit: ESA

the creation of long-lived space debris in the protected regions. Figure 1.8
illustrates the various protected regions per the IADC guidelines.

A simplified subset of the IADC guidelines, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (which were more political
in nature) were endorsed by the United Nations in 2009. Although the IADC
guidelines remained voluntary, several states have implemented the debris
mitigation guidelines through national regulations and policy, which is discussed
in Chapter Two.

The IADC has also focused its research efforts on active debris removal (ADR).
Several IADC member agencies are working on national ADR technology
development efforts. In December 2022, the IADC released a statement on
ADR efforts. This statement notes the importance of following through on post
mission disposal guidelines to the greatest extent possible and suggests that new
spacecraft and upper stages should be designed to ready for ADR, as a backup to
other post-mission disposal plans. The statement also notes the need for further
work on cost, risk, and benefit analysis of ADR technology.

Debris objects are of various sizes. Techniques and approaches to remediation of

large debris will differ from techniques and approaches to remediation of small
debris (1 to 10 centimeter size range). Technical experts from around the world
have been working intensively on both of these problems over the last several
years, and there are some promising technical solutions for removing either large
objects or small objects. There is unlikely to be a single, all-encompassing solution
that can deal with both large and small debris objectives.

Solving the challenges of space debris will require close coordination and
cooperation among the engineers and scientists working on the technology, as
well as the lawyers and policymakers developing policy and regulatory oversight.
One step that can be taken is to avoid the intentional creation of space debris.

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On April 19, 2022, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the
United States would voluntarily commit not to conduct destructive, direct-
ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile tests, and that the United States sought to
establish this as a new international norm for responsible behavior in space. On
December 12, 2022, the UNGA adopted Resolution 77/41, which called upon all
States to commit not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT missile tests and to continue
discussions in the relevant bodies to enhance space security. The resolution
passed 155–9–9. As of June 2024, thirty-seven countries have made the same
pledge not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT missile tests.

ADVANCED ISSUES
The preceding sections discussed important aspects of the international political,
legal, and regulatory framework for space activities. Though subtleties exist at
the boundaries of each of those topics, much is settled and understood. The last
section of this chapter will discuss evolving issues and more advanced topics in
space activities.

Boundary Between Airspace and Outer Space

Despite over half a century of space activities, there is no internationally
recognized legal definition of where airspace ends and where outer space begins.
Neither the Outer Space Treaty nor any other international legal instrument
specifies a beginning or bottom point above which outer space begins. A
definition of outer space is important because the legal regimes governing
airspace and outer space are fundamentally different, and because getting to
outer space requires crossing through airspace. A distinction between these
two domains would help clarify which legal regime governs activities that cross
between them.

Sovereignty, a fundamental component of the modern state, is essentially the

power of a government to impose its exclusive authority—by creating laws,
by deciding disputes, and through related powers such as enforcing its laws
and judicial decisions. A state is exclusively sovereign in the airspace above its
territory and territorial waters. However, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty
severely undercuts state sovereignty in outer space, leaving only jurisdiction
and ownership rights to a state’s launched and registered space objects and
personnel thereof. In air law, state sovereignty over airspace includes the right
to keep others out, and only through complex bilateral and multilateral treaties
do states allow civil aircraft from other states to enter (pass through, land on,
and take off from) their sovereign airspace. This structure is the opposite of the
regime for outer space; all states enjoy the right to freely access, explore, and use
outer space.

In 1976, a number of countries in the equatorial regions of the globe signed on to

the Bogotá Declaration, asserting a legal claim to control the use of space above
their own territory. The declaration sought to upend the existing legal structure by

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Figure 1.9 | Graphic depicting layers of Earth’s atmosphere. Credit: NOAA

Advanced Issues | 35
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stating that the geostationary orbit, as a finite resource, “must not be considered
part of the outer space.” While Colombia’s Constitution continues to recognize
the orbital slot above the country as part of its territory, the Bogotá Declaration’s
claims have not been widely recognized and states continue to defer to ITU
allocations of geostationary slots.

Some feel that this issue—the lack of a legal boundary between airspace and
outer space—may increase in relevance in the near future. Some activities might
be considered to be occurring in airspace and would therefore be governed by
air law; alternatively, they might be considered to be occurring in outer space and
thus would be governed by space law.

Is a reusable space plane governed by air law until it reaches Earth orbit? Or,
because it is a spacecraft, does space law apply for the duration of the mission,
including its transit through the atmosphere? As a general operational rule, it can
be assumed that the area where artificial satellites are able to orbit Earth qualifies
as outer space, although this altitude does not necessarily reflect the ceiling of
airspace. A “spatialist” approach would argue for a bright-line distinction, perhaps
at 100 kilometers above the Earth’s surface—often called the Kármán line—where
the atmosphere is too thin to sustain aeronautical flight.

Others first consider whether the activity involves craft with wings (like aircraft)
or rockets (like spacecraft). Or they consider whether the craft takes off vertically
(like a rocket) or horizontally (like a plane). Depending on whether the craft looks
like an aircraft or spacecraft, and what its mission is, it might make sense to group
it under air law or space law. This “functionalist” approach does not try to decide
on a physical demarcation above the Earth’s surface, as the spatialist approach
recommends.

Whether something qualifies as an aviation activity or a space activity impacts, and

is impacted by, not only the rules of the area where it operates, but which national
rules it must inherently follow and which international responsibility and liability
rules apply. To date, however, no international definition has been agreed upon.
This lack of certainty might be a result of the previously clear distinction between
aircraft in the air and rockets and satellites in outer space. Additionally, neither the
functionalist nor the spatialist approach has dominated the discussion.

As technology develops and more states and non-state actors launch different
types of craft and vehicles, it may become necessary to more clearly demarcate
where space begins. A government considering space legislation might first
consider whether there are any benefits to determining nationally where outer
space legally begins, especially in the absence of an international definition.
Likewise, non-governmental actors should be aware of the different regimes of air
and space law, and the lack of international legal certainty between them.

Space Traffic Management

Space traffic management (STM) refers to measures taken to minimize or
mitigate the negative impacts of the increasing physical congestion in space. As

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 THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
the number of active satellites and amount of space debris in space increases,
particularly in highly used orbits and altitudes, physical congestion has become
a growing problem. To date, there have been several confirmed, unintentional
collisions between a functional satellite and another space object that have
either damaged the satellite or completely destroyed both objects and created
thousands of new pieces of space debris. The goal of STM is to try to eliminate
future collisions and other incidents in space that could create additional debris or
other safety risks for space activities, and to increase the safety and efficiency of
space activities.

There is some debate over the term “Space Traffic Management,” with space
traffic coordination (STC) increasingly being used by some actors who feel that
“management” suggests a higher level of active oversight or control than is
possible, given that a very high percentage of space objects are uncontrolled
space debris.

Space situational awareness (SSA) is an important element of STM. SSA refers

to the ability to characterize the space environment and activities in space. A
key component of SSA is using ground- or space-based sensors, such as radars
or optical telescopes, to track space objects. The tracking data from multiple
sensors is combined to estimate orbits for space objects and predictions of
their trajectories in the future. Other key components include space weather,
characterization of space objects, and pre-planned maneuvers as discussed in
Chapter Three.

While some countries currently engage in practices that could be considered to

be part of STM, there currently is no widespread state practice or established
international regime. In 2010, the U.S. government began a program to provide
close-approach warnings for all satellite operators. A few other countries provide
similar warnings for national entities, and in 2023 the European Union’s Space
Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) programme started providing a similar
capability. Many commercial satellite operators work with a third-party service,
such as the Space Data Association (SDA) or their own national space agency, to
augment the basic warnings and data from governments. This is discussed more
fully in Chapter Three.

There is ongoing debate over whether an international STM regime should begin
with national practice or with an international treaty. Some have also made
comparisons between STM and air traffic management and called for a new
treaty to establish an international body that would set standards for STM and
be similar to the function of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
for air traffic management. However, ICAO was created to resolve differences
between previously existing national airspace regulations. Furthermore, the air
traffic standards that ICAO sets require implementation by national regulative and
administrative bodies, which many countries currently lack for space activities. As
a result, others are pushing for major spacefaring states to establish national STM
regimes that may evolve into an international regime in the future.

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Dark and Quiet Skies

The last decade has seen
a rapid increase and
diversification of space
activity, resulting in over ten
thousand spacecraft operating
in LEO as of May 2024. This
notable proliferation of space
objects has given rise to some
worrying concerns, including
interference with astronomical
observations.

Figure 1.10, taken during

a 333-second exposure
from the Cerro Tololo Inter-
American Observatory in Figure 1.10 | Starlink satellites imaged from Cerro
Chile, shows a set of celestial Tololo Inter-American Observatory (CTIO).
images with Starlink satellites Credit: CTIO/NOIRLab/NSF/AURA/DECam DELVE Survey
leaving nineteen individual
streaks across the image. While computer programs can remove some satellite
streaks, significant streaking renders many images useless. As observatories
are oversubscribed for imaging time, ruined images like this mean lost time
and resources, detrimentally impacting astronomy. A changing night sky with
increased numbers of satellites also affects all those who rely on or merely enjoy
the night sky.

With perhaps thousands of spacecraft predicted to be launched in the next

decade, many of these headed to LEO, the challenge of protecting and preserving
the night sky for science and society has taken the moniker Dark and Quiet Skies,
and organizations including the International Astronomical Union (IAU) and its
Centre for the Protection of Dark and Quiet Skies from Satellite Constellation
Interference (CPS) have raised the salience of this issue in a variety of fora,
including at COPUOS.

There are some technical approaches to minimize the harmful interference

effects of these numerous satellites, and satellite operators have worked with
the international astronomy community to reduce the brightness of their
spacecraft. With the most severe interference threatened shortly after dusk, and
again shortly before dawn, there are approaches to coordinating imaging times
with the astronomy community. However, balancing the benefits of large global
constellations in LEO with their detrimental impacts on astronomy appears to be a
complex problem that a variety of stakeholders, including national regulators and
international bodies, will continue to grapple with.

Status of Humans in Space

As states and private companies contemplate and prepare for crewed space
operations ranging from suborbital to beyond Earth orbit, the legal status of

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 THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
humans in space within the international framework will need to be addressed.
The treaty regime provides particular rights and responsibilities with regard to
astronauts, and they may or may not apply to other spaceflight participants,
such as private individuals and those flying on purely commercial flights.

Article V of the Outer Space Treaty refers to astronauts as “envoys of mankind,”

and requires that states give them “all possible assistance in the event of accident,
distress, or emergency landing” in their territory or on the high seas.
This assistance also requires their safe and prompt return to the state of registry
of their space vehicle. In outer space and on celestial bodies, states must
render “all possible assistance” to astronauts of other states party to the treaty.
Last, states must also inform other states and the UN Secretary-General of any
phenomena they discover in space that could constitute a danger to the life and
health of astronauts.

The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space further develops and refines
the rights and obligations of humans in space. The plain meaning of these texts
is largely clear, and highlights the peaceful and cooperative spirit animating the
positive obligations it imposes upon states.

However, neither these treaties nor any subsequent source of international law
defines the term “astronaut.” It is likely that states seeking to build their space
credentials will be interested in having their citizens join the list of humans who
have traveled to outer space. As private spaceflight becomes a viable industry, and
when suborbital spaceflight occurs across international boundaries, the status
of private individuals and their recognition as astronauts will likely have to be
reassessed on national and/or international levels.

Protecting Celestial Bodies

In addition to the environmental issues discussed in previous sections, the
protection of celestial bodies is an advanced issue which some new actors in
space may face. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty first establishes a positive
commitment where states shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and
mutual assistance, and all activities shall be conducted with due regard for the

Figure 1.11 | NASA Astronaut Kate Rubins conducts a spacewalk on Sept. 1, 2016.
Credit: NASA

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

corresponding interests of other state parties. Concerning the environment of

celestial bodies, all studies and exploration shall be pursued “as to avoid their
harmful contamination.”

The article then requires that states undertake “appropriate international

consultations” before any activity or experiment they have reason to believe would
cause potentially harmful interference with the space activities of other states.
Last, states may request consultations concerning the activities or experiments of
other states when they have reason to believe the activities or experiments would
cause potentially harmful interference with their own activities.

While the text of the article is related to environmental protection, it is chiefly

the second sentence of Article IX that concerns the protection of celestial
bodies and creates the positive obligation for states to adopt appropriate
measures to prevent the harmful contamination of outer space and celestial
bodies. This sentence also concerns the creation of space debris and preventing
the introduction of extraterrestrial matter to Earth. As such, this treaty article
reflects the desire by states to preserve celestial bodies, and it has led to further
elaboration on the meaning of planetary protection.

As mentioned, COSPAR has promulgated a Planetary Protection Policy for

missions to other celestial bodies. Their Planetary Protection Policy, last revised
in June 2020, reflects the concerns of scientists interested in the origin of life
and the preoccupation that the environments of other celestial bodies might be
contaminated, even unintentionally, by the arrival of crewed or robotic spacecraft.
The updated Planetary Protection Policy lays out five categories of missions
according to the destination involved and the type of mission (i.e., orbiter, lander,
return-to-Earth mission; see Table 1.3).

Category I missions are those to celestial bodies lacking direct relevance for
understanding the process of chemical evolution or the origin of life, and include
certain types of asteroids and other destinations to be determined. No planetary
protection concerns are defined for Category I missions, whether they be orbiters,
rovers, or landers.

Category II missions also cover orbiters, rovers, and landers, but relate to missions
to several major celestial bodies: Venus, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune,
as well as Ganymede, Callisto, Titan, Triton, Pluto and Charon, and Ceres, as
well as comets, carbonaceous chondrite asteroids, and Kuiper Belt objects.
These Category II missions address missions to celestial bodies where there is
a significant scientific interest related to the process of chemical evolution or
the origin of life, but, because of the physical environment of the destination,
there is only a remote chance that contamination might compromise future
investigations. Category II missions require a record of planned impact probability
and contamination control measures, as well as a documentation of the planetary
protection measures taken through the general planetary protection plan, a
pre-launch report, post-launch report, post-encounter report, and an end-of-
mission report.

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 Category I Category II Category III Category IV Category V

THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES

Categories III through V are for more advanced missions: either flybys or
Type of Any but Any but Earth No direct contact Direct contact Earth Return
Mission Earth Return (flyby, some (lander, probe,
Return orbiters) some orbiters)

Target Body See See Category- See Category- See Category- See Category-specific
Category- specific listing specific listing specific listing listing
specific
listing

Degree of None Record of Limit on impact Limit on If restricted Earth

Concern planned impact probability probability of return:
probability and Passive non-nominal No impact on Earth or
contamination bioburden control impact Limit Moon;
control on bioburden
measures (active control) Returned hardware
sterile;

Containment of any
sample.

Representative Documentation Documentation Documentation Outbound Same

Range of only (all brief): only (Category II (Category II category as target
Requirements plus): plus): body/ outbound
• PP plan
mission
• Contamination • Pc analysis
• Pre-launch
control plan Inbound If restricted
report
Earth return
• Organics • Microbial
• Post-launch
inventory reduction Documentation
report
(as necessary) plan (Category II plus):
• Post-
Implementing • Microbial • Pc analysis plan
encounter
procedures such assay plan
report • Microbial reduction
as:
• Organics plan
• End-of-
• Trajectory inventory
mission • Microbial assay
biasing
report Implementing plan
• Cleanroom procedures
Implementing
such as:
• Bioburden procedures such as:
reduction (as • Trajectory
• Trajectory biasing
necessary) biasing
• Sterile or contained
• Contamination • Cleanroom
returned hardware
control
• Bioburden
• Continual
• Organics reduction
monitoring of
inventory (as
Partial project activities
necessary)
sterilization
• Project advanced
Implementing of contacting
studies and
procedures such hardware (as
research
as: necessary)
If unrestricted Earth
• Trajectory • Bioshield
return: None
biasing
• Monitoring
• Cleanroom of bioburden
via bioassay
• Bioburden
reduction
(as necessary)

Table 1.3 | This table from COSPAR shows the level of contamination concern for each
COSPAR mission type. Additionally, the chart shows a short list of requirements that
would need to be fulfilled to meet these protection standards. Credit: COSPAR Planetary
Protection Policy
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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

orbiters to Mars, Europa, or Enceladus (Category III), landers to Mars, Europa,

or Enceladus (IV), or any Earth-Return mission (V). Earth-Return missions from
Venus or the Moon are classified as “Unrestricted Earth Return,” while missions
to and from Mars or Europa are “Restricted Earth-Return Missions” requiring
heightened scrutiny.

COSPAR guidelines are implemented on a national level, where space agencies

and governments adopt them into their national licensing and regulatory
frameworks or implement them in the national space agency’s plans. In the
United States, NASA has a Planetary Protection Office, an agency-wide policy
directive, and mandatory procedural requirements for its missions. ESA also has
a planetary protection policy (ESSB-ST-U-001 (Issue 1): ESA planetary protection
requirements), which it imposes on all ESA spaceflight missions, any contributions
to ESA missions, and any ESA contributions to non-ESA missions.

Outside of planned missions to preserve celestial bodies for their scientific value,
there is also the desire to protect and preserve certain areas and artifacts on
celestial bodies because of their importance to space exploration. The landing
sites of the Apollo missions, including the hardware the astronauts left on the
Moon and even the iconic footprints from Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and later
astronauts are of permanent cultural value. The same is true for the Soviet-era
rovers on the surface of the Moon, such as Lunokhod, and of the rovers on other
celestial bodies. While there has been talk of making some of these sites United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage
sites before they are encroached upon by next-generation missions, so far it is up
to national governments and their space agencies to try to preserve those sites
and artifacts in which they have particular interest. For missions planned to certain
destinations, responsible actors would be well advised to educate themselves on
the various planetary protection policies and to observe them in the execution of
their missions. This is especially important if national legislation is silent on the
topic of planetary protection.

Space Resources
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there are significant freedoms
to explore and use outer space. The Outer Space Treaty even ensures that this
exploration and use is “the province of all mankind.” But what rights do states,
private companies, or even people have to use space resources, and what does
the term “space resources” encompass? While the drafters and negotiators of the
Outer Space Treaty considered this topic, they left it vague enough to allow further
refinement. However, this treaty—while enshrining significant freedoms in space—
does have some prohibitions. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states that:

Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means.

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 THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
By referencing the Moon and other celestial
bodies in this article, it is very clear that the
prohibition on national appropriation applies
to both physical celestial bodies and to “void”
space. More importantly, the listing of claims of
sovereignty, and the use of or the occupation
of space, is a list of methods (or means) that
would not justify a state’s appropriation of outer
space. Neither a statement (such as a claim)
nor a physical act (such as using or occupying)
constitutes lawful appropriation. Article II’s list
is not exhaustive: it is merely illustrative of a few Figure 1.12 | Internal asteroid
explicit methods that will not legitimize national contents from Japan’s Hayabusa2
appropriation in space. mission, which collected samples
from asteroid 162173 Ryugu.
The further interpretation and possible Credit: JAXA
clarification of Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty will likely become necessary as a range of space resources activities
expand. Notably, China, the United States, and the USSR have already brought
back lunar samples, and have acted in ways consistent with asserting and
transferring uncontested ownership rights in those samples, and the United
States and Japan have also conducted missions that returned samples collected
from asteroids.

While the issue of the use of space resources is being examined, the purposes
of the Outer Space Treaty would seem counter to any overly drastic prohibitions
that would limit the next generation of space activities. As long as the use of
space resources conforms to the purposes of the treaty, advances the aims of the
treaty, and otherwise conforms to international law, it is permissible. Additionally,
as long as these activities do not rise to the level of a state attempting the
national territorial annexation of outer space or celestial bodies, they are likewise
permissible.

In 2019, the Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group

(a consortium of industry and academia) finalized their Building Blocks for the
Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities. The Hague
Building Blocks demonstrate the further elaboration of elements of normative
regime for the use of space resources, the definition of the term space resources,
and have influenced national and international thought on the issue.

Meanwhile at COPUOS, a Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource

Activities was established in 2021. The Working Group has a Terms of Reference,
five-year Workplan, and Method of Work on potential legal models for regulating
space resources.

Additionally, national approaches and multilateral agreements like the Artemis

Accords signal how states are approaching advanced space governance issues.
See Chapter Two for more information on this example.

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Future of International Space Governance

Another topic that new space actors must be aware of is the changing nature of
international space governance. This chapter has mentioned and discussed the
traditional institutions and committees where space governance was historically
developed. These include COPUOS, as the home of the UN treaties on outer
space, a venue that continues to serve as a “clearinghouse” of information on
national space exploration activities, and as a venue for deliberations on new
rules. Most recently, COPUOS adopted Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability
of Outer Space Activities, and the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability
of Outer Space Activities continues to meet, along with discussions under a variety
of other agenda items touching on space sustainability.

However, other important multilateral fora discuss space security and

disarmament issues in a variety of venues at the UN in Geneva, such as the UN
Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, events put on by
UNIDIR (the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), and in various
UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and UN Open-Ended Working Groups
(OEWGs) considering various issues on space security.

The ITU has also served as a venue for the development of norms related to
outer space, including in study groups and at its World Radiocommunication
Conferences. This and the following chapters show that rules regulating behavior
on space have also been developed outside the UN system, including in regional
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and groups
of states cooperating on space exploration goals such as through the Artemis
Accords and the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) agreements.

Meanwhile, rules have been developed at the national level through the creation
of national space policy, and in national space legislation and its implementing
regulations. The commercial and scientific sectors have also self-organized to
develop standards and recommended practices for their own constituencies.
See Chapter Two and Chapter Three respectively for a deeper discussion of
these issues.

This multifaceted and diverse nature of rule development for outer space activities
is a feature of global space activities, and an awareness of this “polycentric” nature
of globalized space governance will benefit both new and traditional space actors.

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

CHAPTER TWO

National Space Policy

and Administration

CHAPTER TWO FOCUS

This chapter provides an overview of how and why states create national frameworks for
space activities through policy, regulation, and the organizations they create to implement it.
A policy is a principle or a set of principles used to guide decision-making and actions.

In the context of governments, “public policy” refers to why, how, and to what effect
governments pursue particular courses of action or inaction. Public policy decisions often
involve weighing the potential positive and negative impacts of competing options. These
decisions are further complicated by the participation of many different interest groups
and political actors who have competing perspectives in the decision-making process. In
conjunction, “public administration” is the implementation of policy through the organization
of government bureaucracy, the establishment of programs and institutions, and the day-to-
day running of services and activities.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section focuses on public policy
aspects of national frameworks, including various ways space policy can be established; why
states put in place national policy; the relationship between space and science, technology,
and innovation policy; and the role of international cooperation. The second section
focuses on public administration: how countries implement their own national policy and
international obligations through regulative and administrative structures.

46 | HAN DBOOK FOR NE W AC TO RS IN SPAC E

 Dr. Joel Joseph S. Marciano Jr.
DIRECTOR GENERAL
Philippine Space Agency (PhilSA)

INTRODUCTION
A new space actor faces many challenges. Apart from building up essential science
and getting the technology right, venturing into space also requires a host of policies,
regulations, and decisions at the national level. For the Philippines, all of these had to
come together to capture and convey our goals and direction when we started the
Philippine Space Agency (PhilSA) in 2019.

The Philippine Space Policy, established under the Philippine Space Act (Republic
Act No. 11363) signed by then Philippine President Rodrigo R. Duterte, addresses,
among others, the “urgent need to create a coherent and unified strategy for space
development and utilization to keep up with other nations in terms of space science
and technology”. PhilSA was also created under the same Act and given the mandate
to plan, develop, and promote the national space program in line with the Philippine
Space Policy. As the central agency of the Philippine government addressing all
national issues and activities related to space science and technology applications, the
Agency is placed directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines for policy
and program coordination and to ensure alignment in national policies and priorities.

New space actors need guidance and rubric from national space policy in the process
of establishing themselves. Governments have responsibilities under the Outer Space
Treaty to provide authorization and continuing supervision over their national actors,
and cascading those responsibilities into national policy is up to each country. In the
Philippines, we are taking an end-to-end and holistic approach to building the domestic
space ecosystem that unlocks important socioeconomic benefits for the people.

Space is important for my country. We leverage satellites for communication, weather

monitoring, hazard management, climate studies, environmental protection, maritime
safety, and other important uses that bolster national security and the attainment and
protection of national interest – seeking constructive dialogue and cooperation with
other countries in the process. We put in place domestic policy that enshrines access
to space and its environs as a sovereign right, and to enable us to secure opportunities
for creating, adding, and deriving value from such access. The work continues.

Amid the challenges confronting new actors, a responsive policy and regulatory
framework can provide encouragement and the enabling environment for them to
venture into space in a safe, responsible and sustainable way. Thus, in this chapter,
different elements of national space policy are discussed, diving into issues such as
public policy for space, the role of space in science and technology policy, export
control considerations, and remote sensing regulations. After reading through it, new
actors in space should have a better understanding of the types of regulations they
might need in support of their burgeoning space dreams and ambitions.

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

CHAPTER TWO
National Space Policy and Administration

PUBLIC POLICY FOR SPACE

Policy can be established through many different methods, several of which may
be interacting at the same time. One way of establishing policy is through the
international, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements by which a state
is bound. National policy can be established explicitly through formal decision-
making processes such as intra-governmental committees or legislation. Policy
can also be established implicitly through a choice to not pursue a particular
path and can be manifested through cultural or ideological contexts that impact
decision-making and choices. Policy may not be consistent and may even be
contradictory.

In the context of space, policy can take many

different forms. Some states choose to put in Developing a national
place a national space policy, which may or space policy or strategy
may not be accompanied by narrower policies forces a government
covering specific space sectors such as launch,
to go through the
communications, or remote sensing. Other
states choose to put in place policy at the process of having an
organizational level, or through legislation that intragovernmental
establishes specific programs and projects. Still discussion about
others express it through a strategy that spells priorities and goals
out national goals and priorities for space.
for its space program,
Making national space policy or strategy publicly
accessible is one way to demonstrate intentions information which
and priorities for a national space program. It can then be used
also gives an idea of how much budgeting may to inform national
go into a nation’s space activities and raises and international
the overall level of transparency. In addition, discussions.
developing a national space policy or strategy
forces a government to go through the process
of having an intragovernmental discussion about priorities and goals for its space
program, information which can then be used to inform national and international
discussions. The Handbook for Space Capability Development is another resource
that looks at this topic of how governments go about drafting a national space
strategy and building a national space program. The following sections provide an
overview of the different uses and common elements of space policy.

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Rationales, Objectives, and Principles
A national space policy provides the rationale for why a state chooses to engage
in space activities. The reasoning and motivation for engaging in space activities
may differ drastically between states. Some states choose to engage in the entire
spectrum of space activities and capabilities across the commercial, civil, and
national security sectors, while other states choose to focus on or exclude specific
types of activities. In some cases, this choice may reflect a national decision on
a specific interpretation of what the peaceful uses of space means, or a state’s
relationship and ideological approach to its private sector. Explicitly and publicly
defining the rationales for space activities may also be part of a strategy for
boosting internal political support for funding and other resources which support
space activities.

National space policy also provides the objectives for the space activities a state
chooses to engage in. The reason for doing so is to provide high-level guidance on
the goals a state is pursuing. These goals can be specific, such as accomplishing a

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

certain task in a set amount of time, or broad, such as enhancing national prestige
or bulwarking national security goals. Explicitly outlining these objectives not only
provides a signal to other countries, but also can help generate national support
and motivation for specific space activities and programs.

National space policy can also define the principles by which a state will conduct
its space activities. These principles can be used to reaffirm or demonstrate a
state’s adherence to international agreements and treaties, and to outline national
principles that have a historical, cultural, or ideological basis. The principles in a
national space policy can also form the foundation for lower-level government
policies in specific sectors such as national security or commercial space.

When a new space activity is proposed, its alignment with national policy and
principles related to space can be an early indicator of whether that activity
will be implemented successfully. If serious misalignments exist, strategies for
overcoming those misalignments need to be addressed in the planning process.

Government Roles and Responsibilities

A second major use for national space policy is to delineate roles and
responsibilities between various government agencies and entities to comply with
a state’s obligations under the international legal framework for space activities
discussed in Chapter One. States need to assign responsibility to government
entities performing functions such as administering and licensing radio
frequencies used by satellites, licensing remote sensing satellites, and maintaining
a national registry of space objects.

States have multiple options for how to assign roles and responsibilities. Some
countries choose to consolidate all of their space activities into one organization,
while others have multiple government entities that are each tasked with a portion

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Case Study: United Arab Emirates Mars Mission

In July 2014, the government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced its
intentions to develop and launch a robotic spacecraft to Mars orbit. The plan marked
an ambitious expansion of the UAE’s space activities, which had previously focused
on remote sensing and communications and coincided with the establishment of
the United Arab Emirates Space Agency. The UAE’s commitment to a scientific Mars
exploration project encompasses many of the typical goals and drivers that are found
in government space programs.

Emirati officials described three key motivations for the project: symbolism and
inspiration; acting as a catalyst for knowledge and skill development; and providing
an anchor project for the domestic space industry in the UAE. The timing of the
spacecraft launch was symbolically important, as it arrived at Mars in 2021 to coincide
with the 50th anniversary of UAE independence. The mission was also named “Hope”
with the explicit purpose of sending a message of optimism. The UAE defined specific
science objectives for the mission, and involved local universities in the execution of
scientific activities. It also planned for the spacecraft and associated mission support
elements to be manufactured entirely by Emirati citizens, with up to 150 people
employed in the program.

While Emirati-led, the program also demonstrated the role international partnerships
often play in the execution of national space programs. The spacecraft was launched
on a Japanese launch vehicle, and the government of the UAE entered into several
cooperative agreements with other nations (including the United States and Russia)
to exchange information related to Mars science and exploration. Through these
agreements, the UAE sought access to training and knowledge development for its
scientists and engineers. To that end, the UAE Space Agency also entered into an
agreement with Lockheed Martin under which a training program in space-related
skills was established for students and young professionals. Although not solely
related to the Mars mission, this program demonstrated the UAE’s emphasis on
linking space development to scientific and technical capacity-building.

Hope successfully arrived in Mars orbit as planned in February 2021, making the
UAE the first Arab country and the fifth country to reach Mars. Hope has provided
significant scientific returns, including insight into the Martian atmosphere and the
first-ever close up global images of the Martian moon Deimos.

Figure 2.1 | A digital composite of Mars with its smaller moon, Deimos, combining data
captured by the Hope Orbiter from the Emirates Mars Mission. Credit: United Arab Emirates
Mars Mission

50 | HANDBOOK FOR NEW AC TO RS IN SPAC E

of the space activities or oversight. This division of labor could be functional,
such as dividing licensing responsibilities between agencies depending on their
expertise. The division could also be between civil and national security space
activities, in order to enable easier public acknowledgment and international
cooperation while also protecting sensitive technology or capabilities.

National space policy can also be used to direct coordination between national
agencies or entities. If roles and responsibilities are divided among multiple
government agencies, it is often the case that there will be a need for some of
those agencies to coordinate their activities with other entities. This coordination
may not happen naturally, as it can involve disputes over power, control, and
budget. Space policy can be used to direct coordination with other agencies in
situations where their responsibilities overlap, or direct coordination with private
sector or international entities to accomplish policy objectives and principles.

The process by which a government makes national space policy decisions is

important and can vary widely by country. The intra-governmental decision-

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

making process helps ensure that space related policies are consistent with larger
policy objectives, such as foreign policy or innovation policy objectives. Decisions
that are made by individual government agencies or entities without coordination
and input from other stakeholders, including the private sector, are likely to be
suboptimal, because barriers between commercial, civil, and national security
space activities are becoming increasingly blurred. Most space technology is dual-
use, in that it can have both military/security and commercial/civilian applications
which can be carried out simultaneously or alternately. Therefore, policy decisions
on space technology need to strike a balance between controlling access to
the technology to minimize national security risks and increasing access to
maximize its socioeconomic benefits. As a result, policy decisions related to space
activities will often result from coordination and collaboration among the relevant
government agencies and bodies, and may benefit from the input of advisory
bodies that represent other stakeholders, both within and outside of government.

It is important to have administrative and regulatory capacity for implementation

of national policy and associated responsibilities. New state actors should
determine how best to implement their international obligations, particularly their
Outer Space Treaty Article VI responsibilities to authorize and provide continuing
supervision for their national space activities, while also advancing their
domestic priorities.

Although each state’s national space policy is a unique reflection of its politics,
culture, and priorities, there are a few common themes that occur across many
national space policies. These themes reflect common challenges that states face
and priorities as they try to promote through their national space policies.

Role of Space in Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy

The significant socioeconomic benefits reaped by established space nations
from their space activities have been cited as a key motivator by emerging space

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countries making initial investments in space. Often tied to larger strategic goals
for national science, technology, and innovation (STI) policy, space activities
may include a high degree of investment in basic science and in research and
development (R&D), with the goal of contributing to the national economy in
sectors other than space. In this respect, a government’s space policy may be a
subset of STI policy, and space may be one of several target innovation areas, such
as energy, aeronautics, public health, and computing.

STI policies will generally focus on the interactions among the relevant
government, academic, and industry actors involved in education, basic and
applied science, technology, and innovation. The coordination of STI-related
efforts among the different actors is often a key challenge, as is the ability of
actors within the ecosystem to integrate innovative products or processes. One
particular challenge is overcoming the gap between moving from basic research
to commercialization, sometimes referred to as the “valley of death.” In this
respect, STI policies will seek to not only incentivize innovation (e.g., intellectual
property rules, competitive grants or awards), but also to develop the mechanisms
to sustain innovation through the different development cycles so it can yield the
desired economic gains.

As an example, the government of India

adopted the Indian Space Policy in 2023 in
order to give more regulatory stability to its The significant socioeconomic
private sector with the hope of expanding benefits reaped
that part of its economy and using space as by established space nations
a driver for STI. Under this policy, most of from their space activities
the restrictions on commercial participation have been cited as a key
in India’s space sector have been removed. motivator by emerging space
The Indian Space Research Organisation countries making initial
(ISRO) will be responsible for research and investments in space.
development of new space technology and
applications, including human spaceflight,
and the Indian National Space Promotion Authorization Center (IN-SPACe) will
authorize and regulate space activities, with the goal of releasing guidelines and
procedures that would facilitate business for commercial space actors.

Among the primary goals often contained in STI policies is the development of a
highly skilled workforce through investments in science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics (STEM) education. The development of human capital is
considered fundamental in industrial policy as part of efforts to develop niche
capabilities and reduce the emigration of skilled or highly educated workers,
also known as “brain drain.” For example, Argentina’s National Space Plan
2016-2027, developed by CONAE (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales),
mandates that it must “contribute to the national scientific-technological field,
both advanced knowledge and new educational and work opportunities through
the creation of specific careers and related specialties.” This motivation is also
reflected in the practice of many countries seeking partnerships that include
capacity-building components as a way to build human capital and grow national
technological capacities.

52 | HANDBOOK FOR NEW AC TO RS IN SPAC E

Placing space activities within a larger STI framework can help answer critical
questions about the long-term goals of these activities, how they relate to other
science and technological efforts, and how best to coordinate among government
and non-governmental efforts.

International Cooperation
International space cooperation is a key aspect of most space programs.
Depending on the objectives, this cooperation can take many forms, such
as multilateral cooperation at the international or regional level and bilateral
cooperation with individual countries. Depending on the format of this
cooperation, countries may designate specific agencies or institutions as the main
representative, but the activity may involve other agencies or departments and
non-governmental representatives from industry or academia.

At the multilateral level, active participation in the key space forums such as
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or the

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

International Telecommunication Union, as well as related forums for cooperation
in specific application areas such as the Group on Earth Observations, is often
considered a fundamental aspect of these activities. Countries see it as both a way
to show leadership and ensure their views are represented in relevant exchanges
at the international level, while also sharing information about their space
activities and learning about the activities of others. This participation may thus
influence policy debates at the national level.

At a regional or bilateral level, countries may adopt multiple mechanisms to

formalize relationships—whether through issuing joint declarations or statements,
signing cooperative agreements to pursue specific activities together or to
exchange data, pooling institutional or financial resources in a cooperative
program, or by other methods. Regional space cooperation organizations have
also emerged as a way to improve cooperation in and coordination of space
activities at the regional level. For example, the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency
Forum (APRSAF) seeks to advance space activities in the Asia-Pacific region with
institutions from more than forty countries participating along with private
sector entities.

While an exhaustive description of the multiple mechanisms actors have pursued

to enable international cooperation is beyond the scope of this section, the key
insight is that international cooperation is rarely pursued haphazardly, but is
instead often part of larger policy and strategic considerations. International
cooperation is often considered both a mechanism and a goal, so it may feature
in policy documents. As a mechanism, space cooperation enables actors to
leverage the expertise, investments, and resources of others in the development
of programs, whether through the direct acquisition of hardware or the joint
development of technical capacity.

International cooperation can also be driven by larger policy objectives and be

part of a strategy to advance foreign policy, innovation, or trade policy goals. In
emerging space countries, the two aspects may be tightly linked. Chile’s space

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Case Study: Lunar Governance Initiatives

There has been a renewed global interest in lunar and cislunar space activities, with more
than hundred robotic and human exploration missions planned over the next decade.
At the same time, there is also a renewed discussion of how existing space governance
frameworks and principles apply to these new uses, users, and activities on or near the
Moon. While some of these discussions are being held in multilateral fora such as the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS), groups of
states have also created their own initiatives.
The Artemis Accords are a set of principles for lunar activities that was initiated by the
United States and first announced in October 2020 with the signing by eight initial
countries. The Artemis Accords are related to the Artemis program, a NASA-led initiative
to return to the Moon and establish a permanent human presence there that lays the
foundation to further exploration to Mars and beyond. NASA and the U.S. State Department
are co-leads for the Artemis Accords.
The Artemis Accords build on the principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967
and apply them to the lunar space activities. The Artemis Accords’ principles address
transparency, interoperability, release of scientific data, resource utilization, and more.
In 2023, the Artemis Accords partners started a series of working groups to discuss the
specifics of how the principles in the Accords will be applied to their future lunar activities.
Another example of states starting their own lunar initiatives is the International Lunar
Research Station (ILRS), which is led by China and Russia and was announced in June 2021.
Similar to Artemis, the ILRS consists of both a lunar exploration program and a set of
principles for activities undertaken as part of that program.
In June 2021, China and Russia released the “ILRS Guide for Partnership’’ that provides
details about the program’s scientific objectives, mission phases, and guidelines for
partnership. It outlines the Joint Working Group that will oversee the legal, scientific, and
engineering aspects of ILRS. In 2023, China further described the intended creation of an
International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization (ILRSCO) that would handle
the cooperative aspects of the program.
Currently, no details about the ILRS
principles are publicly available.
It is unclear if signing the ILRS
principles will be a prerequisite for
participation in the ILRS program
and vice versa. It is also unclear
if the ILRS principles will differ
significantly from those contained in
the Artemis Accords. However, the
similarities between the activities
planned under Artemis and ILRS
(permanent installations, extraction
and use of lunar water and mineral
resources, and manufacturing on
the lunar surface) suggests they will
be similar.
Figure 2.2 | With NASA Administrator Bill
Nelson and Netherlands Ambassador to the
United States Birgitta Tazelaar looking on, Harm
van de Wetering, Director of the Netherlands
Space Office, signs the Artemis Accords.
Credit: NASA

54 | HAN DBOOK FOR NEW AC TO RS IN SPAC E

policy, for example, is designed with the goal of positioning it as a hub for services
and scientific-technical development so it can be a relevant actor in the region. For
Chile and other countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, international
cooperation—particularly bilateral and regional cooperation—is considered
a priority as a way to extend limited resources, as well as to support related
strategic and political goals. Often states with established space capabilities may
pursue international space cooperation, not because of resource limitations, but
as an added measure to foster positive relationships with other countries.

In this respect, national space policies may detail the goals and priorities of
international cooperation efforts, a mechanism that helps signal others about
a government’s priorities and goals in space, enhances transparency of their
activities with partner nations, and invites new actors to identify opportunities
for engagement.

Export Control and Technology Transfer

The underlying question when working on export controls is, with the increased

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

access to space and burgeoning role of the private sector in space, how does
a state balance controlling the proliferation of militarily sensitive technologies
with commercial development and innovation? It is particularly challenging to
do so while supporting and propelling the space industrial base—an objective of
many national space strategies—as export control is perceived to be a necessary
part of ensuring national security and assuring a stable and predictable space
environment. The balance between efficiency and commercial interests on one
hand and national security on the other is a difficult one to strike; another way of
looking at this is as being part of a larger discussion about promoting innovation
while minimizing risks.

Keeping in mind the international aspect of export control discussed in Chapter

One: International Export Control, export control restrictions on the national level
are extremely challenging to implement and, as a result, should be undertaken
only after a considerable amount of discussion with all stakeholders, including
industry, and when the government has a solid understanding of what it is trying
to accomplish with export control protections. Without stakeholder input, the
domestic industry can suffer unduly with very little benefit to a country’s national
security. States have to be careful of unintended consequences: for example,
cases where export controls were changed and thus created new burdens
for groups in the space industry, or where they unduly hampered domestic
industry even though the same technologies or capabilities were widely available
internationally. It is important to get the conversation as wide as possible when
creating or updating government regulation of an industry, and to have an open
conversation with industry to ensure that all aspects of an issue are considered.

Maintaining a list of technologies that should be controlled is challenging,

particularly for space technologies, many of which are dual-use. One sticking
point for export controls is that often the technology outpaces the legal regimes.
How helpful are export regulations when they are essentially protecting outdated
technology? Another significant issue is that export control, by its nature, tries to

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

control the technology or goods themselves, regardless of how they are being
used. This runs contrary to one of the emerging lessons from dealing with dual-
use space technologies: it is more important and effective to focus on the actions
and uses than on the technology itself.

Balancing national security concerns and positions on fostering domestic

industries and innovation is often an early and important consideration for new
state actors. For non-governmental actors, a thorough understanding of relevant
export control regimes must begin early in the planning process.

Government Relationship with the Private Sector

Governments occupy a range of roles in their interaction with the private sector:
regulator; customer; supplier of technology, intellectual property, and/or seed
funding; collaborator; and competitor. The way these roles are expressed is a
major influence on the development of a broader space industry outside of the
government program in a given country. Along with its role in the market as a
regulator, the government also exerts considerable influence through its role as a
customer. Governments must be aware of how the choices they make in engaging
the private sector through the procurement of goods and services affects both
the development of industry and the evolution of government space strategy
and programs.

Governments may choose to develop required capabilities or services internally,

and not engage the private sector at all. There
are several scenarios in which this approach
may be preferred: the capability may not exist in
the private sector, a determination might have Governments occupy a
been made that development of the capability range of roles in their
is considered a core governmental function interaction with the
(for example, a capability used for national
private sector: regulator;
security purposes), or the capability provides a
customer; supplier of
public good. Developing capabilities internally
to the government provides the government technology, intellectual
with complete control over execution of the property, and/or seed
project as well as any intellectual property funding; collaborator;
developed. It may help the government remain and competitor.
abreast of current technology, and can help
government personnel stay engaged with
program execution. However, in-house work has drawbacks, including a lack
of transparency, and potential cost and efficiency challenges as compared to
wholly private work. As well, governments need to be able to balance developing
a capability in-house while also promoting a related commercial sector (if one
is wanted for that capability). Governments must also remain aware of similar
capabilities that the private sector may be developing in order to ensure that
approaches remain current with regard to comparable capabilities.

56 | HAN DBOOK FOR NE W AC TO RS IN SPAC E

By contracting required capabilities out to the private sector, the government
is able to foster private sector capacity and expertise, which in theory supports
broader economic development objectives. Competition may also lead to more
innovative solutions than might be developed if the work were to be completed
in house. In general, contracting with the private sector is intended to provide
capabilities in a more cost-effective and efficient manner than the developing
of capabilities internally to the government. However, contracting imposes
administrative costs on both the government and the private-sector entities,
specifically in terms of administration and performance oversight. While contracts
can provide the government with a certain level of oversight and ability to specify
quality level, contract performance attributes, and execution timelines, it should
be acknowledged that the contracting process inherently involves a decision
to cede some control of the development of the capability. Contracting may
also create dependencies between the government and companies receiving
contracts. The government may find itself dependent upon one or a few suppliers
for a critical capability, and companies may find themselves dependent upon the
government as a critical source of revenue. Companies may go bankrupt, leaving

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

the government without the specific capability that they provided.

Due in part to these drawbacks, governments are increasingly utilizing public-

private partnership-based approaches to engage the private sector. Public-private
partnership approaches typically seek to develop capabilities in a way that ensures
both the government and the participating private sector entities are co-invested
in the success of the activity. Commonly, governments might specify a need and
some basic requirements, as well as allocate a certain amount of funding. The
capability to be acquired is one that the commercial sector can use to satisfy
non-governmental requirements, with the governmental funding intended to
be complemented by investment and capital provided by the commercial sector.
Projects of this type give the government less control over the execution of the
project but can provide capabilities at less cost than traditional contracting. The
private-sector participants are required to invest their own funding. However, they
are able to retain ownership of the products and intellectual property produced.
These types of activities may also be used to stimulate the development of
capabilities that require governmental support to overcome initial research and
development costs.

Governments may also procure capabilities on a purely commercial basis, often

referred to as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS). In this approach, the private sector
offers items at a standard price, commonly via a catalog. Governments are able
to purchase those items in a market transaction no different from business-to-
business sales. These sorts of transactions have a lower administrative burden
than contracting approaches. They are typically used for the purchase of bulk
goods or commodities. The government is able to procure required items quickly
and efficiently but is not able to specify the details of the development process.

Governments may choose to acquire capabilities through the use of grants

instead of contracts. Grants are typically used in situations where the
government’s interest is in acquiring research or technology development

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Case Study: Collaboration between

Governments and Industry

Collaboration between governments and the private

sector have emerged as an important way to support
both the development of a commercial sector space
economy while also meeting national space goals. These
partnerships can take many forms services, activities,
and vary greatly in
terms of focus, structure, and actual outcomes.
or results. Grants
provide
Early examples of some public-private a large that
partnerships
amount
focused on specific goals of space agency of flexibility
include:

Commercial Orbital Transportationin execution and

Services
scope
(COTS): In this well-known example of a of activities
successful
andin are
public-private partnership, starting 2006,well
NASAsuited
worked Figure 2.3 | Members of the
with commercial industry partnersto toactivities
develop andwhere public watch the launch of a
demonstrate new commercial cargo space transportation
the purpose is SpaceX Falcon 9, a rocket whose
systems to low Earth orbit. Markedly different from
previous approaches to capabilityinvestigational
development,a key development included pre-
rather than
feature of COTS was that the commercial firms invested arranged commitments by NASA
operational.
their own funds into the development of spacecraft and to purchase several operational
launch vehicles and owned the resulting capabilities,
Grants typically flights as part of the COTS
while NASA served as a seed-money investor and advisor
specify a topic of program. Credit: Max Alexander
during the development. For more information on the
program, see the NASA-published investigation and a
Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services document general
for moretimeline
details andfor the delivery
lessons learned.

TerraSAR-X: Another example of ofaresults.

successfulThey generally
public-private do
partnership between the German
not provide
Aerospace Center and Airbus Defence and Spacethe government
is the TerraSAR-X, a satellite that produces
images using a synthetic aperture with much
radar ability resolution.
at one-meter to specify The government was responsible
for development and operation of the ground segment
performance, as well as the instrument calibration
approach,
and satellite operations after launch. Airbus assumed much of the initial risk of developing and
or methods.
deploying the satellite but continues to receive revenues from the data still being produced.

Other types of collaboration canGuidance to new

involve multiple actors,
rounds or ongoing opportunities that
encompass a broader variety of whether
goals. These programs seek to encourage
they are states new to and leverage
emerging markets and capabilities to better serve national priorities. A few ongoing
examples include:

Space Technology Mission Directorate Solicitations: NASA’s Space Technology Mission

Directorate seeks out partnerships to encourage and support priority space technologies and
capabilities. As an example, the Tipping Point solicitations focus cost-share proposals for industry-
developed space technologies where an investment may significantly mature the technology,
increase the likelihood of infusion into a commercial space application, or bring the technology to
market for both government and commercial applications. NASA’s Techport provides information
on prior and current solicitations.

ESA Space Solutions: With a focus on green transition and a digital, sustainable future, ESA
Space Solutions works with businesses across the European continent to develop space-enabled
solutions. Projects can include kick-starts, feasibility, studies, and demonstration projects and
support ranges from financial to technical expertise to networking access.

Japan Space Strategy Fund: Established in March 2024, the Space Strategy Fund is an effort
across several agencies and ministries in Japan, that will focus on the following issue areas:
satellites, space exploration and space transportation aimed at market expansion, solving social
issues, and pioneering new frontiers. Over ten years, this fund is expected to distribute more than
$6 billion to companies through public calls.

58 | HANDBOOK FOR NEW AC TO RS IN SPAC E

space or non-governmental private actors, is that the governmental policy toward
the private or commercial space sector will have a significant impact on the
business success of those private space ventures.

Property Rights
Ownership and control rights to space objects launched by a state and registered
by it are protected for that state (and are protected for its nationals as long as
their state extends those rights to them). These rights may also apply to a state
that procures a launch from another country. Other tangible property rights are
more uncertain.

Concerning rights to resources, while samples of space materials may be

obtained, commercial rights to extracted natural resources in space are widely
debated and, so far, untested. As described in Chapter One: Core Treaties,
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits claims to sovereignty over any celestial body.
Therefore, states are effectively prohibited from granting title to any real property

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

beyond Earth. States retain jurisdiction over their nationals, however, and this
means that states have the power to protect the commercial operations of their
nationals from interference from others with the same nationality. Additionally, a
growing number of states are recognizing the rights of private sector entities to
extract and use space resources, without also giving them full property rights.
This is the strategy employed by the United States in crafting its U.S. Commercial
Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, and also enshrined in the principles
of the Artemis Accords that have been adopted by more than forty-three countries
as of May 2024.

The debate over rights to material extracted from a celestial body is complicated
by differences over the meaning of the ban on “appropriation” in the Outer Space
Treaty. For some, that means a prohibition on assuming any property right for
off-Earth material. For others, there is a clear distinction between the use of
resources extracted or harvested from a celestial body, such as regolith or water,
and ownership of the body itself. Since the United States, Russia, China, and Japan
have all obtained material from celestial bodies, returned it to Earth, and exercised
full ownership and control of it, any ban is shown by practice to not be absolute.

For the immediate future, then, it appears that property rights to material
obtained from celestial bodies will largely be determined by national legislation,
and that those rights will pertain only within the territorial and personal
jurisdiction of the legislating state. As a cautionary note, business plans developed
with the intention of exporting off-Earth material or products derived from
it should ensure that the sovereigns with authority over the intended export
markets will permit the sale of such material and products. No rules specific or
unique to space activity exist for intellectual property. In general terms, the rules
are the same as those that would apply for terrestrial activity.

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL OVERSIGHT

As explained in the previous chapter, states bear international responsibility and
liability for damage caused by the space activities of their nationals. They also are
tasked with oversight and continuing supervision of their national space activities,
including space activities conducted by non-governmental actors. States use
national legislation and regulations to fulfill these international legal obligations,
often referred to as their Article VI obligations (after the relevant article in the
Outer Space Treaty). While establishing national policy rationales and objectives,
as discussed previously in this chapter, is important, there is also a pressing need
to create the organizational structures to implement these policies and provide
oversight of day-to-day national space activities.

National Regulators
The Outer Space Treaty obligates state parties to authorize, license, and
continually supervise national activities for conformity with international law, but
it is at the discretion of each state’s government to determine which agencies are
tasked with this regulation. In some countries, these responsibilities are divided
among several different agencies.

In the United States, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
responsibility for commercial launches, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) deals with commercial telecommunications and frequency allocations,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulates remote
sensing, and the Department of State and the Department of Commerce share
responsibility for export control. In the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom
Space Agency is responsible for the civil space program while the Civil Aviation
Authority is an independent regulator for space. Deciding which agency is
covering which activity can eliminate both gaps and redundancies in the
oversight regime.

Licensing
Licensing is the standard method used by a state to authorize and regulate its
national, non-governmental space activities. Individual actors must comply with
requirements to obtain national licenses before undertaking space activities.
The types of licenses required can vary: launch licenses, frequency-use licenses,
remote sensing licenses, broadcasting licenses, etc. The criteria for obtaining
these licenses can include scientific, technical, environmental, safety, insurance,
and financial solvency requirements, to name a few. In most cases, private sector
space activities require positive confirmation (i.e., a license) before they are
allowed to occur. Licenses often include mandatory reporting or other obligations
on the licensee as a way for the state to discharge its treaty obligation of providing
continuing supervision under Art VI of the OST. This is different from many non-
space sectors, where private sector activities are often allowed by default, and
only specific types of activities, for example those that are particularly risky or

60 | HANDBOOK FOR NEW AC TO RS IN SPAC E

harmful, are required to have permission to proceed. Understanding the licensing
requirements in the applicable jurisdiction/s, the licensing processes to be
followed, as well as the costs and timelines typically required to obtain
the required licenses is absolutely essential for any new actor contemplating
space activities.

National Registries of Space Objects

In accordance with the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention,
states assert ownership of their space objects by placing them on their national
registries. This ownership is twofold, encompassing jurisdiction and control.
Jurisdiction is a legal power to create and enforce laws and to settle claims, and is
held by the state. Control is an operational power analogous to command over the
space object. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty confers these rights:

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership
of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed
on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their
presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to Earth. Such
objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the
Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party,
which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.

While the Outer Space Treaty gives states the rights and the method to assert
jurisdiction and control, it does not make it mandatory; the 1975 Registration
Convention, in turn, requires and obligates states to establish national registries
of space objects. For states party to the Registration Convention, Article II
requires the establishment of a national registry, and providing notification of the
establishment of such registry to the UN Secretary-General.

National registries are sometimes created through legislative acts, either as part
of general space legislation or in an act specifically for the purpose of creating
such a registry, as in the cases of Argentina, the Netherlands, and Italy. National
registries may also be created by executive decree or within regulations by an
agency granted the power to create them.

As of May 2024, 75 states were party to the 1975 Registration Convention, and
39 of them had established national registries of space objects and informed the
UN of such national registries. The European Space Agency (ESA) and European
Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) have
also established registries. Some states place the task with their national space
agency, others with their federal aviation office even if they have a national space
agency, as is the case with Germany.

For states that are not party to the Registration Convention, but still wish to
exercise jurisdiction and control over their national space objects, establishing

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and maintaining a national registry of space objects is a reliable method to

assert and consolidate jurisdictional powers. For non-governmental actors, due
diligence and compliance with governmental oversight likely includes determining
which state will have their spacecraft on its national registry and supplying the
competent authority in that state with the relevant information on their spacecraft
and planned activities. For states that are party to the Registration Convention,
the government is responsible for ensuring that it gets the information it needs
from non-governmental actors in order to maintain its registry. The information
requirements for compliance with the Registration Convention, which is covered
in Chapter One: Registration of Space Objects, are modest and some states follow
enhanced registration practices. For example, New Zealand has gone beyond its
international legal obligations by partnering with commercial SSA data providers
to gain insight on the orbital status of all its national space objects. See Case
Study: New Zealand Monitoring Objects Launched from its Territory for more
information.

Insurance Requirements
While states are ultimately liable for damages resulting from space activities,
many have taken steps to require private sector entities to purchase insurance
that can cover some or all of those potential costs (essentially indemnifying the
state). Along with R&D and launch costs, insurance can be one of the highest
costs associated with satellite activities and, thus, is something to consider
seriously when planning for a space venture. For example, Australia, Brazil, France,
Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States all require the
purchase of insurance at varying levels. Most actors, however, do not require
insurance for satellites for the entirety of while they are on orbit, but rather focus
primarily on the launch and early stages of their operational lifespans, as those
are the portions of space activities that traditionally have had the highest risk of
damages or loss.

Waivers
There are different kinds of waivers that may be used for space activities. A cross-
waiver is a legal instrument between parties where each reciprocally contracts to
not hold the other party liable for any damage suffered. Cross-waivers of liability
are often used in the space industry and might be used between the launch
provider and the operator, or between contractors and subcontractors. Waivers
have the effect of making it easier to contemplate and compute the possible
liability exposure a project faces.

On a regulatory level, waivers can be granted in order to relieve operators from

following a regulation that evolved after their satellite was launched. This type
of waiver might also be called a “variance.” Alternatively, operators can apply for
a waiver from obeying a regulation that they believe to be unduly onerous or to
have national security consequences. Granting waivers can be used by regulators
to allow an industry to innovate; however, regulators should be certain that these
waivers are legitimately needed and not being requested out of convenience or to
obtain an advantage against industry competitors.

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National Frequency Administration and Broadcasting Regulations
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) deals with frequency allocation
and coordination at the international level, which is covered in Chapter One:
International Frequency Management. National administrators determine
frequency use at the domestic level, commonly through licensing and national
frequency tables, and also work within the ITU to coordinate spectrum allocations
for their national entities. For example, the Ministry of Communications in India
is in charge of their spectrum management, and the Office of Communications
(Ofcom) in the UK provides licenses for radiofrequency use. In the United
States, the FCC coordinates non-federal use of frequencies, while the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) coordinates federal
spectrum use.

In addition to working on frequency issues, these administrators can reinforce

other best practices. For example, in order to receive authorization from the FCC
to use a frequency, U.S. commercial satellite operators must submit an orbital

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

debris mitigation plan that is in accordance with internationally recognized
debris mitigation guidelines and even more stringent U.S. guidance. Laws and
regulations pertaining to broadcasting are not limited only to space-based
services and can include other sectors such as cable television. It is important
for any entity undertaking space-based broadcasting activities to comply with
any relevant national rules regarding broadcasting generally. For example, in
Canada, companies engaged in broadcasting are required to broadcast a certain
amount of Canadian content. The national regulator may also impose resolution
limitations on remote sensing or limitations on power emissions.

Spectrum regulation is a part of a government’s responsibility for oversight. This

planning function allows for spectrum allocation, which grants use of a frequency
band to a specific user, dependent upon national policies, technical characteristics
of the spectrum, and international agreements. This allocation process helps
ensure that the spectrum is managed and used in a sustainable way while limiting
the amount of harmful interference created by its use. One growing concern
is not just deconflicting between spectrum usage for different space missions
but also between terrestrial communications and space sector needs. Next,
spectrum engineering is the regulatory function that creates technical standards
for equipment whose frequencies affect or are affected by the radio spectrum.
Finally, there is spectrum compliance, which involves monitoring the use of the
radiofrequency spectrum to ascertain that users are complying with technical
standards and frequency allocations.

Administration of Export and Technology-Transfer Controls

States implement export control measures to meet international commitments
for non-proliferation regimes, to enhance regional stability, and out of national
security interests. States must decide how to administer export control laws.

In order to reliably control exports, a country must establish legal authority

to do so, which would correspond to six principles: comprehensive controls,

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Case Study: Export Controls in the United States

The United States has three agencies with the authority to issue export control licenses: the
Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury. Often, exporters must go to more than
one agency and must ask for multiple licenses. There is interest in streamlining this process
to have one single licensing agency in charge, although this would be a complicated effort
and challenging to implement.

The U.S. Department of State administers perhaps the most well-known example of
export control regimes, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a set of U.S.
government regulations that control the export and import of defense-related articles and
services on the U.S. Munitions List (USML). Businesses must register their products with the
State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), and are required to apply
for export licenses and approvals for hardware and related technical data on the USML
before they can be can be legally exported. The process can be expensive and lengthy and
can add significant burden to commercial activities, particularly for smaller firms. Failure to
comply with the ITAR requirements can lead to serious fines, jail time, and other civil and
criminal penalties.

In addition to the ITAR, the United States also has the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) that apply to a much broader set of commercial dual-use technologies and data that
are not covered by ITAR. Administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within
the Department of Commerce, the EAR is seen as less burdensome but still has controls in
place over many U.S. space technologies and services. Technologies controlled under EAR
are listed on the Commercial Control List (CCL).

Additionally, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
enacts financial penalties against certain actors (states, companies, or persons), depending
on U.S. foreign policy goals. It keeps lists of those who are under trade restrictions, lists
which are included under the BIS Consolidated Screening List.

Satellites and related technologies present a significant challenge for export control. In the
early 2000s, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that placed all satellites and space-related
technologies on the USML, due to concerns over transfer of space technology to China that
could be used to improve ballistic missiles. The stricter controls on export of U.S. satellite
technology led to foreign firms developing their own products, which were often marketed
as “ITAR-free.” As a result, the global market share for U.S. satellite companies dropped
precipitously. A strong push from industry led to Congress passing an updated law in 2012
that gave the White House the authority to determine which specific space technologies
would remain on the USML, and which technologies would be transferred to the less
onerous CCL, while retaining a prohibition on export of space technologies to specific
countries. In 2014, after two years of interagency and public deliberations, the Department
of Commerce announced the shift of some types of satellites and space technologies to the
CCL.

However, the steps to reform U.S. export controls for satellites have not satisfied all the
critics. Companies now need to determine whether or not they need to apply for a license
from the State Department or the Commerce Department, and the overall system has
become more complex. Furthermore, commercial satellites performing above a certain
standard still remain on the USML, as do any spacecraft designed for human habitation that
has integrated propulsion and spacecraft designed for satellite servicing. There continues
to be an on going discussion between the U.S. space industry and the U.S. government over
future changes and reforms to export control. For more information, see Introduction to
U.S. Export Controls for the Commercial Space Industry.

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implementing directives, enforcement power and penalties, interagency
coordination, international cooperation, and protection of government
dissemination of sensitive business information. Next, a country needs to establish
clear regulatory procedures that include a list of controlled items. Finally, the
export control system should have enforcement built into it, including transparent
procedures for issuing export licenses, compliance verification mechanisms, and
investigation of possible illicit exports.

Congestion in Space
As states are responsible for their own space activities and those of their non-
governmental entities, national policies and administration for dealing with
congestion in space are important for improving space sustainability. Addressing
congestion in space deals with tracking space objects and reducing collision risk
between space objects (including both debris and active spacecraft). These are
key objectives of space situational awareness (SSA) systems and space traffic
management and coordination efforts; and are closely related to space debris

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

mitigation and remediation efforts

Case Study: New Zealand’s Space Regulatory

and Sustainability Platform

In 2019, the New Zealand Space Agency (NZSA) and the company LeoLabs announced
their intent to build the Space Regulatory and Sustainability Platform. This cloud-based
platform uses data from LeoLabs’ radars in order to track satellites in low Earth orbit, as
NZSA wanted to make sure that satellites launched from its territory were following New
Zealand’s licensing rules regarding debris mitigation; additionally, NZSA aimed to see if
conjunctions were possibly going to happen in the hopes of preventing collisions that could
create large amounts of orbital debris. This was part of how New Zealand interpreted its
Article VI obligations from the Outer Space Treaty to provide authorization and continuing
supervision of national activities in space by non-governmental actors.

The Space Regulatory and Sustainability Platform was unveiled one year after New Zealand
officially became a launching state when Rocket Labs began launching from its territory in
2018. New Zealand officials wanted to make sure that any satellites it was responsible for as
a launching state were complying with regulations as part of ensuring the responsible and
sustainable use of space.

Figure 2.4 | Sample from LeoLabs and NZSA’s platform. Credit: LeoLabs

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A topic many states struggle with is

potential exceptions to space debris
All states are encouraged
mitigation guidelines at the national
level. It may be necessary to exempt to put in place national
some long-running programs from mechanisms to implement
specific aspects of the guidelines the UN COPUOS and IADC
because portions of the programs debris mitigation guidelines
were designed and implemented
for both governmental and
before the guidelines were adopted.
States may also be inclined to exempt
non-governmental actors. How
some new programs over concerns they are implemented can vary
that implementing the guidelines will depending on a state’s specific
lead to increased costs or operational governmental structure.
challenges. However, widespread
exemptions would have a deleterious
effect on adherence to the guidelines,
which would ultimately negatively impact all space actors. If states are to make
exemptions to the guidelines, they should do so through a well-defined, rigorous
process that includes high-level decision-makers and clearly outlines the costs and
benefits of the exemptions.

In addition to limiting the creation of new debris, several states have also put in
place policies and administrative practices to minimize the impact that existing
space debris have on space activities. The United States, Russia, China, France,
Germany, India, and Japan are among the states that have governmental
organizations tasked with monitoring the population of space objects and
predicting potential close approaches. In some cases, these organizations do
so for their own governmental satellites, while in others they do so for non-
governmental or foreign satellites as well. In either case, they have put in place
procedures and data-sharing mechanisms for notifying satellite operators
and assisting them in assessing the risk of collision and implementing any
avoidance measures.

These practices are often included in the larger discussion about space traffic
management (STM), but at present there is no standard national practice for
implementing STM in a comprehensive manner. It is currently up to each satellite
operator to determine their own tolerance for risk and to use that as a basis for
determining whether to take steps to avoid a close approach with another space
object. Current techniques for predicting close approaches and possible collisions
in orbit are not sophisticated enough to enable mandatory maneuver policies,
with the specific exception of activities such as human spaceflight.

Several states have also put in place policies and organizations for providing a
national space situational awareness (SSA) capability. Developing the capability
to track all space objects requires a considerable network of tracking-station
locations around the world. Thus, SSA has traditionally been a government
function and is often either based on existing national military or dual-use
capabilities. This can create challenges for states that do not have a prior working

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relationship between their national security community and their civil space
community, or for states that try to develop SSA capabilities as a purely civil
function. Third party services and commercial companies are now operating SSA
sensor networks and providing SSA information to satellite operators. Commercial
SSA is further discussed in Chapter 3.

All states are encouraged to put in place national mechanisms to implement the
UN COPUOS and IADC debris mitigation guidelines for both governmental and
non-governmental actors. How they are implemented can vary depending on a
state’s specific governmental structure. Usually, implementation includes policy
directives for federal agencies, a regulatory component in national law, and
licensing requirements for non-governmental entities.

IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS: REMOTE SENSING POLICY AND

ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

Remote sensing satellites have continually sensed Earth for more than six
decades, yielding a valuable repository of data about the planet which has
applications in areas as far-reaching as health, climatology, and urban planning.
Given its strong linkages to socioeconomic development, space-based remote
sensing is a key area of activity for new and established space actors alike. In light
of this, remote sensing is a useful case study highlighting the interaction between
public policy and public administration and illustrates some of the approaches
different countries have taken to managing this kind of activity. Additionally,
new trends in remote sensing activities, especially by non-governmental actors,
illustrate larger policy transformations that are useful for new space actors
to consider.

Figure 2.5 | This composite image uses shortwave infrared data overlaid on a natural-color
mosaic image based on Landsat 8 observations for added geographic detail of the 2023
wildfire in Lahaina, Hawaii. Credit: NASA

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Remote Sensing Policy

Consistent with the main elements of public policy described in the beginning of
this chapter, remote sensing policies primarily seek to:

• identify objectives and priorities guiding the acquisition of data about

the planet;

• define roles and responsibilities of government remote sensing activities

as well as related oversight obligations;

• set requirements by designating procedures private operators must follow

to operate remote sensing systems; and

• identify data policies to govern the conditions of access and distribution of

the data acquired through the operation of these systems.

Remote sensing policies may be included within national-level space policies,

or may have dedicated policies of their own. In some cases, a government will
lay out specific goals with respect to the information being collected or priority
application areas, identifying departments or agencies that are responsible for
acquiring research or operational datasets. Specific government agencies may
also be tasked with operating specific systems. Sector guidance in the 2020 U.S.
National Space Policy, for example, dictates that the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) shall cooperate to
maintain an operational land remote sensing program. The policy also describes
tasks related to the acquisition, archiving, and distribution of the global land
remote sensing dataset.

IDENTIFY DEFINE

Gov’t roles &

Objectives & responsibilities re: SET
priorities guiding activites & oversight
data acquisition

Requirements
via operational
procedures

Data policies
governing data
access & distribution

IDENTIFY
Figure 2.6 | Elements of flight safety analyses to be conducted as part of a full flight
safety analysis, compiled based on review of FAA documents..

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In light of technological advances driving the proliferation of these systems
and the international liability and responsibilities discussed in Chapter One,
remote sensing policies also define roles with respect to the oversight of non-
governmental remote sensing activities, identifying the specific department or
agency and the tasks they perform in the process of authorizing and supervising
a given activity. These guidelines may be further detailed in related regulations,
laws, or agency-level policies. In the United States, the licensing authority for
private remote sensing space systems lies with the Secretary of Commerce, a task
that has been delegated to the NOAA for implementation, and whose principles
are captured in the National Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. NOAA agency-
level policies specify the principles guiding related activities, such as a partnership
policy among government, academia, and the private sector in the provision of
environmental information and services.

Policies also allude to coordination processes necessary to orchestrate the

different elements involved in managing remote sensing activities, which, in
addition to those common for any satellite mission (research, development,

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

launch, operations, etc.), include tasks specific to the processing, archiving, and
distribution of Earth observation data. Institutional coordination is particularly
necessary in the field of remote sensing because of the diversity of users and
stakeholders who routinely derive valuable intelligence from this information.
Understanding needs across these different user communities is an often
challenging but crucial task that feeds into this coordination process to improve
the value of investments in remote sensing programs.

Oversight of Non-Government Remote Sensing Activities

Rapid technological advances often drive the evolution of remote sensing
policies, particularly given the growth of high-resolution imaging satellites from
non-governmental sources. Remote sensing policies primarily seek to advance
national (including commercial) remote sensing activities for the provision of
services, imagery/data, or value-added products while balancing national security
and foreign policy interests. To do this, the policy will specify procedures that
non-governmental operators must meet to be allowed to operate space remote
sensing systems, and the limitations on such activities. Access to the data acquired
by these systems, whether freely or commercially, is also subject to specific
limitations imposed by the oversight authority.

Canada’s Remote Sensing Space Systems Act of 2005, for example, details the
procedure by which an operational license may be canceled or temporarily
revoked when it is determined to be “injurious to national security, the defence
of Canada, the safety of Canadian Forces or Canada’s conduct of international
relations” or “inconsistent with Canada’s international obligations.” In some
countries, a license may not be revoked but the operator may be required to
temporarily cease operations during crisis or conflict—sometimes called “shutter
control”—or to refrain from sensing or distributing data on areas of the world
deemed to be sensitive by the licensing authority. As more commercial companies
provide Earth observation data, it is increasingly becoming a challenge to limit

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

the dispersal of these images and thus attempts to do so via regulation may
concurrently become increasingly rare. Another consideration is whether the data
that a state is attempting to restrain is available internationally; if so, domestic
restraints will provide little effect other than harm to the domestic industry.

Permissions are often granted through licenses issued after the operator has
committed to meeting certain operational and even disposal procedures, and
sometimes following interagency review. As an example, a U.S. commercial remote
sensing license application available on the NOAA Commercial Remote Sensing
Regulatory Affairs website highlights the basic requirements, including the
following:

• Corporate information: contact information and other details about the

business, a description of significant agreements with foreign nations or
persons, etc.

• Launch information: proposed launch schedule, anticipated operational

date, orbital parameters, etc.

• Space segment information: anticipated resolution and swath width of

sensors, onboard storage capacity, anticipated system lifetime, etc.

• Ground segment information: proposed system data collection and

processing capabilities, transmission frequencies, plans for protection of
uplink and downlink, etc.

• Other information including financial information about proposed

commercial data distribution policies, a plan for post-mission satellite
disposal, etc.

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Data Policies
Data policies are a key component of remote sensing policies since these specify
the access and distribution rights and obligations of data acquired through these
activities. Generally, policies make most government-acquired remote sensing
datasets available for scientific, social, and economic benefit by making the data
available to users across government, academia, and the private sector. The
European Union’s Copernicus system’s data is available to users “on a full, free,
and open basis,” and is referred to on its website as a “public good.” Bilateral and
multilateral data exchange programs also exist to facilitate the sharing of specific
datasets among operators and users of partner countries or when such exchange
helps address shared challenges.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), for example, facilitates the

international exchange of meteorological and related data and products, including
those derived from space-based systems, as tied to “matters relating to safety
and security of society, economic welfare and the protection of the environment.”

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

National open-data policies may also apply, usually as part of a larger policy
governing the access and use of government-funded data that is not limited to
space, and may include data acquired through airborne or in-situ platforms.

Even with the proliferation of open data access policies, remote sensing policies
include language specifying conditions of restriction on access or redistribution
of datasets, particularly driven by national security concerns. The main driver
for these different policy elements is the inherent dual-use nature of remote
sensing technologies, which enable applications across civil, commercial, and
military domains. Some satellites or systems serve the needs of both civil and
military users, thus making them “dual use.” However, even while a satellite or a
system may be designed to serve exclusively civil needs, the dual-use nature of
the technology remains, as the data gathered can be aggregated or reused to
feed into applications for military purposes. Consequently, and to balance national
security concerns associated with access to potentially sensitive information, data
policies typically specify resolution or temporal restrictions for the distribution of
high-resolution data or imagery, including those from commercial operators and
providers.

The exchange or redistribution of these datasets may be subject to additional

requirements and examined on a case-by-case basis. In Germany, Earth
observation data acquired through “high-grade” systems are subject to the
German National Data Security Policy for Space-Based Earth Remote Sensing
Systems, and distribution is allowed depending on the level of “sensitivity” of the
data. India requires authorization from IN-SPACe for the dissemination of any
remote sensing or Earth observation data of ≤30 cm Ground Sampling Distance
(GSD) at nadir.

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Broader Policy Context

Driven in large part by technological advances, data policies—and their application
through licenses and other legal mechanisms—will remain a focal point in the
evolution of remote sensing practice currently manifested through the emergence
of multiple sources of non-government data and services. The expansion of
non-government actors in the full value chain of remote sensing activity—from
research and operations to data processing and archiving—is one of the trends
raising new policy and regulatory questions. Another important trend is the
proliferation of geospatial products and services that result from the aggregation
of multiple datasets, which may come from several data providers and are often
collected from various space-based, airborne, and in-situ platforms. In a context
where space activities represent a portion of the remote sensing activities that
governments must oversee, space-derived data and services may be subject to
regulation or oversight by multiple government agencies and be governed under
different legal regimes. For example, privacy debates arising from uninhabited
aircraft systems (UAS) in the United States are beginning to expand to include
discussion of similar concerns related to small satellites, despite the fact that
these systems currently operate in distinctly different legal domains. These and
other developments suggest that in some countries, new rules may emerge that
apply to specific types of remote sensing applications or the kinds of data being
collected, rather than specific collection platforms. In this context, new space
actors should be aware of this broader policy context and should pay attention to
how public administration practices—encompassing policy, legal, and regulatory
measures—from non-space domains may apply to this key area of space activities.

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 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY & ADMINISTRATION

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CHAPTER THREE

Responsible Operations
in Space

CHAPTER THREE FOCUS

The preceding chapters discussed the international legal framework within which national
activities exist, and how states establish space policy, perform interagency coordination,
and supervise and regulate their national activities through legislation, licensing, and
authorization.
This chapter focuses on space activities themselves, and is divided into pre-launch, launch,
in space, and end-of-life issues. As a result, it is also more technological and operational in
perspective than previous chapters. It gives concrete guidance to new actors in space—
whether they are new states, start-up companies, or academic and university-led projects—
as they begin their space activities. The best practices contained in this chapter are the types
of behaviors that responsible actors will implement if they want to conduct successful space
operations while also preserving order, fostering cooperation, and ensuring the long-term
sustainability of space activities.
There are multiple sets of best practices and standards developed by the private sector
that apply to responsible operations in space, with more developed or refined all the time.
Expanding commercial activities may not fit clearly within existing regulatory frameworks or
processes, placing additional importance on responsible operations practices and the need
for national regulatory and policy attention to private sector space activities.

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 Walt Everetts
RETIRED VICE PRESIDENT
Space and Ground Services at Iridium

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, an abandoned, uncontrolled Russian communications satellite collided

with one of Iridium’s active communications satellites in the first ever on-orbit
collision between satellites. The collision destroyed both satellites and produced
thousands of pieces of debris which continue to pose a risk to other satellites in
low Earth orbit. I was there to see it, and I am proud of how my company led the
industry in taking steps to ensure such an accident does not happen again.

The unfortunate incident was a wake-up call for the space industry. With nearly
10,000 active satellites in various Earth orbits, today’s space environment is
significantly more active and complex than it was in 2009. Increasingly, the digital
and informational appetites of our critical infrastructure and of the many products
and services we use each day (and often take for granted) are dependent on the
uninterrupted operation of satellites.

The space environment, and the services we derive from it, requires close
coordination and timely information sharing to improve operational safety and
reduce risk. I am grateful that the space community has significantly advanced the
development and adoption of responsible and sustainable operations approaches,
and has allocated the resources, including space situational awareness data,
necessary to support those approaches, but more needs to be done.

This chapter describes the core behaviors and approaches that are necessary to
conduct responsible space operations while ensuring the long-term sustainability
of the space environment. Current and future space actors have a responsibility
to protect the continued accessibility and stability of the space environment. All
phases of a space mission, including launch, on-orbit operations, ground segment
activities, and end-of-life protocols require sustainable practices such as enhanced
space debris mitigation, operator transparency and information sharing, and
design for demise.

Regulations, policies, guidelines, and best practices all have a place in enabling
sustainable use of space. The effectiveness of these measures depends upon
all space actors taking accountability for their space assets in recognition of the
shared nature of space.

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CHAPTER THREE
Responsible Operations in Space

PRE-LAUNCH
Space activities begin well before a satellite is actually launched into space.
In addition to designing and building the spacecraft, there are a number of
policy, legal, and administrative steps that need to be taken into consideration.
The following topics are deeply connected to both the design of satellites and
operations in space and should be considered well before launch and the
commencement of space operations.

Mission Architecture Design and Planning

Many choices that are made during the design of a satellite or a constellation will
have significant impacts on the space environment. While satellite power systems,
propulsion, guidance, and thermal management are widely discussed in many
satellite engineering texts and handbooks, their impact on space sustainability
and responsible space operations are not always emphasized.

From the very beginning, operators need to develop a plan of how to manage
spacecraft operations at the end of service. International standards exist for how
long a satellite and any associated
objects should remain on orbit post-
mission, and a growing number of Many choices that are made
governments are including a disposal
during the design of a satellite
plan in their licensing requirements.
Design choices such as whether or not
or a constellation will have
a satellite has propulsion, its operational significant impacts
altitude, and whether or not it is on the space environment.
designed to be serviced all impact the While satellite power systems,
options available for disposal. propulsion, guidance, and
Orbital carrying capacity is also a topic
thermal management are
of growing concern. While space itself widely discussed in many
is vast, many satellites are being placed satellite engineering texts
into the same or similar orbits, which and handbooks, their impact
may also include constellations of on space sustainability and
hundreds or thousands of satellites.
responsible space operations
Even if they do not result in a collision,
the increasing number of possible are not always emphasized.

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conjunctions among these satellites can create added costs and operational
complexity for the operators involved. While there are no agreed-upon limits
of what the carrying capacity of various orbits are, the congestion of the “local
neighborhood” needs to be taken into account when selecting a mission altitude.

Another important consideration is the impact a satellite or constellation will have

on the Earth’s environment, both on the way up and on the way down. Ongoing
research suggests that the increasing number of rocket launches and re-entering
satellites may have negative impacts on the Earth’s atmosphere. However, those
findings are still inconclusive and at this time not suitable for drawing any specific
best practices or recommendations.

While there are a growing number of space actors planning for cislunar and lunar
space activities, standards and best practices for operating sustainably in those
regions have not yet been developed. Space activities in cislunar and lunar regions
operate under a very different set of physical and environmental characteristics
than in Earth orbit, and it is likely a different set of sustainable practices will need
to be developed and implemented. To some extent, it will only be feasible to
develop such standards and best practices based on the accumulated experience
of those conducting cislunar and lunar surface operations. However, while such
experience is being accumulated, the actors involved should apply a general
precautionary principle of conducting their operations in a manner that should
not cause harm to the environment or harmful interference with the operations of
other actors.

Developing a Post-Mission Disposal Plan

Spacecraft operators have multiple options for how to dispose of their satellite
at end of life. The most common method, known as direct re-entry, is to actively
maneuver it into the Earth’s atmosphere on a controlled trajectory. However, this
method requires significant propulsion capabilities and fuel reserves, which can be
expensive and is not suitable for all missions.

Another common method is to use natural decay into the Earth’s atmosphere on a
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

reasonable timeline. This is normally done with a smaller disposal maneuver than
direct re-entry, or by having the satellite operate at an altitude which is already
compliant. While on orbit, the satellite may pose a collision risk to other space
objects and the actual time it takes to re-enter can be hard to determine as a
result of variations in solar activity.

If direct or natural atmospheric re-entry is not possible, another option is to

place the satellite in one of the designated storage orbits. These orbits are
designed to reduce the likelihood that the object will pose a risk to operational
satellites in active regions. The most well-known of these regions is the so-called
“geosynchronous graveyard” located roughly 300 kilometers above the active GEO
belt. If this method is chosen, it is critical that the satellite be entirely passivated
through the elimination of all potential energy sources, including batteries and
remaining fuel, to reduce the likelihood of explosions that can create debris in the

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future. Options for active debris removal—use of an external service provider to

remove a spacecraft from orbit—are emerging, and may provide backup or last-
resort options should other methods of post-mission disposal be not viable. To
facilitate future active debris removal, spacecraft can be designed for removal, in
which features such as grappling points or fiducial markers are installed to aid in
potential removal operations.

Design for Demise

Design for Demise is a method of satellite design with the goal of ensuring each
component of a satellite will be completely destroyed during the heat of re-
entry. By designing for demise, satellite operators can avoid having to conduct
a controlled re-entry, which can lengthen the mission lifespan, lower the cost of
development, and reduce the mission ground-support costs. Design for Demise
is a good approach for ensuring compliance with the 1-in-10,000 casualty risk
from space debris re-entry, which is commonly accepted as a threshold by space
agencies. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has a standard
(ISO 27875:2019) that can be applied at the planning, design, and review stages
of satellite development to assess, reduce, and control the potential risk that
spacecraft and launch-vehicle orbital stages pose during re-entry.

Cyber Security
Satellites and their ground control systems involve increasingly complex and
powerful computers and thus are susceptible to cyber attacks. Historically many
satellites used custom hardware and software and dedicated communications
links that made it harder for cyber attackers to get in. Today, many space systems
are using standard commercial hardware and software and may be connected to
terrestrial communications networks, all of which can increase the attack surface a
hostile actor could exploit.

Cyber attacks against space systems comprise several different categories.

The first is a supply chain attack that inserts faulty, counterfeit, or malicious
microelectronics and materials into the manufacturing process, which can
result in vulnerabilities or flaws in the final system that an attacker can leverage.
Another category is a cyber attack directed against the links between satellites
and ground control stations, such as gaining control of the software used by a
commercial antenna network. A third category is an attack against terrestrial
computer systems that are used to process, analyze, and disseminate space data,
such as networks used to distribute space-based weather imagery. Finally, cyber
attacks can be directed against the end user segment, bypassing both the space
and ground control segments. For example, malicious software installed on a
smartphone can disrupt that device’s ability to use satellite navigation
signals accurately.

To date, there have been few publicly confirmed cyber attacks against space
systems, and many satellite operators are reluctant to talk openly about
vulnerabilities or lessons learned from past attacks. This makes it difficult to

78 | HANDBOOK FOR NE W AC TO RS IN SPAC E

provide specific recommendations for steps that can be taken to harden space
systems against cyber attacks. That said, there are some noteworthy resources
that should be considered. The Secure World Foundation’s Global Counterspace
Capabilities report assesses the current and near-term future capabilities for
each country, along with their potential military utility. One is the MITRE ATT&CK®
knowledge base, which is a publicly accessible repository of cyber attack tactics
and techniques that can aid in developing a threat model for a specific space
system. Another useful resource is NASA’s Space Security Best Practices Guide,
which provides cyber security guidance for space systems, missions, and projects
of all sizes.

Pre-Launch Payload Testing

Launching a satellite into space exposes it to significant vibration and acoustic
forces, shock, coupled loads, and thermal and electromagnetic effects. Satellite
designers and engineers need to reference a launch vehicle’s user guide for
information about the environment during launch, and properly test a spacecraft
to make sure it will survive the launch. These risks may also extend into the early
phases of a satellite’s space activities, particularly if it will be undergoing weeks
of maneuvering to reach its final orbit. Steps can be taken during the design,
engineering, and testing phases of satellite development to prepare a spacecraft
for successful deployment.

During the design phase, it may be advisable to select a satellite bus—the main
body of the satellite—that has significant legacy space experience. Commonly
used satellite designs should have significant data collected about how the
spacecraft structure and components handle a launch environment. Furthermore,
using a proven satellite and launch-vehicle combination further reduces the risk of
payload deployment failures.

Spacecraft must be designed to handle the vibration and acoustic effects

generated by rocket motors as a satellite is launched into space. A spacecraft
will be exposed to at least three types of vibro-acoustic environments that occur RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE
during launch, including random vibration, sine vibration, and acoustically induced
vibration. The greatest vibro-acoustic effects are present during the first minutes
of a launch, when pressure and reverberations are the strongest. This is followed
by flow noise as air streams over the payload fairing, causing reverberating sound
within, and is particularly strong during flight through high-dynamic pressure,
such as transition through the sound barrier. Information about the vibro-acoustic
environment of a launch system can be found in a launch vehicle’s user guide.

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Figure 3.1 | An example of a vibration testing station. Credit: ESA

Most ground testing regimes simplify the launch environment and test to the
most extreme conditions, not the specific mission profile. Therefore, if a spacecraft
design is susceptible to vibrational effects, a non-standard, more spacecraft-
specific vibration testing regime should be developed. Vibration effects can be
mitigated during the design and engineering phases by incorporating motion
control solutions to aid in attenuating sine vibration events and random vibration
created by the launch vehicle.

Spacecraft will experience short, intense transient accelerations with broad

frequency content and a very short duration, generally less than 20 milliseconds.
These shocks occur during specific flight actions, such as the separation from
a spent stage with an explosive charge, and can be straightforwardly modeled
and tested on the ground. The hazards of shock can be mitigated by using non-
pyrotechnic bolt-cutter-type release mechanisms.

In addition to taking account of the effects of vibro-acoustics and shock generated

by a launch vehicle, it is also necessary to understand the coupled loads
generated by the interaction of a launch vehicle and spacecraft as a complete
structural system. There are a variety of methods to model coupled loads, but
their quality and accuracy are highly dependent on the spacecraft’s structural
dynamic model and data gathered from previous launches. During the course
of a satellite’s design and launch-vehicle selection process, it is wise to iteratively
update a coupled load’s model as the spacecraft design matures and more data
about the force environment of a launch system are collected.

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During the launch and orbit raising phase, the thermal environment has to
be maintained within the bounds for which the electronics and deployment
mechanisms have been designed and qualified. Different methods are used to
ensure this. At the launch pad, the capsule of the launch vehicle is air-conditioned
or heated to maintain the limits of the temperature excursion. After the payload
fairing is jettisoned, the launch vehicle rotates to expose the satellite to the sun
to keep the temperature inside of the satellite within the allowable temperature
range acceptable to the electronics, and to warm the deployment mechanisms.

During launch, spacecraft will be exposed to various electromagnetic

environments, including energy from tracking radars, launch vehicle radio-
frequency (RF) transmitters, flight through regions of energetic protons, and
atmospheric lightning. Therefore, during the engineering phase, it is important
to strictly adhere to electromagnetic design specifications, and to model possible
occurrences of electrical interference. System-level compatibility between a
spacecraft and launch vehicle is addressed through integrated avionics testing
during manufacturing, with attention to electrical bonding and isolation
requirements for a launch vehicle. Full system integration testing occurs at the
launch site.

The Links Between Testing and Anomaly Mitigation

The importance of the design, manufacturing, and testing of a spacecraft cannot
be overemphasized when it comes to mitigating operational anomalies in space.
For all but human missions, these phases present the only opportunity for true
“hands-on” and re-engineering time with the system.

The following list provides best practices to consider in developing a process

from the pre-operational phase to the phases for reducing occurrences of,
and impact from, certain space anomalies:

; Perform a detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) at multiple phases of design
and eliminate single-point failures wherever possible.
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

; Leverage FMEA results to develop robust and detailed operational procedures and execute
these during the integration and test (I&T) phase to characterize system behavior with an
opportunity to update prior to launch.

; Catalog and save all documentation and test data including vendor-provided material. This
information can be critical to determining the root cause of a failure.

; Develop a flight-like simulator and/or engineering model of the system. A robust simulator
is an invaluable tool for testing complex operational procedures, validating firmware and
software upgrades, and performing detailed root cause investigations.

; Ensure the design of the spacecraft provides ample data for diagnosing anomalies by
incorporating sufficient telemetry access points providing insight from every unit onboard a
vehicle and developing detailed and well-organized telemetry formats.

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Practices such as these help the satellite operator understand the risks inherent
in the mission profile during all phases of a mission and design to mitigate
those risks.

Space Mission Licensing

A non-governmental satellite operator or other responsible entity needs to obtain
one or more licenses for their space activities. These licenses may include (and
are not limited to) radiofrequency, remote sensing, payload authorization, and
launch activities. National governments generally administer this access through
licenses that satellite operators are required to obtain before they are permitted
to launch their system/s. Launch operators must also obtain licenses, which might
separately pertain to launch activities and to re-entry activities. See Chapter Two:
Licensing for more information.

LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
Licensing requirements affect most aspects of space operations, including
telecommunications and remote sensing operations, launch services, and
the operations of satellite ground stations on Earth (satellite Earth stations).
The issuing of licenses is one of the means states use to maintain compliance
with their treaty obligations, as discussed in Chapter One: International State
Responsibility. Licenses cover a range of topics including spectrum access,
national security oversight, compliance with insurance and safety requirements,
and space debris mitigation guidelines, as detailed in Chapter Two: Licensing.
Satellite and launch operators are responsible for applying for and securing
licenses from the relevant national regulatory authorities where they are
headquartered or where they will be conducting operations. The regulatory
authorities responsible for issuing licenses vary by country and domain of
operations, and may include government departments or statutory bodies,
national space agencies, national telecommunications agencies, and national
trade or economic agencies.

FREQUENCY LICENSING
In the satellite telecommunications segment, a primary purpose of licensing
requirements is the coordination and allocation of radiofrequency spectrum
on a domestic and international basis. Operators seeking to deploy a satellite
communications system must apply for a license to operate that system. As
spectrum is a limited resource, the licensing process acts to ensure fair access to
that resource while providing a mechanism to limit the potential for interference
between satellite systems, and between satellite systems and terrestrial uses of
the same or adjacent radio frequencies.

As covered in Chapter Two: Public Oversight and National Administration,

regulators have generally implemented a licensing regime that ensures
coordination and compliance with International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
policies and regulations. In many jurisdictions, the regulator responsible for
issuing a license to a communications satellite operator is also the authority

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responsible for making ITU submissions for that country. This is not, however,
always the case; for example, in the United Kingdom (UK), the Office of
Communications (Ofcom) is responsible for ITU filings, while the Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) is the licensing authority.

In general, any operator seeking to operate a satellite system that will receive
or transmit data (including command and control linkages) over the radio-
frequency spectrum must apply for a license from its relevant regulatory
agency. Typically national administrations also require market access licenses
for communications services. This means that service providers wishing to
offer telecommunications services in a particular jurisdiction must apply to that
country’s regulator for permission to offer those services, even if their actual
space operations are licensed elsewhere. Countries may impose space operations
or debris requirements as part of the market access licensing process. In all cases
prospective operators must provide a range of technical and business information
to the regulator when submitting license applications.

In most cases, license applications must contain technical data describing the
system, including the spectral bands to be used, a planned implementation
timeline, and information concerning financial ability to construct, launch, and
operate the system. Applications may also require detail on the steps to be taken
to reduce the potential for harmful interference through coordination with other
operators, as well as a post-mission disposal plan that takes into account space
debris mitigation guidelines.

Some regulators also require operators to obtain licenses for the ground stations
used to communicate with the satellites, including
end-user terminal equipment (sometimes referred to as “Earth stations”). Earth
station licenses serve to reduce the potential for radiofrequency interference, in
particular interference with other terrestrial applications, and may also include
provisions to evaluate
interference with other
applications, such as RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE
aviation. Earth station
license applications
typically require similar
technical and business
details to satellite network
applications. For end-user
terminals, the licensing
authority may issue
blanket licenses covering
technically identical
equipment.

Satellite operators, Figure 3.2 | Example of a satellite ground station that

would require licensing to communicate with satellites
especially small companies
above. Credit: NASA JPL
or organizations operating

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single or small numbers of satellites, may choose to procure or purchase their

ground stations as a service. A number of companies and service providers
offer ground segment operations and infrastructure as a commercial service,
in which capacity on common ground stations and antennae networks are
offered on a shared basis. Satellite operators may procure time or services from
these networks for both tracking telemetry and control capabilities and for
data downlink and uplink. Such services might offer cost or efficiency savings
to operators, as compared to building their own infrastructure. In some cases
these ground-segment-as-a-service offerings might include regulatory support
to assist in obtaining required spectrum licenses. Operators using this model
should ensure that they understand which licensing requirements pertain to their
operations.

Another option is to route a satellite’s communications through a space-based

service instead of a dedicated ground system. In this model, the satellite
communicates with another satellite, or constellation of satellites, which in turn
relays the information received to their own ground stations. Similar to ground
stations as a service, one advantage of this model is it might help reduce some
of the space-to-ground licensing requirements, although the space-to-space
communications may still require licensing.

REMOTE SENSING LICENSES

In compliance with the international regime discussed in Chapter One and also
discussed in the in-depth analysis on Remote Sensing at the end of Chapter Two,
national governments may also require commercial remote sensing satellite
operators to apply for a license covering the imaging capabilities of the satellite
system. These licenses may be issued by authorities separate from those
responsible for the communications systems aspects. Remote sensing licenses are
typically required to ensure coordination with national security policies. Required
information to be submitted may include system technical details; expected dates
of operation; launch information; data acquisition, access, and distribution plans;
data pricing policy; planned agreements with foreign entities; and a post-mission
disposal plan. Remote sensing licenses may apply conditions on the operator,
such as resolution restrictions and the ability to
restrict imaging of designated national territory.

A relatively new aspect of remote sensing

licenses is non-Earth imaging (NEI)—using a
camera on a satellite to image other space
objects. While the ability to do NEI, commonly
referred to as satellite-to-satellite or “sat-
squared” imaging, has existed since the early
days of space activities, it was often considered
a classified national security capability and
commercial satellites were often prohibited from
doing it. However, the proliferation of global
Figure 3.3 | Image of an H-2A rocket
commercial remote sensing systems has made body taken by a space-based sensor.
Credit: HEO Robotics

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these restrictions increasingly difficult to enforce, and there is growing acceptance
of NEI as a commercial product. That said, some jurisdictions still require a remote
sensing license before authorizing commercial NEI services.

LAUNCH AND RE-ENTRY LICENSES

Entities providing commercial launch services are typically required to obtain
a launch license from a national authority, which may differ from the authority
responsible for other space-related licenses. Launch licenses may be specific to
launch operations or re-entry operations, and may have varying requirements
based on whether the launch (or re-entry) vehicle is experimental or operational,
and whether it is expendable or reusable.

Launch and re-entry licenses authorize an operator to conduct one or more

launches or re-entries defined by a specific set of operational parameters, which
are codified in (and authorized by) the license. These parameters generally
include, but are not limited to: mission names, intended launch windows and
trajectory, parameters for the payload/s intended and final orbits, ground
and flight safety plans, accident investigation plans, and re-entry windows
and trajectory (if applicable). Typically, operators are also required to submit
information demonstrating that their intended launch operations are in
compliance with environmental policies, export control regulations, other licensing
requirements (e.g., frequency and remote sensing), and insurance and liability
coverage obligations.

In order to obtain a license, the launch providers may request information from
the operators of the satellites to be launched. The process of obtaining a launch
license entails multiple steps and submissions to the applicable regulatory
authority. Such authorities often offer pre-application consultation services so that
operators are aware of the steps and information required before they initiate
the process.

Launch and re-entry licenses serve numerous purposes. They act to protect
public safety interests, including protection of third-party safety on the ground
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

and coordination with air traffic management functions. The licensing process
provides national authorities with the ability to review the intended launch
operation against national security considerations and other national regulations
and requirements. The launch licensing process also acts to ensure that national
authorities collect the information necessary to satisfy applicable international
obligations and reporting requirements.

THE LICENSING PROCESS: OBTAINING THE NECESSARY LICENSE/S

Depending on the nature of a given space activity, one or more licenses may
be required. In some cases, the issuing of a given license may be contingent on
another license being issued first, so sequencing the licensing applications may be
required, and more than one jurisdiction may be involved. For example, a launch
service provider operating under one jurisdiction may be required to furnish
licenses pertaining to the payloads to be launched, which may be licensed by
multiple other jurisdictions. However, the general procedure to obtain each of the

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required licenses follows a similar pattern.

The licensing process imposes obligations on both the government agencies

issuing the licenses and the operators who are the licensees. The license approval
process typically includes an inter-agency coordination process in which the
licensing authority consults with other government agencies who might be
affected by, or have oversight of, the proposed operation. This reduces the
administrative burden on the operator by reducing the number of consultations
they must undertake. Licensing authorities often also have an obligation to
conduct technical and financial due diligence on applications received. This helps
reduce the number of frivolous applications received, and helps prevent resources
(such as spectrum) from being allocated to operators who are unable to use it.
Operators should be prepared to respond to due-diligence requests during the
license approval process.

When applying for a license, operators should be aware of potential administrative

fees and the time required to process the application. Fees are intended to allow
the issuing authority to recover costs associated with processing the applications.
Application processing times vary, but can be significant depending upon the
efficiency of the authority and the amount of interagency coordination required.
For applications requiring full coordination and processing with the ITU, the
processing time required can be measured in years. System deployment plans
must account for these processing times.

Licensing applications, processes, and requirements may differ by operating

domain or type of system. Systems operating in geostationary Earth orbit (GEO)
may be subject to a different process than those operating in other orbits,
which may be grouped together as non-geostationary orbit (NGSO). In the
telecommunications segment, Fixed Satellite Services (FSS), Mobile Satellite
Services (MSS), and Broadcasting Satellite Services (BSS) can have differing
licensing processes. Some national regulators may offer less onerous licensing
requirements for amateur satellite operators, and some authorities responsible
for launch operations offer distinctions between experimental and operational
systems. It is the responsibility of
the operator to ascertain which
categories are applicable to their Licensing applications,
system, although national licensing
processes, and requirements
authorities may offer consultation on
this subject. During the application may differ by operating
process, applicants should also be domain or type of system.
aware that some national regulators
make applications public (either in
total or in part) and may also allow public commentary on applications. This may
present implications for business strategy of commercial license applicants.

Once a license is issued, the operator is responsible for various continuing

reporting requirements. Licenses typically have a validity period, after which a
renewal application may be required. Satellite operators are commonly required

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to report any major changes in system operations or performance, significant
operational anomalies, including technical faults, to the licensing authority, and
may also be required to submit annual performance reports. These reporting
requirements satisfy the licensing authority’s national obligation under Article VI
of the Outer Space Treaty to provide continuing oversight of licensees under
its jurisdiction.

Launch Vehicle Selection

When selecting a launch service provider a range of technical and operational
considerations must be evaluated to assess providers’ and vehicles’ suitability
to perform the spacecraft operator’s specific requirements. Some spacecraft
operators may wish to engage a technical consultant to advise on launch vehicle
selection. Generally speaking, most commercial spacecraft operators will seek
proposals from multiple launch service providers.

If a satellite operator requires launch insurance (and most operators do require

insurance in order to meet financial obligations and licensing requirements), an
insurance broker will likely work with the satellite operator and the proposed
launch providers to determine the appropriate insurance rates. If possible, the
satellite operator should expect to have several of its own technical experts on-site
at the launch facility during the launch campaign to participate in the integration
of the satellite with the launch vehicle and other final preparations for the launch.
Insurance is discussed later in this chapter. It is important to select a launch
vehicle with adequate performance capability and appropriate performance
margin to accommodate modest satellite mass growth if necessary. Launch
service providers will not allow their limits to be exceeded because this will result
in catastrophic failure or deployment into an incorrect orbit.

Launch providers normally have a queue of payloads waiting to be launched.

Conducting a space launch is a complex endeavor requiring coordination of
many complicated tasks that are affected by a variety of factors that are difficult
to control. The launch vehicle and satellites are often composed of components RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE
manufactured by dozens to hundreds of suppliers. Those components must be
tested to ensure proper function before and during integration between the
satellite and the launch vehicle. Any anomalies discovered during testing often
require disassembly and further testing. Furthermore, failure of a satellite or
launch vehicle in orbit that shares hardware with a new satellite in manufacture
may require a delay in production until the cause of the other mission’s failure is
determined. Even if a spacecraft and launch vehicle show up at the launch site
on schedule, it may be necessary to wait for the launches of other payloads that
have priority but have experienced schedule slips. Once on the launch pad, factors
such as weather, launch range, and possible conjunctions with objects already on
orbit, can further delay a launch. All of these factors lead to the reality that many
launches do not occur when originally scheduled.

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Multiple Payload Launch and Deployment Options

Multiple choices have emerged for how to deploy payloads into their desired orbit.
The traditional option of launching a single payload on a dedicated rocket directly
into its required orbit remains popular with larger and more expensive satellites,
but often comes with a significant price tag. The growth of large constellations
of small satellites has also led to an increase in clustering, where a single rocket
is loaded up with multiple satellites, sometimes dozens, from the same operator
that are then deployed into the same orbital plane at the same time. Subsequent
launches deploy more clusters into additional planes, thereby filling out the
desired constellation design over time.

The growing demand from newer actors who want to launch smaller satellites has
opened up new markets for rideshares to space, where many satellites are placed
on the same rocket, sometimes from multiple customers. This often leads to less
choice of which orbit any individual payload can go into, although more advanced
restartable upper stages may give more flexibility to deploy into multiple orbits.

In some cases, a rideshare opportunity exists when the primary satellite weighs
less than the rated capacity of the launch vehicles, creating the opportunity for
other smaller payloads to ride along as secondary payloads at a reduced price.
Entities wishing to pursue launch in a ridesharing arrangement might contract
directly with a launch operator or work through a launch broker service, which
matches payloads to
launch opportunities.
Some launch brokers
may themselves purchase
a dedicated launch
opportunity and aggregate
multiple payloads
together. In still other
cases, a launch operator
may dedicate an entire
launch vehicle to rideshare
opportunities on a regular
basis, such as quarterly,
creating opportunities
for rideshare payloads to Figure 3.4 | Vega’s Small Spacecraft Mission Service
manifest for the vehicle dispenser with multiple satellites is lowered onto the
closest to when they rocket’s payload adapter at Guiana Space Centre in
are ready. Kourou, French Guiana in June 2020. Credit: ESA

Ridesharing arrangements are typically lower in cost than purchasing a dedicated

launch, which may be cost-prohibitive for many new actors. However, the
approach has its drawbacks. Secondary payloads typically have a reduced ability
to influence the schedule of the launch, which is usually negotiated between the
launch operator and the primary payload operator. Secondary payloads may also
find themselves with limited orbital insertion options and facing a suboptimal

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vibration and acoustic environment during launch, as these parameters
are defined according to the mission requirements of the primary payload.
Furthermore, a rideshare increases the complexity of the launch and deployment
and therefore increases the risk of failure. Potential rideshare hazards that a
satellite may experience as a consequence of being one of multiple payloads on a
launcher include explosive hazards, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical shock,
battery rupture, electrolyte leakage, sharp edges, protrusions, and premature
mechanism deployment.

Some of the orbital insertion drawbacks are being mitigated by new in-space
transportation and deployment services, which usually consist of a separate
maneuverable vehicle called a deployer or orbital transfer vehicle. The deployer
acts like an additional upper stage and can carry multiple payloads of its own from
the orbit it was placed into by the main rocket to one or more new orbits that
better suit its customer’s needs.

Yet another option for launching a satellite is in-space deployment of satellites

from other orbiting space objects. Crewed orbital platforms such as the
International Space Station have also become “launch vehicles” of a sort. Satellites
are carried up to the station via periodic cargo shipments and then deployed by
astronauts through airlocks and using robotic deployment systems.

RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

Figure 3.5 | Robotic deployment of satellites, in this figure from the Small Satellite Orbital
Deployer (SSOD) held by the ISS’s Kibo robotic arm, presents other opportunities to launch
satellites into orbit. Credit: NASA

For some satellite missions, it may be more efficient to deploy a payload into
space on another operator’s satellite, a technique known as a hosted payload,

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thereby negating the need to build and launch a dedicated satellite. In a hosted
payload configuration, the payload owner pays the host spacecraft operator to
carry an instrument that uses the host satellite’s utilities, such as power, data
transfer, etc. Finally, as new, large constellations of communications satellites
have been announced, a concept called a hosted bus has emerged. In this
configuration, a satellite operator can purchase a spacecraft based on the same
bus as the other satellites in the constellation. The hosted bus operator benefits
because the nonrecurring engineering costs of the satellite bus have been paid
for by the constellation operator, making the hosted bus satellite much less
expensive to build. Another major benefit is that the hosted bus operator can use
the constellation’s communications network and ground infrastructure, and may
be able to ride-share a launch for a relatively low price.

Launch Services Agreement

Securing a launch to outer space with a launch provider will require entering
into a legally binding contract called a launch services agreement. The launch
services agreement will methodically define all the particulars of launching, and
give definitions for many elements of the launch. The agreement delineates all the
particular roles and responsibilities of the actors, but in general, these are that
the customer will be handing over a satellite that is fit for launch, and the launch
provider will be performing certain services, such as successfully integrating
the satellite into the rocket and safely and successfully launching it into the
correct orbit.

Each launch services agreement will include unique elements for each particular
launch, but—as with most contracts—it will always have certain elements that
make it sufficient as a legally binding contract. While the contracts that companies
use may seem lengthy, deal in minutiae, and address scenarios that might not
happen (such as launch failures and other mishaps), legal contracts are nuanced
documents that refine all of the various shared understandings and expectations
of the parties into a finite number of words that address all details, define all roles,
assign risks, and do so in a fashion that would stand up in court as being a valid
contract (i.e., a written reflection of the parties’ shared understanding of what they
undertake to do).

So that both the launch provider and the customer have the exact same
understanding of particular words, a launch contract will define its most important
terms. The definitions section of a contract might define the following: “satellite,”
“launch services,” “launch opportunity,” “launch vehicle,” “launch window,” “launch”
or “launching,” “post-launches services,” “shared launch,” “third party,” “auxiliary
payload,” “launch abort,” “launch failure,” “partial failure,” and other important
terms. Because they are defined, each party is held to understand these terms,
and to agree to them upon entering into the contract.

For example, “launch failure” might be defined differently than “partial launch
failure,” and should the satellite not be placed into the correct orbit, the resulting

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situation might be categorized as a launch failure—or perhaps only a partial
launch failure. This categorization might have a direct impact on the triggering
of insurance and even liability provisions. The definitions in the launch contract
matter, and should be deeply scrutinized by the parties.

Another component of the launch services agreement are the sections listing the
undertakings to be executed by both sides. Sometimes called commitments, or
technical commitments, these enumerate precisely what each side must do so
that the other side can fulfill its obligations under the contract. Because launching
advanced hardware to outer space is such a technological achievement, the
parties are essentially becoming partners with each other for a certain amount of
time. Launch service providers are also typically responsible for verifying payloads
being launched have secured all necessary licenses or authorizations prior to
launch, including payload safety reviews, necessary spectrum or remote sensing
licenses, or any national registration reporting requirements. Payload operators’
failure to secure these required licenses in a timely manner might result in
removal from a launch manifest.

Lastly, parties to a launch contract must face the possibility of disaster, and
consider, negotiate, and agree upon what risks are borne by whom, what rights
are accorded in the case of certain events, and what roles each party must play. A
section of the contract will contain some allocation of potential liabilities and risks.

Standard contracts outside of the space industry have a clause sometimes called
a “force majeure” clause, which means that an intervening, supervening, or
otherwise unpredictable “act of God” will excuse the parties from undertaking their
commitments under the contract.

Insurance
Insurance may be required by the national regulatory authority licensing and
supervising the space activities. It might also be required by the launch services
provider in the launch services agreement. A launch buyer may procure insurance
to minimize exposure resulting from a launch failure. Generally, launch vehicles
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

with a less reliable track record have more expensive insurance while more
reliable systems have less expensive insurance. Therefore, insurance can balance
out the price differential between low-price, high-risk launch options and high-
price, more reliable launch providers. Operators commonly purchase insurance
for launch, which provides coverage from launch-vehicle ignition to on-orbit
delivery. Operators may also purchase a policy which covers launch plus a certain
period of time for initial operations (up to a year). A separate policy, if required, is
purchased to cover satellite failure during its operational phase in orbit. A launch
buyer should also be aware of the liability environments in the nations hosting
the launch providers. If a launch failure causes damage to the uninvolved public, a
launch service buyer may be exposed to liability. Some countries have put in place
indemnification regimes that establish a maximum third-party liability level so that
damages in excess of that amount are paid for by the national government. Not
related to launch, but some operators in GEO may purchase specific policies to
cover the spacecraft during maneuvers to relocate between different slots.

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Launch Mission Assurance

Launch operations deploying satellites rely on a partnership between the launch
operator and the launch buyer to implement a process and culture focused on
mission success. This type of relationship and process, called mission assurance,
is a standard that is perhaps not feasible for smaller commercial budgets, but
can be employed by large-scale buyers, such as national governments. Mission
assurance as a process is an iterative and continuous technical and management
activity employed over the entire lifecycle of a launch system. To achieve success,
the mission assurance process must include a disciplined application of systems
engineering, risk management, quality assurance, and program management
principles.

Key features of mission assurance include a launch procurement strategy that

includes adequate contingency funding, which then ensures that the launch
provider maintains the workforce, facilities, and data-sharing required to perform
integration and launch, handle contingencies, and reach agreement when issues
arise. Another key feature of mission assurance is clear accountability, which
requires that a single entity is responsible for understanding, tracking, and
ensuring that flight worthiness is maintained.

Next, continuity and independent verification require that funding is available

to maintain the depth of independent technical capabilities to analyze potential
issues and render assessment of spaceflight worthiness. Finally, it is necessary
to conduct extensive reviews; both those leading to the spaceflight worthiness
certification and the go/no-go decision for launch, as well as post-flight
data reviews.

LAUNCH
The launch phase is considered the riskiest time period during any space project.
Significant care must be taken to both increase the odds of a successful space
launch and minimize the risk that space launch activities pose to people, ground
installations, and air and maritime vehicles.

There have been satellite launches from more than three dozen sites around
the world. Today, most launches occur from around twenty launch facilities,
although there are plans by many countries and companies to increase that
number in the near future. Creating and safely operating a launch facility requires
thorough consideration of launch safety, environmental, and ground safety issues.
Spaceports are generally located in sparsely populated regions to minimize the
risk that a launch failure could harm people or property in the area. Spaceports
are also often located near oceans or deserts so that a rocket’s ascent trajectory
overflies large, relatively uninhabited regions in order to minimize public exposure
to expelled rocket stages or other falling debris. Once a site for a launch facility
is identified, a national government often requires completion of both a scoping
and a comprehensive environmental impact assessment that assesses the
environmental, ecological, socioeconomic, cultural, and other impacts of the

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operation of a launch facility at the proposed location. Finally, the design and
operations of a spaceport need to follow best practices that have evolved at
established spaceports.

Figure 3.6 | This figure illustrates the typical stages a launch vehicle goes through and the
types of safety considerations at each stage. Credit: FAA

There are no globally agreed-upon rules for how to develop and operate a space
launch facility. Spaceports have traditionally been developed as national assets
and managed by government agencies, although an increasing number of private
sector entities are becoming active in spaceport development and operations.
Within the United States, many states have conducted studies to determine a path
forward toward their own local commercial spaceport development. Some U.S.
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

states have taken steps to incentivize and enable development of commercially

operated spaceports. The U.S. federal government, through the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), has created the most proactive commercial spaceport
regulatory regime thus far, and other countries often reference U.S. regulations.
However, many of these proposals for state or regional spaceports have faced
challenges from local public opposition and in building a business case, and few
are actively generating revenue.

Terrestrial Environmental Safety Considerations

The terrestrial environmental impact of constructing and operating a proposed
launch site may be significant, and the relevant national authority will likely require
an environmental impact analysis. Developers of launch facilities need to take into
account the effect of launch activities on various environmental domains including
the atmosphere, noise sources and effects, and surface environments.

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One environmental concern is the impact space launches have on the

atmosphere. Industrial emissions are often regulated by national air quality
standards to ensure that pollutant levels do not exceed certain regulatory
thresholds set to protect public health. Due to their ultrahazardous effect on
ambient air quality if they are accidentally released, the storage and use of some
high-energy and volatile rocket fuels may be of unique concern. In addition, some
launch vehicles emit hazardous gasses during normal operation. Other types of
launch vehicles, especially those with solid rocket motors, emit various types of
particles when traveling through the upper layers of the atmosphere, which may
come under increased scrutiny by environmental regulators in the future.

A second major source of environmental concern is noise. The amount of noise

created by a proposed launch facility needs to be understood and evaluated in
the context of the natural noise environment. Rocket launches tend to generate
significant amounts of noise that can disrupt wildlife habitats. Sonic booms
generated by launch and re-entry activities along a trajectory may cause further
damage to wildlife, property, and human physiology.

Finally, launch facilities are often placed in areas that are remote from human
populations, but may also be pristine wildlife habitats. Land, marine, wetland,
and other surface environments surrounding a launch site may each have
unique features requiring protection. Site-specific studies and impact mitigation
plans should be in place prior to construction. Developing a launch facility
near areas containing threatened and endangered species habitats should be
especially avoided.

Ground Safety Considerations

Once appropriate environmental concerns are addressed, a national regulatory
entity will likely require a policy review to ensure that a proposed new space
launch facility would not jeopardize national security, foreign-policy interests, or
international obligations of the hosting nation.

Next, a casualty risk assessment will be conducted, where casualty refers to the
number of people who are predicted to be killed or seriously injured by a launch
accident. Launch sites should be placed in areas where launch activities will not
jeopardize public health and safety or the safety of property. Therefore, the flight
corridor for a launch vehicle—the land under its launch trajectory—must be
adequately unpopulated so that there is a minimum chance of damage should the
rocket vehicle or spent stages impact the area. Models exist to calculate the risk to
the public, and some nations, such as the United States, set maximum acceptable
quantitative casualty risk levels.

Because of the explosive nature of many solid and liquid propellants, another key
part of the initial design of a space launch facility is the creation of an explosives
site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard facilities, the distances
between them, and the distances to public areas. Safe handling and management
of explosive launch-vehicle propellants is critical. Standards exist to guide
construction of launch site infrastructure in order to avoid causes of accidental

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 Case Study: SpaceX Starbase

The tensions among spaceport activity, wildlife habitat, and economic interests
were demonstrated in the ongoing debates about SpaceX’s Boca Chica Launch
Site in Texas. Known as Starbase, this commercial spaceport is located near the
Gulf of Mexico and adjacent to a sensitive wetlands area and is home to several
endangered or protected species. Plans to expand its operations to include the
launch of Starship lead to concerns about the environmental impact.

Figure 3.7 | Photo taken from the ISS shows SpaceX Starbase and surrounding areas
in southern Texas. Credit: NASA

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) performed a lengthy

RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

Programmatic Environmental Assessment regarding the SpaceX proposal to

carry out its Starship/Super Heavy Launch Vehicle Program. The FAA found that
Starbase’s operations would not have a significant detrimental impact on the
environment and the public, but also required SpaceX to implement dozens of
mitigation measures to ensure that was the case. These measures ranged from
providing advanced notice of road closures to changing lighting in the facility to
providing public notifications about noise and other factors.

explosions, such as lightning, static electricity, electric supply system problems,

and electromagnetic radiation.

To ensure safe space launch facility operations, it is important for an operator to

address controlling public access, scheduling operations at the site, notifications,

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recordkeeping, and launch site accident response and investigation. Access to

the site should be controlled using security guards, fences, and other barriers.
People entering the site should be taught the safety and emergency response
procedures. Alarms and other warning signals are necessary for informing people
at the site of an emergency situation. If a launch site has multiple users on the
site at the same time, the site operator should have procedures for scheduling
operations so that the activities of one do not create hazards for the other.

Hazard areas are another particular concern. Coordination with the national
maritime and air traffic control entities is necessary to limit how closely aircraft
and watercraft can approach launch and re-entry operational hazard areas.
Notices to Mariners are issued for spaceports near waterways when launch
activities are being conducted. The notices require vessels to clear hazard areas
during specific windows of time. Alternatively, Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs)
are issued for areas surrounding a launch facility and beneath a launch corridor
when expected casualty calculations exceed specified thresholds. When a launch
facility conducts a flight operation, the appropriate equipment to track a launch
vehicle’s progress across the launch range must be aboard the launch vehicle and
on the ground.

Range Safety During Launch Operations

The launch of a satellite requires significant planning, coordination, and risk
management. Range safety operations have evolved over time at launch facilities
around the globe. Standards that are in development by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) identify safe practices that apply to launch
site operations, flight safety systems, and other areas. Globally, most spaceports
are operated by national governments and have varying approaches to the
specific range safety practices. However, core principles are common. Range
safety practices discussed in this section most often reference the commercial
regulations developed and implemented by the U.S. FAA.

First, a flight safety analysis is conducted by a launch operator for each launch
in order to control the risk to the public from hazards created during both a
normal and a malfunctioning launch-vehicle flight. A risk assessment analysis
should account for the variability associated with each source of hazard during
flight, the normal flight and each failure response mode of the launch vehicle,
and each external and launch-vehicle flight environment. Additionally, a risk
assessment should consider populations potentially exposed to the flight, and the
performance of any flight safety system (including time delays associated with the
systems). The outputs of a risk assessment are used to create a plan to sufficiently
isolate the hazard to keep risk to the public within acceptable quantitative limits.
For example, the FAA provides the Flight Safety Analysis Handbook for reference in
this process.

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 Types of Analyses

» Trajectory » Hold-and-resume gate

» Toxic release hazard » Straight-up time
» Overflight gate » Ground debris risk
» Flight safety limits » Flight hazard area
» Probability of failure » Orbital debris
» Time-delay » Collision avoidance
» Malfunction turn » Data loss flight time and planned
safe flight state
» Far-field overpressure
blast effects

Table 3.1 | An example of the various analyses required as part of a full flight
safety analysis.

Public Risk Criteria

National regulatory entities, such as the U.S. FAA, set specific quantitative criteria
for the risk exposure of the public that launch operations must meet. These
standards consist of specific probabilities of risk to the public from inert and
explosive debris, toxic release, and far-field blast overpressure. These quantitative
limits do not apply to aircraft or watercraft, and as a result, a launch operator must
establish hazard areas with rules requiring the removal of waterborne vessels and
aircraft from the hazard zone during the launch activity.

Flight Termination System

In order to meet public risk criteria, it is necessary to incorporate self-destruct
systems on launch vehicles. Activation of a destruct system breaks the launch
vehicle into smaller debris, burns off fuel, and keeps overpressure effects
isolated from the public. Termination criteria are developed during various
flight safety analyses and implemented as part of the written flight safety plan.
Flight termination systems are a critical element of range safety. There are some
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

exceptions to this rule, especially in the older rocket systems that use toxic fuels,
in which case it is preferable for the rocket to destruct farther from the launch site
on a trajectory that is routed into unpopulated areas.

Flight Safety Plan

Based on the conclusions reached during the flight safety analysis, a written
flight safety plan defines how launch processing and flight of a launch vehicle will
be conducted without adversely affecting public safety and how to respond to a
launch mishap. A flight safety plan should identify the flight safety personnel who
will approve and implement each part of the plan.

Elements of a flight safety plan include flight safety rules, a flight safety system,
data on trajectory, and debris dispersion data. The plan must also identify flight
hazard areas that must be cleared and controlled during launch, and support

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systems and services including any aircraft or ship that a launch operator will use.
Last, the plan must have a description of the flight safety-related tests, reviews,
rehearsals, and other safety operations.

A ground safety plan describes the implementation of hazard controls that have
been identified by a launch operator’s ground safety analysis and that address all
public-safety-related issues. The plan should at least include a description of the
launch vehicle and any payload (or class of payload), and identify each hazard,
including explosives, propellants, toxics and other hazardous materials, radiation
sources, and pressurized systems. The plan must also include figures that show
the location of each hazard on the launch vehicle and indicate where at the launch
site a launch operator performs hazardous operations during launch processing.

A VARIETY OF OTHER PLANS ARE NECESSARY

AS PART OF A FLIGHT SAFETY PLAN, INCLUDING:

» Launch support equipment and instrumentation plan

» Local agreements and public coordination plans

» Frequency management plan

» Hazard-area surveillance and clearance plan

» Flight termination system electronic piece-parts program plan

» Communications plan

» Accident investigation plan

» Countdown plan

Safety-Critical Preflight Operations

A launch operator must perform safety-critical preflight operations that protect
the public from the adverse effects of hazards associated with launch processing
and the flight of a launch vehicle. For example, a launch countdown plan should
be distributed to all personnel responsible for the countdown and flight of a
launch vehicle. Any nearby region of land, sea, or air necessary to the launch
should be assessed and monitored to ensure the number and locations of
members of the public meet established safety standards. The operator should
monitor the weather to identify meteorological conditions that could threaten
the safe performance of a launch, such as the presence of lightning. To ensure
accuracy, data verification of launch-vehicle tracking should be employed.

If the launch vehicle exits flight boundaries, the readiness of flight safety systems
must be ensured if intentional destruction of the launch vehicle is required. At
least two tracking sources should be available prior to liftoff, and no less than
one verified tracking source at all times from liftoff to orbit insertion for an orbital
launch, or to the end of powered flight for a suborbital launch.

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Launch Vehicle Stage Disposal
Launch vehicle stages pose hazards for spaceflight and environmental safety if not
properly disposed of. Upper stage launch vehicle stages left in orbit after launch
operations are complete become space debris, while upper stages that conduct
uncontrolled re-entry pose a risk to safety of third parties on Earth. The best way
to mitigate both of these hazards is to conduct a controlled, planned re-entry
disposal of upper stages, targeting unpopulated areas of the Earth (generally
open ocean). Other methods of disposal include maneuvering the stage into an
approved “graveyard” orbit, sending the stage on an Earth-escape trajectory, or
retrieving it via active debris removal service. If the stage must be left in orbit, it
should be passivated and placed in a trajectory that naturally re-enters Earth’s
orbit in compliance with the 25-year “rule” and in a way that ensures maximum
burning up in the atmosphere. Launch vehicle lower stages do achieve orbit,
and thus do not pose long-term space debris risk. However improper disposal
of lower stages can pose environmental and safety risks on Earth. Responsible
range safety provisions are typically designed to ensure lower stages do not pose
casualty risk to down-range populations. Lower stages may contain hazardous
fuel or other materials that if not mitigated may cause harmful effects. Use of
nonhazardous or recovery and reuse of lower stages can be strategies to reduce
this potential harm.

IN–SPACE ACTIVITIES
Remotely operating spacecraft to ensure mission assurance and safety of flight
requires managing a variety of risks—not the least of which is avoiding running
into other active satellites and the hundreds of thousands of pieces of space
debris also orbiting the Earth. The following sections provide a more detailed
discussion of the major issues that satellite operators need to deal with in order
to ensure the well-being of their satellites and prevent collisions or incidents that
could undermine the long-term sustainability of space activities.
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

Satellite Orbit Determination and Tracking

The first step is for satellite operators to be able to know where their own satellite
is in orbit, and know the locations of other objects that may pose a collision risk.
While a growing number of satellites have onboard global satellite navigation
system (GNSS) receivers to determine their position, there is still a need for
alternate ways to validate the GNSS solution and also track the tens of thousands
of nonfunctional objects. The majority of space objects are debris objects and
must be observed using systems which do not rely on the cooperation of the
object being tracked in order to determine their orbit.

Satellite operators need to determine how they will obtain orbital trajectory
information on their satellites and other space objects. Satellite orbit
determination (OD) is the process by which operators or third parties can obtain
knowledge of the satellite’s trajectory, usually relative to the center of mass of the
Earth. The basic theory involves determining a satellite’s position and velocity—its

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state—at a specific time in the past,

and then using a set of differential
equations that model changes in its Remotely operating spacecraft
position and velocity over time to to ensure mission assurance
predict where it will be in the future. In and safety of flight requires
aerospace terms, this is “generating an
managing a variety of risks—not
ephemeris,” which is a set of points in
space that define the future trajectory
the least of which is avoiding
of a satellite. A significant challenge in running into other active
performing accurate OD is developing satellites and the hundreds of
precise and accurate equations of thousands of pieces of space
motion that include the various natural debris also orbiting the Earth.
forces or perturbations that act on
the satellite, such as irregularities in
Earth’s gravity, atmospheric drag, and
the gravitational pull of the sun and the moon.

Satellite OD begins with data on the position and velocity of a satellite, known as
observations. A single observation measures a satellite’s position, and perhaps
velocity as well, at a specific moment in time, and relative to the location of a
specific sensor. Multiple observations taken over a single period of time are
called a track. The observations from one sensor can be used by themselves or
combined with data from other sensors which observe the space object at other
points in its orbit.

Different measurement types have different characteristics, and these lead to

different levels of confidence in satellite state elements estimated from these
measurements. Traditionally, the main source of data has been collected by
ground-based radars and ground- and space-based telescopes. Telescopes may
also use satellite laser ranging (SLR) techniques to directly illuminate satellites
using a laser source to obtain range information. Radar observations can provide
velocity information and typically have excellent angular tracking, but can suffer
from poor range rate estimations. SLR can derive excellent range and range rate
estimations while having poor estimations of angular rates.

No matter the type of sensor, it is important to understand the accuracy and

precision of the tracking data it provides. Often, sensors are periodically tasked
with tracking calibration spheres or other space objects whose orbit is well known
in order to determine their accuracy. If a sensor’s measurements are consistently
off-true, a deliberate bias can be introduced to correct some or all of the error.
The historical performance of sensors can be tracked in order to determine their
accuracy and precision over time, which in turn can be used as a weighting factor
for valuing their data relative to other sensors.

Accurately tracking a space object requires collecting observations from many

parts of its orbit. That means a global network of sensors is required, which can be
terrestrial or space-based. To operate and maintain such a network has historically
been expensive, and as a result, tracking satellites and space debris has been

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primarily a governmental function. To date, the U.S. military has been the primary
source of this type of information to the public, although there are increasingly
other sources of tracking information (both governmental and non-governmental)
that are becoming available to satellite operators.

Orbit Propagation
Knowing where an object is now, however, is only part of the problem, since
there is also a need to know where an object will be in the future to assess
the risk of collision. That means understanding the various forces acting on
an orbital object—Earth gravity, solar and lunar gravitational effects, solar
radiation pressure, and atmospheric drag, the last of which presents a major
challenge for LEO objects. Much scientific research has gone into developing
mathematical models to estimate how these and other natural forces—known
as perturbations—affect satellite trajectories over time. But one force can be
extremely difficult to model: the thrust used to maneuver a spacecraft. Most
active spacecraft have to maneuver periodically to maintain the orbit needed to
perform their mission. A maneuver that takes place during the timeframe of a
future prediction—such as the probability of whether the satellite will collide with
another object—will invalidate the prediction from the moment that the maneuver
is conducted. Thus, accurate modeling and predictions need to take into account
both models of natural perturbations and any planned maneuvers.

The good news is that the satellite operator must know this information well in
order to perform their mission. Sharing the information with other operators can
provide more timely updates and avoid confusion as a result of not knowing an
operator’s intentions. The challenge is that each operator typically uses their own
coordinate systems (and sometimes different time systems), which means they all
have to be normalized—or put in a common reference system—to be useful. This
process requires a full understanding of units, coordinate and time definitions,
and a way to validate that information, since many satellite systems were not
designed to interoperate with those of other operators, only to be internally
consistent. RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

The results also need to be shared in a standard way to ensure that each operator
knows how to understand and apply that normalized data. And that sharing
needs to be done on a regular basis to ensure a common understanding of how
to apply the data and to avoid the possibility of misinterpretation in the midst of
responding to a serious event.

Conjunction Assessment Procedures and Standards

For a satellite operator, one of the key tools for reducing in-space risk is to
perform conjunction assessment (CA); that is, to determine which objects might
have a chance of coming close to, and possibly colliding, with your spacecraft.
Conceptually, the CA task is straightforward. The operator simply needs to
know where all the objects are that might present a collision risk, and be able
to predict where they will be for a period far enough into the future to enable

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an effective course of action should a close approach be deemed unsafe. With

that information, the process of screening each of the operator’s satellites can
be performed quickly using well-known analytical techniques. The challenge
comes from understanding current limitations to performing effective CA and
identifying areas for improvement. The NASA Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment
and Collision Avoidance Best Practices Handbook provides further in-depth
examination of these issues.

Typically, CA is performed for a pair of trajectories, each representing the location

of a space object over time, where the relative separation distance between two
objects is computed over a given prediction time span. The trajectories may
be generated using high-accuracy catalog data from a data provider, or using
positional data generated by the spacecraft itself. A conjunction event is where the
relative separation reaches a local minimum, commonly referred to as the point of
closest approach.

Operational collision risk management starts with the generation of close

approach predictions and ends with an action/no-action decision from mission
stakeholders. The step-by-step process consists of:

Figure 3.8 | Operational collision risk management process.

Potential collisions can be identified by individual spacecraft operators,

operational support organizations such as the Space Data Association (SDA),
government organizations such as the European Union’s Space Surveillance and
Tracking (SST) Program, and a growing number of commercial providers. To be
most useful to satellite operators, the entity conducting the conjunction analysis
should have accurate trajectory data on both active satellites, including planned
maneuvers within the prediction time, and other space objects.

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Operational Conjunction Assessment
The conjunction assessment process occurs throughout the lifetime of a satellite,
from pre-launch to end-of-life operations. Phases of conjunction assessment
include launch, early orbit, on-orbit, collision avoidance, and de-orbit or disposal.
Launch conjunction assessment is the process of predicting and reporting the
close approaches between launch vehicles and orbiting objects. This is done by
screening planned launch trajectories against all objects in the space catalog.
The launch provider typically generates the trajectories, which may include
multiple iterations corresponding to different launch times within the launch’s
window of opportunity.

The process of launch screening compares the trajectory of the launch vehicle
(delivered as ephemeris data) to a catalog of space objects. The preliminary
screening process may begin weeks to days ahead of the launch date depending
on the launch provider’s or launch range’s requirements. Subsequent screenings
are then performed at predetermined intervals, such as at T-4, 3, and 2 days
before launch, and finally on the day of the launch, to produce the most accurate
and timely assessment.

Screening results are provided for predetermined screening volumes that depend
on the satellite mission. For example, a robotic mission with active payloads may
use a stand-off screening distance of 25 kilometers. This means that the launch
operator will be notified of any predicted close approaches with miss distances
less than that.

A number of entities provide launch conjunction assessment services. The U.S.

military performs launch conjunction assessment for all launches that occur from
the U.S. Air Force’s eastern and western launch ranges, as well as for any other
global launch provider who requests the service. Other data providers, such as
Aerospace Corporation, also provide launch conjunction assessment, and many
launch agencies across the world perform independent internal assessments
using publicly available data. RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

There is ongoing debate about the usefulness of pre-launch conjunction

assessment. In many cases, there is a significant amount of uncertainty in the
predicted insertion orbit and the predicted trajectories of existing satellites.
As a result, launch conjunction assessments may yield a high degree of false
positives, and may unnecessarily cause launch delays or aborts. Some launch
operators have concluded that it is only worthwhile to conduct launch conjunction
assessments against the ISS, while others do so for a much larger number of
satellites and debris objects. However, one significant benefit of conducting launch
conjunction assessment screenings is that a satellite operator will discover which
other objects are “in the neighborhood,” and thus, with which other operators
they will need to establish working relationships. In some cases, satellite operators
have decided to modify the planned operational orbit for their satellite based on a
launch conjunction assessment which showed that it was going into a high-traffic
region. In the case of China’s TanSat, the decision was made to not launch it into
the “A-Train” constellation of Earth observation satellites due to the complicated
requirements and procedures necessary for all participants in the A-Train.
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Figure 3.9 | Depiction of NASA’s Afternoon Constellation (“A-Train” and

“C-Train”). Credit: NASA

Early-orbit conjunction assessment spans the phase from the spacecraft’s

separation from the launch vehicle to its arrival at its final orbit. This phase
can take days or months depending on the maneuver plan and methods, and
presents unique challenges to the conjunction assessment process. First, the
limited observational data in the first few days after launch can delay the ability
to generate an accurate prediction of a newly launched object’s future trajectory.
Additionally, the spacecraft’s constant maneuvering makes it difficult to maintain
consistent tracking and updated orbit determinations. Consequently, accurate
and timely early-orbit conjunction assessments often require the use of operator-
provided data for ephemeris-based screenings.

Early-orbit conjunction assessment typically includes the operator providing the

early-orbit maneuver plan to a data provider in addition to a schedule of planned
maneuvers and required screening volumes. As the early-orbit phase progresses,
the operator provides the given satellite’s ephemeris to the data provider for pre-
and post-maneuver screenings against the space catalog. This data exchange
allows the operator to perform collision avoidance, if needed, and helps the data
provider maintain accurate positional data for the maneuvering satellite. The
Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) provides this service for free to all
satellite operators who provide their ephemeris, while operators can request
European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) Services for Collision
Avoidance, which is also free and open to non-EU users. Some space agencies
also provide the service for their own governmental payloads.

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 Case Study: Europe’s Sentinel 1-A Satellite

A real-life situation where early-orbit conjunction assessment created challenges involved

Europe’s Sentinel 1-A satellite. Sentinel 1-A was launched on April 3, 2014, and within its
first day on orbit, it was predicted to have a very close approach with a defunct American
satellite which had not shown up during the pre-launch screening. Planning and conducting
the maneuver proved to be very challenging, as Sentinel 1-A was still in the process of
conducting a set of maneuvers to deploy its solar arrays and antennas. Ultimately, the
maneuver went smoothly and a potentially disastrous situation was avoided.

RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

Figure 3.10 | ESA illustration of the Sentinel 1-A C-band Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR) satellite. Credit: ESA

Several commercial companies have started to offer SSA data and services
However, as is the case with launch conjunction assessments, early-orbit
conjunctions can be difficult to predict in advance.

In-space conjunction assessment is primarily used to ensure spaceflight safety

throughout the lifetime of a satellite. The process screens all active satellites
against all other cataloged space objects. The results provide satellite operators
with predictions of future close approach events. The close approach prediction
information allows satellite operators to take actions to mitigate the risk of
collision. The primary metric for doing so should be the probability of collision (Pc).

Close approach screening results are performed for prediction times that are
dependent upon the satellite’s orbital regime. The prediction time for satellites in
GEO is typically longer than that of all other regimes, largely because GEO orbits
are more predictable over long periods. The screening volume also varies across
the different orbital regimes, and often includes a larger monitoring volume and
a smaller high-interest, or reporting, volume. Table 3.2 provides an example of
how different orbital regimes may be defined and assigned specific screening
durations and volumes depending on their level of risk.

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In- Cross-
Radial Track Track
Orbit Propagation Miss Miss Miss
Regime Orbit Regime Criteria Time (km) (km) (km)

GEO/HEO/ 1300 min < Period < 1800 min 10 Days 10 10 10

MEO Eccentricity < 0.25 & Inclination < 35

LEO 4 1200 km < Perigee < 2000 km 5 Days 0.4 2 2

Eccentricity < 0.25

LEO 3 750 km < Perigee < 1200 km 5 Days 0.4 12 12

Eccentricity < 0.25

LEO 2 500 km < Perigee < 750 km 5 Days 0.4 25 25

Eccentricity < 0.25

LEO 1 Perigee < 500 km 5 Days 0.4 44 51

Eccentricity < 0.25

Table 3.2 | Examples of CA screening volumes. Credit: Unites States Space Command

The satellite operator, data provider, or service provider may perform conjunction
screenings based on schedules dictated by specific missions using any variation
of trajectories, as described before. Currently, the U.S. government provides
free basic CA screenings for all global space operators and may provide
additional services upon request. Private sector service providers such as the
Space Data Association specialize in ephemeris-versus-ephemeris screenings, a
complimentary service for satellite operators who elect to join the organization. A
growing number of commercial companies also provide screening services.

Conjunction assessment reports may be issued and exchanged in a variety of

ways, but the prevailing standard is the Conjunction Data Message (CDM) that has
been defined by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), an
international standards body of space agencies.

Risk Assessment and Avoiding Collisions

Not all satellites possess maneuvering capability, but for potential collisions that
involve at least one satellite with maneuvering capability, decisions on whether to
conduct maneuvers to reduce the risk of a collision must be made. The decisions
involve calculating the risk of collision and the potential costs of a maneuver
(such as expending fuel or disrupting operations). Calculating the risk of collision
requires not just knowledge of where the two objects will be, but also the amount
of uncertainty associated with that knowledge. The location and uncertainty give
the probability of collision, which must be future-combined with the consequences
of a particular collision scenario.

Unfortunately, just calculating the probability of a collision is difficult. Ideally, the

CDM would include the uncertainty data, usually in the form of covariance, but
that is not always the case. The problem is further compounded when tracking
maneuvering satellites, since failing to recognize that a maneuver has occurred
can create a bad orbital prediction, overinflated uncertainty, or both. Similar

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results can be seen when trying to process observations for GEO satellites
operating in clusters when observations are incorrectly associated with the
individual satellites.

From a practical perspective, it is incumbent upon each operator to do their

best to track their own satellites, regularly calibrate their results against other
data sources and share that data with other operators in as timely a fashion
as possible. The predicted trajectory should include natural perturbations and
previously planned orbital maneuvers, and new orbital estimates should be
provided as soon as possible after performing a maneuver or incorporating
or canceling a planned maneuver. That data should be provided in the form of
ephemerides far enough into the future to allow sharing and analysis of the data
in support of decision-making—that is, early enough to plan and conduct an
avoidance maneuver, if it is deemed necessary.

In the face of missing, incomplete, or potentially misleading uncertainty

information, it is imperative that a variety of orbital data sources be compared to
assess a more realistic uncertainty of the relevant orbits. This process must be
applied for every case—not assumed to be the same from case to case.

Although it is impossible to prevent all collisions, these steps can mitigate the
probability of a serious collision that can completely disable a satellite occurring
and thereby creating the next large piece of debris or generating even more small
debris that jeopardizes the entire near-Earth orbital environment. Collaboration
and data sharing—between satellite operators and between operators and
tracking services—are key to success.

Large Constellation Management

A key current trend in space operations activities is the planning, deployment,
and operations of multiple very large satellite constellations (both commercial
and governmental) consisting of
thousands to tens of thousands of
individual satellites in the same or
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

From a practical perspective,

similar orbits. These constellations
it is incumbent upon each
challenge existing space operations
practices and regulation, and require operator to do their best to
updated approaches. In the interim, track their own satellites,
operators have been working to develop regularly calibrate their
large constellation management results against other data
practices, both individually to specific
sources and share that data
constellations and in cooperation
with other operators in as
with other operations. For example,
commercial satellite operators Iridium, timely a fashion as possible.
OneWeb, and SpaceX worked together
in a process facilitated by the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) to develop and release (in
September 2022) a reference guide to Satellite Orbital Safety Best Practices.

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Specific large constellation management practices that will need to be developed

and enhanced include:

• Increased CA and collision avoidance on launch assessment (COLA)

screening requirements, both internal to a single operator’s constellation
and between satellites in a constellation and other space objects, will
require constellation operators to implement automated collision
avoidance systems;

• Publication of satellite positional data (satellite ephemerides), health,

and maneuver plans;

• Procedures for communicating and coordinating with other satellite

operators in the same or similar orbits; and

• Proper practices for satellite deployment and check-out, as well as

design-for-demise and reliable post-mission disposal.

Case Study: Voluntary Best Practices for

Space Safety and Sustainability

In recent years, significant efforts have been made by a number of industry, government,
and civil-society groups to develop and promulgate guidelines, principles, and best practices
for space sustainability and/or space operations. Perhaps highlighted by the trend towards
deployment of large constellations and partially motivated by questions over the efficiency
and efficacy of existing regulatory processes, these efforts seek to establish voluntary
principles and aspirational best practices for space safety that can inform more formal
regulations in the future.

These efforts cover a number of types of space operations, including launch,

in-space operations, and end-of-mission disposal. Some efforts address emerging areas of
space activities, such as lunar operations and in-space servicing, assembly and maintenance
(ISAM). Examples of some of most developed of these efforts include:

CONFERS

An industry association of 70+ companies that is

developing best practices and standards for satellite
servicing. CONFERS has developed and published a
number of recommended operating practices and
principles for commercial rendezvous, proximity
operations (RPO), and on-orbit servicing (OOS), including
the CONFERS Recommended Design and Operational
Practices.

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THE EARTH AND SPACE SUSTAINABILITY
INITIATIVE

A UK-based initiative which is developing Environmental,

Social and Governance (ESG) space sustainability
standards to inform the finance and insurance
communities and policymakers.

THE ESA NET ZERO DEBRIS CHARTER

A document written collectively by a group of space agencies

and industry actors, facilitated by the European Space Agency,
which lays out a set of “high-level guiding principles and specific,
jointly defined targets” intended to drive the space community
towards stopping creation of space debris as a result of space
activities by 2030.

SPACE SAFETY COALITION (SSC)

An “ad hoc coalition of companies, organizations, and

other government and industry stakeholders that
actively promotes responsible space safety through the
adoption of relevant international standards, guidelines
and practices, and the development of more effective
space safety guidelines and best practices.” It publishes,
coordinates, and updates a Best Practices for the
Sustainability of Space Operations document.

THE GLOBAL SATELLITE OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION (GSOA)
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

A trade association focused on the satellite industry, has

published a Code of Conduct on Space Sustainability,
which contains a set of recommended best practices to
mitigate the risk of on-orbit collision, minimize the threat
of non-trackable debris, protect humans in space, and
limit the effects of satellite sunlight reflections on optical
astronomy.

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These initiatives and others have resulted in a collective set of recommendations, principles,
and guidelines which suggest there may be areas of emerging consensus on implementable
best practices for safe operations. Some examples of key common principles expressed in
many of these voluntary efforts include:

• Commitment to transparency and communication of intentions in operations

• Encouragement of intra-operator exchange of information relevant to safety-of-flight and

collision avoidance

• Commitment to post-mission disposal within five years of end of mission

• Encouragement of design practices for responsible de-orbiting and passivation, including

facilitation of servicing/removal

• Initial proposals for “rules of the road” for maneuver coordination and
collision avoidance
However, as the various initiatives have developed somewhat independently of each other,
more work needs to be done to establish areas of consensus, clarify how these voluntary
practices should inform future regulatory regimes, and identify remaining gaps.

Many of the practices remain aspirational, and require validation and updating through
operational experience. Implementation of these principles remains largely a voluntary
commitment of individual operators, although in some cases individual documents have
been formally developed into voluntary consensus standards, such as International
Organization for Standardization standard ISO 24330: Space Systems - Rendezvous And
Proximity Operations (RPO) And On Orbit Servicing (OOS) - Programmatic Principles And
Practices, which was originally developed by CONFERS. Voluntary guidelines and practices
might also be considered as part of voluntary space sustainability rating schemes— such as
the Space Sustainability Rating—that could help to incent adoption and implementation of
these voluntary standards and best practices. In some cases, elements of these voluntary
best practices might ultimately be codified or reflected in binding regulation.

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Space Weather
In addition to possible collisions with other space objects, the space environment
itself can also pose a hazard to satellites. “Space weather” is the term for the set
of physical and electromagnetic processes and effects that occur on the sun, and
ultimately interact with the Earth’s magnetosphere, atmosphere, and surface.
These phenomena, which include solar flares, solar wind, geomagnetic storms,
and coronal mass ejections, can have adverse effects on activities in orbit and on
the Earth’s surface.

The sun is constantly emitting electrically charged particles, which flow outward
throughout the solar system in a phenomenon known as solar wind. The sun also
emits electromagnetic radiation across a variety of wavelengths including radio,
infrared, visible light, ultraviolet, and X-rays. Changes in the intensity of these
emissions result in the variety of effects known as space weather events, including:

• Sunspots, which can lead to increased emission of solar wind. A

geomagnetic storm results, which in mild cases leads to the aurorae
borealis and australis, and in more severe cases can overload terrestrial
power grids and cause blackouts.

• Coronal mass ejections, which correlate with increased numbers of

electrically charged particles being ejected into the solar wind, and which
have effects similar to those of sunspots.

• Coronal holes, which also cause increased solar wind activity.

• Solar flares, which result in high-concentration bursts of radiation.

Outside of the aurorae, space weather effects are generally not visible to the
naked eye. For the most part, the Earth’s natural magnetic field protects the planet
from the general solar and space radiation environment. However, when space
weather events occur, they can have deleterious impacts on spacecraft operations
that operators need to be aware of. These include:
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

• Higher-than-normal levels of charged particles, which might degrade

satellite components and equipment;

• Interference with electrical signals, including those of high-frequency and

ultra-high-frequency communications satellites and global navigation
satellite systems (GNSS);

• Interference with radar and/or space tracking systems looking in

sunward or poleward directions;

• Increased drag for satellites operating in low Earth orbit; and

• The potential for increased radiation exposure for humans in orbit.

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Figure 3.11 | Graphic depicting the effects of space weather on space and terrestrial
infrastructure. Credit: ESA

Strong space weather events can also impact vulnerable systems on Earth’s
surface, including electrical power grids and aviation systems.

Space weather is typically correlated with an eleven-year cycle of solar activity,

with peaks and troughs termed solar maximum and solar minimum respectively,
although notable events can occur at any point in the cycle. Government agencies,
such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Space Weather
Prediction Center (NOAA SWPC) or the Japan National Institute of Information and
Communication Technology, provide space weather forecast services, including
offering watches, warnings, and alerts. Depending on the type of space weather
event, warnings, watches, and alerts can be issued anywhere from ten minutes
to seventy-two hours of advance notice. NOAA SWPC rates space weather events
using the Space Weather Scales to describe their expected severity and possible
effects on people and systems. Operators and other interested parties can
subscribe to the forecast service via their national center or the International
Space Environment Service.

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 Case Study: Starlink Satellite Loss Due to Space Weather

As an example, in early February 2022, 38 of 49 Starlink satellites launched by SpaceX

were lost due to unexpectedly accelerated atmospheric decay. The satellites are normally
launched into a very low orbit and then after checkout are raised up to their higher
operational orbit. However, an unexpected space weather event distended the atmosphere
and caused much higher atmospheric drag than usual, which brought the satellites down
before they could raise their orbits. As of May 2024, SWPC and other space weather services
do not issue alerts or warnings that provide adequate data for satellite users looking at
atmospheric drag and related applications.

Satellite Anomaly Recognition, Response, and Recovery

Anomalies in spacecraft operations come in many forms and result from a
variety of causes, but are generally described as off-nominal behavior of an
individual unit, a subsystem, or the system as a whole. Exact causes of anomalies
can cover a broad range of sources, such as the space environment (e.g.,
high-energy particles from coronal mass ejections, micrometeoroid strikes,
spacecraft charging), poor design (e.g., thermal runaway caused by insufficient
thermal insulation, divide-by-zero cases within flight software), faulty parts or
manufacturing techniques (e.g., debris in bearing races, switch failure), and even
procedural or human error during operations (e.g., incorrect sequence of steps
for unit power-on, accidentally transmitting unintended commands, unintentional
ground- or space-based radiofrequency interference).

At one end of the spectrum, an anomaly may be benign—to the extent that it
goes unnoticed for days, weeks, months, or even years. At the other extreme, an
anomaly may end a mission. An unexpected or unexplained anomaly may also
have military or security implications, especially if it occurs against a backdrop
of heightened geopolitical tensions. Properly and thoroughly preparing for,
responding to, and learning from anomalies can make the difference between
exceeding life expectancies for a mission and experiencing a potentially avoidable
mission-ending event.
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

ANOMALY RECOGNITION
Several steps can be taken to improve an operator’s ability to quickly detect
anomalies during spacecraft operations. The most important element is having
useful, accurate telemetry. All telemetry access points need a clear definition of
nominal and off-nominal states or operating ranges. Defining nominal operating
ranges generally takes several iterations: the first is the predicted range from unit
designers, the second is based on unit test and integration data, and the third is
based on initial characterization data.

As insight into the inner workings of a system is only as good as the data available,
telemetry format composition should not be overlooked. Not all parameters
should be telemetered at the same rate. For example, power failure signatures
have very short durations (milliseconds), while thermal signatures generally take

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time to manifest (seconds to tens of seconds, if not longer). Therefore, power-

related data should be telemetered more frequently than thermistor data.

Software components are inherently susceptible to single-event effects (SEEs)

caused by energetic particles in the space environment. There is ample literature
available on SEEs and methods for designing to account for and respond to them.
As a starting point, integrating an error detection and correction (EDAC) capability
will help reduce the impact of single-event upsets (SEUs), a type of SEE, but will
not fully eliminate the risk of SEUs affecting system performance. Establishing a
mechanism to routinely monitor and correct the overall state of data in on-board
memory can help catch and correct SEE-related issues before they manifest as
errors. In addition, telemetering the status of autonomous corrective actions
(quantity, date/ time, location in memory) can provide great insight into the
space environment encountered as well as the health of a memory unit itself. For
example, repeated attempts to correct the same memory address can provide an
indication of a failed or stuck bit.

ANOMALY RESPONSE
Prior to launch, operational procedures should be written, tested, and trained
on in order for operators to be adequately prepared to not only perform daily
operations but also respond to in-space failures. When developing operational
procedures for anomaly response, it is helpful to define strategic decision points
in the flow of steps. Consider which steps operators are authorized to execute
without supervisory authority and which steps require stakeholder direction
(corporate/government/customer) to perform. In defining decision points, also
consider what information is necessary to choose the path forward and clearly
articulate this information in objective terms. In addition, modularity in procedure
design can be useful, as can expected entry/exit states and anticipated duration
for the execution of each module.

For LEO systems, if manual intervention is required to respond to an anomalous

condition, it must take place during one of the brief in-view periods; therefore,
planning quick and concise steps with clear break-points is vital. Prior to the
vehicle going out of view, it must be configured to a safe state—a state in which
there is little to no risk of further damage or loss of mission until the next in-view
period. Similarly, upcoming orbital events in all regimes must be considered.
For response to a power system anomaly, for instance, it is important to have
heightened awareness of an upcoming eclipse for which the system must be
properly charged and configured. If a sufficient state of charge is not possible, a
typical response would be to power off noncritical units to allow for safe transit
during the eclipse period.

Once all of the above factors have been considered, a system has been built and
launched, and in-space operations are underway, failures will inevitably happen.
In a perfect world, all failure scenarios have been well-thought-out and detailed
operational procedures established along with appropriate responses. In the real
world, however, unforeseen and undocumented failures will happen.

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When a failure occurs, anomaly response protocol takes effect. The first step
in the protocol is an immediate response: any operator action or autonomous
fault response sequence required to configure the vehicle to a “safe” state. The
second step is to initiate a call-in procedure to alert and request assistance and
support from management and system or subsystem experts, based on the
observed signature. The third step is establishing authority for action: defining
who is in charge of response and recovery actions, which may be the operational
crew, factory experts, the owner of the system, or others. The final step is
communicating the impact of the anomaly: determining what the immediate effect
is on the mission, the duration of the projected outage/impact, and who needs to
be informed.

Once a vehicle has been “safed” (configured in a known state it can stay in more
or less indefinitely without concern, disregarding a second, unrelated anomaly),
operators can begin compiling information about the failure while waiting for
system experts to arrive. Useful information includes a detailed timeline of events
leading up to the anomaly, detailed state of all systems on the vehicle before and
after the fault, and a timeline of upcoming events such as out-of-view periods,
eclipses, or conjunctions.

Commercial satellite servicing capabilities are emerging that may be able to

add more information from on-orbit sources to help diagnose and understand
anomalies. A growing number of companies are offering satellite inspection
services, either using retasked Earth imaging satellites or dedicated vehicles,
which may be able to provide more data than is possible to gather through
telemetry or ground-based imaging. Some of these services may include
rendezvous and proximity operations, which will require close coordination
between the servicer and client. Adding spacecraft fiducial markers to a satellite
before launch can help de-risk such activities.

ANOMALY RECOVERY AND ANALYSIS

An anomaly response team should consist of general vehicle system engineers
familiar with the detailed workings of the system as a whole, subsystem and unit
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

specialists educated on specific hardware and software intricacies of the various

units, and representatives of the stakeholders or customers. While all satellite
operations groups have their own processes for anomaly response, recovery, and
investigation, an anomaly recovery usually begins with vehicle system engineers
piecing together details of the scenario and working with individual subsystem
specialists to identify abnormal behavior in all aspects of a system, both prior to
and following the fault. Due to the complexity of space systems and a wide variety
of potential causes, many times a specific root cause cannot be attributed on the
day of an anomaly. Rather, suspect units are isolated and kept offline until further
investigation can take place. In cases where redundant units are available, full
operations may be re-established by performing a controlled swap to a redundant
unit, if not already performed by onboard fault management.

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In general, there are two main severities of anomalies: critical and payload-related.
Critical health and safety anomalies affect communications, power, and thermal or
attitude control subsystems, and payload-related anomalies may affect execution
of the intended mission but do not necessarily affect the ability of the vehicle
to control its subsystems. For vehicle health and safety anomalies, autonomous
fault management response should be designed and tested to quickly establish
safe control of the affected systems. In these cases, the anomaly response
team should focus initial efforts on confirming that autonomous commanding
successfully identified the fault, executed the proper response sequence, and
isolated the suspect unit/s. For noncritical but mission-impacting anomalies, the
anomaly team should focus efforts on isolating the fault and investigating the best
path forward to re-establishing mission throughput, perhaps on redundant units
or in a degraded state if redundant units are not available.

At a point in the anomaly response and recovery process, a full root cause analysis
should take place. However, in practice, it is very rarely possible to determine a
single definitive root cause. More often, the diagram and paths are narrowed
to several “probable root causes” and several “unlikely root causes,” and the
remainder are “exonerated.” Due to the challenges associated with remotely
identifying component-level failures from hundreds to millions of kilometers away
with limited insight, many root cause investigations remain open, documented
with probable but not definitive causes.

FISHBONE DIAGRAMS
Fishbone diagrams are widely recognized as an essential tool to provide a clear
and concise way to visually track investigations that have a multitude of potential
root causes. “Bones” on the fishbone diagram typically include, at minimum:

• Environmental causes (e.g., space weather, debris, etc.),

• Design/parts/manufacturing causes (down to each piece-part within the

failure path), and

• Human/operator causes. As aspects are vetted and eliminated, bones on

the fishbone chart can be exonerated. The goal of a deep-dive root cause
analysis is to narrow a fishbone diagram down to a single bone that can
be deemed the “determined root cause.”

Regardless of the absolute determination of the root cause, lessons are always
learned from anomalies, lessons which can be applied to the current mission as
well as others in a constellation and even across the industry. For example, failure
of the bearings in a reaction wheel on a LEO vehicle due to lubrication breakdown
may provide early warning of potential trouble with control moment gyros built
by the same vendor and used on a different vehicle in a different orbital regime.
Therefore, documenting, cataloging, and maintaining failure information is
paramount to the success of any space program, as is sharing lessons learned
within the space operations community.

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Ultimately, it is important to accept that anomalies will happen over the lifetime of
a space vehicle. Being adequately prepared before anomalies occur and applying
lessons learned afterwards can drastically reduce the impacts to mission success.

END-OF-LIFE
As satellites reach their end of life and cessation of operations, it is important
for satellite operators to dispose of satellites properly. Highly used and
important regions of orbit are already congested, in large part due to satellites
or rocket stages that have been left in those active regions. Increasingly, there
are national regulatory obligations, contractual obligations, guarantees, and
other responsibilities that need to be met during the end-of-life phase of a
space mission.

Post-Mission Disposal
It is important to properly dispose of satellites and launch vehicles at the end of
usable life. Satellites that are not properly disposed of have a chance of interfering
with operating satellites and possibly generating additional debris in orbits that
are useful and commonly used. To minimize this risk, the Inter-Agency Space
Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), an international governmental forum
of experts, has created guidelines for mission developers to use when planning
proper disposal of spacecraft. In addition, ISO has also developed space systems
disposal standards, and several groups of private sector entities have also
pledged to adhere to additional practices that go beyond the current international
standards.

Launch Vehicle and Satellite Passivation

To minimize the risk of satellites creating debris from accidental breakups after
the completion of mission operations, all the onboard sources of stored energy of
a spacecraft or launch-vehicle orbital stage, such as residual propellants, batteries,
high-pressure vessels, self-destructive devices, and flywheels and momentum
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

wheels, should be depleted or safed when they are no longer required for mission
operations or post-mission disposal. This is called passivation.

The importance of designing for proper passivation has been demonstrated by

the more than forty ullage motors flown on the Russian Proton Block DM upper
stage that have broken up in orbit. The ullage motors, first deployed in the 1980s,
are small auxiliary engines that provide the stage with three-axis control during
coast and are routinely ejected when the Block DM stage ignites for the final time.
Depending on the mission profile, the ullage motors may carry up to 40 kilograms
of unused propellant. Over time, solar heating and other factors have caused
dozens of the motors to explode, releasing debris into orbit. Russia has made
design changes to prevent accidental explosion of the engines on new Block DM
models, but some launches continue to eject the units.

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Entity Document

IADC IADC-02-01, Rev 3 (June 2021)

ISO ISO 23112 (2022), ISO 24113: (2023)

U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (November

USA
2019)

NASA NPR 8715.6B (February 2017), NASA-STD-8719.14 (November 2021)

DoD DoD Directive 3100.10 (August 2022)

FAA Title 14, Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 415.39

Space Innovation IB Docket No. 22-271 Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age
FCC
IB Docket No. 18-313

JAXA JAXA Space Debris Mitigation Standard JMR-003E (April 2023)

CNES Technical Regulation (TR) of the French Space Operations Act (FSOA)

ESA ESA Space Debris Mitigation Requirements ESSB-ST-U-007

Roscosmos GOST R 52925-2018

State Administration of Science,. Technology and Industry for National Defense, notice
China on promoting the orderly development of microsatellites and strengthening safety
management

Table 3.3 | International orbital debris limitation documents.

Passivation should occur as soon as the process can be undertaken without

posing unacceptable risk to the satellite payload. Guidelines include the following:

• Residual propellants and other fluids, such as pressurants, should

be depleted as thoroughly as possible, either by depletion burns or
venting, to prevent accidental breakups caused by overpressurization or
chemical reaction.

• Batteries should be designed and manufactured, both structurally and

electrically, to prevent breakups. Pressure increase in battery cells and
assemblies can be prevented by mechanical measures unless these
measures cause an excessive reduction of mission assurance. At the end
of operations, battery charging lines should be deactivated.

• High-pressure vessels should be vented to a level guaranteeing that no

breakups can occur. Leak-before-burst designs are beneficial but are
not sufficient to meet all passivation recommendations of propulsion
and pressurization systems. Heat pipes may be left pressurized if the
probability of rupture can be demonstrated to be very low.

• Self-destruct systems should be designed to not cause unintentional

destruction due to inadvertent commands, thermal heating, or RF
interference.

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 • Power to flywheels and momentum wheels should be terminated during
the disposal phase.

• Other forms of stored energy should be assessed and adequate

mitigation measures should be applied.

• All communications, including telemetry and other forms of RF

transmission, should be turned off or disabled.

Geosynchronous Region Disposal

The geosynchronous region is a special area of Earth orbit. This is defined as 200
kilometers above and below the geostationary altitude of 35,786 kilometers and
15 degrees north and south of the Equator. Maintaining a spacecraft in GEO in
the geosynchronous region requires expenditure of fuel over time to maintain a
fixed position over a point on the surface of the Earth. GEO satellites are disposed
of by maneuvering the spacecraft further out into space, away from the protected
geosynchronous region. However, the decision on when to retire a GEO satellite
can be a difficult tradeoff.

GEO satellites often face depletion of fuel before other satellite subsystems reach
end-of-life. Therefore, operators often must make the difficult decision to retire a
satellite that is generating tens of millions of dollars annually, when the only thing
wrong with it is its low fuel. The lifespan tradeoff is made more difficult because
satellite operators, using newly available low-cost tracking user terminals, can
choose to conduct operations from an inclined orbit. In an inclined orbit, fuel is
expended at a much reduced rate as the satellite is allowed to drift within a certain
region of space, allowing it to continue to be useful. However, there is a risk that
other satellite subsystems, operating beyond their design life, may fail during
inclined operations, leaving the satellite in an orbit that risks contaminating the
protected geosynchronous region.

The IADC recommends fulfilling the two following conditions at the end of the
disposal phase to describe an orbit that remains above the geosynchronous
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

protected region:

1. A minimum increase in perigee altitude of:

235 km + (1000 × CR × A/m) where
CR is the solar radiation pressure coefficient,
A/m is the aspect area to dry mass ratio (m2kg-1), and
235 km is the sum of the upper altitude of the GSO protected region
(200 km) and the maximum descent of a re-orbited spacecraft due to
luni-solar & geopotential perturbations (35 km)

2. An eccentricity less than or equal to 0.003

To minimize the chance of debris creation, a propulsion system should not be

separated from a GEO spacecraft. In the event that there are unavoidable reasons

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that require separation, the propulsion system should be designed to be left in

an orbit that is, and will remain, outside of the protected geosynchronous region.
Regardless of whether it is separated or not, a propulsion system should be
designed for passivation. In addition, spacecraft operators should design missions
to avoid leaving launch vehicle orbital stages in the geosynchronous region.
Most GEO operators require that manufacturers design for one more year than
required for operation so that the satellite can be moved above the geostationary
orbit and allowed to drift away into deep space.

Passing Through LEO Disposal

Some types of launches leave rocket bodies or other fragments in orbits that
pass through LEO. Often this is the case with launches to place a GEO satellite
into a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO), a navigation satellite in medium Earth
orbit (MEO), or a satellite in highly elliptical Molniya orbits. Whenever possible,
spacecraft or orbital stages that are terminating their operational phases in
orbits that pass through the LEO region, or have the potential to interfere with
the LEO region, should be de-orbited (direct re-entry is preferred), or, where
appropriate, maneuvered into an orbit with a reduced lifetime. Retrieval is also a
disposal option.

According to the IADC, a spacecraft or orbital

stage should be left in an orbit in which, using If debris is expected to
an accepted nominal projection for solar activity, survive re-entry and
atmospheric drag will limit the orbital lifetime cause an unacceptable
after completion of operations to twenty-five risk of casualties, it is
years. If a spacecraft or orbital stage is to be necessary for mission
disposed of by re-entry into the atmosphere,
planners to conduct a
debris that survives to reach the surface of the
Earth should not pose an undue risk to people controlled re-entry that
or property. To minimize the risk of debris will spread debris over
surviving re-entry, it is advisable to design a uninhabited areas of
satellite in a manner that results in complete the Earth’s surface.
vaporization during re-entry. If that is not
possible and there is a greater than 1-in-10,000
chance of causing a fatality, it is necessary to perform a controlled re-entry that
deposits surviving debris into uninhabited regions, such as broad ocean areas. In
addition, ground environmental pollution, caused by radioactive substances, toxic
substances, or any other environmental pollutants resulting from onboard articles,
should be prevented or minimized in order to be accepted as permissible.

In the event of a controlled re-entry of a spacecraft or orbital stage, the operator

of the system should inform the relevant air traffic and maritime traffic authorities
of the re-entry time and trajectory and the associated ground area.

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Atmospheric Re-Entry and Risk Assessment
Spacecraft designers must consider what will happen to a spacecraft at the end
of its lifespan. For satellites operating in LEO, it is likely that atmospheric drag will
eventually cause a spacecraft to re-enter Earth’s atmosphere. As satellites re-enter,
they disintegrate, but some debris may survive the heat of re-entry and could
impact the ground and cause casualties. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to predict
specifically where debris will impact as the density of the Earth’s atmosphere is
constantly changing. It is recommended that satellite operators design spacecraft
that will completely burn up during re-entry.

If debris is expected to survive re-entry and cause an unacceptable risk of

casualties, it is necessary for mission planners to conduct a controlled re-entry
that will spread debris over uninhabited areas of the Earth’s surface.

RE-ENTRY
During re-entry, friction and compression generate immense heat as a satellite
traveling more than 29,000 kilometers per hour enters the atmosphere. That
tremendous heat can melt and vaporize the entire spacecraft. However, if a
satellite component’s melting temperature is not reached during re-entry then
that object can survive re-entry and impact the ground. In addition to heat and
pressure, a spacecraft experiences immense loads as it decelerates. These loads,
which can exceed 10 Gs, or ten times the acceleration of gravity at the Earth’s
surface, coupled with the immense heat, cause a spacecraft’s structure to break
apart. The broken-up components will continue to decelerate and, depending on
the density of the atmosphere in the region of re-entry, may reach a low ground
speed, virtually falling straight down from the sky. The broken-up spacecraft
should impact the ground at relatively low speeds, but it still presents a hazard
to people and property on the ground and a satellite operator will be liable
for damages caused by the debris. For more information, see Chapter One:
International Liability and Chapter Two: National Laws.

Predicting the exact area where debris will impact from an uncontrolled re-entry RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

is difficult because drag on the object is directly proportional to atmospheric

density, and the density of the atmosphere varies greatly at high altitudes and is
affected—dramatically even—by solar activity. It is possible to predict the time a
re-entry will begin within a 10 percent margin of the actual time. However, even
one minute of error in time corresponds to a difference of hundreds of kilometers
on the ground because of the great speeds of re-entering objects.

About 10 to 40 percent of a satellite’s mass may survive re-entry, depending on

the size, shape, weight, and material composition. The area of highest probability
where it will strike the surface of the Earth and potentially produce a debris
field is called a footprint. It is possible to predict the size of a footprint but very
difficult to determine specifically where the debris footprint will be located on the
Earth’s surface. The size of the footprint is determined by estimating the breakup
altitude of the satellite or space hardware and then modeling the mass and
aerodynamic properties of surviving debris. Footprint lengths vary in size from

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Figure 3.12 | The final re-entry breakup process, showing that debris surviving re-entry
would fall through airspace potentially occupied by aircraft and could spread over a long,
narrow path. Credit: The Aerospace Corporation

approximately 185 kilometers to 2,000 kilometers, depending on the complexity

and characteristics of the object. The width of a footprint can be affected by winds,
with the greatest uncertainty affecting the lightest objects. A 20- to 40-kilometer
footprint width is typical.

RE-ENTRY THREAT CONSIDERATIONS

While the impact threat to human life and property from the atmospheric re-entry
of space debris is serious, only one person has ever claimed to have been struck
by falling space debris, and that person was hit by a lightweight object and was
not injured. In April 2024, a piece of debris from the International Space Station
crashed through the roof of an occupied house in Florida without injuring anyone.
Over the last fifty years, a significant amount of material is known to have survived
re-entry, but no casualties from the debris have been reported.

CALCULATING RE-ENTRY RISK

There is no internationally accepted standard of “acceptable safety risk” for re-
entry. The UN COPUOS space debris mitigation guidelines leave the delineation of
acceptable risk to national authorities. The IADC identifies two guidelines to follow.
First, to minimize the accumulation of orbital debris, it recommends that satellites
in LEO that have completed their missions should be left in an orbit that will result
in re-entry within twenty-five years. While compliance with this recommendation
is not perfect, most major spacefaring nations support the “25-year rule” and

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are taking steps to improve compliance. Studies done by the European Space
Agency indicate that since 2010, successful compliance with the 25-year rule has
gone from 10 percent to 55 percent for payloads launched into LEO and from 20
percent to 80 percent for upper stages. Over the same time period, successful
compliance for GEO payloads has gone from 60 percent to nearly 90 percent.

In addition to the 25-year rule, the IADC recommends that if a satellite has a
1-in-10,000 chance of surviving re-entry and causing a casualty (either a fatality
or serious injury requiring hospitalization), its re-entry must be controlled. For
a piece of debris that survives atmospheric re-entry, the debris casualty area is
the average debris cross-sectional area plus a factor for the cross-section of a
standing individual. The total debris casualty area for a re-entry event is the sum
of the debris casualty areas for all debris pieces that survive atmospheric re-entry.
The total human casualty expectation is equal to the total casualty debris area
times the average population density for the particular orbit. A variety of models
exist to calculate the likelihood that specific pieces of a satellite will survive re-
entry, including NASA’s Debris Assessment Software (DAS) or its higher-fidelity
Object Re-entry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) and ESA’s Meteoroid and Space
Debris Terrestrial Environment Reference (MASTER) and Debris Risk Assessment
and Mitigation Analysis (DRAMA).

RE-ENTRY PREDICTIONS
Spacecraft re-entries are tracked by space surveillance systems around the globe.
These ground- and space-based radars and telescopes can be used along with
models of the Earth’s atmosphere to determine when an object is likely to re-enter
the atmosphere and the potential path of re-entry, although not specific ground
impact locations. One major source of these re-entry predictions is the U.S.
military, which shares information on upcoming re-entries publicly on spacetrak.
org. Tracking and Impact Prediction messages are issued at T–4 days, T–3 days,
T–2 days, T–1 day, T–12 hours, T–6 hours, and T–2 hours. Re-entry predictions
must be continually updated as a satellite approaches the atmosphere.

Even predictions made within a few hours of re-entry may project a debris
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

footprint that is incorrect by hundreds to thousands of kilometers. Therefore, even

if a significant amount of debris is expected to survive re-entry, it is not logistically
possible to evacuate areas debris might impact. The predictions are mainly used
to alert governments about potential impact events that may threaten populated
areas so that first responders and other services can prepare accordingly.

PLANNING A CONTROLLED RE-ENTRY

If significant portions of a satellite are expected to survive re-entry and
violate the 1-in-10,000 chance casualty threshold, it is important for a satellite
designer to plan a controlled re-entry that will scatter any remaining debris
over an unpopulated part of the ocean. A controlled re-entry requires a satellite
maneuvering strategy that avoids possible collision with space debris or other
satellites. Adequate fuel must be left in a satellite’s tanks to perform the final orbit-
changing burns. Ground support teams must be available to coordinate, perform,
and monitor the final satellite maneuvers.

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EMERGING ISSUES
The rapid increase in the number and types of The rapid increase in the
activities taking place in the space environment, number and types of
driven in part by novel private sector activities,
activities taking place in
is raising a number of issues and challenges
for which responsible operations practices the space environment,
and governance frameworks are not yet driven in part by novel
set. These issues include areas where space private sector activities,
activity may have unanticipated impacts on is raising a number of
the environment, operations where safety
issues and challenges
practices need to be established and codified,
and development of practices for new types of for which responsible
space activity. operations practices and
governance frameworks
Orbital Carrying Capacity are not yet set.

As governments and companies carry out

the planning, deployment, and operations
of multiple very large satellite constellations consisting of thousands to tens of
thousands of individual satellites in the same or similar orbits, concern has been
raised whether there is a limit to the capacity of specific orbital regimes. To better
understand this concern, research is being conducted within the space debris
and orbital dynamics scientific community to define and assess a concept known
as “orbital carrying capacity,” which can be loosely described as a quantification
of the amount of activity specific orbital regions can sustain. Carrying capacity
is concerned with both the ability to effectively manage orbital regimes for
current operators and the ability to maintain access for future activities and
operators. There are a range of research approaches and concepts for defining
and assessing orbital carrying capacity, including long-term environmental
perspectives, near-term space safety perspectives, behavioral approaches, and
approaches looking at economic incentives.

As of May 2024, orbital carrying capacity concepts have not reached a level
of research maturity where they are operationally relevant to regulatory or
licensing considerations, nor is it clear how the regulatory process might be best
equipped to utilize carrying capacity. However, continuing research into orbital
carrying capacity may ultimately help establish a more holistic approach to space
environmental management.

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Potential Atmospheric Effects from Launches and Re-Entries
As the rate of space launch and the numbers of satellites re-entering the Earth’s
atmosphere both continue to increase, researchers have begun to study the
potential effects those increased activities might have on the atmosphere. Early
results from this research, while preliminary, indicate that there is potential for the
accumulation of these space activities to have deleterious or negative effects on
atmospheric chemistry and composition, and on climate change. NOAA research
has found that these potential effects include the deposition of metallic particles
in the upper atmosphere as a result of satellites and rocket bodies burning up
during re-entry as well as the deposition of microparticles containing black carbon
soot, nitrous oxides, and alumina in the emissions from rocket launches, both of
which could contribute to climate change and ozone layer depletion.

Research efforts to describe and quantify these potential impacts are in initial
stages, and there is a need to both increase this research and to begin to
examine potential mitigation approaches. Mitigation approaches might include
changes in materials used for satellite manufacturing, revisions to design-for-
demise practices, and increased emphasis on clean or “green” fuels. In some
cases, as research progresses, there is potential that best practice for mitigation
of one space sustainability challenge (e.g., post-mission disposal to minimize
space debris) may be in tension with other impacts of space activities on the
environment (e.g., atmospheric effects of satellite re-entry).

Sustainable Practices for Cislunar Space and Lunar Surface Operations

Space activities are increasingly expanding into cislunar space and onto the lunar
surface. However, operational best practices for this area of activity are not as
well defined as for operations in GEO and LEO. Many of the practices that have
been developed for operations in GEO and below will not suffice or even apply to
the different physical and operational environment in the cislunar regime. There
are currently no established consensus practices for mitigating the creation of
debris in lunar orbit and on the lunar surface nor for post-mission disposal of
spacecraft in cislunar space. Furthermore, space situational awareness capabilities
RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS IN SPACE

to monitor activities in the cislunar domain are currently very limited. On the lunar
surface itself, dealing with the lunar dust disturbed by lunar activities will be a
shared challenge faced by all lunar operators. There will also be a need to develop
interoperability in key infrastructure in the interests of safety. Running through
all of these challenges is the need for coordination and information exchange
related to lunar activities. Currently no formal coordination mechanisms for lunar
activities currently exist.

This lack of lunar coordination mechanisms could lead to misunderstandings

and safety challenges and even the potential for dangerous misunderstandings.
As the tempo of activities in the cislunar domain increases there is need to
develop specific operations practices for that domain, and refine those practices
based on lessons learned from shared operational experience. There is also a
need to develop formal coordination forums at the international level. Informal

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groups in the lunar community such as the Global Expert Group on Sustainable
Lunar Activities have begun to develop initial suggestions for such practices and
coordination mechanisms.

In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing

In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) capabilities represent a
significant change in how space activities are conducted and could in turn lead to
many advances in space safety and sustainability. However, while there has been
some initial work done by groups such as CONFERS to develop recommended
practices and standards for commercial ISAM activities, there is still much work to
do and many aspects of ISAM are still in a nascent state. The inherently dual-use
nature of ISAM capabilities pose special challenges for ensuring the transparency
of intentions and activities to help prevent misperceptions and mistakes that
can increase tensions. Use of commercial ISAM capabilities to support national
security space missions adds to this challenge.

The novelty of ISAM capabilities also remains a challenge for international and
national oversight frameworks, including spectrum allocation and coordination,
many of which were developed without considerations for ISAM. As commercial
ISAM capabilities continue to evolve and mature, there will need to be a
similar evolution of the oversight frameworks to include consideration of ISAM
capabilities.

Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety

Historically, conducted solely by governmental operators, human spaceflight
activities (both suborbital and orbital) are increasingly being conducted by
commercial operators. These commercially and privately operated flights now
include both solely commercial missions and missions conducted by companies
on behalf of governments, including flying government personnel as commercial
spaceflight participants. Commercial human spaceflight is still generally
considered an experimental activity, in which participants take part under an
informed consent regime. However, as commercial human spaceflight becomes
more common, there will be a need to document and codify safety practices,
including lessons learned. Ultimately the informed consent regime will need to be
replaced with more formal and systematic certification, inspection, and regulation
based safety practices. National jurisdictions which currently have learning periods
or regulatory moratoria in place regarding commercial human spaceflight will
eventually need to lift those measures and put into place effective and appropriate
regulatory frameworks.

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Annex

Relevant Organizations and Fora

INTRODUCTION
There are a multitude of fora where various actors seek to engage in space policy-
related decision-making, advocacy, and expertise. Below is a list of organizations
new actors should be aware of when conducting space activities. The list below is
not exhaustive, but it encapsulates an overview of significant organizations that
new actors should understand and consider engaging.

There are three broad categories of organizations:

» Intergovernmental Organizations, Agencies, and Fora;

» Trade Associations and Industry Groups; and

» Scientific and Technical Organizations.

Each category is defined based primarily on who comprises their membership and
the interests they represent and may have exceptions or nuances not captured in
this text.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AGENCIES, AND

OTHER FORA
The selection of organizations below shows some of the international groups
that focus, in whole or in part, on sustaining the use of outer space for all.
These organizations are characterized by having member states as the primary
participants and often deal with norm-building, standard-setting, and rule-making
for space activities. Others serve as venues for technical and other international
collaboration efforts. This category also includes regional organizations focused
on similar activities. Observer states, NGOs, or other groups may also be present
for the proceedings of these organizations.

African Space Agency (AfSA)

The African Space Agency (AfSA) was officially established on January 25,
2023. It is composed of member states from the African Union (AU), aiming
to promote the continent’s space activities, coordination, and research. It is
headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, and seeks to promote cooperation between the
different space policies of AU members.

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Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF)
The Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum was formed in 1993 to enhance
space activities in the Asia-Pacific region. It is composed of space agencies,
governmental bodies, international organizations, private companies,
universities, and research institutes from over forty countries. Additionally,
APRSAF has five working groups and a workshop group. These additional
entities focus on a variety of topics, including satellite navigation, space
exploration, and engineering management.

Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)

The Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization is an intergovernmental
organization that seeks to promote and strengthen the development of
collaborative space programs among its Member States by establishing the
basis for cooperation in peaceful applications of space science and technology.
It is headquartered in Beijing and has eight member states.

Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS)

The Committee on Earth Observation Satellites was formed in 1984. It is
composed of space agencies and organizations from around the world. CEOS
works by coordinating satellite missions and data sharing. It aims to optimize
global Earth observation efforts to monitor and address environmental and
climate challenges.

European Space Agency (ESA)

The European Space Agency was established on May 30, 1975, and is
composed of twenty-two member states from across Europe. ESA missions
include scientific exploration, Earth observation, and telecommunications. It
aims to explore space, develop satellite technologies, and foster international
cooperation between European countries and the world.

The European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)

The European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) was formed in
2021. It is composed of EU member states and space industry stakeholders.
EUSPA works by managing and promoting EU space programs, including
Galileo and Copernicus. Its aim is to ensure the efficient use of space
technologies for economic growth and security.

Group on Earth Observations (GEO)

Established in 2005, and as of 2024 having 116 member countries, 151
participating organizations, and 19 associates, GEO co-produces user-driven
Earth intelligence solutions that inform decisions and accelerate action on
global, societal, and environmental challenges, leveraging its unique position
ANNEX

as an established intergovernmental body with a strong and inclusive

partnership.

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Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)

Founded in 1993, the IADC is an international governmental forum of thirteen
space agencies focused on the worldwide coordination of activities related
to artificial and natural debris in space. The IADC formulated technical space
debris mitigation guidelines in 2002, revised them in 2007, and updated them
in 2021. The IADC is composed of four working groups: measurements (WG1),
environment and database (WG2), protection (WG3), and mitigation (WG4), as
well as a Steering Committee.

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

The ITU is a specialized agency of the UN system and is based in
Geneva, Switzerland. It is tasked with facilitating equitable access to the
electromagnetic spectrum and orbital resources for satellite services and
with promoting the advancement, implementation, and efficient operation
of these services. The ITU manages the international frequency coordination
process, develops global standards, and maintains the Master International
Frequency Register. Every three to four years, the ITU also convenes the World
Radiocommunication Conference to revise or adopt the international Radio
Regulations—a treaty containing the regulatory, operational, procedural, and
technical provisions applicable to radio spectrum and orbital resources. Each
country has one vote at the WRC, though many decisions are adopted by
consensus.

The ITU Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R)‑

The International Telecommunication Union’s Radiocommunication
Sector (ITU-R) was established in 1992. It operates through study groups,
conferences, and working parties that develop international standards
and regulations for radiocommunication services. It is composed of ITU
member states, private sector members, and academic institutions. ITU-R
aims to ensure efficient and interference-free use of the radio-frequency
spectrum and satellite orbits. Its goals include facilitating global wireless
communication, enhancing spectrum management, and promoting the
development of new radiocommunication technologies.

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 ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T)
The Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is the division
of the ITU responsible for coordinating technical standards for
telecommunications. It does this through a consensus-based approach
with both member states and sector members providing input to
the numerous study groups. The purpose of the study groups is to
develop “Recommendations” and other technical documents, which
become mandatory only when adopted as part of a national law. The
World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which
meets every four years, approves the study groups, sets their work
programme for the next four-year period, and appoints their chairmen
and vice-chairmen.

Though not as relevant for space actors as the ITU-R, the ITU-T has study
groups looking at cybersecurity, the Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, and
other topics of interest to some companies.

ITU Development Sector (ITU-D)

The International Telecommunication Union’s Development Sector
(ITU-D) was established in 1992. Its primary aim is to promote equitable
and sustainable access to information and communication technologies
(ICTs) worldwide. It is composed of ITU member states and sector
members. ITU-D focuses on reducing the digital divide, fostering digital
inclusion, and supporting developing countries in enhancing their ICT
infrastructure and capabilities. It provides technical assistance, policy
guidance, and capacity-building programs.

International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the ISO is an independent organization
with a membership of 163 national standards bodies. Through its members, it
brings together experts to share knowledge and develop voluntary, consensus-
based, and market-relevant international standards that support innovation
and provide solutions to global challenges. ISO maintains a standing Technical
Committee on Aircraft and Space Vehicles (TC20), and subcommittees on
Space Data and Information Transfer Systems (SC13) and Space Systems and
Operations (SC14).

Intersputnik
Intersputnik was formed on November 15, 1971. It is composed of member
countries from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The organization
pools satellite resources for affordable communication services, aiming to
ANNEX

enhance global telecommunications, especially for developing countries,

through cooperation and satellite technology.

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United Nations (UN)

Established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the UN is the world’s
largest and most important international intergovernmental political institution.
Its principal organs (the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and
Social Council, Secretariat, and International Court of Justice) work to maintain
international peace and security; cooperate in solving international economic,
social, cultural, and humanitarian problems; and promote respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

The General Assembly is the UN’s main deliberative organ and is composed
of all Member States, who each have one vote on all decisions. The General
Assembly meets in New York at the UN Headquarters each year in the second
half of September. Decisions on important matters (such as peace, security, and
new members) require a two-thirds majority, while all other matters require a
simple majority. Much of the work of the General Assembly is carried out by its
committees and other bodies, two of which concern themselves with matters
related to outer space.

First Committee
The First Committee of the UN General Assembly is the Disarmament
and International Security Committee, which tasks itself with general
disarmament and international security issues that occasionally touch
upon issues related to outer space.

Fourth Committee
The Fourth Committee of the UNGA is the Special Political and
Decolonization Committee. The yearly report from COPUOS is received
by the Fourth Committee, which also creates the mandate for the next
year of work by COPUOS.

United Nations Conference on Disarmament (UN CD)

Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, as a successor to previous UN-organized
committees related to disarmament, the current Conference on Disarmament
(CD) was established in 1980 and deals with a number of issues interrelated
with disarmament, including as a regular agenda item the prevention of an
arms race in outer space (PAROS).

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UN OOSA)

Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, OOSA is organized under the UN Secretary-
General and has two sections: the Committee, Policy, and Legal Affairs section,
and the Space Applications Section. OOSA acts as the Secretariat to COPUOS
and to its two subcommittees. OOSA’s Programme on Space Applications assists
developing countries in using space technology for development, providing
technical assistance, training, and fellowship programs in remote sensing,
satellite communication, satellite meteorology, satellite navigation, space law,
and basic space sciences. OOSA is also the keeper of the UN registry of space
objects and serves as the secretariat to the ICG. OOSA also manages the

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Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency
Response (UN-SPIDER) with offices in Vienna, Austria; Bonn, Germany; and
Beijing, China.

United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space (UN COPUOS)
Established by a UNGA resolution in 1958, COPUOS is the principal UN
committee considering space activities. COPUOS and its two subcommittees
meet in Vienna, Austria. The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) meets
for two weeks, usually in January or February, the Legal Subcommittee (LSC)
meets for two weeks sometime in March, April, or May, and the full COPUOS
plenary meets in the summer for one and a half weeks. As of 2024, membership
(which is only open to states) is 102 and growing, and a diverse number of
intergovernmental and non-governmental permanent observers also attend.
Reports from COPUOS are sent for approval to the UNGA’s Fourth Committee.
COPUOS is the body where the principal legal instruments, such as the Outer
Space Treaty, were drafted and negotiated. For a more detailed understanding
of COPUOS’s history and workings, please see the Secure World Foundation
publication, The COPUOS Briefing Book.

UN Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial Information

Management (UN-GGIM)
Established in 2011, UN-GGIM provides a forum for coordination and exchange
among member states and international organizations while promoting the
development of global geospatial information and its use in addressing global
challenges.

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

Established in 1950, the WMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations
dedicated to international cooperation in the areas of meteorology, hydrology,
and related applications. The WMO facilitates policy formulation and exchange
of data related to these areas and maintains a number of reference standards
and datasets. The WMO Space Programme works to coordinate the availability
and utilization of space-based data sources and products for weather and
climate observation purposes in the WMO’s 191 member states.

International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG)

Established in 2005, the ICG strives to promote voluntary cooperation on
matters of mutual interest related to civil satellite-based positioning, navigation,
timing (PNG), and value-added services. This includes coordination among
providers of GNSS, regional systems, and augmentations to ensure greater
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compatibility, interoperability, and transparency.

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TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRY GROUPS

This selection of organizations focuses on private sector space organizations.
These organizations are often composed of individual companies or
conglomerates. These groups often work closely with governments through
advocacy and outreach, maintaining a central focus on preserving the outer space
environment for societal and economic purposes.

Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)

The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) was formed in 1919, and is
composed of major aerospace and defense companies in the United States. AIA
aims to promote the aerospace industry’s interests, advance innovation, and
support national security and economic growth. It seeks to accomplish these
aims through advocacy, policy development, and industry collaboration.

The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)

The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) was formed in
1963. It is composed of aerospace professionals and enthusiasts, operating
through conferences, publications, and technical committees. It aims to
advance aerospace science, technology, and engineering, foster professional
development, and promote the aerospace industry’s contributions to society.

Asia-Pacific Satellite Communications Council (APSCC)

The Asia-Pacific Satellite Communications Council is an international
nonprofit association representing all sectors of the satellite and/or space-
related industry. Its members include satellite manufacturers, launch service
providers, satellite service providers and satellite risk management companies,
telecom carriers, and broadcasters from Asia, Europe, and North America.
APSCC’s overall mission is to promote the development and use of satellite
communications and broadcasting services, as well as other aspects of space
activities, for the socioeconomic and cultural welfare of the Asia-Pacific region.

El Cluster Latinoamericano de Industria Espacial (CLIE)

El Cluster Latinoamericano de Industria Espacial (CLIE) was formed in 2021.
It is composed of Latin American space companies and organizations. CLIE
works through collaboration, innovation, and shared resources to promote the
region’s space industry. Its aim is to enhance space technology development,
create market opportunities, and foster regional cooperation.

Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF)

The Commercial Spaceflight Federation is a U.S.-based trade organization
that mainly focuses on the commercial space transportation industry. CSF
was founded in 2006 and, as of May 2024, has more than eighty-five member
organizations. The main goals of CSF are to promote technology innovation,
guide the expansion of Earth’s economic sphere, bolster U.S. leadership in
aerospace, and inspire America’s next generation of engineers and explorers.

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Commercial Smallsat Spectrum Management Association (CSSMA)
The Commercial Smallsat Spectrum Management Association is a U.S.-based
trade association that coordinates and advocates for policies affecting small
satellite users. CSSMA was formed in 2016 and has over forty members. CSSMA
maintains a strong focus on spectrum coordination between commercial users,
government users, and satellite operators.

CONFERS (Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous

and Servicing Operations)
The Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operation is an
international trade association of private sector entities focused on developing
in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) capabilities. CONFERS
helps to develop international standards and engages with governments on
policies and regulations related to ISAM.

European Association of Remote Sensing Companies (EARSC)

The European Association of Remote Sensing Companies is a nonprofit,
membership-based organization that promotes the use of Earth observation
technology, with an emphasis on European companies that offer Earth
observation-related products and services. EARSC’s mission is to foster the
development of the geo-information service industry in Europe. As of May
2024, EARSC represents 27 countries and has over 140 member organizations.
Member of observer status is available to any organization that uses or provides
remote sensing observations of the Earth and its environment, irrespective of
sensor type or source (e.g., satellite, aircraft, or unmanned aerial vehicle).

The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI)

The European Space Policy Institute was formed in 2003. Composed of
European space stakeholders, including agencies, industries, and research
organizations, ESPI conducts independent research and policy analysis and
hosts events. It aims to provide decision-makers with informed insights to
shape space policy and promote Europe’s role in space activities.

Global Satellite Operators Organization (GSOA)

The Global Satellite Operators Association is a nonprofit forum of global satellite
operators. As of May 2024, it is composed of CEOs from sixty-three member
organizations. It aims to be the platform for collaboration between companies
involved in the satellite ecosystem globally and a unified voice for the sector.
GSOA was previously the European, Middle East, and African Satellite Operators
Association (ESOA) and was rebranded as GSOA in 2021.
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Satellite Industry Association (SIA)

The Satellite Industry Association is a U.S. trade association representing
the commercial satellite industry. SIA was formed in 1995 by several major
U.S. satellite companies as a forum to discuss issues and develop industry-
wide positions on shared business, regulatory, and policy interests. SIA has
established active working groups involved with a host of policy issues including
government services, public safety, export control policy, international trade
issues, and regulatory issues (satellite licensing, spectrum allocation, and
regulatory policy).

The Space Industry Association of Australia (SIAA)

The Space Industry Association of Australia (SIAA) was formed in 1992. It is
composed of Australian space industry stakeholders, including companies,
research institutions, and government agencies. SIAA works through advocacy,
industry collaboration, and events. Its aim is to promote the growth of
Australia’s space industry and influence national space policy.

SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Scientific and technical organizations are focused on specialized issues or
interests within the space sustainability regime. These organizations, which
include nonprofit organizations, unions, committees, and more, often serve as
facilitators, convenors, and initiators between other organizations in the space
community.

The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS)

The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems is an international
standards body that focuses on communications and data systems standards
for spaceflight.

European Organisation for the Exploitation of

Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)
EUMETSAT, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites, was formed in 1986. It is composed of thirty European member
states. EUMETSAT aims to monitor “weather, climate and the environment from
space on behalf of our member states.”

The International Academy of Astronautics (IAA)

The International Academy of Astronautics was formed in 1960. It is composed
of global experts in astronautics and related fields. IAA works through
conferences, publications, and collaborative research. It aims to foster
the development of astronautics, recognize achievements, and promote
international cooperation in space exploration and technology.

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International Astronautical Federation (IAF)
Founded in 1951 by scientists from around the world interested in dialogue
and collaboration in the field of space research, the International Astronautical
Federation, as of May 2024, has 513 members from 77 countries, including
all leading space agencies, companies, societies, associations, museums, and
space research institutes worldwide. The IAF holds the yearly International
Astronautical Congress (IAC) at a different locale each year, as well as other
global conferences on space exploration, space sciences, and related themes.

International Astronomical Union (IAU)

Founded in 1919 and based in Paris, France, the International Astronomical
Union is an international scientific organization of professional astronomers
focused on astronomical research and education. The IAU is the recognized
authority for assigning names and designations to celestial bodies. As of
May 2024, the IAU has 85 state members (national bodies) and over 11,500
individual members.

IAU Center for the Protection of Dark and Quiet Skies from
Satellite Constellation Interference (IAU CPS)
Within the IAU, the Center for the Protection of Dark and Quiet Skies
from Satellite Constellation Interference (IAU CPS) was created in 2022
to coordinate collaborative multidisciplinary international efforts with
institutions and individuals. It works internationally to help mitigate the
negative impact of satellite constellations on ground-based optical and
radio astronomy observations and is also concerned with protecting and
preserving humanity’s enjoyment of the night sky.

International Amateur Radio Union (IARU)

Founded in 1925, the International Amateur Radio Union is an international
union for the cooperation among and coordination of radio frequencies
allocated to amateurs, including amateurs using amateur-satellite applications.
The IARU has a Satellite Frequency Coordination division, and its IARU Satellite
Advisor can help in planning space telemetry, space telecommands, and
operating frequencies. Frequency coordination with the IARU is necessary for
transmission from space of certain amateur-allocated frequencies.

International Institute of Space Law (IISL)

Founded in 1960, the International Institute of Space Law is composed of
institutions and individuals elected based on their contributions to the fields of
space law and related social sciences. Dedicated to fostering the development
of space law, the IISL organizes and holds an annual Colloquium at the IAC
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in partnership with the IAF, publishes an annual volume of its proceedings,

and organizes an annual space law moot court competition and other events
throughout the year. The IISL is a permanent observer at COPUOS, and in
recent years has jointly organized a symposium on the first day of the COPUOS
LSC meeting.

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Open Geospatial Consortium (OCG)

The OGC is a membership-based nonprofit organization dedicated to the
development and promulgation of open-source standards for the international
geospatial community. Its members include private-sector representatives from
the space, airborne, and terrestrial remote sensing industries, government
agencies, academia, research organizations, and non-governmental
organizations. OGC works through a consensus process to develop standards
for the interoperability and sharing of geospatial data, regardless of source. Its
membership currently consists of more than 500 organizations worldwide.

ReLACA Espacio
ReLACA Espacio, the Latin American and Caribbean Space Network, was
formed in 2021. It is composed of a network of universities and institutions
within the region with space-related activities. ReLACA Espacio works through
collaboration, knowledge exchange, and joint projects. Its aim is to strengthen
regional space capabilities and promote sustainable space development.

Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG)

Composed of member agencies including space agencies and international
organizations, the Space Frequency Coordination Group works informally
to develop resolutions and recommendations which express technical and
administrative agreements to prevent and alleviate the risks of radiofrequency
interference. The effectiveness of SFCG recommendations depends upon their
voluntary acceptance and implementation by members.

Space Generation Advisory Council (SGAC)

The Space Generation Advisory Council (SGAC) was formed in 1999. It is
composed of students and young professionals in the space sector worldwide.
SGAC works through events and projects to provide input on space policies. It
aims to engage the next generation in space policy, advocacy, and international
collaboration to shape the future of space exploration.

Space Safety Coalition (SSC)

The Space Safety Coalition (SSC) was formed in 2019. It is composed of
satellite operators and space industry stakeholders. SSC works by developing
and promoting best practices and guidelines for space operations. It aims to
enhance space safety, reduce collision risks, and ensure sustainable use of
space environments.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADR CDM CSF

Active Debris Removal Conjunction Data Message Commercial Spaceflight
Federation
AEB CFR
Brazilian Space Agency Code of Federal CSpOC
Regulations (USA) Combined Space
AIAA Operations Center (USA)
American Institute CNES
of Aeronautics and National Center for Space CTIO
Astronautics Studies (France) Cerro Tololo Inter-
American Observatory
APRSAF CNSA
Asia-Pacific Regional Space China National Space DAS
Agency Forum Administration Debris Assessment
Software (USA)
APSCC CONAE
Asia-Pacific Satellite National Commission DDTC
Communications Council on Space Activities Directorate of Defense
of Argentina Trade Controls (USA)
ASI
Italian Space Agency CONIDA DLR
National Aerospace German Aerospace Center
BELSPO Research and
Belgian Science Development DoD
Policy Office Center (Peru) Department of
Defense (USA)
BIS COPUOS
Bureau of Industry and Committee on the DRAMA
Security (USA) Peaceful Uses of Outer Debris Risk Assessment
Space (UN) and Mitigation
BSS Analysis (EU)
Broadcasting COSPAR
Satellite Services International Committee DV
on Space Research Change in Velocity
CA
Conjunction Assessment COTS EAR
Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Export Administration
CCL Regulations (USA)
Commercial Control CPS
List (USA) Center for the Protection EARSC
of Dark and Quiet Skies European Association
CCSDS from Satellite Constellation of Remote
Consultative Committee Interference Sensing Companies
for Space Data Systems
CSA EDAC
CD Canadian Space Agency Error Detection and
Conference on Correction
Disarmament (UN)

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ESA GGE ICAO

European Space Agency Group of International Civil Aviation
Governmental Experts Organization
ESG
Environmental, Social and GNSS ICG
Governance Global Navigation International Committee
Satellite Systems on Global Navigation
ESOA Satellite Systems
European, Middle East, and GPS
Africa Satellite Operators Global Positioning System ICJ
Association International Court
GSD of Justice
EU Ground Sampling Distance
European Union IISL
GSOA International Institute
EUMETSAT Global Satellite Operators of Space Law
European Organisation Association
for the Exploitation of ILRS
Meteorological Satellites GTO International Lunar
Geosynchronous Research Station
EUSST Transfer Orbit Cooperation Organization
European Union’s Space
Surveillance and Tracking HAC ILRSCO
High Accuracy Catalog International Lunar
FAA Research Station
Federal Aviation HEO Cooperation Organization
Administration (USA) High Earth Orbit
IN-SPACe
FCC I&T Indian National
Federal Communications Integration and Test Space Promotion
Commission (USA) Authorization Center
IAC
FMEA International IOT
Failure Modes and Astronautical Congress Internet of Things
Effects Analysis
IADC ISAM
FSOA Inter-Agency Space Debris In-Space Servicing,
French Space Coordination Committee Assembly and Maintenance
Operations Act
IAF ISO
FSS International Astronautical International Organization
Fixed Satellite Services Federation for Standardization

GEO IARU ISRO

Geostationary Earth Orbit International Amateur Indian Space Research
Radio Union Organisation
GEO
Group on Earth IAU ITAR
Observations International International Traffic in
Astronomical Union Arms Regulations (USA)

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ITU MEXT NOAA
International Ministry of Education, National Oceanic
Telecommunication Union Sports, Culture, Science and Atmospheric
and Technology ( Japan) Administration (USA)
ITU-R
International MIFR NOTAMs
Telecommunication Union Master International Notices to Air Missions
Radiocommunication Frequency Register
NSAU
ITU-T MILAMOS National Space Agency
International Manual on International of Ukraine
Telecommunication Union Law Applicable to Military
Telecommunication Uses of Outer Space NSC
Standardization Sector Norwegian Space Center
MSIP
JAXA Ministry of Science, NTIA
Japan Aerospace Information and National
Exploration Agency Communications Telecommunications and
Technology, and Future Information Administration
JSpOC Planning (South Korea)
Joint Space Operations NZSA
Center (USA) MSS New Zealand Space Agency
Mobile Satellite Services
KazCosmos OD
Ministry for Investment MTCR Orbit Determination
and Development– Missile Technology
Aerospace Committee Control Regime OEWG
(Kazakhstan) Open-Ended
NASA Working Group
LBA National Aeronautics and
Federal Aviation Space Administration (USA) OFAC
Office (Germany) Office of Foreign Assets
NASB Control (USA)
LEO National Academy of
Low Earth Orbit Sciences (Belarus) Ofcom
Office of
LSC NATO Communications (UK)
Legal Subcommittee North Atlantic Treaty
(COPUOS, UN) Organization OGC
Open Geospatial
LTS NEI Consortium
Long-Term Sustainability Non-Earth Imaging
OOSA
MASTER NGO Office for Outer Space
Meteoroid and Space Non-governmental Affairs (UN)
Debris Terrestrial Organization
Environment ORSAT
Reference (EU) NGSO Object Re-entry Survival
Non-geostationery orbit Analysis Tool (USA)
MEO
Medium Earth Orbit

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OST SDA STM

Outer Space Treaty Space Data Association Space Traffic Management

PAROS SEEs STSC

Prevention of an Arms Single Event Effects Scientific and Technical
Race in Outer Space Subcommittee
SEUs (COPUOS, UN)
Pc Single Event Upsets
Probability of Collision SUPARCO
SFCG Pakistan Space and Upper
PCA Space Frequency Atmosphere Research
Permanent Court of Coordination Group Commission
Arbitration
SIA SWPC
PNG Satellite Industry Space Weather Prediction
Position, Association Center (NOAA, USA)
Navigation, Timing
SLR TBC
R&D Satellite Laser Ranging To Be Considered
Research and Development
SME TBD
RAAN Small and Medium Sized To Be Determined
Right Ascension of the
Ascending Node SSA TCBM
Space Transparency
REACH Situational Awareness and Confidence-
Registration, Evaluation, Building Measure
Authorisation SSC
and Restriction of Space Safety Coalition TR
Chemicals (EU) Technical Regulation
SSN
RF Space Surveillance TRL
Radiofrequency Network (USA) Technology
Readiness Level
REG SSOD
Registration Convention Small Satellite UAE
Orbital Deployer United Arab Emirates
RHUs
Radioisotope Heat Units STC UAS
Space Traffic Coordination Uninhabited
Roscosmos Aircraft Systems
State Space STEM
Corporation (Russia) Science, Technology, UK
Engineering, and United Kingdom
RTGs Mathematics
Radioisotope UKSA
Thermoelectric Generators STI UK Space Agency
Science, Technology, and
SAR Innovation UN
Synthetic Aperture Radar United Nations

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UNCITRAL UTC
United Nations Coordinated
Commission on Universal Time
International Trade Law
WMO
UNESCO World Meteorological
United Nations Organization
Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization WRC
World
UNGA Radiocommunication
United Nations Conference
General Assembly
WTSA
UN-GGIM World Telecommunication
United Nations Committee Standardization Assembly
of Experts on Global
Geospatial Information
Management

UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research

UN-SPIDER
United Nations Platform
for Space-based
Information for Disaster
Management and
Emergency Response

US
United States

USGS
United States
Geological Survey

USML
United States
Munitions List

USSR
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

USSTRATCOM
United States
Strategic Command

List of Abbreviations | 145