CHRISTIAN CADAJAS Y CABIAS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

 Petitioner, who was then 24 years old, met the victim, AAA, who was only 14 years old,
in the canteen where he works. Their relationship started when the younger sibling of
AAA told petitioner that AAA had a crush on him. Petitioner tried to evade AAA, but the
latter started to stalk him. Later, AAA sent petitioner a request in his Facebook
Messenger, which he accepted.

 The petitioner and AAA would then exchange messages on Facebook Messenger and
after some time, petitioner courted AAA for two weeks, until they became sweethearts
on April 2, 2016.

 Sometime in June 2016, BBB, the mother of AAA, learned of their relationship. She
discovered the relationship because AAA would borrow her cellphone to access the
latter's Facebook account. Her mother was thus able to read their messages whenever
AAA would forget to log out her account. BBB disapproved of their relationship because
AAA was still too young. However, petitioner and AAA ignored her admonishment.

 Sometime in October 2016, BBB was disheartened when she read that petitioner was
sexually luring her daughter to meet with him in a motel. She confronted petitioner and
told him to stay away because AAA was still a minor.

 At around 5:30 in the morning of November 18, 2016, BBB was shocked when she read
the conversation between petitioner and AAA. She found that petitioner was coaxing her
daughter to send him photos of the latter's breast and vagina. AAA relented and sent
petitioner the photos he was asking. When AAA learned that her mother read their
conversation, she rushed to a computer shop to delete her messages. BBB, however, was
able to force her to open petitioner's Facebook messenger account to get a copy of their
conversation.

 On the part of the petitioner (Christian), he admitted sending AAA the messages "oo
ready ako sa ganyan" and "sige hubad." He, however, denied having sent AAA, photos of
his private part. On November 17, 2016, AAA asked petitioner to delete their messages
from his account. He even told her "bakit kasi hindi ka pa nagtitino, hayan tuloy nakita
ng mama mo." On the same day, petitioner broke up with AAA because her mother did
not like him.
 Petitioner later learned from his co-workers that two (2) criminal cases were filed against
him. He was charged for violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 (Child abuse) and for
child pornography as defined and penalized under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in
relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775.
 Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.

 After trial, the RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge for violation of Section 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610 (Child Abuse), but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No.
9775(Child Pornograpy) . As such, petitioner was sentenced to reclusion temporal and to
pay a fine of P1,000,000.00.

 According to the RTC, petitioner was aware that AAA was still a minor when he
obstinately prodded the latter to send him photos of her private parts. This is an explicit
sexual activity, a lascivious conduct, which the minor victim, AAA, could not have done
were it not for the persistent inducement of the petitioner

 On the other hand, the RTC dismissed the charge against petitioner for violation of
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 (Child abuse) holding that AAA is a city lass who was no
longer innocent of the ways of the world. She herself attested that she was not affected
by what happened.

 In Criminal Case Related to Child abuse, accused CHRISTIAN CADAJAS y CABIAS NOT
GUILTY and is hereby acquitted. In Criminal Case related to Child pornography, finding
accused CHRISTIAN CADAJAS y CABIAS GUILTY of violation of Sections 4(a) and 3(b) and
(c)(5) of RA 9775 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal and to pay a FINE of One Million Pesos.

 On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment. The CA held that the minority of AAA
was both established and was even admitted by the petitioner. the CA modified the
same and sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 14 years, eight
months and one day, as minimum, to 18 years and three months, as maximum. The fine
imposed was retained as it was within the range prescribed by law

Issue
Whether the CA gravely erred in not finding that the evidence presented by the prosecution are
inadmissible for violating petitioner's right to privacy.

Ruling

the petition is DENIED, Petitioner Christian Cadajas y Cabias is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of child pornography under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to Sections
4(a) and 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all its
accessory penalties and to pay a fine in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

One of the arguments raised by petitioner before this Court concerns the admissibility of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, which was taken from his Facebook messenger account.
He claims that the photos presented in evidence during the trial of the case were taken from his
Facebook messenger account. According to him, this amounted to a violation of his right to
privacy, and therefore, any evidence obtained in violation thereof amounts to a fruit of the
poisonous tree.

The court disagree.

The right to privacy is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's
person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person's ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the
public is not necessarily concerned." Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let
alone."

3 types of Pivacy according to Leonen:

1) Locational privacy - also known as situational privacy, pertains to privacy that is felt in a
physical space. It may be violated through an act of trespass or through an unlawful
search.

2) informational privacy - refers to one's right to control "the processing—i.e., acquisition,

disclosure and use—of personal information."

3) Decisional privacy - regarded as the most controversial among the three, refers to one's
right "to make certain kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and
reproductive autonomy."

Be that as it may, the act of AAA cannot be said to have violated petitioner's right to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test.

(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and

(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms,
and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Hence, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-
to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. [46]

Here, petitioner's expectation of privacy emanates from the fact that his Facebook Messenger
account is password protected, such that no one can access the same except himself. Petitioner
never asserted that his Facebook Messenger account was hacked or the photos were taken
from his account through unauthorized means. Rather, the photos were obtained from his
account because AAA, to whom he gave his password, had access to it. Considering that he
voluntarily gave his password to AAA, he, in effect, has authorized AAA to access the same. He
did not even take steps to exclude AAA from gaining access to his account. Having been given
authority to access his Facebook Messenger account, petitioner's reasonable expectation of
privacy, in so far as AAA is concerned, had been limited. Thus, there is no violation of privacy to
speak of.

While the messages and photos were taken from the Facebook Messenger of petitioner
because AAA was forced by BBB to do so, such does not deviate from the fact that petitioner
allowed another person to access his account. When he gave his Facebook Messenger password
to AAA, he made its contents available to AAA, and the latter would then have the latitude to
show to other persons what she could access, whether she be forced to do so or not. The
availability of accessing these photos limited the scope of his right to privacy, especially that
these became essential in pursuing AAA's claims to protect her rights.

In any case, it bears pointing out that petitioner failed to raise his objection to the admissibility
of the photos during the proceedings in the RTC. Basic is the rule that in order to exclude
evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper time, and the
grounds therefore be specifiedFrom the foregoing, one can be convicted for committing child
pornography upon proof of the following:

(1) victim is a child;

(2) victim was induced or coerced to perform in the creation or production of any form of child
pornography; and

(3) child pornography was performed through visual, audio or written combination thereof by
electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means. This Court finds that the
prosecution was able to prove these facts by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9775 defines a child to be as follows:

(a) "Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over, but is unable to fully take
care of himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.

For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also refer to:

(1) a person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child as defined
herein; and
(2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a person who is
represented or who is made to appear to be a child as defined herein.

“What we're trying to penalize, what we're trying to prohibit is the pedophile from gravitating
towards that kind of material.”

Senator Santiago noted that the possession of child pornography was not qualified by the
adverb "knowingly". She explained that knowledge of child pornography does not attach to
possession but only to access. Therefore, she believed that mere possession of child
pornography is punishable and not subject to the defense that the possessor was not aware of
the materials in his or her possession.

Engaging in such a relationship does not remove the special protection of a child. This is
especially true in the digital age and space, where a child's interaction with others easily evades
supervision.

All told, the courts a quo did not err in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A.
No. 9775.

Vivares v. St. Therese College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Facts:

 Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were,
during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College
(STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a
beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others,
took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were
then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile.

 Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s
high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted
pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.
Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn,
they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

 Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal

Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia
and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually
the entirety of their black brassieres.

 Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s
Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-
Charge, for appropriate action.

 On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr.
Purisima), STC’s high school principal. They claimed that during the meeting, they were
castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including
Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr.
Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are
barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

 A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan
(Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against
STC. On March 25, 2012, petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia,
joined the fray as an intervenor.
  the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

 Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data on the grounds of the following:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity
before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only."
They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of
the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court: the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
habeas data. To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy.

The Issues

Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given or not. Whether or not there was
indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case.

Ruling

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through
the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist
that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe
pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy
since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting
safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only
limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them,
people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing
said post without their knowledge and consent. As petitioner’s children testified, it was Angela
who uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the five of them.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my students showed me some pictures
of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high
school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there
are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab,
these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the
various photographs. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were
‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph.

 If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;"

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;

Important:

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is
no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with
the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering
the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the
said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the
students who showed the images to Escudero.

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find
no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Title: MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation: A Case on Breach of
Contract and the Application of the Electronic Commerce Act
Facts:
Events Leading to the Supreme Court:
1. Initial Business Dealings: MCC, a domestic corporation engaged in importing and
wholesaling stainless steel, regularly conducted business with Ssangyong, an international
trading company. They communicated through faxes for orders, confirmed by signed pro
forma invoices outlining terms and conditions.
2. The Agreement: On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong confirmed an order of 220 metric tons
(MT) of hot rolled stainless steel with MCC under preferential rates. MCC confirmed the
order through a signed fax.
3. Order Splitting and Partial Letter of Credit (L/C): Due to MCC’s inability to open a
full L/C, the order was split into two. Subsequent communications oversaw details on
shipment and further price adjustments informed through faxes, all of which were
acknowledged by MCC.
4. Failure to Open L/C and Requests for Extensions: Despite several communications,
MCC failed to open the L/C as agreed. Ssangyong sent multiple requests for the facilitation
of the L/C, even offered a discount, but MCC could only open a partial L/C for one half of the
order. They further requested price adjustments citing market price drops and operational
losses.
5. Legal Action for Damages: As MCC still failed to fulfill its obligation for the remaining
half, Ssangyong sought legal remedy and filed a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract. MCC lodged a defense claiming failure in presenting original pro forma invoices
among others.
6. Lower Court Rulings: The trial court found MCC and its manager liable, awarding
damages and attorney’s fees to Ssangyong. The decision was appealed to the CA, which
upheld the trial court’s ruling but absolved the manager from liability.
7. Supreme Court Petition and Ruling: MCC sought a review claiming issues on evidence
admissibility and the imposition of damages. The Supreme Court partially granted MCC’s
appeal, adjudicating discussions on the electronic evidence admissibility under the
Electronic Commerce Act, the existence of a contract, and the appropriate imposition of
damages.
Issues
1. Finality of the CA Decision: Whether the CA decision had become final and executory
due to procedural lapses.
2. Admissibility of Electronic Evidence: The admissibility of faxed documents as
electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.
3. Existence of a Perfected Contract: Whether there was a perfected contract between
MCC and Ssangyong and if MCC breached such contract.
4. Appropriateness of Damages Award: The validity of the awarded actual damages and
attorney’s fees in favor of Ssangyong.
Court’s Decision:
1. Procedural Issue: The court found valid reasons to consider the appeal despite
procedural lapses, citing substantial justice concerns.
2. Electronic Evidence: The court ruled that original fax transmissions are not considered
electronic documents under the Electronic Commerce Act and thus, photocopies of such
faxes cannot be considered as electronic evidence.
3. Contract and Breach: The court affirmed the existence of a contract and MCC’s
subsequent breach, based on the totality of business conduct and other unchallenged
documentary evidence.
4. Damages: The court struck down the actual damages award due to insufficient proof but
maintained the award for attorney’s fees. It awarded nominal damages to Ssangyong for the
breach.

Facts:

Parties and Business Relationship

 MCC Industrial Sales Corporation (MCC), a domestic corporation engaged in importing

and wholesaling stainless steel, conducted business with Ssangyong Corporation, an
 international trading company with a head office in Seoul and regional headquarters in
Makati City.
 The two companies typically transacted their orders and confirmations via telephone
calls and facsimile (fax) or telecopy transmissions.

Formation and Terms of the Transaction

 On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong’s Manila office sent, by fax, a letter to MCC’s Manager
Gregory Chan confirming an order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel at
a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT.

 Chan, acting on behalf of MCC (and Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation), assented by
affixing his signature on the conforme portion of the fax.

 On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO401 detailing
the transaction’s terms including payment through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at
sight.

 MCC replied by fax, with the invoice marked by Chan’s conformity signature, thereby
confirming the order.

 Due to MCC’s inability to open a full letter of credit for the entire order, the original
220MT order was split into two orders of 110MT each—documented under Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

Developments and Subsequent Communications

 On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong notified MCC (via fax) that 193.597MT of the stainless steel
was ready to ship, urging the opening of the L/C.

 On June 22, 2000, additional communications indicated a US$30/MT price adjustment

and the arrangement to ship the goods in two tranches (100MT on the same day with
the balance by June 27, 2000).

 Follow-up letters on June 26 and 27, 2000 further pressed MCC for the necessary L/C
opening due to mounting warehousing costs and issues of timely shipment.

 On June 28, 2000, Ssangyong expressed concern in a fax that its principal was in
difficulty due to MCC’s failure to open the L/Cs.
  On June 29, 2000, Chan requested an extension of time by fax explaining that MCC’s
credit line was fully availed, while Ssangyong replied urging prompt action.

 In a bid to maintain their business relationship, Ssangyong offered a further US$20/MT

discount in a letter dated June 30, 2000.
 Despite repeated follow-ups, MCC did not open an L/C for the full order, and on August
15, 2000, Ssangyong, through counsel, warned that failure to open the L/C would result
in contract cancellation and a claim for damages of US$96,132.18.
 Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 were issued on August 16,
2000 with a revised quantity of 100MT per invoice and a reduced price of US$1,700.00
per MT; both bore Chan’s signature.

 An L/C was eventually opened on August 17, 2000 for the shipment covered by Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 and the goods were delivered.

 MCC later requested a price adjustment due to prevailing market conditions in a fax
dated August 22, 2000, which was rejected by Ssangyong.

 On August 23, 2000, Ssangyong sent a demand letter for the opening of the final L/C for
the remaining shipment with a warning of cancellation and additional damages; Chan
failed to respond.

 Finally, on September 11, 2000, Ssangyong, through counsel, canceled the contract
under the earlier pro forma invoices and demanded US$97,317.37 in damages.

 This contractual breach led Ssangyong to file a civil action for damages on November 16,
2001, alleging MCC’s failure to open the required L/C and consequent breach of
contract.

Procedural History

 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision on March 24, 2004, in favor of
Ssangyong, ordering MCC and Chan to pay actual damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs, while excluding Sanyo Seiki from liability.

 MCC and Chan appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), raising
several errors, including:
  The alleged error in the determination of the quantity contracted and
consequential documents.

 The admissibility of the pro forma invoices (fax printouts) as evidence.

 The award of actual damages and attorney’s fees.

 The holding of joint and several liability of Gregory Chan.

 On August 31, 2005, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling on damages and other
findings but absolved Chan from liability.

 MCC subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on October 4, 2005, which

was denied by the CA on November 22, 2005.

 MCC then elevated the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on
certiorari, challenging the CA’s decision on various legal grounds.

Issue:

Timeliness and Finality of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision

 Whether the CA decision dated August 15, 2005, had become final and
executory, particularly considering the receipt of the decision by counsel and the
filing of the motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Admissibility of Fax Transmissions as Electronic Evidence

 Whether the photocopies and printouts of the facsimile transmissions

(specifically Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2)
qualify as “electronic documents” or “electronic data messages” under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

 Whether these copies can satisfy the best evidence rule in lieu of original fax
transmissions.

Existence of a Perfected Contract and Alleged Breach

 Whether a valid and perfected contract of sale existed between MCC and
Ssangyong based on the exchanged fax communications and subsequent
conduct.

 Whether MCC’s failure to open the required letter of credit constituted a breach
of the contractual obligation.
  The implications of the subsequent adjustments (split orders, price reductions)
on the original contract terms.

Award of Damages and Attorney’s Fees

 Whether the award of actual damages (US$93,493.87) in the lower courts was
supported by sufficient and reliable evidence.

 Whether, in the absence of adequate proof of actual damages, the damages

should have been reduced or deleted.

Ruling:

Notice and Timeliness in Appellate Practice

 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000

emphasized that “electronic data messages” and “electronic documents” are
intended for paperless communications.

 Ordinary facsimile transmissions, having an inherent paper-based origin (both in

the original transmission and in their physical printouts), do not meet the criteria
set forth for electronic evidence.

 In circumstances where the best evidence is required, secondary photocopies of

fax transmittals cannot substitute for originals unless strict conditions under the
Rules on Evidence are satisfied.

 . Contract and Breach: The court affirmed the existence of a contract and MCC’s

 subsequent breach, based on the totality of business conduct and other

unchallenged documentary evidence.

 Damages: The court struck down the actual damages award due to insufficient
proof but maintained the award for attorney’s fees. It awarded nominal damages
to Ssangyong for the breach