Pu Appellant
Pu Appellant
(NLEMCC’25)
IN THE HONOURABLE
THE STATE
(PETITIONERS)
VERSUS
(RESPONDENTS)
1- List of abbreviation 02
2- Index of authorities 03
3- Statement of Jurisdiction 04
4- Statements of Facts 05
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN-1973
CASE LAWS
STATEMENT OF JURISDUCTION
The Honorable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the present petition
under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 which grants the Supreme Court of
Pakistan the sole authority to hear and determine appeals from the High Court rulings,
ensuring its position as the ultimate appellate body for all legal issues within the nation.
The counsel seeks leave to appeal and requests the Court’s consideration of the issues at
hand.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Incident Overview:
Judicial Decisions:
Sessions Court Decision:
o After considering the facts, evidence, and circumstances, the Sessions Judge
held all three accused guilty of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan
Penal Code (PPC).
o The court sentenced all three to death.
High Court Decision:
o Upon appeal, the High Court upheld the murder reference but revised the
sentences.
ISSUE – I
Whether the Criminal Appeal in maintainable before the Supreme Court of Pakistan or Not?
ISSUE – II
Can the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt which of the accused committed the act
of murder?
ISSUE – III
Should the accused be held jointly responsible under Section 34 PPC, or is there insufficient
evidence to establish common intention?
ISSUE - IV
Does the intoxication of the accused and witnesses weaken the credibility of the testimonies?
ISSUE - V
Should Abdul Wahid or the co-accused be convicted of murder, or can they plead for a lesser
charge such as manslaughter under Exception 1 of Section 300 PPC?
ISSUE - VI
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
ISSUE-I
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals under Article 185 of the
Constitution, with the requirement of granting leave for appeals not covered by specific clauses.
The cases of Zeeshan alias Shani and Ansar Ali illustrate the court's power to grant leave to
appeal and to overturn lower court judgments, acquitting the appellants in some cases.
ISSUE-II
The prosecution cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt which of the accused committed
the murder due to conflicting witness statements, compromised CCTV footage, lack of direct
evidence, and inconclusive forensic findings. The conditions at the scene, including flickering
lights and loud music, created ambiguity, making it difficult to ascertain the truth. As the burden
of proof lies with the prosecution and doubts exist, the accused should be granted the benefit of
the doubt and acquitted of the charge.
z
ISSUE-III
The concept of "common intention" under Section 34 of the law requires a pre-arranged plan
and shared intent among participants to establish vicarious liability. Mere presence at a crime
scene is insufficient; active participation or evidence of shared intent is essential. Common
intention can be inferred from actions and circumstances, but benefit of the doubt favors the
ISSUE-IV
Yes, intoxication of the accused and witnesses weakens the credibility of their testimonies. The
Supreme Court has emphasized that factors like the witness's level of intoxication, distance
from the crime scene, and lighting conditions affect the reliability of their accounts. Additionally,
the lack of clarity in the witnesses' attention due to intoxication and the integrity test of
witnesses further undermine their credibility. Given these factors, the court should reject their
testimonies and grant the accused the benefit of the doubt.
ISSUE-V
In this case, Abdul Wahid and the co-accused should be acquitted of the charge of murder, as the
prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The lack of direct evidence,
conflicting witness statements, unreliable forensic findings, and the ambiguity of the venue
conditions all contribute to reasonable doubt. According to the principle of the benefit of the
doubt, as established in various legal precedents, the accused must be given the benefit of
doubt, and in this case, it would be more prudent to convict them of a lesser charge, such as
manslaughter, rather than murder.
ISSUE-VI
Inconclusive forensic evidence significantly weakens the prosecution's case in criminal trials.
The absence of usable fingerprints on the weapon due to contamination, along with other gaps
in the forensic evidence, creates a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's involvement in the
crime. Legal precedents emphasize that the prosecution must establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and when critical forensic evidence is missing or unreliable, the benefit of
doubt must be extended to the accused. Therefore, in this case, the lack of credible forensic
evidence warrants the acquittal of the accused, as no legally sufficient evidence supports a
conviction.
ADVANCED ARGUMENTS
ISSUE – I
1
2021 SCMR 142
2
2010 SCMR 1821
ISSUE – II
The Counsel most respectfully submits before the Supreme Court that benefit of Doubt can
be given to accused due to absence of any witness.
“It is also an established principle of law and equity that it is better that 100 guilty persons
should let off but one innocent should not suffer.” The court, in the said case also observed
that “… it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty and
if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused. Reliance is based
on Mst. Asia Bibi Vs. State4, Tariq Pervaiz v. The State5, Ayub Masih v. The State6 and
Abdul Jabbar vs. State7.”
The Counsel humbly submits before the Honorable Supreme Court that there are following
doubts in the case at hand. These are as follows:
Logical Reasoning:
Evidence and Investigation
Venue Conditions: The flickering lights and loud music create ambiguity,
making it difficult to ascertain the sequence of events.
Lack of direct evidence: Lack of direct evidence and inconclusive forensic
findings create reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.
CCTV Footage: The footage is partially corrupted and lacks audio, leaving
critical gaps in evidence.
Forensic Evidence: The weapon recovered from the scene showed no conclusive
fingerprints due to contamination.
Autopsy Report: The cause of death was confirmed as severe internal bleeding
from multiple stab wounds to the chest and abdomen, suggesting the possibility of
multiple attackers.
Multiple Injuries: The autopsy report indicates that Mohsin suffered three stab
wounds, suggesting the possibility of multiple attackers.
Eyewitness Accounts: Witnesses provided conflicting statements. Some
identified Abdul Wahid as holding the broken bottle, while others implicated Bilal
and Usman.
3
11 2024 SCMR 156
4
PLD 2019 SC 64
5
1995 SCMR 1345
6
PLD 2002 SC 1048
7
2019 SCMR 129
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-II
From all above mentioned evidences and surrounding circumstances, the one thing is clear,
prosecution has no strong evidence that which of the accused commit the murder and they
don’t have the strong evidences to prove common intention.
The question of common intention under Section-34 is in detail discussed in Question-3
which I will further explain legally.
Conclusion:
As the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and the prosecution has the duty to prove the
guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt and according to a principle of law, benefit of
doubt goes to accused. Keeping in view the doubts raised and above explained reasons, the
counsel is of the view that accused should be given the benefit of doubt and thus should be
acquitted from the charge of murder.
ISSUE – III
SHOULD THE ACCUSED BE HELD JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE UNDER
SECTION 34 PPC, OR IS THERE INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH COMMON INTENTION?
Supreme Court has finally delineated the following prerequisites to understand the dogma of
common intention for its application in the case in terms of section 34 PPC:-8
(a) It must be proved that criminal act was done by various persons
(b) The completion of criminal act must be in furtherance of common intention as they all
intended to do so.
(c) There must be a pre-arranged plan and criminal act should have been done in concert
pursuant whereof.
(d) Existence of strong circumstances (for which no yardstick can be fixed and each case will
have to be discussed on its own merits) to show common intention.
(e) The real and substantial distinction in between `common intention' and `similar intention'
be kept in view.
Common intention and pre-arranged plan:
"Common intention" under Section 34 requires a pre-arranged plan and a prior meeting of
minds. Without evidence of shared intent and coordination, individuals are only liable for
their own actions. Proving collective intent is essential for vicarious liability.
It is well settled that common intention pre-supposes prior concert. "Common intention"
necessarily implies a pre-arranged plan. There must be a prior meeting of the minds of the
criminals and a plan formed among them to perpetrate a particular crime. To constitute
"common intention," it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to the
rest of them and shared by them. 9
Before a man can be vicariously convicted for a criminal act of another, the act must have
been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. Accordingly, there must be a
prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man, and each can have
the same intention, namely, the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate
fatal blow, and yet none would have the common intention required by the section because
there was no prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan. In such a case, each would
individually be liable for whatever injury he caused, but none could vicariously be convicted
for the act of any of the others. If the prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a
fatal one, he cannot be convicted of murder, however clearly an intention to kill could be
proved in his case. 10
Explanation of such pre-concert can be established even by an act performed by an individual
after completion of the crime, but some evidence showing meeting of mind or pre-planning is
necessary for conviction.11A person in doing an act may have the same or similar intention
with another person doing the same act, yet he may not have a common intention with him so
8
2023 YLR 2120
9
AIR 1978 SC 1492, 1995 Cri L.J 2409
10
PLD 1956 S.C. (Ind) 176, AIR 1972 SC 535
11
2008 [Link] 1000
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-III
as to invoke the aid of Section 34. In the latter case, there is always an element of pre-
planning before the act is actually done between the two or more persons.12
The offence must be proved to have been committed in concert and pursuance to a pre-
arranged plan. (PLD 2017 Pesh. 5) Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each
can individually inflict a separate fatal blow, and yet none may have the common intention
required under Section 34, as there may not have been a prior meeting of the minds to form a
pre-arranged plan. In such a case, each would be liable individually for whatever injury he
caused, and if the prosecution could not prove that his separate blow caused the fatal injury,
then he could not be convicted for murder. (AIR 1972 SC 535)
Common intention and participation:
A person cannot be made liable for an offence with the help of this section unless he has
actually participated in the commission of the crime.13
Mere Presence:
The mere presence of a person at the scene of an offence does not automatically imply their
involvement in the crime. For liability under section 34, there must be clear evidence of
shared common intention or participation in the crime. The accused's role must go beyond
just being present, and the prosecution must establish active involvement or facilitation of the
crime.
Mere presence of persons at the scene of an offence is not ipso facto sufficient to render them
liable u/s 34. Mere presence of the accused at the place of incident with co-accused who
committed the offence might not be sufficient to visit the former with the vicarious liability,
but there should be some strong circumstance manifesting a common intention. Generally,
common intention inter alia preceded by some or all of the elements, namely, common
motive, pre-planned preparation and concert pursuant to such a plan. Common intention
might have developed even at the spur of the moment or during the commission of the
offence.14
Mere presence of an accused with another accused who commits the crime would not
constitute his common intention unless there is evidence referring to the criminal act that the
accused committed in furtherance of common intention with the other accused. 15 Mere
presence of an accused at the time of commission of crime is not enough to hold him
responsible for the commission of crime unless the prosecution succeeds in establishing that
the accused had also shared common intention or common object with his co-accomplices or
helped or facilitated them in the crime.16
Mere presence. Mere presence of the accused is not sufficient to attract provisions of s. 34,
PPC. There must be proof of some overt act on the part of each accused done in furtherance
12
PLD 1950 Pesh 60
13
AIR 1971 SC 885
14
2022 YLR 885
15
2022 SCMR 1187
16
2021 MLD 392
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-III
of common intention.17 Person merely present at or near the scene, not carrying any weapon
nor even marching along with other assailants cannot be convicted with aid of S. 34. 18 Mere
presence of a person at the time of commission of offence is not sufficient to prove common
intention unless his presence is proved in furtherance of the common intention of all.19
Presence of the accused simpliciter not to be sufficient to saddle him with the common
intention in furtherance of the commission of offence where his only part assigned to him is
having fired in air to scare complainant party.20
Mere presence of a person on the spot does not necessarily attract the application of s. 34,
P.P.C.21Mere presence at the place of occurrence without active participation or the doing of
some positive act which would indicate the sharing of the common intention would not make
a person liable for the commission of an offence even with the aid of s. 34, P.P.C. (1981 Cri
LJ 84).
Mere presence at the scene of the crime may in certain circumstances amount to participation
in the crime. But this is a matter of evidence and has to be established by cogent proof (AIR
1978 SC 1392). Mere fact that two accused went together at the place of incident by itself is
not sufficient to make one liable for acts of another. Common intention must precede the act
constituting the offence.22
Merely because a number of persons had gathered together at a certain place, a common
intention to commit a crime cannot be inferred.23
Common intention may be inferred from the strong evidences and surrounding
circumstances:
For a person to be held liable under section 34, it must be proven that they shared a common
intention with others involved in the crime. Mere presence at the scene of the offence is
insufficient unless there is clear evidence of their active participation or involvement.
Common intention can be inferred from the conduct, actions, and prior concert of the
accused.
The charge of sharing common intention would always require proof that the gathering of
more than one person was with the active knowledge of the ultimate consequence of their
gathering, i.e., a determined goal or a likely consequence resulting from the actions of all or
any one of them.24 Common intention may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances
and the conduct of the parties. 25 Common intention could be inferred from the entire conduct
of the accused and not just from an individual act which they committed on the spot.26
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-III
17
PLD 2005 Kar 177
18
AIR 2001 S.C 1344
19
PLD 1961 Lah 348
20
PLJ 1982 Cr C. (Kar) 315
21
2005 P Cr.L.J. 1442
22
1984 Cri LJ 221
23
AIR 1953 SC 420
24
2022 P [Link]. Note 62 (94)
25
2020 YLR 1476
26
2011 MLD 1636
MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANT P a g e | 14
2ND NATIONAL EAGELS MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025
Vicarious liability cannot be visited unless some strong circumstances showing common
intention exist (2005 P. Cr.L.J. 1442). Mere fact that several persons took part in a crime, in
the absence of common intention, is not sufficient to convict them of the crime (2010 P
Cr.L.J. 253). Common intention is a question of fact which can be ascertained from the
evidence recorded in the case (2012 YLR 1325). If the prosecution alleged that the offence
was committed with common intention, which presupposed prior consent, it must be proved
that the offence was committed by a pre-arranged plan. Inference of common intention
cannot be drawn unless it is proved by direct evidence or circumstances.27
Vicarious liability cannot be visited unless some strong circumstances showing common
intention exist.28 The principle of vicarious liability could not be invoked unless and until
common intention and object were proved. Strong circumstances must exist manifesting a
common intention. The word "intention" is a state of mind that is not ordinarily ascertainable
but must be gathered or inferred from external acts. For this purpose, it is necessary to
examine the acts of the accused. Material must be available to show some overt act done in
furtherance of the common intention.29
Direct proof of pre-planning, premeditation, consultation, and instigation are necessary to
lead to the inference of common intention. Strong circumstances showing common intention
with co-accused must exist for making him vicariously liable. 30 In order to support a
conviction under that section, mere presence would not be sufficient; there must be proof of
some overt act on the part of each accused done in furtherance of the common intention. 31
Unless common intention is established as a matter of necessary inference from the proved
circumstances of the case, the accused persons will each be liable only for their particular act
and not for the act done by any other person.32
Common intention is a question of fact that can be ascertained based on acts and the conduct
of the accused, the ferocity of the attack, the weapons used, the number and seat of injuries,
the number of blows, and the element of prior concert of mind.33
No common intention found: Where there is no evidence that, except for the accused, none of
the other accused persons assaulted the deceased nor any of them exhorted the accused to
attack the deceased, the evidence does not unfold any prior concert or meeting of the minds
of the other accused persons in sharing the intention of the accused to murder the deceased
(AIR 1992 SC 59). Likewise, where there was a dispute over land between the accused party
and the deceased party, and the fatal injury on the deceased was inflicted by only one accused
while the remaining accused were armed only with sticks, they cannot be said to have shared
the common intention to cause death (1993 AIR SCW 3494).
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-III
Benefit of doubt:
27
2021 YLR 1696
28
2022 YLR Note 199 (211)
29
2017 YLR 232
30
2002 P CrLJ. 1072
31
1969 SCMR 454
32
AIR 1978 SC 1492
33
PLD 2006 SC 109
Where there is a doubt regarding the existence of common intention, the benefit of the doubt
must go to the accused. It is a principle of criminal law that in cases of ambiguity or
insufficient evidence, the accused cannot be convicted. This principle safeguards the rights of
the accused, ensuring that they are not wrongfully penalized.
Where there is a doubt regarding the existence of common intention to murder the deceased,
the benefit of the doubt must go to the accused. 34 If the accused was inside a closed room and
caused fatal injuries to the deceased in common intention, where it is not an open place and
no specific role was assigned to each accused, the benefit of doubt should be extended. 35 If
the accused is attributed only with uttering a lalkara and no further indication of his
knowledge of the co-accused carrying a knife, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the
doubt.36
The prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the
testimony of the eye-witnesses becomes doubtful, the prosecution case as a whole becomes
doubtful. A double presumption of innocence is available in cases of acquittal: the general
principle of law that an accused is innocent until proven guilty, and the second presumption
stemming from the order of acquittal passed in favor of the accused.37
If an accused is alleged to have exhorted the main accused who fired on the deceased, but the
accused did not use a firearm nor had any active role in the incident, and only used the
exhortation words "Mar Sale Ko" after strong abuses and threats by others, this does not
indicate a common intention to kill. The words used by the accused could mean either to kill
or to beat. The accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.38
Award of sentence:
In criminal law, fairness and consistency are vital in ensuring equal treatment for all accused.
When the guilt of several accused persons is proven to be equal and indistinguishable, they
must face equal punishment. This principle maintains justice and upholds the integrity of the
legal system.
Accused persons who participated in the commission of the crime gave one injury each to the
deceased, and all injuries, individually and collectively, were said to be sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature. No distinction in awarding sentences to each of the
accused could be made when the guilt of several accused was proven to be equal and
undistinguishable. The arm of the law must reach all the accused persons sternly and
remorselessly in an equal manner. The sentence awarded to the accused persons was
modified by the Supreme Court applying the principle of consistency.39
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-III
Conviction:
34
1968 P. Cr.L.J. 1123; 1969 P. Cr.L.J. 893, 1969 SCMR 344
35
PLJ 1998 FSC 126, 1984 P. Cr.L.J. 3151
36
1982 P. Cr.L.J. 466
37
2014 P. Cr.L.J. 148
38
AIR 1999 SC 883
39
2000 SCMR 1482
MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANT P a g e | 16
2ND NATIONAL EAGELS MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025
In criminal cases involving premeditated and concerted attacks, the law demands that the
accused be treated equally and face appropriate punishment. The application of vicarious
liability provisions like sections 34 or 149, P.P.C. should not alter the conviction or sentence
unless there is clear evidence of involvement. Consistency in sentencing ensures fairness and
justice, maintaining integrity in the legal system.
Conviction once recorded under section 302, P.P.C. in the case of a premeditated and
concerted attack launched with the intention of killings makes no difference with the
invocation of sections 34 or 149, P.P.C. The normal penalty of death is to be ordinarily
exacted to such convicts, and no discrimination justifiably permissible on such score in the
matter of sentence.40 There must be material to show that overt acts were done in furtherance
of the common intention of all the accused or in prosecution of the common object of
members of an unlawful assembly.41 It is always necessary not to apply either of provisions
of sections 34, 107, and 149, P.P.C., which seek conviction on vicarious liability only when
there is doubt about the application of these provisions.42
For instance:
For the application of Section 34, the crime must be committed with a shared common
intention among the individuals involved. If any act deviates from this common intention, the
liability cannot be extended to others. Each individual is held responsible for their actions
within the scope of the planned offence, and no one can be held accountable for acts outside
the premeditated common intention.
Section 34 of the Code creates joint liability for those who indulge in the organized
commission of a crime (2005 PCLJ 794). Section 34 will not apply unless it is shown that the
act constituting the offence is of the kind contemplated by the group as a whole and is not
foreign to their common intention (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 361). If three persons go out to
commit a felony, and one of them, unknown to the others, puts a pistol in his pocket and
commits a felony of another kind, such as murder, the two who did not concur in this second
felony will not be guilty thereof, notwithstanding it happened while they were engaged with
him in the felonious act for which they went out [(1930) 1 Lawin 194]. Where the attack on
the deceased was provoked by something which unexpectedly happened immediately before
it was launched, it was not possible to hold that the deceased was stabbed in furtherance of
the common intention of all the accused to murder him. No question of section 34 arises, and
each accused is responsible for his own individual act (PLD 1951 Lah 222). A companion of
a robber might have an approbation and admiration for him if he had killed one of the
villagers who were out to capture them, but that will not take the place of the intention
necessary for the application of section 34 (PLD 1956 Lah 157).
ISSUE – IV
DOES THE INTOXICATION OF THE ACCUSED AND WITNESSES
WEAKEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE TESTIMONIES?
40
PLD 1976 S.C. 452
41
1990 MLD 461
42
PLD 1988 S.C. 86
In this case the Supreme Court have applied Estimator Variables of Stress, Weapon
Focus and Distance and Lightning. After applying these variables, the Supreme
Court acquitted the appellants from the murder charge by extending them benefit
of the doubt.
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-III
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness's degree of attention;
(3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the suspect;
43
Case laws
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation (seeing the accused in
court); and
(5) the time between the crime and the confrontation (seeing the accused in court).
Relevance with our Case: The Supreme in para 13 of 2019 SCMR 95644 have cited
the above stated factors for credibility of witnesses. In our case the court must
consider these factors and declare that the witnesses Degree of Attention( factor 2)
got affected by the intoxication, so these witnesses testimonies cannot not be reliable.
3. Impeachment of credibility:
If there is one infirmity with impeaches the credit of a witness it is enough to make
his entire statement doubtful.45
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-IV
Benefit of Doubt:
44
para 13 of 2019 SCMR 956
45
NLR 1985 Cr. 219, PLJ 1985 Cr.C.(Lah.) 76
46
1980 [Link] 898
Bottom Line: As the witnesses are not reliable, so the benefit of doubt must be given
to accused in our case
ISSUE – V
47
2016 SCMR 274
48
1995 SCMR 1377
In the case at hand, there are multiple factors that create reasonable doubt regarding
the guilt of the accused. These include:
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-V
49
1998 SCMR 1993
50
2016 PCLJ Note 36(61)
51
2003 [Link] 1847
52
2002 PC 1312
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-V
53
2016 SCMR 2021
54
2008 PCI LJ 279
55
2014 SCMR 1197
56
2008 P [Link] 383
CONCLUSION:
Superior courts held in judgments of 2003 [Link] 184757, PLD 2002 SC 104858 Rule
of benefit of doubt is described as golden rule essentially the rule of prudence which
cannot be ignored while dispensing the justice according to law It is better that ten
guilty persons be acquitted rather than one innocent person be convicted The rule
occupied a pivotal place in Islamic Law and is enforced vigorously in view of Saying
Holy Prophet (PBUH) that "mistake of Qazi in releasing a criminal is better than his
mistake punishing an innocent.
Following the golden rule of criminal law and Qanun-e-Shahadat, the accused
must be granted the benefit of doubt, and as such, they should be acquitted of the
charges.
As held in 2004 P CrLJ 31359 Court to draw conclusion whether or not prosecution
had succeeded in establishing acquisition against the accused. If Court comes the
conclusion that the charge imposed against accused had not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt then accused would become entitled to be acquitted.
As held in 2013 P Cr.L.J. 112260 Prosecution has failed to prove the motive,
suppressed material fact and occurrence in mystery and it could safely be concluded
that either it was a case of no evidence, or occurrence did not take place the manner as
suggested by the prosecution. Prosecution having failed to prove its case against cased
persons beyond any shadow of doubt, they were acquitted extending them benefit of
doubt.
ISSUE – VI
57
2003 [Link] 1847
58
PLD 2002 SC 1048
59
2004 P CrLJ 313
60
2013 P Cr.L.J. 1122
In criminal trials, the prosecution must prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, supported by credible and convincing evidence. This principle is clearly
articulated in cases like 2018 [Link] Note 15 (p.18)61 and 2019 YLR 260362, in which
courts emphasized the importance of reliable evidence in securing a conviction by
court of justice. If the prosecution fails to establish the accused’s guilt through
substantive evidence, or if there are significant gaps in the evidence, the benefit of
doubt must be extended to the accused. As it is well established principle of law:
In this case, several elements of the prosecution’s evidence cast doubt on the accused's
involvement, particularly regarding forensic analysis and the handling of key physical
evidence:
ADVANCE ARGUMENT-VI
61
2018 [Link] Note 15 (p.18)
62
2019 YLR 2603
63
2018 [Link] Note 15 (p.18)
64
2019 YLR 2603
CONCLUSION:
Combining both the legal and logical reasoning, it becomes evident that the failure to
provide credible forensic evidence—such as a usable fingerprint or a verified weapon
—significantly weakens the prosecution's case. When crucial evidence such as the
forensic analysis is either incomplete or inconclusive, and when the prosecution
cannot conclusively tie the accused to the crime, the legal standard is not met. In these
circumstances, the legal principle demands that the accused be acquitted, as there is no
legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction. These deficiencies in evidence
create a reasonable doubt, necessitating the acquittal of the accused as the legal
principle dictates that no one should be convicted without clear, irrefutable evidence.
[Link] THAT the Grant the leave of appeal is granted under article 185(3) as in this case
grave miscarriage of justice is established;
1. II. HOLD THAT prosecution is unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that which
of accused has committed murder;
III. HOLD THAT accused are not liable for murder as there is insufficient evidence to
establish there culpability;
1. [Link] THAT the intoxication of witnesses and the unreliable nature of their
testimonies lead to the rejection of their evidence. That the accused be granted the
benefit of the doubt and acquitted;
[Link] THAT the absence of direct evidence and inconclusive forensic findings create
reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. That the accused be acquitted on these
grounds;
[Link] THAT the inconclusive forensic evidence and lack of irrefutable proof fail to
establish the guilt of the accused. That the accused be acquitted due to the prosecution’s
failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.