Nakba

The Nakba (Arabic: ‫ا لَّن ْكَبة‬, romanized: an-Nakba , lit. 't he cat ast rophe') is t he et hnic
cleansing[2] of Palest inian Arabs t hrough t heir violent displacement and dispossession
of land, propert y, and belongings, along wit h t he dest ruct ion of t heir societ y and t he
suppression of t heir cult ure, ident it y, polit ical right s, and nat ional aspirat ions.[3] The
t erm is used t o describe t he event s of t he 1948 Palest ine war in Mandat ory Palest ine
as well as t he ongoing persecut ion and displacement of Palest inians by Israel.[4] As a
whole, it covers t he fract uring of Palest inian societ y and t he long-running reject ion of
t he right of ret urn for Palest inian refugees and t heir descendant s.[5][6]
 Nakba

Part of the 1948 Palestine war and the

Arab–Israeli conflict

Palestinians being expelled from Haifa at

gunpoint, April 1948

Location Mandatory
Palestine

Target Palestinian Arabs

Attack type Ethnic cleansing,

forced
displacement,
dispossession,
mass killing, settler
 colonialism,
biological warfare

Deaths 15,000 Palestinian

Arabs killed[1]

Victims 750,000+
Palestinian Arabs
expelled or fled

Perpetrators Israel
Haganah
Irgun
Lehi

Motive Anti-Arab racism ·

Zionism · Settler
colonialism

During t he foundat ional event s of t he Nakba in 1948, approximat ely half of Palest ine's
predominant ly Arab populat ion, or around 750,000 people,[7] were expelled from t heir
homes or made t o flee t hrough various violent means, at first by Zionist paramilit aries,
and aft er t he est ablishment of t he St at e of Israel, by it s milit ary. Dozens of
massacres t arget ed Palest inian Arabs and over 500 Arab-majorit y t owns, villages, and
urban neighborhoods were depopulat ed,[8] wit h many of t hese being eit her complet ely
dest royed or repopulat ed by Jews and given new Hebrew names. Israel employed
biological warfare against Palest inians by poisoning village wells. By t he end of t he
war, 78% of t he t ot al land area of t he former Mandat ory Palest ine was cont rolled by
Israel.

The Palest inian nat ional narrat ive views t he Nakba as a collect ive t rauma t hat defines
t heir nat ional ident it y and polit ical aspirat ions. The Israeli nat ional narrat ive views t he
Nakba as a component of t he War of Independence t hat est ablished Israel's
st at ehood and sovereignt y.[9] Also, t hey negat e or deny t he at rocit ies commit t ed,
claiming t hat many of t he expelled Palest inians left willingly or t hat t heir expulsion
was necessary and unavoidable. Nakba denial has been increasingly challenged since
t he 1970s in Israeli societ y, part icularly by t he New Hist orians, alt hough t he official
narrat ive has not changed.[9][10][11]

Palest inians observe 15 May as Nakba Day, commemorat ing t he war's event s one day
aft er Israel's Independence Day.[12][13] In 1967 following t he Six-Day War, anot her
series of Palest inian exodus occurred; t his came t o be known as t he Naksa
(lit. 'Set back'), and also has it s own day, 5 June. The Nakba has great ly influenced
Palest inian cult ure and is a foundat ional symbol of t he current Palest inian nat ional
ident it y, t oget her wit h t he polit ical cart oon charact er Handala, t he Palest inian
keffiyeh, and t he Palest inian 1948 keys. Many books, songs, and poems have been
writ t en about t he Nakba.[14]
Ottoman and British
Mandate periods (prior to
1948)

The UN Partition Plan for Palestine in

1947

The root s of t he Nakba are t raced t o t he arrival of Zionist s and t heir purchase of land
in Ot t oman Palest ine in t he lat e 19t h cent ury.[15] Zionist s want ed t o creat e a Jewish
st at e in Palest ine wit h as much land, as many Jews, and as few Palest inian Arabs as
possible.[16] By t he t ime t he Brit ish announced t heir official support for Zionism in t he
1917 Balfour Declarat ion during World War I,[17] t he populat ion of Palest ine was about
750,000, approximat ely 94% Arab and 6% Jewish.[18]
Aft er t he part it ion of t he Ot t oman Empire, Brit ish-ruled Mandat ory Palest ine began in
1922.[19] By t hen, t he Jewish populat ion had grown t o around 10%.[20] Bot h t he Balfour
Declarat ion and t he Mandat e for Palest ine referred t o t he 90% Arab populat ion as
"exist ing non-Jewish communit ies."[21]

Following World War II and t he Holocaust , in February 1947, t he Brit ish declared t hey
would end t he Mandat e and submit t he fut ure of Palest ine t o t he newly creat ed
Unit ed Nat ions for resolut ion.[22] The Unit ed Nat ions Special Commit t ee on Palest ine
(UNSCOP) was creat ed, and in Sept ember, submit t ed a report t o t he UN General
Assembly recommending part it ion.[23] Palest inians and most of t he Arab League were
opposed t o t he part it ion.[24] Zionist s accept ed t he part it ion but planned t o expand
Israel's borders beyond what was allocat ed t o it by t he UN.[25] In t he aut umn of 1947,
Israel and Jordan, wit h Brit ish approval, secret ly agreed t o divide t he land allocat ed t o
Palest ine bet ween t hem aft er t he end of t he Brit ish Mandat e.[26]

On 29 November 1947, t he General Assembly passed Resolut ion 181 (II) – t he Unit ed
Nat ions Part it ion Plan for Palest ine.[27] At t he t ime, Arabs made up about t wo-t hirds
of t he populat ion[28] and owned about 90% of t he land,[29] while Jews made up
bet ween a quart er and a t hird of t he populat ion[30] and owned about 7% of t he land.[31]
The UN part it ion plan allocat ed t o Israel about 55% of t he land, where t he populat ion
was about 500,000 Jews and 407,000-438,000 Arabs. Palest ine was allocat ed t he
remaining 45% of t he land, where t he populat ion was about 725,000-818,000 Arabs
and 10,000 Jews. Jerusalem and Bet hlehem were t o be an int ernat ionally governed
corpus separatum wit h a populat ion of about 100,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews.[32]

The part it ion plan was considered by det ract ors t o be pro-Zionist , wit h 56%[33] of t he
land allocat ed t o t he Jewish st at e alt hough t he Palest inian Arab populat ion numbered
t wice t he Jewish populat ion.[34] The plan was celebrat ed by most Jews in
Palest ine,[35] wit h Zionist leaders, in part icular David Ben-Gurion, viewing t he plan as a
t act ical st ep and a st epping st one t o fut ure t errit orial expansion over all of
Palest ine.[36][37][38][39] The Arab Higher Commit t ee, t he Arab League and ot her Arab
leaders and government s reject ed it on t he basis t hat in addit ion t o t he Arabs forming
a t wo-t hirds majorit y, t hey owned a majorit y of t he lands.[40] They also indicat ed an
unwillingness t o accept any form of t errit orial division,[41] arguing t hat it violat ed t he
principles of nat ional self-det erminat ion in t he UN Chart er which grant ed people t he
right t o decide t heir own dest iny.[42][43] They announced t heir int ent ion t o t ake all
necessary measures t o prevent t he implement at ion of t he resolut ion.[44][45][46][47]
The 1948 Nakba

Clickable map of Mandatory Palestine with the depopulated locations during the 1948 Palestinian expulsion
and flight

The cent ral fact s of t he Nakba during t he 1948 Palest ine war are not disput ed.[48]

About 750,000 Palest inians—over 80% of t he populat ion in what would become t he
[ ]
Eleven Arab urban neighborhoods and over 500 villages were dest royed or
depopulat ed.[8] Thousands of Palest inians were killed in dozens of massacres.[49]
About a dozen rapes of Palest inians by regular and irregular Israeli milit ary forces have
been document ed, and more are suspect ed.[50] Israelis used psychological warfare
t act ics t o fright en Palest inians int o flight , including t arget ed violence, whispering
campaigns, radio broadcast s, and loudspeaker vans.[51] Loot ing by Israeli soldiers and
civilians of Palest inian homes, business, farms, art work, books, and archives was
widespread.[52]

Nov 1947 – May 1948

Small-scale local skirmishes began on 30 November and gradually escalat ed unt il
March 1948.[53] When t he violence st art ed, Palest inians had already begun fleeing,
expect ing t o ret urn aft er t he war.[54] The massacre and expulsion of Palest inian Arabs
and dest ruct ion of villages began in December,[55] including massacres at Al-Khisas
(18 December 1947),[56] and Balad al-Shaykh (31 December).[57] By March, bet ween
70,000 and 100,000 Palest inians, most ly middle- and upper-class urban elit es, were
expelled or fled.[58]

In early April 1948, t he Israelis launched Plan Dalet , a large-scale offensive t o capt ure
land and empt y it of Palest inian Arabs.[59] During t he offensive, Israel capt ured and
cleared land t hat was allocat ed t o t he Palest inians by t he UN part it ion resolut ion.[60]
Over 200 villages were dest royed during t his period.[61] Massacres and expulsions
cont inued,[62] including at Deir Yassin (9 April 1948).[63] Arab urban neighborhoods in
Tiberias (18 April), Haifa (23 April), West Jerusalem (24 April), Acre (6-18 May), Safed
(10 May), and Jaffa (13 May) were depopulat ed.[64] Israel began engaging in biological
warfare in April, poisoning t he wat er supplies of cert ain t owns and villages, including a
successful operat ion t hat caused a t yphoid epidemic in Acre in early May, and an
unsuccessful at t empt in Gaza t hat was foiled by t he Egypt ians in lat e May.[65]

Under int ense public anger over Palest inian losses in April, and seeking t o t ake
Palest inian t errit ory for t hemselves in order t o count er t he Israeli-Jordanian deal, t he
remaining Arab League st at es decided in lat e April and early May t o ent er t he war
ft t h B it i h l ft [66] H th i f th l i d d t A bL
st at es were st ill weak and unprepared for war,[67] and none of t he Arab League st at es
were int erest ed in t he est ablishment of an independent Palest inian st at e wit h Amin
al-Husseini at it s head. Neit her t he expansionist King Abdullah I of Jordan nor t he
Brit ish want ed t he est ablishment of an independent Palest inian st at e.[68] On 14 May,
t he Mandat e formally ended, t he last Brit ish t roops left , and Israel declared
independence.[69] By t hat t ime, Palest inian societ y was dest royed and over 300,000
Palest inians had been expelled or fled.[70]

May 1948 – Oct 1948

1948 expulsion of the Tantura women and

children to Furaydis

On 15 May, Arab League armies ent ered t he t errit ory of former Mandat ory Palest ine,
beginning t he 1948 Arab–Israeli War, t he second half of t he 1948 Palest ine war.[71]
Most of t he violence up t o t hat point occurred in and around urban cent ers, in t he
Israeli port ion of t he part it ioned land, while Brit ish t roops were st ill present .[72] Aft er
t he end of t he Mandat e, Israel seized more land allocat ed t o t he Palest inians by t he
UN part it ion plan, and expulsions, massacres, and t he dest ruct ion of villages in rural
areas increased,[73] including t he Tant ura massacre (22-23 May).[74]

The first t ruce bet ween Israel and t he Arab League nat ions was signed in early June
and last ed about a mont h.[75] In t he summer of 1948, Israel began implement ing ant i-
repat riat ion policies t o prevent t he ret urn of Palest inians t o t heir homes.[76] A Transfer
Commit t ee coordinat ed and supervised effort s t o prevent Palest inian ret urn, including
t he dest ruct ion of villages, reset t lement of Arab villages wit h Jewish immigrant s,
confiscat ion of land and t he disseminat ion of propaganda discouraging ret urn [77]
During t he t en days of renewed fight ing bet ween Israel and t he Arab st at es aft er t he
first t ruce, over 50,000 Palest inians were expelled from Lydda and Ramle (9-13
July).[78] A second t ruce was signed in mid-July and last ed unt il Oct ober.[75] During t he
t wo t ruces, Palest inians who ret urned t o t heir homes or crops, labelled "infilt rat ors" by
t he Israelis, were killed or expelled.[79]

Oct 1948 – Jul 1949

Expulsions, massacres, and Israeli expansion cont inued in t he aut umn of 1948,[80]
including t he depopulat ion of Beersheba (21 Oct ober),[81] t he al-Dawayima massacre
(29 Oct ober),[82] and t he Safsaf massacre (also 29 Oct ober).[83] That mont h, Israel
convert ed t he ad hoc milit ary governat es ruling over Palest inian Arabs in Israel int o a
formal milit ary government t hat cont rolled nearly all aspect s of t heir lives, including
curfews, t ravel rest rict ions, employment and ot her economic rest rict ions, arbit rary
det ent ion and ot her punishment s, and polit ical cont rol.[84] Mart ial law assist ed Israeli
effort s t o find and expel or kill "infilt rat ors" in order t o prevent Palest inians from
repopulat ing t heir villages.[85]

Most of t he fight ing bet ween Israel and t he Arab st at es ended by t he wint er of
1948.[86] On 11 December 1948, t he UN passed Resolut ion 194, resolving t hat
Palest inians should be permit t ed t o ret urn t o t heir homes and be compensat ed for
lost or damaged propert y, and est ablishing t he Unit ed Nat ions Conciliat ion
Commission.[87] Armist ices formally ending t he war were signed bet ween February and
July 1949,[88] but massacres and expulsions of Palest inians cont inued in 1949 and
beyond.[89]

By t he end of t he war, Palest ine was divided and Palest inians were scat t ered.[90]
Israel held about 78% of Palest ine,[91] including t he 55% allocat ed t o it by t he UN
part it ion plan and about half of t he land allocat ed for a Palest inian st at e.[92] The West
Bank and Gaza St rip comprised t he remaining half, and were now held by Jordan and
Egypt , respect ively.[93] The int ernat ionally governed corpus separatum was divided
bet ween an Israeli-held West Jerusalem and a Jordanian-held East Jerusalem.[94]
Israel wit h it s expanded borders was admit t ed as a member t o t he Unit ed Nat ions in
M 1949 [95] Ab t 156 000 P l ti i i d d ilit l i I l
including many int ernally displaced persons.[96] The approximat ely 750,000
Palest inians who were expelled or fled from t heir homes were now living in refugee
camps in t he West Bank, Gaza St rip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.[97] None were allowed
t o ret urn.[98] No Palest inian st at e was creat ed.[99]
Post-1948 Nakba

Martial law period (1949–1966)

Boundar ies defined in the

1947 UN Par tition Plan for
Palestine:

Area assigned for a

Jewish state
Area assigned for an
Arab state
Planned Corpus
separatum with the intention
 that Jerusalem would be
neither Jewish nor Arab

Ar mistic e Demarc ation

Lines of 1949 (Green Line):

Israeli controlled
territory from 1949
Egyptian and
Jordanian controlled territory
from 1948 until 1967

The Nakba cont inued aft er t he end of t he war in 1949.[4] Israel prevent ed Palest inian
refugees out side of Israel from ret urning.[100] Palest inians cont inued t o be expelled,
and more Palest inian t owns and villages were dest royed, wit h new Israeli set t lement s
est ablished in t heir place.[101] Palest inian place names and t he name "Palest ine" it self
were removed from maps and books.[102]

Sixt y-nine Palest inians were killed in t he 1953 Qibya massacre.[103] A few years lat er,
49 Palest inians were killed in t he Kafr Qasim massacre, on t he first day of t he 1956
Suez Crisis.[104]

Palest inians in Israel remained under st rict mart ial law unt il 1966.[105]

Naksa period (1967–1986)

During t he 1967 Six-Day War, hundreds of t housands of Palest inian refugees were
driven from t he West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Most were driven int o
Jordan.[106] This has become known as al-Naksa (t he "set back").[107] Aft er t he war,
Israel occupied t he West Bank and Gaza St rip.[108]

Some t wo t housand Palest inians were killed in a massacre led by t he Lebanese Front
at t he Siege of Tel al-Zaat ar in 1976, during t he Lebanese Civil War.[109] Palest inian
refugees in Lebanon were killed or displaced during t he 1982 Lebanon War, including
bet ween 800 and 3,500 killed in t he Sabra and Shat ila massacre.[110]
Since the First Intifada (1987–
present)
The First Int ifada began in 1987 and last ed unt il t he 1993 Oslo Accords.[111] The
Second Int ifada began in 2000.[112] In 2005, Israel wit hdrew from Gaza and blockaded
it .[113] In t he West Bank and East Jerusalem, Israel has built t he Israeli West Bank
barrier[114] and creat ed Palest inian enclaves.[115]

In 2011, Israel passed t he Nakba Law, which denies government funding t o inst it ut ions
t hat commemorat e t he Nakba.[116]

The 2023 Israel-Hamas War has caused t he highest Palest inian casualt ies since t he
1948 war,[117] and has raised fears among Palest inians t hat hist ory will repeat
it self.[118] These fears were exacerbat ed when Israeli Agricult ural Minist er Avi Dicht er
said t hat t he war would end wit h "Gaza Nakba 2023."[119] Dicht er was rebuked by
Prime Minist er Benjamin Net anyahu.[120]

Components
The Nakba encompasses t he violent displacement and dispossession of Palest inians,
along wit h t he dest ruct ion of t heir societ y, cult ure, ident it y, polit ical right s, and
nat ional aspirat ions.[3]

Displacement
During t he 1947–49 Palest ine war, an est imat ed 750,000 Palest inians fled or were
expelled, comprising around 80% of t he Palest inian Arab inhabit ant s of what became
Israel [7] Almost half of t his figure (over 300 000 Palest inians) had fled or had been
expelled ahead of t he Israeli Declarat ion of Independence in May 1948,[70] a fact
which was named as a casus belli for t he ent ry of t he Arab League int o t he count ry,
sparking t he 1948 Arab–Israeli War.[121]

Clause 10.(b) of t he cablegram from t he Secret ary-General of t he League of Arab

St at es t o t he UN Secret ary-General of 15 May 1948 just ifying t he int ervent ion by t he
Arab St at es, t he Secret ary-General of t he League alleged t hat "approximat ely over a
quart er of a million of t he Arab populat ion have been compelled t o leave t heir homes
and emigrat e t o neighbouring Arab count ries." In t he period aft er t he war, a large
number of Palest inians at t empt ed t o ret urn t o t heir homes; bet ween 2,700 and 5,000
Palest inians were killed by Israel during t his period, t he vast majorit y being unarmed
and int ending t o ret urn for economic or social reasons.[122]

The Nakba is described as et hnic cleansing by many scholars,[123] including Palest inian
scholars such as Saleh Abd al-Jawad,[124] Beshara Doumani,[125] Rashid Khalidi,[126] Adel
Manna,[127] Nur Masalha,[128] Nadim Rouhana,[129] Ahmad H. Sa'di,[130] and Areej
Sabbagh-Khoury,[131] Israeli scholars such as Alon Confino,[132] Amos Goldberg,[133]
Baruch Kimmerling,[134] Ronit Lent in,[135] Ilan Pappé,[136] and Yehouda Shenhav,[137] and
foreign scholars such as Abigail Bakan,[138] Elias Khoury,[139] Mark Levene,[140] Derek
Penslar,[141] and Pat rick Wolfe,[142] among ot her scholars.[143]

Ot her scholars, such as Yoav Gelber,[144] Benny Morris,[145] and Set h J. Frant zman,[146]
disagree t hat t he Nakba const it ut es an et hnic cleansing. Morris in 2016 reject ed t he
descript ion of "et hnic cleansing" for 1948, while also st at ing t hat t he label of "part ial
et hnic cleansing" for 1948 was debat able; in 2004 Morris was responding t o t he claim
of "et hnic cleansing" occurring in 1948 by st at ing t hat , given t he alt ernat ive was
"genocide - t he annihilat ion of your people," t here were "circumst ances in hist ory t hat
just ify et hnic cleansing ... It was necessary t o cleanse t he hint erland ... ['cleanse' was]
t he t erm t hey used at t he t ime ... t here was no choice but t o expel t he Palest inian
populat ion. To uproot it in t he course of war"; Morris said t his result ed in a "part ial"
expulsion of Arabs.[147][148]

St ill ot her scholars use different frameworks t han "et hnic cleansing": for example,
Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake use "forced removal" and Alon Confino uses "forced
migrat ion".[149]

At t he same t ime, many of t hose Palest inians who remained in Israel became
int ernally displaced. In 1950, UNRWA est imat ed t hat 46,000 of t he 156,000
Armist ice Agreement s were int ernally displaced refugees.[150][151][152] As of 2003,
some 274,000 Arab cit izens of Israel – or one in four in Israel – were int ernally
displaced from t he event s of 1948.[153]

Dispossession and erasure

The UN Part it ion Plan of 1947 assigned 56% of Palest ine t o t he fut ure Jewish st at e,
while t he Palest inian majorit y, 66%, were t o receive 44% of t he t errit ory. 80% of t he
land in t he t o-be Jewish st at e was already owned by Palest inians; 11% had a Jewish
t it le.[154] Before, during and aft er t he 1947–1949 war, hundreds of Palest inian t owns
and villages were depopulat ed and dest royed.[155][156] Geographic names t hroughout
t he count ry were erased and replaced wit h Hebrew names, somet imes derivat ives of
t he hist orical Palest inian nomenclat ure, and somet imes new invent ions.[157] Numerous
non-Jewish hist orical sit es were dest royed, not just during t he wars, but in a
subsequent process over a number of decades. For example, over 80% of Palest inian
village mosques have been dest royed, and art efact s have been removed from
museums and archives.[158]

A variet y of laws were promulgat ed in Israel t o legalize t he expropriat ion of

Palest inian land.[159][160]

Statelessness and
denationalization
The creat ion of Palest inian st at elessness is a cent ral component of t he Nakba and
cont inues t o be a feat ure of Palest inian nat ional life t o t he present day.[161] All Arab
Palest inians became immediat ely st at eless as a result of t he Nakba, alt hough some
t ook on ot her nat ionalit ies.[162] Aft er 1948, Palest inians ceased t o be simply
UNRWA Palest inians, West Bank-Palest inians, and Gazan-Palest inians, each wit h
different legal st at uses and rest rict ions,[163] in addit ion t o t he wider Palest inian
diaspora who were able t o achieve residency out side of hist oric Palest ine and t he
refugee camps.[164]

The first Israeli Nat ionalit y Law, passed on 14 July 1952, denat ionalized Palest inians,
rendering t he former Palest inian cit izenship "devoid of subst ance", "not sat isfact ory
and is inappropriat e t o t he sit uat ion following t he est ablishment of Israel".[165][166]

Fracturing of society
The Nakba was t he primary cause of t he Palest inian diaspora; at t he same t ime Israel
was creat ed as a Jewish homeland, t he Palest inians were t urned int o a "refugee
nat ion" wit h a "wandering ident it y".[167] Today a majorit y of t he 13.7 million Palest inians
live in t he diaspora, i.e. t hey live out side of t he hist orical area of Mandat ory Palest ine,
primarily in ot her count ries of t he Arab world.[168] Of t he 6.2 million people regist ered
by t he UN's dedicat ed Palest inian refugee agency, UNRWA,[a] about 40% live in t he
West Bank and Gaza, and 60% in t he diaspora. A large number of t hese diaspora
refugees are not int egrat ed int o t heir host count ries, as illust rat ed by t he ongoing
t ension of Palest inians in Lebanon or t he 1990–91 Palest inian exodus from
Kuwait .[170]

These fact ors have result ed in a Palest inian ident it y of "suffering", whilst t he
det errit orializat ion of t he Palest inians has creat ed a unit ing fact or and focal point in
t he desire t o ret urn t o t heir lost homeland.[171]
Long-term implications
and "ongoing Nakba"
The most import ant long-t erm implicat ions of t he Nakba for t he Palest inian people
were t he loss of t heir homeland, t he fragment at ion and marginalizat ion of t heir
nat ional communit y, and t heir t ransformat ion int o a st at eless people.[172]

Since t he lat e 1990s, t he phrase "ongoing Nakba" (Arabic: ‫النکبة المستمرة‬, romanized: al-
nakba al-mustamirra ) has emerged t o describe t he "cont inuous experience of
violence and dispossession" experienced by t he Palest inian people.[173] This t erm
enjoins t he underst anding of t he Nakba not as an event in 1948, but as an ongoing
process t hat cont inues t hrough t o t he present day.[174]

On November 11, 2023, Israeli Agricult ure Minist er Avi Dicht er remarked in an int erview
on N12 News on t he nat ure of t he 2023 Israel–Hamas war t hat "From an operat ional
st andpoint , you cannot wage a war like t he IDF want s t o in Gaza while t he masses are
bet ween t he t anks and t he soldiers," he said. "It 's t he 2023 Gaza Nakba."[175]

Terminology
The t erm Nakba was first applied t o t he event s of 1948 by Const ant in Zureiq, a
professor of hist ory at t he American Universit y of Beirut , in his 1948 book Ma cnā an-
Nakba (The Meaning of the Disaster).[176] Zureiq wrot e t hat "t he t ragic aspect of t he
Nakba is relat ed t o t he fact t hat it is not a regular misfort une or a t emporal evil, but a
Disast er in t he very essence of t he word, one of t he most difficult t hat Arabs have
ever known over t heir long hist ory."[177] Prior t o 1948, t he "Year of t he Cat ast rophe"
among Arabs referred t o 1920, when European colonial powers part it ioned t he
Ot t oman Empire int o a series of separat e st at es along lines of t heir own choosing.[178]
The word was used again one year lat er by t he Palest inian poet Burhan al-Deen al-
Abushi.[177] Zureiq's st udent s subsequent ly founded t he Arab Nat ionalist Movement in
1952, one of t he first post -Nakba Palest inian polit ical movement s. In a six-volume
encyclopedia Al-Nakba: Nakbat Bayt al-Maqdis Wal-Firdaws al-Mafqud (The
Catastrophe: The Catastrophe of Jerusalem and the Lost Paradise) published
bet ween 1958 and 1960,[179] Aref al-Aref wrot e: "How can I call it but Nakba
["cat ast rophe"]? When we t he Arab people generally and t he Palest inians part icularly,
faced such a disast er (Nakba) t hat we never faced like it along t he cent uries, our
homeland was sealed, we [were] expelled from our count ry, and we lost many of our
beloved sons."[180] Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari also used t he t erm Nakba in t he t it le of
his book Sir al Nakba (The Secret behind the Disaster) writ t en in 1955. The use of t he
t erm has evolved over t ime.[181]

Init ially, t he use of t he t erm Nakba among Palest inians was not universal. For example,
for many years aft er 1948, Palest inian refugees in Lebanon avoided and even act ively
resist ed using t he t erm, because it lent permanency t o a sit uat ion t hey viewed as
t emporary, and t hey oft en insist ed on being called "ret urnees".[182] In t he 1950s and
1960s, t erms t hey used t o describe t he event s of 1948 included al-'ightiṣāb ("t he
rape"), or were more euphemist ic, such as al-'aḥdāth ("t he event s"), al-hijra ("t he
exodus"), and lammā sharnā wa-tla'nā ("when we blackened our faces and left ").[182]
Nakba narrat ives were avoided by t he leadership of t he Palest ine Liberat ion
Organizat ion (PLO) in Lebanon in t he 1970s, in favor of a narrat ive of revolut ion and
renewal.[182] Int erest in t he Nakba by organizat ions represent ing refugees in Lebanon
surged in t he 1990s due t o t he percept ion t hat t he refugees' right of ret urn might be
negot iat ed away in exchange for Palest inian st at ehood, and t he desire was t o send a
clear message t o t he int ernat ional communit y t hat t his right was non-negot iable.[182]

National narratives
 While Palestinians and Israeli Arabs mourn the 1948 war as the Nakba (left, Israeli Arabs' annual March of
Return), most Israeli Jews celebrate it as their war of independence (right).

Palestinian national narrative

The Palest inian nat ional narrat ive regards t he repercussions of t he Nakba as a
format ive t rauma defining it s nat ional, polit ical and moral aspirat ions and it s ident it y.
The Palest inian people developed a vict imized nat ional ident it y in which t hey had lost
t heir count ry as a result of t he 1948 war. From t he Palest inian perspect ive, t hey have
been forced t o pay for t he Holocaust perpet rat ed in Europe wit h t heir freedom,
propert ies and bodies inst ead of t hose who were t ruly responsible.[10]

Shmuel Trigano, writ ing in t he Jewish Political Studies Review published by t he

Jerusalem Cent er for Public Affairs, out lines t he evolut ion of t he Nakba narrat ive
t hrough t hree st ages. Init ially, it depict ed Palest inians as vict ims displaced by Israel's
creat ion t o make way for Jewish immigrant s. The next phase recast t he Six-Day War
as Israel's colonizat ion of Palest inian lands, aligning t he Palest inian cause wit h ant i-
colonial sent iment s. The final st age leverages Holocaust memories, accusing Israel of
apart heid, resonat ing wit h West ern guilt over t he Holocaust . He argues t hese evolving
int erpret at ions omit complex hist orical fact ors involving failed at t empt s t o eliminat e
Israel, cont est ed t errit orial claims, and Jewish refugee displacement from Arab
nat ions.[183]
Israeli national narrative
The Israeli nat ional narrat ive reject s t he Palest inian charact erizat ion of 1948 as t he
Nakba (cat ast rophe), inst ead viewing it as t he War of Independence t hat est ablished
Israel's st at ehood and sovereignt y.[9][10] It port rays t he event s of 1948 as t he
culminat ion of t he Zionist movement and Jewish nat ional aspirat ions, result ing in
milit ary success against invading Arab armies, armist ice agreement s, and recognit ion
of Israel's legit imacy by t he Unit ed Nat ions.[9] While acknowledging some inst ances of
Israeli responsibilit y for t he Palest inian refugee crisis, as document ed by hist orians
like Benny Morris, t he overarching Israeli narrat ive accommodat es t his wit hin t he
cont ext of Israel's emergence as a st at e under difficult war condit ions, wit hout
negat ing Israel's foundat ional st ory and ident it y.[9] It perceives t he 1948 war and it s
out come as an equally format ive and fundament al event – as an act of just ice and
redempt ion for t he Jewish people aft er cent uries of hist orical suffering, and t he key
st ep in t he "negat ion of t he Diaspora".[10]

According t o t his narrat ive, t he Palest inian Arabs volunt arily fled t heir homes during
t he war, encouraged by Arab leaders who t old Palest inians t o t emporarily evacuat e so
t hat Arab armies could dest roy Israel, and t hen upon losing t he war, refused t o
int egrat e t hem.[184] This viewpoint also cont rast s Jewish refugees absorbed by Israel
wit h Palest inian refugees kept st at eless by Arab count ries as polit ical pawns. In
cont rast t o t he Palest inian narrat ive, claims t hat Arab villages were depopulat ed and
t hat Palest inian homes were dest royed are not acknowledged by t he mainst ream
Israeli narrat ive, t ypically using t erminology such as "abandoned" propert y and
"populat ion exchange" rat her t han "confiscat ed" or "expelled."[184][9]

Israeli legislative
measures
Israeli officials have repeat edly described t he t erm as embodying an "Arab lie" or as a
just ificat ion for t errorism In 2009 t he Israeli Educat ion Minist ry banned using t he t erm
"nakba" in t ext books for Arab children.[185]

In May 2009, Yisrael Beit einu int roduced a bill t hat would out law all Nakba
commemorat ions, wit h a t hree-year prison sent ence for such act s of
remembrance.[186] Following public crit icism, t he bill draft was changed, t he prison
sent ence dropped and inst ead t he Minist er of Finance would have t he aut horit y t o
reduce st at e funding for Israeli inst it ut ions found t o be "commemorat ing
Independence Day or t he day of t he est ablishment of t he st at e as a day of
mourning".[187] The new draft was approved by t he Knesset in March 2011, and
became known as t he Nakba Law.[188][189][190] In 2011, t he Knesset passed t he Nakba
Law, forbidding inst it ut ions from commemorat ing t he event . According t o Neve
Gordon, a school ceremony memoralizing t he Nakba would, under t he 2011 law, have
t o respond t o charges t hat it incit ed racism, violence and t errorism, and denied Israel's
democrat ic charact er, in doing so.[191] In 2023, aft er t he Unit ed Nat ions inst it ut ed a
commemorat ion day for t he Nakba on 15 May, t he Israeli ambassador Gilad Erdan
remonst rat ed t hat t he event it self was ant isemit ic.[192] The implement at ion of t he
new law unint ent ionally promot ed knowledge of t he Nakba wit hin Israeli societ y.[193]

Nakba denial
The denial of t he Nakba is cent ral t o Zionist narrat ives of 1948.[194] The t erm 'Nakba
denial' was used in 1998 by St eve Niva, edit or of t he Middle East Report, in describing
how t he rise of t he early Int ernet led t o compet ing online narrat ives of t he event s of
1948.[195] In t he 21st cent ury t he t erm came t o be used by act ivist s and scholars t o
describe narrat ives t hat minimized element s of t he expulsion and it s aft ermat h,[194]
part icularly in Israeli and West ern hist oriography before t he lat e 1980s,[196] when
Israel's hist ory began t o be reviewed and rewrit t en by t he New Hist orians.[197][198]

Nakba denial has been described as st ill prevalent in bot h Israeli and American
discourse and linked t o various t ropes associat ed wit h ant i-Arab racism.[199] The 2011
'Nakba Law' aut horized t he wit hdrawal of st at e funds from organizat ions t hat
commemorat e t he day on which t he Israeli st at e was est ablished as a day of
mourning, or t hat deny t he exist ence of Israel as a "Jewish and democrat ic st at e."[188]
Israeli grassroot s movement s, such as Zochrot , aim t o commemorat e t he Nakba
t hrough public memorials and event s [188] In May 2023 following t he 75t h anniversary
of t he Nakba, Palest inian president Mahmoud Abbas made t he denial of t he 1948
expulsion a crime punishable by t wo years in jail.[200]

International positions
On 17 May 2024, t he Unit ed Nat ions commemorat ed t he Palest inian Nakba for a
second year, calling on t he int ernat ional communit y t o redouble it s effort s t o end t he
Israeli occupat ion. An event , "1948-2024: The Cont inuing Palest inian Nakba" was also
held.[201]

Historiography
Avraham Sela and Alon Kadish claim t hat t he Palest inian nat ional memory of t he
Nakba has evolved over t ime, reconst ruct ing t he event s of 1948 t o serve
cont emporary Palest inian nat ional demands. They argue t hat t he Palest inian
hist oriography of t he Nakba t ends t o "ent irely ignore" t he at t acks launched by Arab
irregular and volunt eer forces against t he Yishuv, downplaying t he role of Palest inian
leaders in t he event s leading t o t he 1948 war and defeat .[202]

Elias Khoury writ es t hat t he works of Edward Said were import ant for t aking a
"radically new approach" t o t he Nakba t han t hose of Zureiq and ot her early adopt ers
of t he t erm, whose usage had "t he connot at ion of a nat ural cat ast rophe" and t hus
freed "Palest inian leadership and Arab government s from direct responsibilit y for t he
defeat ."[203]

In films and literature

Farha , a film about t he Nakba direct ed by Jordanian direct or Darin J. Sallam, was
chosen as Jordan's official submission for t he 2023 Academy Awards Int ernat ional
Feat ure Film cat egory. In response, Avigdor Lieberman, t he Israeli Finance Minist er,
ordered t he t reasury t o wit hdraw government funding for Jaffa's Al Saraya Theat er,
where t he film is scheduled for project ion.[204]

Museums
The Al Qarara Cult ural Museum held a collect ion of pre-Nakba jewellery. It was
dest royed in an explosion as a result of an Israeli at t ack in Oct ober 2023.[205][206]

See also

History
portal

Al-Nakba: The Palestinian

Catastrophe 1948
Balfour Declaration
Haifa Declaration
Jewish exodus from the Muslim
world
 Nakba Day
Nakba Law
The Holocaust and the Nakba

Notes

a. Note: The 6.2 million is

composed of 5.55 million
registered refugees and 0.63m
other registered people; UNRWA's
definition of Other Registered
Persons refer to "those who, at
the time of original registration
did not satisfy all of UNRWA's
Palestine refugee criteria, but
who were determined to have
 suffered significant loss and/or
hardship for reasons related to
the 1948 conflict in Palestine;
they also include persons who
belong to the families of other
registered persons."[169]

References

1. Wright, Juwariyah (16 May 2024).

"The Solemn History Behind
Nakba Day" ([Link]
78612/nakba-day-history/) .
Time. Retrieved 15 September
2024.
2. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 30, 65,
71, 81, 182, 193–194; Abu-Laban
& Bakan 2022, p. 511; Manna
2022; Pappe 2022, pp. 33, 120–
122, 126–132, 137, 239; Hasian
Jr. 2020, pp. 77–109; Khalidi
2020, pp. 12, 73, 76, 231; Slater
2020, pp. 81–85; Shenhav 2019,
pp. 49–50, 54, and 61; Bashir &
Goldberg 2018, pp. 20 and 32 n.2;
Confino 2018, p. 138; Hever
2018, p. 285; Masalha 2018,
pp. 44, 52–54, 64, 319, 324, 376,
383; Nashef 2018, pp. 5–6, 52,
76; Auron 2017; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 393; Al-
Hardan 2016, pp. 47–48; Natour
2016, p. 82; Rashed, Short &
Docker 2014, pp. 3–4, 8–18;
Masalha 2012; Wolfe 2012,
pp. 153–154, 160–161; Khoury
2012, pp. 258, 263–265; Knopf-
Newman 2011, pp. 4–5, 25–32,
109, 180–182; Lentin 2010, ch. 2;
Milshtein 2009, p. 50; Ram 2009,
p. 388; Shlaim 2009, pp. 55, 288;
Esmeir 2007, pp. 249–250; Sa'di
2007, pp. 291–293, 298, 308;
Pappe 2006; Schulz 2003, pp. 24,
31–32
3. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022,
pp. 511–512; Manna 2022,
pp. 7–9; Khalidi 2020, pp. 60, 76,
82, 88–89; Shenhav 2019,
pp. 48–51; Bashir & Goldberg
2018, Introduction; Nashef 2018,
p. 6; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
2017, p. 393 n. 2; Al-Hardan 2016,
pp. xi, 2; Rashed, Short & Docker
2014, p. 1; Sayigh 2013, pp. 52–
55; Masalha 2012, pp. 1, 10–13;
Lentin 2010, ch. 2; Milshtein
2009, p. 47; Ram 2009, pp. 366–
367; Webman 2009, p. 29; Abu-
Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 3, 8–9
4. Sayigh 2023, pp. 285 ("Nakba
entailed a continuing state of
rightlessness"), 288 n. 12 ("the
Nakba was not limited to 1948")
and 288 n. 13 ("Palestinians were
attacked in Jordan in ‘Black
September’, 1970, with heavy
casualties; in Lebanon during the
civil war of 1975–1990, including
the massacre of Tal al-Zaater
[1976]; during the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon in 1982, with the
massacre of Sabra/ Shatila;
during the Battle of the Camps
1985–1988; and again in 2007
with the Lebanese Army's attack
on Nahr al-Bared camp.
Palestinians were evicted from
Kuwait in 1990, and again in
2003; expelled from Libya in
1994–1995; evicted by landlords
in Iraq in 2003. In Syria, 4,027
have been killed and 120,00
displaced so far in the current
civil war. Israeli attacks against
Gaza have been continuous:
2008–2009, 2012, 2014, 2018,
2019 ... In the Occupied West
Bank, attacks by armed Israeli
settlers are frequent [Amnesty
2017]."); Pappe 2021, pp. 70-71 ("
[p. 70] The incremental
colonization, ethnic cleansing,
and oppression occurring daily in
historical Palestine is usually
ignored by the world media.") and
80 ("The Palestinians refer to
their current situation quite often
as al-Nakba al-Mustamera, the
ongoing Nakba. The original
Nakba or catastrophe occurred in
1948, when Israel ethnically
cleansed half of the Palestinian
population and demolished half
of their villages and most of their
towns. The world ignored that
crime and absolved Israel from
any responsibility. Since then, the
settler-colonial state of Israel has
attempted to complete the ethnic
cleansing of 1948."); Khalidi 2020,
p. 75, "None were allowed to
return, and most of their homes
and villages were destroyed to
prevent them from doing so.38
Still more were expelled from the
new state of Israel even after the
armistice agreements of 1949
were signed, while further
numbers have been forced out
since then. In this sense the
Nakba can be understood as an
ongoing process."; Shenhav 2019,
p. 49, "To be sure, the ethnic
cleansing of Palestine did not
begin or end in 1948. It started
back in the 1920s, with an
aggressive acquisition and
takeover of lands that reached a
peak in 1948 and again in 1967.
The ethnic cleansing continues in
the present day by other means:
the silent transfer in Jerusalem;
the settlements and the
expropriation of land in the West
Bank; the communal settlements
in the Galilee for Jews only; the
new Citizenship decree (which
bans Palestinian citizens from
bringing their Palestinian spouses
into Israel, thanks to the
emergency laws); the
“unrecognized Palestinian
villages” constantly under the
threat of destruction; the
incessant demolition of Bedouin
houses in the south; the omission
of Arabic on road signs; the
prohibition on importing literature
from Arab countries, and many
others. One telling example is the
fact that not one Arab town or
village has been established in
Israel since 1948."; Bashir &
Goldberg 2018, pp. 7 ("The Nakba
is an explicitly continuing present.
Its consequences as well as the
eliminatory colonial ideas and
practices that informed it are still
unfolding, being deployed, and
affecting contemporary
Palestinian life. Its aftermath of
suffering and political weakness
affects almost every Palestinian
and Palestinian family, along with
the Palestinian collective, on a
near-daily basis.") and 33 n. 4 ("In
Palestinian writings the signifier
“Nakba” came to designate two
central meanings, which will be
used in this volume
interchangeably: (1) the 1948
disaster and (2) the ongoing
occupation and colonization of
Palestine that reached its peak in
the catastrophe of 1948.");
Khoury 2018, pp. xiii–xv, "[p. xiii]
The Nakba's initial bloody
chapters were written with the
forceful ethnic cleansing of
Palestinians in 1948 ... This
proves the error of some Arab
historians who considered the
Nakba a historic event whose
place is set firmly in the past. The
everyday reality of life in
Palestine clearly indicates that
the 1948 war was merely the
beginning of the catastrophic
event. It did not end when the
cease-fire agreements of 1949
were signed. In fact, 1948 was
the beginning of a phenomenon
that continues to this day ... [p.
xiv] The Nakba continues to this
day even for those Israeli
Palestinians who were denied
their label of national identity as
“Palestinians” and are now
referred to as “Israeli Arabs.” ...
While the continuing Nakba is
obscured from view in Israel by
the laws and legislation approved
by the Israeli parliament, the
Nakba is very conspicuous in
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and
Gaza. Those lands occupied in
1967 are subject to military laws,
while settlements proliferate in
every corner: from Jerusalem,
which is being suffocated by
Jewish settlements, to the West
Bank, through to the Jordan
Valley. Repression, administrative
detentions, and outright killing
have become daily
institutionalized practices. Israel,
in fact, has built a comprehensive
apartheid system shored up by
settler-only roads that circumvent
Palestinian cities, the wall of
separation that tears up and
confiscates Palestinian cities and
villages, and the many
checkpoints that have made
moving from one Palestinian
Bantustan to the next a daily
ordeal. The consequences of the
continuing Nakba are nowhere
clearer than in Jerusalem and
Hebron, where settlers plant their
communities among Palestinians,
closing roads and turning ordinary
chores into a daily nightmare.
They reach the peak of
inhumanity by transforming Gaza
into the biggest open-air prison in
the world."; Rouhana & Sabbagh-
Khoury 2017, pp. 393 ("We use
“Nakba” to refer to an event and a
process. The event refers to the
dismantlement of Palestine and
Palestinian society in 1948 as a
result of the establishment of
Israel and the ethnic cleansing of
Palestinians from the part of
Palestine on which Israel was
established. The process refers
to the continuation of what
started in 1948 until today in the
forms of dispossession, exile,
colonization, and occupation."),
405 ("the Palestinian catastrophe
that has been continuing for close
to seven decades"), 407 ("Israel
continued the ethnic cleansing
well into the early 1950s"), and
422-423 ("This emerging
differentiation between the
Nakba as a traumatic and
rapturous event and the Nakba as
an ongoing process is of utmost
importance ... Support for the
increasing awareness of the
Nakba as an ongoing structural
process rather than a memory of
a discrete historical event with a
beginning and an end, and
support for the realization that
the Nakba also includes the
Palestinians in Israel, can be
found in the gradual emergence
of certain sentiments ... the
continued Nakba is the other side
of the colonial project of the
Jewish state."); Rashed, Short &
Docker 2014, pp. 1 ([Abstract]
"The paper suggests that the
‘Nakba’ of 1948, which was based
on appropriation of the land of
Palestine without its people,
comprising massacres, physical
destruction of villages,
appropriation of land, property
and culture, can be seen as an
ongoing process and not merely a
historical event.") and 12-18 ("[p.
12] The concept of an ‘ongoing’
Nakba is not a new one for
Palestinians ..."); Masalha 2012,
pp. 5 ("The clearing out and
displacement of the Palestinians
did not end with the 1948 war, the
Israeli authorities continued to
‘transfer’ (a euphemism for the
removal of Palestinians from the
land), dispossess and colonise
Palestinians during the 1950s"),
12-14 ("[p. 12] The Nakba as a
continuing trauma occupies a
central place in the Palestinian
psyche ... [p. 13] With millions still
living under Israeli colonialism,
occupation or in exile, the Nakba
remains at the heart of both
Palestinian national identity and
political resistance ... [p. 14] the
Nakba and ethnic cleansing of
Palestinians from Jerusalem and
other parts of the West Bank are
continuing"), 75 ("The pattern of
Israeli massacres of Palestinian
civilians established in 1948 has
been maintained: for example,
the massacres at Qibya in
October 1953, the al-Azazme
tribes in March 1955, Kafr Qasim
on 29 October 1956, Samo‘a in
the 1960s, the villages of the
Galilee during Land Day on 30
March 1976, Sabra and Shatila on
16–18 September 1982, al-Khalil
(Hebron) on 25 February 1994,
Kfar Qana in 1999, Wadi Ara in
2000, the Jenin refugee camp on
13 April 2002, the mass killing
during the popular Palestinian
uprisings (intifadas) against
Israeli occupation in the West
Bank and Gaza (1987–1993 and
2000–2002), Gaza (December
2008–January 2009), the Gaza
flotilla raid on 31 May 2010."),
251 ("The processes of ethnic
cleansing and transfer in
Palestine continue."), and 254
("While the Holocaust is an event
in the past, the Nakba did not end
in 1948. For Palestinians,
mourning sixty-three years of al-
Nakba is not just about
remembering the ‘ethnic
cleansing’ of 1948, it is also
about marking the ongoing
dispossession and dislocation.
Today the trauma of the Nakba
continues: the ongoing forced
displacement of Palestinians
caused by Israeli colonisation of
the West Bank, land confiscation,
continued closures and invasions,
de facto annexation facilitated by
Israel's 730-kilometre ‘apartheid
wall’ in the occupied West Bank,
and the ongoing horrific siege of
Gaza. Palestinians in Gaza, the
West Bank and East Jerusalem
are denied access to land, water
and other basic resources. Today
the Nakba continues through the
‘politics of denial’. There are
millions of Palestinian refugees
around the world, all of whom are
denied their internationally
recognised ‘right of return’ to their
homes and land. The memory,
history, rights and needs of
Palestinian refugees have been
excluded not only from recent
Middle East peacemaking efforts
but also from Palestinian top-
down and elite approaches to the
refugee issue (Boqai’ and Rempel
2003). The ongoing ethnic
cleansing of Palestinians from
Jerusalem, the West Bank and
the Naqab, and the failure of both
the Israeli state and the
international community to
acknowledge 1948 as such,
continue to underpin the
Palestine–Israel conflict ...");
Lentin 2010, p. 111, "Non-Zionist
scholars operate a different
timescale and highlight the
continuities between wartime
policies and post-1948 ethnic
cleansing. They treat the Nakba
as the beginning of an ongoing
policy of expulsion and
expropriation, rather than a fait
accompli which ended a long
time ago."; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di
2007, pp. 10 ("For Palestinians,
still living their dispossession, still
struggling or hoping for return,
many under military occupation,
many still immersed in matters of
survival, the past is neither
distant nor over ... the Nakba is
not over yet; after almost sixty
years neither the Palestinians nor
Israelis have yet achieved a state
of normality; the violence and
uprooting of Palestinians
continues.") and 18-19 ("One of
the most important is that the
past represented by the
cataclysmic Nakba is not past.
What happened in 1948 is not
over, either because Palestinians
are still living the consequences
or because similar processes are
at work in the present ... . Their
dispersion has continued, their
status remains unresolved, and
their conditions, especially in the
refugee camps, can be miserable.
For those with the class
backgrounds or good fortune to
have rebuilt decent lives
elsewhere, whether in the United
States, Kuwait, or Lebanon, the
pain may be blunted. But for
those in the vicinity of Israel, the
assaults by the Zionist forces that
culminated in the expulsions of
the Nakba have not actually
ceased. The Palestinians who
remained within the borders of
the new state were subjected to
military rule for the first twenty
years. Then in 1967, with the
military occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza, there was
another dislocating assault. In
1982 Israel bombarded and
invaded Lebanon, causing mass
destruction, the routing of the
PLO, and then a massacre in the
refugee camps. With Palestinian
resistance in the occupied
territories (the two intifadas), the
violence escalated. Hardly a week
goes by now when Palestinians
are not shelled, shot,
“assassinated,” arrested, taken to
prison, or tortured. Not a day
goes by when they are not
humiliated at checkpoints or
prevented from moving about by
the Israeli army. The
confrontation continues and with
it the funerals, the house
demolitions, the deportations,
and the exodus. The usurping of
water, the confiscation of land,
the denial of legal rights, and the
harassment also continue.");
Jayyusi 2007, pp. 109-110 ("The
unfolding trajectory of continuous
dispossession and upheaval
experienced at the hands of the
Israeli state was to reshape the
space of the collective narrative
over time. It was to become
obvious that the Nakba was not
the last collective site of trauma,
but what came later to be seen,
through the prism of repeated
dispossessions and upheavals,
as the foundational station in an
unfolding and continuing saga of
dispossession, negations, and
erasure.") and 114-116
5. Masalha 2012, p. 3; Dajani 2005,
p. 42: "The nakba is the
experience that has perhaps
most defined Palestinian history.
For the Palestinian, it is not
merely a political event — the
establishment of the state of
Israel on 78 percent of the
territory of the Palestine Mandate,
or even, primarily a humanitarian
one — the creation of the modern
world's most enduring refugee
problem. The nakba is of
existential significance to
Palestinians, representing both
the shattering of the Palestinian
community in Palestine and the
consolidation of a shared national
consciousness."; Abu-Lughod &
Sa'di 2007, p. 3: "For Palestinians,
the 1948 War led indeed to a
"catastrophe." A society
disintegrated, a people dispersed,
and a complex and historically
changing but taken for granted
communal life was ended
violently. The Nakba has thus
become, both in Palestinian
memory and history, the
demarcation line between two
qualitatively opposing periods.
After 1948, the lives of the
Palestinians at the individual,
community, and national level
were dramatically and irreversibly
changed."
6. Khalidi, Rashid I. (1992).
"Observations on the Right of
Return". Journal of Palestine
Studies. 21 (2): 29–40.
doi:10.2307/2537217 ([Link]
[Link]/10.2307%2F2537217) .
JSTOR 2537217 ([Link]
[Link]/stable/2537217) . "Only by
understanding the centrality of
the catastrophe of politicide and
expulsion that befell the
Palestinian people – al-nakba in
Arabic – is it possible to
understand the Palestinians'
sense of the right of return"
7. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511,
"over 80 per cent"; Pappe 2022,
p. 128, "Three-quarters of a
million Palestinians ... almost 90
per cent"; Khalidi 2020, p. 60,
"Some 80 percent ... At least
720,000 ..."; Slater 2020, pp. 81
("about 750,000"), 83 ("over 80
percent"), and 350 ("It is no longer
a matter of serious dispute that in
the 1947–48 period—beginning
well before the Arab invasion in
May 1948—some 700,000 to
750,000 Palestinians were
expelled from or fled their villages
and homes in Israel in fear of
their lives—an entirely justifiable
fear, in light of massacres carried
out by Zionist forces."); Shenhav
2019, p. 49, "750,000"; Bashir &
Goldberg 2018, p. 7, "some
750,000"; Bishara 2017, pp. 138
("expelled close to 750,000") and
148 n. 21 ("number of the
refugees displaced ranged
between 700,000 and 900,000";
Bäuml 2017, p. 105,
"approximately 750,000"; Cohen
2017, p. 87, "approximately
700,000 ... between half a million
and a million"; Manna 2013, pp.
93 ("approximately 750,000") and
99 n. 12 ("Recently, both
Palestinian and Israeli scholars
seem to agree on this estimate of
700,000–750,000 refugees.");
Masalha 2012, pp. 2, "about 90
per cent ... 750,000 refugees";
Wolfe 2012, p. 133, "some three
quarters of a million"; Davis 2011,
pp. 7 ("more than 750,000") and
237 n. 21 ("Most scholars
generally agree with the UN
number, which it was somewhere
in the vicinity of 750,000"); Lentin
2010, pp. 6 ("at least 80 per
cent") and 7 ("more than
700,000"); Ghanim 2009, p. 25,
"Around 750,000-900,000";
Kimmerling 2008, p. 280,
"700,000 to 900,000"; Morris
2008, p. 407, "some seven
hundred thousand"; Sa'di 2007,
pp. 297, "at least 780,000 ... more
than 80 percent"
8. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511;
Manna 2022, p. 17; Pappe 2022,
pp. 121 and 128 ("Half of the
villages had been destroyed,
flattened by Israeli bulldozers ...");
Khalidi 2020, p. 73, "conquest and
depopulation ... of scores of Arab
cities, towns, and villages";
Shenhav 2019, p. 49, "abolition of
hundreds of Palestinian towns
and villages"; Bashir & Goldberg
2018, p. 1, "destruction of
hundreds of villages and urban
neighborhoods ... evacuation of
villages"; Cohen 2017, p. 80;
Pappe 2017, p. 66, "In a matter of
seven months, 531 villages were
destroyed and eleven urban
neighborhoods emptied."
Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
2017, p. 400, "Palestinian cities
whose inhabitants were almost
completely forced out ...
hundreds of evacuated and
destroyed towns"; Rashed, Short
& Docker 2014, p. 10 (quoting
Mark Levene) "With at least 5,000
men, women, and children
slaughtered in the massacres,
531 villages and 11 major towns
destroyed and up to 800,000 folk
uprooted, mostly into exile, the
point of Pappe's effort can only
be affirmed."; Manna 2013, p. 91;
Khoury 2012, p. 259; Masalha
2012, pp. 3 ("over 500 villages
and towns and a whole country
and its people disappeared from
international maps and
dictionaries ... Walid Khalidi ...
listed 418 depopulated and
destroyed villages. However,
Salman Abu-Sitta's figure of 531
includes 77 destroyed Bedouin
villages in the south"), 7 ("coastal
cities of Palestine — Jaffa, Haifa
and Acre — were largely
depopulated"), 74 ("hundreds of
villages had been completely
depopulated and their houses
blown up or bulldozed"), 90-91
("Of the 418 depopulated villages
documented by Khalidi, 293 (70
per cent) were totally destroyed
and 90 (22 per cent) were largely
destroyed."), 107 ("nearly 500
destroyed and depopulated
villages"), and 115 ("towns and
villages of southern Palestine,
including the cities of Beer Sheba
and al-Majdal, were completely
depopulated"); Wolfe 2012, p. 161
n.1, "According to official Israeli
estimates, over 85% of
Palestinian villages were
‘abandoned’ in the Nakba, 218
villages being listed as
destroyed."; Davis 2011, pp. 7
("destruction of more than four
hundred villages ... depopulation
of Palestinians from cities"), 9
("418 villages that were
emptied"), and 237 n. 20 ("The
total number of depopulated
villages, hamlets, settlements,
and towns is estimated to be
between 290 and 472. The most
comprehensive study and the
clearest on its methods for
including and eliminating
population settlements is the
massive All That Remains (W.
Khalidi 1992), which estimates
the number of villages to be 418.
According to this study, Israeli
topographical maps chart 290
villages, Benny Morris's 1987
study lists 369, and the
Palestinian encyclopedia
published by Hay’at al-Mawsu‘a
al-Filastiniyya gives 391 (among
other sources on the subject).");
Ghanim 2009, p. 25, "about 531
villages were deliberately
destroyed"; Kimmerling 2008,
p. 280, "Most of their villages,
towns, and neighborhoods were
destroyed or repopulated by
Jewish residents"; Sa'di 2007, pp.
293-297 ("[p. 297] destruction of
some 420 Palestinian towns and
villages")
9. Partner, Nancy (2008). "The
Linguistic Turn along Post-
Postmodern Borders:
Israeli/Palestinian Narrative
Conflict". New Literary History. 39
(4): 823–845.
doi:10.1353/nlh.0.0065 ([Link]
[Link]/10.1353%2Fnlh.0.0065) .
JSTOR 20533118 ([Link]
[Link]/stable/20533118) .
S2CID 144556954 ([Link]
[Link]/CorpusID:1445
56954) .
10. Golani, Motti; Manna, Adel (2011).
Two sides of the coin:
independence and Nakba, 1948:
two narratives of the 1948 War
and its outcome ([Link]
[Link]/books?id=w_-FBAAAQ
BAJ&pg=PA14) . Institute for
Historical Justice and
Reconciliation. p. 14. ISBN 978-
90-8979-080-4. Retrieved
14 November 2023. "The
Palestinians regard the Nakba
and its repercussions as a
formative trauma defining their
identity and their national, moral,
and political aspirations. As a
result of the 1948 war, the
Palestinian people, which to a
large degree lost their country to
the establishment of a Jewish
state for the survivors of the
Holocaust, developed a
victimized national identity. From
their perspective, the Palestinians
have been forced to pay for the
Jewish Holocaust with their
bodies, their property, and their
freedom instead of those who
were truly responsible. Jewish
Israelis, in contrast, see the war
and its outcome not merely as an
act of historical justice that
changed the historical course of
the Jewish people, which until
that point had been filled with
suffering and hardship, but also
as a birth – the birth of Israel as
an independent Jewish state
after two thousand years of exile.
As such, it must be pure and
untainted, because if a person, a
nation, or a state is born in sin, its
entire essence is tainted. In this
sense, discourse on the war is
not at all historical but rather
current and extremely sensitive.
Its power and intensity is directly
influenced by present day events.
 In the Israeli and the Palestinian
cases, therefore, the 1948 war
plays a pivotal role in two simple,
clear, unequivocal, and
harmonious narratives, with both
peoples continuing to see the war
as a formative event in their
respective histories."

11. Khalidi, Walid (1961)

12. Schmemann, Serge (15 May
1998). "MIDEAST TURMOIL: THE
OVERVIEW; 9 Palestinians Die in
Protests Marking Israel's
Anniversary" ([Link]
[Link]/1998/05/15/world/mideas
t-turmoil-overview-9-palestinians-
[Link]
l) . The New York Times.
ISSN 0362-4331 ([Link]
[Link]/issn/0362-4331) .
Archived ([Link]
g/web/20220305041314/https://
[Link]/1998/05/15/
world/mideast-turmoil-overview-9
-palestinians-die-protests-markin
[Link]) from the original
on 5 March 2022. Retrieved
7 April 2021. "We are not asking
for a lot. We are not asking for
the moon. We are asking to close
the chapter of nakba once and for
all, for the refugees to return and
to build an independent
Palestinian state on our land, our
land, our land, just like other
peoples. We want to celebrate in
our capital, holy Jerusalem, holy
Jerusalem, holy Jerusalem."
13. Gladstone, Rick (15 May 2021).
"An annual day of Palestinian
grievance comes amid the
upheaval" ([Link]
om/2021/05/15/world/middleea
st/[Link]) . The New
York Times. ISSN 0362-4331 (htt
ps://[Link]/issn/03
62-4331) . Archived ([Link]
[Link]/web/2021051509291
0/[Link]
1/05/15/world/middleeast/nakba
-[Link]) from the original on
15 May 2021. Retrieved 15 May
2021.

14. Masalha 2012, p. 11.

15. Khalidi 2020, pp. 8–18; Bashir &
Goldberg 2018, pp. 2 and 7;
Khoury 2018, pp. xi-xiii and xv;
Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
2017, p. 423; Rashed, Short &
Docker 2014, p. 8; Manna 2013,
p. 89; Masalha 2012, pp. 44, 70,
and 168; Wolfe 2012, p. 134;
Morris 2008, pp. 1 and 392; Sa'di
2007, pp. 287–290
16. Manna 2022, pp. 2 ("the principal
objective of the Zionist leadership
to keep as few Arabs as possible
in the Jewish state"), 4 ("in the
1948 war, when it became clear
that the objective that enjoyed the
unanimous support of Zionists of
all inclinations was to establish a
Jewish state with the smallest
possible number of
Palestinians"), and 33 ("The
Zionists had two cherished
objectives: fewer Arabs in the
country and more land in the
hands of the settlers.");
Khalidi 2020, p. 76: "The Nakba
 represented a watershed in the
17. Masalha 2018, pp. 309–310 and
history of Palestine and the
325; Bishara 2017, p. 149; Manna
Middle East. It transformed most
2013, p. 89; Wolfe 2012, pp. 144;
of Palestine from what it had
Morris 2008, pp. 9–10; Sa'di
been for well over a millennium—
2007, pp. 288
a majority Arab country—into a
new state that had a substantial
Jewish majority. This
transformation was the result of
two processes: the systematic
ethnic cleansing of the Arab-
inhabited areas of the country
seized during the war; and the
theft of Palestinian land and
property left behind by the
refugees as well as much of that
owned by those Arabs who
18. Khalidi
remained2020,
in Israel.
pp. 27There
("around
would
94
have been
percent [Arabs]"),
no other28way
("6 percent
to
achieve aand
[Jews]"), Jewish
43; Slater
majority,
2020,
thepp.
explicit
39 ("50,000
aim Jews
of political
... 700,000
Zionism
from itsand
Arabs") inception. Nor 750,000,
44 ("about would it
have
of whom
been50,000–60,000
possible to dominate
or less
the country
than 9 percent
without
werethe
Jewish");
seizures
of land."; 2018, p. 314, "[quoting
Masalha
Slater 2020,
Balfour in 1919]
pp. 49
700,000
("There
Arabs";
were
three arguments
Morris for"Jewish
2008, p. 15, the moral
acceptability
numbers had ofgrown
someunder
formthe
of
transfer. The
Ottomans from
main
some
one—certainly
twenty-five
for the Zionists
thousand to sixty
but
tonot
eighty-five
only for
them—was
thousand between
the alleged
1881necessity
and
of establishing
1914. The Arabaincrease
secure and
had
stableless
been Jewish
dramatic—from
state in as much of
 Palestine as was feasible, which
450,000 (1881) to 650,000
was understood to require a large
(1918)"; Pappe 2006, p. 11, "no
Jewish majority."), 81 ("From the
more than five per cent [Jews]"
outset of the Zionist movement
19. Sayigh 2023, p. 281; Manna 2013,
all the major leaders wanted as
p. 89; Masalha 2012, p. 33, 54,
few Arabs as possible in a
and 150; Wolfe 2012, p. 143;
Jewish state"), 87 ("The Zionist
Davis 2011, p. 6; Morris 2008,
movement in general and David
pp. 9–14; Sa'di 2007, pp. 288–
Ben-Gurion in particular had long
290.
sought to establish a Jewish
state in all of “Palestine,” which in
their view included the West
Bank, Gaza, and parts of Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria."), and 92 ("As
Israeli historian Shlomo Sand
wrote: 'During every round of the
national conflict over Palestine
20. Sabbagh-Khoury
which is the longest
2023,
running
p. 53,
conflict of
"around 12its
percent
kind in[Jews]";
the modern
era, Zionism
Pappe 2022, has
p. 79,
tried
"They
to
appropriate additional
[Palestinians] represented
territory.'");
90 per
Segev
cent of2019, p. 418, "thebut
the inhabitants, Zionist
were
dream from
treated as if the
theystart—maximum
constituted only
territory,
50 per cent";
minimum
Davis Arabs";
2011, p. 6, "11
Cohen 2017,
percent [Jews]"
p. 78, "As was
suggested by Masalha (1992),
Morris (1987), and other scholars,
many preferred a state without
Arabs or with as small a minority
as possible, and plans for
population transfers were
considered by Zionist leaders and
activists for years.";
 Lustick & Berkman 2017, pp. 47
21. Sayigh 2023, p. 281, "A more
48, "As Ben-Gurion told one
dangerous discursive
Palestinian leader in the early
deformation was the Balfour
1930s, 'Our final goal is the
Declaration's designation of the
independence of the Jewish
Palestinians as 'existing non-
people in Palestine, on both sides
Jewish communities' contrasted
of the Jordan River, not as a
with 'the Jewish people' [Cronin
minority, but as a community
2017]. The political implications
numbering millions" (Teveth
of this distinction are evident: a
1985:130). Ipso facto, this meant
'people' was qualified for
Zionism's success would produce
nation/statehood, whereas
an Arab minority in Palestine, no
disparate 'communities' were
matter what its geographical
not."; Khalidi 2020, p. 27,
dimensions.";
"Significantly, the overwhelming
Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
Arab majority of the population
2014, p. 6, "It was obvious to
(around 94 percent at that time)
most approaches within the
Zionist
went unmentioned
movement—certainly
by Balfour,to
the mainstream
except in a backhanded
as represented
way as
by Labor
the Zionism
'existing and its
non-Jewish
leadership headed
communities in Palestine.'";
by Ben Gurion,
Slater
that a p.
2020, Jewish
39, "...state would entail
the Balfour
getting rid
Doctrine and
of the
as many
League
of Mandate
the
Palestinian
were conditional,
inhabitants
stipulating
of thethat
land
as possible
the ... Following
'non-Jewish' Wolfe,of
communities
we argue that the90
Palestine—some logic
percent
of of
demographic
the indigenouselimination is an
peoples!—must
inherent
retain their
component
'civil and religious
of the
Zionist project
rights.'"; Wolfe 2012,
as a settler-
p. 146, "The
colonial project,
Mandate's although
preamble it has
included a
taken different
safeguard clause
manifestations
protecting the
since the
rights of ‘existing
foundingnon-Jewish
of the Zionist
movement."; This clause is
communities’.
Masalha 2012, p. 38, From the
significant on a number of counts,
late nineteenth century and
not least the transience implied in
throughout the Mandatory period
the term ‘existing’, whose
the demographic and land
suggestion of temporariness was
policies of the Zionist Yishuv in
reinforced by the designation of
Palestine continued to evolve. But
91 per cent of the population as
its demographic and land battles
‘non-Jewish’."; Shlaim 2009, p. 23,
with the indigenous inhabitants of
"On the other hand, to refer to 90
Palestine were always a battle for
per cent of the population as 'the
'maximum land and minimum
non-Jewish communities in
Arabs' (Masalha 1992, 1997,
Palestine' was arrogant,
2000).";
dismissive and even racist. It was
Lentin 2010, p. 7, "'the Zionist
also the worst kind of imperial
leadership was always
double standard, implying that
determined to increase the
there was one law for the Jews,
Jewish space ... Both land
purchases in and around the
 villages,
and one law
and for
military
everybody else.";
preparations,
Morris 2008, pp.
were
9–10
all designed to

22. dispossess
Pappe 2022,the
[Link]
111–113; from
the area2020,
Khalidi of [Link] Jewish
72; Slater 2020,
state'
p. 62; (Pappe 2008:p.
Cohen 2017, 94).";
74; Davis
Shlaim
2011, p.2009,
6 p. 56, "That most
Zionist leaders wanted the largest
23. Pappe 2022, p. 115 and 119;
possible Jewish state in
Khalidi 2020, p. 72; Slater 2020,
Palestine with as few Arabs
p. 62; Cohen 2017, pp. 74–75;
inside it as possible is hardly
Morris 2008, pp. 40–41 and 47–
open to question.";
51
Pappé 2006, p. 250, "In other
words, hitkansut is the core of
Zionism in a slightly different
garb: to take over as much of
Palestine as possible with as few
 Palestinians as possible. ;
24. Manna 2022, p. 31, "However, the
Morris 2004, p. 588, "But the
Palestinian leadership, which was
displacement of Arabs from
aware of the unfavorable balance
Palestine or from the areas of
of power, could not accept the
Palestine that would become the
unjust partition resolution. Being
Jewish State was inherent in
content to say 'no' without
Zionist ideology and, in
presenting acceptable
microcosm, in Zionist praxis from
alternatives put it in the position
the start of the enterprise. The
of the aggressor, and the Jewish
piecemeal eviction of tenant
side appeared to be the victim
farmers, albeit in relatively small
who was threatened with
numbers, during the first five
annihilation at the hands of
decades of Zionist land purchase
neighboring Arab states. Despite
and settlement naturally
their resounding utterances, these
stemmed from, and in a sense
states were not prepared for a
hinted at, the underlying thrust of
military battle in Palestine, nor
the ideology which was to turn an
Arab-populated
were they unitedland into opinions
in their a State
with
as toan
what
overwhelming
needed to be
Jewish
done.
majority."
The Palestinians found
themselves being propelled into
battle without preparation and
with neither a unified command
nor sufficient awareness of what
was happening in the corridors of
the Arab League."; Pappe 2022,
pp. 116, "Despite this, the
Palestinians’ consensual rejection
of partition was fully known to
UNSCOP. For the Palestinians,
leaders and common people
alike, partition was totally
unacceptable, the equivalent in
their eyes of the division of
Algeria between the French
settlers and the indigenous
population."; Bashir & Goldberg
2018, p. 16, "The Arabs opposed
the partition plan—which they
justifiably saw as support for
Zionist colonialism and
imperialist intervention in the
Arab Middle East—and especially
the fact that it had awarded the
Jews, a minority in Palestine,
more than half of the territory.";
Cohen 2017, p. 74, "The
Palestinian leadership and the
Arab states rejected the Partition
Plan (for figures and a detailed
analysis of the UN Partition Plan
and the Arab rejection of it, see
Khalidi 1997). Two fundamental
reasons are worth mentioning:
first, they regarded the area in its
entirety as Arab territory and
refused to submit any of it to
Jewish sovereignty. Secondly,
they objected to a move that
would render one-third of the
Palestinian population a minority
in a Jewish state."; Shlaim 2009,
p. 38, "Within the Arab League,
however, there was no consensus
on the future of Palestine. Most
members, at least at the
declaratory level, backed an
uncompromising policy in the
fight against Zionism, and
denounced the United Nations
partition plan of 29 November
1947 as illegal, impracticable and
unjust, as did the AHC. The Arab
League was fully behind the
Palestinians in opposing partition
and, from the time it was founded
in March 1945 until Britain
confirmed its decision to
withdraw from Palestine in the
autumn of 1947, there was
consistent support for creating a
unitary and independent
Palestinian state. After that,
however, there were conflicting
views concerning the positive
policy to adopt on the future of
Palestine. On the one hand there
was Haj Amin al-Husseini, the
Mufti of Jerusalem, who pursued
a maximalist programme for an
independent and sovereign
Palestinian state over the whole
of Palestine. On the other hand
there was King Abdullah of
Transjordan, whose undeclared
aim was to partition Palestine
with the Zionists and to annex the
Arab part to his kingdom."; Morris
2008, pp. 63–64, "The Zionists
and their supporters rejoiced; the
Arab delegations walked out of
the plenum after declaring the
resolution invalid. The Arabs
failed to understand why the
international community was
awarding the Jews any part of
Palestine. Further, as one
Palestinian historian later put it,
they could not fathom why 37
percent of the population had
been given 55 percent of the land
(of which they owned only 7
percent). Moreover, the Jews had
been given the best agricultural
lands (the Coastal Plain and
Jezreel and Jordan Valleys) while
the Arabs had received the 'bare
and hilly' parts, as one Palestinian
politician, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, told
a Zionist agent.162 More
generally, 'the Palestinians failed
to see why they should be made
to pay for the Holocaust. . . . [And]
they failed to see why it was not
fair for the Jews to be a minority
in a unitary Palestinian state,
while it was fair for almost half of
the Palestinian population—the
indigenous majority on its own
ancestral soil—to be converted
overnight into a minority under
alien rule.'". But see: Slater 2020,
pp. 65-66 ("[p. 66] In any case,
many Palestinians were prepared
to negotiate a compromise
settlement with the Zionists. As
several of the Israeli 'New
Historians' have demonstrated,
the failure of the Palestinian
revolt of the 1930s and the
determination of the British and
later the United Nations to
enforce a compromise in
Palestine resulted in greater
moderation and realism among
many Palestinians who by the
mid-1940s had come to the
realization that partition and the
creation of a Jewish state in part
of Palestine was unavoidable. As
a result, a number of Palestinian
proposals were made for a
compromise settlement; they
were ignored by Ben-Gurion and
other Zionist leaders because of
the Zionist determination, as
Simha Flapan put it, 'to achieve
full sovereignty [in a Palestine] at
whatever cost.'") and 212 ("To be
sure, the Palestinians and the
Arab states also initially rejected
a two-state compromise, for
example, as it was embodied in
the 1947 UN partition plan ...")
25. Pappe 2022, p. 116, "In fact, the
Yishuv's leaders felt confident
enough to contemplate a
takeover of fertile areas within
the designated Arab state. This
could be achieved in the event of
an overall war without losing the
international legitimacy of their
new state."; Slater 2020, pp. 64-
65, 75 ("... the evidence is
overwhelming that the Zionist
leaders had no intention of
accepting partition as a
necessary and just compromise
with the Palestinians. Rather, their
reluctant acceptance of the UN
plan was only tactical; their true
goals were to gain time, establish
the Jewish state, build up its
armed forces, and then expand to
incorporate into Israel as much of
ancient or biblical Palestine as
they could.") and 212 ("... while for
tactical reasons Ben-Gurion and
the other Zionist leaders officially
“accepted” it—but their fingers
were crossed behind their backs,
for they planned to expand from
the partition borders once they
had the power to do so. Which
they did."); Masalha 2012, p. 58, "
[quoting Morris] large sections of
Israeli [Yishuv] society —
including the Ahdut Ha’avodah
party, Herut, and Mapai leaders
such as Ben-Gurion — were
opposed to or extremely unhappy
with partition and from early on
viewed the war as an ideal
opportunity to expand the new
state's borders beyond the UN-
earmarked partition boundaries
and at the expense of the
Palestinians. Like Jordan's King
Abdullah, they too were opposed
to the emergence of a Palestinian
Arab state and moved to prevent
it."; Morris 2008, p. 101, "...
mainstream Zionist leaders, from
the first, began to think of
expanding the Jewish state
beyond the 29 November
partition resolution borders.";
Sa'di 2007, p. 291, "According to
the Israeli historian Benny Morris
(2001: 138) the two leaders of
the Zionist movement, Chaim
Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion,
'saw partition as a stepping stone
to further expansion and eventual
takeover of the whole of
Palestine.'". But see: Cohen 2017,
pp. 74–76, "[p. 74] The Zionist
leadership, for its part, promoted
the proposal and worked with
American assistance to secure
its adoption by the UN General
Assembly ... One of the questions
often raised is whether the
Zionists were genuine when they
accepted it ... [p. 75] though the
existence of a large Arab minority
in the Jewish state was not seen
by the Zionist leadership as the
best, ideal situation, they
nonetheless decided to adhere to
international law and to the UN
resolution if the Palestinian Arabs
adhered to it."
26. Manna 2022, p. 88, "Under the
partition resolution, the Arab
state included three basic areas:
the Galilee mountains in the
north, the mountains of central
Palestine (subsequently called
the West Bank), and a coastal
strip which extends from north of
Isdud (Ashdod) to Rafah. The
presence of the Egyptian army in
the south explains why the Gaza
Strip remained under Arab rule,
and the presence of the
Jordanian Arab Legion in the
center, and the prior agreement
between King Abdullah and the
Zionist leadership, explains what
became of the West Bank.";
Pappe 2022, pp. 123 ("The
Legion paused near the city of
Jerusalem, the fate of which
remained undecided despite the
tacit understanding before the
war between the Hashemites and
the Jews on the partitioning of
post-Mandate Palestine between
them.") and 129 ("The tacit
understanding reached between
Israel and Jordan during the war
over the partitioning of post-
Mandate Palestine neutralized the
Arab Legion, Jordan's efficient,
British-led army, which confined
its activity to the area around
Jerusalem. This was a strategic
decision that determined the
balance of power in the 1948
war."); Khalidi 2020, pp. 77–78,
"Thereafter he sought to expand
his territory through a variety of
means. The most obvious
direction was westward, into
Palestine, whence the king's
lengthy secret negotiations with
the Zionists to reach an
accommodation that would give
him control of part of the country
... Both the king and the British
opposed allowing the
Palestinians to benefit from the
1947 partition or the war that
followed, and neither wanted an
independent Arab state in
Palestine. They had come to a
secret agreement to prevent this,
via sending “the Arab Legion
across the Jordan River as soon
as the Mandate ended to occupy
the part of Palestine allotted to
the Arabs.” This goal meshed with
that of the Zionist movement,
which negotiated with ‘Abdullah
to achieve the same end."; Slater
2020, pp. 79 ("In fall 1947, a
number of meetings occurred
between King Abdullah of Jordan
and high Zionist leaders. These
resulted in a secret agreement
under which Abdullah would keep
the Arab Legion out of any Arab
invasion into the lands
designated to Israel by the UN,
and Israel would stay out of the
West Bank, designated for an
Arab state, and East Jerusalem,
which was to be
internationalized. Because of his
ambitions to extend Hashemite
rule into the West Bank, Abdullah
had no interest in destroying a
Jewish state within the UN
boundaries; in fact, he preferred a
friendly Jewish neighbor to a
hostile Palestinian one.") and 88
("Before the war, the Zionists and
King Abdullah of Jordan had
secretly reached an agreement to
avoid war with each other: the
Israelis would not oppose a
Jordanian takeover of the West
Bank as long as Abdullah kept the
Arab Legion out of an Israel
within its UN-designated
boundaries."); Manna 2013, pp.
90-93 ("[p. 90] They failed also to
consider the effects of
factionalized Arab world and the
clear interest of King Abdullah of
Jordan in preventing the
establishment of a Palestinian
state, even if it meant colluding
with Britain and the Jewish
Yishuv."); Masalha 2012, p. 150,
"The picture that emerges from
the 1948 war, for example, as
historian Avi Shlaim has shown,
is not the fictional one (still
repeated by Israeli
spokespersons) of Israel
standing alone against the
combined might of the Arab
world. It is rather one of
convergence between the
interests of Israel and those of
Hashemite Transjordan and the
‘tacit alliance’ between the
Zionists and Hashemites (backed
by the British) against other
members of the divided Arab ‘war
coalition’ (Shlaim 2001: 79–103)
and especially against the
creation of an independent state
for the Palestinians, within the UN
Partition Plan."; Shlaim 2009, pp.
38 ("King Abdullah of Transjordan,
whose undeclared aim was to
partition Palestine with the
Zionists and to annex the Arab
part to his kingdom"), 80 ("Greater
tactical flexibility but a similar
reluctance to pay a significant
price emerge from the survey of
Israel's negotiations with Jordan.
That King Abdullah, the
grandfather of King Hussein, dealt
with the Jewish Agency was an
open secret. These contacts were
maintained from the
establishment of the emirate of
Transjordan in 1921 until
Abdullahs assassination in
1951."), 169-170 ("In 1947 its
leaders reached an agreement
with King Abdullah of Jordan to
partition Palestine at the expense
of the Palestinians."), and 256
("Britain's secret objective was
partition between the Zionists
and King Abdullah of Jordan, their
loyal ally - which was the precise
outcome of the 1948 war.");
Morris 2008, pp. 189–195, "[p.
191] So partition it would have to
be. This was agreed in principle
in two secret meetings in August
1946 in Transjordan between
'Abdullah and Jewish Agency
emissary Eliahu (Elias) Sasson.
(Incidentally, 'Abdullah and his
prime minister, Ibrahim Hashim,
believed—as had the Peel
Commission—that such a
partition, in order to be viable and
lasting, should be accompanied
by a transfer of the Arab
inhabitants out of the area of the
Jewish state–to-be.) There
matters stood until UNSCOP
proposed partition—but between
Palestine's Arabs and Palestine's
Jews—as the preferred solution.
Neither 'Abdullah nor the Jewish
Agency wanted a Husseini-led
Palestinian Arab state as their
neighbor; both preferred an
alternative partition, between
themselves. On 17 November
1947, twelve days before the
passage of the partition
resolution, Golda Myerson (Meir),
acting head of the Jewish Agency
Political Department, secretly met
'Abdullah at Naharayim (Jisr al-
Majami), to reaffirm the
agreement in principle of August
1946. 'Abdullah at first vaguely
reiterated his preference for
incorporating all of Palestine in
his kingdom, with the Jews
enjoying autonomy. Meir
countered that the Jews wanted
peaceful partition between two
sovereign “states.” The Jews
would accept a Jordanian
takeover of the West Bank as a
fait accompli and would not
oppose it—though, formally, the
Jewish Agency remained bound
by the prospective UN decision to
establish two states. 'Abdullah
said that he, too, wanted a
compromise, not war. In effect,
'Abdullah agreed to the
establishment of a Jewish state
in part of Palestine and Meir
agreed to a Jordanian takeover of
the West Bank (albeit while
formally adhering to whatever
partition resolution the General
Assembly would adopt). Both
sides agreed not to attack each
other. The subject of Jerusalem
was not discussed or resolved ...
[p. 193] Thus it was that when
Golda Meir, disguised in an Arab
robe, arrived on the night of 10–
11 May in Amman for her second
secret meeting with 'Abdullah, the
previous months’ understanding
about a peaceful Jewish-
Hashemite partition was not
reaffirmed ... There was a green
light. Jordan had won British
consent to occupy of the West
Bank with the termination of the
Mandate—so 'Abdullah, Abul
Huda, and Glubb believed—and
nothing the British did or said
thereafter was to contradict this
impression ... [p. 194] But
'Abdullah's bellicose tone and
Meir's gloomy report
notwithstanding, the king had
decided—as became clear from
the Legion's subsequent actions—
to move into Arab Palestine while
trying to avoid war with the
Yishuv and refraining from
attacking the territory of the UN-
defined Jewish state."; Sa'di 2007,
p. 291, "Not content with the 56
percent of the country offered to
them by the un plan, the Zionists
colluded with ‘Abdallah, the Emir
of Trans-Jordan, to partition the
remaining 43 percent proposed
for a Palestinian Arab State
(Shlaim 1988; 2001; Rogan 2001)
and ended up with more than
three quarters of the country.
Even this was not enough. Zionist
leaders have always refused to
accept a final demarcation of the
Jewish State's borders."
27. Manna 2022, p. 30; Pappe 2022,
p. 118; Khalidi 2020, p. 72; Slater
2020, p. 63; Bashir & Goldberg
2018, p. 16; Masalha 2012,
pp. 67, 150, 194, 196, and 224;
Davis 2011, p. 7; Shlaim 2009,
p. 256; Morris 2008, pp. 51–74;
Sa'di 2007, pp. 290–291
28. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511,
"67 per cent"; Manna 2022, pp. 30
("two-thirds of the population")
and 90 ("more than two thirds
(about 1,350,000) of the country's
two million people"); Natour
2016, p. 89, "around 70 %"; Morris
2008, p. 15, "1.3 million"; Pappe
2006, p. 29, "The indigenous
Palestinians made up the two-
third majority, down from ninety
per cent at the start of the
Mandate."
29. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511,
"the ‘Arabs’, who in 1948 owned
90 per cent of the land"; Rogan
2017, ch. 9 ([Link]
com/books?id=16U0mEbf4nAC&
pg=PA314) , "By 1947 the Arabs
of Palestine constituted a two-
thirds majority with over 1.2
million people, compared to
600,000 Jews in Palestine ...
Arabs owned 94 percent of the
total land area of Palestine and
some 80 percent of the arable
farmland of the country."; Natour
2016, p. 89, "Arabs with an
ownership of ... around 94 %;
Manna 2013, p. 90, "At the end of
1947 the Arabs of Palestine ...
possessed about 90% of
Palestine's privately-owned land.";
Sa'di 2007, p. 291, "Furthermore,
in terms of land ownership, the
Jewish holdings in the proposed
Jewish State were about 11
percent as compared to the 80
percent of land then owned by
Palestinians. In the proposed
Arab Palestinian state, Jews
owned a mere 1 percent of the
land."
30. Slater 2020, p. 62, "one-third";
Natour 2016, p. 89, "around
35 %"); Wolfe 2012, pp. 133–134,
"26%"; Davis 2011, p. 6, "33
percent"; Morris 2008, pp. 15
("630,000") and 65 ("37 percent");
Sa'di 2007, p. 290, "about one-
third"; Pappe 2006, p. 34, "no
more than one third"
31. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 119
("about 7 percent of the total
territory of Mandatory Palestine
by May 15, 1948") and 262 ("just
over 1.5 million dunams, or only
about 7 percent"); Khalidi 2020,
p. 83, "about 6 percent of
Palestinian land had been Jewish-
owned prior to 1948"; Natour
2016, p. 89 (6%); Masalha 2012,
p. 58, "6.6 per cent of the land
area of Palestine"; Wolfe 2012,
pp. 133–134, "around 7%"; Davis
2011, p. 6, "nearly 8 percent of
the land"; Morris 2008, p. 65, "7
percent"; Sa'di 2007, p. 290,
"between 5.6 percent and 7
percent"; Pappe 2006, pp. 24 ("by
the end of the Mandate ... around
six per cent of the land") and 34
("less than six per cent of the
total land area of Palestine")
32. Manna 2022, pp. 30 ("It was
expected that the Palestinians
would not accept this unjust
resolution, which gave 54 percent
of their homeland to the Jews
and gave them, who constituted
two-thirds of the population, only
45 percent.") and 294 n. 41
("According to estimates, up to
the end of 1947 about 450,000
Palestinians lived in the area
allocated for the Jewish state
under the partition resolution; 95
percent of them became
refugees, and only about 5
percent remained in Israel and
became citizens."); Khalidi 2020,
p. 72, "The postwar realignment
of international power was
apparent in the workings of
UNSCOP and in its majority
report in favor of partitioning the
country in a manner that was
exceedingly favorable to the
Jewish minority, giving them over
56 percent of Palestine, against
the much smaller 17 percent for
the Jewish state envisioned by
the 1937 Peel partition plan.";
Slater 2020, pp. 62 ("One problem
with this solution was that the
Jews were only one-third of the
population of mandatory
Palestine, so that to create a
viable state with a Jewish
majority, the UN engaged in a
kind of gerrymandering, creating
the proposed state on some 57
percent of the land, almost twice
as large as that proposed by the
Peel Commission ..."), 84 ("in
December 1947, the area
designated by the UN for a
Jewish state was estimated to
contain about 500,000 Jews and
400,000 Arabs"), and 86 ("Recall
Ben-Gurion's assessment that on
the eve of the UN partition there
were 500,000 Jews and 400,000
non-Jews (mostly Arab Muslims)
in the area allotted for a Jewish
state. Other estimates differ only
slightly; for example, in his history
of Israel, Sachar gives the figures
as 538,000 Jews, 397,000 Arabs.
Using those figures, then, Jews
comprised about 58 percent of
the population of the coming
Jewish state."); Bashir & Goldberg
2018, p. 16, "... awarded the
Jews, a minority in Palestine,
more than half of the territory.";
Bishara 2017, pp. 149–150, "The
partition plan of 1947 stipulates
clearly the partition of Palestine
into 'a Jewish state' and an 'Arab
state.' But in the context of the
partition plan, 45% of the
population of the Jewish state is
Arab. It seems a Jewish state
that was 45% Arab could be
imagined at that time. The
partition plan did not exhort,
'Deport these Arabs out of the
Jewish state' but rather took the
existing demographic structure of
the country at the time for
granted and accepted it as it was.
It just drew a line, saying that in
particular areas a Jewish state
will emerge although it will
include up to 45% Arabs, and in
other areas an Arab state will
emerge that has 10% Jews. The
partition plan actually
emphasizes that Arabs and Jews
have to live together. In that plan,
the Arabs were expected to be
about half the population in the
Jewish state and a big majority in
the Arab state."; Cohen 2017,
p. 74, "... two states – one Jewish
and one Arab – in the area of
Mandate Palestine and proposed
that Jerusalem in its entirety
would be administered by an
international regime.
Approximately 800,000 Arabs and
9,000 Jews lived in the area
earmarked for the Arab state.
Half a million Jews and about
400,000 Arabs lived in the area
designated as the Jewish state,
where the Arabs constituted 40%
(a proportion slated to decrease
with expected waves of Jewish
immigration). The estimated
number of Jews and Arabs living
in the greater area of Jerusalem
was more or less equal (around
100,000 each)."; Natour 2016,
p. 89, "This plan proposed to
divide the country between Jews,
whose landownership would
increase from 6 to 54 % (they
made up for around 35 % of the
population) and the Arabs with an
ownership of 46 % instead of
around 94 % (who made up for
around 70 % of the population)
..."; Masalha 2012, p. 68, "55 per
cent"; Davis 2011, p. 7, "On
November 29, 1947, the United
Nations General Assembly
passed Resolution 181, which
contained a plan to partition
Palestine into Arab and Jewish
states, with an international zone
(called a corpus separatum) for
the 'holy areas' in Jerusalem and
Bethlehem, to be administered by
the UN (see Map 1). The Arab
state, which never came to
fruition, was to have a population
of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000
Jews on some 43 percent of the
land of Palestine. The Jewish
state was to have a Jewish
population of 498,000 and an
Arab population of 407,000 on 56
percent of the land. The
population of the International
Zone was to be 105,000 Arabs
and 100,000 Jewish inhabitants.";
Morris 2008, pp. 63–64,
"Resolution 181[II] called for the
partition of Palestine into two
sovereign states, one Jewish, the
other Arab ... The Jewish state,
on about 55 percent of
Palestine's territory ... The Arab
state, on about 42 percent of
Palestine ... The Jerusalem area—
including the city itself, outlying
villages ('Ein Karim and Abu Dis),
and Bethlehem—was designated
a corpus separatum"; Sa'di 2007,
pp. 290–291, "Although Jews by
then constituted only about one-
third of the population, the
proposed Jewish State was to be
established on 56 percent of
Palestine's territory and was to
have included only a slight Jewish
majority of 499,000 Jews versus
438,000 Palestinians. The Arab
state was to have been
composed of 43 percent of the
country reflections and would
include 818,000 Palestinians and
fewer than 10,000 Jews (Khalidi
1997: 11)."; Pappe 2006, pp. 34
("the Jews, who owned less than
six per cent of the total land area
of Palestine and constituted no
more than one third of the
population, were handed more
than half of its overall territory.")
and 35 ("On forty-two per cent of
the land, 818,000 Palestinians
were to have a state that included
10,000 Jews, while the state for
the Jews was to stretch over
almost fifty-six per cent of the
land which 499,000 Jews were to
share with 438,000 Palestinians.
The third part was a small
enclave around the city of
Jerusalem which was to be
internationally governed and
whose population of 200,000 was
 equally divided between
Palestinians and Jews.")

33. "BBC News" ([Link]

k/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/0
3/v3_ip_timeline/html/[Link]
m) . [Link]. Retrieved
23 October 2023.
34. Ben-Dror 2007, pp. 259–7260:
"The Arabs overwhelmingly
rejected UNSCOP's
recommendations. The Arabs’ list
of arguments against the
majority's conclusions was
indeed a long one. A Palestinian
historian summarized it by saying
‘Everything about it was Zionist’.
When one takes into
consideration the majority's
recommendations and the
enthusiasm with which these
recommendations were accepted
by the Zionist leadership, then
one can indeed affirm that claim.
UNSCOP recommended an
independent Jewish state,
although the Arabs firmly
objected to the principle of
independence for the Jews, and
did so in a way very generous to
the Jews. More than half of the
area of Palestine (62 percent)
was allocated to be a Jewish
state and the Arab state was
supposed to make do with the
remaining area, although the
Palestinian Arab population
numbered as much as twice the
Jewish population in the land.
The pro-Zionist results from
UNSCOP confirmed the Arabs’
basic suspicions towards the
committee. Even before the onset
of its inquiry in Palestine, argued
the Arabs, most of its members
took a pro-Zionist stand. In
addition, according to the Arabs,
the committee's final object – the
partition – was pre-decided by
the Americans. According to this
opinion, the outcome of the
UNSCOP inquiry was a foregone
conclusion. This perception,
which led the Palestinian Arabs to
boycott the committee, is shared
by some modern studies as well."
35. "U.N.O. PASSES PALESTINE
PARTITION PLAN" ([Link]
au/[Link]-article134238148) .
Newcastle Morning Herald and
Miners' Advocate (NSW : 1876 –
1954). NSW: National Library of
Australia. 1 December 1947. p. 1.
Retrieved 24 October 2014.
"Semi-hysterical Jewish crowds
in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were
still celebrating the U.N.O.
partition vote at dawn to-day.
Great bonfires at Jewish
collective farms in the north were
still blazing. Many big cafes in Tel
Aviv served free champagne. A
brewery threw open its doors to
the crowd. Jews jeered some
British troops who were patrolling
Tel Aviv streets but others handed
them wine. In Jerusalem crowds
mobbed armoured cars and drove
through the streets on them. The
Chief Rabbi in Jerusalem (Dr
Isaac Herzog) said: "After the
darkness of 2000 years, the dawn
of redemption has broken. The
decision marks at epoch not only
in Jewish history, but in world
history." The Jewish terrorist
organisation, Irgun Zvai Leumi,
announced from its headquarters
that it would "cease to exist in the
new Jewish state."
36. David McDowall (1990). Palestine
and Israel: The Uprising and
Beyond. I.B. Tauris. p. 193.
ISBN 9780755612581. "Although
the Jewish Agency accepted the
partition plan, it did not accept
the proposed borders as final and
Israel's declaration of
independence avoided the
mention of any boundaries. A
state in part of Palestine was
seen as a stage towards a larger
state when opportunity allowed.
Although the borders were 'bad
from a military and political point
of view,' Ben Gurion urged fellow
Jews to accept the UN Partition
Plan, pointing out that
arrangements are never final, 'not
with regard to the regime, not
with regard to borders, and not
with regard to international
agreements'. The idea of partition
being a temporary expedient
dated back to the Peel Partition
proposal of 1937. When the
Zionist Congress had rejected
partition on the grounds that the
Jews had an inalienable right to
settle anywhere in Palestine, Ben
Gurion had argued in favour of
acceptance, 'I see in the
realisation of this plan practically
the decisive stage in the
beginning of full redemption and
the most wonderful lever for the
gradual conquest of all of
Palestine."
37. Sean F. McMahon, The Discourse
of Palestinian-Israeli Relations (ht
tps://[Link]/books?id
=Xq6MAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA40) ,
Routledge 2010 p. 40. "The
Zionist movement also accepted
the UN partition plan of 1947
tactically. Palumbo notes that
“[t]he Zionists accepted this
scheme [the UN partition plan]
since they hoped to use their
state as a base to conquer the
whole country.” Similarly, Flapan
states that “[Zionist] acceptance
of the resolution in no way
diminished the belief of all the
Zionist parties in their right to the
whole of the country [Palestine]”;
and that “acceptance of the UN
Partition Resolution was an
example of Zionist pragmatism
par excellence. It was a tactical
acceptance, a vital step in the
right direction – a springboard for
expansion when circumstances
proved more judicious.”
38. Michael Palumbo (1990).
Imperial Israel : the history of the
occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza ([Link]
mperialisraelhi0000palu/page/1
8/mode/2up) . Bloomsbury.
p. 19. ISBN 9780747504894.
"The Zionists accepted this
scheme [the UN partition plan]
since they hoped to use their
state as a base to conquer the
whole country"
39. Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel:
Myths and Realities, Pantheon,
1988, ISBN 978-0-679-72098-0,
Ch. 1 Myth One : Zionists
Accepted the UN Partition and
Planned for Peace, pages 13-53
"Every school child knows that
there is no such thing in history
as a final arrangement— not with
regard to the regime, not with
regard to borders, and not with
regard to international
agreements. History, like nature,
is full of alterations and change.
David Ben-Gurion, War Diaries,
Dec. 3, 1947"
40. Eugene Rogan (2012). The Arabs:
A History ([Link]
om/books?id=LILdBDrm-ksC&q=e
ugene+rogan+history+of+arabs)
(3rd ed.). Penguin. p. 321.
ISBN 978-0-7181-9683-7.
41. Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a
history of the first Arab-Israeli war
([Link]
s?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ) . Yale
University Press. p. 73. ISBN 978-
0-300-12696-9. Retrieved 13 July
2013. "Bevin regarded the
UNSCOP majority report of 1
September 1947 as unjust and
immoral. He promptly decided
that Britain would not attempt to
im- pose it on the Arabs; indeed,
he expected them to resist its
implementation… The British
cabinet...: in the meeting on 4
December 1947... It decided, in a
sop to the Arabs, to refrain from
aiding the enforcement of the UN
resolution, meaning the partition
of Palestine. And in an important
secret corollary... it agreed that
Britain would do all in its power to
delay until early May the arrival in
Palestine of the UN
(Implementation) Commission.
The Foreign Office immediately
informed the commission "that it
would be intolerable for the
Commission to begin to exercise
its authority while the [Mandate]
Palestine Government was still
administratively responsible for
 Palestine"... This... nullified any
possibility of an orderly
implementation of the partition
resolution."

42. "The Question of Palestine and

the UN, "The Jewish Agency
accepted the resolution despite
its dissatisfaction over such
matters as Jewish emigration
from Europe and the territorial
limits set on the proposed Jewish
State." " ([Link]
pal/wp-content/uploads/2008/0
4/DPIQoPPub_280220.pdf)
(PDF).
43. Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A
Modern History of Palestine, (http
s://[Link]/books?id=
ghf_OBksgykC&pg=PA76) Olive
Branch Press, (1989) 1991 p. 76.

44. Perkins, Kenneth J.; Gilbert,

Martin (1999). "Israel: A History"
([Link]
39) . The Journal of Military
History. 63 (3): 149.
doi:10.2307/120539 ([Link]
org/10.2307%2F120539) .
ISSN 0899-3718 ([Link]
[Link]/issn/0899-3718) .
JSTOR 120539 ([Link]
[Link]/stable/120539) .
45. Best, Antony (2004), International
History of the Twentieth Century
and beyond ([Link]
0.4324/9781315739717-1) ,
Routledge, p. 531,
doi:10.4324/9781315739717-1
([Link]
315739717-1) , ISBN 978-1-315-
73971-7, retrieved 29 June 2022

46. Live by the Sword: Israel's

Struggle for Existence in the Holy
Land, James Rothrock, p. 14

47. Lenczowski, G. (1962). The

Middle East in World Affairs (3rd
Edition). Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press. p. 723
48. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511,
"In light of the ever-growing
historiography, serious
scholarship has left little debate
about what happened in 1948.";
Khalidi 2020, p. 60, "What
happened is, of course, now well
known."; Slater 2020, p. 406 n.44,
"There is no serious dispute
among Israeli, Palestinian, or
other historians about the central
facts of the Nakba."; Khoury 2012,
pp. 258 ("The realities of the
nakba as an ethnic cleansing can
no more be neglected or negated
... The ethnic cleansing as
incarnated by Plan Dalet is no
longer a matter of debate among
historians ... The facts about
1948 are no longer contested, but
the meaning of what happened is
still a big question.") and 263 ("We
don't need to prove what is now
considered a historical fact. What
two generations of Palestinian
historians and their chronicles
tried to prove became an
accepted reality after the
emergence of the Israeli new
historians."); Wolfe 2012, p. 133,
"The bare statistics of the Nakba
are well enough established.";
Lentin 2010, p. 6, "That the 1948
war that led to the creation of the
State of Israel resulted in the
devastation of Palestinian society
and the expulsion of at least 80
per cent of the Palestinians who
lived in the parts of Palestine
upon which Israel was
established is by now a
recognised fact by all but diehard
Zionist apologists."; Sa'di 2007,
pp. 290 ("Although the hard facts
regarding the developments
during 1947–48 that led to the
Nakba are well known and
documented, the obfuscation by
the dominant Israeli story has
made recovering the facts,
presenting a sensible narrative,
and putting them across to the
world a formidable task.") and
294 ("Today, there is little or no
academic controversy about the
basic course of events that led to
the Zionist victory and the almost
complete destruction of
Palestinian society.")
49. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511;
Pappe 2022, p. 128, "a few
thousand died in massacres";
Manna 2022, pp. 16–17,"There is
now a general consensus among
the parties to the historical
discussion that there were
dozens of massacres and acts of
expulsion of Palestinians from
their country prior to and after
May 1948. The debate revolves
essentially around the extent to
which the top Israeli leadership
was responsible for these acts
and gave the orders to carry them
out."; Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 100, "
[According to Saleh Abdel
Jawad:] between December of
1947 and January of 1949 ...
'nearly 70 massacres' had been
committed, and he was adamant
that this was a conservative
count"; Khalidi 2020, p. 93,
"civilian massacres at Dayr Yasin
and at least twenty other
locations"; Slater 2020, pp. 77
("Zionist massacres and forced
expulsion of the Palestinians,
which began well before the
invasion") and 81-82 ("the
massacres and expulsions of the
Palestinians—today widely known
as the Nakba"); Shenhav 2019,
p. 49, "It is now clear that
expulsions and massacres took
place all over Palestine, not only
in Dir Yasin, al-Lod, and al-
Tantura."; Rashed, Short & Docker
2014, p. 11, "The ‘standard
operating procedure’ of Zionist
troops was to surround a village,
and even though the villagers
might surrender, ‘able men and
boys were lined up, and
sometimes shot’, and in the worst
cases ‘a more general massacre
ensued’ ... following Pappé,
Levene summarises that ‘at least
5,000 men, women, and children
[were] slaughtered in the
massacres’"; Rouhana & Sabbagh-
Khoury 2014, p. 6, "Throughout
the extensive deliberations about
the future of the Arabs (what was
known as the ‘Arab Question’ in
the Zionist vernacular until 1948)
and in particular the issue of their
expulsion, physical elimination
was not considered an option, as
it was for some other settler-
colonial projects. Many
massacres against Palestinians
took place, some of which were
discussed in the Zionist narrative.
We agree with the historians who
argue that the goal of many of
these massacres was not the
physical elimination of the
Palestinians but rather their
evacuation from Palestine.38
Massacres were strategically
used to terrorize Palestinians into
leaving their towns. One can call
this ‘demographic elimination’ to
distinguish it from ‘physical
elimination’."; Docker 2012, p. 19,
"There were further ‘atrocities’
including mutilation, cruelty, and
weapons of terror."; Masalha
2012, pp. 76 and 84–87, "[p. 76]
scores of massacres carried out
in 1948"; Lentin 2010, pp. 109–
111; Morris 2008, p. 405, pp. 405
("In truth, however, the Jews
committed far more atrocities
than the Arabs and killed far more
civilians and POWs in deliberate
acts of brutality in the course of
1948.") and 406 ("In the yearlong
war, Yishuv troops probably
murdered some eight hundred
civilians and prisoners of war all
told—most of them in several
clusters of massacres in
captured villages during April–
May, July, and October–
November 1948. The round of
massacres, during Operation
Hiram and its immediate
aftermath in the Galilee and
southern Lebanon, at the end of
October and the first week of
November 1948 is noteworthy in
having occurred so late in the
war, when the IDF was generally
well disciplined and clearly
victorious. This series of killings—
at 'Eilabun, Jish, 'Arab al-Mawasi,
Saliha, Majd al-Kurum, and so on
—was apparently related to a
general vengefulness and a
desire by local commanders to
precipitate a civilian exodus.";
Abu-Lughod 2007, p. 104 n. 7,
"sixty-eight massacres of
Palestinians conducted in 1948
by Zionist and Israeli forces";
Sa'di 2007, pp. 293 and 300,
"Morris (2004a) also mentions
twenty-four cases of massacre,
while Palestinian scholars using
oral historical methods have
documented more than sixty";
Slyomovics 2007, pp. 29–31 and
37; Pappe 2006, pp. 258,
"Palestinian sources, combining
Israeli military archives with oral
histories, list thirty-one confirmed
massacres - beginning with the
massacre in Tirat Haifa on 11
December 1947 and ending with
Khirbat Ilin in the Hebron area on
19 January 1949 - and there may
have been at least another six.
We still do not have a systematic
Nakba memorial archive that
would allow one to trace the
names of all those who died in
the massacres - an act of painful
commemoration that is gradually
getting underway as this book
goes to press."
50. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 185–
186; Sayigh 2023, p. 282; Manna
2022, pp. 75-77 ("[p. 75] The
Israeli army carried out killings
(including massacres), pillaged,
and raped in a number of border
villages, including Safsaf, Saliha,
Jish, Hula, and Sa‘sa‘, on the day
the villages were occupied or
shortly thereafter."), 202, and 301
nn. 79-81 ("[n. 79] It seems likely
that cases of rape during and
after the 1948 war were
underreported in the historical
literature. With time, it becomes
more difficult to investigate those
events."); Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 84,
"Palestinian researchers,
archivists, interviewers, and
others who help chronicle these
events now have transcontinental
allies who collect oral histories
that are filled with tales of the
rape of women and the killing of
innocent children during the
involuntary transfers of the
1940s."; Natour 2016, p. 94;
Khoury 2012, p. 263, "Many
stories of massacres, rape, and
expulsion are known, and many
other stories are still to be
revealed: Tantura, Safsaf, Ein al-
Zeitun, Sa’sa’, Sha’ab, Kabri, Abou
Shousha, Ai’laboun, and so on.";
Masalha 2012, pp. 82–84, "[p. 82]
The use of rape and other forms
of sexual violence by Jewish
forces in 1948 as weapons of
war and instruments of ethnic
cleansing has yet to be studied. In
1948 the rape of Arab women
and girls was not a rare or
isolated act committed by
individual forces, but rather was
used deliberately as an
instrument to terrorise the civilian
population and push people into
fleeing their homes."; Knopf-
Newman 2011, p. 183; Lentin
2010, p. 31; Ram 2009, p. 373;
Morris 2008, pp. 406–407, "The
Israelis’ collective memory of
fighters characterized by 'purity of
arms' is also undermined by the
evidence of rapes committed in
conquered towns and villages.
About a dozen cases—in Jaffa,
Acre, and so on—are reported in
the available contemporary
documentation and, given Arab
diffidence about reporting such
incidents and the
(understandable) silence of the
perpetrators, and IDFA censorship
of many documents, more, and
perhaps many more, cases
probably occurred. Arabs appear
to have committed few acts of
rape."; Humphries & Khalili 2007,
pp. 209, 211-213 ("[p. 211-212]
As Benny Morris writes, the
regular and irregular military
forces of the Yishuv had
employed rape in 'several dozen
cases' (Morris 2004a: 592) and
the news of the rape, though
subsequently silenced by both
perpetrators and victims, spread
as quickly as the news of
massacres, aided by the fear and
horror of the Palestinians and the
'whispering campaign' of the
Yishuv military commanders ...
these rapes were one of the more
devastating components of
Hagana assaults and perhaps the
primary explanation behind the
decision of many of the refugees
to flee."), and 223-226; Sa'di 2007,
pp. 293 ("On numerous occasions
in the execution of Plan D, the
Zionist forces expelled people
from their towns and villages,
committed rape and other acts of
violence, massacred civilians, and
executed prisoners of war."), 299-
300 ("Morris (2004a) reports that
there were 'about a dozen' cases
of documented rape, often
followed by murder. As he notes,
'We have to assume that the
dozen cases of rape that were
reported . . . are not the whole
story. They are just the tip of the
iceberg' (Morris, 2004b: 39)."),
and 303-304; Slyomovics 2007,
pp. 31 ("Morris documents
statistics of a dozen cases of
rapes and twenty-four instances
of massacres as supporting
evidence for a pattern") and 33-38
("[p. 37] It has been a major
achievement by historians of
1948 that the conditions and
numbers of actual rape and
civilian massacre of the
Palestinian population are finally
recognized."); Pappe 2006, pp. 90,
132, 156, 184, 196, and 208-211
("[p. 209] David Ben-Gurion
seems to have been informed
about each case and entered
them into his diary. Every few
days he has a sub-section: 'Rape
Cases'."); Schulz 2003, pp. 28 and
136 ("According to [Kitty]
Warnock [Land Before Honor:
Palestinian Women in the
Occupied Territories, Monthly
Review Press 1990], honour was
an ingredient in the exodus as
fear and concern to save women
from being raped was a reason
for flight.")
51. Hasian Jr. 2020, pp. 101 ("Israeli-
sponsored radio messages that
were used to 'wage psychological
warfare'") and 103 ("Walid Khalidi,
who wrote some of the first
Palestinian summaries of what
happened during the fall of Haifa
in 1959, has recently revisited
these issues and concluded that
the British colluded with the
Haganah in ways that made sure
that the use of “psychological
warfare tactics” would be used in
ruthless ways so that the Plan
Dalet could be carried out against
unarmed civilians who needed to
be moved out of these lands.");
Slater 2020, p. 81; Cohen 2017,
p. 79; Masalha 2012, pp. 2 and
68, "From the territory occupied
by the Israelis in 1948, about 90
per cent of the Palestinians were
driven out — many by
psychological warfare and/or
military pressure and a very large
number at gunpoint."; Lentin
2010, p. 109; Shlaim 2009, p. 55,
"Morris describes the flight of the
Palestinians wave after wave,
town by town, and village by
village. He gives numerous
specific examples of
psychological warfare, of
intimidation, of expulsion by force
and of atrocities committed by
the armed forces of the infant
Jewish state."; Morris 2008, pp.
160 ("To reinforce this
“whispering,” or psychological
warfare, campaign, Allon's men
distributed fliers, advising those
who wished to avoid harm to
leave “with their women and
children.”") and 332 ("employing
'psychological warfare by means
of flyers and ‘treatment’ of civilian
inhabitants'"); Sa'di 2007, p. 308,
"Morris's (2004a) research
confirms what Palestinians have
argued all along; he shows
definitively that active expulsion
by the Jewish forces, the flight of
civilians from the battle zones
following the attacks of Jewish
forces, psychological warfare,
and fear of atrocities and random
killing by the advancing Jewish
forces were the main causes for
the Palestinian refugee problem.";
Pappe 2006, pp. 156 ("The UN
'peace' plan had resulted in
people being intimidated and
terrorised by psychological
warfare, heavy shelling of civilian
populations, expulsions, seeing
relatives being executed, and
wives and daughters abused,
robbed and in several cases,
raped."), 197 ("... from the Chief of
Staff, Yigael Yadin: 'Your
preparations should include
psychological warfare and
"treatment" (tipul) of citizens as
an integral part of the
operation.'"), and 278 n. 27 ("A
range of strategies that could only
be described as psychological
warfare was used by the Jewish
forces to terrorize and demoralize
the Arab population in a
deliberate attempt to provoke a
mass exodus. Radio broadcasts
in Arabic warned of traitors in the
Arabs' midst, describing the
Palestinians as having been
deserted by their leaders, and
accusing Arab militias of
committing crimes against Arab
civilians. They also spread fears
of disease. Another, less subtle,
tactic involved the use of
loudspeaker trucks. These would
be used in the villages and towns
to urge the Palestinians to flee
before they were all killed, to
warn that the Jews were using
poison gas and atomic weapons,
or to play recorded 'horror
sounds' - shrieking and moaning,
the wail of sirens, and the clang
of fire-alarm bells."); Morris 2004,
pp. 129, 168-169 ("Jewish tactics
in the battle were designed to
stun and quickly overpower
opposition; demoralisation was a
primary aim. It was deemed just
as important to the outcome as
the physical destruction of the
Arab units. The mortar barrages
and the psychological warfare
broadcasts and announcements,
and the tactics employed by the
infantry companies, advancing
from house to house, were all
geared to this goal. The orders of
Carmeli's 22nd Battalion were ‘to
kill every [adult male] Arab
encountered’ and to set alight
with firebombs ‘all objectives that
can be set alight. I am sending
you posters in Arabic; disperse
on route.’"), 230, 246, 250, 252,
468 ("He also ordered the
launching of ‘psychological
warfare operations’ and
instructed the units ‘to deal with
the civilian [populations]’. Yadin
did not elaborate but presumably
the intention was to frighten
civilian communities into flight."),
522 (Israel agreed that 'those of
the civilian population who may
wish to remain in Al Faluja and
‘Iraq al Manshiya are to be
permitted to do so ...' But within
days Israel went back on its word.
Southern Front's soldiers
mounted a short, sharp, well-
orchestrated campaign of low-
key violence and psychological
warfare designed to intimidate
the inhabitants into flight.
According to one villager's
recollection, the Jews ‘created a
situation of terror, entered the
houses and beat the people with
rifle butts’.128 Contemporary
United Nations and Quakers
documents support this
description. The UN Mediator,
Ralph Bunche, quoting UN
observers on the spot,
complained that ‘Arab civilians . . .
at Al Faluja have been beaten and
robbed by Israeli soldiers and . . .
there have been some cases of
attempted rape’."), and 591 ("If
Jewish attack directly and
indirectly triggered most of the
exodus up to June 1948, a small
but significant proportion was
due to direct expulsion orders and
to psychological warfare ploys
(‘whispering propaganda’)
designed to intimidate people
into flight."); Masalha 2003,
pp. 26–27
52. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 36, 44,
163, 169–177, 183, 186–189,
226–236, 241, 247–251, 256,
265; Sayigh 2023, pp. 281–282;
Manna 2022, pp. 49, 83, 152,
169–170, 174–176, 182, 201,
287 n. 2, 316 n. 26; Khalidi 2020,
pp. 250 n. 4 and 287 n. 58;
Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Confino
2018, pp. 141–143; Masalha
2018, p. 185; Nashef 2018,
pp. 95, 143 n. 4, 178–179, and
180 n.8; Lustick & Berkman 2017,
p. 41; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
2017, pp. 396 n. 6 and 413;
Natour 2016, p. 94; Fierke 2014,
p. 805 n. 17; Masalha 2012,
pp. 16, 135–147; Lentin 2010,
pp. 31, 70, and 84; Ram 2009,
p. 371; Morris 2008, pp. 154–
155, 163, and 281; Abu-Lughod
2007, p. 89; Pappe 2006, pp. 91–
95, 100, 109, 125, 147, 167–169,
190, 200, 204–211
53. Manna 2022, p. 293 n. 18, "Some
researchers, particularly on the
Israeli side, describe the events
of the war in its first months as a
“civil war.” This description is
inaccurate and controversial; it is
preferable to divide the war into
two stages without describing the
first stage as a civil war."; Pappe
2022, pp. 118–120, "[p. 118] The
next day brought the first outburst
of intra-communal violence,
activated by hot-headed youth on
both sides ... A slow deterioration
into a widespread civil war in the
next few months generated
second thoughts in the UN, and in
Washington, about the
desirability, indeed, the feasibility,
of the partition plan. But it was
too late for a large number of
Palestinians, evicted from their
houses after their leaders lost the
early battles with the Jewish
forces ... [p. 120] Until March
1948, clashes between the two
communities, beginning the day
after the UN partition plan was
accepted by the General
Assembly, were scattered,
random and uncontrolled."; Khalidi
2020, p. 73, "Like a slow,
seemingly endless train wreck,
the Nakba unfolded over a period
of many months. Its first stage,
from November 30, 1947, until
the final withdrawal of British
forces and the establishment of
Israel on May 15, 1948,
witnessed successive defeats by
Zionist paramilitary groups,
including the Haganah and the
Irgun, of the poorly armed and
organized Palestinians and the
Arab volunteers who had come to
help them."; Cohen 2017, p. 78,
"The outbreak of hostilities
immediately after the UN vote in
favor of the Partition Plan ...";
Davis 2011, p. 235 n. 1, "The
fighting began in late 1947,
following the United Nations
decision to partition Palestine
into a Jewish state and an Arab
state, and continued until Israel
reached separate truce
agreements with Egypt, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Syria in Rhodes
between February and July of
1949 (Shlaim 2000, pp. 41–47).";
Morris 2008, pp. 75–78, "[p. 77]
This stage was characterized by
gradually expanding, continuous,
small-scale, small-unit fighting.
There was terrorism, and
counterterrorist strikes, in the
towns and ambushes along the
roads. Arab armed bands
attacked Jewish settlements, and
Haganah units occasionally
retaliated. It was formless—there
were no front lines (except along
the seams between the two
communities in the main, mixed
towns), no armies moving back
and forth, no pitched battles, and
no conquests of territory."; Sa'di
2007, p. 292, "Soon after the
announcement of the UN
partition resolution in November
1947, local skirmishes erupted
between the two communities.
Attacks and retributions
escalated into civil strife.";
Masalha 2003, p. 26, "Within
weeks of the UN partition
resolution, the country was
plunged in what soon became a
full-scale civil war. By mid-
December 1947, ‘spontaneous
and unorganised’ Palestinian
outbreaks of violence were being
met with the full weight of
Yishuv's armed forces, the
Haganah, in what the British High
Commissioner for Palestine
called ‘indiscriminate action
against the Arabs’ ..."
54. Pappe 2022, pp. 119 ("... the
hasty departure of many
members of the local Palestinian
elite, who left in fear of the
oncoming conflict and in the hope
of returning to a calmer Palestine
(70,000 left between September
1947 and March 1948). This
exodus produced a collective
sense of insecurity and terror
among many segments of the
Palestinian urban population.")
and 121 ("the first wave of about
70,000 Palestinians belonging to
the social and economic elite of
the country, who had fled
Palestine by January 1948");
Morris 2008, pp. 93 ("But the
disintegration of Arab Palestine,
which underlay the military
collapse, began well before the
Haganah went on the offensive in
early April 1948; indeed, there
were telling signs even before the
UN partition vote and the start of
the accelerated British
evacuation. The trigger appears
to have been the UNSCOP
partition proposals and Britain's
announced intention to leave.
Already in early November 1947,
an official reported chaos in the
largely Arab-staffed Nazareth
District administration; the offices
had ceased to function."), 94
("Flight was the earliest and most
concrete expression of
Palestinian demoralization.
Within twenty-four hours of the
start of the (still low-key)
hostilities, Arab families began to
abandon their homes in mixed or
border neighborhoods in the big
towns."), and 411 ("Most of the
displaced likely expected to
return to their homes within
weeks or months, on the coattails
of victorious Arab armies or on
the back of a UN decision or
Great Power intervention. Few
expected that their refugeedom
would last a lifetime or
encompass their children and
grandchildren. But it did."); Morris
2004, p. 6, "The Arab exodus from
the areas that became the Jewish
State at the end of the war
occurred over the space of 20
months, from the end of
November 1947 to July 1949,
with several small appendages
during the following months and
years."
55. Pappe 2022, pp. 118–119,
"Twelve days after the adoption
of the UN resolution, the
expulsion of Palestinians began.
A month later, the first Palestinian
village was wiped out by Jewish
retaliation to a Palestinian attack
on convoys and Jewish
settlements. This action was
transformed into an ethnic
cleansing operation in March,
which resulted in the loss to
Palestine of much of its
indigenous population."; Khalidi
2020, p. 72, "The expulsion of
enough Arabs to make possible a
Jewish majority state necessarily
and inevitably followed
[partition]."; Slater 2020, p. 81, "In
fact, the forced transfer of the
Palestinians began not as a
response to the Arab invasion in
the spring of 1948, but nearly six
months earlier in December 1947,
following the proclamation of the
UN partition plan."; Docker 2012,
p. 19, "In Jaffa in February 1948
‘houses were randomly selected
and then dynamited with people
still in them’."; Masalha 2012,
p. 79, "Ilan Pappé, commenting
on the massacres carried out by
Jewish forces during the Nakba,
writes: 'Palestinian sources,
combining Israeli military
archives with oral histories, list
thirty-one confirmed massacres
— beginning with the massacre in
Tirat Haifa on 11 December 1947
and ending with Khirbat Illin in the
Hebron area on 19 January 1949
— and there may have been at
least another six. We still do not
have a systematic Nakba
memorial archive that would
allow one to trace the names of
all those who died in the
massacres.' (Pappé 2006: 258)";
Morris 2008, pp. 117–118, "Until
the end of March ... no territory
was conquered and no village—
with two exceptions over
December 1947–March 1948
('Arab Suqreir and Qisariya)—was
destroyed."; Pappe 2006, p. 40,
"Coerced expulsions followed in
the middle of February 1948
when Jewish troops succeeded
in emptying five Palestinian
villages in one day."; Morris 2004,
pp. 76–77
56. Manna 2022, p. 32, "One of the
first operations was directed at
the village of Khisas, north of
Hula Lake, and was conducted by
the Palmach on 18 December
1947. A dozen residents of the
village were killed, including some
children. The blowing up of
houses and the killings caused
panic to spread among the
villagers and the inhabitants of
neighboring villages as well, so
that hundreds took flight and
went about searching for a refuge
for their families in Syria."; Morris
2008, pp. 103, "In Khisas, the
Palmahniks stormed a house,
killing three men, a woman, and
four children, and then blew it up,
also damaging an adjacent
building; at the mansion, they
killed four men ... Much of
Khisas's population fled—and
those who remained sued for
peace ... No one was punished.";
Pappe 2006, p. 57, "Jewish
troops attacked the village on 18
December 1947, and randomly
started blowing up houses at the
dead of night while the occupants
were still fast asleep. Fifteen
villagers, including five children,
were killed in the attack.";
Masalha 2003, pp. 35, 47 ("12
Arab villagers were murdered in
cold blood in a Haganah raid."),
144, and 152
57. Manna 2022, p. 34, "After
midnight of the new year, the
Palmach unit carried out an
attack on the village from the
east, using firearms and
grenades, which resulted in
dozens of dead and wounded
among the residents who were
asleep in their homes."; Pappe
2022, p. 121, "Their fear for their
lives was accentuated by
massacres committed in Balad
al-Shaykh, where on the last day
of 1947, scores of Palestinians
were slaughtered in retaliation for
a terrorist attack on Jewish
workers in the nearby refinery.";
Confino 2018, p. 151 n.13, "The
Haganah occupation of Balad al-
Sheikh came next, leaving several
dozen civilians dead, including
men, women, and children.";
Masalha 2012, p. 85, "Balad al-
Shaykh, 11 December 1947 and
31 December–1 January 1948:
14 civilians, of whom 10 were
women and children were killed in
the second attack by the
Haganah"; Lentin 2010, p. 74, "In
December 1947 the Hagana killed
many of the inhabitants of Balad
al-Shaysh, the burial place of
Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, one
of Palestine's most revered
leaders of the 1930s, killing over
sixty Palestinians, including
women and children."; Morris
2008, p. 103, "On the night of 31
December–1 January, the
Haganah sent in a Palmah
company and several
independent platoons. The orders
were to 'kill as many men as
possible'—or, alternatively, '100'
men—and 'destroy furniture, etc.,'
but to avoid killing women and
children. The raiders moved from
house to house, pulling out men
and executing them. Sometimes
they threw grenades into houses
and sprayed the interiors with
automatic fire. There were
several dozen dead, including
some women and children."
58. Pappe 2022, p. 119, "70,000 left
between September 1947 and
March 1948"; Morris 2008,
pp. 94–95, "Despite the
haphazard efforts of some Arab
local authorities, the following
months were marked by
increasing flight from the main
towns and certain rural areas. By
the end of March 1948 most of
the wealthy and middle class
families had fled Jaffa, Haifa, and
Jerusalem, and most Arab rural
communities had evacuated the
heavily Jewish Coastal Plain; a
few had also left the Upper
Jordan Valley. Most were
propelled by fear of being caught
up, and harmed, in the fighting;
some may have feared life under
Jewish rule. It is probable that
most thought of a short,
temporary displacement with a
return within weeks or months,
on the coattails of victorious Arab
armies or international diktats.
Thus, although some (the
wealthier) moved as far away as
Beirut, Damascus, and Amman,
most initially moved a short
distance, to their villages of origin
or towns in the West Bank or
Gaza area, inside Palestine,
where they could lodge with
family or friends. During this
period Jewish troops expelled the
inhabitants of only one village—
Qisariya, in the Coastal Plain, in
mid-February (for reasons
connected to Jewish illegal
immigration rather than the
ongoing civil war)—though other
villages were harassed and a few
specifically intimidated by IZL,
LHI, and Haganah actions (much
as during this period Jewish
settlements were being harassed
and intimidated by Arab
irregulars). Altogether some
seventy-five thousand to one
hundred thousand Arabs fled or
were displaced from their homes
during the first stage of the civil
war, marking the first wave of the
exodus."; Pappe 2006, p. 40,
"Though sporadic, these early
Jewish assaults were severe
enough to cause the exodus of a
substantial number of people
(almost 75,000)."; Morris 2004,
p. 67, "By then, the Arab exodus
from Palestine was well under
way. By the end of March 1948,
some 100,000 Arabs, mostly
from the urban upper and middle
classes of Jaffa, Haifa and
Jerusalem, and from villages in
Jewish-dominated areas such as
the Jordan Valley and the Coastal
Plain, had fled to Arab centres to
the east, including Nazareth,
Nablus, and Bethlehem, or out of
the country altogether."
59. Manna 2022, pp. 106
("Simultaneously with the arrival
of quality weapons from Prague,
Ben-Gurion began implementing
Plan Dalet which caused
hundreds of casualties among the
Palestinians.") and 107 ("the
ethnic cleansing policy, which had
entered a decisive phase in
April"); Pappe 2022, p. 120, "In
March 1948, the military
campaign began in earnest. It
was driven by Plan D, a military
blueprint prepared by the Hagana
in anticipation of combating the
Arab forces in Palestine and
facing the Arab armies after 14
May 1948 ... Plan D was put into
full operation in April and May. It
had two very clear objectives, the
first being to take swiftly and
systematically any installation,
military or civilian, evacuated by
the British ... The second, and far
more important, objective of the
plan was to cleanse the future
Jewish state of as many
Palestinians as possible."; Khalidi
2020, p. 73, "This first stage saw
a bitterly fought campaign that
culminated in a country-wide
Zionist offensive dubbed Plan
Dalet in the spring of 1948.";
Masalha 2012, pp. 71–72, "First,
there was Plan Dalet. This
Haganah plan, a straightforward
document, of early March 1948,
was in many ways a blueprint for
the expulsion of as many
Palestinians as possible. It
constituted an ideological-
strategic anchor and basis for the
destruction of Arab localities and
expulsion of their inhabitants by
Jewish commanders. In
conformity with Plan Dalet, the
Haganah cleared various areas
completely of Arab villages.";
Lentin 2010, pp. 109–111, "[p.
109] Dealing first with
responsibility: while the ‘new
historians’, especially Morris,
uncovered individual cases of
expulsions and massacres as
well as plans – notably Plan Dalet
– for the removal of Palestinians,
they were unwilling to accept the
Palestinian contention that Plan
Dalet was a Zionist master plan
for ethnic cleansing."; Morris
2008, pp. 93 ("Haganah went on
the offensive in early April 1948")
and 118-121 ("[p. 118] Plan D,
formulated in early March and
signed and dispatched to the
Haganah brigade commanders on
10 March, was Yadin's blueprint
for concerted operations on the
eve of the final British departure
and the pan-Arab invasion that
was expected to follow hard on
its heels ... But by the end of the
period it was clear that a
dramatic conceptual change had
taken place and that the Yishuv
had gone over to the offensive
and was now engaged in a war of
conquest. That war of conquest
was prefigured in Plan D."); Sa'di
2007, p. 292, "However the
conflict was abruptly changed at
the beginning of April 1948. The
Zionist leadership feared an
alteration in the U.S. position,
abandoning its support for
partition in favor of a plan to
place Palestine under
international trusteeship (Pappé
2004: 130; Morris, 2001b: 204–
5). In response, the Hagana, the
main Jewish military force,
opened a large-scale offensive.
60. Morris 2008, p. 179, "The
Haganah, after holding its own on
the defensive for four months
while it transformed from a
militia into an army, launched a
series of offensives—most
precipitated by Arab attacks—
that, within six weeks, routed the
Arab militias and their ALA
reinforcements. Important pieces
of territory assigned in the UN
Partition Resolution to
Palestinian Arab or international
control—including Jaffa and West
Jerusalem—fell under Zionist
sway as hundreds of thousands
of Arabs fled or were driven out.";
Sa'di 2007, p. 292, "The aim of
Plan D, as the offensive was
known, was to capture the
territories allocated to the Jewish
state, as well as areas in Galilee
and on the highway between Tel-
Aviv and Jerusalem that were
part of the proposed Palestinian
state (Flapan 1987: 42)."
61. Masalha 2012, pp. 12–13,
"Hundreds of villages would be
destroyed, urban life in Palestine's
most populous Arab
communities would disappear,
and almost a million Palestinians
would be rendered homeless
and/or stateless.'"; Morris 2008,
pp. 118-121 ("[p. 118] But
henceforward, Haganah policy
would be permanently to secure
roads, border areas, and Jewish
settlements by crushing minatory
irregular forces and destroying or
permanently occupying the
villages and towns from which
they operated ... [p. 120] To
achieve these objectives,
swathes of Arab villages, either
hostile or potentially hostile, were
to be conquered, and brigade
commanders were given the
option of “destruction of villages
(arson, demolition, and mining of
the ruins)” or “cleansing [of
militiamen] and taking control of
[the villages]” and leaving a
garrison in place. The
commanders were given
discretion whether to evict the
inhabitants of villages and urban
neighborhoods sitting on vital
access roads. The individual
brigades were instructed in detail
about which British police
stations and army camps they
were to occupy, the particular
roads they were to secure, and
the specific villages and towns
they were to conquer and either
depopulate, destroy, and mine or
garrison ... The plan gave the
brigades carte blanche to
conquer the Arab villages and, in
effect, to decide on each village's
fate—destruction and expulsion
or occupation. The plan explicitly
called for the destruction of
resisting Arab villages and the
expulsion of their inhabitants. In
the main towns, the brigades
were tasked with evicting the
inhabitants of resisting
neighborhoods to the core Arab
neighborhoods (not expulsion
from the country). The plan
stated: “[The villages] in your
area, which have to be taken,
cleansed or destroyed—you
decide [on their fate], in
consultation with your Arab
affairs advisers and HIS officers.”
Nowhere does the document
speak of a policy or desire to
expel “the Arab inhabitants” of
Palestine or of any of its
constituent regions; nowhere is
any brigade instructed to clear
out “the Arabs.”""), 126-138, and
303-305 ("[p. 304] During the
following weeks, Haganah/IDF
units as a matter of routine
destroyed—when they had
sufficient explosives or
caterpillars—captured villages,
partially or wholly."); Sa'di 2007,
pp. 292 ("The plan, as quoted in
Morris (2004a: 164) called for
“operations against enemy
settlements which are in the rear
of, within or near our defense
lines, with the aim of preventing
their use as bases for an active
armed force.” However, as Morris
points out, given the size of the
country, most Palestinians towns
and villages within and beyond
the proposed Jewish state fell
within this category. According to
Plan D, the brigade commanders
were given “discretion” in what to
do with the villages they occupied
—that is, to destroy them or leave
them standing (Morris 2004a.:
165). On numerous occasions in
the execution of Plan D, the
Zionist forces expelled people
from their towns and villages,
committed rape and other acts of
violence, massacred civilians, and
executed prisoners of war. As we
will see, these acts have been
widely documented, most
forcefully by Israeli historians
using military and state
archives.") and 294 ("In the
coastal area between Haifa and
Tel-Aviv, for example, fifty-eight
out of the sixty-four villages that
had existed were wiped out
(Pappé 2004: 137). By the end of
the war only two remained. In the
course of this campaign even
villages that maintained good
relations with nearby Jewish
settlements and refrained from
resorting to violence, such as Deir
Yassin, were not spared."); Pappe
2006, p. 104, "Between 30 March
and 15 May, 200 villages were
occupied and their inhabitants
expelled. This is a fact that must
be repeated, as it undermines the
Israeli myth that the 'Arabs' ran
away once the 'Arab invasion'
began. Almost half of the Arab
villages had already been
attacked by the time the Arab
governments eventually and, as
we know, reluctantly decided to
send in their troops."; Morris
2004, p. 34, "But in the end, the
Palestinians and the ALA failed to
capture a single Jewish
settlement, while the Jews, by
mid-May, conquered close to 200
Arab villages and towns, including
Jaffa, Beisan, Safad, Arab Haifa
and Arab Tiberias."
62. Cohen 2017, pp. 79–80, "At this
stage of the clashes, the gap
between the Zionist discourse
and Zionist practices widened.
The change in the conduct of the
Jewish forces – above all the
expulsion of Arab communities –
was not accompanied by a
change in the discourse."; Morris
2008, p. 100, pp. 100 ("As late as
24 March 1948, Galili instructed
all Haganah units to abide by
standing Zionist policy, which
was to respect the “rights, needs
and freedom,” “without
discrimination,” of the Arabs
living in the Jewish State areas.
The policy changed only in early
April, as reflected in the
deliberations of the Arab affairs
advisers in the Coastal Plain. At
their meeting of 31 March, the
advisers acted to protect Arab
property and deferred a decision
about expelling Arabs or
disallowing Arabs to cultivate
their fields. But a week later the
advisers ruled that “the intention
[policy] was, generally, to evict the
Arabs living in the brigade's
area.”"), 161 ("Together, the Yiftah
and Golani Brigades, over late
April–mid-May, had conquered
Eastern Galilee and largely
cleared out its Arab inhabitants."),
and 410-411 ("And it was that war
that propelled most of those
displaced out of their houses and
into refugeedom. Most fled when
their villages and towns came
under Jewish attack or out of fear
of future attack. They wished [p.
411] to move out of harm's way.
At first, during December 1947–
March 1948, it was the middle-
and upper-class families who
fled, abandoning the towns; later,
from April on, after the Yishuv
shifted to the offensive, it was the
urban and rural masses who fled,
in a sense emulating their
betters."); Sa'di 2007, p. 293, "By
then, many acts of expulsion and
massacre had occurred, including
the widely publicized massacre of
Deir Yassin (April 9, 1948) ...";
Pappe 2006, pp. 40 ("About
250,000 Palestinians were
uprooted in this phase, which
was accompanied by several
massacres, most notable ofwhich
was the Deir Yassin massacre."),
104 ("Villages near urban centres
were taken and expelled, and
sometimes subjected to
massacres, in a campaign of
terror designed to prepare the
ground for a more successful
takeover of the cities."); Morris
2004, p. 593, "In general, the
Jewish commanders preferred to
completely clear the vital roads
and border areas of Arab
communities – Allon in Eastern
Galilee, Carmel around Haifa and
in Western Galilee, Avidan in the
south. Most villagers fled before
or during the fighting. Those who
stayed put were almost invariably
expelled."
63. Manna 2022, pp. 37-38 ("killing
and wounding hundreds of men,
women, and children ... mutilation
and burning of corpses and the
humiliation and torture of
hundreds of prisoners"), 75 ("The
massacre at Dayr Yasin holds a
central symbolic position in the
Palestinian memory of the Nakba
..."), and 295 n. 51 ("For several
years Haganah sources were
relied on, which the British and
others adopted, and which
indicated that over 250 people
were killed in the Dayr Yasin
massacre. However, recent
Palestinian research indicates
that the number of those killed
was 104, less than half the
original Haganah estimate.");
Pappe 2022, p. 121, "a well-
publicized bloodbath"; Hasian Jr.
2020, p. 83, "For more than 70
years many Israeli researchers,
journalists, military planners, and
others have admitted that
incidents like the killings of
between 100 and 250 civilians at
Deir Yassin in April of 1948 can
be documented from materials
that can be found in Israel
Defense Force archives, but this
is contextualized as an atypical
incident that proves the rule of
Jewish avoidance of civilian
casualties during wartime.";
Khalidi 2020, p. 74, "People fled
as news spread of massacres
like that on April 9, 1948, in the
village of Dayr Yasin near
Jerusalem, where one hundred
residents, sixty-seven of them
women, children, and old people,
were slaughtered when the village
was stormed by Irgun and
Haganah assailants."; Slater 2020,
p. 82, "In addition to the forced
expulsions, Zionist forces carried
out several massacres, some of
them even before the May 1948
Arab state invasion. The most
notorious of them was the April
8–9 killing of over one hundred
Palestinian civilians in the village
of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem.
There is a lively debate among
Israeli historians over whether
Deir Yassin and other massacres
reflected deliberate Zionist policy
or rather was perpetrated by
individual military units,
particularly by the Irgun and
fanatical “Stern Gang” terrorists
who operated independently of
the Haganah, the military arm of
the Zionist leadership. However,
from the point of view of
terrorized Palestinians who
learned of the massacres, it was
entirely irrelevant whether the
killings represented official policy
or not—either way, they had very
good reasons to flee."; Shenhav
2019, p. 49; Ghanim 2018,
pp. 104–107, "Deir Yassin
witnessed a horrific massacre in
1948 in which tens of civilians
were killed, including women and
children, after which the entire
village, excepting a few buildings,
was demolished, and Kfar Shaul
was established upon its ruins.";
Rashed, Short & Docker 2014,
p. 11, "the ‘infamous massacre’ of
Dayr Yasin in April 1948"; Docker
2012, p. 19, "When the Jewish
soldiers burst into Deir Yassin,
the bodies of the men killed were
‘abused’."; Khoury 2012, p. 261;
Masalha 2012, pp. 79–83, "[p. 80]
Although not the bloodiest
massacre of the war, Dayr Yasin
was the site of the most
notorious mass murder of
Palestinian civilians in 1948 — an
event which became the single
most important contributory
factor to the 1948 exodus, a
powerful marker of the violence
at the foundation of the State of
Israel. On 9 April, between 120
and 254 unarmed villagers were
murdered, including women, the
elderly and children.56 There
were also instances of rape and
mutilation. Most Israeli writers
today have no difficulty in
acknowledging the occurrence of
the Dayr Yasin massacre and its
effect, if not its intention, of
precipitating the exodus."; Wolfe
2012, p. 160; Knopf-Newman
2011, pp. 182–183, "Dayr Yasin
was one of numerous massacres
that Jewish militias enacted as
part of Plan Dalet, the Zionists’
blueprint to cleanse Palestine of
its indigenous population."; Lentin
2010, p. 139, "between 93 and
254 Palestinians, including 30
babies, were massacred";
Kimmerling 2008, p. 313 ("about
120 villagers killed") and 410 n.
17 ("the massacre of about 125
villagers"); Morris 2008, pp. 125–
129, "[p. 126] The IZL and LHI
troopers moved from house to
house, lobbing in grenades and
spraying the interiors with small
arms fire. They blew up houses
and sometimes cut down those
fleeing into the alley-ways,
including one or two families. ... It
quickly emerged that the fighting
had been accompanied, and
followed, by atrocities. ... Some
militiamen and unarmed civilians
were shot on the spot. A few
villagers may have been trucked
into Jerusalem and then taken
back to Deir Yassin and executed;
a group of male prisoners were
shot in a nearby quarry; several of
those captured were shot ... [p.
127] The IZL and LHI troopers
systematically pillaged the village
and stripped the inhabitants of
jewelry and money. Altogether,
100–120 villagers (including
combatants) died that day —
though the IZL, Haganah, Arab
officials, and the British almost
immediately inflated the number
to “254” (or “245”), each for their
own propagandistic reasons.
Most of the villagers either fled or
were trucked through West
Jerusalem and dumped at
Musrara, outside the Old City
walls. ... But the real significance
of Deir Yassin lay, not in what had
actually happened on 9 April, or in
the diplomatic exchanges that
followed, but in its political and
demographic repercussions. ...
The most important immediate
effect of the media atrocity
campaign, however, was to spark
fear and further panic flight from
Palestine's villages and towns.";
Abu-Lughod 2007, p. 104 n. 7, "by
conservative estimates
slaughtered about 115 men,
women, and children and stuffed
their bodies down wells";
Humphries & Khalili 2007, p. 211;
Jayyusi 2007, p. 132 n. 12, "The
massacre at Deir Yassin was
frequently cited in the Lifta
accounts as having been a
landmark, a focal point in the
events of the Nakba itself."; Sa'di
2007, pp. 293 ("By then [May 15],
many acts of expulsion and
massacre had occurred, including
the widely publicized massacre of
Deir Yassin (April 9, 1948)") and
304; Slyomovics 2007, p. 35, "the
most famous atrocity of the 1948
war, which was carried out on
April 9 in Deir Yassin near
Jerusalem. Approximately 105
Palestinian villagers were
massacred by Jewish forces.";
Schulz 2003, p. 28, "The most
stark example is Deir Yasin,
carved into the memory of
Palestinian suffering. The Deir
Yasin massacre, conducted by a
joint IZL—LHI operation with the
reluctant, but nevertheless given,
consent of the Haganah, was the
one event that had the most
immediate effect upon flight. The
attack was connected to an
operation intended to secure the
western entrance to Jerusalem
(ibid.: 113). The atrocities that
were committed in the event, in
which 250 villagers were
massacred and scores of others
subject to rape, torture and
mutilation, contributed to the
spread of panic among
Palestine's Arabs (ibid.: 113f.).
Deir Yasin came to serve as a
representation of what Jewish
forces (irregular or not) might be
capable of. Deir Yasin continues
to stand out as a symbol of the
nakba and the main focal point in
remembering the catastrophe."
64. Manna 2022, p. 17, "Palestinian
cities of Haifa, Jaffa, Safad, and
Tiberias were depopulated";
Pappe 2022, p. 121, "This meant
occupation and the expulsion of
the Palestinian population. This
was the fate of Jaffa, Haifa,
Safad and Tiberias."; Khalidi 2020,
pp. 73–74, "Plan Dalet involved
the conquest and depopulation in
April and the first half of May of
the two largest Arab urban
centers, Jaffa and Haifa, and of
the Arab neighborhoods of West
Jerusalem, as well as of scores
of Arab cities, towns, and villages,
including Tiberias on April 18,
Haifa on April 23, Safad on May
10, and Beisan on May 11. Thus,
the ethnic cleansing of Palestine
began well before the state of
Israel was proclaimed on May 15,
1948 ... Jaffa was besieged and
ceaselessly bombarded with
mortars and harassed by snipers.
Once finally overrun by Zionist
forces during the first weeks of
May, it was systematically
emptied of most of its sixty
thousand Arab residents.
Although Jaffa was meant to be
part of the stillborn Arab state
designated by the 1947 Partition
Plan, no international actor
attempted to stop this major
violation of the UN resolution ...
[p. 74] Subjected to similar
bombardments and attacks on
poorly defended civilian
neighborhoods, the sixty
thousand Palestinian inhabitants
of Haifa, the thirty thousand living
in West Jerusalem, the twelve
thousand in Safad, six thousand
in Beisan, and 5,500 in Tiberias
suffered the same fate. Most of
Palestine's Arab urban population
thus became refugees and lost
their homes and livelihoods.";
Cohen 2017, p. 80, "On May 14,
Ben-Gurion read the Declaration
of Independence at the founding
of the state ceremony which
included the following widely
quoted appeal: “We appeal – in
the very midst of an onslaught
that has been raging against us
for months – to the Arab
inhabitants of the state of Israel
to preserve peace and participate
in the building of the state on the
basis of full and equal citizenship
and due representation in all its
provisional and permanent
institutions.” At that time, the
Arabs of Tiberias, Safed, and
most of the Arabs of Haifa (who
were supposed to be citizens of
the Jewish state, according to the
Partition Plan) as well as those of
Jaffa (in the planned Arab state)
had already been uprooted from
their cities (on the occupation of
these cities, see Morris 1987).
They were not to enjoy the
promised equality of the Jewish
state."; Khoury 2012, p. 259,
"They also lost their cities. The
three major coastal cities—Jaffa,
Haifa, and Aka [Acre]—were
occupied and their citizens
evacuated."; Masalha 2012, p. 7,
"coastal cities of Palestine —
Jaffa, Haifa and Acre — were
largely depopulated";; Davis 2011,
p. 7, "the depopulation of
Palestinians from cities—Acre,
Haifa, Safad, Tiberius, Beersheba,
Jaffa, and Baysan"; Morris 2008,
pp. 138 ("During the following
weeks, the Jewish forces
assaulted and conquered key
urban areas ... Arab Tiberias and
Arab Haifa, Manshiya in Jaffa,
and the Arab neighborhoods of
West Jerusalem all fell in quick
succession."), 138-139 (Tiberias),
140-147 (Haifa), 155-159 (Safed),
147-155 (Jaffa), and 164-167
(Acre); Sa'di 2007, pp. 293–294,
"occupation of cities and the
expulsion of their inhabitants in
Tiberias (April 18), Haifa [p. 294]
(April 22), Safad (May 11) and
Jaffa (May 13)"; Pappe 2006, pp.
91-92 (Tiberias), 92-96 (Haifa),
97-98 (Safed), 98-99 (Jerusalem),
100-101 (Acre), and 102-103
(Jaffa)
65. Morris & Kedar 2023, pp. 752–
776, "[p. 752] Taken together,
these documents revealed that
the Acre and Gaza episodes were
merely the tip of the iceberg in a
prolonged campaign ... But
bulldozing or blowing up houses
and wells was deemed
insufficient. With its back to the
wall, the Haganah upped the ante
and unleashed a clandestine
campaign of poisoning certain
captured village wells with
bacteria – in violation of the
Geneva Protocol ... The aim of
Cast Thy Bread ... like the
demolitions, was to hamper an
Arab return. Over the weeks, the
well-poisoning campaign was
expanded to regions beyond the
Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road and
included Jewish settlements
captured or about to be captured
by Arab troops, and then to
inhabited Arab towns, to facilitate
their prospective conquest by the
Haganah or to hinder the
progress of the invading Arab
armies ... [p. 768] The Yishuv's
decision to use the
bacteriological weapons was
taken at the highest level of the
government and military and was,
indeed, steered by these officers,
with Ben-Gurion's authorization,
through the campaign ... [p. 769]
The use of the bacteria was
apparently fairly limited in
Israel/Palestine during April–
December 1948, and apart from
Acre, seems to have caused no
epidemic and few casualties. At
least, that is what emerges from
the available documentation.";
Nashef 2018, p. 143 n. 4 (quoting
Pappe 2006); Carus 2017, p. 145,
"Some BW programs relied on
extremely crude methods, about
as sophisticated as those
employed by some terrorist
groups or criminals ... The same
was true of the reported activities
associated with the early Israeli
program in 1948."; Docker 2012,
pp. 19–20, "The urbicide of May
1948 directed against the old
Crusader city of Acre involved
biological warfare, including
poisoning of water, Pappé writing
that it seems clear from Red
Cross reports that the Zionist
forces besieging the city injected
‘typhoid germs’ into the water
supply, which led to a ‘sudden
typhoid epidemic’. There was a
similar attempt to ‘poison the
water supply in Gaza’ on 27 May
1948 by injecting typhoid and
dysentery viruses into wells; this
attempt was fortunately foiled.";
Martin 2010, p. 7, "Israeli
biological warfare activities
included Operation Shalach,
which was an attempt to
contaminate the water supplies
of Egyptian Army. Egypt reports
capture of four ‘Zionists’ trying to
infect wells with dysentery and
typhoid. There are also
allegations that a typhoid
outbreak in Acre in 1948 resulted
from a biological attack and that
there were attacks in Egypt in
1947 and in Syria in 1948.";
Sayigh 2009, "A unit had been
formed to develop biological
weapons, and there is evidence
that these were used during 1948
to poison the water supplies of
Akka and Gaza with typhoid
bacteria."; Ackerman & Asal 2008,
p. 191, "Egyptian Ministry of
Defense and, later, Israeli
historians, contend that Israeli
soldiers contaminated Acre's
water supply."; Pappe 2006, pp.
73–4 ("The flame-thrower project
was part of a larger unit engaged
in developing biological warfare
under the directorship of a
physical chemist called Ephraim
Katzir ... The biological unit he led
together with his brother Aharon,
started working seriously in
February [1948]. Its main
objective was to create a weapon
that could blind people.") and
100–101 ("During the siege [of
Acre] typhoid germs were
apparently injected into the water.
Local emissaries of the
International Red Cross reported
this to their headquarters and left
very little room for guessing
whom they suspected: the
Hagana. The Red Cross reports
describe a sudden typhoid
epidemic and, even with their
guarded language, point to
outside poisoning as the sole
explanation for this outbreak ... A
similar attempt to poison the
water supply in Gaza on 27 May
was foiled."); Abu Sitta 2003, "The
Zionists injected typhoid in the
aqueduct at some intermediate
point which passes through
Zionist settlements ... The city of
Acre, now burdened by the
epidemic, fell easy prey to the
Zionists. ... Two weeks later, after
their "success" in Acre, the
Zionists struck again. This time in
Gaza, where hundreds of
thousands of refugees had
gathered after their villages in
southern Palestine were
occupied. The end however was
different. ... The biological crimes
perpetrated against the
Palestinians in Acre and Gaza in
1948 are still being enacted
today."; Leitenberg 2001, p. 289,
"As early as April 1948, Ben
Gurion directed one of his
operatives in Europe (Ehud Avriel)
to seek out surviving East
European Jewish scientists who
could “either increase the
capacity to kill masses or to cure
masses: both things are
important.” At that time, that
‘capacity’ meant chemical and
biological weapons ... These were
ultimate weapons that could be
used either for offense or
defense (and the context of the
immediate military operations, as
well as those that had preceded
it, would be the critical factors in
that categorization)."; Cohen
2001, p. 31, "It is believed that
one of the largest operations in
this campaign was in the Arab
coastal town of Acre, north of
Haifa, shortly before it was
conquered by the IDF on May 17,
1948. According to Milstein, the
typhoid epidemic that spread in
Acre in the days before the town
fell to the Israeli forces was not
the result of wartime chaos but
rather a deliberate covert action
by the IDF—the contamination of
Acre's water supply ... The
success of the Acre operation
may have persuaded Israeli
decisionmakers to continue with
these activities. On May 23, 1948,
Egyptian soldiers in the Gaza area
caught four Israeli soldiers
disguised as Arabs near water
wells ... It seems that many
people knew something about
these operations, but both the
participants and later historians
chose to avoid the issue, which
gradually became a national
taboo ... Despite the official
silence, it appears there is little
doubt now about the mission of
the failed Gaza operation."
66. Pappe 2022, p. 122, "Only at the
end of April 1948 did the
politicians in the Arab world
prepare a plan to save Palestine,
which in practice was a scheme
to annex as much of it as
possible to the Arab countries
participating in the war."; Khalidi
2020, p. 75, "The second phase
followed after May 15, when the
new Israeli army defeated the
Arab armies that joined the war.
In belatedly deciding to intervene
militarily, the Arab governments
were acting under intense
pressure from the Arab public,
which was deeply distressed by
the fall of Palestine's cities and
villages one after another and the
arrival of waves of destitute
refugees in neighboring capitals.";
Slater 2020, pp. 77–78, "[p. 77]
Moreover, there had been no Arab
state intervention in the six
months preceding the war—the
civil war period between the
Jewish and Palestinian peoples,
as it is often termed—during
which the Zionist forces mainly
seized only the areas that the UN
had allocated to Israel. The
intervention came only after the
Zionists began seizing land
allocated to the Arabs ... [p. 78] In
any case, the Israeli New
Historians agree that the primary
cause of the Arab invasion was
less that of sympathy for the
Palestinians than the result of
inter-Arab monarchical and
territorial rivalries, especially the
fears of other Arab monarchs that
King Abdullah of Jordan would
seize the West Bank and then use
it as a springboard for his long
dream of creating a Hashemite
kingdom extending over parts of
Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq.";
Morris 2008, pp. 155 ("The mass
flight from the towns and villages
of Palestine at the end of April
triggered anxiety and opposition
among the Arab leaders."), 180-
183 ("[p. 180] As the months
passed and the Palestinian Arabs,
beefed up by contingents of
foreign volunteers, proved
incapable of defeating the Yishuv,
the Arab leaders began more
seriously to contemplate sending
in their armies. The events of
April 1948—Deir Yassin, Tiberias,
Haifa, Jaffa—rattled and focused
their minds, and the arrival of
tens of thousands of refugees
drove home the urgency of direct
intervention. By the end of April,
they decided to invade ... [p. 183]
The decision to invade was finally
taken on 29–30 April, at the
simultaneous meetings of the
Arab heads of state in Amman
and the military chiefs of staff in
Zarka. Egypt still held back. But
the die was cast. And on 11–12
May Egypt would also commit
itself to invasion ... For all their
bluster from Bludan through
Cairo, the Arab leaders—except
Jordan's—did almost nothing to
prepare their armies for war."),
194-195 ("[p. 194] 'Abdullah's aim
was to take over the West Bank
rather than destroy the Jewish
state—though, to be sure, many
Legionnaires may have believed
that they were embarked on a
holy war to “liberate” all of
Palestine. Yet down to the wire,
his fellow leaders suspected
'Abdullah of perfidy (collusion
with Britain and/or the Zionists)
... But once he had radically
restricted the planned Jordanian
(or Jordanian-Iraqi) contribution
to the war effort, the other
invasion participants had felt
compelled to downgrade their
own armies’ objectives ... [p. 195]
The altered Hashemite
dispositions and intentions posed
a dilemma for King Farouk: he
was not about to allow his
archrival, 'Abdullah, to make off
with the West Bank (and possibly
East Jerusalem) while completely
avoiding war with the Israelis
(something, incidentally, that all
along he had suspected 'Abdullah
intended) ... Thus, in the days
before and after 15 May the war
plan had changed in essence
from a united effort to conquer
large parts of the nascent Jewish
state, and perhaps destroy it, into
an uncoordinated, multilateral
land grab. As a collective, the
Arab states still wished and
hoped to destroy Israel—and, had
their armies encountered no
serious resistance, would, without
doubt, have proceeded to take all
of Palestine, including Tel Aviv
and Haifa. But, in the
circumstances, their invasion
now aimed at seriously injuring
the Yishuv and conquering some
of its territory while occupying all
or most of the areas earmarked
for Palestinian Arab statehood."),
and 396-397, "[p. 396] The Arab
war aim, in both stages of the
hostilities, was, at a minimum, to
abort the emergence of a Jewish
state or to destroy it at inception.
The Arab states hoped to
accomplish this by conquering all
or large parts of the territory
allotted to the Jews by the United
Nations. And some Arab leaders
spoke of driving the Jews into the
sea and ridding Palestine “of the
Zionist plague.” The struggle, as
the Arabs saw it, was about the
fate of Palestine/the Land of
Israel, all of it, not over this or that
part of the country. But, in public,
official Arab spokesmen often
said that the aim of the May 1948
invasion was to “save” Palestine
or “save the Palestinians,”
definitions more agreeable to
Western ears. The picture of Arab
aims was always more complex
than Zionist historiography
subsequently made out. The chief
cause of this complexity was that
fly-in-the-ointment, King 'Abdullah.
Jordan's ruler, a pragmatist, was
generally skeptical of the Arabs’
ability to defeat, let alone destroy,
the Yishuv, and fashioned his war
aim accordingly: to seize the
Arab-populated West Bank,
preferably including East
Jerusalem ... [p. 397] Other Arab
leaders were generally more
optimistic. But they, too, had
ulterior motives, beyond driving
the Jews into the sea or, at the
least, aborting the Jewish state.
Chief among them was to prevent
their fellow leaders (especially
'Abdullah) from conquering and
annexing all or too much of
Palestine and to seize as much of
Palestine as they could for
themselves."; Sa'di 2007,
pp. 293–294, "It was not until
May 15, a month and a half after
the implementation of Plan D,
that neighboring Arab states sent
in armed forces in an attempt to
halt the Zionist seizure of territory
and the ethnic cleansing of the
population ... The physical and
psychological condition of the
refugees as well as the horror
stories they carried intensified the
pressures on Arab leaders to
commit their regular armies to
the battle ... Their intervention
came too late, when their ability
to tip the balance of power had
already been lost. The Zionist
forces were able to repel the
attacks of the Arab armies, to
pursue the campaign of
conquest, and to continue
expelling Palestinians and
destroying their villages ...
Moreover, because of political
rivalries between Arab leaders,
there was a failure to coordinate
operations (Flapan 1987; Gerges
2001: 151–158; Shlaim 2001)."
67. Morris 2008, pp. 181 ("In general,
in private they appreciated and
admitted their military weakness
and unpreparedness. But in
public, militant bluster was the
norm.") and 401 ("Egypt, Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan had
all achieved independence (or
semi-independence) a few years
before, and most had new armies
with inadequate training and no
experience of combat. Their
populations consisted largely of
illiterate peasants for whom
religion, family, clan, and village
were the cores of identity and
loyalty. They were relatively
untouched by the passions of
modern nationalism (though were
easily swayed by Islamic rhetoric)
and lacked technological skills,
which bore heavily on the
functioning of air and naval
forces, artillery, intelligence, and
communications. The states
themselves were all poor and
poorly organized and led by self-
serving politicians of varied
abilities and ethics; all, except
Lebanon, were governed by
shambling autocracies, and none,
except perhaps Jordan's, enjoyed
popular legitimacy or support.");
Sa'di 2007, p. 294, "Although Arab
military commanders and some
politicians were well aware of the
weakness of their armies, they
bent to public pressure and tried
to salvage what they could. The
newly independent Arab states,
most of which were still to some
degree under the military control
of Western powers, were unable
to conduct a military campaign.
Their national armies were
unprepared for war. They were
small, poorly equipped and
inexperienced."
68. Khalidi 2020, pp. 77–78,
"Thereafter he sought to expand
his territory through a variety of
means. The most obvious
direction was westward, into
Palestine, whence the king's
lengthy secret negotiations with
the Zionists to reach an
accommodation that would give
him control of part of the country
... Both the king and the British
opposed allowing the
Palestinians to benefit from the
1947 partition or the war that
followed, and neither wanted an
independent Arab state in
Palestine. They had come to a
secret agreement to prevent this,
via sending “the Arab Legion
across the Jordan River as soon
as the Mandate ended to occupy
the part of Palestine allotted to
the Arabs.” This goal meshed with
that of the Zionist movement,
which negotiated with ‘Abdullah
to achieve the same end."; Slater
2020, p. 77, "First, while none of
the Arab states were interested in
the establishment of a
Palestinian state—that would
interfere with their own territorial
ambitions in the area—there is no
reason to doubt what they said at
the time, namely, that they were
furious at Zionist massacres and
forced expulsion of the
Palestinians, which began well
before the invasion."; Morris
2008, p. 195, "From the start, the
invasion plans had failed to
assign any task whatsoever to
the Palestinian Arabs or to take
account of their political
aspirations. Although the Arab
leaders vaguely alluded to a duty
to “save the Palestinians,” none of
them seriously contemplated the
establishment of a Palestinian
Arab state with Husseini at its
head. All the leaders loathed
Husseini; all, to one degree or
another, cared little about
Palestinian goals, their rhetoric
notwithstanding. It was with this
in mind that Jordan, on the eve of
the invasion, ordered the ALA out
of the West Bank and
subsequently disarmed the local
Arab militias. The Arab states’
marginalization of the Palestinian
Arabs was in some measure a
consequence of their military
defeats of April and the first half
 of May. These had also rendered
them politically insignificant."

69. Pappe 2022, p. 123; Slater 2020,

p. 75; Davis 2011, p. 7; Morris
2008, pp. 177–179
70. Manna 2022, p. 41, "Most of the
four hundred thousand
Palestinians who lived in those
areas had become refugees
before the intervention of the
Arab armies began"; Pappe 2022,
p. 121, "By the time the British left
in the middle of May, one-third of
the Palestinian population had
already been evicted"; Khalidi
2020, p. 75, "In this first phase of
the Nakba before May 15, 1948, a
pattern of ethnic cleansing
resulted in the expulsion and
panicked departure of about
300,000 Palestinians overall and
the devastation of many of the
Arab majority's key urban
economic, political, civic, and
cultural centers."; Slater 2020, pp.
81 ("While a number of studies
have found no evidence to
support the Israeli claim of an
Arab propaganda campaign to
induce the Palestinians to flee,
well before the Arab invasion
some 300,000 to 400,000
Palestinians (out of a population
of about 900,000 at the time of
the UN partition) were either
forcibly expelled—sometimes by
forced marches with only the
clothes on their backs—or fled as
a result of Israeli psychological
warfare, economic pressures, and
violence, designed to empty the
area that would become Israel of
most of its Arab inhabitants.") and
406 n.44 ("Reviewing the
evidence marshaled by Morris
and others, Tom Segev concluded
that 'most of the Arabs in the
country, approximately 400,000,
were chased out and expelled
during the first stage of the war.
In other words, before the Arab
armies invaded the country'
(Haaretz, July 18, 2010). Other
estimates have varied concerning
the number of Palestinians who
fled or were expelled before the
May 1948 Arab state attack;
Morris estimated the number to
be 250,000–300,000 (The Birth
of the Palestinian Refugee
Problem Revisited, 262); Tessler
puts it at 300,000 (A History of
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
279); Pappé’s estimate is
380,000 (The Making of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, 96) ... Daniel
Blatman estimates the number to
be about 500,000 (Blatman,
“Netanyahu, This Is What Ethnic
Cleansing Really Looks Like”).
Whatever the exact number, even
Israeli 'Old Historians' now admit
that during the 1948 war, the
Israeli armed forces drove out
many of the Palestinians, though
they emphasized the action as a
military 'necessity.' For example,
see Anita Shapira, Israel: A
History, 167–68."); Cohen 2017,
p. 80, "On May 14, Ben-Gurion
read the Declaration of
Independence ... At that time, the
Arabs of Tiberias, Safed, and
most of the Arabs of Haifa (who
were supposed to be citizens of
the Jewish state, according to the
Partition Plan) as well as those of
Jaffa (in the planned Arab state)
had already been uprooted from
their cities (on the occupation of
these cities, see Morris 1987).
They were not to enjoy the
promised equality of the Jewish
state."; Masalha 2012, pp. 12–13,
"‘Between the last month of 1947
and the four and a half months of
1948, the Palestinian Arab
community would cease to exist
as a social and political entity.’
Hundreds of villages would be
destroyed, urban life in Palestine's
most populous Arab
communities would disappear,
and almost a million Palestinians
would be rendered homeless
and/or stateless.'"; Morris 2008,
pp. 78 ("Then, in early April, the
Haganah went over to the
offensive, by mid-May crushing
the Palestinians. This second
stage involved major campaigns
and battles and resulted in the
conquest of territory, mainly by
the Jews."), 93 ("The civil war half
of the 1948 War, which ended
with the complete destruction of
Palestinian Arab military power
and the shattering of Palestinian
society, began on 30 November
1947 and ended on 14 May 1948,
by which time hundreds of
thousands of townspeople and
villagers had fled or been forcibly
displaced from their homes."),
118 ("The moment the Haganah
switched to the offense and
launched large-scale, highly
organized, and sustained
operations, the Arab weaknesses
came to the fore—and their
militias, much like Palestinian
society as a whole, swiftly
collapsed, like a house of cards."),
138 ("in effect delivering a death-
blow to Palestine Arab military
power and political aspirations"),
171, 179 ("Palestinian Arab
military power was crushed, and
Palestinian Arab society, never
robust, fell apart, much of the
population fleeing to the inland
areas or out of the country
altogether."), and 400; Sa'di 2007,
p. 294, "This campaign led to the
expulsion of some 380,000
Palestinians, about one-half of
the total Palestinian refugees
who would soon be created."
71. Pappe 2022, p. 123; Slater 2020,
p. 75; Morris 2008, pp. 180–205
72. Manna 2022, p. 32, "In the first
stage of the war the gap in
preparedness between
Palestinians and Jews was not
apparent due to the defensive
policy adopted by the Haganah.
The presence of British forces in
parts of the country during that
period played a role in the
adoption of that tactic, as did the
desire not to provoke a
comprehensive reaction on the
part of the Arabs. Despite that,
when the Haganah chose to
mount military operations, it
became apparent that the
Palestinian citizens were
exposed and had no effective
protection."; Pappe 2022, p. 127,
"in the first phase, it was urban
Palestine that was subjected to
expulsions and massacres";
Morris 2008, pp. 78 ("In
describing the first, civil war half
of the war, it is necessary to take
account of three important facts.
One, most of the fighting between
November 1947 and mid-May
1948 occurred in the areas
earmarked for Jewish statehood
(the main exception being
Jerusalem, earmarked for
international control, and the
largely Arab-populated “Corridor”
to it from Tel Aviv) and where the
Jews enjoyed demographic
superiority ... Two, the Jewish
and Arab communities in western
and northern Palestine were
thoroughly intermingled ... And
three, the civil war took place
while Britain ruled the country
and while its military forces were
deployed in the various regions.
The British willingness and ability
to intervene in the hostilities
progressively diminished as their
withdrawal progressed, and by
the second half of April 1948 they
rarely interfered, except to secure
their withdrawal routes.") and 101
("Much of the fighting in the first
months of the war took place in
and on the edges of the main
towns—Jerusalem, Tel Aviv–
Jaffa, and Haifa.")
73. Manna 2022, pp. 109–111, "[p.
109] The war that Israel
continued to wage since the
summer of 1948 was to expand
the territory of the Jewish state at
the expense of the contemplated
Arab state under the partition
resolution ... [p. 111] months of
ceasefire in the wake of the
occupation of Nazareth and lower
Galilee (July to October) ...";
Pappe 2022, pp. 125–128, "[p.
125] Israel's leaders, furnished
with new weapons but
apprehensive lest the
international community impose
an unfavourable solution on them,
made an effort to complete a
takeover of most of Palestine. In
August, the successful Israeli
campaigns continued, leading to
their complete control of
Palestine, apart from the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip ... [p.
126] The conventional war
occurred on the edges of what
was to be the Jewish state, and
within areas the Jews coveted in
the proposed Palestinian state.
Within the Jewish state proper, a
strange and chilling situation
developed around 300 or so
Palestinian villages ... 370
[villages] wiped out by Israel ...
From the end of April until the end
of July 1948, a grim scene was
repeated in almost every village.
Armed Israeli soldiers surrounded
each village on three sides and
put the villagers to flight through
the fourth side. In many cases, if
the people refused to leave, they
were forced onto lorries and
driven away to the West Bank. In
some villages, there were Arab
volunteers who resisted by force,
and when these villages were
conquered, they were
immediately blown up and
destroyed ... [p. 127] The
systematic aspect was in the
methods employed, first
terrorizing the population,
executing a few to induce others
to leave and then inviting an
official committee to assess the
value of land and property in the
deserted villages or
neighbourhoods ... While, in the
first phase, it was urban Palestine
that was subjected to expulsions
and massacres, the bulk of the
population living in the rural areas
became victims of this policy
after May 1948 ... [p. 128] Half of
the villages had been destroyed,
flattened by Israeli bulldozers that
had been at work since August
1948 when the government had
decided either to turn them into
cultivated land or to build new
Jewish settlements on their
remains."; Ghanim 2018,
pp. 106–108, "[p. 106] The “ten-
day series” refers to a series of
operations undertaken by the
Zionist forces lasting from the
eight until the eighteenth of July,
1948, during which many
operations to expel inhabitants
and seize villages took place ...
[p. 107] During the “ten days,” the
Etzioni Brigade attacked the
villages located south of
Jerusalem alongside forces from
the Lehi and Etzel brigades, who
had already committed the
massacre of Deir Yassin in April
1948 ... Operation Danny, which
took place between the ninth and
seventeenth of July, 1948 was
one of the most significant
operations of the “ten days,”
during which both Lydda and
Ramla fell on the twelfth and
thirteenth of July as well as
villages south of Jerusalem. The
fall of Lydda and Ramla (and the
implications of these events),
whereby the residents were
systematically expelled and
prevented by armed force from
returning to their villages and
cities, constituted one of the
most tragic moments of the war
for Palestinians ... Lydda also
witnessed the Dahmash
Massacre, during which tens of
Palestinians who were gathered
in the Dahmash mosque were
terminated ... [p. 108] fifty
thousand residents of Lydda and
Ramla were expelled after being
terrorized."; Cohen 2017, pp. 81-
83 ps=, "[p. 81] As the war
progressed, and the Arabs of
Palestine continued to be
uprooted from their homes, the
position that the refugees should
not be allowed to return was
gaining momentum. An official
decision sealing this trend was
taken in a government session on
June 16 ... [p. 82] The policy that
emerged in the weeks following
the Arab armies’ invasion was
that of preventing the Palestinian
refugees’ return and also
encouraging the expulsion of
Palestinians from their towns and
villages ... [p. 83] The conquest of
Nazareth and its surrounding
area, in addition to Lydda and
Ramleh during the 10-day battle,
confirmed the military
capabilities of the newly
established Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) and expanded the territory
under Israeli control beyond the
boundaries stipulated by the
Partition Plan. While most of the
Palestinian population in these
areas fled or were expelled, tens
of thousands of Palestinian
residents remained under Israeli
rule."; Morris 2008, pp. 309-310
("The condition of many of the
four hundred thousand Arabs
displaced by midsummer 1948
was 'appalling.'") and 405 ("When
the civil war gave way to the
conventional war, as the Jewish
militias—the Haganah, IZL, and
LHI—changed into the IDF and as
the Arab militias were replaced by
more or less disciplined regular
armies, the killing of civilians and
prisoners of war almost stopped,
except for the series of atrocities
committed by IDF troops in Lydda
in July and in the Galilee at the
end of October and beginning of
November 1948."); Pappe 2006,
pp. 148–156, "[p. 148] All in all,
the level of preparation the
military command was engaged
in during June for the next stages
showed a growing confidence in
the Israeli Army's ability to
continue not only its ethnic
cleansing operations, but also its
extension of the Jewish state
beyond the seventy-eight per cent
of Mandatory Palestine it had
already occupied ... [p. 150] As
they progressed, the Israeli
troops were more determined
than ever to resort to summary
executions and any other means
that might speed up the
expulsions ... The pace of
occupying and cleansing villages
in the lower and eastern Galilee
was faster than in any phase of
the operations that had gone
before ... [p. 156] From 9 July, the
day after the first truce ended, the
sporadic fighting between the
Israeli army and the Arab units
from Jordan, Iraq, Syria and
Lebanon continued for another
ten days. In less than two weeks,
hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians had been expelled
from their villages, towns and
cities. The UN 'peace' plan had
resulted in people being
intimidated and terrorised by
psychological warfare, heavy
shelling of civilian populations,
expulsions, seeing relatives being
executed, and wives and
daughters abused, robbed and in
several cases, raped. By July,
most of their houses had gone,
dynamited by Israeli sappers.";
Morris 2004, p. 171, pp. 171 ("But
ultimately, the atmosphere of
transfer, as we shall see,
prevailed through April–June:
Most communities attacked were
evacuated and where no
spontaneous evacuation
occurred, communities more
often than not were expelled.
Throughout, Arabs who had fled
were prevented from returning to
their homes. In some areas,
villages that surrendered were
disarmed – and then expelled; in
others, Haganah (and IZL and
LHI) units refused to accept
surrender, triggering departure.
But, still, because of the absence
of a clear, central expulsive policy
order, different units behaved
differently."), 355 ("Through the
second half of 1948, the IDF,
under Ben-Gurion's tutelage,
continued to destroy Arab
villages, usually during or just
after battle, occasionally, weeks
and months after. The ministerial
committee was not usually
approached for permission. The
destruction stemmed from
immediate military needs, as in
Operation Dani, and from long-
term political considerations ...
During the Second Truce, from 19
July until 15 October, the army
continued to destroy abandoned
villages in piecemeal fashion,
usually for reasons that were
described as military."), and 597
("But while there was no
‘expulsion policy,’ the July
offensives were characterised by
far more expulsions and, indeed,
brutality than the first half of the
war.")
74. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 258–
260; Pappe 2022, p. 127, "Two
hundred men between the ages
of thirteen and thirty were
massacred"; Khoury 2012, p. 263;
Masalha 2012, p. 85, "between 70
and 200 Palestinian civilians
were killed ... in a large-scale,
well-planned massacre"; Lentin
2010, pp. 69–71, 140;
Slyomovics 2007, p. 35; Esmeir
2007, pp. 229–250. But see:
Morris 2008, p. 164,
"Documentary evidence indicates
that the Alexandroni troops
murdered a handful of POWs—
 and expelled the inhabitants—but
provides no grounds for believing
that a large-scale massacre
occurred."))

75. Pappe 2022, p. 124-125; Morris

2008, pp. 264–319.
76. Pappe 2022, p. 136, "To avert
this, the Israeli government
began, in August 1948, to execute
an anti-repatriation policy, which
resulted in either the total
destruction or full Jewish
takeover of every deserted
Palestinian house and dwelling,
both in the villages and the urban
neighbourhoods."; Cohen 2017,
p. 81, "As the war progressed, and
the Arabs of Palestine continued
to be uprooted from their homes,
the position that the refugees
should not be allowed to return
was gaining momentum. An
official decision sealing this trend
was taken in a government
session on June 16."; Davis 2011,
p. 9, "The state's policy during and
after the 1948 War was to
destroy the houses in the villages
so that people would not be
encouraged to return.31 In the
process, some 70 percent of
these villages were completely
destroyed, and another 22
percent were left with only a few
houses or religious places
standing."; Morris 2008, pp. 298–
309 and 411, "[p. 298] During the
truce, the Arabs and Bernadotte
pressed Israel to agree to a return
of all or some of the refugees.
But the Zionist leaders had
decided against this. By late
summer 1948 a consensus had
formed that the refugees were
not to be allowed back during the
war, and a majority—led by Ben-
Gurion and Shertok—believed that
it was best that they not return
after the war either. The Israelis
argued that a discussion of
refugee repatriation must await
the end of hostilities: in wartime,
returnees would constitute a fifth
column. But, in private, they
added that after the war, too, if
allowed back, returnees would
constitute a demographic and
political time bomb, with the
potential to destabilize the
Jewish state ... The Israeli
decision to bar a refugee return
had consolidated between April
and August."; Pappe 2006,
pp. 187–190, "[p. 187] The major
activities towards the end of the
1948 ethnic cleansing operation
now focused on implementing
Israel's anti-repatriation policy on
two levels. The first level was
national, introduced in August
1948 by an Israeli governmental
decision to destroy all the evicted
villages and transform them into
new Jewish settlements or
'natural' forests. The second level
was diplomatic, whereby
strenuous efforts were made to
avert the growing international
pressure on Israel to allow the
return of the refugees. The two
were closely interconnected: the
pace of demolition was
deliberately accelerated with the
specific aim of invalidating any
discussion on the subject of
refugees returning to their
houses, since those houses
would no longer be there ... There
was a third anti-repatriation
effort, and that was to control the
demographic distribution of
Palestinians both within the
villages that had not been
cleansed and in the previously
mixed towns of Palestine, at that
point already totally'de-Arabised'.
For this purpose, the Israeli army
established, on 12 January 1949,
a new unit, the Minority Unit. It
was made up of Druze,
Circassians and Bedouin who
were recruited to it for one
specific job only: to prevent
Palestinian villagers and town
dwellers from returning to their
original homes."; Morris 2004,
p. 589, "But if a measure of
ambivalence and confusion
attended Haganah\IDF treatment
of Arab communities during and
immediately after conquest, there
was nothing ambiguous about
Israeli policy, from summer 1948,
toward those who had been
displaced and had become
refugees and toward those who
were yet to be displaced, in future
operations: Generally applied with
resolution and, often, with
brutality, the policy was to prevent
a refugee return at all costs. And
if, somehow, refugees succeeded
in infiltrating back, they were
routinely rounded up and expelled
(though tens of thousands of
‘infiltrators’ ultimately succeeded
in resettling and becoming Israeli
citizens). In this sense, it may
fairly be said that all 700,000 or
so who ended up as refugees
were compulsorily displaced or
‘expelled’."
77. Masalha 2012, pp. 73–74, "In
1948 more than half of the
Palestinians were driven from
their towns and villages, mainly
by a deliberate Israeli policy of
‘transfer’ and ethnic cleansing.
The name ‘Palestine’ disappeared
from the map. To complete this
transformation of the country, in
August 1948 a de facto ‘Transfer
Committee’ was officially (though
secretly) appointed by the Israeli
cabinet to plan the Palestinian
refugees’ organised resettlement
in the Arab states. The three-
member committee was
composed of ‘Ezra Danin, a
former senior Haganah
intelligence officer and a senior
Foreign Ministry adviser on Arab
affairs since July 1948; Zalman
Lifschitz, the prime minister's
adviser on land matters; and
Yosef Weitz (born in Russia in
1890, emigrated to Palestine in
1908), head of the Jewish
National Fund's land settlement
department, as head of the
Committee. The main Israeli
propaganda lines regarding the
Palestinian refugees and some of
the myths of 1948 were cooked
up by members of this official
Transfer Committee. Besides
doing everything possible to
reduce the Palestinian population
in Israel, Weitz and his colleagues
sought in October 1948 to
amplify and consolidate the
demographic transformation of
Palestine by: preventing
Palestinian refugees from
returning to their homes and
villages; destroying Arab villages;
settling Jews in Arab villages and
towns and distributing Arab lands
among Jewish settlements;
extricating Jews from Iraq and
Syria; seeking ways to ensure the
absorption of Palestinian
refugees in Arab countries and
launching a propaganda
campaign to discourage Arab
return."; Morris 2008, pp. 300 and
308; Pappe 2006, p. 212, "Thus
he decided to appoint Danin and
Weitz to a committee of two that
from then on would take all final
decisions on Palestinian property
and land, the main features of
which were destruction and
confiscation."; Morris 2004,
pp. 312–329, "[p. 312] From May,
Weitz pressed Ben-Gurion and
Shertok to set up a ‘Transfer
Committee’, preferably with
himself at its head, to oversee
‘transfer policy’, which in the main
was to focus on measures that
would assure that there would be
no return. More guardedly, the
committee was also to advise the
political leadership and the
Haganah on further population
displacements. The first unofficial
Transfer Committee – composed
of Weitz, Danin and Sasson, now
head of the Middle East Affairs
Department of the Foreign
Ministry – came into being at the
end of May, following Danin's
agreement to join and Shertok's
28 May unofficial sanction of the
committee's existence and goals
... [p. 313] from the beginning of
June, with JNF funds and
personnel, the committee set
about razing villages in various
areas ... [p. 329] Although no
formal decision was reached, a
committee – the second and
official Transfer Committee –
with far narrower terms of
reference than Weitz had
originally sought, was at last
appointed by Ben-Gurion. The 18
August gathering at the Prime
Minister's Office had been defined
as ‘consultative’. The participants
had been united on the need to
bar a return and there was
general, if not complete,
agreement as to the means to be
used to attain this end –
destruction of villages, settlement
in other sites and on abandoned
lands, cultivation of Arab fields,
purchase and expropriation of
Arab lands, and the use of
propaganda to persuade the
refugees that they would not be
allowed back. The same day,
orders went out to all IDF units to
prevent ‘with all means’ the return
of refugees."; Schulz 2003,
pp. 33–34, "Initially a number of
measures were taken in order to
prevent refugees from returning.
At the end of May a Transfer
Committee was set up, proposing
that return be barred and that the
Arab Palestinian population be
assisted in being absorbed
elsewhere. In this plan, villages
were to be destroyed during
military operations, cultivation
was to be hindered and Jews
were to be settled in towns and
villages (Morris 1987:136). The
plan became official policy during
the latter part of the war ... In
June the Israeli government
decided officially to bar a return,
in order to maintain what had,
from a Zionist perspective, been
achieved. The Israeli Defence
Forces (IDF) had received an
order to halt any movement of
refugees back to Israel by the use
of fire."
78. Pappe 2022, p. 128, "The people
of Lydda, Ramleh and Majdal
were evicted by force, suffering
massacres and humiliation in the
process."; Manna 2022, p. 48
("The murder of dozens in the
Dahmash mosque massacre in
Lydda, and the subsequent
expulsion of tens of thousands of
the inhabitants of the city and of
neighboring Ramla on a blistering
hot Ramadan day") and 96 n. 72
("Just as the Dayr Yasin
massacre is the most famous
operation in the killings of
defenseless Palestinian civilians,
the expulsion of tens of
thousands of the inhabitants of
Lydda and Ramla became the
most famous ethnic cleansing
operation carried out by the
Israeli army with orders from the
top leadership."); Hasian Jr. 2020,
p. 93; Slater 2020, p. 82, "During
the 1948 war Rabin was a leading
Haganah general and commander
of a force that violently expelled
50,000 inhabitants of the
Palestinian towns of Lydda and
Ramle."; Shenhav 2019, p. 49;
Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 13,
"the Nakba in Lydda and the
massacre that took place there";
Ghanim 2018, pp. 107–108, "the
Dahmash Massacre, during which
tens of Palestinians who were
gathered in the Dahmash mosque
were terminated ... That is how
fifty thousand residents of Lydda
and Ramla were expelled after
being terrorized."; Cohen 2017,
p. 82, "... the 10-day battle (July
9–18, 1948) when almost all the
residents of Ramleh and Lydda –
two towns that were designated
to become part of the Arab state
but were considered by Ben-
Gurion as a strategic threat to the
Jewish state – were expelled (for
an eyewitness account of the
events in Lydda and Ramleh, see
Busailah (1981); for a basic
account, see Morris (1986); for
interviews with the Palmach
commanders who expelled the
inhabitants, see Shavit 2013:99–
115). Their expulsion was carried
out on an order, or at least with
the approval of Ben-Gurion
(Morris 1986:91) ... Ben-Gurion
issued a second, milder order,
according to which the Arab
inhabitants were to be
encouraged, but not forced, to
leave, but by then the expulsion
had already been carried out.";
Masalha 2012, p. 86, "one of the
bloodiest atrocities of 1948.
According to Israeli historian
Yoav Gelber, Dayr Yasin 'was not
the worst of the war's atrocities ...
the massacre of approximately
250 Arabs in Lydda ... took place
following capitulation and not in
the midst of combat’ ... Dozens of
unarmed civilians who were
detained in the Dahmash Mosque
and church premises of the town
were gunned down and murdered.
One official Israeli source put the
casualty figures at 250 dead and
many injured. It is likely, however,
that somewhere between 250
and 400 Arabs were killed in this
IDF massacre; and an estimated
350 more died in the subsequent
expulsion and forced march of
the townspeople ... A group of
between twenty and fifty Arab
civilians was brought to clean up
the mosque and bury the
remains. After they had finished
their work, they were shot into the
graves they had dug."; Knopf-
Newman 2011, p. 183, "... al-
Ramla and Lydda also
experienced massacre, rape, and
forced migration, but as
Hammad's poem indicates 400
Palestinians out of 17,000
remained. Before the expulsion,
in July 1948 Hagana, in collusion
with Irgun, encircled the area and
attacked its inhabitants ..."; Morris
2008, pp. 287–292; Slyomovics
2007, p. 30, "The largest single
expulsion of Palestinians, some
50,000 urban-dwellers"; Pappe
2006, p. 156, "As we have seen,
15 May 1948 may have been a
very significant date for the 'real
war' between Israel and the Arab
armies, but it was totally
insignificant for the ethnic
cleansing operations. The same
goes for the two periods of truce
- they were notable landmarks for
the former but irrelevant for the
latter, with one qualification,
perhaps: it proved easier during
the actual fighting to conduct
large-scale cleansing operations
as the Israelis did between the
two truces, when they expelled
the populations of the two towns
of Lydd and Ramla, altogether
70,000 people, and again after
the second truce, when they
resumed the large-scale ethnic
cleansing of Palestine with huge
operations of uprooting,
deportation and depopulation in
both the south and the north of
the country."; Schulz 2003, p. 28,
"Serious atrocities were
committed in several instances,
for example in Lydda,
accelerating flight."
79. Khoury 2012, p. 262, "As the
infiltrators were limited by
Israelis, Palestinian peasants
tried to return across the borders
in order to rejoin their households
or to collect their harvest."; Morris
2008, pp. 296 ("large numbers of
Arab refugees continuously tried
to infiltrate through Israeli lines to
return to their homes or reap
crops") and 300 ("Already on 1
June, a group of senior officials,
including Shertok, Cabinet
Secretary Zehev Sharef, and
Minority Affairs Minister Bechor
Shitrit, had resolved that the
Arabs “were not to be helped to
return” and that IDF commanders
“were to be issued with the
appropriate orders.” It was feared
that the refugees would try to
exploit the impending truce
beginning 11 June to infiltrate
back to their homes. Front-line
units were instructed to bar a
refugee return. Oded Brigade HQ
instructed its battalions “to take
every possible measure to
prevent” a return; this would
“prevent tactical and political
complications down the road.”
The army, too, appears to have
been thinking of both the military
and political advantages of
barring a return ... No vote was
taken on 16 June—though orders
immediately went out to all front-
line units to bar refugee
infiltration “also with live fire.”");
Morris 2004, pp. 442-446 ("[p.
442] The institution of the Second
Truce and the relative quiet that
descended on the front lines
tempted the refugees to try to
return to their homes or, at least,
to reap their crops along and
behind the lines. Immediately
after the start of the truce, IDF
units on all the fronts were
instructed to bar the way,
including by use of live fire, to
Arabs seeking to cross into Israeli
territory, be it for resettlement,
theft, smuggling, harvesting,
sabotage or espionage. Such
instructions were periodically
reissued. The units were also
instructed to scour the now-
empty villages for infiltrators, to
kill or expel them, and to patrol
still-populated villages where
illegal residents were to be
identified, detained and expelled.
Different units implemented
these orders with varying degrees
of efficiency, severity and
consistency. Pressure on the
national-level leadership to act
firmly against Arab infiltration
was applied by settlements,
especially in hard-hit areas like
the Coastal Plain, which feared
terrorism and theft; by officials
who feared for the future of the
new settlements; by IDF units
deployed along the front lines,
who saw the infiltrators as a
security threat; and by the police
... [p. 443] the army had been
dealing with the problem – albeit
without decisive success – since
the end of the 'Ten Days'. ... [p.
445] During the Second Truce, IDF
outposts and patrols regularly
harassed harvesters between
front line positions, behind the
lines and in no man's land, to a
depth of 500–600 metres –
though the phenomenon was not
as widespread as during the First
Truce, when the harvest had been
at its height. The policy often
involved destroying structures
used by harvesters for storage or
sleep.") and 529 ("Few Arab
villagers were left on the Israeli
side of the ceasefire lines
separating the new State and the
areas held by Jordan and the Iraqi
forces in the Triangle when the
major bouts of fighting ended in
central Palestine in mid-1948.
Most of the empty pre-1948
villages were demolished by the
IDF to render the sites
unattractive to would-be
returnees. Along the front lines,
the army continuously harassed
Arab cultivators and barred
infiltrators; Israel, for both military
and political reasons, wanted as
few Arabs inside the country,
behind the lines, as possible, and
feared saboteurs and spies. The
purpose of most of the
infiltrations was agricultural or to
return home or theft; very few
were terroristic. But there was
sporadic terrorism.")
80. Manna 2022, pp. 60-92 ("[p. 60]
The dominant understanding that
the population of the Galilee
escaped the Nakba is not
accurate, since of the 220 cities
and villages in the Galilee
populated by Arabs, only 70
remained after the Nakba. Over
two-thirds of the Palestinian
towns and villages had been
destroyed and their populations
expelled; 100,000 Arabs or fewer
escaped this fate, representing
about half of those who were
living in the Galilee until the end
of 1947. It is true that more
Palestinian residents remained in
the Galilee than in any other area
occupied by Israel in 1948;
nevertheless, ethnic cleansing in
some parts of the Galilee was
almost total ... [p. 75] In the
villages of upper Galilee closer to
the Lebanese border, however,
the war crimes and expulsions
were more severe and cruel. The
Israeli army carried out killings
(including massacres), pillaged,
and raped in a number of border
villages, including Safsaf, Saliha,
Jish, Hula, and Sa‘sa‘, on the day
the villages were occupied or
shortly thereafter. The killings and
expulsions were carried out in
villages that had put up no
resistance to the occupiers. The
inhabitants of some villages
(Saliha, for example) even
resisted the presence of the ARA
in their village, but this did not
save them when the soldiers of
the Israeli army entered their
village."), 301 n. 83 ("The Israeli
army carried out massacres in
‘Ilabun, against al-Mawasi Arabs,
in Kufr ‘Inan, Farradiyya, Majd al-
Krum, al-Bi‘na, Dayr al-Asad,
Nahaf, Tarshiha, Safsaf, Jish,
Sa‘sa‘, Hula, and Saliha. In the
massacres of upper Galilee alone
hundreds of defenseless civilians
and prisoners were executed by
the soldiers."), and 308 n. 96
("The murder and expulsion of
defenseless civilians involved the
residents of the villages of ‘Ilabun,
al-Mawasi Arabs, Kufr ‘Inan, Majd
al-Krum, al-Bi‘na, Dayr al-Asad,
Nahf, Sha‘b, Mirun, Jish, al-Safsaf,
Sa‘sa‘, Tarshiha, Salha, Hula, and
others."); Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 93,
"In that 1988 Tikkun essay Benny
Morris once argued that “Jewish
atrocities” were “far more
widespread than the old
historians” had indicated, and he
went on to mention the
massacres of Arabs at places like
Al-Dawayima, Eilaboun, Jish,
Safsaf, Hule, Saliha, Sasa, and
Lydda."; Slater 2020, p. 90, "On
October 15, Rabin continued, after
Egypt fired a few shots at the
convoy, “we had our pretext” and
Israel implemented its plan,
succeeding not only in expelling
the Egyptian forces from the
Negev but also seizing a large
section of the western Negev
region that had previously been
allocated to the Arab state.";
Cohen 2017, p. 87, "Even before
the government was discussing
the census and the elections, it
had decided on resuming the
fighting. In late October of 1948,
the IDF launched offensives in the
south and north of the country
and completed its conquest of
the Galilee, the Negev, and the
southern coastal line to Gaza.
During these conquests, dozens
of thousands of Palestinians
were once again uprooted from
their homes. Some were expelled
by Jewish forces; others fled,
fearing revenge. Some left with
the retreating Egyptian army (in
the south) and al-Qawuqji's Arab
Liberation Army (in the north). In
the south, none of the Arab
settlements remained standing,
but some of the Bedouin
communities did. In the Galilee,
many managed to remain
steadfastly in their villages
despite efforts to expel them.";
Masalha 2012, pp. 73–74; Morris
2008, pp. 313 ("...the IDF
offensive against the Egyptian
expeditionary force that began on
15 October and the offensive
against the ALA in the Galilee two
weeks later.") and 344-348;
Pappe 2006, p. 190, "Under the
watchful eyes of UN observers
who were patrolling the skies of
the Galilee, the final stage of the
ethnic cleansing operation, begun
in October 1948, continued until
the summer of 1949. Whether
from the sky or on the ground, no
one could fail to spot the hordes
of men, women and children
streaming north every day.
Ragged women and children were
conspicuously dominant in these
human convoys: the young men
were gone-executed, arrested or
missing. By this time UN
observers from above and Jewish
eyewitnesses on the ground must
have become desensitised
towards the plight of the people
passing by in front of them: how
else to explain the silent
acquiescence in the face of the
massive deportation unfolding
before their eyes?"
81. Pappe 2022, p. 126, "The Israelis
occupied Beersheba in October
1948, and the Israeli army even
threatened to enter Sinai and the
West Bank, that is, to enter Egypt
proper and ignore the tacit
understanding with Jordan.";
Masalha 2012, p. 115, "towns and
villages of southern Palestine,
including the cities of Beer Sheba
and al-Majdal, were completely
depopulated"; Davis 2011, p. 7,
"the depopulation of Palestinians
from cities—Acre, Haifa, Safad,
Tiberius, Beersheba, Jaffa, and
Baysan"
82. Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 93; Pappe
2020, pp. 33–34, "a soldier's
eyewitness report ... enumerates
details of the massacre at al-
Dawayima as told to the author of
the letter by a soldier who
participated in the operation ...
'There was no battle and no
resistance (and no Egyptians).
The first conquerors [to enter the
village] killed from 80 to 100
[male] Arabs, women and
children. They killed the children
by smashing their skulls with
sticks. There was not a home
without its dead.'"; Masalha 2012,
p. 86, "80–100 were killed by the
IDF"; Morris 2008, p. 333; Sa'di
2007, p. 293, "According to a
report on the testimony of one
Israeli soldier ... 'The first [wave]
of conquerors killed about 80 to
100 [male] Arabs, women and
children. The children they killed
by breaking their heads with
sticks. There was not a house
without dead.'"; Slyomovics 2007,
pp. 29–30, "an Israeli army
massacre of more than eighty
villagers"
83. Sayigh 2023, p. 282, "61 bodies";
Manna 2022, pp. 75–77 and 80, "
[p. 76] The soldiers gathered all
those who remained in their
homes and shot and killed twelve
young men. Then they took
dozens of men (some of whom
had fought with the ARA) to a well
where they executed them.76 Not
satisfied with killing the men in
cold blood, the soldiers picked
several women and asked them
to fetch water to the village. After
they had moved away some
distance, the soldiers followed
and raped them, killing two in the
process."; Hasian Jr. 2020, p. 93;
Pappe 2020, p. 34, "The
document states that, in Safsaf,
'They caught fifty-two men, tied
them to one another, dug a hole
and shot them. Ten were still alive
[when thrown into the pit] the
women came and asked for
mercy. They found the bodies of
six old men, all in all sixty-one
bodies, three [reported] cases of
rape . . . one, a child aged
fourteen ...'"; Docker 2012, p. 19,
"Survivors of the Safsaf
massacre witnessed ‘how one
pregnant woman was
bayoneted’."; Khoury 2012, p. 263;
Masalha 2012, p. 86, pp. 78-79 ("
[quoting Morris] About half of the
acts of massacre were part of
Operation Hiram [in the north, in
October 1948]: at Safsaf, Saliha,
Jish, Eilaboun, Arab al Muwasi,
Deir al Asad, Majdal Krum, Sasa.
In Operation Hiram there was an
unusually high concentration of
executions of people against a
wall or next to a well in an orderly
fashion."), 84, and 86 ("50–70
were killed by the IDF"); Morris
2008, pp. 341 ("The order made
no mention of the prospective
fate of the civilian inhabitants of,
and refugees in, the “pocket.” But
an earlier order, produced six
weeks before the start of Hiram
by Haifa District HQ, one of
Northern Front's units, spoke of
“evicting” the inhabitants from the
conquered villages. This would
have been in line with Ben-
Gurion's stated expectation that
the “pocket” would be “empty
[reik]” of Arab villagers after
conquest."), and 345 ("fifty to
seventy civilians and POWs were
murdered ... by the Seventh
Brigade"); Humphries & Khalili
2007, p. 211; Pappe 2006,
pp. 180–185, "[p. 185] By 31
October, the Galilee, once an area
almost exclusively Palestinian,
was occupied in its entirety by
the Israeli army."
84. Manna 2022, pp. 199–200,
"Isolating the Arabs from the rest
of the citizens of Israel and
imposing military rule over them
had abrogated their political
rights. The military government
resorted to the 1945 defense
(emergency) regulations to
legitimize the policy of
repression, theft, and the
expulsion of thousands of those
who remained in the Galilee and
elsewhere. The government's
policy made Arab residents
accused of being perpetual
violators of those unjust laws.
The imposition of permanent
curfews at night, limiting the
mobility of citizens, and the
system of permits which were
granted to those with close
connections and denied to the
rest, deprived people of a
dignified life and basic rights.
Even within Arab towns and
villages the army declared large
tracts of land “military zones”
which the owners of the land
were prohibited from entering or
cultivating. In this way the system
of military rule strangled the
economy of Arab citizens and
prohibited the development of
their towns and villages so as to
make it easier to control them.
Ian Lustick well described and
analyzed Israeli policy towards
the Palestinian minority, which
relied on control through a
system of isolation under tight
military rule."; Pappe 2022,
pp. 145–146, "While other
Palestinians were confined in
camps or became citizens of
Jordan or non-citizens in the
Gaza Strip, 160,000 Palestinians
within the new Jewish state were
put under military rule in October
1948. This was to last eighteen
years, and the memory of those
dark times has played a
formative role in the construction
of Palestinian identity in Israel to
today and strained to breaking
point the relationship between
the minority and the majority ...
The legal status of the military
rule that was imposed on the
Palestinian minority in October
1948 was grounded in the
mandatory emergency
regulations the British had issued
in 1945 against the Jewish
underground, which gave military
governors extended authority
over the people under their rule.
These same regulations now
became a pernicious tool in the
hands of callous and sometimes
sadistic military rulers, who
generally were drawn from non-
combatant units just before their
retirement. Their cruel behaviour
consisted mainly of harassing the
population with a range of
abuses, not unlike those to which
new army recruits were
subjected. There were other
aspects to Israeli military rule.
Under its umbrella, the official
land confiscation policy was able
to continue in the name of
‘security’ and ‘public interest’.
Political activists even vaguely
suspected of identifying with
Palestinian nationalism were
expelled or imprisoned."; Khalidi
2020, p. 83, "Until 1966, most
Palestinians lived under strict
martial law and much of their
land was seized (along with that
of those who had been forced
from the country and were now
refugees)."; Bäuml 2017,
pp. 103–124, "[p. 103] The
military rule was forced upon the
Arabs through a special military
unit called “the military
government,” which was the main
Israeli official mechanism
governing the Arabs remaining in
Israel. As the Arabs within the
state of Israel had become a
minority and were no longer a
threat to the Zionists, the overall
aim of the military government
was to secure the continued
traditional segregation and
exclusion of Arabs from the
Zionist project, which started with
the beginning of Zionism. This
included expropriation of large
areas of Arab land that had been
given over to Jewish settlement,
as well as the Arabs being
defined as security threats that
had to be withstood ... [p. 108]
Thus, during the 1948 war, the
Temporary State Council decided
to place the Galilee, the Triangle
area, the Naqab and the cities of
Ramleh, Lydda, Jaffa, and Majdal
Asqalan – areas with an Arab
majority population at the end of
the battles – under special
military rule. From that time until
the end of this rule in 1968, the
military government was the
central Israeli official body
administering the affairs of the
Arab minority in Israel ... The aim
of the military government's
actions was to minimize and
almost abolish the civil equality
that the Arabs should have
enjoyed as Israeli citizens. The
military government resulted in
the exclusion of the Arabs from
all the Jewish state systems, their
discrimination in every domain,
the deepening of their internal
divides or the creation of new
ones, the erasure of their identity,
and the hindering of their sense
as a national collective ... [p. 115]
Contemporaneous testimonies
describe the raison d’etre of the
military government: This was the
government's way of preventing
the Arabs from working in the
Jewish sector, or of regulating
their employment in various
ways, such as time, numbers, and
areas of employment – for its
own convenience (Ben-Porat
1966). The military government
prevented the Arabs from taking
over government land and major
transportation routes (this fact
was determined by the Retner
Committee, which examined the
necessity of the military
government; Kafkafi 1998). It also
prevented them from taking over
abandoned Arab villages,
establishing new ones, or moving
their homes to other places at
will, especially to Jewish cities
(Schiff 1962; see also Ozacky-
Lazar 1998 for testimony by
Colonel Shacham before the
Rosen Committee in 1959).
Through movement and living
restrictions, the Israeli
government used the military
government over the Arabs to
keep Arabs away from their
lands, thus making it easier for
the government to confiscate
them (Amitai 1963b; Jiryis 1976;
LA, 2-926-1957-148, January 30,
1958). The government averts
modernization, industrialization,
and urbanization among the Arab
citizens, leaving the Arab sector
at a very low level of employment
and material comfort, creating
very large villages with no local
employment opportunities (Falah
1991b; Kafkafi 1988).31"; Lustick
& Berkman 2017, pp. 42–46, "[p.
42] For almost two decades, from
1948 through 1966, suffrage
rights for Arab citizens coexisted
with severe and systematic
restrictions on the Arab
population's civil liberties,
economic and cultural rights, and
freedom of movement. This
regime of pass laws, permits,
curfews, harassment, isolation,
and petty punishments was
enforced by poorly trained army
units and administered by Jewish
bureaucrats and military officers
thought by the rest of the military
to be incapable of performing
serious military functions. The
military government controlled
Arabs by isolating them from
Jews, fragmenting them into
disconnected villages and
regions, enforcing divisions
among religious communities,
stoking interclan rivalries among
kinship groups, enlisting
networks of informers, and co-
opting traditionalist elites. Overall,
the objective was to render the
presence of Arabs – a sizable
non-Jewish minority in the
country – as irrelevant as
possible to the life of the Jewish
state (Lustick 1980). Officially
established in October 1948, the
military government's legal
authority was rooted in
emergency mandatory legislation
absorbed by Israeli cabinet
decree following the declaration
of statehood in mid-May. The
Defense Emergency Regulations
“delegated effective sovereignty
to the military within a specified
territory and authorized its
commander to suspend all basic
constitutional liberties, including
the property and habeas corpus
rights, of its inhabitants”
(Robinson 2013:33).3 Armed with
these and other emergency laws,
Ben-Gurion appointed Haganah
commander Elimelekh Avner to
oversee the military regime that
replaced the ad hoc
administrations set up by the
army in majority Arab areas ... [p.
43] Although loosened gradually
between its establishment in
1948 and its abolition in 1966, in
its first decade the military
government controlled nearly
every aspect of daily life in Arab
areas. Formal military permits
were required for opening a shop,
harvesting crops, seeking
medical treatment, finding a job in
a Jewish city, traveling to work, or
simply moving between villages
for visitation. To turn the spigots
of cheap Arab labor on and off
when and where it was necessary
for the Jewish economy, only a
fraction of all Arab requests for
work permits were granted. Arab
farmers were not allowed to
independently market their
produce but rather were forced to
sell it at below-market prices to
state-created monopolistic
marketing firms. Blacklists were
used to deny politically affiliated
Arabs development loans and
travel authorization (Lustick
1980:184) ... [p. 45] For nearly
two decades, the military
government was instrumental in
stripping the Arab minority of its
remaining physical assets and
depriving it of an independent
political base from which it could
promote its national, cultural, and
economic interests. This was not
only its effect but its raison
d’être."; Masalha 2012, pp. 5
("After 1948 the Palestinians
inside Israel had to endure
eighteen years of military
administration, which restricted
their movements, controlled
almost every aspect of their life
and acted as an instrument for
the expropriation of the bulk of
their lands (Sa’di 2005: 7–26;
Jiryis 1976; Lustick 1982; Kamen
1987: 484–9, 1988: 68–109;
Falah 1996: 256–85; Benziman
and Mansour 1992; Kretzmer
1987). The military government
(1948–66) declared Palestinian
villages ‘closed military zones’ to
prevent displaced Palestinians
from returning." and 230-231
("After its establishment, Israel
treated the Palestinians
remaining within its frontiers
almost as foreigners. It swiftly
imposed a military government in
the areas inhabited by the
Palestinian minority, expropriated
over half of the lands of this ‘non-
Jewish’ population, and pursued
various policies of demographic
containment, political control,
exclusionary domination, and
systematic discrimination in all
spheres of life. The military
government, imposed by prime
minister and defence minister
David Ben-Gurion, became closely
associated with both his hostile
attitude towards the Palestinian
minority and his authoritarian
style and almost unchallenged
leadership of the ruling Labour
Party ... Officially the purpose of
imposing martial law and military
government on Israel's Arab
minority was security. However,
its establishment, which lasted
until 1966, was intended to serve
a number of both stated and
concealed objectives. The first
was to prevent the return of
Palestinian refugees —
‘infiltrators’ in Israeli terminology
— to their homes. In the process,
others who had not ‘infiltrated’ the
country were sometimes driven
out as well — the second
objective. The third purpose of
the military government was to
maintain control and supervision
over the Israeli Arabs, who were
separated and isolated from the
Jewish population. ho were
separated and isolated from the
Jewish population. The use of
force and coercion formed an
important element in Israel's
policy towards its Arab citizens in
the post-1948 period. The
institution of the military
government, together with the
imposition of the Defence
Emergency Regulations,
promulgated by the British
Mandatory authorities in 1945,
empowered the military
governors to close off the Arab
localities and to restrict entry or
exit only to those who had been
issued permits by the military
authorities. These regulations
also enabled the Israeli
authorities to evict and deport
people from their villages and
towns; to place individuals under
administrative detention for
indefinite periods without trial;
and to impose fines and penalties
without due process. The military
governors also were authorised
to close Arab areas in order to
prevent internal Arab refugees
(also referred to as ‘present
absentees’, they were estimated
at 30,000, or one-fifth of those
remaining) from returning to their
homes and lands that had been
confiscated by the state and
taken over by new and old Jewish
settlements."); Morris 2008,
p. 349, "As was its wont in
occupied Arab-populated areas,
Israel imposed military
government on the core of the
Galilee.144 The inhabitants,
mostly deemed hostile or of
doubtful loyalty, were subjected to
a strict regimen of curfews and
travel restrictions, which lasted,
with a gradual easing of the
strictures, until 1966."; Morris
2004, pp. 421–422, "[p. 422] With
the help of attached IDF units, the
governors ruled the communities,
imposing curfews, handing out
residency and travel permits,
organising municipal services,
dispensing food and health care
to the needy, establishing schools
and kindergartens, and organising
search operations for infiltrating
refugees and their expulsion."
85. Manna 2022, p. 87, "During the
last few months of 1948, many of
those who had been forced to
migrate during or after Operation
Hiram tried to return to their
villages on their own; the army, on
the other hand, was persistent in
using various ways to prevent
this from happening, particularly
in those villages where most of
the residents had been forced
out. The army also conducted
“combing” operations in the
remaining villages to arrest
“infiltrators” and expel them
across the border once again.";
Masalha 2012, pp. 230–231,
"Officially the purpose of
imposing martial law and military
government on Israel's Arab
minority was security. However,
its establishment, which lasted
until 1966, was intended to serve
a number of both stated and
concealed objectives. The first
was to prevent the return of
Palestinian refugees —
‘infiltrators’ in Israeli terminology
— to their homes. In the process,
others who had not ‘infiltrated’ the
country were sometimes driven
out as well — the second
objective. The third purpose of
the military government was to
maintain control and supervision
over the Israeli Arabs, who were
separated and isolated from the
Jewish population."; Pappe 2006,
p. 189, "Those who were arrested
were deported to Lebanon; but if
they found refuge in the area
Israel continued to occupy until
the spring of 1949, they were
likely to be expelled again. Only
on 16 January 1949 did the order
came to stop the selective
deportations from southern
Lebanon, and the Minority Unit
was instructed to confine its
activity solely to the Galilee and
the former mixed towns and
cities. The mission there was
clear: to prevent any attempt -
and there were quite a few - by
refugees to try to smuggle their
way back home, no matter
whether they tried to return to a
village or a house to live, or just
wanted to retrieve some of their
personal possessions. The
'infiltrators', as the Israeli army
called them, were in many cases
farmers who sought
surreptitiously to harvest their
fields or pick the fruit from their
now unattended trees. Refugees
who tried to slip past the army
lines quite often met their death
at the hands of Israeli army
patrols. In the language of Israeli
intelligence reports, they were
'successfully shot at'. A quote
from such a report dated 4
December 1948 records:
'successful shooting at
Palestinians trying to return to the
village of Blahmiyya and who
attempted to retrieve their
belongings.'"; Morris 2004, pp.
508-510 ("[p. 508] During the last
months of 1948 and the first
months of 1949 there was
constant infiltration of refugees
from Lebanon back to the villages
... [p. 509] The case of Bir‘im, Iqrit
and Mansura illustrates how deep
was the IDF's determination from
November 1948 onward to create
and maintain a northern border
‘security belt’ clear of Arabs ... [p.
510] But for months, IDF and GSS
attention focused on Tarshiha,
the largest village in the area ...
Most of its original 4,000–5,000
inhabitants (4/5 Muslims) had
fled during Hiram. By December
1948, the village had some 700
inhabitants, 600 of them
Christians, a minority of them
infiltrees (inhabitants who had
fled the country and then
infiltrated back). The settlement
authorities wanted the
abandoned housing for
immigrants; the military viewed
settlement in the village as ‘very
important’, as only 12 per cent of
the Galilee's population at this
time was Jewish. Their main fear
was that, if left partially empty,
the village would fill up with
returnees. The villagers, for their
part, lived in continuous fear of
expulsion, and periodically sent
delegations to plead with Israeli
officials. Shitrit repeatedly
interceded with Ben-Gurion and
‘saved’ them."), 513-514
("Immediately after Hiram, the
Israeli authorities, parallel to the
start of the border-clearing
operations, put their minds to the
problem of the populated, semi-
populated and empty Arab
villages in the interior of the
Galilee, to all of which refugees
were returning. The fear was that
with the worsening winter
weather and the refugees’ steady
pauperisation, the influx would
increase and empty and semi-
populated villages would fill up
anew, ultimately increasing the
State's Arab minority and the
security problems thus
engendered ... [p. 514] From mid-
December 1948 onward, the IDF
periodically mounted massive
sweeps in the Galilee villages to
root out returnees and expel them
... But infiltrators continued to
return."), 518 ("Southern Front
was successful in preventing
refugees from returning to the
villages. In contrast with Northern
Front, Yigal Allon, OC Southern
Front, had completely driven out
the local population during
Operation Yoav and no fully or
semi-populated villages were left
behind his front lines (save for
Majdal and Egyptian-held Faluja
and ‘Iraq al Manshiya in the Faluja
Pocket). There were no recurrent,
large-scale cat-and-mouse games
as occurred in the north. So, while
large-scale infiltration continued,
aimed at retrieving possessions,
[p. 519] smuggling, theft, harvest
and the like, the infiltrators found
it almost impossible to resettle or
gain permanent footholds in the
villages; there was no local
population to assist them or
among which they could
disappear."), and 534-536 ("[p.
534] The clearing of the borders
of Arab communities following
the hostilities was initiated by the
IDF but, like the expulsions of the
months before, was curbed by
limitations imposed by the
civilian leadership and was never
carried out consistently or
comprehensively. Even the initial
border-clearing operation in the
north in November 1948, which
set as its goal an Arab-free strip
at least five kilometres deep, was
carried out without consistency
or political logic. ... In terms of
the army's independence in
expelling or evicting Arab
communities, November 1948
marked a watershed ...
Thereafter, the IDF almost never
acted alone and independently; it
sought and had to obtain approval
and decisions from the supreme
civilian authorities ... The IDF's
opinions and needs, which
defined in great measure Israel's
security requirements, continued
to carry great weight in decision-
making [p. 535] councils. But they
were not always decisive and the
army ceased to act alone ... [p.
536] Side by side with the border-
clearing operations Israel also
mounted recurrent sweeps in the
villages in the interior designed to
root out illegal returnees and to
‘shut down’ minimally inhabited
villages ... The aim was to keep
down the Arab population as well
as to curtail various types of
trouble that infiltrators augured. In
a narrow sense, political,
demographic, agricultural and
economic considerations rather
than military needs seem to have
been decisive. The presence of
Arabs in a half-empty village,
given the circumstances, meant
that the village would probably
soon fill out with returnees.
Completely depopulating the
village and levelling it or filling the
houses with Jewish settlers
meant that infiltrators would have
that many less sites to return to.
In complementary fashion, filling
out half-empty Arab villages (as
happened at Tur‘an, Mazra‘a and
Sha‘b) with the evicted population
of other villages meant that these
host villages would be ‘full up’ and
unable to accommodate many
infiltrees.")
86. Pappe 2022, pp. 126–127, "[p.
126] The UN tried to deter the
Israelis with sanctions; the USA
sent a sharp warning; and the
British gave an ultimatum that the
Israeli operations were a casus
bello in London's view. These
moves succeeded in keeping the
Israelis within the ceasefire lines
... By the winter of 1949, the guns
were silent. The second phase of
the war had ended, and with it,
the second, but not the last, stage
of the ‘cleansing’ of Palestine was
over. The third phase was to
extend beyond the war until 1954
and will be dealt with in the next
chapter."; Slater 2020, p. 90, "Two
months later Rabin's forces were
poised to push beyond the Negev
into Egypt itself (the western
Sinai peninsula); however, facing
a British threat that it would
militarily intervene if Israel
continued attacking the Egyptian
army, Ben-Gurion accepted a final
ceasefire."; Morris 2008, p. 350,
"The fronts remained under truce
and largely quiet during the
second half of November and
most of December."
87. Manna 2022, pp. 121 ("The
communist bloc states opposed
United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 194 concerning the
right of Palestinian refugees to
return or receive compensation
for their property. Arab countries
also opposed this resolution, but
for different reasons than the
states of the communist bloc,
whose opposition was based on
unconditional support for Israel.")
and 128 ("It was therefore
expected that Israel would heed
the December 1948 declaration
of the United Nations concerning
human rights and Resolution 194
which gave the Palestinian
refugees the right of return and
compensation for the property
they had lost. Yet events
contradicted the expectations of
the fate-stricken people inside
and outside their homeland.");
Pappe 2022, pp. 128 and 134–
137, "[p. 136] The government in
Jerusalem was constantly on the
alert lest the international
community insist on
implementing the commitment it
had made to the refugees in
Resolution 194."; Khalidi 2020,
pp. 105 and 176; Slater 2020,
pp. 97–98, 263 and 272–273;
Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 37 n.
36; Bishara 2017, p. 149; Docker
2012, p. 27, "Resolution 194 was
passed by the United Nations
General Assembly only two days
after it adopted the UN
Convention on genocide"; Sayigh
2009, p. 165, "In September 1948,
towards the end of formal
conflict, Count Bernadotte, the UN
Mediator for Palestine, proposed
that the refugees should return to
their homes as part of an overall
peace settlement. His proposal
was subsequently formalized in
UNGA Resolution 194 (December
11, 1948). Resolution 194 has
consistently been invoked by
Palestinian negotiators, and as
consistently rejected by Israelis.
Yet Israel was admitted to
membership of the UN on the
basis of agreeing to cooperate
with the UN on the issues of
Jerusalem and the refugees, an
agreement forged when the UN
formed the Conciliation
Commission for Palestine in
December 1948 to work on a
peace settlement. At that time
President Truman put pressure
on Israel to allow back at least a
token 100,000 refugees. Israel
refused. It also rejected two other
proposals made by the
Conciliation Commission: the
delimitation of Israel's
boundaries, and the
internationalization of Jerusalem.
These early settlement
negotiations show how a pattern
was set of Israeli non-compliance
with UN resolutions."; Morris
2008, p. 338, "On 11 December,
the assembly, in Resolution 194,
formally adopted a number of
Bernadotte's proposals, including
recognition of the refugees’ right
of return and the establishment of
the Palestine Conciliation
Commission (PCC)."; Pappe
2006, p. 188, "The major
international endeavour to
facilitate the return of the
refugees was led by the UN
Palestine Conciliation
Commission (the PCC). This was
a small committee with only three
members, one each from France,
Turkey and the United States. The
PCC called for the unconditional
return of the refugees to their
homes, which the assassinated
UN mediator, Count Folke
Bernadotte, had demanded. They
turned their position into a UN
General Assembly resolution that
was overwhelmingly supported
by most of the member states
and adopted on 11 December
1948. This resolution, UN
Resolution 194, gave the
refugees the option to decide
between unconditional return to
their homes and/or accepting
compensation."; Masalha 2003,
p. 1 and 40 ("At the United
Nations Israel denied the right of
the Palestinian refugees to return
to their homes and villages,
opposing in particular UN General
Assembly Resolution 194 of
December 1948."); Schulz 2003,
p. 139, "Part and parcel of
Resolution 194 is thus the right to
return and the right to
compensation for those choosing
not to return and for lost
property."
88. Manna 2022, p. 128, "Shortly after
the fighting between Egypt and
Israel ended in early 1949, the
two states began talks on an
armistice and the drawing of
borders between them. Israel's
signing of an armistice
agreement on 24 February 1949
with the biggest Arab state
consolidated its military victory.
Egypt was the first Arab state to
sign an agreement, followed by
Lebanon on 23 March, and
Jordan on 3 April. According to
the agreement with Jordan
signed at Rhodes, the “little
triangle” area, with a population
of 31,000, was transferred to
Israel. Syria was the last to sign
an armistice agreement, on 20
July 1949, and the uncertain
period between the end of
military battles and the drawing
of actual borders ended. Some
historians regard these
agreements as the real and
official end of the 1948 war in
Palestine."; Pappe 2022, p. 126,
"negotiations produced armistice
lines that held in the case of
Syria, Jordan and Egypt until
1967 and in the case of Lebanon
until 1978"; Slater 2020, pp. 88
and 93–95, "[p. 95] in 1949 it
negotiated separate military
truces or armistice agreements
with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and
Egypt"; Davis 2011, pp. 7 and 235
n. 1, "[p. 235 n.1] Israel reached
separate truce agreements with
Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria
in Rhodes between February and
July of 1949"; Morris 2008,
p. 375, "The war of 1948 formally
ended with the signing of
armistice agreements between
Israel and four of the Arab
belligerents: Egypt (on 24
February 1949), Lebanon (23
March 1949), Jordan (3 April
1949), and Syria (20 July 1949).
The Iraqis refused to enter into
armistice negotiations."
89. Khalidi 2020, p. 75, "Still more
were expelled from the new state
of Israel even after the armistice
agreements of 1949 were signed,
while further numbers have been
forced out since then. In this
sense the Nakba can be
understood as an ongoing
process."; Pappe 2006, pp. 179–
198, "[p. 187] "The 'mopping-up'
operations actually continued
well into April 1949, and
sometimes resulted in further
massacres ... [p. 197] Nor did any
contrition such as Alterman's stop
the forces from completing their
mission of cleansing Palestine, a
job to which they now applied
increasing levels of ruthlessness
and cruelty. Hence, starting in
November 1948 and all the way
up to the final agreement with
Syria and Lebanon in the summer
of 1949, another eighty-seven
villages were occupied; thirty-six
of these were emptied by force,
while from the rest a selective
number of people were
deported."; Morris 2004, pp. 505–
536, "[p. 505] In the weeks and
months after the termination of
hostilities, the Israeli authorities
adopted a policy of clearing the
new borders of Arab
Communities. Some were
transferred inland, to Israeli Arab
villages in the interior; others
were expelled across the border
... In general, throughout this
period, the political desire to have
as few Arabs as possible in the
Jewish State and the need for
empty villages to house new
immigrants meshed with the
strategic desire to achieve ‘Arab-
clear’ frontiers and secure
internal lines of communication.
It was the IDF that set the policy
in motion, with the civil and
political authorities often giving
approval after the fact ... [p. 535]
The period November 1948 –
March 1949 saw a gradual shift
of emphasis from expulsion out
of the country to eviction from
one site to another inside Israel:
What could be done without
penalty during hostilities became
increasingly more difficult to
engineer in the following months
of truce and armistice. There was
still a desire to see Arabs leave
the country and occasionally this
was achieved (as at Faluja and
Majdal), albeit through
persuasion, selective
intimidation, psychological
pressure and financial
inducement. The expulsion of the
Baqa al Gharbiya refugees was a
classic of the genre, with the
order being channeled through
the local mukhtar. But generally,
political circumstances ruled out
brute expulsions. Eviction and
transfer of communities from one
site to another inside Israel was
seen as more palatable and more
easily achieved."
90. Khalidi 2020, p. 82; Manna 2013,
pp. 91–93; Masalha 2012,
pp. 12–13; Sa'di 2007, p. 294;
Pappe 2006, p. 175 and 235

91. Khalidi 2020, p. 60, "78 percent";

Shenhav 2019, p. 50, "over 80
percent"; Rouhana 2017, p. 17,
"78%"; Manna 2013, p. 91, "about
78%"; Masalha 2012, p. 68, "78
per cent"; Wolfe 2012, p. 133,
"77%"; Davis 2011, p. 7, "78
percent"; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di
2007, p. 3, "more than 77 percent"
92. Slater 2020, p. 90; Bäuml 2017,
p. 105; Manna 2013, p. 91, "The
largest portion of it was occupied
by Israel, which annexed
approximately half of the
proposed Arab state which was
to be established according to the
UN partition plan of 1947.";
Masalha 2012, p. 68, "The ‘War of
Liberation’, which led to the
creation of the State of Israel on
78 per cent of historic Palestine
(not the 55 per cent according to
the UN partition resolution)";
Wolfe 2012, pp. 133–134; Davis
2011, p. 7, "Communal fighting
through this period until the
armistice agreements were
signed in late 1949 resulted in the
expanded borders of the Jewish
state, declared to be the state of
Israel on May 15, 1948, and the
expulsion or flight of the majority
of the Arabs living within its
borders. From this point until
1967, Israel existed in some 78
percent of historic Palestine ...";
Shlaim 2009, pp. 29 ("As a result
of the war, Israel acquired
considerably more territory and
more contiguity than had been
given to it by the UN
cartographers.") and 39 ("By the
time the first truce was declared
on 11 June, the Israel Defence
Force was in control of areas
beyond what had been assigned
to the Jewish state under the
partition plan ..."); Morris 2008,
pp. 375–376; Sa'di 2007, p. 294;
Pappe 2006, p. 175
93. Sayigh 2023, p. 283; Pappe 2022,
pp. 128 and 132; Khalidi 2020,
pp. 75 and 82–84; Slater 2020,
pp. 91–92 and 212; Manna 2013,
pp. 91–92; Masalha 2012, pp. 6–
7; Davis 2011, p. 7; Lentin 2010,
p. 6; Shlaim 2009, pp. 29 and 93;
Morris 2008, pp. 270 and 350;
Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 3;
Pappe 2006, pp. 197–198 and
235

94. Pappe 2022, p. 124; Shlaim 2009,

p. 256; Morris 2008, pp. 270,
316–317 and 350

95. Manna 2013, p. 91; Sayigh 2009,

p. 160; Pappe 2006, p. 175
96. Manna 2022, pp. 7 ("The
consensus among studies that
trace the history of this Arab
minority in the Jewish state is
that those who remained totaled
156,000."), 88 ("in January 1949,
the number of Arabs in the
Jewish state stood at 125,000 ...
Based on these numbers, it is
clear that the official figure of
156,000 quoted by historians and
researchers prior to the transfer
of the villages of the Triangle to
Israeli control is inaccurate."), and
304 n. 131 ("Most researchers
use this figure from official Israeli
statistics without scrutiny or
reference to the fact that it may
be inaccurate."); Pappe 2022,
p. 128, "160,000"; Khalidi 2020,
p. 60, "160,000"; Slater 2020,
p. 81, "about 150,000 to 160,000";
Confino 2018, p. 151 n. 10,
"150,000"; Bäuml 2017, p. 106,
"about 160,000"; Bishara 2017,
p. 138, "about 150,000"; Cohen
2017, p. 87, "in late 1948 ... About
130,000 ... In the summer of
1949, the total number of the
Arab citizens in Israel was
156,000."; Rouhana 2017, p. 5 n.
6, "approximately 156,000";
Masalha 2012, pp. 5–6,
"160,000"; Davis 2011, p. 9,
"125,000"; Lentin 2010, p. 6,
"between 60,000 and 156,000
Palestinians (depending on the
source)"; Ghanim 2009, p. 25,
"About 170,000"; Abu-Lughod &
Sa'di 2007, p. 3, "from 60,000 to
156,000, depending on the
sources"
97. Pappe 2022, pp. 128 and 132–
133; Khalidi 2020, pp. 82–84;
Bäuml 2017, p. 105; Manna 2013,
p. 93; Davis 2011, p. 7; Pappe
2006, pp. 121, 197–198 and 235;
Morris 2004, pp. 1, 35 and 602–
604
98. Manna 2022, pp. 128–129, "Israel
opened its doors to the Jewish
diaspora of the world so that they
could 'return' and live in Israel, but
slammed them shut in the face of
Palestinians who had been forced
to migrate from their homes only
yesterday."; Khalidi 2020, p. 75,
"None were allowed to return, and
most of their homes and villages
were destroyed to prevent them
from doing so."; Slater 2020,
p. 94, "For that reason, as well as
its “transfer” ideology and
security concerns, the Israeli
government decided to block the
return of the Palestinian refugees
—the survivors of the Nakba who
had fled into neighboring Arab
states—by any means necessary.
As Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary
in the summer of 1948: the return
of the refugees 'must be
prevented . . . at all costs.'"; Bashir
& Goldberg 2018, p. 7, "And it is
the State of Israel that has
prevented the return of the
refugees since the end of the
war."; Sayigh 2009, p. 165, "A
central aspect of Al-Nakba, and
the one that has prevented any
solution up to now, is Israel's
steadfast refusal to allow the
victims of expulsion to return.";
Morris 2008, p. 411, "Few
expected that their refugeedom
would last a lifetime or
encompass their children and
grandchildren. But it did. The
permanence of the refugee
problem owed much to Israel's
almost instant decision, taken in
the summer of 1948, not to allow
back those who had fled or been
expelled. The Zionist national and
local leaderships almost instantly
understood that a refugee return
would destabilize the new state,
demographically and politically.
And the army understood that a
refugee return would introduce a
militarily subversive fifth column.
Again, it was Shertok who
explained: “We are resolute not to
allow anyone under any
circumstances to return. . . . [At
best] the return can only be
partial and small; the solution [to
the problem] lies in the
resettlement of the refugees in
other countries.”"; Pappe 2006,
p. 224, "The dispossession of
Palestinian lands did not only
entail the expulsion of their legal
owners and the prevention of
their repatriation and regaining
ownership. It was compounded
by the reinvention of Palestinian
villages as purely Jewish or
'Ancient' Hebrew places.";
Masalha 2003, p. 41, "The official
Israeli position has always been
that there can be no return of the
refugees to Israeli territories, and
that the only solution to the
problem is their resettlement in
the Arab states or elsewhere.
Since 1949 Israel has
consistently rejected a return of
the 1948 refugees to their homes
and villages; it has always
refused to accept responsibility
for the refugees and views them
as the responsibility of the Arab
countries in which they reside.";
Schulz 2003, pp. 33 ("What is
beyond any doubt is the Israeli
refusal to allow refugees to return
after the war.") and 139
("International diplomacy
attempting to deal with the
refugee issue has since the
1950s focused on resettlement
somewhere else, as Israel would
not admit any process of return,
 due to the sensitive demographic
nature of Israel.")

99. Manna 2022, p. 100; Slater 2020,

p. 90; Masalha 2012, p. 137;
Davis 2011, p. 7; Shlaim 2009,
p. 170, "The Palestinian state
envisaged in the UN partition plan
of 29 November 1947 never saw
the light of day."; Morris 2004,
p. 35
100. Khalidi 2020, p. 75; Slater 2020,
p. 94; Shenhav 2019, p. 61; Bashir
& Goldberg 2018, p. 7; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 407;
Manna 2013, pp. 92–93; Masalha
2012, pp. 5 and 74; Wolfe 2012,
p. 170 n.96; Kimmerling 2008,
pp. 280–281
101. Sayigh 2023, p. 281; Khalidi 2020,
pp. 75 and 83; Slater 2020, p. 83;
Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, pp. 400–
401 and 407–408; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, p. 4;
Manna 2013, p. 93; Masalha
2012, pp. 5, 107, and 117; Wolfe
2012, p. 161 n.1

102. Sayigh 2023, pp. 281 and 287;

Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 402-
403 and 413; Manna 2013, p. 91;
Masalha 2012, pp. 1–3, 73, and
102; Shlaim 2009, p. 29.
103. Manna 2022, p. 195; Khalidi 2020,
pp. 90–91, "In October 1953,
Israeli forces in the West Bank
village of Qibya carried out a
massacre following an attack by
feda’iyin that killed three Israeli
civilians, a woman and her two
children, in the town of Yehud.
Israeli special forces Unit 101,
under the command of Ariel
Sharon, blew up forty-five homes
with their inhabitants inside,
killing sixty-nine Palestinian
civilians."; Masalha 2012, p. 75,
"the massacres at Qibya in
October 1953 ... Israeli troops of
the notorious Unit 101 of the
Israeli army, under the command
of Ariel Sharon, attacked the West
Bank village of Qibya, killing 69
Palestinians, many while hiding in
houses blown up over their
heads; 45 houses, a school, and a
mosque were also destroyed
(Shlaim 2000: 90–93; Morris
1997: 257–76; Chomsky 1983:
383–5)."; Pappe 2006, p. 258.
104. Manna 2022, p. 11 ("On the
Jordanian front, which remained
quiet during the Sinai War, Border
Guard troops carried out a
massacre in Kafr Qasim on the
evening of 29 October 1956. The
killing by Israeli troops of forty-
nine Arab citizens in cold blood,
eight years after the Nakba,
signals clearly how they were
viewed by the ruling majority and
its representatives in the security
agencies."), 19 ("the army
declared a curfew on the villages
of the Triangle hours before the
war began on 29 October 1956—
and announced it only after
villagers had left to tend their
fields. This sudden movement
restriction resulted in the killing of
forty-nine people from the village
of Kafr Qasim by Border Guards
as they returned from their fields
that evening, unaware of the
curfew", 193-196, and 267-273;
Ghanim 2018, pp. 96 ("This state
of affairs began to change
gradually with the passage of
time and the waning of the
prospect of expulsion, especially
after the massacre of Kafr Qasim
in 1956 on the eve of the
Tripartite Aggression and the
subsequent reconciliation in Kafr
Qasim.") and 112 n.16 ("The
massacre took place on the
October 29, 1956, in the village
Kafr Qasim. The Israel Border
Police shot dead forty-nine
Palestinian Arab civilians, all of
whom were citizens of Israel.");
Masalha 2012, p. 75, "Israeli-
Palestinian village of Kafr Qasim,
where on 29 October 1956 Israeli
border guards murdered in cold
blood forty-nine villagers (mostly
women and children) returning
from their fields"; Kimmerling
2008, p. 315, "1956 Forty-seven
Israeli Arabs massacred in Kafr
Qasim village after violating
curfew."; Pappe 2006, p. 197
("forty-nine villagers of Kfar
Qassim, a village transferred to
Israel in the armistice agreement
with Jordan, were butchered")
and 258 ("Israeli troops
massacred forty-nine villagers
returning from their fields")
105. Manna 2022, pp. 199–200;
Pappe 2022, pp. 145–146;
Khalidi 2020, p. 83; Shenhav
2019, p. 51; Bashir & Goldberg
2018, p. 7; Confino 2018, p. 151
n. 10; Bäuml 2017, pp. 103–136;
Lustick & Berkman 2017, pp. 41–
46; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
2017, p. 408; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, pp. 3–4
and 16; Masalha 2012, pp. 5, 68,
and 230–231; Lentin 2010, pp. 6
and 10; Ghanim 2009, p. 23;
Morris 2008, p. 349; Abu-Lughod
& Sa'di 2007, pp. 3, 16, and 19;
Morris 2004, pp. 421–422
106. Masalha 2012, pp. 13 and 128;
Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 19.

107. Manna 2013, p. 86; Jayyusi 2007,

pp. 109 and 115.

108. Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Bashir &

Goldberg 2018, p. 7; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 405;
Manna 2013, pp. 94–97; Masalha
2012, pp. 168–169; Morris 2008,
p. 419; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007,
pp. 3 and 19.
109. Sayigh 2023, p. 288 n. 13,
"Palestinians were attacked ... in
Lebanon during the civil war of
1975–1990, including the
massacre of Tal al-Zaater"; Pappe
2022, p. 204, "The Syrians
slaughtered Palestinians in Tel-
Zaatar in 1976"; Khalidi 2020,
pp. 125–126, "Tal al-Za‘tar ...
Palestinians in all these places
suffered such atrocities ... the
camp was overrun in August
1976 and its entire population
was expelled. Perhaps two
thousand people were killed in
what was probably the largest
single massacre during the entire
war ... The LF carried out the Tal
al-Za‘tar massacre with Israel's
covert support"; Khoury 2012,
p. 263, "The massacres in
Palestinian camps ... Tal Al
Zaatar camp (1976) ... are a
continuation of the massacres of
1948."; Kimmerling 2008, p. 319,
"Christian right-wing militias in
Lebanon, supported by Syria,
enforce a siege on Tal al-Zaatar, a
Palestinian refugee camp; the
siege ends with a massacre of
the camp inhabitants."
110. Sayigh 2023, p. 288 n. 13,
"Palestinians were attacked ...
during the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in 1982, with the
massacre of Sabra/Shatila";
Khalidi 2020, pp. 125-126, 140,
154-163 ("[p. 154] Between
September 16 and the morning of
September 18, the militiamen
murdered more than thirteen
hundred Palestinian and
Lebanese men, women, and
children."), and 279 n. 42 ("The
most complete analysis of the
number of victims of the
massacre, based on extensive
interviews and painstaking
research, is by the distinguished
Palestinian historian Bayan
Nuwayhid al-Hout, who in Sabra
and Shatila: September 1982
(Ann Arbor: Pluto, 2004),
established a minimum of close
to 1,400 killed. She notes,
however, that as many victims
were abducted and never found,
the actual number was
undoubtedly larger, and is
unknowable."); Manna 2013,
p. 96, "[During the 1982 Lebanese
War] the Palestinians suffered
again from massacres and
destruction in the refugee
camps."; Khoury 2012, p. 263,
"The massacres in Palestinian
camps ... Shatila and Sabra
(1982)—are a continuation of the
massacres of 1948"; Masalha
2012, p. 75 ("The large-scale
massacre of Palestinian civilians
by the Israeli-allied Kataib
Lebanese militia; estimates of
those killed are between 800 and
3,500."), 137, 141–143, and 226-
227; Lentin 2010, pp. 88 ("The
1982—2000 Lebanon war, the
first not to be perceived as a 'no-
choice' war, led to the Sabra and
Shatila massacre in which the IDF
allowed Lebanese Christian
Phalangist militiamen to enter
two Palestinian refugee camps
and massacre civilians inside,
leading to mass protests by
Israeli Jews throughout Israel.")
and 169-170 ("2,000 civilians
were brutally murdered under the
watchful eyes of the IDF");
Kimmerling 2008, p. 319,
"Christian-Maronite militias, under
Israeli protection, massacre
Palestinians in the Sabra and
Shatilla refugee camps."; Abu-
Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 5
 ("Landmark events in Palestinian
history such as ... the massacre
at Sabra and Shatila") and 19 ("In
1982 Israel bombarded and
invaded Lebanon, causing mass
destruction, the routing of the
PLO, and then a massacre in the
refugee camps."); Pappe 2006,
p. 258.

111. Khalidi 2020, pp. 164–199;

Manna 2013, p. 99 n. 16; Masalha
2012, p. 75; Lentin 2010, p. 88;
Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, pp. 5
and 19.
112. Khalidi 2020, pp. 200–227;
Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
2014, p. 15; Manna 2013, p. 97;
Masalha 2012, pp. 75, 189-190
and 198-199; Abu-Lughod & Sa'di
2007, pp. 3 and 19.

113. Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 1;

Khoury 2018, p. xiv; Manna 2013,
p. 97 and 99 n. 10; Masalha 2012,
p. 254.

114. Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, p. 23;

Jayyusi 2007, pp. 123.

115. Sayigh 2023, p. 281; Khoury

2018, p. xiv; Manna 2013, p. 97;
Masalha 2012, p. 47 and 254.
116. Shenhav 2019, p. 49; Bashir &
Goldberg 2018, p. 2; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, p. 418 and
423; Rashed, Short & Docker
2014, pp. 16–17; Rouhana &
Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, p. 14.
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122. Morris, Benny (1997). Israel's
Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab
Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and
the Countdown to the Suez War
([Link]
s?id=YUthqHRF-m8C) . Clarendon
Press. p. 432. ISBN 978-0-19-
829262-3. "The available
documentation suggests that
Israeli security forces and civilian
guards, and their mines and
booby-traps, killed somewhere
between 2,700 and 5,000 Arab
infiltrators during 1949–56. The
evidence suggests that the vast
majority of those killed were
unarmed. The overwhelming
majority had infiltrated for
economic or social reasons. The
majority of the infiltrators killed
died during 1949–51; there was a
drop to some 300–500 a year in
1952–4. Available statistics
indicate a further drop in fatalities
during 1955–6, despite the
relative increase in terrorist
infiltration."
123. Auron 2017, pp. xxxv-xxxvii and
1–12; Al-Hardan 2016, pp. 47–
48; Hasian Jr. 2020, pp. 77–109;
Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, pp.
3–4, 8–12, 13 ("The University of
Oxford's first professor of Israel
Studies Derek Penslar recently
stated that pro-Israelis needed to
catch up with the past 30 years of
academic scholarship that has
accepted the ‘vast bulk of
findings’ by the New Historians
regarding the Nakba. He said:
‘what happened to the
Palestinians, the Nakba, was not
a genocide. It was horrible, but it
was not a genocide. Genocide
means that you wipe out a
people. It wasn't a genocide. It
was ethnic cleansing.' That
Penslar mistakenly interprets the
concept of genocide is perhaps
not surprising."), and 14-18;
Lentin 2010, p. 111, "Non-Zionist
scholars operate a different
timescale and highlight the
continuities between wartime
policies and post-1948 ethnic
cleansing. They treat the Nakba
as the beginning of an ongoing
policy of expulsion and
expropriation, rather than a fait
 accompli which ended a long
time ago (e.g., Karmi and Cotran
1999; Pappe 2004a; Abu Lughod
and Sa’di 2007)."; Milshtein 2009,
p. 50 ("The majority of Palestinian
writers"); Ram 2009, pp. 387–
388 (Israeli historians); Shlaim
2009, pp. 55, 288 (New
Historians)

124. Slyomovics 2007, p. 28, "[quoting

Abd al-Jawad 2004, p. 627] Israeli
historiography has adopted a
denial of the Nakba, a negation of
the breadth of ethnic cleansing
perpetrated in Palestine."
125. Manna 2022, p. viii, "[foreword by
series editor Doumani] ... by
managing to stay in their homes
and on their land, they resisted
the wave of ethnic cleansing that
transformed Palestine in 1948
and that persists to this day."
126. Khalidi 2020, pp. 12 ("This
provided the demographic critical
mass and military manpower that
were necessary for the ethnic
cleansing of Palestine in 1948."),
73 ("Thus, the ethnic cleansing of
Palestine began well before the
state of Israel was proclaimed on
May 15, 1948."), 76 ("The Nakba
represented a watershed in the
history of Palestine and the
Middle East. It transformed most
of Palestine from what it had
been for well over a millennium—
a majority Arab country—into a
new state that had a substantial
Jewish majority. This
transformation was the result of
two processes: the systematic
ethnic cleansing of the Arab-
inhabited areas of the country
seized during the war; and the
theft of Palestinian land and
property left behind by the
refugees as well as much of that
owned by those Arabs who
remained in Israel."), and 231
("Given the clarity of what is
involved in ethnic cleansing in a
colonial situation (rather than in
circumstances of a confusing
civil-cum-proxy war interlaced
with extensive foreign
intervention, as in Syria and Iraq),
a new wave of expulsions would
probably not unfold as smoothly
for Israel as in the past.")
127. Manna 2022, pp. 3 ("The policy of
ethnic cleansing during the 1948
war was more complex and
expansive than a specific plan
such as Plan Dalet."), 10 ("At the
other end of the spectrum were
Muslims who suffered from the
iron-fist implementation of the
policy of ethnic cleansing that
included massacres, demolition
of houses, and expulsion of the
population of the Galilee and
other areas."), 83 ("Although
hundreds of villages were
destroyed and their inhabitants
expelled following massacres
which were part of the ethnic
cleansing policy to empty the
country of its original inhabitants,
little has been written about the
atrocities—despite these having
been witnessed by those who
remained, whose testimonies no
historian, including the
revisionists, bothered to listen
to."), and 98 ("The leaders of the
Jewish state had their own
regional motivations which
prompted them to exclude
members of that sect from the
ethnic cleansing plan of the
Nakba.")
128. Masalha 2018, pp. 44 ("In view of
the Zionist ethnic cleansing of
most of Palestine in 1948 and the
current reality of
coloniser/colonised in the
country, the liberal Zionist slogan
that the history of modern
Palestine centres on the idea of
‘one land, two peoples’ rings
hollow ... . Following the ethnic
cleansing of Palestine in 1948
and the ruptures of the Nakba, the
Israeli state, now in control of 78
per cent of the land, accelerated
its toponymic project and
pursued methods whose main
features were memoricide."), 319
("On the other hand, since the
ethnic cleansing of the 1948
Nakba and the creation of the
Israeli state, a large number of
Palestinian Arabic place names
have been Judaised,
Hebraicised."), and 376 ("But this
‘natural landscape’ is a carefully
constructed scene to camouflage
the systematically expropriated
land of Palestinian villages, the
destruction of cultivated olive
groves and the ethnic cleansing
of the Nakba."); Masalha 2012,
p. 254, "While the Holocaust is an
event in the past, the Nakba did
not end in 1948. For Palestinians,
mourning sixty-three years of al-
Nakba is not just about
remembering the “ethnic
cleansing” of 1948, it is also
about marking the ongoing
dispossession and dislocation.
129. Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury
2017, p. 393, "We examine how
Palestinian history, particularly
the history of the dismantlement
of Palestine and the ethnic
cleansing of the majority of
Palestinians from their homeland
– known in Palestinian
historiography as the Nakba –
has gradually started to occupy
the center of the present political
and cultural experience and
discourse of the Palestinians in
Israel."
130. Sa'di 2007, pp. 291–293 ("[p. 291]
It also enabled them to
incorporate into its
implementation the transfer (a
euphemism for what we now call
ethnic cleansing) of the
Palestinians residing within the
boundaries of the Jewish state ...
[p. 293] It was not until May 15, a
month and a half after the
implementation of Plan D, that
neighboring Arab states sent in
armed forces in an attempt to
halt the Zionist seizure of territory
and the ethnic cleansing of the
population."), 298 ("As to the
ethnic cleansing of Palestinians
during the Nakba and its
aftermath, it was represented by
Israeli and Zionist scholars as a
deceitful act of the natives
themselves."), and 308 ("What is
the real reason for Morris’s
refusal to accept Palestinian
testimony and memory? That it
might be part of something
unrelated to the historian’s craft is
given some credence by his later
statement on the ethnic cleansing
he documented in his book. In an
interview in Ha’aretz (also
discussed by Slyomovics), he
expresses the ultimate form of
denial of moral responsibility for
the Nakba: he deplores the fact
that the job was not completed.")
131. Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, pp. 5 ("But
these lands became free only
after the ethnic cleansing and
eventual decimation of
indigenous populations in North
America and after the
displacement of the peasants
through aggressive land purchase
in Palestine and the expulsion of
the majority of the Palestinian
population during the 1948
Nakba"), 11, 30, 65, 71, 81, 182,
and 193–194
132. Confino 2018, pp. 136 ("Few
Jews resisted the Nakba, and
fewer still rejected an offer to
receive an abandoned Palestinian
home; there is no list of righteous
among the Jews when it comes
to the ethnic cleansing that was
the Nakba."), 138 ("The Holocaust
and the Nakba, it should be
emphasized, are completely
different in their magnitude and
historical character; one is a
genocide geared toward total
extermination, while the other is
an ethnic cleansing geared
toward removing, not annihilating,
an ethnic group.") and 146 ("The
Holocaust should be placed
within a history of Nazi war and
occupation, empire building, and
comparative genocide, much as
the Nakba should be placed
within a global history of
decolonization, the breakup of the
British Empire, partitions, and
comparative modern ethnic
cleansing, as well as within
comparative settler colonialism.")
133. Bashir & Goldberg 2018, pp. 20
("In this sense, the Nakba,
although a unique event in its
own right, belongs to the same
modern and global history of
genocide and ethnic cleansing of
which the Holocaust (also a
unique event) is a part—perhaps
the most extreme and cruelest
part.") and 32 n.2
134. Kimmerling 2008, pp. 280–281,
"Thus, a de facto ethnic cleansing
was carried out ... Palestinians
refer to the 1948 war and their
subsequent exile as a nakba, a
catastrophe; Israeli Jews regard
the same period as a war of
independence that has become a
fundamental component of their
identity and a symbolic
compensation for the Holocaust.
Both peoples have their own
cosmic catastrophes, and both
have strong collective memories
of being the victims of a colossal
injustice—either the Jewish
experience of Nazi genocide or
the Palestinian experience of
politicide and ethnic cleansing."
135. Lentin 2010, pp. 8, 20-23 ("[p. 21]
Even though it is not the only act
of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in modem
history, the Nakba is unique in
many ways ... [p. 23] Some may
argue that the Holocaust, horrible
as it was, is indeed a historical
event, while the Nakba – not
genocide but rather ‘ethnic
cleansing’, or ‘spaciocide’ –
continues in the shape of ongoing
denial of access, land
confiscations and oppression of
the Palestinian population."), 69
("Collecting Palestinian victims’
testimonies, as is practiced by
Zochrot (see Chapter 7), offers
Israeli Nakba co-memorators a
certain feel-good factor. However,
the testimonies of Israeli
perpetrators are much harder to
collect ... little serious attempt
was made to excavate the
personal stories of Jewish pre-
state soldiers who carried out the
expulsions, expropriations,
massacres, rapes and ethnic
cleansing."), 89-90 ("By now,
many, though definitely not all,
Israeli Jews have accepted that
the Nakba did happen ... Despite
this gradual recognition, my
sense is that the majority of
Israeli Jews prefer to accept
Morris’s contention in the 2004
interview with Ha’aretz, that while
the ethnic cleansing of Palestine
did happen, it was a necessary
evil: ‘there are historical
circumstances in which ethnic
cleansing can be justified ... when
the alternative is between ethnic
cleansing and genocide, the
genocide of your own nation, I
prefer ethnic cleansing’"), 110-
111 ("In recent years, however,
Israeli Jews have been somewhat
more willing to accept the
centrality of the expulsions, glibly
termed ‘transfer’ (Morris 2002)
and the fact that their state did
indeed conduct systematic ethnic
cleansing ... Non-Zionist scholars
operate a different timescale and
highlight the continuities between
wartime policies and post-1948
ethnic cleansing. They treat the
Nakba as the beginning of an
ongoing policy of expulsion and
expropriation, rather than a fait
accompli which ended a long
time ago (e.g., Karmi and Cotran
1999; Pappe 2004a; Abu Lughod
and Sa’di 2007). Though hardly
anti-Zionist, Morris is explicit in
linking what he does admit was
ethnic cleansing with the 1948
war."), 114 ("In contrast to the
Israeli Holocaust memorial at Yad
Vashem, ‘there is no Nakba
museum, no Nakba Hall of
Names, no Central Database of
Nakba victims’ names, no
tombstones or monuments for
the hundreds of Palestinian
villages and towns ethnically
cleansed and destroyed in
1948’."), 150 ("We must ask,
however, what the co-
memoration of the Nakba
facilitates ... Does it enable the
Israeli resistance movement to
concentrate on ‘the [1967]
occupation’, ignoring the fact that
Israel’s Palestinian citizens are
also the victims of the ongoing
occupation and ethnic cleansing
(Yiftachel 2009)?") and 155
("Thus, despite the
unquestionable importance of
remembering and telling the
Nakba, and side by side with
insisting on the Palestinian right
of return, many in the Israeli
‘peace camp’ continue to deny
both the racialisation of
 Palestinians, and the ongoing
ethnic cleansing of Palestine, as
was evidenced by the Zionist left
during the Gaza war which it
supported in the spirit of the
(Foucauldian) imperative that
(Israeli) society must be
defended (Foucault 2003).")

136. Pappe 2022, pp. 33, 120–122,

126–132, 137, 239; Pappe 2006.
137. Shenhav 2019, pp. 49-50 ("But
now, following the adoption of a
reckless but useful piece of
legislation known as the Nakba
Law (March 2011)—which
imposes sanctions on
organizations that mention the
Palestinian tragedy—almost every
household in Israel has become
acquainted with the Arabic word:
al-Nakba ... The ethnic cleansing
of Palestine included the abolition
of hundreds of Palestinian towns
and villages, some immediately
repopulated by Jews (and
sometimes even other
Palestinians) to prevent return.
Add to that the confiscation of
lands, houses, and property by
the state, and the looting of
removable objects by Jewish
citizens—without any shame or
disgrace. To be sure, the ethnic
cleansing of Palestine did not
begin or end in 1948. It started
back in the 1920s, with an
aggressive acquisition and
takeover of lands that reached a
peak in 1948 and again in 1967.
The ethnic cleansing continues in
the present day by other means:
the silent transfer in Jerusalem;
the settlements and the
expropriation of land in the West
Bank; the communal settlements
in the Galilee for Jews only; the
new Citizenship decree (which
bans Palestinian citizens from
bringing their Palestinian spouses
into Israel, thanks to the
emergency laws); the
“unrecognized Palestinian
villages” constantly under the
threat of destruction; the
incessant demolition of Bedouin
houses in the south; the omission
of Arabic on road signs; the
prohibition on importing literature
from Arab countries, and many
others. One telling example is the
fact that not one Arab town or
village has been established in
Israel since 1948."), and 61
("Today many historians, Jews
and Palestinians, provide a
revisionist formulation in which
the Nakba is not just the
expulsion and displacement of
1948, but especially the ban on
return to homes and families
immediately after the war and in
fact to this date. According to this
interpretation, the sovereign
decision of the Israeli
government to prevent the return
of hundreds of thousands of
people to their homes after the
war is a formal act of ethnic
cleansing.")
138. Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, p. 511,
"Palestinians have long known
what happened to them in 1948
and its very human costs.
However, the work of the ‘new’
(or revisionist) Israeli historians
from the late 1970s also
challenged the official state
narrative of a miraculous wartime
victory through access to
material in the Israeli archives.
This has established what Ilan
Pappé has summarised as the
‘ethnic cleansing of Palestine’, a
process involving massacres and
expulsions at gunpoint. In light of
 the ever-growing historiography,
serious scholarship has left little
debate about what happened in
1948. In fact, scholars are
currently fruitfully addressing
issues such as the intersection of
the Holocaust with its roots in
European racism, and the Nakba
with its roots in European
colonisation."

139. Khoury 2018, pp. xii–xiii, "The

Nakba’s initial bloody chapters
were written with the forceful
ethnic cleansing of Palestinians
in 1948."; Khoury 2012, pp. 258
and 263–265.
140. Levene 2018, pp. 45–65, "[p. 59]
It is within this framework that
the contours of the ethnic
cleansing not only in Palestine
but also, almost simultaneously,
in India (albeit within a rather
different colonial frame of
reference and with much larger
death and displacement tolls)
need to be set. The fact that in
terms of the act of tihur
(cleansing) what a nascent Israel
did to Palestinians was not
exceptional hardly makes it any
less egregious, not least given
that somewhere in that reckoning
 is the knowledge of what had
happened to Jews just two or
three years earlier."

141. Rashed, Short & Docker 2014,

p. 13, "[quoting Penslar] He said:
'what happened to the
Palestinians, the Nakba, was not
a genocide. It was horrible, but it
was not a genocide. Genocide
means that you wipe out a
people. It wasn’t a genocide. It
was ethnic cleansing.'"
142. Wolfe 2012, pp. 153–154 ("The
relative restraint that Zionists
displayed in the Ottoman and
Mandate periods did not mean
that they had yet to formulate the
goal of replacing Palestinians in
Palestine. The initial restraint was
pragmatic – the eventual Nakba,
to adapt Carl von Clausewitz,
being a continuation of purchase
by other means ... When we
observe this remarkably
disciplined and systematic
programme of settler-state
formation, the complementarity
between the creation of the
Jewish state and the ethnic
cleansing of Palestine emerges
with particular clarity, the two
being inseparable features of a
unified programme."), and 159–
161 ("In the absence of that
context, the Nakba would make
no sense. We might even agree
with Benny Morris that ethnic
cleansing was a spontaneous
aberration that took place in the
heat of warfare ... To understand
the Nakba, therefore, we have to
keep in mind the crucial fact that
it was Zionism’s first opportunity.
The fact that the emergent
Jewish state seized this
opportunity with such devastating
effectiveness was both a
testament to and a legacy of its
preparedness. As we have seen,
the creation of the Jewish state
and the ethnic cleansing of
Palestine were two sides of the
same coin. The conquest of
economics was a Nakba-in-
waiting.")
143. Hever 2018, p. 285, "Once again,
the question of comparison and
analogy alongside distinction and
disconnection between the
Holocaust and the Nakba arises.
It is greatly exacerbated by the
fact there is a causal connection
between the importation of the
failure to resolve the “Jewish
Question” (or to escape its
horrifying “success” in the form
of the “Final Solution”) to
Palestine and the attempt to
achieve a resolution there by
creating a Jewish space without
Palestinians—a euphemistic way
of referring to ethnic cleansing by
means of the Nakba."; Ghanim
2018, p. 110, "The meeting
between the Palestinian and the
Holocaust survivor in a settler
colonial context is intertwined
with the enterprise of the
establishment of Israel in 1948
upon the obliterated Palestinian
landscape. The relationship
between the two events was
formed on the basis of an
exclusionist prototype, deadly for
the Palestinian due to its
contextualization within the
Zionist national enterprise,
whereby the State of Israel was
established using measures of
violence against and ethnic
cleansing of the Palestinians; this
is especially evident when taking
into account that, as some have
noted, almost half of the
participants in the war of
1948/Palestinian Nakba were
Holocaust survivors."; Khoury
2018, p. 123, "Second,
Holocaust/Nakba deliberations
unsettle the Zionist narrative of
the Holocaust, reading the latter
outside of mainstream Zionism,
even situating the ethnic
cleansing of Palestine within the
larger historical trajectory that led
to the Holocaust."; Rashed, Short
& Docker 2014, p. 18, "When
reviewing the Palestinian case, it
would be too easy to focus solely
on whether or not the ‘ethnic
cleansing’ of 1948 constituted a
genocide and whether the
massacres that took place during
this time can be construed as
genocidal. Yet it is apparent to
Palestinians in different contexts
experiencing discriminatory
policies intended to drive them
away from their land that the
‘Nakba’ of 1948 did not end in
that era and is an ongoing
process."; Slater 2020, pp. 81–85
("[pp. 84-85] "Was Ethnic
Cleansing 'Necessary'? ... There
were two other possible Israeli
policies that would have met the
need for a Jewish state but
avoided the Nakba ... Even if one
accepts those assumptions—
shaky as they are—it hardly
follows that the only way to have
done so was by violent ethnic
cleansing.") and 350 ("Finally, the
legitimate goal of self-defense
cannot possibly justify the Nakba
... While Israeli historians still
argue about whether the Nakba
was the intended or explicit
“policy” of the Israeli government,
no one doubts that the
indisputable desire of Ben-Gurion
and other Zionist leaders to
ensure a large Jewish majority in
Israel had a great deal to do with
it. To be sure, a strong case can
be made that a heavily Jewish
majority in the state of Israel was
a historically justifiable goal, but it
by no means follows that ethnic
cleansing—as we would call it
today—was the only way to bring
that about."); Nashef 2018, pp. 5–
6, "Unfortunately, the Nakba is
unending. It was born in a red
house in Tel Aviv, in which the
architects of Plan Dalet (Plan D)
finalized the strategy for the
ethnic cleansing of Palestine in
March 1947."; Natour 2016, p. 82,
"The Nakba as the flight and
expulsion is a disaster for the
Palestinian people. It is a matter
of fact and is a direct result of the
events that took place in
Palestine shortly before and
during the establishment of the
state of Israel. That the expulsion
was planned and was one of the
preconditions for the
establishment of the Jewish state
in Palestine has been described
by several authors who provide
convincing evidence from
analysis of documents and
testimonies that it was a
systematic ethnic cleansing of
the country."; Knopf-Newman
2011, pp 4–5 ("In contemporary
discourse the word transfer is
better known as ethnic cleansing,
a term I employ in this book to
illustrate the reality of the nakba
(Arabic for the catastrophe and
descriptive of Palestinians
expelled by Zionists in 1948)
when 750,000 Palestinians were
forcibly removed from their
homes and land, and exiled as
refugees ... The phrase ongoing
nakba refers to the processes
begun in 1948, to claim land for
Jews and forcibly displace
Palestinian Muslims and
Christians, which continues
unabated until now—most visibly
in Lydda, Jaffa, and the Negev ...
Judaization refers to the process
by which Israelis have covered up
their crimes of ethnic cleansing
not only by destroying homes and
foresting over the land, but also
by renaming cities and villages
with those that sound more
biblical, thus mythologizing a
Jewish history that predates an
Arab one ... Technically, European
Jews who participated in the
initial and ongoing ethnic
cleansing since the nakba in 1948
are settlers. But the term settler
colonialism is more apt."), 25–32
("[p. 25] Established in 1901, the
JNF has been the main agent of
colonization in Palestine, first by
purchase, then by ethnic
cleansing of Palestinians, later by
destroying Palestinian villages, by
foresting over those villages, and
Judaizing areas by renaming
them. After the nakba the JNF
continued its confiscation of land,
helped to create new colonies,
and after 1967 began its project
of Judaizing Jerusalem ... [p. 32]
Information about elaborate plans
by Zionist leaders, including David
Ben-Gurion, to ethnically cleanse
Palestine, known as Plan Dalet,
devised before United Nations
Resolution 181 partitioning
Palestine, is suppressed."), 69
("Jerusalem is the setting of
heightened tension due to the
ongoing nakba (continuing the
process of ethnic cleansing that
began before 1948) in the city,
making it an example of the
failures of coexistence."), and
180–182 ("[p. 182] The massacre
of Dayr Yasin signifies not only a
particular massacre on April 9,
1948, but also emblematizes all
massacres that took place
throughout Palestine during the
nakba ... Confronting the fact that
survivors of European genocide
enacted their own systematic
ethnic cleansing project, known
as Plan Dalet, reveals some of the
questions that unravel Palestinian
history."); Esmeir 2007, pp. 232
("This legal strategy would have
enabled them to turn the trial into
a case about the denial of the
Nakba. They wanted to transform
the courtroom into a stage for a
dramatization of historical pain
and a public telling of the story of
the ethnic cleansing of
Palestinians—a story, in their
view, that the institutions of the
Israeli state have suppressed."),
242 ("Katz, in short, attempted to
retrieve all possible details that
could enable him to present a
picture of the past that was as
accurate as possible, for
otherwise, he could not refute the
official Zionist narrative that
denies the bloody ethnic
cleansing of Palestinians."), and
249-250 ("Incoherence,
contradictions, and absences
should then be understood as
signifiers of something that is still
present—the death of human
relationships, the ethnic cleansing
of Palestinians, and the
destruction of an entire society.");
Schulz 2003, pp. 24, 31–32 ("[p.
32] However, from the founding
of the state until mid-June 1948
there was expulsion on a grand
scale, reminiscent of an ‘ethnic-
cleansing’ project ... [quoting
Benvenisti 2000] After the
‘miraculous exodus’ had taken
place and it had become evident
that the establishment of a
Jewish state without Arabs—a
possibility that the leaders of the
Yishuv had not previously
envisioned—was indeed
achievable, ‘ethnic cleansing’
 became an acceptable, or even a
desirable, means of achieving it.")

144. Auron 2017, pp. xxxv-xxxvii and 1-

12.

145. Ram 2009, pp. 387–388.

146. Bashir & Goldberg 2018, p. 32
n.2.
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Nakbah is associated with a rapid
de-Arabization of the country.
This process has included the
destruction of Palestinian
villages. About 418 villages were
erased, and out of twelve
Palestinian or mixed towns, a
Palestinian population continued
to exist in only seven. This swift
transformation of the physical
and cultural environment was
accompanied, at the symbolic
level, by the changing of the
names of streets, neighborhoods,
cities, and regions. Arabic names
were replaced by Zionist, Jewish,
or European names. This
renaming continues to convey to
the Palestinians the message that
the country has seen only two
historical periods which attest to
its "true" nature: the ancient
Jewish past, and the period that
began with the creation of Israel."
158. Williams 2009, p. 98: "Just as the
land of Palestine was to be
cleared of the unwanted presence
of its inhabitants, so the period
after 1948 witnessed the
‘clearing’ of evidence of non-
Jewish cultures: in the shape of
their historical and archaeological
remains, from the landscape as
well as the looting of their
artefacts from museums and
archives. Part of this was
sanctioned – if secret – Israeli
government policy; part of it
unattributable (military)
vandalism – again. Astonishingly,
as well as the ‘primitive’ cultural
relics of the Palestinian past –
with something like eighty per
cent of village mosques
demolished in this period – the
destruction also included
remarkable Roman remains, as in
the city of Tiberias, which
happened even when Israeli
officials had specifically asked for
them to be spared (see Rapaport
2007). Once again, just as the
Nakba contrived to be both
punctual historical event and
persistent catastrophic condition,
so the obliteration of historic non-
Jewish sites in Palestine proved
to be not simply a product of the
destructive ecstasy of the
moment of victory in 1948, but
much more of a calculated,
consistent approach, a policy that
is still being carried out today, in
pointless demolition, bulldozing
and dynamiting in cities such as
Nablus and Hebron."
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162. Sayigh 2007, p. 136.
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166. Kattan, Victor (1 January 2005).

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grim paradoxes of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is that
the foundation of the state of
Israel, intended to create a safe
haven for the 'archetypical'
Jewish diaspora, spelt the
immediate diasporisation of the
Arab Palestinians. The
territorialisation of the Jewish
diaspora spurred a new
'wandering identity' and the
Palestinians became a 'refugee
nation'. To the Palestinians, the
birth of Israel is thus remembered
as the catastrophe, al-nakba, to
 imprint the suffering caused by
dispersal, exile, alienation and
denial ... The nakba is the root
cause of the Palestinian
diaspora."

168. Schulz 2003, pp. 1–3.

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170. Schulz 2003, p. 2: "Although the
PLO has officially continued to
demand fulfilment of UN
resolution 194 and a return to
homes lost and compensation,
there is not substantial
international support for such a
solution. Yet it is around the hope
of return that millions of
Palestinian refugees have formed
their lives. This hope has
historically been nurtured by PLO
politics and its tireless repetition
of the 'right of return'—a mantra in
PLO discourse. In addition, for
hundreds of thousands (or even
millions) of Palestinian refugees,
there are no prospects (or
desires) for integration into host
societies. In Lebanon, the
Palestinians have been regarded
as 'human garbage' (Nasrallah
1997), indeed as 'matters out of
place' (cf. Douglas 1976), and as
unwanted."
171. Schulz 2003, pp. 2–3:
"Fragmentation, loss of homeland
and denial have prompted an
identity of ’suffering', an
identification created by the
anxieties and injustices
happening to the Palestinians
because of external forces. In this
process, a homeland discourse, a
process of remembering what
has been lost, is an important
component ... Therefore the
dispersal (shatat in Arabic) and
fragmentation of the Arab
population of Palestine have
served as uniting factors behind a
 modern Palestinian national
identity, illuminating the facet of
absence of territory as a weighty
component in creations and
recreations of ethnic and national
identities in exile.
Deterritorialised communities
seek their identity in the territory,
the Homeland Lost, which they
can only see from a distance, if at
all. The focal point of identity and
politics is a place lost."

172. Manna 2013, p. 91.

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Baumgarten, Helga (2005). "The

Three Faces/Phases of
Palestinian Nationalism, 1948–
2005". Journal of Palestine
Studies. 34 (4): 25–48.
doi:10.1525/jps.2005.34.4.25 (h
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[Link]) .
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5 ([Link]
10.1525/jps.2005.34.4.25) .
Caplan, Neil (2012). "Victimhood in
Israeli and Palestinian National
Narratives". Bustan: The Middle
East Book Review. 3 (1): 1–19.
doi:10.1163/187853012x63350
8 ([Link]
87853012x633508) .
JSTOR 10.1163/187853012x63
3508 ([Link]
ble/10.1163/187853012x63350
8) .
Chakraborty, Ranjani (15 May
2023). "Why Palestinians
protest every May 15" ([Link]
[Link]/videos/2023/5/1
5/23723947/palestine-nakba-m
ay-15-protests-israel) . Vox.
Confino, Alon (9 January 2023).
"The Nakba and the Zionist
Dream of an Ethnonational
State" ([Link]
m/hwj/article-abstract/doi/10.1
093/hwj/dbac034/6978619?red
irectedFrom=fulltext) . History
Workshop Journal. 95: 131–
153. doi:10.1093/hwj/dbac034
([Link]
j%2Fdbac034) . ISSN 1363-
3554 ([Link]
rg/issn/1363-3554) .
Darwish, Mahmoud (10–16 May
2001). "Not to begin at the end"
([Link]
0011202055655/[Link]
[Link]/weekly/2001/533/op
[Link]) . Al-Ahram Weekly.
No. 533. Archived from the
original ([Link]
eg/weekly/2001/533/[Link])
on 2 December 2001.
Gutman, Yifat; Tirosh, Noam
(August 2021). "Balancing
Atrocities and Forced
Forgetting: Memory Laws as a
Means of Social Control in
Israel" ([Link]
7%2Flsi.2020.35) . Law & Social
Inquiry. 46 (3): 705–730.
doi:10.1017/lsi.2020.35 (http
s://[Link]/10.1017%2Flsi.2020.
35) . S2CID 234091285 (https://
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Khoury, Nadim (January 2020).
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Narrating the Holocaust and the
Nakba". Philosophy & Social
Criticism. 46 (1): 91–110.
doi:10.1177/019145371983944
8 ([Link]
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Koldas, Umut (2011). "The 'Nakba'
in Palestinian Memory in Israel".
Middle Eastern Studies. 47 (6):
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doi:10.1080/00263206.2011.61
9354 ([Link]
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S2CID 143778915 ([Link]
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Masalha, Nur (2008).
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Nakba: Commemoration, Oral
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doi:10.3366/E14749475080001
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Project MUSE 255205 (https://
[Link]/article/255205) .
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Weintraub, Roy; Gibson, Lindsay (30
August 2024). "The Nakba in
Israeli history education: Ethical
judgments in an ongoing
conflict" ([Link]
0%2F00933104.2024.239631
9) . Theory & Research in Social
Education: 1–32.
doi:10.1080/00933104.2024.23
96319 ([Link]
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 Wermenbol, Grace (31 May 2021).
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