Family Case Compilation
Family Case Compilation
Firm X Partners
1. Mpaata Jerome Owagage
2. Julianne Mwebaze
3. Diane Niyogusabwa
4. Aine Raymond
5. Gerald Ndobya
6. Muhanuuzi Dora
7. Mulindwa Fredrick
8. Daphne Musoki
9. Awino Mercy
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10. Kule Roland
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Relevant Statutes
1. The 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda .
2. The Marriage Act, Cap 251
3. The Divorce Act, Cap 249
4. The Customary Marriages and Divorce of Mohammedans Act Cap 252
6. The Hindu Marriage and Divirce Act Cap 250
7. The Domestic Violence Act 2010
8. The Uganda Registration Services Bureau Act Cap 210
9. The Judicature Act Cap 13
[Link] Civil Procedure Rules as Amended.
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Cases
1. Uganda V. John Eduku (1975) HCB 35912
Principle: a customary marriage is not valid until the last instalment of bride price is paid in full or
unless it is waived off by the bride’s family
Brief Facts: the accused was charged with adultery and the state argued that he had committed
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adultery with a married woman. The father of the married woman gave evidence that the
complainant, her supposed husband and his daughter had not had their marriage solemnised since
the bride price was not fully paid and the complainant was supposed to pay 18 head of cattle. The
Chief Magistrate held that there was no prima facie case against the accused.
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On appeal by the DPP, the High Court held that since bride price had not been paid in full, no
customary marriage subsisted between PW2 and the complainant and the two could not be regarded
as husband and wife. Court stated that the fact that PW2 and the complainant lived together did not
mean that they were customarily married and the accused would not have known in the absence of
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any other evidence. The trial magistrate was correct in holding that there was no prima facie case
made out against the accused. On that basis, it was held that there was no valid marriage
customarily unless bride price was paid in full.
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3. Ayoob V. Ayoob (1968) EA 72
Principle: A marriage contracted under one system of law cannot be dissolved under another
system of law
Brief Facts: The parties, both Mohammedans, were married under the Marriage Act of Kenya and
later on the same day went through a ceremony of marriage according to Mohammedan law. The
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husband later purported to divorce the respondent by “talak”, and by petition to the High Court
sought a declaration that his marriage was lawfully dissolved. Held that the first marriage was valid
and the subsequent muslim marriage was inconsequential for as long as the first marriage stood
undissolved. The proper procedure was thus to petition to dissolve the first marriage during the
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lifetime of the spouses by a decree of divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act. Since it was not a
“Mohammedan marriage” within the meaning of the Mohammedan Marriage Act, it could not be
ended by Talak.
Contrast with Abdalla Hamid Mohamed v Jasnena Zaludova, 1983 TLR 314 [Held: The
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respondent's conversion to Islam had the effect of subjecting the parties’ rights and obligations
incidental to their marital status to Islamic law. if a change of domicile, which is a voluntary act,
may result in a change of status by reason of the application of a different system of law, it is
difficult to see why a change of religion, the domicile remaining unchanged, may not also result in a
change of status, if the law to be I applied is then different by reason of the difference of religion.
There is no principle of law that a marriage must be dissolved under the same system as that under
which it was contracted]
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Was a petition for dissolution of marriage contracted under lugbara customary law. The petitioner
paid the bride price of the respondent in instalments even after she was already living with him. She
ran away, and was later found out to be pregnant while away from home.
HELD
- The high court has unlimited original jurisdiction to entertain any suit based on customary law (as
it does in all matters).
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- The customary marriage (registration) act is silent on the procedure for obtaining a divorce under
customary law.
- In proceedings for marriage dissolution, the existence of marriage must be proved. If there is no
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marriage, there is no ground for action. An original marriage certificate or certified copies must be
presented, or evidence of a ceremony of marriage having been conducted followed by cohabitation
of the parties.
- Bride price refers to customary payments made by a man or his family to a woman’s family for
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6. Uganda V. Kato & Ors. (1976) HCB 204
The accused persons were accused of murder. One of the witnesses was the wife of one of the
accused persons with whom she had kids. He had not paid dowry or obtained the consent of the
parents. The issue was whether she was a wife and therefore non compellable.
HELD
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- The wife or husband of an accused is a competent but not a compellable witness for the
prosecution without consent of the accused.
- The test of determining what a customary marriage is, is whether the union is treated as a marriage
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by the laws or customs of the nation, race or sect to which the parties belong. The parties must have
satisfied all the formal and essential requirements prescribed for the validity of a marriage under
customary law. It does not matter whether the marriage was registered or not.
- The marriage was not valid. Dowry was not paid, and the consent of the parents was not obtained
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either.
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- There are no separate grounds for divorce between men and women anymore. All grounds of the
divorce are now open to both parties.
- To prove desertion, there must be certain outward physical conduct the factum of desertion and
secondly, animus deserendi which is intention. Factum is the act of an absconding party in leaving
the matrimonial home. The contest is usually the intention. It must have been the intention of the
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party leaving the home to break it up for good.
- Custody of the child, consideration is given to the welfare principle.
9. Ayiko Mawa Solomon Vs Lekeru Annet Ayiko Divorce Cause No. 0001 of 2015
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Principle: Speaks to a valid Muslim Marriage.
Facts
The two went through a Nikkah ceremony and lived together. At the time they began dating, the
respondent was expecting another man’s child and on 13th October 2009 she was delivered of that
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child but attributed paternity to the petitioner in the relevant medical records. The couple then on
2nd December 2009 underwent a civil marriage at the office of the Chief Administrative Officer of
Arua District.
The petitioner however started suspecting that the respondent was in an adulterous relationship
while he was away for studies in Canada. The petitioner also realised that the child was not his. The
respondent on the other hand stated that the petitioner had equally committed adultery with a lady
and the two had sired two children together. They henceforth sought dissolution of this marriage.
Held
A Nikah is a valid Islamic traditional marriage ceremony whose essential requirements are; mutual
(consent) agreement by the bride and the groom; presence of a Legal guardian (Wali) for the bride
or his representative, (Wakeel); the presence of two adult and sane Muslim witnesses,
(Ash-Shuhud), who should be two males or one male and two females; and the payment of Mahr
(marriage-gift) by the groom to the bride either immediately (muajjal) or deferred (muakhkhar), or a
combination of both.
A man, the groom does not have to have a wali at the time of the marriage contract, rather the man
is the one who enters into the marriage contract by himself. It is the woman who needs to have a
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wali, because the Prophet said, according to the hadeeth narrated by ‘Aa’ishah: “Any woman who
gets married without a wali, her marriage is invalid, invalid, invalid.” Narrated by al-Tirmidhi,
1102; classed as hasan by Abu Dawood, 2083; Ibn Maajah, 1879.
But if a man is feeble-minded, he has to have a wali (guardian). If he is of sound mind, however, he
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does not need a wali. So, in essence, both parties mutually agree and enter into this contract. Please
note. Both bride and groom have the liberty to define various terms and conditions of their liking
and make them a part of this contract.
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There is a strict condition for a Muslim woman. She may only marry a Muslim man and there is no
Nikkah if she marries a non Muslim. If she wishes to marry him, he must convert to Islam free
willingly. A Muslim man may marry a Christian or Jew faith woman so long as she does not
practise Shirk and does not believe in anything that is forbidden in Islam. A Muslim man is Not
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allowed to marry a non believing woman who follows any other faith such as Atheist, Hinduism,
Sikhism, Buddhism and so on. A word of advice, please avoid doing secret Nikkah or trying to play
the hero doing it swiftly by yourselves and without the blessings of the parents or close relatives
and guardians. You risk committing zinaa (Illegal sexual acts) as there may be no Nikkah in the first
place.
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guardianship in marriage in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah in the presence of the witnesses
here with the dowry agreed upon. And Allah is our best witness.”) The husband-to-be replies with:
“I accept marrying your daughter/in your guard giving her name to myself in accordance with the
Islamic Shari'ah and in the presence of the witnesses here with the dowry agreed upon. And Allah is
our best witness.” The ceremony is then complete! Yes, over in just a few minutes!
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Al-Nikah: the Islamic Marriage Ceremony.
The nikah is a simple ceremony in which a man and woman declare their verbal commitment to
each other as husband and wife. It is a "contract" to which both must agree and it is considered an
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act of worship (ibadah). In the very simplest form of the ceremony: there is the Al-Ijab wal-Qubul
(offer and acceptance) only, where the Wali (woman’s guardian in marriage) offers the bride to the
groom, who then accepts. One matrimonial party expresses “ijab" willing consent to enter into
marriage and the other party expresses “qubul" acceptance of the responsibility in the assembly of
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marriage ceremony. (The Wali may say: “I give you my daughter / the girl in my guardianship in
marriage in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah in the presence of the witnesses here with the
dowry agreed upon. And Allah is our best witness.”) The husband-to-be replies with: “I accept
marrying your daughter/in your guard giving her name to myself in accordance to the Islamic
Shari'ah and in the presence of the witnesses here with the dowry agreed upon. And Allah is our
best witness.”The ceremony is then complete! Yes, over in just a few minutes!
Secondary Requirements:
1) Written marriage contract ("Aqd-Nikah") signed by the bride and the groom and witnessed by the
two adult and sane witnesses;
2) Qadi (State appointed Muslim judge) or Ma'zoon (a responsible person officiating the marriage
ceremony) usually the Imam. (However any trust worthy practicing Muslim can conduct the nikah
ceremony, as Islam does not advocate priesthood.);
4) Khutba-tun-Nikah (sermon) to solemnise or bless the marriage, this includes making Du'aa.
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The contract is written and signed by the bride and the groom and their two respective witnesses.
This written marriage contract (Aqd-Nikah) is then announced publicly. The marriage contract
documents are recorded with the masjid and registered with the local government, thus fulfilling the
civil obligations of the marriage. Without this, the marriage would not be recognised under the law
of the country you reside and the legal rights of the spouse, such as inheritance, couples and later
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their children rights would not be valid. You will note that it is not essential to have the couple
present in the same room during Nikah, just so long as the Wali and the Witnesses are there and
have witnessed everything and the bride has given her consent and permission. She may remain
silent. Meaning it's a Yes! She accepts.
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Announcement of the Nikah
Islam encourages its followers to announce a marriage and to celebrate this wonderful relationship
between a man and a woman. The nikah is also a social activity. The Prophet said: “Declare this
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marriage, have it in the masjid and beat the drums.” However, despite being a religious ceremony,
the nikah does not need to take place in a masjid. That is a matter of personal choice. However, you
will be required to hold a separate civil ceremony. Sometimes, men and women sit separately at the
nikah. They may be in a separate room or there may be a partition between them. Again, this is a
matter of preference.
Sermon
The marriage sermon (Khutbah-tun-Nikah) is a way of blessing the marriage and begins by praising
Allah سبحانه و تعالى. “There is none worthy of worship except Allah and Muhammad is His servant
and messenger”, the Muslim confession of faith, is then declared. The main body of the sermon
comprises three verses from the holy Qur’an and one Hadith:
(O mankind! Be dutiful to your Lord, Who created you from a single person, and from him He
created his wife, and from them both He created many men and women, and fear Allaah through
Whom you demand your mutual (rights), and (do not cut the relations of) the wombs (kinship)
Surely, Allaah is Ever an All-Watcher over you).’ [ al-Nisaa’ 4:1],
(O you who believe! Fear Allaah as He should be feared, and die not except in a state of Islam (as
Muslims) with complete submission to Allaah.)’[Al ‘Imraan 3:102],
(O you who believe! Keep your duty to Allaah and fear Him, and speak (always) the
truth).’[al-Ahzaab 33:70].”
(Praise be to Allah, we seek His help and His forgiveness. We seek refuge with Allah from the evil
of our own souls and from our bad deeds. Whomsoever Allah guides will never be led astray, and
whomsoever Allah leaves astray, no one can guide. I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, and
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I bear witness that Muhammad is His slave and Messenger).
The ceremony draws to a close with Du’aa for the bride and groom, their families, the local Muslim
community and the Muslim community as a whole (ummah).
Mahr
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It is written in the Qur’an that mahr must form part of the marriage contract. The groom gives mahr
to his bride as a demonstration of his commitment to her and to providing for her. It can take the
form of money, property or possessions. There is no set amount, although moderation is
recommended, and the gift is agreed between the bride and the groom. “And give the women their
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dowries as a free gift, but if they are pleased to offer you any of it, accept it with happiness and with
wholesome pleasure.” [Qur’an 4:4]
The groom may pay the mahr before he marries, at the time of marriage, or at a later date, as agreed
with his bride. The mahr can even be postponed indefinitely. However, it will become payable
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immediately in the case of divorce or death. The amount and method of payment is written into a
contract, which is signed by the bride, groom and their witnesses. Following this, the Aqd-Nikah is
announced to all who attend the nikah. Traditionally, mahr would reflect the social status of the
bride’s family. However, these days, the giving of mahr is seen mainly as a symbol. No one wants
to begin married life burdened with debt and, equally, Islam does not wish to prevent men from
getting married simply because they cannot afford an expensive dowry.
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family and friends; the groom receives the congratulations of men. The newlyweds are also
presented with gifts. It is believed that gifts given willingly will strengthen the relationships
between people. Therefore, it is important to keep gifts affordable. The Prophet said: “Exchange
gifts, strengthen your love of one another” [At-Tirmizi]
Other traditions
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Remember these are traditions and a cultural necessity in certain countries. It is not a requirement in
Islam. A mangni (engagement ceremony) may take place once the couple has accepted each other
for marriage. It provides an opportunity for the two families to come together and for the couple to
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exchange rings, if they so wish. This is not a religious requirement but a cultural. (Actually in Islam
there is no exchange of rings.) The outfit of the bride-to-be is traditionally provided by the groom’s
family. It is traditional, but not a religious requirement for the bride to hold a mendhi ceremony,
usually at home, shortly before the wedding. The groom’s family provides the henna, which is
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applied to the bride’s hands and feet. Following the application of mendhi, the bride does not leave
the house until the nikah. Her wedding clothes are also provided by the groom’s family. Please note
again: It is not a religious requirement for the bride and groom to exchange rings in marriage;
however it has become tradition and culture dictates it. Gold jewellery is acceptable for women
only, although silver rings may be worn by both men and women.
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wife under a potentially polygamous marriage, the second ceremony converted that marriage into a
monogamous one. It ceased to be an Islamic marriage governed by The Marriage and Divorce of
Mohammedans Act, Cap 252 and turned into a civil marriage governed by The Marriage Act
Cap 251 and The Divorce Act, Cap 249.
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3. Standard of proof in divorce matters
Citing Kakunka Edward v. Aliet Yudesi Kyoyanga, [1972] HCB 208; Ruhara Mary (Mrs) v.
Ruhara Christopher [1977] HCB 86 and Habyarimana Veronica v. Habyarimana Perfect
[1980] HCB 139 that the standard of proof of adultery and cruelty is above the ordinary
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preponderance of evidence but not as high as beyond reasonable doubt.
As regards the allegation of adultery, direct evidence proving the fact of commission of adultery is
quite rare in divorce causes. At best, the evidence is mostly circumstantial. Ntabgoba, PJ, in
George Nyakairu v. Rose Nyakairu [1979] HCB, 261, commented thus; “in allegations of
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adultery, it is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery for that fact is almost to be inferred
from circumstances as a necessary conclusion since it is indeed very rare that parties are ever
surprised during the direct act of adultery.
3. Desertion
Referring to the Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition 2009, at page 211, the court defined desertion
as the wilful and unjustified abandonment of a person’s duties or obligations, especially to military
service or to a spouse or family. In Family Law the five elements of spousal desertion are
1) a cessation of cohabitation,
2) the lapse of a statutory period,
3) an intention to abandon. As to the animus there must proof of lack of intent to return and resume
the marital relationship. The respondent against whom desertion is alleged may testify as to intent
but cannot evade the effect of his or her conduct. The court ascertains the respondent’s intent by
considering all of the facts and circumstances. The passage of time in and of itself cannot constitute
an intention to desert. Intention to leave the home and break it up for good is to be determined in
each case from all the evidence on the record
4) a lack of consent from the abandoned spouse, and
5) a lack of spousal misconduct that might justify the abandonment.
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that there is no condonation, collusion or connivance between the parties. In Y. Mugonya v.
Trophy Nakabi Mugonya, [1975] HCB 297, it was stated that proof of condonation requires
evidence of forgiveness and reinstatement of the relationship, although further commission of
matrimonial offences revives the condoned offence.
5. Matrimonial Property
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Referring to Muwanga v. Kintu High Court Divorce Appeal No. 135 of 1997, Matrimonial
property was stated to be understood differently by different people. There is always property
which the couple chose to call home. There may be property which may be acquired separately by
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each spouse before or after marriage. Then there is property which a husband may hold in trust for
the clan. Each of these should in my view be considered differently. The property to which each
spouse should be entitled is that property which the parties chose to call home and which they
jointly contribute to.
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excessive verbal abuse, physical violence characterized by beatings and boxing, addictive drinking
which would drive the Respondent into feats of anger and aggressiveness towards the Cross
Petitioner. Furthermore, since May 2008, the Respondent has deserted her and their marriage. The
facts in the cross petition were uncontroverted.
Held:
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In granting a dissolution of marriage, Courts look at the totality of the facts before it and determine
whether the facts lead to the finding that the marriage has irretrievably broken down and then
divorce is granted. (Also see Gershom Masiko Vs Florence Masiko Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2011)
Based on the fact that the evidence of the respondent was not controverted, the marriage had indeed
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irretrievably broken down.
11. Han Herman Kock vs Victoria Kayecha Divorce Cause No. 6 of 2011
Wasn’t found
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Mohammedans law.
was contracted; the consequences of the marriage depend upon the law of the country where the
parties reside, whether temporarily or permanently, after the marriage.
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customs and the laws of a given tribe, a marriage exists in Uganda. It can be proved by cohabitation
of the parties which occurs after proof of the ceremony.
- When parties make a choice and opt to be governed by customary law in their Marriages, they are
presumed to have made an undertaking that before, during and after their Marriages, they will be
governed by the same rules, there is need to prove the grounds that satisfy divorce under Customary
Law.
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17. Mifumi (U) Ltd vs Attorney General Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No. 02 of
2014
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This was a petition to declare the marriage custom and practice of demanding bride price and its
refund in the case of marriage breakdowns, unconstitutional. It was an appeal from the
Constitutional Court where the constitutionality of bride price was challenged at first instance.
Held;
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a) Bride price does not fetter the free consent of persons intending to get married and, consequently,
is not in violation of Article 31(3) of the Constitution. It is a voluntary exchange of gifts between
the groom to be, bride to be and their respective parents.
b) However, the demanding for any “gifts” by the parents of the girl intending to marry and their
payment, which “gifts” in essence form the bride price, and the making of the payment of these
gifts a condition precedent to a valid customary marriage, unconstitutional.
c) The custom of refunding bride price however, as a condition for the dissolution of customary
marriage is unconstitutional and violates Articles 31(1) and (2), and is accordingly prohibited.
d) The payment of bride price as a condition precedent to a valid customary marriage, and of its
return as a condition precedent to the dissolution of a customary marriage which has been
demanded for by a woman’s parents and/or relatives, undermines the dignity and status of women
and is therefore inconsistent with Articles 32(2), 33(1) and (4) and 21(1) and (2) of the
Constitution.
18. Kiwuwa vs Serunkuma and Another High Court Civil Suit No. 52/2006
The plaintiff instituted a suit to prevent the celebration of the church marriage of the first and
second defendants on the ground that both defendants, like the plaintiff, being Baganda by tribe,
belonged to the same clan.
He argued that such a marriage “is abominable, immoral, unethical, uncustomary and illegal”.
Further, on the basis of the right to culture under Article 37 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, the
court was enjoined to enforce the custom in issue as the same was the right of the Baganda as a
tribe. On their part, the defendants argued that a marriage between the two of them as clan-mates
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would merely be culturally repugnant but not illegal under the Marriage Act, Cap. 251 as the
written law on prohibited degrees of consanguinity did not cover this legal aspect.
Issue
a) Whether or not the defendants, being Baganda by tribe and being members from the same
‘Ndiga’ clan, can lawfully contract a marriage under the Marriage Act, Cap. 251 or any other laws
of Uganda.
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Held;
There was no provision in the Marriage Act that excludes the observance of a customary law and
practice by those intending to contract the type of marriage the Marriage Act allows.
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Justice Remmy Kasule observed that: “Because of the fact that over time, since the advent of the
colonial era and Christianity, native Ugandans kept to their customs in marriage, it became
necessary for the religions to give due recognition to some of these customs in the celebration of
marriage.”
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He further observed that as such, ‘a marriage under the Marriage Act became a combination of both
what is religious and what is customary although remaining a church or civil marriage’.
The judge then concluded that although not within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity,
compliance with customary practice was a valid procedural requirement for the solemnization of a
marriage under the Marriage Act. Accordingly, judgment was entered for the plaintiff, declaring
that the first and second defendant’s intended marriage was illegal, null and void by reason of the
custom that, being Baganda by tribe both belonging to the same clan “Ndiga”, they could not
lawfully contract a marriage as between themselves.
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which are vital to a regular Kikuyu marriage. It was on evidence that the defendant was not present
and consenting at at least of these stages. Thus, the petitioner failed to prove his case.
Act required the wife to prove that she was indeed married to the man at the time of the case, that
the property in question had been acquired during the subsistence of the marriage and that she had
contributed whether directly or indirectly. In fact, the language of the provision did not limit it to
only property acquired during the marriage, but to all property.
In determining the contribution, the court needs to assess the value of the wife’s non-monetary
contribution in order to determine her interest in the suit property.
The trial judge had no scientific basis to determine that the C-sections incapacitated the wife to the
level of reducing the value of her contribution. In any case, what better contribution can there be to
a family than bearing children!
There was evidence that she had made an equal contribution (albeit indirect) and therefore was
entitled, across all boards, to equal share of the matrimonial property.
21. Zainabu vs Zainabu [1973] EA 280
Brief Facts: The appellant and respondent were Sunni Mosley of the Shafi'i sect. Appellant apple to
Court for an order that her husband be forced to divorce her on grounds of cruelty and construction
destination on grounds of cruelty and drove her away telling her she was no longer of any use to
him.
Held:
Constructive Desertion: Since they are Sunni Shaffi Muslims, the law pertaining to them should be
applied to them. According to that law, construction desertion is an alien concept that is not
recognized. In these circumstances if the man was indeed beating her he would only be guilty for
cruelty.
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On Talaq: The court cannot compel a husband to pronounce talaq to his wife. It is illegal and
incompetent. That the wife actually sought for faskh (dissolution of marriage) and not talaq. That
for this case all court is to determine whether a matrimonial offence was committed and if so
dissolve the marriage.
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22. Rwabinumi vs Bahimbisomwe Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2009
Brief Facts: The appellant was challenging the division of property by the High Court and upheld
by the Court of Appeal.
Issues:
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• What amounts to contribution to earn a spouse a share in the property?
• What amounts to matrimonial property?
Held: Citing Muwanga v Kintu and Kivuitu v Kivuitu; That it can be direct and Monetary or
indirect and non-monetary. These cases recognize not only a spouse's indirect contribution but also
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non-Monetary contributions which enable the other spouse to either acquire or develop the property.
Matrimonial Property is property parties chose to call home and which they jointly contribute to.
On division of property: Parties are given shares of property equivalent to the contributions that
they made. Where the property was jointly acquired during the subsistence of marriage, the courts
have awarded 50% shares for both parties. Article 31 (1) (b) of the Constitution of Uganda state
constitutional production on the baiss of sex which is enshrined in Articles 21 and 33 of the
Constitution. The constitution, while recognising the right to equality of men and women in
marriage and at its dissolution also reserved the constitutional right of individual, being married or
not, to own property either individually or in association with others under Article 26 (1) of the
Constitution. Had the drafters of the Constitution wanted to take away the right of married persons
to own separate property in their individual names, they would have explicitly stated so.
23. Kamweru vs Kamweru [2003] 2 EA 484
Brief Facts: The appellant had filed a divorce petition in the High Court seeking dissolution of his
marriage to the respondent on the ground of adultery with the 3 co-respondents. The High Court
found that there was no adultery hence appeal.
Issue; What is the burden of proof for cases of adultery?
Held: Burden of Proof in cases of adultery is beyond reasonable doubt but it is not as strict as that
in criminal cases. Standard of Proof is on the preponderance of doubt which simply means that the
court should be satisfied as to be sure that there was a martial offence committed.
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Brief Facts: The appellant sought for the family house to be sold and the proceeds are shared
equally upon divorce.
Issue: What is the nature of the contribution that a wife or husband has to make before she can be
held to have acquired a share in the matrimonial home?
Held: That it is written nowhere that the contribution must be monetary. Contribution to acquisition
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of property can be in the form of direct monetary contribution and indirect non-monetary
contribution. Non-monetary contribution includes taking care of the children, looking after crops
etc even if it can't be quantified in Monetary terms. These contributions are important because they
help the salaried husband acquire the property. Therefore in these ways, together wit salaried
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husbands both contribute to the property. Both their names can be registered for the property. If a
husband registers property in his name solely, then the wife has a right to apply for her share and
the court assesses her non-Monetary contribution.
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the opposite sex, the two persons not being married to each other.
To be a ground of adultery, it must be committed since the celebration of marriage. It is immaterial
whether the marriage has been consummated or not.
In the facts, the respondent has a child out of wedlock who was born after their marriage and has on
many occasions slept with other women.
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Cruelty may be defined as willful and unjustified conduct of such character as to cause danger to
life, limb or health (bodily or mental) or give rise to reasonable apprehension of such danger. To
constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of must be serious. It must be higher than the ordinary
wear and tear of a married [Link] is therefore the effect of the conduct rather than the nature which is
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of paramount importance in assessing the charge of cruelty. It must be proved that the respondent,
however mindless of the consequences, has behaved in a way that the petitioner could not in the
circumstances be called upon to endure and that such conduct caused injury to the health or
reasonable apprehension.
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Having proved the ground of adultery coupled with cruelty under section 5(2) of the Divorce Act
and absence of collusion, accessory to or condonation and connivance eon the part of the [petitioner
or any counter charge under section 7 and 8 of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to the first order
towards dissolution of the marriage. Decree Nisi granted.
Custody of children given to the mother and the father should pay for education and 50%
maintenance.
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cruelty as to warranty dissolution of marriage can be established.
According to Bromley’s Family law 3rd Edition pg. 95 there is no need for injury to be actually
suffered. A reasonable apprehension that injury will result if the conduct is persisted, I will suffice
for the court will not wait for the petitioner to be actually injured affording him/her relief.
Ground of cruelty was established.
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28. Kagga vs Kagga Divorce Cause No. 11 of 2005
The supreme court recognized unmonetized contribution of a wife where Justice Mwangusya
observed that “our courts have established a principle which recognizes each spouse’s contribution
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to acquisition of property ad this may be direct, where the contribution is monetary or indirect
where a spouse offers domestic services…when distributing the property of a divorced couple, it is
immaterial that one of the spouses was not financially endowed as the other as is showed in this
case.
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That while the respondent was the financial muscle all the wealth, they acquitted the contribution of
the petitioner as no less important than that made by the respondent.
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wife may sue for divorce on the ground of adultery alone, in the same way as the husband is entitled
to so under the same sections.
➢ Section 22 of the DA provides for the co-respondent to pay costs to the petitioner (incase
petitioner is the husband) where adultery with the wife has been proved. Held to be in conflict with
the constitution as it seeks to punish an adulterous wife while the husband walks scot free.
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Discriminatory and targeting women.
➢ Although the underlying principle in all custody cases was that the welfare of the children was
paramount, the courts in applying this principle had to consider other ancillary circumstances.
These included for example such matters as to who of the spouses was to blame for the breakup,
who was more financially equipped to look better after the interests of the interest and which of the
spouses could provide a more comfortable home.
➢ In allegations of adultery, it is not necessary to prove direct act of adultery for the fact was
almost always to be inferred from the circumstances as a necessary conclusion since it is indeed
true that parties were ever surprised in the act of adultery.
➢ Immorality can be a sufficient ground for interfering with a father’s common law right to
custody of his children unless such immorality was very fragrant or was coupled with other habits
injurious to the children.
32. Habyarimana vs Habyarimana [1980] HCB 139
Petitioner filed for dissolution and custody of their children. Her grounds were that the respondent
was adulterous, cruel to her which was causing her physical and mental stress and that he had
removed the children from the care of the petitioner.
HELD; Odoki, J.
➢ Definition of adultery (Relied on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition para 444) –
Consensual sexual intercourse during the subsistence of the marriage between one spouse and a
person of the opposite sex not being the other spouse. It is sexual intercourse between two persons
of whom one or both are married, but who are not married to each other.
➢ Adultery as a criminal offence is committed when a man has sexual intercourse with any married
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woman who is not his wife or where a woman has sexual intercourse with a man who is not her
husband. It is therefore not a criminal offence for a married man to have sexual intercourse with an
unmarried woman (See Sec. 154 of PCA) but such conduct amounts to the matrimonial offence of
adultery.
➢ The BOP lies throughout on the person alleging it there being a presumption of innocence.
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➢ On SOP, it is trite that an allegation of adultery must be proved to the satisfaction of the court
that is beyond reasonable doubt. However it seems that the judge interpreted this rule widely in
stating that the BOP in divorce proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. Available authority
suggests that such burden is indeed to the satisfaction of court and this has been held to mean not
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beyond reasonable doubt but on the preponderance of probability although the degree of probability
is higher than in ordinary civil suits, it’s not as high as in criminal cases.
➢ To constitute adultery, the conduct must have the effect of producing actual or apprehended
injury to the petitioner’s physical or mental health. The conduct complained of must be serious. It
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must be higher than the ordinary wear and tear of married life. It is therefore the effect of the
conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing the charge of cruelty.
33. Hough vs Hough Divorce Cause [L. A. No. 19234. In Bank. June 26, 1945.
The case involved married British nationals that were domiciled in Uganda. They had been living in
the UK but had since relocated to Uganda. In this matter, the question of domicile was raised as a
preliminary point in order to determine under what law their divorce proceedings would be handled.
It was argued for the respondent that the laws of England should apply since the domicile of the
husband determined that of the wife.
In Uganda, the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of inter alia sex – Article 21; while
Article 33(1) states that woman and man have equal rights and further, under Article 31(1)(b), man
and woman are equal before, during and after marriage. The common law position of dependent
domicile is untenable in the face of the provisions on equality and non-discrimination in the
constitution. A married woman is free to choose her domicile.
34. Richard Irumba vs Florence Irumba Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.45 of 1995
This case was about the applicability of UK Legislation in Uganda. The respondent sought to have
their divorce matter brought immediately after one year of their marriage as opposed to the position
in Uganda which provided for three years. It was the case for the respondent that Ugandan courts
had to apply the law as was in England – which had been reduced to one year. [Citing Nyali v AG
– 1955]; it was opined that:
It is recognition that the common law cannot be applied in a foreign land without considerable
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qualification. Just as with an English Oak, so with the English Common Law. You cannot transplant
it to the African continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will
flourish indeed but needs careful tending. So with the Common Law. It has many principles of
manifest justice and good sense which can be applied with advantages to peoples of every race and
colour all over the world. But it also has many refinements and subtleties and technicalities which
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are not suited to other folk. These off shoots must be cut away. In these far off lands the people
must have a law which they understand and which they will respect. The common law cannot fulfil
this role except with considerable qualifications. The task of making these qualifications is
entrusted to the Judges of these lands. [Consider Sec 14 (3) of the Judicature Act, Cap 13]
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35. Doreen Kirungi vs Ronald Mugabe Divorce Cause No. 48 of 2013
The case was concerned with the dissolution of the marriage, custody as well as maintenance of the
children. The case for the petitioner was that their marriage had irretrievably broken due to the
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respondent’s desertion and cruelty (beating and abusing). However, since the respondent was
agreeable to the dissolution, the focus was towards custody:
The cardinal principle on who to grant custody of a child of this nature (3 years) is the welfare of
the child. At her tender age, the child needs to live with the parent who has cared for her since she
was born rather than the parent who has been absent from her life. [Consider also; sec 3 of the
Children’s Act]
36. Namuyimba Proscovia vs David Ralph Pace Divorce Cause No. 14 of 2017
This was a petition for divorce and subsequent dissolution of the marriage between the couple. The
case for the petitioner was that the respondent had deserted her for three years since he refused not
to come to Uganda where they had agreed to relocate to from China. It was also established that the
respondent had committed adultery with another woman.
The desertion on the part of the respondent is unreasonable by virtue of his refusing to return to
Uganda in accordance with the arrangement between the two – consequently depriving the
petitioner of her conjugal rights as the respondent’s spouse.
37. Haji Musa Kigongo vs Olive Kigongo. High Court Civil Suit No. 295/2015
The two parties had been living together for 26 years as husband and wife. When the relationship
became sour, the “husband” sought to have the respondent evicted from the “matrimonial home”
just like any other trespasser. It was the case for the respondent that she was married to the
respondent and as such could not be evicted from the home that she had contributed to insofar as
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construction as well as tendering was concerned. Court found in her favour:
Save for the lack of sufficient proof that the two were married, the defendant relied on the assurance
by the plaintiff that she was his wife and had a home for life. Until the relationship took another
turn, the plaintiff had never objected to the defendant being his “wife”. The two parties behaved and
intended to live like a married couple. They shared the suit property as their ‘matrimonial home.’
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Premised on equity, it is only fair that the defendant is entitled and has an interest in the suit
property based on her financial as well as her other non-monetary contributions such as time and
presence during the construction of the house.
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