G.R. No.

146815 April 9, 2003

HEIRS OF PEDRO LAURORA and LEONORA LAURORA, petitioners,

vs.
STERLING TECHNOPARK III and S.P. PROPERTIES, INC., respondents.

The owners of a property have no authority to use force and violence to eject alleged
usurpers who were in prior physical possession of it. They must file the appropriate action in
court and should not take the law into their own hands.

FACTS:
A complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages was filed before the MTC. Petitioners
alleged that they [were] the owners of the Lot, planted trees and has possessed the land up
to the present. Respondents Sterling Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. through their
Engr. bulldozed and uprooted the trees and plants, and with the use of armed men and by
means of threats and intimidation, succeeded in forcibly ejecting [petitioners]. As a result of
their dispossession, [petitioners] suffered actual damages.
Respondents averred that [petitioners were] not the owners of the land because they
disposed of it sometime in 1976 as shown by legal documents. The Land Authority issued an
order of award in favor of [petitioners], approving the application of Pedro Laurora to buy the
subject Lot. Thereafter, petitioners requested the Department of Agrarian Reform for the
transfer of the lot to Juan Manaig. Favorably acted upon, the DAR issued a permit to transfer
through its Regional Director. The petitioners as sellers and witnessed by their sons
executed a ‘Kasulatan ng Paglilipatan ng Lupa’ transferring the land to Juan Manaig as
buyer. They then executed a ‘Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan’ or Deed of Sale wherein they
sold the Lot including all improvements therein, in favor of Juan Manaig. After the approval
of the sale from the [petitioners] to Juan Manaig, the latter paid its real estate taxes. The tax
declarations of the land in the name of its previous owners were cancelled and transferred in
the name of [petitioner] Pedro Laurora as owner-transferee. Thereupon, the heirs of the late
‘JUAN MANAIG’ sold the land to Golden Mile Resources Development Corporation which
likewise sold it to [respondent] S. P. Properties, Inc.

ISSUE: WON private respondents have a valid and legal right to forcibly eject petitioners
from the premises despite their resistance and objection, through the use of arm[ed] men
and by bulldozing, cutting, and destroying trees and plants planted by petitioners, without
court order, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

HELD:

Physical Possession of the Land

The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real
property -- possession de facto, not possession de jure. Only prior physical possession,
not title, is the issue. If ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such
question, but only to determine the question of possession.
The ownership claim of respondents upon the land is based on the evidence they
presented. Their evidence, however, did not squarely address the issue of prior
possession. Even if they succeed in proving that they are the owners of the land, the fact
remains that they have not alleged or proved that they physically possess it by virtue of
such ownership. On the other hand, petitioners’ prior possession of the land was not
disputed by the CA, which merely described it as usurpation.

The issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately

intertwined with the issue of possession, to such an extent that the question of who had prior
possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the
land is. No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents’
claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court
cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of ownership.
Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in
possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by the owners. If
such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the present case, the party
who proves prior possession -- in this case, petitioners -- can recover possession
even from the owners themselves. Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into
and occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take the law into their
own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom.

Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned by respondents, still
they are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom. Under appropriate
circumstances, respondents may file, other than an ejectment suit, an accion publiciana --
a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion
reivindicatoria -- an action to recover ownership of real property.
 G.R. No. 170575 June 8, 2011

Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,

vs.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent.

FACTS:
The controversy between petitioners and respondent emanated from a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer filed by the former against the latter. The petitioner appears to be the
registered owner of Lot 3-A. Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation,
took possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement
entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said
land is in the character of being lessee thereof.
Petitioners served notices upon the respondent to vacate the premises of said land.
The respondent did not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its
possession and occupancy of said land. Petitioners then filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer .

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant is the
lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous
contractual relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas
Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The
Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of the land it is
leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the land leased by it from the
City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease
according to its terms and pursuant to law.
The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold
by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.

ISSUES: WON there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.

HELD:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In
forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the
prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful
possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to
continue in possession.

The allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not
for unlawful detainer. "In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth." "[W]here the
defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab initio," the summary action for forcible
entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.
In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and
control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming that these
allegations are true, it hence follows that respondent’s possession was illegal from the very
beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners’ complaint is one for forcible entry – that
is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without
right." Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners
alleged that respondent’s possession was illegal at the inception.

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in petitioners’

Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that
the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the
instant suit for unlawful detainer. Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry
within the reglementary one-year period from the time of dispossession. Petitioners likewise
alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject
property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year
from the time of dispossession, the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when
petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a
valid cause of action against the respondent.
 G.R. No. 174191 : January 30, 2013

NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CRISOSTOMO GALABO,

ADELAIDA GALABO, and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR, Respondent.

FACTS:
The dispute in the case relates to the possession of a parcel of land. Respondents
are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained a Lot, a portion of the Arakaki
Plantation, owned by National Abaca and other Fibers Corporation. Donato and the
respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original survey of 1916
to 1920.
When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki
Plantation in the 1950s, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did not
include Lot No. 102; thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-for Lot
No. 722 Lot No. 102 was not included. The respondents, however, continue to posses,
occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102. When NQFC opened its business it allegedly offered to
buy Lot No. 102. Donato declined and to ward off further offers, put up "Not For Sale" and
"No Trespassing" signs on the property. In the 1970s, Crisostomo fenced off the entire
perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it.
The respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate
Lot No. 102. Santos claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Deed
of Transfer) which the respondents and their mother allegedly executed in Santos favor. The
respondents denied this claim and maintained that they had been occupying Lot No. 102,
which the BOL itself recognized per its letters and the Certification dated April 12, 2000
confirming Donato as the long-time occupant and awardee of the property. To perfect their
title, the respondents applied for free patent.
NQFCs workers, with armed policemen of Toril, Davao City, entered by force Lot No.
102 to fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. Crisostomo received a
letter from NQFCs counsel demanding that he remove his house from Lot No. 102. NQFC
subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down various trees that the respondents
had planted on the property. When conciliation failed, the respondents filed a complaint for
forcible entry with damages before the MTCC against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had
been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them of
possession through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth.

ISSUE: WON NQFC had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102.

HELD:
Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or
material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal
concepts for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. The word
"possession" in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or
possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated
in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."
Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects him." He cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by its owners. For
these reasons, an action for forcible entry is summary in nature aimed only at providing an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession. Ejectment suits are intended to "prevent
breach of x x x peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to
respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his." Thus, lest the purpose of
these summary proceedings be defeated, any discussion or issue of ownership is avoided
unless it is necessary to resolve the issue of de facto possession.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for forcible entry,
and unlawful detainer, is proper:cSECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and
prove: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the
defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. As in any civil case, the
burden of proof lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish
their case by preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently
alleged and proved the required elements.
To support its position, NQFC invokes the principle of tacking of possession, that is,
when it bought Lot No. 102 from Santos its possession is, by operation of law, tacked to that
of Santos and even earlier, or at the time Donato acquired Lot No. 102 in 1948. NQFCs
reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law allows a present possessor to tack his
possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the property
for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to possession de
jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or
losing ownership through prescription. We reiterate possession in forcible entry suits refers
to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.
 [ G.R. No. 178635, April 11, 2011 ]

SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES AND DAISY C.

FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims he and his wife bought a 428-square meter
registered property. Teresita operated a boarding house on the property. Because the Abads
did not consider running the boarding house themselves, they agreed to lease the property
back to Teresita for P30,000.00 a month so she could continue with her business. But,
although the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly abandoned the boarding house,
forcing the Abads to take over by engaging the services of Teresita's helper, to oversee the
boarding house business.
Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to have certain damage to some toilets
repaired. While she was attending to the matter, she also hired house painters to give the
boarding house fresh coat of paint. Respondents came, accompanied by two men, and
forcibly took possession of the boarding house. Frightened, the painters called the Abads
who immediately sought police help. The Abads were later appeased, however, when they
learned that the intruders left the place. The day the Abads left for abroad, respondents
forcibly entered and took possession of the property once again. Because of this, petitioner
filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondents.
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they forcibly seized the place. They claimed
ownership of it by inheritance. They also claimed that they had been in possession of the
same from the time of their birth. That Oscar had been residing on the property since 1967.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Abad sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical possession of
the property in question.

HELD:
Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to enable first
level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff had prior physical
possession of the property; and, second, that the defendant deprived him of such
possession by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.

There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy
forcibly entered the subject property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation, citing
such property as one "of which they have complete physical and material possession of the
same until deprived thereof." Abad argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffs prior
physical possession of the property before the dispossession, sufficient to confer on the
MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit
is not required to use in his allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules.
It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that dispossession took place
under the required conditions.
It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make out a case
for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to
prove that he had prior physical possession for this gives him the security that
entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
him. Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of the property after buying
the same since they immediately rented it to Teresita who had already been using the
property as a boarding house. Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act of
ownership that amounted to their acquiring full physical possession of the same.
But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in September 2002. Oscar
and Daisy, on the other hand, have proved that they had been renting spaces in the property
as early as 2001 as evidenced by receipts that they issued to their lessees. This was long
before they supposedly entered the property, using force, in 2002.

It is of course true that a property owner has the right to exercise the
attributes of ownership, one of which is the right to possess the property. But Abad is
missing the point. He is referring to possession flowing from ownership which is not
in issue in this case. Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than
physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Servillano utterly failed to prove prior physical
possession in his favor. The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible
entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint.
 [ G.R. No. 205951, July 04, 2016 ]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER. VS. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS
LINES, INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines is the owner of two parcels of land totaling.
Respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. was the former owner of the lots but it lost the
same by foreclosure to petitioner; nonetheless, respondent continued to occupy the same.
Petitioner and respondent executed a Contract to Sell covering the subject property .
Respondent failed to fully pay the stipulated price in the contract to sell. Petitioner thus sent
a notarized demand letter entitled "Demand to Pay with Rescission of Three (3) Contracts to
Sell. Petitioner sent another letter-demand to vacate.

ISSUE: WON an action for ejectment is proper.

HELD:
It must have escaped the attention of the MTCC, the RTC, and the CA that an
ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is as well available against one who
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right of possession
under an express or implied contract, such as a contract to sell. Under Section 1, Rule
70 of the 1997 Rules, "a x x x vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs." In such cases, it is sufficient to allege
in the plaintiffs complaint that -

1. The defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a
contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; 2. Eventually, the defendant's possession of the
property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration
or the termination of the defendant's right of possession; 3. Thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and
4. Within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Upon an examination of the Complaint and evidence in Civil Case No. 2171, it
appears that petitioner complied with the above requirements. It alleged that respondent
acquired the right to occupy the subject property by A Contract to Sell; that respondent failed
to pay the required amortizations and thus was in violation of the stipulations of the
agreement.
It was plainly erroneous for the lower courts to require a demand to pay prior to filing
of the ejectment case. This is not one of the requisites in an ejectment case based on
petitioner's contract to sell with respondent. As correctly argued by petitioner, the full
payment of the purchase price in a contract to sell is a positive suspensive condition whose
non-fulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from
conveying title to the purchaser; in other words, the non-payment of the purchase price
renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. Respondent's failure and
refusal to pay the monthly amortizations as agreed rendered the contract to sell without force
and effect; it therefore lost its right to continue occupying the subject property, and should
 vacate the same.
G.R. No. 224137

LEONORA RIVERA-AVANTE, Petitioner vs. MILAGROS RIVERA AND THEIR HEIRS

WITH THE LATE ALEJANDRO RIVERA, and ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE
DERIVING CLAIM OR RIGHTS FROM THEM, Respondents

FACTS:
Herein petitioner is the registered owner of a house and lot. Respondent is her sister-
in-law, being the wife of her deceased brother. Petitioner claims that she and her husband
allowed respondents to stay in the disputed premises out of compassion for respondent and
in consideration of her deceased brother Alejandro. However, in 2005, petitioner and her
husband, finding the need to utilize the subject property and in view of their plan to distribute
the same to their children, demanded that respondents vacate the premises in question.
Petitioner and her husband have, likewise, obtained information that respondents are
financially able to rent their own place and, in fact, have acquired several residential
properties and vehicles. However, respondents refused the demand of petitioner and her
husband, and even filed a case questioning petitioner's ownership of the said property
contending that they are, in fact, co-owners of the subject property and that petitioner
obtained title over the disputed lot through fraud, deceit and falsification. Petitioner sent a
formal demand letter to respondents asking them to vacate the disputed premises, but this
remained unheeded. Petitioner sent respondents another letter asking them to leave the
subject property and to pay reasonable rent from the date of receipt of the said letter until
they have fully vacated the questioned premises, but to no avail. Hence, petitioner filed an
unlawful detainer case.

ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC'S DECISION
IN HOLDING THAT THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
CASE MUST BE FILED IS RECKONED FROM THE 22 MAY 2006 DEMAND LETTER AND
NOT THE 7 September 2007 DEMAND LETTER AS THE FINAL ONE.

HELD:
An action for unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property
from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right
to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant
in an unlawful detainer case is originally legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if the following allegations are
present: 1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; 2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; 3. thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and 4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Moreover, the sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the parties.12 When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
In the present petition, the issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not
petitioner's action for unlawful detainer was timely filed. More particularly, the sole issue to
be determined is the date upon which the one-year prescriptive period for the filing of
petitioner's unlawful detainer case should be reckoned. Is it May 22, 2006, which is the date
of the initial demand letter or September 3, 2007, which was the latest demand letter prior to
the filing of the unlawful detainer case against respondents?

It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC, which
adopted and affirmed by the CA, are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is
not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are
substantial reasons for doing so.15 In the instant case, the Court finds no exceptional reason
to depart from this policy.
As correctly cited by both the RTC and the CA, the established rule as
enunciated by this Court in Racaza v. Gozum is that subsequent demands that are
merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-
year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still
be reckoned from the date of the original demand. The Court is not unaware of the principle
as reiterated in the case of Republic of the Philippines, et al. v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,17 that where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the
reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer case is from the last
demand. Sunvar, nonetheless, acknowledged that this principle is still subject to the rule that
if the subsequent demands are mere reiterations or reminders of the original demand, the
one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would still be counted from the first demand.
Thus, on the basis of this settled rule, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the
letter of September 3, 2007, which is a mere reiteration of the original demand, will not
operate to renew the one-year period within which petitioner should file her unlawful detainer
case because the said period will still be counted from the date of the original demand which
was made on May 22, 2006. Hence, on the basis of the foregoing discussions, the instant
petition should be dismissed.
 G.R. No. 193075, June 20, 2016

EMMANUEL REYES, SR. AND MUTYA M. REYES, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF

DEOGRACIAS FORLALES, NAMELY: NAPOLEON FORLALES, LITA HELEN
FORLALES-FRADEJAS, JAIME FORLALES, JR., JULIUS FORLALES FORTUNA,
HORACE FORLALES, GALAHAD FORLALES, JR., INDEPENDENCE FORLALES-
FETALVERO, MELITON FORLALES, JR., MILAGROS V. FORLALES AND MERCEDES
FORLALES-BAUTISTA, Respondents.

FACTS:
The present case originated from an unlawful detainer suit filed by respondents Heirs
against petitioners demanding that the petitioners vacate a portion of Lot No. 1408 (disputed
portion) located at Barangay Dapawan. Municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon. The
portion of land occupied by the petitioners formed part of the estate of Deogracias Forlales
which was adjudicated to Mercedes Forlales Bautista (Mercedes).
As early as 1978, the petitioners claimed that they had already been occupying the
disputed portion. For one reason or another, they executed an affidavit saying that their stay
on the lot owned by Mercedes was with the permission of the administrator of the estate o
and was subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the rightful owner. Mercedes invited
the petitioners to see her for a formal talk regarding their temporary stay on her property, but
the latter refused and simply sent a note asking Mercedes if they could stay longer "for the
sake of convenience" of their family.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Upon realizing that the petitioners still had not vacated the disputed portion,
Independencia wrote the petitioners, asking them to vacate the premises within six (6)
months from receipt of the letter. No action followed until the respondents filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer which was dismissed because the respondents filed it one (1) year
beyond the date Independencia demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises. This
decision became final and executory on October 15, 1997.
Respondents, through Independencia, instituted a complaint for ejectment and
demolition of the house. A fromal letter to the petitioners demanding that they vacate the
subject property, cease and desist from constructing their house, and remove what had
already been constructed. The respondents claimed that the petitioners acknowledged in
their affidavit that Independencia allowed them to occupy a portion of the lot owned by
Mercedes on a temporary basis and by mere tolerance and that their stay on the land was
only for the sake of convenience to the family.
ISSUE: WON the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit should start from the
date when the respondents first gave their formal demand.

HELD:
If the entry is illegal from its inception, the action which may be filed against the
intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If not - or the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter became illegal - the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be
filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand to
vacate.hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer. Since the main
distinction between the two actions is based on when and how the defendant entered the
property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.The allegations in the
complaint determine the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over
the case.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites
the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the
plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the right of possession; (3) thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on the defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. In the absence of these
allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court do not have jurisdiction over.
The complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer as it would seem that the
respondents allowed the petitioners to occupy the disputed portion up until they sent their
final demand to vacate. But, as correctly raised by the petitioners right from the very start,
the respondents had already considered the occupancy unlawful as early as 1993. In other
words, contrary to how the CA and the trial courts appreciated the petitioners' occupancy
from 1993 to 2005, we find that their possession during this period was not by mere
tolerance.
In Sarona v. Villegas, we explained that a case for unlawful detainer alleging
tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a
case for forcible entry can hide behind an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed
beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry: A close
assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to
be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible
entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. At present, we find it
hard to believe that the respondents tolerated the occupancy after their attempts to
dispossess the petitioners from the lot.

Professor Tolentino defines and characterizes "tolerance" in the following

manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[...] acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity,
the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are
generally those particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another
without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy. They are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness
or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land,
tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well. And even though this
is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription.
There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated.
Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be
considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an
authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed.
The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission.
In this light, the occupation cannot be characterized as possession by mere tolerance. The
filing of the first complaint for unlawful detainer affirms the fact that the respondents no
longer wanted the petitioners to occupy the disputed portion as early as 1993. It was duly
alleged in their first complaint that it was on May 28, 1993, when the respondents finally
demanded the petitioners to vacate. Thus, the possession of the petitioners after said date
started becoming illegal because they no longer had a right to occupy the portion of the lot.

While the rule is to start counting the one-year period from when the last demand
was made, our ruling in Desbarats v. Vda. De Laureano justifies that the period should be
reckoned from the date of the first demand to vacate. Consequently, the respondents availed
of the wrong remedy after the MCTC dismissed the first complaint because the period
allowed to file a complaint for unlawful detainer already lapsed one year after May 28, 1993.
 G.R. No. 151369 March 23, 2011

ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and EDITHA PE-
TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y.
ONG, Respondent.

FACTS:
The instant petition stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by herein respondent
through his representative against herein petitioners. In the Complaint, it was alleged that
Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land together with the improvements thereon,
herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any
contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is
simply by mere tolerance of Tong. Tong demanded that respondents vacate the house they
are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to vacate the
same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.
In their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged that Tong
is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a dummy of a certain alien named
Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot and, as such, Tong's ownership is null
and void; petitioners are the true and lawful owners of the property in question and by
reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to anybody.

ISSUE: WON an for accion publiciana and not an unlawful detainer case should be filed.

HELD:
Respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioners occupied the subject
property by his mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes
illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses
to comply with such demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a
complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.
Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners which was less than a year from the
date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the action was filed within the one-year period
prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioners' assertion that the filing of the
unlawful detainer case was premature, because respondent failed to comply with the
provisions of the law on barangay conciliation. As held by the RTC, Barangay Kauswagan
City Proper, through its Pangkat Secretary and Chairman, issued not one but two certificates
to file action after herein petitioners and respondent failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement. The Court finds no error in the pronouncement of both the MTCC and the RTC
that any error in the previous conciliation proceedings leading to the issuance of the first
certificate to file action, which was alleged to be defective, has already been cured by the
MTCC's act of referring back the case to the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo of
Barangay Kauswagan for proper conciliation and mediation proceedings. These subsequent
proceedings led to the issuance anew of a certificate to file action.
 [ G.R. No. 212979, February 18, 2019 ]
MA. ANTONETTE LOZANO, PETITIONER, V. JOCELYN K. FERNANDEZ RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
The present controversy revolves around a parcel of land and its improvements in
currently declared for taxation purposes under the name of respondent Jocelyn K.
Fernandez.
Petitioner Ma. Antonette Lozano (Lozano) executed a Waiver and Transfer of
Possessory Rights (Waiver)[4] over the subject property in favor of Fernandez. After the
execution of the document, Fernandez continued to tolerate Lozano's possession over the
property. On July 15, 2009, she sent a demand letter[5] to Lozano ordering her to vacate the
premises. Because Lozano failed to leave the property, Fernandez was constrained to file an
action for unlawful detainer against her before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Olongapo City (MTCC).
Since 1996, Lozano had owned and possessed the subject property. She never
recalled signing any Waiver in Fernandez's favor. Lozano explained that Fernandez duped
her into signing a blank document, which was later converted to a Waiver. She denied
having appeared before a notary public to notarize the said document. Lozano claimed that
the real contract between her and Fernandez was a loan with mortgage as evidenced by the
fact that she remained in possession of the property even after the execution of the said
Waiver and that she had issued checks in payment of the loan. She pointed out that
Fernandez was engaged in the business of lending imposing unconscionable interest and
was in the practice of securing collateral from the lendee.

ISSUE: WON CA GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DECISION OF THE RTC

ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF THE PETITIONER FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THERE WAS NO TOLERANCE IN CONTEMPLATION OF
THE LAW ON EJECTMENT THAT WAS PROVEN

HELD:
Tolerance is more than mere passivity

On the basis of the said Waiver, Fernandez claims that she had acquired possession
of the said property. She adds that she tolerated Lozano's continued possession thereof
after she did not exert her right after the execution of the said document.
In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance
must be proved. Bare allegations of tolerance are insufficient and there must be acts
indicative of tolerance. In Reyes v. Heirs of Deogracias Forlales, the Court had
expounded on the concept of tolerance in unlawful detainer cases, to wit: [. . .] acts
merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without
material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.
They are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or
friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a
horse therein, or getting some water from a well. And even though this is continued for a
long time, no right will be acquired by prescription. [...]

There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated.
Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be
considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an
authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed.
The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission
 In other words, for there to be tolerance, complainants in an unlawful detainer must
prove that they had consented to the possession over the property through positive acts.
After all, tolerance signifies permission and not merely silence or inaction as silence or
inaction is negligence and not tolerance.
In the present case, Fernandez's alleged tolerance was premised on the fact that she
did not do anything after the Waiver was executed. However, her inaction is insufficient to
establish tolerance as it indicates negligence, rather than tolerance, on her part. Thus, even
assuming the Waiver was valid and binding, its execution and Fernandez's subsequent
failure to assert her possessory rights do not warrant the conclusion that she tolerated
Lozano's continued possession of the property in question, absent any other act signifying
consent.

In addition, contrary to the appreciation of the CA, the affidavits of Fernandez and
Gascon do not prove that the former tolerated Lozano's possession of the property. A close
perusal of the averments in their affidavits reveals that they merely concluded that Lozano's
possession was by mere tolerance. The affidavits were bereft of any statement describing
positive acts of Fernandez manifesting tolerance or permission. The CA erred in giving
weight to these affidavits as they do not contain specific averments of tolerance and merely
stated unfounded conclusions. Again, Fernandez cannot simply claim that she had tolerated
Lozano's possession because she did not do anything after the execution of the Waiver as
silence does not equate to tolerance or permission. In short, the execution of the Waiver
alone is not tantamount to the tolerance contemplated in unlawful detainer cases. The
absence of an overt act indicative of tolerance or permission on the part of the plaintiff is
fatal for a case for unlawful detaine