entropy

Article
Physical-Layer Security Analysis over M-Distributed
Fading Channels
Sheng-Hong Lin 1,2,3 , Rong-Rong Lu 3 , Xian-Tao Fu 3 , An-Ling Tong 4 and Jin-Yuan Wang 1,2,3, *
1 Key Laboratory of Intelligent Computing & Signal Processing, Ministry of Education, Anhui University,
Hefei 230039, China
2 Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrated Administration Technologies for Information Security,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
3 Key Lab of Broadband Wireless Communication and Sensor Network Technology, Ministry of Education,
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China
4 General Information Department, North Information Control Research Academy Group Co., Ltd.,
Nanjing 21153, China
* Correspondence: [email protected]




Received: 10 September 2019; Accepted: 11 October 2019; Published: 12 October 2019


Abstract: In this paper, the physical layer security over the M-distributed fading channel is
investigated. Initially, an exact expression of secrecy outage probability (SOP) is derived, which has
an integral term. To get a closed-form expression, a lower bound of SOP is obtained. After that, the
exact expression for the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) is derived, which is in
closed-form. Finally, an exact expression of ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) is derived, which has two
integral terms. To reduce its computational complexity, a closed-from expression for the lower bound
of ESC is obtained. As special cases of M-distributed fading channels, the secure performance of the
K, exponential, and Gamma-Gamma fading channels are also derived, respectively. Numerical results
show that all theoretical results match well with Monte-Carlo simulation results. Specifically, when
the average signal-to-noise ratio of main channel is larger than 40 dB, the relative errors for the lower
bound of SOP, the probability of SPSC, and the lower bound of ESC are less than 1.936%, 6.753%, and
1.845%, respectively. This indicates that the derived theoretical expressions can be directly used to
evaluate system performance without time-consuming simulations. Moreover, the derived results
regarding parameters that influence the secrecy performance will enable system designers to quickly
determine the optimal available parameter choices when facing different security risks.

Keywords: physical layer security; M-distributed fading channels; SOP; SPSC; ESC

1. Introduction
For future wireless communications, it can be expected that it will be necessary to support massive
user connections and exponentially increasing wireless services [1]. With the explosive growth of
wireless services, information privacy and security are becoming a major growing concern for users [2].
Traditionally, classical network security techniques [3] are often employed. However, these techniques
do not consider the physical nature of the wireless channel. Recently, as a compelling technology for
supplementing traditional network security, physical layer security (PLS) has been proposed [4].
The framework of PLS was pioneered by Shannon, who proposed the concept of perfect secrecy
over noiseless channels [5]. However, random noise is an intrinsic element of almost all wireless
communication channels. Under noisy channels, Wyner established the wiretap channel model and
proposed the concept of secrecy capacity [5]. For Wyner’s wiretap model, a passive eavesdropper
wiretapped the transmission over the main channel. While attempting to decode the information, no

Entropy 2019, 21, 998; doi:10.3390/e21100998 www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy

Entropy 2019, 21, 998 2 of 19

conditions are imposed on the available resources for the eavesdropper. After that, Csiszár introduced
the non-degraded channels [5]. It was proved that the secure communication over additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels can be achieved as long as the channel capacity of the main channel
is better than that of the eavesdropping channel.
By considering the impacts of channel fadings in wireless communications, recent works extended
previous results to many scenarios. Under complex Gaussian fading channels, the secrecy capacity
was derived in [6]. For Rayleigh fading channels, the average secrecy capacity and secrecy outage
performance for frequency diverse array communications were investigated in [7]. In [8], the average
secrecy outage probability (SOP) and the average secrecy outage duration of Nakagami-m fading
channel were discussed. Under generalized Gamma fading channels, the theoretical expressions of the
probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) and the SOP were derived in [9]. Moreover, for
Nakagami-n (i.e., Rice) fading channel, the probability of SPSC was derived [10]. Another commonly
used model is called lognormal fading, which was usually employed to characterize the shadow fading
in radio frequency wireless communications (RFWC) [11], the atmosphere turbulence effects in optical
wireless communications (OWC) [12], or the small-scale fading for indoor ultra wide band (UWB)
communications [13]. In [14], the SOP of the correlated lognormal fading channels was discussed.
For independent/correlated lognormal fading channels, the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) and the
SOP were investigated in [15]. Moreover, in [16] and [17], the secrecy capacities were analyzed over
generalized-K fading channel and κ − µ fading channel, respectively. As mentioned above, the PLS for
many well-known fading channels have been discussed. However, to the best of our knowledge, the
PLS for a newly proposed fading model, M distribution, has not been involved in open literature.
One motivation to consider the M distribution in this paper is its generality. The M distribution
is a general fading model since it covers many well-known fading models as special cases, such as
lognormal, Gamma, K, Gamma-Gamma, exponential, et al. [18]. In other words, the M-distributed
fading model unifies many previously proposed fading models in a single one. Another motivation is
that the M-distributed fading can be applied to many communication environments. Specifically, it
can be used to characterize the shadow fading in RFWC, the atmosphere turbulence effects in OWC, or
the small-scale fading in indoor UWB communications. As a new tractable fading model, it has been
widely used to describe the statistical behavior of these wireless channels. Up to now, closed-form
expressions of different performance indicators (such as bit error rate [19], outage probability [20] and
capacity [21]) over M fading channels had been analyzed. However, the secure performance over M
fading channels has not been completely revealed.
In this paper, a wireless communication network with one transmitter (Alice), one legitimate
receiver (Bob) and one eavesdropper (Eve) is considered. The main and eavesdropping channels
experience independent M-distributed fadings. The PLS over the M fading channel is investigated.
The main contributions are listed as follows:

• Under the M-distributed fading channel, the exact expression of the SOP is first derived. To
reduce computational complexity, a closed-form expression for the lower bound of the SOP is
obtained. It is shown that the performance gap between the exact SOP expression and its lower
bound is small in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime.
• The closed-form expression for the probability of the SPSC over the M-distributed fading channel
is derived. It is found that when the target secrecy rate is set to be zero, the lower bound of SOP
has the same expression as the probability of the SPSC.
• Over the M-distributed fading channel, the exact expression of the ESC with a double integral is
obtained. To obtain a closed-form expression, the lower bound of ESC is then derived. It is shown
that the performance gap between the exact expression and the lower bound of the ESC is small.
• As special cases of the M fading channel, the secure performance over the K, exponential, and
Gamma-Gamma fading channels is derived, respectively. The accuracy of these performance
analysis is verified by simulations.
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 3 of 19

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the system model is introduced.
Section 3 focuses on the secure performance analysis. For some special cases, the secrecy performance
is further investigated in Section 4. Section 5 presents numerical results before Section 6 concludes
the paper.
Notations: E(·) denotes the expectation operator, Var(·) denotes the variance operator. Γ(·)
denotes the Gamma function. Kv (·) denotes the modified Bessel function of the second kind with order
v. G m,n
p,q [·|·] denotes the Meijer’s G function [22]. N ( a, b ) denotes a Gaussian distribution with mean a
and variance b. f X ( x ) and FX ( x ) denote the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of a random variance X. { x }+ denotes max{ x, 0}.

2. System Model
In this paper, we consider a wireless communication system with three entities, i.e., a transmitter
(Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve), as depicted in Figure 1. In the system,
Alice transmits data to Bob. Due to the broadcast feature of the wireless channel, both Bob and Eve
can receive the signal.

HB
n el
chan
Main
Bob

Ea v
Alice esdr
o
ppe
r ch
HE ann
el
Eve

Figure 1. A wireless communication system with a transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob), and
an eavesdropper (Eve).

For Bob and Eve, the received signals Yn (n = B for Alice-Bob link and n = E for Alice-Eve link)
are given by

Yn = Hn X + Zn (1)

where X is the transmit signal, and it satisfies E( X 2 ) = P, where P is the average power of the
transmit signal. Zn ∼ N (0, σn2 ) stands for the AWGN, where σn2 is the noise variance. Hn denotes
the M-distributed channel fading, which is a seven-parameter distribution and can be denoted as
Hn ∼ M(αn , β n , ρn , Ωn , ξ n , φ1,n , φ2,n ). The PDF of Hn is given by [19]
s !
βn αn +k
2 −1
αn β n h
f Hn (h) = An ∑ ak,n hn Kαn −k 2 , h≥0 (2)
k =1
ξ g,n β n + Ω0n

where αn
  β n + αn
2αn2

ξ g,n β n 2


 A n = 1+ α2n ξ g,n β n +Ω0n
ξ g,n Γ(αn )




1− k 
!
   k
βn − 1 (ξ g,n β+Ω0n ) 2 Ω0n k−1 αn 2


ak,n =

k−1 Γ(k) ξ g,n βn (3)

Ω0n = Ωn + ξ c,n + 2 ξ c,n Ωn cos(φ1,n − φ2,n )

 p



ξ c,n = ρn ξ n




ξ g,n = (1 − ρn )ξ n


Moreover, αn > 0 is a parameter related to the effective number of large-scale cells of the scattering
process. β n ∈ N denotes the amount of fading parameter. Ω0n denotes the average power of the LOS
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 4 of 19

component and the coupled-to-LOS scattering term. φ1,n and φ2,n are the deterministic phases of the
LOS and the coupled-to-LOS scatter components, respectively. ξ n is the average power of the total
scatter components, and ρn is a parameter in the range of [0, 1].
From (1), the received SNRs at Bob and Eve are written as
.
γn = P| Hn |2 σn2 (4)

According to (2) and (4), the PDF of γn is given by

βn   αn + j s √ !
An σ 2 αn + j αn β n σn r
f γn ( r ) =
2 ∑ a j,n √n
P
r 4 −1 Kαn − j 2 √
P ξ g,n β n + Ω0n

,r ≥ 0 (5)
j =1

Moreover, the CDF of γn can be derived as

βn  αn +k Z √ s !
r

σ 2 αn +k αn β n σn m
Fγn (r ) = An ∑ ak,n √n
P 0
m 2 −1 Kαn −k 2 √
P ξ g,n β n + Ω0n

dm (6)
k =1

According to (14) in [20], Kv ( x ) in (6) can be rewritten as Meijer’s G-function, and then using (26)
in [20] for (6), the CDF of γn is given by

βn  αn + j " √ α +j
#
An σn 2 αn + j 2,1 αn β n σn r 1 − n2
Fγn (r ) =
2 ∑ a j,n √ P r 4 G1,3 √ P ξ β + Ω0
αn−j j−αn αn+j (7)
j =1 g,n n n 2 , 2 ,− 2

3. Secrecy Performance Analysis

In the following three subsections, the SOP, the probability of SPSC, and the ESC over the
M-distributed fading channel will be discussed, respectively.

3.1. SOP Analysis

According to [23], the secrecy capacity for one realization of the SNR pair (γB , γE ) is given by
(
ln(1 + γB ) − ln(1 + γE ), if γB > γE
C= (8)
0, if γB ≤ γE

Referring to (8), the SOP is defined as the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity falls
below a target secrecy rate, which can be written as

PSOP = Pr(C ≤ c) (9)

where c denotes the target secrecy rate, and it can be re-expressed using the SNR threshold γth as
c = ln(1 + γth ). Therefore, Equation (9) can be further written as
   
1 + γB
PSOP = Pr ln ≤ ln(1 + γth )
1 + γE
= Pr [γB ≤ (1 + γth )(1 + γE ) − 1] (10)

According to (5), Equation (10) can be further written as

Z ∞ Z (1+γth )(1+w)−1
PSOP = f γE (w) f γB (u)dudw (11)
0 0

By analyzing (11), the double integrals can be simplified to a single one, which is shown in the
following theorem.
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 5 of 19

Theorem 1. For the M-distributed fading channels (i.e., Hn ∼ M(αn , β n , ρn , Ωn , ξ n , φ1,n , φ2,n ), the SOP can
be derived as a single integral

β β  αE +k  αB + j Z ∞
(1 + γth ) AB AE E B σ 2 σ 2 αE + k αB + j
PSOP = 1−
4 ∑ ∑ ak,E √E a j,B √B
P P 0
w 4 [(1 + γth )(1 + w) − 1] 4 −1
k =1 j =1
√
" # v 
αE + k
u p
α β σ w 1− 2 α
 t B B√B β σ ( 1 + γ )( 1 + w )− 1
2,1
√ E E E th
u
×G1,3
αE − k αE − k αE +k KαB−j 2
dw (12)
P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 2 ,− 2 ,− 2 P ξ g,B β B + ΩB0

Proof. According to (11) and using the partial integration, the SOP can be further written as
Z ∞
PSOP = FγB [(1 + γth )(1 + w) − 1] dFγE (w)
0
Z ∞
=1 −(1 + γth ) FγE (w) f γB [(1 + γth )(1 + w)− 1] dw (13)
0

Substituting (5) and (7) into (13), Equation (12) can be obtained.

Remark 1. The SOP PSOP is a monotonously increasing function with respect to the SNR threshold γth .
min = P max
Therefore, the minimum and maximum values of the SOP are given by PSOP SOP ( γth = 0) and PSOP =
PSOP (γth → ∞) = 1, respectively.

Theoretically, Equation (12) can be employed to evaluate the SOP over the M-distributed fading
channels. However, the expression has a complex integral term. Generally, we are more interested
in the SOP performance at high SNR (i.e., γB  1, γE  1). In this case, a tight lower bound of the
SOP will be provided in this paper. When γB > γE , we have (1 + γB )/(1 + γE ) < γB /γE . Therefore,
we have    
1 + γB γB ∆
C = ln < ln = CAsy (14)
1 + γE γE
where CAsy = C + δ, (δ > 0) can be interpreted as the asymptotic secrecy capacity. Figure 2 shows the
instantaneous secrecy capacity C and the asymptotic secrecy capacity CAsy for different γB . As can be
seen, when γB > γE  1, the performance gap between C and CAsy is small. In other words, CAsy can
be used to evaluate SOP in the high SNR regime.

5 .0

4 .5 C , γB = 2 5
S e c r e c y C a p a c ity ( n a t/tr a n s m is s io n )

C A s y
, γB = 2 5
4 .0
C , γB = 3 5
3 .5
C A s y
, γB = 3 5
3 .0 C , γB = 4 5
2 .5 C A s y
, γB = 4 5
2 .0

1 .5

1 .0

0 .5

0 .0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0
γΕ

Figure 2. The instantaneous secrecy capacity C and the asymptotic secrecy capacity CAsy for
different γB .
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 6 of 19

According to (14), the SOP can be written as

PSOP = Pr [C ≤ ln(1 + γth )]

= Pr CAsy − δ ≤ ln(1 + γth )


≥ Pr CAsy ≤ ln(1 + γth )
L ∆
= Pr [γB ≤ (1 + γth )γE ] = PSOP (15)

L
Note that (15) provides a lower bound PSOP for the SOP. After some analysis, the following theorem
is derived.

Theorem 2. For the M-distributed fading channels (i.e., Hn ∼ M(αn , β n , ρn , Ωn , ξ n , φ1,n , φ2,n ), a closed-form
expression for the lower bound of SOP can be derived as

√  αB2+ j ! − αE + αB + k + j
βE βB  2
A A σB 1 + γth αE β E
L
PSOP = 1− B E
4 ∑ ∑ k,E j,B
a a
σE ξ g,E β E + ΩE0
k =1 j =1
" #
α +j α +j α +j
3,2 1 − B2 − αE , 1 − B2 − k, 1 − B2
× G3,3 χ(γth ) αB − j αB − j αB + j (16)
2 ,− 2 ,− 2

where

√
∆ αB β B σB ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 1 + γth
χ(γth ) = (17)
ξ g,B β B + ΩB0


αE β E σE

Proof. By comparing (10) with (15), the lower bound of the SOP can be derived by replacing (1 +
γth )(1 + w)− 1 with (1 + γth )w in (12), i.e.,

βE βB   αE + k   αB + j Z ∞
(1 + γth ) AB AE σE 2 σB 2 αE + k αB + j
L
PSOP = 1−
4 ∑ ∑ k,E Pa √ a j,B √
P 0
w 4 [(1 + γth )w] 4 −1
k =1 j =1
√
" #  v 
1 − αE2+k
u p
2,1 αE β E σE w u αB β B σB (1 + γth )w
× G1,3 √
αE − k αE − k αE + k K αB − j 2
 t √
 dw (18)
P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 2 ,− 2 ,− 2 P ξ g,B β B + ΩB0

√
By letting t = w and then using (14) in [20], Equation (18) can be written as

β β   αE + k   αB + j Z ∞ α +k α + j
AB AE E B σE 2 σB 2 αB + j
∑ ∑
E B
L
PSOP =1 − a k,E √ a j,B √ (1 + γth ) 4 t 2 + 2 −1
4 k =1 j =1 P P 0
" # " √ #
2,1 αE β E σE t 1 − αE2+k 2,0 αB β B σB 1 + γth t −
× G1.3 √ αE − k αE − k αE + k G0,2 √ αB − j αB − j dt (19)
P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 2 ,− 2 ,− 2 P ξ g,B β B + ΩB0 2 ,− 2

By using (21) in [24], Equation (19) can be finally written as (16).

Remark 2. The lower bound of SOP PSOP L is a monotonously increasing function with respect to the SNR
L,min
threshold γth . Therefore, the minimum and maximum values of the lower bound of SOP are given by PSOP =
L ( γ = 0) and P L,max L ( γ → ∞ ) = 1, respectively.
PSOP th SOP = P SOP th

Remark 3. The lower bound of the SOP, PSOP L , is independent of the average transmit power P. Therefore,
L .
increasing P can not improve the performance of PSOP
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 7 of 19

3.2. Probability of SPSC Analysis

In physical layer secure communications, the probability of SPSC is often used as a fundamental
benchmark, which is used to emphasize the probability of the existence of the secrecy capacity. In this
paper, the probability of SPSC is given by setting γth = 0 in (12). Therefore, the following theorem
is obtained.

Theorem 3. For the M-distributed fading channels (i.e., Hn ∼ M(αn , β n , ρn , Ωn , ξ n , φ1,n , φ2,n ),
the closed-form expression of the probability of SPSC is given by

 αB + j !− αE +αB +k+ j " #

β β 2 α +j α +j α +j
AB AE E B σB 2 αE β E 1 − B2 − αE , 1 − B2 − k, 1 − B2
4 k∑ ∑ak,E a j,B σE 3,2
PSPSC=1 − G3,3 χ(0) αB − j αB − j (20)
=1j=1
ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 2 ,− 2 ,− 2
αB + j

where χ(·) is given by (17).

Proof. According to the definition of the probability of SPSC and (10), we have

PSPSC = PSOP (γ = 0)
= Pr [γB ≤ γE ] (21)

In (15), when γ = 0, the lower bound of SOP is given by

L
PSOP (γ = 0) = Pr [γB ≤ γE ] (22)

L ( γ = 0). Letting γ = 0 in (16), (20) can be derived.

Equations (21) and (22) imply that PSPSC = PSOP

Remark 4. Similar to Remark 3, the probability of SPSC, PSPSC , is also independent of the average transmit
power P. This indicates that the probability of SPSC can not be improved by increasing P.

3.3. ESC Analysis

Given the instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve, the instantaneous secrecy capacity is given by

C (u, w) = {ln(1 + u) − ln(1 + w)}+ (23)

Then, the ESC can be written as

Z ∞Z ∞
CErg = C (u, v) f γB (u) f γE (w)dwdu (24)
0 0

By calculating (24), the following theorem is derived.

Entropy 2019, 21, 998 8 of 19

Theorem 4. For the M-distributed fading channels (i.e., Hn ∼ M(αn , β n , ρn , Ωn , ξ n , φ1,n , φ2,n ), the ESC is
given by

βB βE   αE + k   αB + j
A A σ 2 σ 2
CErg = B E
4 ∑ ∑ ak,E √E
P
a j,B √B
P
j =1 k =1
Z ∞
s √ ! " √ #
αB+j+αE +k
−1 αB β B σB u 2,1 αE β E σE u 1 − αE2+k
× ln(1 + u)u 4 K αB − j 2 √ G1,3 √ αE − k k − αE αE + k du
P ξ g,B β B + ΩB0 P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0



0 2 , 2 ,− 2

βE βB   αE + k   αB + j
A A σ 2 σ 2
+ E B
4 ∑ ∑ ak,E √E
P
a j,B √B
P
k =1 j =1
Z ∞
s √ ! " √ α +j
#
αE+k+αB+j
−1 αE β E σE w 2,1 1− BαB β B σB w
× ln(1 + w)w K αE − k 2 √
4 √
αB − j j − αB 2 αB + j
G1,3 dw
P ξ g,E β E + ΩE 0 P ξ g,B β B + ΩB 0


0 2 , 2 ,− 2
α
 E + k " #
(αE β E σE )2 − αE4+k , 1 − αE4+k
β
AE E

σE 2

8π k∑
6,1
+ ak,E √ G2,6
2 αE − k αE − k +2 k − αE 2− αE + k (25)
=1 P 16P ξ g,E β E + Ω0 4 , 4 , 4 , 4 , − αE4+k , − αE4+k
E

Proof. According to (23) and (24), the ESC can be further expressed as
Z ∞Z u
CErg = [ln(1 + u) − ln(1 + w)] f γB (u) f γE (w)dwdu
0 0
Z ∞ Z ∞ Z ∞
= ln(1 + u) f γB (u) FγE (u)du+ ln(1 + w) f γE (w) FγB (w)dw − ln(1 + w) f γE (w)dw (26)
|0 {z } |0 {z } |0 {z }
C1 C2 C3

where the first term C1 can be written as

β β  αE + k  αB + j Z ∞ s √ !
AB AE B E
 
σE 2 σB 2 αB+j+αE+k αB β B σB u
4 j∑ ∑ k,E P √ √ −1 √
C1 = a a j,B ln ( 1 + u ) u 4 K αB−j 2
P ξ g,B β B+ΩB0


=1 k =1 P 0
" √ #
2,1 αE β E σE u 1 − αE2+k
× G1.3 √
αE − k k − αE αE +k du (27)
P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 2 , 2 ,− 2

Similarly, the second term C2 can be expressed as

β β  αE + k  αB + j Z ∞ s √ !
AE AB E B
 
σE 2 σB 2 αE+k+αB+j αE β E σE w
4 k∑ ∑ ak,E P √ √ −1 √
C2 = a j,B ln(1 + w)w 4 K αE − k 2
P ξ g,E β E+ΩE0


=1 j =1 P 0
" √ α +j
#
2,1 αB β B σB w 1 − B2
× G1.3 √
αB − j j − αB αB + j dw (28)
P ξ g,B β B + ΩB0 2 , 2 ,− 2

Moreover, the third term C3 can be written as

βE  αE +Zk ∞ " √ #
−

A σ 2 αE + k
−1 2,0 √ αE β E σE w
C3 = E ∑ ak,E √E ln(1 + w)w 4 G0,2
P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0
αE − k αE −k dw (29)
2 ,− 2
4


k =1 P 0

According to (11) in [24], Equation (29) is further written as

β   αE +Zk ∞ " √ #
AE E −
 
σ 2 αE + k 1, 1 2,0 α β σ w
C3 = ∑
4 k =1
ak,E √E
P 0
w 4 −1 G2,2
1,2
w
1, 0
G0,2 √ E E E
P ξ g,E β E + Ω0

αE − k
, − αE2−k
dw (30)
E 2
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 9 of 19

By employing (21) in [24], (30) can be further written as

 αE + k " #
(αE β E σE )2 − αE4+k , 1 − αE4+k
βE 
A σ 2
C3 = E
8π ∑ ak,E √E 6,1
G2,6
2 αE − k αE − k +2 k − αE 2− αE + k
, − αE4+k , − αE4+k
(31)
k =1 P 16P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 4 , 4 , 4 , 4

Then, substituting (27), (28) and (31), (25) can be derived.

It can be seen from Theorem 4 that the exact expression of the ESC (25) is a very complex integral
expression. It is very hard to obtain a closed-form expression for the ESC. Alternatively, a lower bound
of the ESC is derived in the following theorem.

Theorem 5. For the M-distributed fading channels (i.e., Hn ∼ M(αn , β n , ρn , Ωn , ξ n , φ1,n , φ2,n ), a closed-form
expression for the lower bound of the ESC is given by

 αB + j " #
(αB β B σB )2 α +j α +j
βB 
AB 2 − B4 , 1 − B4
 σ
8π j∑
L
CErg = a j,B √B 6,1
G2,6
2 αB − j αB − j +2 j − αB 2− αB + j α +j α +j
 =1 P 16P ξ g,B β B + ΩB0 4 , 4 , 4 , 4 , − B4 , − B4
 αE + k " #)+
(αE β E σE )2 − αE4+k , 1 − αE4+k
β
AE E

σE 2
− ∑
8π k=1
ak,E √ 6,1
G2,6
2 αE − k αE − k +2 k − αE 2− αE + k
, − αE4+k , − αE4+k
(32)
P 16P ξ g,E β E + ΩE0 4 , 4 , 4 , 4

Proof. According to (31), the ergodic capacity for Alice-Bob link is given by

 αB + j " #
(αB β B σB )2 − αB4+ j , 1 − αB4+ j
βB 
A σ 2
C1,Erg = B
8π ∑ a j,B √B 6,1
G2,6
2 αB − j αB−j+2 j−αB 2−αB+j αB+j αB+j (33)
j =1 P 16P ξ g,B β B + ΩB0 4 , 4 , 4 , 4 ,− 4 ,− 4

Similarly, the ergodic capacity for Alice-Eve link is C3 in (31).

Referring to [25], a lower bound of the ESC is given by
 +
CErg ≥ C1,Erg − C2,Erg (34)

Substituting (33) and (31) into (34), (32) can be derived.

4. Some Special Cases

As it is well known, the M distribution covers many well-known fading models as special cases,
which is shown in Table 1. In this section, the derived secrecy analysis results in Section 3 will be
extended to these fading channels.

Table 1. Special cases of the M distribution.

Distribution Models Generation

K distribution Ω = 0, ρ = 0
Exponential distribution Ω = 0, ρ = 0, α → ∞
Gamma-Gamma distribution ρ = 1, Ω0 = 1
Lognormal distribution ρ = 0, Var[|UL |] = 0, ξ g → 0
Gamma-Rician distribution β→∞
Gamma distribution ρ = 0, ξ g = 0
Rice-Nakagami distribution ρ = 0, Var[|UL |] = 0
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 10 of 19

4.1. K Distribution Channel

Letting Ωn = 0 and ρn = 0, the M distribution in (2) reduces to the K distribution as
α n +1 α n −1
s !
2
2αn h 2 hαn
f Hn (h) = α n +1
K α n −1 2 , h≥0 (35)
Γ(αn )(ξ g,n ) 2 ξ g,n

In this case, the lower bound of SOP in (16) becomes

αB +1 ! αB +1 " √ #
1−2αE−αB
,−αB2+1 , 1−2αB
2
L (1 + γth ) 4 σB αB ξ g,E 3,2 σB αB ξ g,E 1 + γth 2
PSOP = 1− G3,3 αB −1 1− αB αB +1 (36)
Γ ( αE ) Γ ( αB ) σE αE ξ g,B σE αE ξ g,B 2 , 2 ,− 2

Moreover, the probability of SPSC in (20) reduces to

! αB +1 " #
1−2αE −αB
, − αB2+1 , 1−2αB
2
1 σB αB ξ g,E 3,2 σB αB ξ g,E 2
PSPSC = 1− G3,3 αB −1 1− αB αB +1 (37)
Γ ( αE ) Γ ( αB ) σE αE ξ g,B σE αE ξ g,B 2 , 2 ,− 2

Furthermore, the lower bound of ESC in (32) becomes


! αB +1  !2 
 2 αB +1 3− αB
L
 α σ
B B 1 6,1 1 α B σB − 4 , 4
CErg = √ G  √
4πΓ(αB ) 2,6 16 ξ g,B P αB4−1 , αB4+1 , 1−4αB , 3−4αB , − αB4+1 , − αB4+1

 ξ g,B P


! αE +1  !2 +
2 αE +1 3− αE
αE σE 1 6,1 1 α σ
E E − , 
− √ G2,6 √ αE−1 αE+1 1−αE 4 3−αE 4 αE+1 αE+1 (38)
ξ g,E P 4πΓ(αE ) 16 ξ g,E P 4 , 4 , 4 , 4 ,− 4 ,− 4 

4.2. Exponential Distribution Channel

When Ω = 0, ρ = 0 and α → ∞, the M distribution in (2) reduces to the exponential distribution
 
1 h
f H,n (h) = exp − , h≥0 (39)
ξ g,n ξ g,n

Under this channel, the lower bound of SOP in (16) becomes

√
L ξ g,E σB 1 + γth
PSOP = √ (40)
ξ g,B σE + ξ g,E σB 1 + γth

Moreover, the probability of SPSC in (20) reduces to

ξ g,E σB
PSPSC = (41)
ξ g,B σE + ξ g,E σB

Furthermore, the lower bound of ESC in (32) becomes

  !2   !2 +
1 1 1 1
− , − ,
 σ σ σ σ 
L B 4,1 B 2 2 E 4,1 E 2 2
CErg= √ G2,4 √ 1 1 1
− √ G2,4 √ 1 1 1
 (42)
 2ξ g,B Pπ 2ξ g,B P 0, 2 , − 2 , − 2 2ξ g,E πP 2ξ g,E P 0, 2 , − 2 , − 2 
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 11 of 19

4.3. Gamma-Gamma Distribution Channels

The Gamma-Gamma distribution is derived by letting ρ = 1 and Ω0 = 1 in the M distribution (2).
Therefore, the PDF of the Gamma-Gamma distribution is written as
αn + β n
2( α n β n ) 2 αn + β n  p 
f Hn (h) = h 2 −1 K α n − β n 2 α n β n h , h ≥ 0 (43)
Γ(αn )Γ( β n )

With this channel, the lower bound of SOP in (16) becomes

αB + β B  αB +βB " √ 2−2αE−αB−β B 2−2β E−αB−β B 2−αB−β B
#
L (1 + γth ) 4 αB β B σB 2
3,2 αB β B σB 1+γth 2 , 2 , 2
PSOP =1 − G3,3 αB − β B β B − αB (44)
Γ(α B ) Γ ( β B ) Γ ( αE ) Γ ( β E ) αE β E σE αE β E σE 2 , 2 ,− 2
αB + β B

Moreover, the probability of SPSC in (20) reduces to

 αB +βB "

2−2αE−αB−β B 2−2β E−αB−β B 2−αB−β B
#
1 αB β B σB 2
3,2 αB β B σB 2 , 2 , 2
PPSPC = 1− G3,3 αB − β B β B − αB (45)
Γ ( αB ) Γ ( β B ) Γ ( αE ) Γ ( β E ) αE β E σE αE β E σE 2 , 2 , −
αB + β B
2

Furthermore, the lower bound of ESC in (32) becomes


αB +βB " #
αB β B σB 2 6,1 (αB β B σB ) 2 α +β α +β

1 − B 4 B , 1− B 4 B

L √
CErg = G2,6 αB−β B αB−β B+2 β B−αB β B−αB+2
4πΓ(αB )Γ( β B ) P 16P 4 , 4 , 4 , 4
α +β α +β
, − B4 B , − B4 B
αE +βE " #)+
αE β E σE 2 6,1 (αE β E σE ) 2 α +β α +β

1 − E4 E , 1 − E4 E
− √ G2,6 αE−β E αE−β E+2 β E−αE β E−αE +2 (46)
4πΓ(αE )Γ( β E ) P 16P 4 , 4 , 4 , 4
α +β α +β
, − E4 E , − E4 E

4.4. Other Channels

In a similar manner, the secrecy performance for other fading channels in Table 1 can also be
obtained. Due to the space limitation, the detailed derivations are omitted here.

5. Numerical Results
In this section, a wireless communication system with Alice, Bob and Eve are considered. Under
the system model, some typical results will be presented. To evaluate the secure performance of the
system, the average strengths of Alice-Bob link and Alice-Eve link are used as the performance metrics.
The two performance indicators are given as

βB  − αB+j+4
E(γB )= AB2P Γ(αB + 2) ∑ aB,j ξ αβB β+BΩ0
2
Γ ( j + 2)


 2σ B g,B B Bj =1
− αE+k+4 (47)
βE 
E(γE )= AE2P Γ(αE+2) ∑ aE,k ξ
2

Γ ( k + 2)

 αE β E
0
2σ E g,E β E+ΩE
k =1

In this section, the exact simulation results, the simulation results of the lower bound, and the
theoretical results of the lower bound of different performance indicators will be shown. To facilitate
the accuracy analysis, the relative error is employed as a useful measure. Here, three relative errors are
defined as follows

|S − TLow |
e1 = × 100%


S




|SLow − TLow |
e2 = × 100% (48)

 SLow
 e3 = |S − T | × 100%



S
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 12 of 19

where S and T denote the exact simulation value and theoretical value, SLow and TLow denote the
simulation value and theoretical value of the lower bound.

5.1. SOP Results

Figure 3 shows the SOP versus E(γB ) with different E(γE ) when γth = 0 dB and (αB , β B ) =
(αE , β E ) = (2, 2). It can be observed that the SOP performance improves with the increase of
E(γB ). This indicates that the larger the average strength of the main channel is, the better the
system performance becomes. Moreover, the theoretical results of the lower bound of SOP match the
simulation results very well. This shows the accuracy of the lower bound of SOP. Furthermore, when
E(γE ) = 1 dB, which does not satisfy the condition E(γE )  1, and thus the performance gap between
the lower bound of SOP and the exact result of the SOP is observable. With the increase of E(γE ), the
gap becomes smaller and smaller. This indicates that when E(γE )  1, the derived lower bound of
SOP can be used to evaluate the system performance, without reliable on time-intensive simulations.

E(E) = 18 dB

0.1

E(E) = 6 dB
SOP

E(E) = 1 dB
0.01

Theoretical results, Lower bound

Simulation results, Lower bound
Simulation results, Exact
1E-3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 3. Secrecy outage probability (SOP) versus E(γB ) with different E(γE ) when γth = 0 dB and
(αB , β B ) = (αE , β E ) = (2, 2).

Figure 4 shows the SOP versus E(γB ) with different γth when E(γW ) = 18 dB and (αB , β B ) =
(αE , β E ) = (2, 2). As can be observed, the SOP decreases with the increase of E(γB ), which coincides
with the conclusion in Figure 3. Moreover, for the lower bound of SOP, the gap between theoretical
results and simulation results is very small, which verifies the accuracy of the derived lower bound.
In this simulation, the lower bound of SOP and the exact result of the SOP almost coincide for larger
E(γB ) and E(γE ), which shows the tightness of the lower bound of the SOP. Furthermore, it can be seen
that the value of the SOP increases with the increase of γth . This indicates that large SNR threshold
will degrade the system performance.
Table 2 shows the accuracy of the SOP for different E(γB ) when E(γE ) = 18 dB, (αB , β B ) =
(αE , β E ) = (2, 2) and γth = −4 dB. As can be seen, all the relative errors e1 and e2 are quite
small. This indicates that the derived lower bound of SOP in (16) is very accurate to evaluate the
system performance.
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 13 of 19

th = 20 dB

th = 8 dB

th = -4 dB
SOP
0.1

th = -25 dB

Theoretical results, Lower bound

Simulation results, Lower bound
Simulation results, Exact
0.01
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 4. SOP versus E(γB ) with different γth when E(γE ) = 18 dB and (αB , β B ) = (αE , β E ) = (2, 2).

Table 2. Relative errors of SOP.

E(γB ) 10 dB 20 dB 30 dB 40 dB 50 dB
e1 3.699% 3.205% 1.880% 1.936% 0.293%
e2 0.436% 0.041% 0.795% 0.651% 0.156%

In this subsection, the lower bounds of the SOP over different fading channels are also provided,
as shown in Figure 5. In this figure, the lower bounds of the SOP over the K, exponential, and
Gamma-Gamma fading channels are derived in (36), (40) and (44), respectively. Moreover, the lower
bounds of the SOP over the M-distributed fading channel (i.e., (16)) with special parameters are also
provided. As can be seen in Table 1, when Ω = 0 and ρ = 0, the M-distributed channel reduces to
the K channel; when Ω = 0, ρ = 0 and α → ∞, the M-distributed channel reduces to the exponential
channel; when ρ = 1 and Ω0 = 1, the M-distributed channel reduces to the Gamma-Gamma channel.
As can be observed, the results of (16) with Ω = 0 and ρ = 0 match with that of (36) very well. The
results of (16) with Ω = 0, ρ = 0 and α → ∞ and the results of (40) coincide with each other. Similarly,
the difference between (16) with ρ = 1 and Ω0 = 1 and (44) is so small and it can be ignored. These
conclusions indicate that the derived expression of SOP over the M-distributed fading channel is a
general expression, which can be accurately extended to other well-known fading channels.
1

E(E)=9 dB

0.1
E(E)=1 dB
SOP

M, =0, =0
K
0.01
¥
M, =0, =0, 
Exponential
M, =1, '=1
Gamma-Gamma

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 5. SOP versus E(γB ) for different fading channels with γth = 1 dB.
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 14 of 19

5.2. Probability of SPSC Results

Figure 6 shows the probability of SPSC versus E(γB ) with different E(γE ) when (αB , β B ) =
(αE , β E ) = (2, 2). In this figure, the value of SPSC decreases with the increase of E(γB ). However,
the value of the probability of SPSC increases with the increase of E(γE ). This shows the impacts of
the average strength of the main channel and the average strength of the main channel on system
performance. Moreover, it can be seen that the theoretical results match the simulation results very
well, and thus the derived exact expression of the probability of the SPSC is very accurate to evaluate
the system performance.

E() = 18 dB
Probability of SPSC

0.1

E() = 1 dB

0.01
E() = 6 dB

Theoretical Results
Simulation Results
1E-3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 6. Probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) versus E(γB ) with different E(γE )
when (αB , β B ) = (αE , β E ) = (2, 2).

Figure 7 shows the probability of SPSC versus E(γB ) with different (αE , β E ) when (αB , β B ) = (2, 2).
Obviously, with the increase of E(γB ), the probability of SPSC decreases. The conclusion is the same as
that in Figure 6. Once again, it can be observed that small differences appear between the theoretical
results and the simulation results. Therefore, the exact expression of the probability of SPSC can be
used to evaluate the system performance without time-intensive simulations. Moreover, it can be seen
that when E(γB ) is small, the probability of SPSC increases with the increase of (αE , β E ). However, the
trends of curves changes when E(γB ) is large, i.e., the probability of SPSC decreases with the increase
of (αE , β E ).

1
Theoretical Results
Simulation Results

()= (1,1), (2,2),

Probability of SPSC

0.1 (4,4)

()= (1,1), (2,2),

(4,4)

0.01

1E-3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 7. Probability of SPSC versus E(γB ) with different (αE , β E ) when (αB , β B ) = (2, 2).
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 15 of 19

Table 3 shows the accuracy of the SOP for different E(γB ) when (αB , β B ) = (2, 2) and (αE , β E ) =
(1, 1). It can be seen that the discrepancies between the simulation and theoretical results are small
enough in most cases. Therefore, the derived closed-form expression of the probability of SPSC is
accuracy to evaluate the system performance.

Table 3. Relative errors of the probability of SPSC.

E(γB ) 10 dB 20 dB 30 dB 40 dB 50 dB
e3 0.780% 0.125% 7.777% 6.753% 2.283%

In Figure 8, the probabilities of the SPSC over different fading channels are also provided.
Specifically, the probabilities of the SPSC over the K, exponential, and Gamma-Gamma fading channels
are obtained by (37), (41) and (45), respectively. Moreover, the probability of the SPSC over the
M-distributed fading channel (i.e., (20)) with special parameters are also provided as shown in
Table 1. Similar to Figure 5, the results over the M-distributed fading channel with special parameters
match the results of the other fading channels very well. Therefore, the derived probability of SPSC
over the M-distributed fading channel can be used as a unified expression for many well-known
fading channels.

E(E) = 9 dB
Probability of SPSC

0.1
E(E) = 1 dB

M, =0, =0
K
M, =0, =0,  ¥
0.01
Exponential
M, =1, '=1
Gamma-Gamma

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 8. Probability of SPSC versus E(γB ) for different fading channels.

5.3. ESC Results

Figure 9 shows the ESC versus E(γB ) with different E(γE ) when (αB , β B ) = (αE , β E ) = (2, 2).
In Figure 9, when E(γB ) is small, the ESC is almost zero. With the increase of E(γB ), the ESC increases
accordingly. For a fixed E(γB ), the ESC performance degrades with the increase of E(γE ). Moreover,
for the lower bound of the ESC, the performance gap between theoretical results and simulation
results is very mall, and thus the derived lower bound of ESC is accurate. Furthermore, when
E(γB ) is small, the difference between the lower bound of ESC and the exact results of ESC is large.
However, with the increase of E(γB ), the gap becomes smaller and smaller. Therefore, at high SNR
regime, the derived lower bound of ESC can be employed to evaluate the system performance without
time-intensive simulations.
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 16 of 19

10
Theoretical results, Lower bound
9 Simulation results, Lower bound
Simulation results, Exact
8

ESC (nats/transmission)
7

6
E(E) = 1 dB

5
E(E) = 10 dB
4

2 E(E) = 18 dB
1

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 9. Ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) versus E(γB ) with different E(γE ) when (αB , β B ) = (αE , β E ) =
(2, 2).

Figure 10 shows the ESC versus E(γB ) with different (αE , β E ) when (αB , β B ) = (2, 2). As seen in
Figure 9, the ESC also increases with the increase of E(γB ) in Figure 10. Moreover, the gaps among the
theoretical results of the lower bound of ESC, the simulation results of the lower bound of ESC and
the exact results of ESC are very small for large E(U ). This conclusion is the same as that in Figure 9.
Furthermore, with the increase of (αE , β E ), the ESC performance degrades.

8
Theoretical results, Lower bound
7 Simulation results, Lower bound
Simulation results, Exact
6
ESC (nats/transmission)

()= (1,1)
5

()= (2,2) ()= (4,4)

3

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 10. ESC versus E(γB ) with different (αE , βE ) when (αB , βB ) = (2, 2).

Table 4 shows the relative errors of ESC when (αB , β B ) = (2, 2) and (αE , β E ) = (4, 4). It can be
observed that the error e2 is small for all cases. However, when E(γB ) is small, the error e1 is large.
Small E(γB ) represents the main channel is much worse than the eavesdropping channel, which is
quite rare in practical scenarios. Moreover, with the increase of E(γB ), e1 decreases rapidly. Therefore,
the derived lower bound of ESC is valid in the high SNR regime.

Table 4. Relative errors of ESC.

E(γB ) 25 dB 30 dB 35 dB 40 dB 45 dB 50 dB
e1 31.911% 11.668% 3.879% 1.845% 0.713% 0.195%
e2 3.112% 0.401% 0.419% 0.258% 0.221% 0.450%
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 17 of 19

Furthermore, Figure 11 shows the lower bound of ESC versus E(γB ) for different fading channels.
The lower bounds of ESC over the K, exponential, and Gamma-Gamma fading channels are obtained
by (38), (42) and (46), respectively. Moreover, the lower bound of ESC over the M-distributed fading
channel (i.e., (25)) with special parameters are also provided as shown in Table 1. Once again, it can
be seen that the results over the M-distributed fading channel with special parameters show close
agreement with that of the other fading channels.

10
M, =0, =0
9
K
8
M, =0, =0,  ¥
Exponential
ESC (nats/transmission)

7 M, =1, '=1
Gamma-Gamma
6

5
E(E)=1 dB
4

3
E(E)=9 dB

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
E(B) dB

Figure 11. ESC versus E(γB ) for different fading channels.

6. Conclusions
By considering the M-distributed fading channels, this paper has investigated the PLS problem.
The theoretical expressions of the SOP, the probability of SPSC, and the ESC are derived, respectively.
In this paper, a limitation of the theoretical analysis is that both the exact SOP and ESC are with a
complex integral, and closed-form expressions for them are not derived. Alternatively, tight lower
bounds for SOP and ESC are derived, which are in closed-forms. Numerical results show that the SOP
and its lower bound are monotonously increasing functions with respect to γth . Moreover, when E(γB )
and E(γE ) are large, the gap between the SOP and its lower bound is very small. The exact expression
for probability of SPSC has the same form as that for the lower bound of SOP when γth = 0. With the
increase of (αE , β E ), the probability of SPSC increases for small E(γB ) and decreases for lagre E(γB ).
Moreover, for large E(γB ) and E(γE ), the difference between the exact ESC and its lower bound is
small enough. Therefore, the derived expressions are accurate and can be used to evaluate the system
performance without time-intensive simulations. Moreover, the derived results are extended to many
well-known channels, which can provide some insights for practical system design.
After deriving the expressions of the secure performance indicators over the M-distributed fading
channel, the natural next step is to consider the secure transmission schemes to further improve
the PLS.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, S.-H.L., J.-Y.W.; methodology, S.-H.L., R.-R.L., X.-T.F.; software, S.-H.L.;
validation, R.-R.L. and X.-T.F.; investigation, S.-H.L.; resources, S,-H L., R.-R.L. and X.-T.F.; writing-original draft
preparation, S.-H.L.; writing-review and editing, R.-R.L., X.-T.F., A.-L.T. and J.-Y.W.
Funding: This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (61701254), Natural Science
Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20170901), the open research fund of Key Laboratory of Intelligent Computing
& Signal Processing, Anhui University, and the Opening Project of Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrated
Administration Technologies for Information Security (AGK2019002).
Acknowledgments: The authors thank the anonymous reviewers and the Editor for their helpful comments and
review of this article.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Entropy 2019, 21, 998 18 of 19

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