CASE#20
Shenzhou Mining Group Corp. vs. Mamanwa Tribes of Brgy Taganito
and Urbiztondo, GR No. 2026685, March 16, 2022
FACTS:
The Mamanwa Tribes of Barangay Taganito and Urbiztondo, Municipality of
Claver, Surigao del Norte, filed a petition with the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) to cancel Shenzhou Mining Group Corporation's
Compliance Certificate and secure a preliminary injunction. The Mamanwa
Tribes had occupied an ancestral domain in various municipalities of Surigao
del Norte since time immemorial, which was recognized by the NCIP through
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title No. R13-CLA-0906-048.
During the signing, the tribal leaders were led to believe that Shenzhou was
the bona fide holder of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement No. 102-98-
XIII, allegedly issued on February 23, 1998. However, later revelations
showed that the true holder of the agreement was Claver Mineral
Development Corporation, not Shenzhou. The Mamanwa Tribes had not
received the royalty payments due.
Based on the misrepresentations and non-payment of royalties, the
Mamanwa Tribes filed a petition with the NCIP to cancel Shenzhou's
Compliance Certificate and secure a preliminary injunction. The NCIP En
Banc declared the Compliance Certificate void ab initio, leading to the
nullification of all agreements, licenses, and similar issuances based on the
certificate. It was determined that Commissioner Masagnay signed the
certificate under an unauthorized redelegation of authority, which was
exclusively vested in the NCIP Chairperson as per Resolution No. 007, series
of 2010.
Shenzhou appealed the NCIP resolution to the Court of Appeals, which
upheld the cancellation of the certificate and the associated orders. Shenzhou
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that
the compliance certificate was valid as it met all procedural requirements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the redelegation of authority from the NCIP
Chairperson to Commissioner Masagnay contravenes the rule that delegated
power cannot be further redelegated
RULING:
Yes. Republic Act No. 8371, especially Section 59, along with its
implementing rules and regulations, vests the power to issue certification
preconditions solely in the NCIP as a body—and specifically through its
Chairperson. The NCIP’s authority cannot be validly redelegated to another
officer; hence, any such redelegation (as from the Chairperson to
Commissioner Masagnay) contravenes the principle of nondelegation.
The authority involved in this case is vested by law in the Commission.
The Commission then delegated this authority to Chairperson Insigne. When
Insigne authorized Masagnay to sign on his behalf, Insigne did so as
someone to whom authority had already been delegated. "A power once
delegated cannot be redelegated.".
In this case, there was no showing that the Commission En Banc
allowed Insigne to redelegate the power to sign compliance certificates to
other officials from the Commission. The delegatee's exercise of the
delegated power is always subject to the review of the delegating authority.48
When the delegation is found to be void, all acts performed pursuant to that
delegation may be declared void by the delegating authority.
A fundamental tenet in administrative law that prohibits the
redelegation of power unless explicitly authorized by law. Expressed by the
Latin maxim “potestas delegata non potest delegari,” it underscores that
delegated powers must be executed by the delegate personally, without
transferring that authority to another.
The jurisprudence reaffirms the constitutional mandate to protect
ancestral domains and the rights of indigenous cultural communities. The
requirement of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) stands as a key
safeguard in any concession, license, or agreement affecting indigenous
lands, reinforcing the necessity for strict adherence to proper delegation and
procedural compliance by the NCIP.
CASE#21
Ynot v. IAC, 149 SCRA 659
FACTS:
The Executive Order No. 626-A, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
October 25, 1980, was a controversial measure that prohibited the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and carabeef, regardless of their age,
sex, physical condition, or purpose. The order imposed an absolute ban on
their transport from one province to another, and confiscated property found in
violation would be subject to immediate confiscation and forfeiture by the
government. The confiscated property would then be redistributed to
charitable institutions and deserving farmers at the discretion of designated
government officials.
In 1984, Restituto Ynot, a petitioner, transported six carabaos via a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo. The police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
confiscated the carabaos, citing the violation of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The petitioner filed a suit for their recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin against him. After a detailed examination of
the merits, the trial court upheld the confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of
the bond due to the petitioner's failure to produce the carabaos when
required. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, which affirmed the trial court's ruling. The Supreme Court challenged
the constitutionality of the executive order through a petition for review on
certiorari. The lower courts and government maintained that the executive
order was presumed constitutional as it fell within the ambit of the state's
police power aimed at preserving a vital agricultural resource.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was denied his right to be heard before punishment or
deprivation of his property, thereby contravening the minimum requirements
of notice and hearing.
RULING:
Yes. the Supreme Court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
The court held that: The measure violated the essential due process
principles by depriving the petitioner of his right to be heard prior to the
imposition of punishment. - The method of enforcement—summary
confiscation by the police—lacked the necessary judicial oversight and due
process safeguards. The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is
part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion
is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one
side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if
an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each
other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in
its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that
a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence
of power.
CASE#22
Miranda v. CSC, GR No. 213502, Feb 19, 2019
FACTS:
Jerlinda M. Miranda served as an Accountant III at the Western Visayas
Medical Center (WVMC). She faced administrative charges for inefficiency,
incompetence in performing her official duties, grave misconduct, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the service for her failure to submit WVMC's financial
reports to the Commission on Audit (COA) for the periods of March to
December 1996, as well as for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. In her
defense, Miranda attributed the delays to her being new to the position and to
changes in the accounting system
Procedural History:
1. Department of Health (DOH): The DOH through then Secretary
Francisco T. Duque IIIfound Miranda guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. She was
dismissed from service, with accessory penalties including the
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government
service.
2. Civil Service Commission (CSC): Miranda appealed to the CSC,
which include Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, CSC affirmed the
DOH's decision. Her motion for reconsideration was also denied.
3. Court of Appeals (CA): Miranda filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on procedural
grounds, stating that the proper remedy was a petition for review under
Rule 43. Additionally, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion by the
CSC and upheld the substantial evidence supporting Miranda's
culpability.
4.
ISSUE
Whether the apparent conflict of interest—namely, Chairman Duque’s dual
involvement as the former DOH officer and current CSC chairman—
constituted grave abuse of discretion in the review process.
RULING
Yes, the very person who issued the assailed DOH Decision17 in his capacity
as then Secretary of Health. Hence, it is just proper that he should have
inhibited himself from taking part on the appeal proceedings in the CSC, as
Chairman of the CSC. Having participated in the proceedings with the DOH
and having ruled for the dismissal of Miranda, it was incumbent upon Duque
to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same case during the
appeal with the CSC. While it is true that he was not able to sign the Decision
of the CSC as he was on official leave, records show that he nonetheless
signed the CSC resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision involving the same case. This clearly shows that he still took
active part in the appeal proceedings.
The Court had ruled that the officer who reviews a case on appeal
should not be the same person whose decision is under review
CASE#23
Mendoza v. Napolcom, 460 SCRA 399
FACTS:
This case arises from an affidavit-complaint filed by Teodoro V. Conti
against PO3 William M. Mendoza and PO2 Angelita Ramos, both
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), for illegal arrest, illegal
detention, physical injuries, and robbery.
On the basis of the complaint, P/Chief Superintendent Orlando H. Macaspac,
then District Director of the PNP Southern Police District Office (SPDO),
National Capital Region, administratively charged petitioner and PO2
Ramos with grave misconduct
According to the complaint, on February 21, 1993, at around 2:30 a.m., inside
the HI-PITCH Disco Club located at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, the
respondents forcibly arrested Conti, who was the Floor Manager of Nikko’s
Music Lounge. At gunpoint, they brought him to the Office of the District
Special Operations Unit (DSOU). Once inside, PO2 Ramos allegedly ordered
Conti to remove his gold necklace and forced him to swallow it. When Conti
resisted, Ramos struck him
with the butt of her gun and inserted the barrel into his mouth. Both officers
then allegedly mauled Conti, inflicting multiple facial injuries. Additionally, they
detained him in a holding cell and took his money amounting to PHP 970.00,
along with his gold necklace, wristwatch, and gold bracelet.
Petitioner and PO2 Ramos submitted a joint affidavit denying the
allegations.
Administrative Proceedings:
after summary proceedings, PNP Regional Director Oscar T. Aquino found
them guilty and ordered their dismissal from the service.
Appeal to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB):
The officers appealed to the RAB of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), National Capital Region, on the ground of denial of due
process.
On August 23, 1993, the RAB upheld the decision of the PNP Regional
Director.
Mendoza filed a motion for reconsideration, citing his inability to participate in
the clarificatory hearing. However, the RAB denied motion on December 17,
1993, for lack of merit.
Mendoza then filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 61, Makati City (Special Civil Case No. 96-074), arguing that
he was denied due process and seeking the annulment of the RAB’s decision.
The RAB, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), moved to dismiss
the petition, arguing that Mendoza failed to exhaust administrative remedies
since he should have appealed to the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) and subsequently to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) before resorting to judicial intervention.
On April 21, 1997, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that an
exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies when
the questioned acts are allegedly performed without or in excess of
jurisdiction and in utter disregard of due process.
The RAB, with the assistance of the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. granting the petition and
dismissing Special Civil Action No. 96-074 filed with the RTC.
Filed petition for review
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Mendoza’s case for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
RULING:
[Link] Court of Appeals granted the petition filed by the RAB and dismissed
Special Civil Action No. 96-074. The appellate court's decision was based on
the petitioner’s failure to adhere to the administrative remedy requirements.
The ruling underscored that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an
essential aspect of procedural due process. The omission of such a motion by
the petitioner indicated a lack of merit in his claims.
Section 47 of the Civil Service Law provides inter alia that in cases
where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the
Civil Service Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the
Department and finally to the Commission. Petitioner as failure to exhaust
all administrative remedies is fatal to his cause. It is elementary that where, as
here, a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should
first be resorted to
CASE#24
Ibrahim v. COMELEC, GR No. 192289, Jan 8, 2013
FACTS:
Kamarudin K. Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor of Datu
Unsay, Maguindanao, for the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, Rolan G.
Buagas, the Acting Election Officer, reported to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC)20 candidates were not registered voter therein. The list includes
Ibrahim, along with other candidates.
the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 09-0946 on December
22, 2009, disqualifying Ibrahim and other candidate from the electoral race for
not being a registered voter in the municipality where he sought election.
Procedural History:
On January 8, 2010, Ibrahim, along with other affected candidates, filed a
Petition/Opposition challenging the COMELEC's resolution, arguing that
some of them had participated in previous elections without issues regarding
their voter registration status.
On May 6, 2010, the COMELEC en banc denied the opposition, upholding
Ibrahim's disqualification based on certifications from election officials stating
he was not a registered voter in Datu Unsay.
Election Results and Proclamation Suspension: Despite his
disqualification, Ibrahim received the highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor
in the May 10, 2010 elections. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBOC), chaired by Buagas, suspended his proclamation, citing Section 5,
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Ibrahim filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging
the COMELEC en banc's resolutions and the suspension of his proclamation
.
ISSUE:
Whether Ibrahim, by filing a petition under Rule 64, effectively challenged the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc or should have instead utilized a pre-
proclamation controversy mechanism.
RULING:
Holding that his resort to Rule 64 was proper for reviewing final resolutions
issued by the COMELEC en banc. Emphasizing that the COMELEC en
banc’s actions in disqualifying Ibrahim and ordering the suspension of his
proclamation were null and void due to a lack of jurisdiction.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that
any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be
brought for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from
receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued
by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
CASE#25
CAB v. PAL, 63 SCRA 524
FACTS
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) operates under a legislative franchise—Public
Act No. 4271, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2360 and 2667—which
grants it authority to provide both domestic and international air services. In its
domestic operations, PAL services several routes, including:
● Flight 213: Tuguegarao to Manila
● Flight 205: Baguio to Manila
On May 12, 1970, PAL encountered an issue where twenty (20) passengers
scheduled to fly from Baguio to Manila could not be accommodated on its
regular Flight 205. To address this, PAL directed Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to
Manila) to make an unscheduled flagstop in Baguio City to pick up the
stranded passengers before continuing to Manila.
At the time of the flight diversion:
Flight 213 was carrying only five (5) passengers. No other airline was
operating the Baguio-Manila route, meaning no other carrier was affected
by PAL's action. PAL incurred additional costs exceeding the revenue
generated from the flagstop, suggesting that the decision was made purely
to meet public demand rather than for profit. No formal complaints were
filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), except possibly by its
chairman.
Despite these considerations, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) ruled that
PAL violated Republic Act No. 776 by conducting the unscheduled stop
without prior authorization. The CAB imposed a fine of ₱5,000 on PAL.
PAL filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the flagstop was done
in good faith to address public necessity. The CAB reduced the fine to
₱2,500 but maintained that PAL should have obtained prior permission before
making operational changes.
ISSUE
Whether or not Republic Act No. 776 empower the Civil Aeronautics Board to
impose administrative fines for violations of its regulations, specifically for
unauthorized flagstops.
RULING
Yes, The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative,
whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act,
or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the
provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provisions, or
rules and regulations so issued (Section 10(D) Republic Act 776). (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal any administrative decision or order" of the Civil Aeronautics
Administrator on matters pertaining to "imposition of civil penalty or fine in
connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and
regulations issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own
initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil
Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose,
remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties,
as the case may be." (Sec. 10(F) (G) Republic Act 776). (Emphasis for
emphasis). The power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and make
compromise in respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil
Aeronautics Administrator (Sec. 32(17) Republic Act 776).
There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution
109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil penalty contemplated and mentioned
in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a fine in the nature of
criminal penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code, because the
"fine" in this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's
violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous authority on "May 12,
1970 and on previous occasions", said C.A.B. explaining clearly in its
resolution No. 132(70) that the "imposition of the fine is not so much on
exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air
carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or
requirements of the government regulating agency ... " In other words, it is an
administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose
without criminal prosecution. Similar power has been granted to the
Commissioners of Immigration and Customs for violation of the Immigration
law and Tariff and Customs Code, respectively. (Sec. 44 of Commonwealth
Act 613, Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by R.A. 118, 135, 144, 503,
749, 827 and 1901; Sec. 2307 of R.A. 1937, Tariff and Customs Code) The
same power has been given to the Public Service Commission in its exercise
of an effective administrative regulatory supervision and control over public
service enterprises. (Section 21, Chapter IV, Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended) .
CASE#26
People v. Regencia, GR No. 260001,
FACTS:
This appeal assails the following issuances of the Sandiganbayan in Case No.
SB-17-CRM-0923 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Celso G. Regencia":
1)Decision 1 dated February 11, 2022, finding appellant Celso G. Regencia
(appellant) guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and
2)Resolution 2 dated April 7, 2022, denying appellant's Motion for
Reconsideratio Jul 3, 2023
Celso G. Regencia, the Mayor of Iligan City, was accused of illegally
exercising the powers and functions of a mayor despite being incarcerated.
Regencia had been suspended from office for six months beginning March 2,
2015, by order of the Office of the President. During his suspension, he was
charged with Murder and voluntarily surrendered to the court on October 12,
2015. He was then detained at Iligan City Jail.
Despite being in detention, Regencia continued issuing executive orders,
memoranda, and directives, signing checks and vouchers, and appointing
personnel, claiming that his suspension had ended on October 17, 2015. He
attempted to resume office as mayor on October 19, 2015.
Prosecution’s Case:
● Ruderic Marzo (Vice Mayor & Acting Mayor): Testified that Regencia
continued performing mayoral duties despite being incarcerated. Marzo
sought guidance from the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), which confirmed that Marzo should remain as
Acting Mayor since Regencia was legally incapacitated.
● DILG Undersecretary Austere Abong Panadero: Issued a letter on
October 21, 2015, affirming that Regencia was disqualified from
performing his duties due to his detention. This letter was furnished to
Regencia through his lawyer.
● Despite the DILG ruling, Regencia continued to act as mayor,
prompting Marzo to file a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman on November 19, 2015.
Defense’s Argument:
● Regencia obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) on December 7, 2015, preventing Marzo
from acting as mayor.
● The TRO was later dissolved just before the end of Regencia’s mayoral
term on June 30, 2016.
● Despite being in detention, Regencia ran for re-election in 2016 and
won.
Legal Issue:
● Whether Regencia unlawfully exercised the powers of the Mayor of
Iligan City while being legally incapacitated due to his incarceration.
.
ISSUE
Whether or not that the case was barred by res judicata.
RULING
Yes. There is Res Judicata by conclusiveness of judgment if all the following
elements are present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having Jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second
action, identity of parties, but not identity of causes of action.
Here, the first three elements were already established. As for the
fourth element, although in the criminal case, the plaintiff is the People of the
Philippines, while in the administrative case, the complainant is Marzo, in both
cases, public interest is involved, and the real complainant is the collectivity of
the People of the Philippines. In any event, absolute identity of parties is not
required but only substantial identity, and there is substantial identity of
parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case
and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first
case.
CASE#27
Montemayor v. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264
FACTS:
Factual Background: In 1995, Luis Bundalian filed an unverified letter-
complaint addressed to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, accusing Edillo C. Montemayor of accumulating unexplained
wealth in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.. The complaint
alleged that in 1993, Montemayor and his wife purchased a house and lot
located at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, for
US$195,000.00, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. Bundalian
claimed that Montemayor's in-laws, who resided in California and had poor
credit standings, could not have afforded such an expensive property on
behalf of Montemayor and his wife. Private respondent accused petitioner of
amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
The letter was then endorsed to the Philippine Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PCAGC) for investigation. Petitioner counsel filed his counter
affidavit alleging that the real owner of the property was his sister in law and
Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the
subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He attached to his
counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report of the
Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
The investigation revealed that Montemayor's annual income in 1993 was
P168,648.00, which was insufficient to justify the acquisition of a property
worth US$195,000.00 (approximately P3.9 million at the 1993 exchange rate).
The PCAGC concluded that the property was unlawfully acquired, as its value
was manifestly disproportionate to Montemayor's lawful income
Administrative Actions: Based on the PCAGC's findings, the Office of the
President issued Administrative Order No. 12 on August 24, 1998, ordering
Montemayor's dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government
benefits. Montemayor's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him
to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which also dismissed his appeal
ISSUE
Whether the prior dismissal of similar charges by the Ombudsman rendered
the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.
RULING
No the court ruled that they cannot sustain petitioner's stance that the
dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the
administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To
be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in
the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his
possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For
the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was
investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control
of the President over him. As the PCAGC's investigation of petitioner was
administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the
case at bar.
CASE#28
Facura v. CA, GR No. 166495, Feb 16, 2011
FACTS:
The LWUA is a government-owned and controlled corporation established
under Presidential Decree No. 198. Rodolfo S. De Jesus served as the
Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services, and Edelwina DG.
Parungao was the Manager of the Human Resources Management
Department (HRMD).
On March 28, 2001, De Jesus was dismissed from his position by the LWUA
Board through Resolution No. 061, with his motion for reconsideration
subsequently denied by Resolution No. 069.
He appealed to the CSC but while pending, a newly reconstituted LWUA
Board reinstated De Jesus via Resolution No. 172. De jesus withdraw his
petition
Under the CSC Accreditation Program, particularly under CSC Resolution No.
967701 .LWUA has been granted the authority to take final action on
appointment papers effective January 1, 1997.
LWUA Administrator Lorenzo Jamora granted authority De Jesus to issue
appointment, subsequently, he signed appointment papers for nine
confidential staff members, backdating their effectivity to dates prior to his
reinstatement. These retroactive appointments were later questioned for their
legality and compliance with Civil Service Commission (CSC) regulations.
CSC issued Resolution No. 011811, which remanded the case to LWUA for
the conduct of an investigation regarding De Jesus’ dismissal, to be finished
within three (3) calendar months, failure of which would result in the dismissal
of the case against De Jesus.
Complaint and Ombudsman Ruling:
Roque C. Facura and Eduardo F. Tuason filed a complaint against De Jesus
and Parungao, alleging violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019), dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct,
and falsification of official documents related to the issuance of the retroactive
appointment papers. The Office of the Ombudsman found both De Jesus and
Parungao guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, leading to their
dismissal from government service.
Court of Appeals Proceedings:
De Jesus and Parungao appealed the Ombudsman's decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, reinstating De Jesus and Parungao
pending the resolution of their appeals. Eventually, the CA affirmed the
dismissal of De Jesus but ordered the reinstatement of Parungao.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment and/or res judicata—particularly in light of prior Supreme Court
decisions and CSC resolutions.
RULING
Yes, Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars
the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the
proceeding for probable cause are grounded on the same set of facts, involve
the same issue of falsification of official documents, and require the same
quantum of evidence substantial evidence, as was similarly found in
Borlongan, and correctly relied upon by De Jesus.
