MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS: CREATING CAPABILITY
OVERMATCH
Lt Gen (Dr) N B Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
Abstract
Multi-domain operations (MDO) encompass the synchronized
employment of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities to achieve
strategic and operational objectives. It involves a holistic approach to
warfare, integrating different domains to create a unified and synergistic
effect. MDO emphasizes the interconnectedness of these domains,
recognizing that adversaries can operate across multiple environments.
This concept necessitates joint and combined forces, advanced technology,
and innovative strategies to counter complex threats and achieve decisive
outcomes. The Indian military has to strategize and aim at generating
military effectiveness by embracing the inter connectedness of different
domains. Leveraging these capabilities synergistically it can gain a decisive
advantage in any conflict in the Himalayas.
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LT GEN (DR) N B SINGH
Introduction
The war in Ukraine has entered the third year and both sides continue to come out all guns
blazing after periods of consolidation operations that enable regenerating and
repositioning of military capabilities. The war has become an industrial scale war,
demonstrating the power of technology to generate capability overmatch and create
decision dilemmas for the adversary. One crucial lesson is the emergence of connectivity
as an indispensable military resource. Forces without connectivity could be constrained to
suffer enormous costs in blood, hardware and morale. Mass, a fundamental principle of
war need not be achieved through concentration of forces but also through delegation and
decentralisation. The idea of combined arms is going down to lower formations and units
where soldiers will need to possess more initiative, technical knowledge and skills. A small
team with satellite link can see and strike targets that were once the preserve of higher
echelons. Due to increased battlefield transparency, troops will have to be constantly on
the move, disperse to survive and hence demands for physical and mental toughness will
be extreme. Militaries without the resilience to absorb massive losses of men and material
may not remain viable on the battlefield. Ukraine war is teaching all militaries to strategize
and train differently.1
The Indian military is confronted with an adversary that is aiming and arming to achieve
technological parity with the mightiest military. It is modernising it forces at a fast tempo,
attempting to transform into a world class force. It is refining its command and control
structures to conduct dynamic, fast tempo joint, multi domain operations. Its military
industrial base is home grown, resilient capable of introducing new technologies in the
stride and maintaining industrial surges that could wear out the enemy. These
technologies are enabling sharing of information, intelligence, battlefield, logistics,
weather predictions on robust, survivable communication links to enhance situational
awareness that could facilitate decision making and buoy up military effectiveness. The
emergence of a Strategic Support Force responsible for electronic warfare, space and cyber
space demonstrates the growing focus of the adversary on conducting multi domain
operations (MDO).2
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MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS: CREATING CAPABILITY OVERMATCH
Regional Developments
The security landscape in the subcontinent is historically prone to political and military
stand off by our adversaries and could result in blunting military effectiveness in multiple
domains particularly cyber, information and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). MDO are
conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces to neutralise an adversary’s
warfighting capabilities by creating several dilemmas at operational and tactical levels
through application of capabilities and resources across domains (land, air, maritime,
space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum) to achieve military effectiveness and
create an operational overmatch. Key components of MDO are :-
• Integration. MDO emphases seamless integration of capabilities across different
domains, breaking down of organizational silos and fostering collaboration amongst
branches and units.
• Convergence. MDO seeks to achieve convergence where actions in one domain
complement and reinforce actions in other e.g. air strikes may be coordinated with EW
and cyber attacks to degrade enemy’s defences before a ground attack.
• Information Assurance. Information superiority is crucial in MDO. Effective
collection, analysis and dissemination of information enable commanders to make
informed and timely decisions giving the forces a decisive edge.
• Agility and Adaptability. MDO requires flexibility and adaptability to respond
rapidly to changing circumstances. Commanders must be able to shift resources and
adjust tactics dynamically to exploit emerging opportunities or counter adversary
actions.
China is aiming to achieve near technological and military parity with the US and has the
economic and industrial base to make this vision a reality. It has repeatedly demonstrated
the intent to dominate, challenge its neighbours and fracture existing cordial relations
between them. It continues to make investments in India’s immediate and strategic
neighbourhood in order to deny access, breed ambiguity and bring smaller nations under
its influence. It is already made rapid strides towards building a modern, world class
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military that can project power universally. In its pursuit of informatization considered to
be an important lever of modernisation, it has developed unique capabilities in the fields
of microelectronics, AI, quantum computing, EW, EMP, space and counter space
technologies. It has streamlined processes of acquiring, transmitting, analysing and
employing information to conduct joint military operations in multiple domains and
developed capabilities to provide field commander near real-time shared situational
awareness that would enable quick and unified efforts to exploit fleeting opportunities. It
expects future wars to be fought outside its geographical borders encompassing maritime
domains too.3 For the Indian military it will prudent to use these developments as a pacing
threat to develop own capabilities. Vulnerable fault lines have to be identified and
addressed else these will be the first principal targets. The war in Ukraine has amply
demonstrated this.
The PLA has moved ahead with the creation of theatre commands in place of regional
commands and established joint operations command centre manned by persons from all
services. It is working towards expanding the operational environment in a number of
ways; time, domains, geography and constituents. The battlefields stands expanded with
the inclusion of cyber, space, information and electronic warfare (EW) becoming key
components of their operations. The battlefield has expanded geographically too with
increased ISR and deep strike capabilities. Its capabilities to collect information on military
and other strategic targets, detect changes in force postures, assess predictability in
conduct of military operations, special operations, signal intelligence, survivable
communication networks and sensor shooter links are rising through a well crafted
modernisation plan backed with liberal funding.4
Its well developed indigenous defence industrial base (DIB) rolls out increasingly
sophisticated platforms that give it an escalation advantage in not only geographical terms
but also duration of conflict, constraining its adversaries to react and divert resources to
address the capability overmatch. Take the case of the light tank. The Indian Army was the
first to move light tanks into J&K region in 1948 ( Zoji La) and 1962 (Chushul), yet over the
years it never could foresee the advantages of deploying a bespoke light tank for its forces
till the positioning of the Chinese light tank Type 15 at Line of Actual Control (LAC). It can
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MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS: CREATING CAPABILITY OVERMATCH
conduct unconventional warfare to generate instability through proxies, activists,
terrorists and subverts. Its capabilities in the information, cyber and space domains are
being repeatedly honed through pilot runs and periodic launches to assess effectiveness.
These actions create ambiguity and inhibit retaliation due to denial about origin.
Information Assurance
What the Adversary can do
The all round capability development of PLA has given operational approaches to it to
fracture and severely impede the warfighting abilities of any force that still operates on
predictable and templated operational concepts; specially those based on attrition
oriented, slow tempo trench warfare. The emphasis on winning high tech wars has led to
creation of core military capabilities in the following areas:--
• Power projection – using a combination of long range air power, aircraft carriers, bases
and economic connectivity through BRI initiative.
• NBC Forces – Possesses full spectrum expertise, combat units and equipment for such
operations. Nuclear forces are being optimised to enhance peace time readiness levels
and responsiveness.
• Space and Counterspace – Continues to develop capabilities to effectively use space
based systems for civil and military use and deny an adversary the use of space based
assets during crisis and conflicts.
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• Cyberspace – Has invested in developing cyber reconnaissance, cyber attack and cyber
defence capabilities for controlling the information domain comprising not only
networks but also electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), intelligence and psychological
domains.
• Deception – Designated as a form of combat support it aims to create asymmetric
advantages, achieve technological surprise and paralyse the adversary through
deception.
• Logistics – Originally organised on the Russian push model of logistic support, it is
being transformed into a precision logistic support system that is agile, digitised, based
on high speed transportation with skilled human resource to support high tempo
operations.
• Defence Industrial Base – This perhaps is the most significant capability of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that gives it the wherewithal to aspire for
technological parity with US and in the bargain technological dominance in the region.
Its network of science cities, industrial parks and high tech zones can provide the
industrial and maintenance surge needed for prolonged combat operations to wear out
an adversary. The growing cooperation between China and Russia could help plug
gaps in industrial capabilities of its DIB. This provides strategic assurance, consolidates
national resilience and the ability to pursue its national security strategy both at
regional and global level.
• Underground Assets – A versatile military underground assets programme has been
pursued to create hardened facilities to protect command and control centres and
missile assets. Such a technologically advanced tunnelling and construction
programme can be used at LAC to throw up new capability surprises for the Indian
military like the reported employment of Eletro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons to
disable men and machine during the LAC stand off.
The extent and spread of this planned modernization have given PLA a Western style
command and control capability in which theatre command can develop varied force
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packages to meet mission needs. The Strategic Support Force is equipped for operations in
the EW, space and cyber domains. In summary, close integration of information warfare,
unconventional actions and conventional warfare capabilities gives PLA a very strong
competitive advantage and if employed with balance it provides the ability to calibrate the
tempo of conflict and exploit weaknesses of adversary as these unfold. Its cross domain
synergy can give it layered options across domains enabling it to observe and strike
vulnerabilities both during close and deep manoeuvres.5
Own Response: Incubating Military Effectiveness
Military effectiveness refers to the competitive advantage that a military possesses over its
adversary i.e. the operational and technical overreach, the agility and depth with which a
military can paralyse its adversary in all warfighting domains. It entails the performance
of similar military activities better than the adversary. Highly skilled human resource,
technological superiority, ability to innovate on the fly, new warfighting concepts are key
to military effectiveness, as these enable launching of technological surprise. Militarily
effective forces possess the resilience to overcome new threats posed by a determined
enemy.
To be able to in demonstrate military effectiveness to stymie the intentions of an adversary
the military needs to look at force postures much beyond mirroring. It has to create
capabilities across most domains; critical being survivable communications and sensor
shooter links in a contested EM environment. It has to develop battle procedures that very
effectively utilise the terrain to its advantage. It has to be agile enough to integrate
capabilities in all domains and be prepared for deep operations that go beyond the LAC.
Deep operations will be needed to ensure effective battle field interdiction of extended
lines of communications and inhibit logistic sustainment. Some Key Response Areas
(KRAs) could be:-
Integrated Capability Development
The fundamental requirement for the Army is to develop combat capabilities in multiple
domains to stymie the adversary’s intentions and manoeuvres, neutralising its capability
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LT GEN (DR) N B SINGH
overmatch and creating multiple dilemmas. The IBGs need to be versatile enough to
integrate, synchronise and converge all elements of combat power including space, cyber,
EMS, information to carry out Blip Krieg alongside physical manoeuvres. In the face of any
capability surprise sprung by the adversary, real-time situational awareness using a
constellation of low earth orbit satellites (LEOS) could provide communication
connectivity and intelligence to forward troops in the form of a live feed. FPV drone/
precision rounds available at IBGs could be then dispatched to neutralise the threat. Data
driven combat can add precision and speed of the kind frontline troops have not been used
to. Electronic Warfare (EW) could scale up survivability.
FPV Drone: Despatching an Explosively Formed Projectile
A special focus on countermeasures that denude capabilities of drones and precision
weapons like EW is needed. Sensors, precision weapons and the connecting networks all
can be rendered ineffective by EW as the War in Ukraine has shown.6 Excalibur rounds,
drones and missiles have been largely neutralised by Russian EW. However the flop side
is that jamming can impact own communications and also interfere with other electronic
devices. So the attempt is to enhance encryption and introduce malicious software in the
drone communication links, use other guidance means like terrain matchingetc. In
summary the side that achieves EMS supremacy and can prosecute Blip Krieg along side
Blitzkrieg will retain the competitive advantage. EW and Cyber warfare have now become
indispensable.
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Integrated Capability Deployment
Operational Innovation
Ukraine war has demonstrated how even infantry men in positional defences have become
vulnerable to drone warfare. What happens to trench warfare that has been so effective
employed by the Army in the mountains in the past. Even a small body of men can be
effectively found by a drone if the stay at a place for too long. It can then attack the target
or bring in precision fires. Agility and dispersion could help but would create gaps in the
defences. Hence positional defence will have to be multi layered employing technology. A
technological counter using platoon weapons needs to be improvised at the defended
locality level. Jamming as an anti drone measure at times may not be feasible. Global
Positioning System (GPS) can be supplemented by signals from LEOS, or ground based
communication, terrain matching or magnetic field navigation to overcome jamming.7 A
possible kinetic solution using an AGS enabled device can be an answer. A radar can be
integrated to the grenade launcher to create a 150-200 metre saturation area around the
trenches to destroy anti personnel drones. Similar improvisations need to be developed at
platform level for artillery batteries and tank squadrons to effectively counter adversary’s
capability overmatch at tactical level.
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AGS based Anti Drone System
Combat Force Regeneration
An issue that normally gets overlooked by the Army in prolonged forward deployments
is equipment capability degradation when platforms are warehoused and operated in the
open. It is one thing to move heavy weapon platforms in close proximity of the LAC and
another to keep them going once they arrive. The US Army maintained an operation
readiness rate (ORR) of 95% in Iraq and operational availabilities below 90% had
commanders being questioned. Such high rates were feasible mainly because of its large
indigenous DIB and a very agile logistics delivery system.8 In Ukraine both sides are
struggling to sustain equipment readiness rates of above 50% as the density of ISR and
firepower delivered by FPV drone has created a sticky battlefield with very high attrition. 9
The development of the domestic defence manufacturing industry and local supply chains
of vintage platforms has to be taken up on a war footing to avoid a scramble for spare parts
and ammunition in times of need. In the extremely difficult terrains of Himalayas,
equipment stress is much more intense than the OEMs expectations and could silently
erode readiness of units. New norms for wartime sustainment of platforms have to be
evolved. A forward sustainment base (FSB) for in service engineering needs to be created
in Ladakh. Two and a half decades ago this outcome had surfaced during combat
exploitation of Bofors, but the localised nature of the conflict did not impact the crisis
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MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS: CREATING CAPABILITY OVERMATCH
adversely. Hence no lessons learnt. Continuous combat force regeneration through
seamless integration between Army’s FSB, Navy, IAF, DPSU, OEMs and MSMEs has to be
aimed at, to support MDO at the LAC since losses of equipment both due to terrain and
battle damage could be overwhelming.
Distributed Logistics
One important lesson in Ukraine has been that logistics is too important a subject to be left
to generalists. The push or pull model needs to be replaced by distributed logistics. In
Ukraine, the Russian Army depended on logistic sustainment from rear areas and
mainland to move food, fuel, ammunition and spares by rail, road and air. It then had to
be transported in soft skinned fuel carriers and logistic vehicles. Troops that moved South
from Belarus towards Kiev in Feb 2022, had the supplies cut off and were destroyed
piecemeal with artillery and other fires.10 The use of HIMARS rockets later on by Ukraine
to target fuel and ammunition replenishment areas threw a spanner in the wheels of the
Russia’s warfighting machine,starving it of fuel and ammunition. This enabled Ukraine to
launch successful counter offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv.11 Ukraine’s supply lines
have proved to be more resilient, reliable and agile may be due to the fact that it fighting
the war on its own territory(7) ;something that the Indian military has to take note and work
upon. Ukraine has managed to support its diverse arsenal of tanks, guns, rockets and
missiles by pioneering new forms of operational sustainment. 3D printing of spare parts,
condition based monitoring of key systems, use of algos to decide what to push and when
are some innovative procedures.12 Stocks need to be positioned well forward by creation
of FSBs. Deep engineering support and agile logistics is sine qua non for the kind of long
duration combat, an intelligent, technologically advanced adversary can resort to. The
repeated attempts to optimise ‘tooth to tail ratios’ by downsizing the tail can have serious
consequences --- loss of face of a vaunted force. Logistic has had a stellar role in military
history—the Army needs to re- learn this.
Addressing Pre-emption
The Indian military has a history of repeated pre-emption by the adversary both at LAC
and LC. Today the bandwidth to deliver surprise over an expanded battlespace has
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increased covering cyber, EMS, space, information, NBC besides classical domains. It has
become increasingly feasible for adversaries to develop counters to known capabilities.
Dependence on foreign systems has created new vulnerabilities, as specifications get
shared if similar systems are acquired by others e.g. Sukhoi, S400, T90/T80 tanks. Counters
get developed in quick time as they no longer have to wait for systems to be deployed and
learn how to counter capabilities. This fast-tracked cycle of measure/countermeasure/
counter-countermeasure will continue to add surprise to future conflicts. Ukraine’s war at
sea has succeeded due to technological surprises.13 In the new era of aspiring power
competition, PLA could employ many layers of stand off in multiple domains to deliver
surprise. Non- kinetic effects like disruption of communications, denial of tracking &
navigation capabilities, fakes, information overload could precede kinetic operations.
Achieving technological parity in game changing technologies would be an enabling step
towards a comprehensive MDO capability.14 This calls for employment of the military’s
intellectual firepower to think beyond the algorithm and evolve doctrine, organizations,
training, leadership, systems, human resource and processes for sustained military
effectiveness. Exercises must follow thereafter, replicating the future battlefield --
expansive, lethal and hyperactive with increased strategic ambiguity and entropy. The
capability of early warning and launching own surprises across the Himalayas must be
silently incubated and honed
Total War
Future engagements in the sub continent could be remain at the diplomatic, information,
economic, industrial level and escalation to armed conflict may not be the end state.
Besides developing unconventional warfare capabilities and synergising, land, air and
maritime operations with space, cyber, EMS there is a need to look at two critical area of
national resilience; firstly, industrial surge and secondly concept of total war. Besides
modernization of hardware and munitions, the industrial base has to gear up to
manufacturing combat enabling systems and technologies at a pace that outpace daily
losses of platforms or helps regenerate battle damaged platforms. Acquisition process has
to become more accommodative towards indigenous solutions even if these are not fully
mature using the Buy and Try model so that feed back from the military can help improve
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MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS: CREATING CAPABILITY OVERMATCH
performance of indigenous systems. The role of local population in and around the
country’s borders will be very crucial in future conflicts. Cross society networks and
resistance of the kind witnessed in Ukraine can add to national resilience. Smart phones
and the available uploads, volunteer hackers, civilian drone manufacturers, commercial
imagery providers and AI analysts, can all end up civilianising the digital battle field and
add to national effort and military effectiveness.
Conclusion
Future wars in the Indian context could have a very unique dimension. Besides being multi
domain, it could have an uncanny resemblance with the war in East Europe. Apart from
the fact that most platforms on either side of the LAC are from the Russian stable and hence
equipped with similar technologies, the sheer losses of men and material could be very
high. This is because of the formidable industrial might of the northern adversary and its
ability to deploy large number of formations, hardware and ammunition in the areas of
interest. In a stalemate situation, its ability to quickly generate overmatch through its
integral industrial base and limited reliance on foreign supplies could be a differentiator.
Long duration conflicts with periods of consolidation operations like the one being seen in
Ukraine will give advantage to Red and has to be avoided at all costs. In addition, the
possibility of Pakistan acting in concert with PLA cannot be ruled out. It could raise the
tempo of its unconventional warfare extending it to other parts of the country specially the
NE, create ambiguities using automated “bots” to influence domestic and foreign
audiences and delay decision and reaction. In short, from our western neighbour one can
expect all actions including terrorism, subversion, criminal activities, reconnaissance,
information warfare and direct strikes at lines of communication and industrial
infrastructure using techint and hardware supplied by China and some others; all in
support of a joint strategic objective. With both sides having access to technology, the side
with capability to fight in a technologically contested environment is likely to have an
advantage. The Indian military has to strategize and aim at generating military
effectiveness by embracing the inter connectedness of different domains. Leveraging these
capabilities synergistically it can gain a decisive advantage in any conflict in the Himalayas
as the terrain is in support. A calibrated force posture with focus on capability
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LT GEN (DR) N B SINGH
consolidation and generation may be better to prevent onset of human and equipment
fatigue. Combat resilience, industrial resilience and resilience of the human resource could
form the core strands of this strategy.
****
Lt Gen (Dr) N B Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) is a former DGEME, DGIS and Member Armed
Forces Tribunal. He writes on technology related operational subjects, space and green energy
initiatives.
NOTES
1 The Intelligence: “Ukraine’s War two years on”. Podcast by The Economist 23/02/24
2 Defence Intelligence Agency, US Department of Defence , “China Military Power” 2019.
[Link]/military-Power -Publications
3 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, “The US Army in Multi- Domain Operations 2028”.Dec 2018
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 The Intelligence : “Russia pushes back on Kharkiv”. Podcast by The Economists 13/03/24.
7 The Economist, “The Future of War” July 8 2023.
8 “Army Equipment After Iraq”; Lawrence J. Korb, Loren B Thomson, Caroline P Wadhams,2006 Center
for American Progress [Link]
9 The Intelligence : “Russia pushes back on Kharkiv”. Podcast by The Economists 13/03/24.
10 The Economist, “The Future of War” July 8 2023.
11 The Intelligence : “Russia pushes back on Kharkiv”. Podcast by The Economists 13/03/24.
12 The Economist, “The Future of War” July 8 2023.
13 The Intelligence: “Stalemate in Ukraine”. Podcast by The Economist 02/11/23.
14 Vivekanand International Foundation, “Indian Armed Forces in 2047”, Pentagon Press LLP, New Delhi,
2023.
SYNERGY – Volume 3 Issue 2 • August 2024 93
TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN MULTI DOMAIN OPERATIONS
(MDO) FOR JOINT WARFIGHTING
Lt Col Gaurav Kumar Singh
“It seems probable that once the machine thinking method had started, it would not take
long to outstrip our feeble powers… They would be able to converse with each other to
sharpen their wits. At some stage, therefore, we should have to expect the machines to take
control.” —Alan Turing
Abstract
MDO converges effects across the domains of land, air, maritime, space
and cyber to achieve advantage for friendly forces. These domains must
incorporate niche technologies for disruptive impact on the battlefield.
This article focuses on the impact of niche technologies in MDO and its
overall impact on Joint Warfighting. The paper also lays out suggested
road map for implementation of niche technology in MDO.
Introduction
The MDO concept of United States (US) is aimed to exploit its technological edge with its
adversaries and compensate the developments in Russian and Chinese military
capabilities. It unequivocally targets the integrated systems and the anti-access strategies
of Russia and China. Similarly, Chinese recognise technology as a determining factor to
structure their military science and strategy. China insists on the non-kinetic aspect of
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